MARKET CONCENTRATION, STRATEGIC SUPPLIERS, AND PRICE DISPERSION

A Dissertation

by

CHAD R. WADE

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 2006

Major Subject: Economics

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Approved by:

Chair of Committee,	John B. Van Huyck
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ABSTRACT

Market Concentration, Strategic Suppliers,
and Price Dispersion. (December 2006)
Chad R. Wade, B.A., University of Utah
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John Van Huyck

A central result in price theory is the law of one price: prices of a homogeneous good sold at different locations should be equal. Empirical studies of the law of one price find that it is often violated.

In my dissertation I explore the allocation problem that suppliers face when supplying multiple markets. I use the experimental method to examine the effect of an increase in the number of suppliers in a market, ceteris paribus, has on the allocation decisions of market participants. I also use the experimental method to investigate suppliers that are strategic and show that market concentration and transportation costs restrict the supplier's ability to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium.

A strategic supplier takes account his own effect on prices. Strategic supplies face a difficult strategy coordination problem. If they cannot solve it, then an inefficient outcome may result. Coordination failure may result in price dispersion across the markets. Resulting price signals do not inform suppliers who should respond and by how much. Price signals are not sufficient for suppliers to solve the strategy coordination problem. In the experiments, I observe that increasing the quantity of suppliers, that is the Herfindahl index of concentration, in the market will decrease the frequency of the equilibrium strategy to be played, holding other things constant. Increasing the number of firms in a market, ceteris paribus, increases price dispersion and coordination on an efficient market allocation is de-

creased.

The experiments reveal that the ability of suppliers to coordinate is directly correlated with the optimization premium: the expected payoff difference between best responding to an opponents strategy and the payoff to an inferior response. The incentive is greater to best respond when the optimization premium is larger. Coordination at the equilibrium allocation is quicker.

To Angie Wade

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE LAW OF ONE PRICE

A. Introduction

The law of one price states that in competitive market without trade barriers and net of transportation costs, the price of homogeneous goods sold at different locations will be the same. There are three critical assumptions that allow us to make such a strong statement about prices. First, we are describing a market that is competitive. The second assumption is no trade barriers. This allows for the free movement of goods and market participants to facilitate trade. The third assumption is that the good must be homogeneous, that is similar enough so that consumers do not prefer one over the other.

Throughout economic textbooks, the law of one price is standard economic theory. In Lipsey, Courant and Ragan [33] they describe "the law of one price states that when a product that can be cheaply transported is traded throughout the entire world, it will tend to have a single worldwide price - the world price." Also, O'Sullivan and Sheffrin [41] state the law of one price as "the theory that goods easily tradable across countries, should sell at the same price, expressed in a common currency."

Marshall [35] states, "... the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency for the same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time in all parts of the market: but of course if the market is large, allowance must be made for the expense of delivering the goods to different purchasers; each of whom must

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This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Economic Theory.

be supposed to pay in addition to the market price a special charge on account of delivery." Marshall clearly explains that prices tend toward equilibrium in their market.

Cournot [10] describes a market as "the entire territory of which the parts are so united by the relations of unrestricted commerce that prices take the same level throughout with ease and rapidity." Stiglitz [51] wrote of the "law of the single price" when he states that "under this law, there is a uniform price in the market and price differences are quickly eliminated by arbitrage."

Jevons [27] defines a market by stating: "By a Market I shall mean much what commercial men use it to express. Originally a market was a public place in a town where provisions and other objects were exposed for sale; but the word has been generalised, so as to mean any body of persons who are in intimate business relations and carry on extensive transactions in any commodity. A great city may contain as many markets as there are important branches of trade, and these markets may or may not be localised. The central point of a market is the public exchange, mart or auction rooms, where the traders agree to meet and transact business. In London, the Stock Market, the Corn Market, the Coal Market, the Sugar Market, and many others, are distinctly localised; in Manchester, the Cotton Market, the Cotton Waste Market, and others. But this distinction of locality is not necessary. The traders may be spread over a whole town, or region of country, and yet make a market, if they are, by means of fairs, meetings, published price lists, the post office, or otherwise, in close communication with each other. Thus, the common expression Money Market denotes no locality: it is applied to the aggregate of those bankers, capitalists, and other traders who lend or borrow money, and who constantly exchange information concerning the course of business."

McChesney, Shughart and Haddock [37] identify some of the problems in

defining the law of one price and the problem with defining a market or market boundaries. They explain that due to the difficulty in definitions, the modern law becomes "incoherent." They explain the tautology in defining the law in a way that also defines a market. If a market is one that is defined as a realm that where prices "tend toward uniformity", then a market and the law of one price are tautological.

Some of the confusion of the law of one price comes from the definition of a market. A market for something is a mechanism for carrying out voluntary exchange between people who want to buy it and people who want to sell it subject to the rules of the particular market mechanism. The location that trade takes place is the marketplace. This can be in the town square, Wall Street, or cyberspace.

The simplest conception of a market is if all buyers and all sellers meet at the same point or location and all trade occurs. This concept of a market allows the law to be satisfied without trade impediments and transportation costs. When we think of the impact of space on the law, it becomes more difficult for competition to be transmitted across locations. Theoretically, time is irrelevant in the transmission of competition that is perfect because time is assumed to be instantaneous. Other complexities also occur such as trade barriers and transportation costs. Trade barriers further complicate the application of the law of one price.

1. Why should the law of one price hold?

The logic behind the law of one price is simple. If a consumer is able to purchase a good at a lower price from a different seller, he will do so. If consumers are always trying to purchase the good from the low price seller, then only the low price seller will sell the good. All other sellers will have to match that price to stay in the market. This leaves the good being sold at the lowest price and all others at that same price which is uniformity or the law of one price.

When the good is found in a different location, they too are influenced by the price the good is selling at this location. The consumer just needs to pay to get the good to him. This is why the transportation costs are important. If the price is less expensive by transportation costs and the price of the good, then he will buy it from that location. The price in any location is being influenced by the price in all other locations.

Another argument for the law of one price is arbitrage of a durable good. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary arbitrage is defined as "the nearly simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in different markets in order to profit from price discrepancies." When market participants seek to take advantage of price discrepancies in multiple locations, the price is both markets is driven to uniformity.

2. Interpretations of the law of one price

The law of one price is a static equilibrium result. But it can be interpreted as an attractor of a disequilibrium dynamic. The law of one price states that in a competitive market without trade barriers and net of transportation costs, homogeneous goods sold at different locations will be equal. Krugman and Obstfeld [31] state the definitions of the law is "identical goods...must sell for the same price", as though the law is a concept of static equilibrium.

Because it has been well established that empirically the law of one price has many violations, the law is sometimes referred to as an attractor. Stigler [50] states: "A market, according to the masters, is the area within which the price of a commodity tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation costs." It appears that many economists see the idea of the law of one price as an attractor. When Stigler writes that prices "tend to uniformity", he is evidently speaking of

an attractor, where price is being moved toward an equilibrium. And Marshall [35] when speaking of the "tendency" for the law to hold in a perfect market, he too is speaking of the law as an attractor.

B. When should the law of one price hold?

1. Arbitrage argument

Arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a state of disequilibrium between two or more locations. A buyer purchases a good in one location and simultaneously sells the good in another location for a higher price than the good was purchased. Profit taking disequilibrium will drive prices in multiple locations to converge, less any transportation or transaction costs that may be involved. Arbitrage in a frictionless economy will instantaneously converge prices. Arbitrage is an argument for the law of one price to hold throughout all markets.

2. Competitive equilibrium

Price taking arguments depend on the assumption that market participants believe that they have no influence on price. In theory this is represented as the number of suppliers approaches infinity we say that no individual supplier has any effect on price due to the infinitely small allocation by any one individual supplier. The same holds for consumers of a good. In practice, we call a market competitive with "many" market participants. Throughout I refer to price takers as market participants that believe "as if" they have no influence on market price even though the number of market participants may not apply to the law of large numbers. In experimental economics, experiments have demonstrated time and again that it takes very few participants to obtain price taking behavior.

When firms compete solely on price, a competitive equilbrium can be acheived with as few as two suppliers. Bertrand pricing results when rival firms compete solely on price. When suppliers compete on price, price reduces to marginal cost which is the competitive outcome.

The Economist [14] contemplated how the internet would change pricing behavior by market participants. They state "The explosive growth of the internet promises a new age of perfectly competitive markets. With perfect information about prices and products at their fingertips, consumers can quickly and easily find the best deals. In this brave new world retailers' profit margins will be competed away, as they are all forced to price at cost." As many economists have pointed out, this has not occurred.

3. Market institutions

Most retail transactions occur predominantly in posted offer markets. A seller posts a price and each buyer chooses a seller. Buyer search is the main competitive force in such markets. If the prices posted are different at different locations, the informed buyer will usually purchase at the lower price. Because search is costly, it may be that posted prices for the same good may never be uniform leaving us with price dispersion in a posted offer market.

Walras [54] described a general equilibrium model in which market participants come together in a central location to trade all goods. An auctioneer determines prices for goods by announcing a price vector for all goods and suppliers and consumers submit quantities to purchase and sell and the announced price. If there is excess demand or supply, the auctioneer adjusts the price vector accordingly and reannounces. Once there is no excess supply or demand, the announced price stands and trade takes place. The method by which the auctioneer arrives at

a equilibrium price is referred to as the tatonnement price dynamic. In the tatonnement price dynamic, trade occurs only after equilibrium occurs which satisfies the law of demand and supply as well as the law of one price.

Under decentralized competition, there is no auctioneer coordinating the allocation decisions of market participants. Instead, there are locations that clear through a Marshallian or local auctioneer. The local auctioneer announces prices for goods in a local market until the local market clears, regardless of market activity in foreign locations. In the decentralized market structure, suppliers allocate goods among the local markets without knowing the realized prices (or allocation strategies of the other firms) in the economy. The mechanism by which suppliers determine the delivery of their goods to a specific location is determined by knowledge of the local markets, a prior history of the local demand structure and the participation of other firms in that local market. Strategic suppliers have an incentive allocate to the markets where the expected price is greatest allowing for their own allocations to influence the market price. The markets themselves dictate the quantities that should be delivered by the inherent willingness to pay for such goods by the consumers.

There are many different auction market settings. They include double oral, english, dutch, sealed bid and others. In each case the law of one price states that the price should be equal for the good being sold if it is homogeneous, less any transportation costs. The auction setting allows the buyer with the highest willingness to pay to purchase the good. When looking at the law of one price in this context, we must be cognizant of the fact that the distribution of buyers is changing after each sale. Once a buyer, who had the highest willingness to pay at that instant has exited the market, those left presumably have a lower willingness to pay. It may also be that the different buyers have different discount rates and

are more patient.

Osborne and Rubinstein [42] in their book on bargaining and market institutions present various sequential bargaining models that arrive at the law of one price. They show that even with agents bargaining over the surplus when there is asymmetry in the number of buyers and sellers and they are randomly pairwise matched, that over the time horizon, the law of one price results.

4. Search models and information

Consumers are supposed to maximize their consumer surplus. If we assume that there is a violation in the law of one price and consumers face a distribution of prices, then all consumers will search over the distribution to find the lowest price and suppliers will all supply at the lowest price. If we also assume that it is costly to search, then consumers will search for the lowest price until the expected gain from searching is less than the cost to do so. Because search is costly, the price from all suppliers will not converge to uniformity when suppliers know that it is costly to search and there is rents to be obtained from consumers with a higher price.

Stigler's [49] article in the Journal of Political Economy was a step forward in the understanding of price dispersion. Stigler posited that information was in effect a large culprit in the dispersion of prices for a homogeneous good. He suggests that not all dispersion is due to ignorance but is also in part due to non-homogeneity of commodities. An example cited in the paper is that of an automobile at a new car dealership that is essentially homogeneous with a car at another dealership. He found dispersion even in a local market that was significant. The automobile may have been identical, but perhaps the service at the dealership was distinct or the variety of stock or other unobserved heterogeneities. Stigler posits that there should be a skewed distribution of prices due to the minimum being

constrained by the costs, but there being no constraint on the maximum.

Another reason price dispersion exists is due to the costs of information. If an individual wants to purchase a good, the probability of finding the lowest price on the first inquiry depends on the distribution of the prices for that commodity. There is diminishing returns to gathering price information. Once the costs outweigh the expected benefits from search an individual should stop searching. It is this costly searching that allows price dispersion to exist. If information was costless, the searcher would continue until the lowest price was found. All other firms would exit the market or conform to the lowest price.

Another cost associated with price dispersion is the cost to the firms to ascertain the dispersion of prices for a given commodity. All firms may be searching and pricing accordingly and that requires that the search occur not only once but at all points in time. This also becomes more difficult with rival suppliers entering and exiting the market. A firm must know which rival firms are supplying the good and consumers must also know this information to reduce dispersion in the market. The greater the heterogeneity in the commodity the costlier the search for both the consumer and the supplier. These costs quickly outweigh the benefit of searching for both the consumer and the firm.

Advertising by firms helps to mitigate some of the costs for both the consumer and the rival suppliers. It allows the cost of search to decrease. However, the firm has an incentive to monopolize the private information regarding the product. Advertising is not only meant to inform but to assist in price discrimination. The firm wants the commodity to be distinguished from rival firms' commodities and by advertising can convey differences in rivals commodities.

5. International trade models

Many theorems in economics rest on the assumption that the law of one price holds. Mishken [39] states "The theory of PPP is simply an application of the law of one price to national price levels rather than to individual prices." In the international trade literature, purchasing power parity (PPP) is a direct result of the law of one price. Purchasing power parity states that the ratio of the two countries price levels, P_i, P_j, equals the exchange rate, $e = P_i/P_j$. The law of one price is for an individual good, so the exchange rate follows where the exchange rate, e, is the ratio of a good k in country i and j, such that $e = P_i^k/P_j^k$. If the law of one price holds then the purchasing power parity also holds.

Krugman and Obstfeld [31] state the law in even stronger terms "The law of one price states that in competitive markets free of transportation costs and official barriers to trade (such as tariffs), identical goods sold in different countries must sell for the same price when their prices are expressed in terms of the same currency." A trade barrier is a general term that describes any government policy or regulation that restricts international trade. The following is a list of typical barriers to trade: import duties, import licenses, export licenses, quotas, tariffs, subsidies and other disincentives meant to discourage international trade. The net effect of a trade barrier is to raise the price of the good.

Market participants, when there are barriers to trade, face higher retail prices and reduced quantities sold. It also makes it easier for markets to be segmented for the purpose of price discrimination. Segmenting markets involves reducing a market into subgroups, it is derived from the recognition that the total market is often made up of submarkets. When markets are segmented it is difficult for the law of one price to be sustained due to price discrimination and complexity and

cost of market transactions.

6. Transportation costs

The purest form of the law of one price assumes that there is frictionless trade without transportation costs and trade barriers. With a good being sold in multiple locations across the world, it is necessary to include transportation costs in the theory. Assuming the good is can be purchased from any location, the consumer will purchase the good from the lowest price seller that includes transportation costs to the consumer's door.

7. Bounded rationality

It is difficult and costly for the human mind to weigh all contingencies. It is also costly to analyze all contingencies or possibilities. This is why market participants adopt strategies that are consistent with their beliefs are far as they are able to analyze them. Kreps [30] explains "A boundedly rational individual attempts to maximize but finds it costly to do so and, unable to anticipate all contingencies, and aware of this inability, provides ex ante for the (almost inevitable) time ex post when an ununforeseen contingency will arise." So a boundedly rational[1] agent has limited computational abilities and in many cases imperfectly defined objectives, as they make complex decisions that are not fully comprehended.

Bounded Rationality may help explain some of the observed price dispersion, The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a model of bounded rational behavior. In a QRE, market participants form beliefs about what other will do and calculate the expected payoffs of different choices. This means that they may not choose

[1]For a more complete description of models of bounded rationality, see Ariel Rubinstein's *Modeling Bounded Rationality* [47]

the the action with the highest expected payoff. Choices are made according to a statistical rule in which better choices are chosen more often. The QRE is a model that fits the data in experiments and allows for the possibility that market decision makers are boundedly rational. The law of one price may be an attractor and the QRE is a nice choice theory model that may help explain deviations from the one price law.

Baye and Morgan [4] develop a model that helps explain why price dispersion is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook Bertrand competition. They show how bounded rationality among sellers helps to rationalize such dispersion. Using a variety of statistical tests, they show how bounded rationality based theories of price dispersion organize the data suggesting violations in the one price law.

8. Market concentration

Most models of price dispersion predict that as the number of market participants increases, market power by sellers and buyers decreases and firms are less able to price discriminate.

Baye and Morgan [3] presents a model in which consumers can be divided into two distinct segmented populations. The first type of consumer is called a shopper. This type of consumer is most sensitive to price. This means that they will purchase the good at the lowest price outlet. The other type of consumer is called a loyal. This refers to the preference that this consumer has for established relationships and ease of transaction. A simple example is when a consumer is looking for a book online. The loyal may already have an established relationship with Amazon (an online book retailer). The loyal is less likely to search the internet for a lower price due to the ease and simplicity of transaction with Amazon. The

shopper on the other hand is more concerned with price and will scour the internet looking for the lowest price. The shopper sees all firms as perfectly substitutable. Firms then price at the lowest price stochastically. By doing so allows the firms to avoid a Bertrand pricing trap that reduces price to marginal cost and removes all profits to the firms.

The model predicts that as the number of firms increases, the expected price paid by the informed (shopper) decreases and the expected price paid by the captive (loyal) consumer increases.

Many of Baye and Morgan's articles use this same model of shoppers and loyals to describe price dispersion in the internet market. Their analysis suggests an increasing number of activities that brands a homogeneous good thereby creating a loyal customer and reducing the need to become the low price retailer. By doing so, price dispersion decreases, raises prices and transfers rents from consumers and e-retailers to advertising market participants.

9. Disequilibrium and the optimization premium

The optimization premium, which is the difference between the earnings from a giving a best response and the earnings from some other action, is key in models that assume that participants are not perfectly rational. By incorporating models suggesting that the smaller or flatter the optimization premium, it may be that suppliers are unable to eliminate price dispersion as the incentive to do so decreases. Models of disequilibrium may go a long way in explaining empirical price dispersion. When we think of a firm making a decision between any two actions, as the increased payoff between any action and a best response shrinks small enough that it is difficult for a firm to calculate the payoffs to a given action accurately, it may not do so. Battalio, Samuelson and Van Huyck [2] provide statistically and

economically significant evidence that the optimization premium helps explain observed human behavior.

10. Cross-hauling

A seminal paper presented by Brander [6] develops a model of strategic trade. When suppliers account for their influence of prices they engage in cross-hauling. Cross-hauling being defined as the costly and bidirectional transporting of an identical product between two locations. Many economists in the reciprocal dumping literature attribute this phenomenon to varied tastes and preferences where the good is not perfectly substitutable. Brander showed that even with an identical or homogeneous good, suppliers have an incentive to cross-haul their good. The setting in which Brander describes this model is multiple firms in multiple locations with constant marginal cost. Firms believe that if they export some portion of their good to the foreign market, the price will be higher for the remaining stock in the home market, thus generating higher profits.

Brander's models employs simple game throetic techniques to model international duopolists, assuming both firms are identical and having one firm in each country. Each firm produces according to an identical cost function and identical transport costs to the foreign market. By assuming constant marginal costs, Brander is able to separate domestic and foreign markets. The transport costs are of the iceberg type such that some percentage less than one arrives to the consumer and is given by where is the shrinkage.

Firms then maximize the traditional profit function for both markets simultaneously as in the Cournot model. Once the firms are allowed to choose production and allocate to maximize profits, the firms allocate to both markets paying the transport costs associated with this allocation.

C. Evidence of price dispersion

Empirical tests of the one price law usually reject it.

1. International trade

International trade is clearly one of the places in the literature that attempts to reconcile the law with empirical evidence.

a. Trade barriers

Kravis and Lipsey [29], discuss the law of one price and purchasing power parity with tradable and nontradable goods. They find that nontradable goods are more likely to have less price dispersion than their tradable counterparts. The result is believed to be due in part to nominal sticky prices of nontradable goods. They also find that across countries, national price levels increase systematically with the level of a country's per capita income. As the per capita income increases, the ratio of tradable to nontradable prices decreases. This is in large part due to the stability of nontradable goods prices and price fluctuations that arise with tradable goods due to exchange rate fluctuations and external pressures.

Isard [25] presents evidence that exchange rate changes change the relative dollar-equivalent prices of a narrowly defined set of goods. By defining the goods in this narrow manner, Isard is able to match more closely the relative prices in other countries. The mechanism that Isard describes as the enforcement of the law of one price is commodity arbitrage. However, even with commodity arbitrage, there may be in place restrictions to free markets, such as discriminating monopolies, tariffs, subsidies and other trade restrictions. These external forces create barriers to arbitrage and decrease the possibility of satisfying the one price law. The

other hurdle that Isard attempts to overcome is the homogeneity of goods. The smallest perceived differences may change preference is one country or another.

Isard uses data from the United States, Germany and Japan. The monthly wholesale export prices in a time series from 1968-1975. The evidence is strong throughout that the relative prices of these commodities does not fluctuate around a mean, but are serially correlated or influenced heavily by the exchange rate. At least in the German and the Japanese cases, the significance of the exchange rate levels suggest that the shocks have persistent and long lasting effects to relative prices of closely matched goods.

The segmentation in markets across countries is believed to be one of the main reasons that the law of one price does not hold in an international setting. Typically international economists define a single country as a single market. By defining each country as its own market, economists have found large price dispersion from one country to another. This is believed to be due to market segmentation, such that firms are able to use trade barriers, asymmetric information and transportation costs to increase profits in certain markets.

b. Exchange rates

Engel and Rogers [18] look at the impact of the euro on European price dispersion and integration relative to multiple currencies. One impact of the euro has been increased economic integration. By removing currency conversions and costs associated with conversion, market participants may more freely perform market transactions without the risk that is inherent with multiple currencies such as exchange rate fluctuations. A single currency encourages travel, encourages businesses to engage in trade beyond their borders, and encourages arbitrage because it reduces the complexity of calculating prices. All of these simplifications should

reduce deviations in the law of one price.

The euro is the official currency of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), known as the Eurozone, and single currency for over 300 million Europeans. Non-European members participating in the official use of the euro include: Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City. It is the de facto currency of Andorra, Kosovo and Montenegro. The euro was introduced to world financial markets as an accounting currency in 1999 and launched as physical coins and banknotes in 2002[2].

Engel and Rogers use data which covers the period from 1990-2003 and is from a survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which includes data on 101 narrowly defined traded goods from 18 European cities in 11 Eurozone countries. They also use data on 38 non-traded goods. The comparison group is 7 cities in Europe which are not part of the Eurozone.

There results are very interesting. First they state that unconditionally there is a decline in price disperion over much of the 1990's but there is little evidence of further decline since 1999. The evidence applies to cities within the Eurozone and to other European cities outside of the Eurozone. It is suggested that many European countries took significant steps in the 1990's to reduce trade frictions and create a climate for trade to be simplified. This may have led to the reduction in price dispersion over that period. It is a curiosity that with the introduction of the euro in 1999, that price dispersion did not further decrease. It may be that the sample is taken too soon after the transformation, or that currency conversion is not costly enough to show real reductions in price dispersion.

[2]See also Goldberg and Knetter [21], for a discussion on exchange rates.

Asplund and Friberg [1] found an interesting violation in the law of one price due entirely to currency fluctuations where price is listed in two currencies on the same good at the same location at the same time. The data used is taken from three Scandinavian duty-free outlets, where each good is priced in Swedish kroner (SEK) and Finnish markka (FIM) at the same time in the same location. The data is taken from the Birka Line ferry operation between Sweden and Finland. The pricing of the good in two currencies simultaneously allows consumers to purchase the good in the currency of choice, and presumably the lower price currency, however, this did not always occur. The nominal price was usually adjusted just once a year. There is menu and other costs associated with price adjustment.

By pricing in two currencies simultaneously, an opportunity for arbitrage occurs because nominal prices do not instantaneously adjust as currency fluctuations occur. There was no mention of individuals trying to arbitrage while on the boat. A very nice natural experiment is presented where the law of one price does not hold even when there are no search or transportation costs. However, there does exist some cost to arbitrage. Even these small costs may prohibit consumers from being able to arbitrage the good. This allows the duty-free shops to list the price of the good in two different currencies simultaneously and not have to change the nominal price with currency fluctuations.

Rogoff, Froot and Kim [46] examine price dispersion over the past 700 years. Along the lines of Stigler, it is natural to assume that price dispersion would exist many centeries ago due to the lack of information about foreign prices. The surprising result is that with the advent of a quick transmission of foreign prices, volatility and price dispersion has not declined. The data that Rogoff et al. [46] piece together dates back to 1273. The commodity prices examined are barley, butter, cheese, oats, peas, silver and wheat.

Deviations in the law have remained quite stable over the past 700 years in commodity prices. It is remarkable including the decline in transportation costs, wars, pestilence, disease and information changes that have occurred over the same period. They describe much of the violations to a non-integrated market. As this may be some of the reason for the deviations, we will show that even in a framework of a completely integrated market, suppliers are not always able to allocate such that the law of one price is achieved.

c. Borders

Borders or political boundaries may segment markets by making trade costly and complex. By segmenting markets, arbitrage becomes more difficult and firms are more able to price discriminate. Political entities introduce trade restrictions in the form of quotas, tariffs, different currencies, etc. Many articles have demonstrated the increase in price dispersion across countries or borders. Some of the dispersion is explained by the border effect and some is not.

Engel and Rogers [20] find large border effects on prices when they looked at border states in the United States and Canada. Distance explained some of the variability of prices of similar goods, but does not explain much of the segmentation that borders create. They looked at the border effect on the prices of goods within the United States and across the border that were similar distances and similar transport costs. After accounting for these differences, there remained a large portion of price variation that is not explained by the transport costs or the distance.

Lutz [34] uses micro level data from the European car market to examine why there are violations in the law of one price. With cars, the incentive to shop and find the lowest price is greater because the potential savings are greater. It would

be natural to expect that prices would converge. However, this is not the case. This is due in part to cross-border effects as well as information and transaction costs. Lutz finds that borders make it more difficult for market participants to arbitrage across borders and this makes it easier to have market segmentation. Contrary to Engel and Rogers [18], he finds that a single currency lowers price differences significantly.

McCallum [36] and Helliwell [24] looked at trade volumes and they both found large border effects relative to the volume of trade within a country but with similar distances and transportation costs. Goldberg and Verboven [22] looked at market integration in Europe as the Europeans were attempting to integrate their markets. The data set was composed from the European car market from 1970-2000. They find that convergence to the law of one price has indeed taken place during the period of their data set and that the persistence of shocks has been reduced by a third from 5-6 years across countries to just 1.5 - 1.6 years. It is interesting to note that Engel and Rogers [20] find the same result, but after the integration of the currency in 1999, they do not see further integration.

As Engel and Rogers [19] point out, there appears to exist market segmentation within country as well as across country. If transportation costs are the culprit, then the same market segmentation that is seen internationally should apply within a country. However, many recent papers have looked at the price dispersion within the United States and across the border in Canada to determine how much market segmentation exists.

2. Transportation costs

We would expect price to fall within the cost of transport, especially within close proximity. The following articles find that that may not be the case in practice.

Elzinga and Hogarty [17] found that the price of coal in different parts of the state of Kentucky sold for prices that differed much more than the cost of transport. The example from a report in 1975 stated that the fob (free on board) price of bituminous coal was $27.03 per ton in eastern Kentucky and only $13.75 per ton in western Kentucky. The shipping cost via rail averaged $5.00 per ton. The price difference should be no greater than the shipping cost or $18.75.

Engel and Rogers [19] investigate violations in the one price law. They use disaggregated data of consumer prices to describe differences in prices across the United States of similar goods. They posit that price dispersion is due in part to market segmentation and also nominal sticky prices. They also look price variation as it relates to the tradeability of a good, tradeable or nontradeable, and find that price dispersion is greater for traded goods. They are not able to look directly at the law of one price because they are constrained by the data. They instead look what they call the "proportional law of one price" (PLOP) which uses price indexes instead of direct prices of individual goods. Their main findings indicate that when goods are sold in distant cities, the economic forces that would work to equalize prices is weaker. This is most likely due to transportation costs. The second result which states that non-traded goods have smaller price dispersion is due to greater nominal price stickiness for non-traded goods.

3. Information costs

Brynjolfsson and Smith [7] find there still exists frictions throughout internet markets for books and CD's and that price dispersion still exists on the range of 30%. Ellison and Ellison [16] find that a fairly homogeneous good such as computer memory has a price dispersion of only 4%. This may be due to the type of consumer that purchases computer memory or the type of purchase such as impul-

siveness of buying a book relative to memory.

Baye, Morgan, and Scholten [5] use an internet website where suppliers of a good advertise their product on a leading price comparison website, in this case Shopper.com. They compile a data set containing 4 million price observations in the consumer electronics market. The data are daily price quotes from merchants selling the the top 1000 products covered by Shopper.com. The data was collected from August 2, 2000 through March 31, 2001. They find systematic differences in the level of price dispersion depending on the number of firms. When there was only 2 firms listed, the range of prices averages 22%. When there was 17 firms listed, the range in prices averaged 35%. They also find little evidence of any convergence to the law of one price.

Sorensen [48] presents an empirical study in which he looks at pricing of pharmaceuticals in separate geographical locations but within the same market. They find that pharmacy heterogeneity accounts for at most one third the observed price disperion. It is not surprising that the empirical results they find of observed dispersion in price is dependent on consumers incentives to price shop. The consumer is more sensitive to price and is more willing to seek lower costs when the pharmaceuticals is purchased regularly and frequently. Suppliers would prefer to be able to price discriminate. This is consistent with the typical search model where cost of search is weighed against potential reduction in price.

Sorensen looked at prescription drug prices at competing pharmacies in the same locality. Due to a law in New York requiring pharmacies to post prices for the top 152 top-selling prescriptions. The data used comes from the towns of Middletown and Newburgh, New York in March 1998. Both towns were fairly isolated from nearby towns and consisted of 10 and 11 pharmacies respectively, also, the posted price was required by law to be respected at the request of the consumer.

He finds that frequently purchased pharmaceuticals have a reduced absolute price dispersion relative to pharmaceuticals that are single or irregularly purchased. He also suggests that some of the price dispersion is due to the pharmacy heterogeneity.

Dahlby and West [11] look at price dispersion involving the price of auto insurance policies to test the prediction of a dispersion model due to Carlson and McAfee [8]. They come to the same conclusion that Sorensen found, which is that costly search prohibits or at least hinders the collapse of price to marginal cost.

Meyer, Van Huyck, Battalio and Saving [38] ran an experiment that used a recontracting mechanism. The recontracting mechanism is a sequential quantity allocation mechanism. Each supplier was asked in sequence to make an allocation decision. After each allocation the choice was posted and other suppliers could then see the decisions of their rival suppliers. This was continued in sequence until all suppliers were always satisfied with their allocation decisions. In each period of this treatment the law of one price was perfectly satisfied.

4. Reputation

Reputation is one method that helps firms price discriminate. Pan, Shankar and Ratchford [43] find that online retailers are able to charge more for a homogeneous good if they have a bricks and mortar storefront. They conclude that online shoppers are willing to pay a premium for certain intangibles surrounding the sale of the good. They also find that if an online only store enters the market early, this helps create a reputation that allows them to charge higher prices. They see that the prices charged by the online only firms are less and they are competing on price, whereas bricks and mortar and online stores have a stronger reputational effect and may offer better service.

Graddy [23] gathered data from the Fulton fish market in New York City. There are about 35 dealers, but not all dealers carry all types of fish. There are no posted prices and each dealer is free to charge a different price to every customer. There is no bargaining over prices except on very large orders. Most of the customers are repeat customers. Graddy finds that there is significant price dispersion in the market for whiting fish. Price dispersion intraday also existed and was significant. The average price per pound was $0.821 and the standard deviation was 0.304. She also found that prices were less for Asians than for white people. Asians made up 62% of the total quantity sold and the buyers were almost exclusively men. Almost all of the owners and sales people are white. Other studies have found the same result in other fish markets, in particular Kirman and Vignes [28] find evidence of persistent price dispersion at the Marseilles fish market.

5. Disequilibrium

Meyer, Van Huyck, Battalio and Saving [38] present an innovative way of looking at deviations from the law of one price and "considered the question of how the equal prices or rates of return across markets that are the result of competitive equilibrium produce the resource allocation consistent with these same prices and rates of return." They suggest that suppliers confront an information/incentive problem and use experiments to test the importance of history's role on future allocation decisions. They find that naive subjects are not able to coordinate on useful precedents and "while naive subjects learn to respond to systematic violations in the law of one price, this behavior produces non-stationary, rather than equilibrium, time series for market aggregates." Experienced subjects did use historical precedents to coordinate on pure-strategy outcomes.

D. Dissertation motivation

It is interesting that so many investigators find violations of the law of one price. An explanation that is not often considered is that when the number of suppliers is large any individual supplier has a small optimization premium. Meyer et al. [38] note that when suppliers behave "as if" they have no effect on price and the law of one price is satisfied, then there is no pecuniary incentive to conform to the strategic equilibrium. When it is violated, strategic uncertainty makes observed price differences an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity because the violation does not indicate who should respond or by how much. The optimization premium is the incentive a supplier has to best respond.

Price dispersion is not fully explained by trade barriers, exchange rates, borders, transportation costs or information costs. My thesis is that observed price dispersion or violations in the law of one price are the result of a difficult strategy coordination problem and that sufficiently small suppliers will not have a large enough optimization premium or incentive to eliminate price dispersion.

When there are very few suppliers in a market, the incentives or optimization premium is greater than when there are many suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases, the incentive to best respond becomes very small. The number of suppliers also increases the complexity of the best response decision and it becomes costly and complex to make such calculations. When the decisions to optimize accurately has a small penalty, the market participant may not do so with price dispersion being the end result.

Information costs are greater and incentives to do the right thing are smaller as the number of suppliers increase in a market. As the optimization premium increases suppliers will behave more strategically. Brander [6] showed that strate-

gic suppliers will engage in cross-hauling. As the number of firms supplying the market increases, the optimization premium falls and the amount of inefficient cross-hauling falls. Transportation costs may answer the question of which supplier should respond to a violation of the law of one price. Transportation costs help coordinate the market allocation but introduce inefficient cross-hauling.

Chapter II examines the influence of the number of suppliers on the ability of suppliers to eliminate price dispersion. The analysis presented in chapter II is without transportation costs. The reason that transportation costs are eliminated is to allow a clean interpretation of the optimization premium on the behavior of the subjects to optimally allocate. Without transportation costs, any aggregate allocation that solves the law of one price is efficient. However, a strategic supplier has an incentive to deviate if the aggregate allocation is not at the unique equilibrium allocation.

Without transportation costs, any allocation that satisfies the law of one price is efficient including the unique strategic equilibrium. However, with the inclusion of transportion costs, there is only one allocation that is Pareto optimal which differs from the strategic equilibrium. In chapter III we implement a two-by-two design. There were 4 treatments: 2 without transportation costs and 2 with heterogeneous transportation costs. Transportation costs signal to the suppliers where they should allocate. We test whether subjects behave as price takers, whether increasing the number of suppliers decreases price dispersion and whether increasing the number of suppliers decreases less efficient cross-hauling.

CHAPTER II

MARKET CONCENTRATION, STRATEGIC SUPPLIERS, AND PRICE DISPERSION

A. Introduction

A central result in price theory is the law of one price: prices of a homogeneous good sold at different locations should be equal. Empirical studies of the law of one price find that it is often violated. Isard [25] describes the law as being "...flagrantly and systematically violated by empirical data." He finds that violations in the law can be attributed to product differentiation and trade restrictions, such as discriminating monopolies, tariffs, and subsidies. These external forces create barriers to arbitrage and decrease the possibility of satisfying the one price law. Parsley and Wei [44] and Engel and Rogers [19] looked at price fluctuations within the United States, and found that violations could not be not be accounted for by trade barriers, distance, preferences, tariffs or subsidies. Rogoff, Froot and Kim [46] describe volatility, magnitude and persistence of deviations from the one price law have not declined much in the period from 1273 to the present despite lower transportation costs, reduced trade restrictions and fewer wars and plagues today.

Baye and Morgan [4] looked at price dispersion on the internet where there were no trade barriers, products were homogeneous and the cost of information was relatively small. They attribute price dispersion in the internet market to strategic rather than price taking behavior. They also tested this claim in the laboratory and found similar results.

Meyer, Van Huyck, Battalio and Saving [38] describe the incentive-information

problem that arises when allocation decisions are determined exclusively by price signals. If the law of one price is satisfied, then there is no pecuniary incentive to conform to the equilibrium. When it is violated, strategic uncertainty makes observed price differences an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity because the violation does not indicate who should respond or by how much.

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate the possibility that the observed price dispersion or violations in the law of one price of a homogeneous good is the result of this difficult strategy coordination[1] problem. Using the experimental method allows us to control for the possibility that sufficiently small suppliers will not have a large enough optimization premium or incentive to eliminate price dispersion. (See Van Huyck [52])

In the real world it is difficult if not impossible to determine the true optimization premium of a firm. When it becomes too costly to analyze all contingencies or possibilities, market participants adopt strategies that are consistent with their beliefs are far as they are able to analyze them. Using the experimental method allows us to control for the possibility that when a supplier faces an allocation decision, there may not be enough incentive for them to correctly determine the optimal allocation strategies. Under these circumstances that suppliers may not be able to eliminate price dispersion across markets.

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[1]See Van Huyck, Gillette, and Battalio [53] for a discussion on coordinating games.

B. Analytical framework

To focus the analysis, consider an economy of m islands, see Phelps [45]. On each island there is a Marshallian [35] fish market.[2] Hence, each island has a local market for fish. In the morning of each day, fisherman i makes the half day sail to the fishing grounds, where his fleet of m boats catch x_i units of fish. The fisherman must decide how to divide up the catch, s_{ij}, amongst his m boats, which spend the afternoon delivering the catch to the m islands. Just before dinner, consumers on each island come down to the dock to purchase the catch of the day, which sells for price P_j on island j. Any fish not eaten at dinner that market day spoils. That evening fisherman i's fleet returns to his home island with his profits for the day, π_i .

In this economy, there are n suppliers indexed $i \in I = 1, 2, \ldots, n$. Each supplier is endowed with x_i units of a homogeneous good. The total catch is $x = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i$. There are m locations, indexed $j \in J = 1, 2, \ldots, m$. Let I denote the set of suppliers and J denote the set of locations. Supplier i delivers $s_{ij}x_i$ units of the homogeneous good to location j.

A supplier must decide what share of the catch to deliver to each location, which can be represented by the $1 \times m$ vector $s_i = (s_{i1}, s_{i2}, \ldots, s_{im})$. Supplier i's decision must satisfy the feasibility constraint that $\sum_{j=1}^{m} s_{ij} = 1$ and $s_{ij} \geq 0$. Denote supplier i's set of feasible deliveries S_i and $s_i \in S_i$. Supplier i delivers $q_{ij} = s_{ij}x_i$ units to location j.

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[2] Marshall writes, "...when a thing already made has to be sold, the price which people will be willing to pay for it will be governed by their desire to have it, together with the amount they can afford to spend on it.... This, for instance, is the case with a fish market, in which the value of fish for the day is governed almost exclusively by the stock on the slabs in relation to demand...[p.290]."

An allocation is an $n \times m$ matrix of supplier choices denoted $s = (s_1, \ldots, s_n)^T$. The set of feasible allocations is denoted S. An allocation s determines the total quantity of the good supplied to each location j, denoted Q_j^s, and defined $Q_j^s = \sum_{i=1}^n q_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^n s_{ij} x_i$. All units of the good delivered to location j are sold for price P_j.

The profit from a delivery of q_{ij} units is the prevailing price P_j times the quantity delivered, $P_j q_{ij}$. Supplier i chooses the vector s_i to maximize the realized profit function given what the supplier believes is the expected price $E[P_j]$, which is the sum of realized profits from deliveries to each location:

$$\pi_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} P_j q_{ij} = \sum_{j=1}^{m} x_i P_j s_{ij}. \tag{2.1}$$

A *price taking* supplier knows P_j and behaves as if the expected price will be the prevailing price $E[P_j] = P_j$, such that P_j is exogenous rather than endogenous variable.[3] Given a $1 \times m$ vector of prices $P_i = (P_{i1}, \ldots, P_{im})$, a price taking supplier i maximizes total profits when $s_i^\star$ satisfies:

$$\sum_{j \in \bar{J}^i} s_{ij}^\star = 1, \tag{2.2}$$

where $\bar{J}^i = \{j \in J : P_i^\star = max(P_{i1}, \ldots, P_{im})\}$. $\bar{J}^i$ is the set of locations with the highest price.

A price taking supplier would not voluntarily choose positive deliveries to location k if $P_{ik} < P_i^\star$, which implies that $s_{ik}^\star = 0$ for $k \notin \bar{J}^i$. However, a price taking supplier is indifferent about the quantity delivered to locations contained in the set of highest price locations, $\bar{J}^i$.

[3]Results in experimental economics have demonstrated time and again that it takes very few participants to obtain price taking behavior. A common rule of thumb is four participants gives price taking behavior.

At each location there is demand for the good, which is represented by a demand function that determines quantity demanded Q_j^d at location j given the prevailing price, P_j:

$$Q_j^d = D(P_j, W_j), for j \in J; \tag{2.3}$$

where W_j is a parameter representing the influence of the number, wealth, and preferences of consumers at location j on market demand. Assume that the quantity demanded is decreasing in P_j and increasing in W_j.

Local market clearing requires that the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded at location j, that is, $Q_j^s = Q_j^d = Q_j$, where Q_j is the quantity exchanged in location j. Prices will adjust to clear the m locations. A component needed to complete the analytical framework is a specification of how the $1 \times m$ vector of market clearing prices $P^\star$ is determined. Two hypothetical price setting institutions are a centralized [Walrasian] auction and m decentralized [Marshallian] auctions.

The theory predicts that regardless of the number of suppliers, the law will be satisfied at the equilibrium. It is traditionally assumed that by increasing the number of suppliers, price dispersion should decrease or be eliminated. I want to test the law of one price using the experimental method, which allows me to control for the possibility that sufficiently small suppliers may not have a large enough optimization premium to eliminate price dispersion. By increasing the number of suppliers, the optimization premium of the supplier decreases. The reduction in the premium to best respond means that suppliers may not have an incentive to eliminate price dispersion.

C. The experimental framework

The experiment consists of two treatments (See Table I). Each treatment consists of five cohorts. The first treatment consists of 6 ”large” suppliers. The second treatment consists of 12 ”small” suppliers. Each session was repeated for 50 periods. The subjects had common and complete information about their own and everybody else's earning's matrix. We assumed linear demand, $P_j = 0.70 - 0.11667Q_j$, and two markets, A and B, without transportation costs. Symmetric demand was simulated across both markets using a computer to determine quantities purchased at quantities delivered.

Table I. Experimental design

Treatment	Cohort	Stock	Eqbm. Allocation	Periods	Equilibrium Profits
6 Suppliers	5	2	50%	50	\$0.70
12 Suppliers	5	1	50%	50	\$0.35

The total stock in the economy remained the same in both treatments, $x_i n = X$. Each period each large supplier received a divisible allocation of two, $x_i = 2$, and each small supplier received an allocation of one, $x_i = 1$.

Varying the number of suppliers in the economy, while holding the total stock in the economy constant, allowed us to test whether increased market concentration, which increases the optimization premium suppliers faced, lowered price dispersion.

The strategic supplier i optimizes by choosing s^*_{iA} to maximize the following profit function:

$$\pi_i = x_i s_{iA} P_A(s_{iA}, s_{-iA}) + x_i(1 - s_{iA}) P_B(s_{iA}, s_{-iA}) \tag{2.4}$$

where P_j is determined by the allocation decisions of all of the market suppliers.

The first order conditions can be rewritten to this problem as the following

$$s_{iA} = \frac{(n+1)}{4} - \frac{\sum s_{-iA}}{2}. \tag{2.5}$$

The market statistic, m_{-iA}, is the average allocation of the other suppliers, $m_{-iA} = \frac{1}{(n-1)} \sum_{-i} s_{-iA}$. Substituting in, the best response function becomes

$$r_i(m_{-iA}) = \frac{(n+1)}{4} - \frac{m_{-iA}(n-1)}{2}. \tag{2.6}$$

To satisfy the feasibility constraints, $s_{iA} + s_{iB} = 1$, where $s \in [0, 1]$, the subject's best response functions in the experiments for the treatment with 6 large suppliers becomes

$$r_i(m_{-iA}) = \begin{cases} 0 & if \;\; m_{-iA} > 0.7 \\ (1.75 - 2.5 m_{-ij}) & if \;\; 0.3 \leq m_{-iA} \leq 0.7 \\ 1 & if \;\; m_{-iA} < 0.3 \end{cases} \tag{2.7}$$

In the treatment with 12 small suppliers the best response function becomes

$$r_i(m_{-ij}) = \begin{cases} 0 & if \;\; m_{-ij} > 13/22 \\ (3.25 - 5.5 m_{-ij}) & if \;\; 9/22 \leq m_{-ij} \leq 13/22 \\ 1 & if \;\; m_{-ij} < 9/22 \end{cases} \tag{2.8}$$

In both treatments, the unique equilibrium allocation for each strategic sup-

plier becomes

$$s_i^* = \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right) \tag{2.9}$$

and the equilibrium price is in each market becomes \$0.35 for both treatments. The equilibrium profits for each supplier then become

$$\pi_i^* = x_i P^* = x_i(\$0.35). \tag{2.10}$$

1. Optimization incentives

The two treatments differ in the size of the premium (penalty) for (not) best responding to allocation assignments by other suppliers. We refer to this incentive to best respond as the optimization premium. Let $\pi_G(r_i(s_{-i}), s_{-i})$ denote the expected payoff to a player in game G who plays $r_i(s_{-i})$. Let $\pi_G(s_i, s_{-i})$ be defined as the expected payoff to player i for playing s_i. Then the optimization premium for game G is the function $u_G(s_i, s_{-i}) : [0, 1] \rightarrow \Re$ given by

$$u_G(s_i, s_{-i}) = \pi_G(r_i(s_{-i}), s_{-i}) - \pi_G(s_i, s_{-i}) \tag{2.11}$$

The intuition behind the optimization premium is that a larger optimization premium creates a larger incentive for the supplier to best respond to rival firms. The optimization premium has been shown to influence the coordination of subjects and the speed of convergence to a stable equilibrium. (see Battalio, Samuelson and Van Huyck [2]) The small suppliers have a smaller optimization premium thus penalizing the suppliers less for not having best responded.

The small suppliers have a smaller optimization premium to best responding correctly. The following equations indicates that by increasing the individual stock

ceteris paribus increases the optimization premium.

$$u_G(s_i, m_{-ij}) = \begin{cases} -0.11667x^2 s_i(2s_i + (2m_{-ij} - 1)(n-1)) & if \;\; s_i^{BR} = 0 \\ -0.23333x^2(s_i^{BR} - s_i)^2 & if \;\; 0 < s_i^{BR} < 1 \\ -0.11667x^2(2(s_i^2 + m_{-ij}(n-1)(s_i - 1))) + & \\ \quad [-0.11667x^2(s_i(n+1) + (n-1))] & if \;\; s_i^{BR} = 1 \end{cases} \tag{2.12}$$

Equation (2.12) indicates that the optimization premium for the large suppliers is four times as large as the small suppliers in the region, $0 < s_i^{BR} < 1$, around the unique equilibrium allocation. The penalty for the small suppliers to not best respond is much smaller than the large suppliers creating less incentive to coordinate on the strategic equilibrium. Figures 1 and 2 represent the optimization premium described in equation 2.12. Each contour line represents a five cent penalty for not having best responded. The figures represent the increased penalty faced by the large suppliers for not best responding.

2. Experimental design

Figure 3 diagrams the best response functions from functions 2.7 and 2.8. The vertical axes depict the allocation choice of the strategic supplier to Market A. The horizontal axes depict the average allocation of the rival suppliers. Because the axes are denoted in shares allocated to the Market A, the relevant portion of the figure is from zero to one.

The participants were students that were randomly recruited throughout Texas A&M University. The subjects were read statements concerning the time required



Fig. 1. Optimization premium, where each contour line represents a $0.05 penalty for not having best responded (6 large suppliers)

and the nature of the experiments. If more subjects wanted to participate than were needed, the subjects needed were randomly chosen from the group, the others were paid a "show-up" fee and were not allowed to participate. The subjects were then read the instructions as they followed along on their computer. The subjects were also told that their earnings would vary according to the decisions that they made during the experiments and that the experiments would last from one to three hours depending on the decisions of the people in their cohort. After reading the subjects the instructions, but before the session began, the subjects



Fig. 2. Optimization premium, where each contour line represents a $0.05 penalty for not having best responded (12 small suppliers)

filled out a questionnaire to determine that they could understand how to read the payoff tables.

The experiment uses the ERL (Economics Research Laboratory) Gray Box software (see Figure 4). The subjects participated in a two treatment design with a specified number of goods. The subjects were not allowed to talk or communicate with one another, or look at another subject's work. As each subject looked at the screen, they were able to determine what they think the average of the other



Fig. 3. Best response functions for the large and small suppliers (where $m_{-ij} = 1/(n-1)\sum_{-i} s_{-ij}$)

market players would supply to each market. This is called the market statistic (MS).

To better depict the best response curves from Figure 3, the Gray Box software depicts the payoffs for each allocation strategy in a shaded contour interface. Lighter shades denotes higher values by a gradient of shading where lighter shades indicate higher values. The subjects were allowed to supply any whole percent to either Market A or Market B giving the subjects a choice from 0 to 100 percent of their product. The payoff for each subject was determined by the allocative decisions of the other members of the cohort.

The market statistic (MS) is what the subjects see as a horizontal yellow line in Figure 4. They can slide the market statistic over the contour surface until they think they find what they think is the expected choice of other suppliers to market. They then can move what they see as a vertical green line, which is their own participation in market, up and down until they have found a best response to the market statistic. The payoffs to each MS and their own allocation choice are



Fig. 4. Example of ERL Gray Box GUI

displayed next to the green vertical line.

The interface also displayed a history of their choices and the choices of the other suppliers. The history displayed the choice of the subject, the MS, the payoff realized and a running total for all previously completed periods. There was no time limit for the subjects to make a choice in any of the periods.

Once the subjects confirm their choice and once all other participants have made their choice, their own payoff is displayed along with the true market statistic. The game is repeated for 50 periods. The subjects earned from $16.47 to $35.01 plus a $5.00 fee for participating. After the experiment the subjects were all paid in cash and in private and were allowed to leave. Equilibrium play throughout the experiment would have resulted in earnings of $17.50 for each small suppliers and $35.00 for each large suppliers.

The novelty of the Gray Box software is the clear depiction of the optimization premium to the subjects. The contour shading indicates a better and best response to all allocation choices by rival suppliers. The subject is not left to randomly search

the grid for a better response to a response by other suppliers. The contour clearly demarcates the better and best responses to others allocation choices.

D. Experimental results

The results are quite shocking in two areas. First, the magnitude of price dispersion was greater for the 12 small suppliers. Indicating that decreased market concentration may result in greater disperion of prices. Second, the allocation decisions of the 12 small suppliers varied greatly throughout the experiments and coordinated on the strategic equilibrium only a very small number of times.[4]



Fig. 5. The closing price in Market A by round (6 large suppliers, by cohort)

Figures 5 and 6 indicate the price that clears the market for Market A in each period. The law of one price suggests a market clearing price of $0.35 each period. Deviations from that price are inefficient. Prices are fairly stable around $0.35. In

[4]The play of the subjects is analyzed as well as the first and last 25 periods. Dispersion of price is relatively stable after 25 periods.

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

Fig. 6. The closing price in Market A by round (12 small suppliers, by cohort)

Figure 5, for the six large suppliers, the average market clearing price was $0.3483 with a standard deviation of $0.0456. Figure 6 depicts the twelve small suppliers and their average market clearing price is $0.3478 with a standard deviation of $0.0527.

Figures 7 and 8 depict the price dispersion between the markets defined as the absolute value between the market clearing prices in each period. The mean price dispersion[5] for the six large suppliers is $0.063. For the small suppliers the mean price dispersion is $0.078. The price disperion is statistically significantly different from one another. A decrease in market concentration increases price dispersion in the markets.

Measures of price dispersion that are unitless are helpful when comparing across products. Suppose the prices across markets is drawn from a distribution,

[5]Price dispersion is measured as the absolute difference in the price in Market A from the price in Market B.



Fig. 7. The difference in price between Market A and Market B by round (6 large suppliers, by cohort)

F, with mean μ and variance σ^2. The coefficient of variation, $CV = \sigma/\mu$, has been used by Carlson-Pescatrice [9], Sorensen [48] and Baye, Morgan and Scholten [5] and others, to measure price dispersion in traditional retail markets. The coefficient of variation for the large suppliers is 0.131 and for the small suppliers the coefficient of variation is 0.151. A t-test indicates that the two coefficients are statistically different from one another with a p 0.000.

Table II describes the difference from equilibrium play. We then measured the absolute difference in price from location A less the price in location B from s_i^*. Throughout the experiment, the large suppliers consistently have less variance in their allocation decisions. We also looked at the first and last 25 periods. The mean allocation difference from the unique equilibrium, s_i^*, for the large suppliers was 9.79 percentage points throughout the experiment and 19.484 percentage points for the small suppliers. When we only consider the first 25 periods, the mean difference for the large suppliers was 15.12 and 22.27 for the small suppliers with



Fig. 8. The difference in price between Market A and Market B by round (12 small suppliers, by cohort)

a p-value of less than 1%. The difference is even more visible for the last 25 periods where the mean difference for the large suppliers was 4.45 and 16.70 for the small suppliers again with a p-value substantially less than 1.

In Table III, we looked at the difference in the play of the subjects over the first half of the experiment and the last half of the experiment. For both treatments the mean allocation is 50% to both markets. It becomes clearer as the experiments continue that the coordination is less likely to occur in later rounds in the small suppliers treatment. The standard deviation for the large suppliers drops to 9.6 for the last 25 periods of the experiment whereas the standard deviation for the small suppliers decreases some but is still 24.69.

The small and the large suppliers treatments have a mean allocation over the 50 periods that does not deviate much from the equilibrium. However, the standard deviation for the small suppliers is much greater than for the large suppliers.

Table II. Means test of difference from unique equilibrium, s_i^*

Firms	Obs.	Mean	s.e.	std. dev.	95% Conf.	Int.
All Rounds						
6	1500	9.789	0.3740	14.484	9.056	10.523
12	3000	19.484	0.3391	18.576	18.819	20.149
Combined	4500	16.252	0.2670	17.911	15.729	16.776
Difference		-9.695^{***}	0.5048		-10.68	-8.700
		(-19.203)				
First 25 Periods						
6	750	15.12	0.622	17.04	13.91	16.35
12	1,500	22.27	0.479	18.55	21.33	23.21
Combined	2,250	19.89	0.387	18.37	19.13	20.65
Difference		-7.14^{***}	0.808		-8.72	-5.56
		(-8.84)				
Last 25 Periods						
6	300	4.45	0.311	8.50	3.84	5.06
12	600	16.70	0.470	18.19	15.78	17.62
Combined	900	12.62	0.351	16.67	11.93	13.31
Difference		-12.25^{***}	0.699		-13.62	-10.88
		(-17.51)				

*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses

The large suppliers find the equilibrium and stay there.

Table IV describes the unique equilibrium strategy, s_i^*, played by the subjects by cohort for the first and last 25 periods of the experiments as well as an aggregate equilibrium play by treatment. From Table IV, it becomes apparent that the large suppliers are more likely to play the unique equilibrium strategy than the small suppliers. Even once the dispersion in price becomes more stable in the last 25 periods, the small suppliers are still a lost less likely to play the unique strategy equilibrium.

The level of equilibrium play was greater for the large suppliers due to the increased incentive to optimize. From the Fisher tests in Table V we can see that the rates at which the individual suppliers supply at the unique equilibrium is distinct.

Table III. A measure of variance in play by treatment

Treatment	Obs.	s_i^*	Mean	std. dev.	Min	Max
All Rounds						
All 6 Large Suppliers	1,500	50	50.24	17.48	0	100
All 12 Small Suppliers	3,000	50	50.32	26.92	0	100
First 25 Periods						
All 6 Large Suppliers	750	50	50.33	22.79	0	100
All 12 Small Suppliers	1,500	50	50.29	28.99	0	100
Last 25 Periods						
All 6 Large Suppliers	750	50	50.15	9.60	1	100
All 12 Small Suppliers	1,500	50	50.35	24.69	0	100

The large suppliers were more likely to supply both markets at the unique equilibrium than their small supplier counterparts. The small suppliers were slower to find the unique equilibrium and were less able to coordinate. Figure 9 through Figure 14 describe the allocation decisions of each supplier throughout the 50 periods. Next to the name of the figure is the treatment that each subject participated. The straight line through the data is a fitted regression line and denotes the trend in the allocation choices of the players. Figure 9 is divided up into cells that represent the cohort and player.

Table IV. Play of s_i^* during the first and last 25 periods

	First 25 Periods		Last 25 Periods	
Treatment/Cohort	**# of times s_i^* Played**	**Percent**	**# of times s_i^* Played**	**Percent**
6 Large Suppliers				
1st Cohort	36	24.00	77	51.33
2nd Cohort	49	32.67	92	61.33
3rd Cohort	28	18.67	55	36.67
4th Cohort	45	30.00	67	44.67
5th Cohort	42	28.00	131	87.33
12 Small Suppliers				
1st Cohort	40	13.33	65	21.67
2nd Cohort	23	7.67	35	11.67
3rd Cohort	87	29.00	145	48.33
4th Cohort	52	17.33	84	28.00
5th Cohort	50	16.67	97	32.33
Totals by Treatment				
6 Large Suppliers	200	26.67	422	56.27
12 Small Suppliers	252	16.80	426	28.40

Table V. Fisher exact tests (aggregated by treatment)

Treatment	**not s_i^***	**%**	**s_i^***	**%**	**Total**
First 25 Periods					
6 Large Suppliers	550	73%	200	27%	750
12 Small Suppliers	1,248	83%	252	17%	1,500
Total	1,798	80%	452	20%	2,250
Left Tail ($Pr \leq F$)			3.980×10^{-8}		
Right Tail ($Pr \geq F$)			0.999		
Two-Tailed ($Pr \leq p - value$)			7.452×10^{-8}		
Last 25 Periods					
6 Large Suppliers	328	44%	422	56%	750
12 Small Suppliers	1,074	72%	426	28%	1,500
Total	1,402	62%	848	38%	2,250
Left Tail ($Pr \leq F$)			1.874×10^{-37}		
Right Tail ($Pr \geq F$)			1.0		
Two-Tailed ($Pr \leq p - value$)			2.389×10^{-37}		
All Periods					
6 Large Suppliers	878	59%	622	41%	1,500
12 Small Suppliers	2,322	77%	678	23%	3,000
Total	3,200	71%	1,300	29%	4,500
Left Tail ($Pr \leq F$)			1.234×10^{-38}		
Right Tail ($Pr \geq F$)			1.0		
Two-Tailed ($Pr \leq p - value$)			1.831×10^{-38}		



Fig. 9. Allocation decisions by round (6 large suppliers, all cohorts)



Fig. 10. Allocation decisions by round (12 small suppliers, 1st cohort)



Fig. 11. Allocation decisions by round (12 small suppliers, 2nd cohort)



Fig. 12. Allocation decisions by round (12 small suppliers, 3rd cohort)



Fig. 13. Allocation decisions by round (12 small suppliers, 4th cohort)



Fig. 14. Allocation decisions by round (12 small suppliers, 5th cohort)

Figures 15 and 16 describe the level of aggregate efficiency in the economy. The large suppliers extract more of the surplus, about 98.17%. In Figure 16, which describes the small suppliers, the average efficiency is 97.45%. This is a about a 1% decline in efficiency which is statistically significant.



Fig. 15. Market efficiency by round relative to the unique equilibrium (6 large suppliers, by cohort)

Theory suggests the small and large suppliers use s_i^*. Suppliers can play the secure strategy and be efficient. When we look at Figure 16 we see the small suppliers are not able to extract as much of the surplus.

Table XV tests whether the subjects play is statistically different. The means are percentages of efficiency relative to the maximum producer surplus available in the economy. Again the treatments were split up into the first and last 25 periods to allow for coordination to take place. This measure of efficiency is less concerned with equilibrium play and more concerned with coordination. In the first 25 pe-



Fig. 16. Market efficiency by round relative to the unique equilibrium (12 small suppliers, by cohort)

riods, there is not much difference in the level of efficiency that is exhibited. The last 25 periods, the small firms were less efficient in coordinating on an efficient outcome. Tables XVI through XIX in Appendix A1, test the theory as proposed in Meyer et al. [38] that there is a weighted attraction such that once a supplier notices the price below or above P^* in period t, do they remain there in period $t+1$. χ^2 tests are used to check for random play.

Figure 17 depicts the empirical distribution function for the two different treatments and a Kolmogorov-Smirnof test was performed which soundly rejects the hypothesis that the two distributions were drawn from the same population. The largest difference in the two distributions was 0.1343 and there were 4,500 observations between the two distributions. The level of significance was p 0.000. It is clear



Fig. 17. The empirical distribution function as a percentage of allocation to Market A

from the figure that the small suppliers were more widely dispersed throughout the distribution and the large suppliers were more likely to play s_i^*.

1. Naive best-responders

A naive market participant that simply best responds would react to the play in previous period by best-responding information from only the previous period. A model was used to test the theory of the naive best responder where

$$Ownmove_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 r_i(m_{-iA}) + \epsilon \tag{2.13}$$

where Ownmove is the allocation choice in the current period, $r_i(m_{-iA})$ is the best-reply to the market statistic from the previous period. The results were tested

where $H_0 : \beta_1 = 1$. An F-test confirms that the subjects are not naively best responding. Table VI describes the results form equation 2.13.

Table VI. Naive best-responders

Variable	6 Large Suppliers	12 Small Suppliers
Best reply to MS_{t-1}	0.156	0.110
	(0.025)	(0.015)
Constant	42.511	44.937
	(1.326)	(0.901)

Standard errors in parentheses

2. Autocorrelation and independence

A runs test was performed on each of the suppliers looking at random play by the suppliers. The results for treatment of 12 small suppliers indicates that 17 of the 60 suppliers allocations may not be serially independent at the 5% level of significance. The results for the large suppliers indicates that 9 of the 30 suppliers allocations may not be serially independent at the 5% level of significance.

An up and down test was also used to look at auto-correlation between rounds. The test show that 14 of the large suppliers and 21 of the small suppliers indicates a rejection of auto-correlation at the 5% level of significance.

We wanted to know whether the dispersion of prices is similar to that of random play so we solved for the theoretical variance, $E[(P_1 - P_2)]^2$, if the suppliers were to allocate using a random draw from a uniform distribution, $s_i \in [0, 1]$. The theoretical variance (see Appendix A3 for proof) is

$$E[(P_1 - P_2)^2]_6 = \$0.02722$$

$$E[(P_1 - P_2)^2]_{12} = \$0.01361$$

where the subscripts denote the large and small suppliers respectively. The actual or observed price dispersion was

$$(P_1 - P_2)_6^2 = \$0.00834$$

$$(P_1 - P_2)_{12}^2 = \$.01110$$

A means test was performed. The 6 large suppliers clearly had a variance in price dispersion that was much less than the theoretical with a p-value of $\sim$0.000. The theoretical prediction decreases with the number of suppliers. This is not the case with the observed data. The price dispersion increases. The t-test on the small suppliers also suggested that the observed was less than the theoretical prediction at the 5% level of significance with a p-value of 0.027.

E. Conclusion

Market concentration was found to influence price dispersion. As the number of suppliers, ceteris paribus, increases, the optimization premium is reduced resulting in increased price disperion. The ability of suppliers to coordinate in this setting is correlated with the optimization premium.

The coordination at the strategic equilibrium as the market concentration increases is demonstrated in Figures 18-19 and suggests the difficulty associated with a smaller optimization premium. The number of subjects that play the strategic equilibrium as a percentage of the whole cohort is reduced as the market concen-



Fig. 18. The percentage of suppliers that allocate at the unique (s_i^*) equilibrium (6 large suppliers)

tration decreases. Increasing the number of firms holding the stock in the economy constant, increases the difficulty for firms to coordinate at the equilibrium.

Baye and Morgan [3] looked at an internet shopping site to analyze price dispersion with very low information costs. They found on a website that lists the price of many rival suppliers for a homogeneous good similar coefficients of variation to our experiments. With 2 suppliers selling a homogeneous good the $CV = 0.229$, with 4 suppliers: $CV = 0.094$, with 8 suppliers: $CV = 0.225$ and with 12 suppliers: $CV = 0.054$. The magnitude of the coefficient of variation found by Baye and Morgan is similar to what we observe in the laboratory.

The number of firms supplying the market has direct implications on the ability of suppliers to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. In contrast to the notion that with decreased market concentration or as you approach perfect competition



Fig. 19. The percentage of suppliers that allocate at the unique (s_i^*) equilibrium (12 small suppliers)

price dispersion decreases, we expect and find just the opposite. We find that with increased suppliers to an economy, the greater is the price dispersion. When we hold markets demand constant and the quantity available to be allocated in each period, the incentive to best respond decreases with decreased market concentration.

CHAPTER III

MARKET CONCENTRATION, PRICE DISPERSION, AND INEFFICIENT CROSS-HAULING

A. Introduction

A fundamental result is economics is the law of one price. There are many reasons to expect a homogeneous good sold at different locations to sell for the same price. Yet most investigators find violations of the law. Isard [25] describes the law as being "...flagrantly and systematically violated by empirical data" and finds that violations in the law can be attributed to product differentiation and restrictions to free markets, such as discriminating monopolies, tariffs, subsidies and other trade restrictions. Parsley and Wei [44] and Engel and Rogers [19] looked at price fluctuations within the United States, which allows them to control for trade barriers such as those found by Isard. They still found price dispersion that could not be accounted for by distance and preferences. Stigler [49] posited that information was in effect a large culprit in the dispersion of prices for a homogeneous good. Stigler suggests that "Price dispersion is a manifestation– and, indeed, it is the measure– of ignorance in the market." Baye and Morgan [4] found price dispersion on the Internet where there were no trade barriers, products were homogeneous and the cost of information was negligible.

Deviations in the law have remained quite stable over the past 700 years in commodity prices. Rogoff, Froot and Kim [46] examine price dispersions over the past 700 years. The surprising result is that with the advent of a quick transmission of foreign prices, volatility and price dispersion has not declined.

It is puzzling that so many investigators find violations of the law of one price.

Many explanations have been offered. For example, information and transportation costs, borders, trade barriers, and exchange rates, among thers, have all been offered as reasons that law does not hold empirically. When tested carefully these new explanations explain only a very little part of the observed violations of the law of one price.

An explanation that is not often considered is that when the number of suppliers is large any individual supplier has a small optimization premium. A small optimization premium results in markets experiencing long periods of disequilibrium dynamics. Meyer et al. [38] note that if the law of one price is satisfied, then there is no pecuniary incentive to conform to the equilibrium. When it is violated, strategic uncertainty makes observed price differences an unreliable indicator of a profit opportunity because the violation does not indicate who should respond or by how much. The optimization premium is the incentive a supplier has to best respond. It is usually impossible to compute the optimization premium using field data. This paper uses the experimental method to investigate whether ceteris parabis lowering the number of suppliers and thus increasing the optimization premium increases the frequency that the law of one price is satisfied.

As the optimization premium increases suppliers will behave more strategically. Brander [6] showed that strategic suppliers will engage in cross-hauling. Cross-hauling is the bidirectional transporting of an identical product between two locations, which decreases welfare when transportation is costly. As the number of firms supplying the market increases, the optimization premium falls and the amount of inefficient cross-hauling falls. Transportation costs may answer the question of which supplier should respond to a violation of the law of one price. Transportation costs help coordinate the market allocation but introduce inefficient cross-hauling.

B. Analytical framework

To focus the analysis, consider an economy of m islands.[1] On each island there is a Marshallian [35]) fish market.[2] Hence, each island has a local market for fish. In the morning of each day, fishermen i sails to their fishing grounds, where their fleet of m boats catch x_i units of fish. The fishermen must decide how to divide up the catch, s_{ij}, amongst their m boats, which spend the afternoon delivering the catch to the m islands. Just before dinner, consumers on each island come down to the dock to purchase the catch of the day, which sells for price p_j on island j. Any fish not eaten at dinner that market day spoils. That evening fishermen i's fleet returns to their home island with their profits for the day, π_i .

In this economy, there are n suppliers indexed $i = 1, 2, \ldots, n$. Each supplier is each endowed with x_i units of a homogenous good. The total units of the homogenous good is $x = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i$. There are m locations, indexed $j = 1, 2, \ldots, m$. Let I denote the set of suppliers and J denote the set of locations. Supplier i delivers $q_{ij} = s_{ij}x_i$ units of the homogenous good to location j.

A supplier must decide what share of the catch to deliver to each location, which can be represented by the $1 \times m$ vector $s_i = (s_{i1}, s_{i2}, \ldots, s_{im})$. Supplier i's decision must satisfy the feasibility constraint that $\sum_{j=1}^{m} s_{ij} = 1$ and $s_{ij} \geq 0$. Denote supplier i's set of feasible deliveries S_i and $s_i \in S_i$.

---

[1]The analytical framework differs from Meyers, et al. [38] in two ways. The allocation problem is continuous and transportation costs may not be zero. It is based on Van Huyck [52]. Phelps [45] popularized the study of island economies.

[2]Marshall writes, "...when a thing already made has to be sold, the price which people will be willing to pay for it will be governed by their desire to have it, together with the amount they can afford to spend on it.... This, for instance, is the case with a fish market, in which the value of fish for the day is governed almost exclusively by the stock on the slabs in relation to demand...[35]." A similar parable with indivisible market delivery was used in Meyer et al. [38].

An allocation is an $n \times m$ matrix of supplier choices denoted $s = (s_1, \ldots, s_n)^T$. The set of feasible allocations is denoted S. An allocation s determines the total quantity of the good supplied to each location j, denoted q_j^s, and defined $q_j^s = \sum_{i=1}^n q_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^n s_{ij} x_i$. All units of the good delivered to location j are sold for price p_j.

Supplier i's marginal transportation costs to location j are denoted c_{ij} and are assumed to be a positive constant. The profit from a delivery of q_{ij} units is the prevailing price times the quantity delivered, $p_j q_{ij}$, less transportation costs, $c_{ij} q_{ij}$. Supplier i chooses the vector s_i to maximize the realized profit function, which is the sum of realized profits from deliveries to each location:

$$\pi_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} (p_j - c_{ij}) q_{ij} = \sum_{j=1}^{m} x_i (p_j - c_{ij}) s_{ij} = x_i \sum_{j=1}^{m} \bar{p}_{ij} s_{ij}, \tag{3.1}$$

where $\bar{p}_{ij}$ is the prevailing price in market j net of supplier i's transportation costs. Before analyzing the model under the assumption of strategic behavior, we assume suppliers are price takers. Results in experimental economics often demonstrate that it takes very few participants to obtain price taking behavior.

A *price taking* supplier knows p_j and behaves as if p_j is an exogenous rather than endogenous variable. Given a $1 \times m$ vector of net prices $\bar{p}_i = (\bar{p}_{i1}, \ldots, \bar{p}_{im})$, a price taking supplier i maximizes total profits when $s_i^\star$ satisfies:

$$\sum_{j \in \bar{J}^i} s_{ij}^\star = 1, \tag{3.2}$$

where $\bar{J}^i = \{j \in J : \bar{p}_{ij} = \bar{p}_i^\star = max(\bar{p}_{i1}, \ldots, \bar{p}_{im})\}$. $\bar{J}^i$ is the set of locations with the highest price net of supplier i's transportation costs.

A price taking supplier would not voluntarily choose positive deliveries to location k if $\bar{p}_{ik} < \bar{p}_i^\star$, which implies that $s_{ik}^\star = 0$ for $k \notin \bar{J}^i$. However, a price taking

supplier is indifferent about the quantity delivered to locations contained in the set of highest price locations, $\bar{J}^i$.[3]

At each location there is demand for the good, which is represented by a demand function that determines quantity demanded q_j^d at location j given the prevailing price, p_j:

$$q_j^d = q(p_j, w_j), for j \in J; \tag{3.3}$$

where w_j is a parameter representing the influence of the number, wealth, and preferences of consumers at location j on market demand. Assume that the quantity demanded is decreasing in p_j and increasing in w_j.

Local market clearing requires that the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded at location j, that is, $q_j^s = q_j^d = q_j$, where q_j is the quantity exchanged in location j. Prices will adjust to clear the m locations. A component needed to complete the analytical framework is a specification of how the $1 \times m$ vector of market clearing prices $p^\star$ is determined. Two hypothetical price setting institutions are a centralized [Walrasian] auction and m decentralized [Marshallian] auctions.

1. Centralized competition with recontracting and the law of one price

A conventional approach to the problem of general market clearing is to assume a hypothetical central exchange where a complete set of contracts that require the delivery of a specified quantity of a specified good on a specified date to a specified location, are traded.[4] Because it illustrates the coordination problem of a market

[3]Let $p^\star = max(p_{i1}, \ldots, p_{im})$. If $p_j = p^\star$ for all $j \in \bar{J}^i$, then a price taking supplier i only delivers to the locations in the set of locations with their lowest transportation cost.

[4]Debreu [12]) motivates these hypothetical contracts as being analogous to the futures contracts for No.2 Red Winter Wheat traded in Chicago. Of course, "Organized futures markets concern only a small number of goods, locations, and dates

economy, allows a formal definition of the law of one price and because it will characterize the efficient equilibrium in the experiment to follow, a useful benchmark case is to assume that a supplier could enter into a "futures" contract for the delivery of q_{ij}^s units of the good to location j at price p_j in a central exchange. Having postulated the existence of a central exchange it is then possible to give the following "recontracting" rationalization for the determination of the general market clearing price vector $p^\star$.[5]

At the beginning of the market day, the Walrasian auctioneer announces a price vector p^1 to the central exchange participants, which includes all n suppliers and the unspecified consumers. Taking this announcement as given, each participant fills out a "ticket" listing their supply or demand for the good. If supply equals demand for all local markets, then the participants' "tickets" are exchanged for binding "futures" contracts. However, if general market clearing is not achieved the "tickets" are returned and the Walrasian auctioneer announces another price vector p^2. This "recontracting" process continues until general market clearing is achieved.

a. The allocation problem with homogeneous transportation costs

Assume that all suppliers have homogeneous transportation costs, that is, $c_{ij} = c_j$ for all j. A necessary condition for general market clearing is that all prices net of transportation costs must be equal, that is, $\bar{p}_j^\star = \bar{p}^\star$ for all j in J. If not, then there exits a location k such that it is not contained in the set of highest price markets, $\bar{J}^i$. Location k would not be served by any supplier and, hence, there would be excess

(not too distant in the future), ... [p.33]."

[5]Walras [54]) provides this rationalization, see also Edgeworth [15], Jaffe [26] and Leijonhufvud [32].

demand in location k. This necessary condition for an equilibrium is often called the *law of one price*.

The introduction of a central exchange for a homogenous commodity supplied to alternative locations would eliminate the economic distinction between local markets. The law of one price implies that the m locations are integrated into one central market for the homogenous commodity.

Merely announcing an equilibrium vector of prices $(p_1^\star, \ldots, p_m^\star)$, while necessary, is not sufficient to insure general market clearing when suppliers have homogenous transportation costs. While the equilibrium vector of prices leaves suppliers indifferent between supplying the m locations, prices provide no information to suppliers concerning where to actually deliver the good. Suppliers may choose to deliver all of the good to a single location, which means that no location satisfies the local market clearing condition, but any adjustment of prices to the excess supply and demand in the local markets would violate the law of one price.

Consequently, information about excess demand or supply in the local markets is not sufficient to inform the Walrasian auctioneer's groping for an equilibrium vector of prices. Instead, the Walrasian auctioneer must know how to reallocate the tickets submitted so as to leave the suppliers indifferent and, yet, satisfy the local market clearing conditions. In Walrasian models, the implicit conversion of tickets into futures contracts hides an allocation problem.

While there is a unique equilibrium price vector, there are infinitely many equilibrium allocations. Given an equilibrium price vector and homogenous transportation costs, a feasible allocation s is contained in the set of Walrasian allocations, S^w, when the allocation satisfies the general market clearing condition, that

is,

$$S^w = \{\ s \in S \mid \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{ij} x_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_{ij} \ \equiv\ q_j^s = q_j^d(p^\star) \quad \forall\ j \in J\ \} \tag{3.4}$$

Walrasian allocations have the desirable property that they are Pareto efficient, see Debreu [12].

The Walrasian auctioneer not only must announce an equilibrium price vector, but he must also assign an equilibrium allocation to the market participants, that is, he must assign to each supplier a specific location for delivery. Because this allocation problem is hidden in the implicit recontracting rationalization of equilibrium, Walrasian models of general market clearing do not formalize and can not analyze the allocation problem inherent in actual decentralized economies.[6]

b. Heterogenous transportation costs, market entry, and price taking suppliers

One reaction to the allocation problem is to argue that unformalized idiosyncratic characteristics of the suppliers solve the allocation problem. For example, suppose that locating operations at a specific location reduces a supplier's transportation costs associated with deliveries to that location. Then the suppliers' location decision results in suppliers having heterogenous transportation costs. Assume that a supplier's location is predetermined by the condition that a fixed cost of entry is equal to the shadow price of the endowment, that is, there is no incentive for new suppliers to enter any local market.

Let a *local* supplier i to market k have a supplier specific cost c_{ik} equal to 0.

[6]Diamond [13] also emphasizes this shortcoming of Walrasian general market clearing models and suggests using a search equilibrium framework. However, search equilibria involve direct agent to agent exchanges, which introduces a difficult bilateral bargaining problem, see Osborne and Rubinstein [42]. Our model of decentralized competition avoids this bargaining problem. Hayek was one of the first to argue that the Walrasian framework does not formalize the essential coordination problem of a decentralized economy, see O'Driscoll [40].

Let I^j denote the set of suppliers local to market j, that is, $I^j = \{\ i \in I \mid c_{ij} = 0\}$. A *foreign* supplier h to market j has marginal transportation costs c_{hj} greater than 0. Partition the set of suppliers, I, into m sets of local suppliers for market j, I^j, where $I = I^1 \cup I^2 \cup \ldots I^m$. Equilibrium entry makes it is feasible for local demand to be served by local suppliers; specifically, let $\sum_{i \in I^j} s_{ij} x_i = q_j^d(p^\star)$.

Given the assumed distribution of local suppliers, then the equilibrium price vector $(p^\star, \ldots, p^\star)$ not only clears all markets but also implies a unique allocation. When all markets have the same price $p^\star$, supplier i's price net of transportation costs $\bar{p}_{ij}$ is highest in his local market j and supplier i only delivers to j, that is, $\bar{J}^i = \{j\}$ for all i in I^j. Since $\bar{J}_i$ contains a single element, price taking suppliers who are local to market j maximizes total profits when they deliver everything to their home market, that is, $s_{ij} = 1$ for $j \in \bar{J}^i$ and $s_{ik} = 0$ for k not in $\bar{J}^i$. This individual behavior is consistent with general market clearing, because it is feasible for local suppliers to satisfy local demand at $p^\star$.

Heterogenous transportation costs solve the allocation problem, but weakens the law of one price. Given supplier locations, there are now infinitely many price vectors that motivate suppliers to implement allocation $s^\star$. Specifically, the local price of the homogenous commodity can differ from $p^\star$ as long as this variation leaves the set of markets with maximal prices unchanged for all suppliers.

The equilibrium with all suppliers serving their local market is a unique equilibrium that is also efficient. No transportation costs are incured. The transportation costs solve the allocation problem, but are not actually incurred, and there is no social welfare loss due to transportation to foreign markets.

2. Decentralized competition with strategic suppliers

Instead of a centralized futures market, suppose that each island has a spot market for the good, that is, each location has a Marshallian auctioneer who discovers the price, p_j^*, at location j that equate demand to supply. The price is determined after a supplier has delivered q_{ij} units of the good to location j. The good perishes just after it has been delivered and cannot be transported to a second local market.[7] Hence, the decision is irreversible and the supplier sells q_{ij} at the prevailing price, p_j^*. Given the quantity supplied to market j, q_j^s, the local auctioneer announces a price p_j^* that clears the local market, that is, $q_j^s = q_j^d = q(p_j, w_j)$.

Inverting the demand function gives the local price p_j as a function of the total quantity supplied to market j, q_j^s:

$$p_j^* = p(q_j^s, w_j) = p(\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{ij} x_i, w_j). \tag{3.5}$$

The inverse demand function $p(q_j^s, w_j)$ is assumed to be strictly positive on some bounded interval $(0, \bar{q}\,(w_j))$ on which it is twice continuously differentiable, decreasing in q_j^s, and increasing in w_j. The inverse demand function is assumed to be concave in q_j^s. For $q_j^s \geq \bar{q}\,(w_j)$, $p(q_j^s, w_j) = 0$. Since the locations are isolated it is natural to assume that p_j does not depend on deliveries to other locations.

Equation (5) maps a vector of quantities into a vector of prices, which is determined by an allocation s implemented by the n suppliers. The law of one price no longer holds as the local price is what ever is necessary to clear the location. This dispersion of realized prices does not provide convential arbitrage opportunities for suppliers, because of the physical isolation of each local market. Competitive suppliers would like to avoid making deliveries to locations not contained in the

[7] See Fisher [20] for an analysis of arbitrage across time.

set of locations with maximal realized prices, $\bar{J}^i$.

Increasing the share s_{ij} supplier i delivers to location j lowers the price p_j^* by the assumption of a negatively sloped demand curve. Instead of price taking behavior, this section supposes that each supplier behaves strategically and takes account of their influence on prices. The strategic interdependence amongst the suppliers can be formalized as the following strategic market game: The n suppliers make up the set of "players", I. Each supplier chooses from the set of the feasible share vectors, $s_i \in S_i$. An *exclusive allocation* for supplier i is an $(n-1) \times m$ matrix of supplier choices denoted $s_{-i} = \{s_1, \ldots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, \ldots, s_n\}^T$. Using equation (5), it is possible to rewrite supplier i's realized profit function, equation (1), in terms of s_i and s_{-i}:

$$\pi_i = \pi(\ s_i,\ s_{-i}) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \left(\ p(\sum_{h=1}^{n} s_{hj} x_h,\ w_j) \ - \ c_{hj} \right) \ s_{ij} x_i. \tag{3.6}$$

The market game Γ is defined by the $\pi = \{\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_n\}$, S, and I.

Given an exclusive outcome s_{-i}, a strategic supplier i chooses s_i^* to maximize the following Lagrangian function:

$$L = \pi(s_i,\ s_{-i}) + \lambda \left(x_i - \sum_{j=1}^{m} s_{ij} x_i \right). \tag{3.7}$$

The first order conditions to this problem are

$$p(\sum_{h=1}^{n} s_{hj} x_h,\ w_j)\ x_i + \left(\frac{\partial p_j}{\partial q_j^s} x_i \right) s_{ij} x_i - c_{ij} x_i = \lambda x_i, \quad \text{for all } j \in J, \tag{3.8}$$

and $x_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} s_{ij} x_i$. Equation (8) can be rewritten as

$$p(\sum_{h=1}^{n} s_{hj} x_h,\ w_j) - c_{ij} + \frac{\partial p_j}{\partial q_j^s} x_i s_{ij} \ = \ \lambda, \quad \text{for all } j \in J. \tag{3.9}$$

Supplier i chooses s_i^* such that marginal profits are the same at all locations and equal to the shadow price of the endowed good. Unlike price taking behavior where the price net of transportation costs determines behavior, supplier i also accounts for the effect an extra unit has on the profitability (which changes by $\partial p_j/\partial q_j^s$) of inframarginal units, $q_{ij} = s_{ij}x_i$. The profit function is concave in s_i. Hence, the second order conditions are satisfied and the first order conditions are for a unique maximum. The solution to the first order conditions gives the best response functions, $r_{ij}\left(s_{-ij}\right)$, for the strategic suppliers. Let $r_i\left(s_{-i}\right) = \left(r_{i1}\left(s_{-i1}\right), \ldots, r_{im}\left(s_{-im}\right)\right)$.

A feasible outcome s^* in game Γ is a *mutual best response outcome* when

$$\pi_i(\ s_i,\ s_{-i}^*) \leq \pi_i(\ s_i^*,\ s_{-i}^*), \tag{3.10}$$

for all $s_i \in S_i$ and for all $i \in I$. No supplier can increase their profits by choosing some other delivery vector given the other suppliers delivery vectors. An assignment s^* is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of allocation game Γ, that is, $s_i^* = r_i\left(s_{-i}^*\right)$ for all $i \in I$.

C. The experiment's framework

The framework established for the experiments was to use linear demand, $P_j(s_{ij}.s_{-ij}) = w_j - b_j(x_i s_{ij} + \sum_{-i} x_- i s_{-ij})$, with two symmetric locations (location A and B) where suppliers are symmetrically located. The transportation costs are heterogeneous such that each supplier has a designated home location, h, without a cost to transport, $c_{ih} = 0$ and a foreign location, j, that is costly to transport, $c_{ij} \neq 0$. The strategic supplier i optimizes by choosing s_{ih}^* to maximize the following profit function:

$$\pi_i = x_i s_{ih} P_h(s_{ih}, s_{-ih}) + x_i(1 - s_{ih}) P_j(s_{ih}, s_{-ih} - c_{ij}) \tag{3.11}$$

Solving the first order conditions and solving for the choice variable becomes

$$s_{ih} = \frac{(n+1)}{4} - \frac{\sum s_{-ij}}{2} + \frac{c_{ij}}{4x_i b_j} \tag{3.12}$$

The market statistic, m_{-ij}, is the average allocation of the other suppliers, $m_{-ij} = [1/(n-1)] \sum_{-i} s_{-ij}$. Substituting in, the best response function becomes

$$r_i(m_{-ih}) = \frac{(n+1)}{4} - \frac{m_{-iA}(n-1)}{2}. + \frac{c_{ij}}{4x_i b_j} \tag{3.13}$$

To satisfy the feasibility constraints, $s_{iA} + s_{iB} = 1$, where $s \in [0, 1]$.

The unique equilibrium becomes

$$s^*_{ih} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{c_{ij}}{2x_i(n+1)b_j} \qquad \forall i. \tag{3.14}$$

When $c_{ij} = 0$, the equilibirum allocation is to allocate to both locations with half, $s^*_{ih} = 1/2$.

Revenue was determined by the quantity supplied, which was determined by the decision of the individual, multiplied by the price. However, price was determined by the decisions of not only the individual, but of the decisions of the whole cohort. Linear demand equations have a property that if the individual supplies half to Market A and half to Market B, the profits paid to the individual is indifferent to decisions made by the other suppliers to the markets at the market equilibrium. This secure strategy equilibrium is also the cross-hauling strategic equilibrium where an individual does not incur transportation costs. The secure strategy is not the optimal strategy for the suppliers with transportation costs. This secure strategy equilibrium induces the strategic cross-hauling strategy to be played by

the market participants.

D. Optimization incentives

1. The optimization premium and market concentration

The four treatments differ in the size of the premium (penalty) for (not) best responding to allocation assignments by other suppliers. We refer to this incentive to best respond as the optimization premium. Let $\pi_G(r_i(s_{-i}), s_{-i})$ denote the expected payoff to a player in game G who plays $r_i(s_{-i})$. Let $\pi_G(s_i, s_{-i})$ be defined as the expected payoff to player i for playing s_i. Then the optimization premium for game G is the function $u_G(i) : [0, 1] \rightarrow \Re$ given by

$$u_G(s_i, s_{-i}) = \pi_G(r_i(s_{-i}), s_{-i}) - \pi_G(s_i, s_{-i}) \tag{3.15}$$

The intuition behind the optimization premium is that a larger optimization premium creates a larger incentive for the supplier to best respond to rival firms. The optimization premium has been shown to influence the coordination of subjects and the speed of convergence to a stable equilibrium. The small suppliers have a smaller optimization premium thus penalizing the suppliers less for not having best responded. Figure 20 represents the optimization premia for the four treatments. Each contour line represents a \$0.05 penalty for not having best responded. Because the optimization premium is defined as the difference in the best response to an alternative allocation, along the best response the premium for deviating is zero. As is clear from the Figure 20, the treatments with large suppliers have a much greater optimization premium than the small suppliers.



Fig. 20. Optimization premium, where each contour line represents a $0.05 penalty for not having best responded

2. Inefficient cross-hauling

The efficient market outcome is one where the total welfare in the economy is maximized. Considering multiple markets and multiple firms with transportation costs allows us to measure the welfare implications of other allocation strategies that satisfy the law of one price. We denote Ω as the total welfare in the economy which consists of the consumer surplus, Ψ, and the producer surplus, Π. Thus,

$$\Omega = \Psi + \Pi = \Psi + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \pi_{i\cdot} \tag{3.16}$$

where $\pi_{i\cdot}$ is the individual profits generated by firm i in all markets.

In the framework imposed on the subjects with transportation costs, there is a unique Pareto optimal allocation. That is for each supplier to wholly allocate to the location that does not incur a transportion cost. This is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium, where each supplier behaves as a price taker and supplies the location with the lowest transportation cost.

The unique equilibrium allocation when $c_{ij} > 0$ is not the Pareto optimal allocation. The strategic equilibrium does not maximize welfare when firms face transportation costs to foreign markets due to waste created by cross-hauling a homogeneous good. A strategic supplier tries to influence the price to increase profits. As we see in Equation 3.14, the supplier still has an incentive to allocate to the location that is costly. Suppliers in both locations have the same incentive to allocate a portion to the costly location creating an inefficiency in the market.

The strategic equilibrium profit is

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_i^* &= x_i s_{ih}^* P^* + x_i(1 - s_{ih}^*)(P^* - c_{ij}) \\ &= x_i P^* - x_i s_{ih}^* c_{ij} \\ &= x_i P^* - \mu_i \\ &= \hat{\pi}_i - \mu_i \end{aligned} \tag{3.17}$$

where μ_i is the cross hauling loss created by a strategic supplier delivering to a location where transportation costs are incurred and $\hat{\pi}_i$ is the efficient profits that can be generated if all firms deliver solely to their home market.

To see the effect of an increase in the market concentration on the loss of welfare we impose the ceteris paribus condition

$$x_i n = X \tag{3.18}$$

where x_i is the stock, n is the number of suppliers and X is the total stock in the economy. The previous condition creates a clean ceteris paribus comparison of increased market participation. By holding the stock constant across treatments, optimization premium is reduced for the small suppliers. We then observe the effect of the optimization premium on the law of one price which is the incentive to strategically supply both markets. A large supplier can have a greater effect of price, which creates an incentive for greater cross-hauling inefficiency. If we substitute (3.18) into (3.17) we get

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_i^* &= \frac{X}{n} s_{ih} P^* + \frac{X}{n}(1 - s_{ih}^*)(P^* - c_{ij}) \\ &= \frac{X}{n} P^* - \frac{X}{n}(1 - s_{ih}^*) c_{ij} \end{aligned} \tag{3.19}$$

If we differentiate (3.19) with respect to n we can see the effect on μ_i, the cross-hauling loss. If we define $\hat{\Pi} = n\hat{\pi}_i$ as the efficient market equilibrium, meaning that all firms supply solely their home market, we can say that the welfare loss to the economy when firms are not efficiently allocating the good is $\Phi = \hat{\Pi} - n\pi_i^*$ which is the efficient profits they could have earned without cross-hauling minus the amount that a perfectly strategic supplier would receive. The total producer surplus loss then becomes $\Phi = n\mu_i$. To see the effects of an increase in the market concentration,

$$\frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial n} = \frac{-c_{ij}^2}{2b_j(n+1)^2} < 0 \tag{3.20}$$

indicating that less market concentration, the smaller the loss in welfare due to cross-hauling. Firms are more likely to supply their home markets rather than paying the transportation cost and cross-hauling to the foreign market. The increase in the number of firms to the market monotonically decreases the welfare loss to the firms when allocating at the strategic equilibrium.

A strategic supplier will no longer allocate to the costly location when $c_{ij} \geq x_i b_j(n+1)$. At this boundry condition, the cost to allocate to the costly location outweighs the potential benefit.

E. The experimental design

Table VII. Experimental design - 2×2 design

Treatment	Sessions	Suppliers per Session	Stock	Transport Costs	Periods
1	5	2	3	\$0.00	50
2	5	6	1	\$0.00	50
3	5	2	3	\$0.07	50
4	5	6	1	\$0.07	50

The experiment uses a 2×2 design, which results in four treatments. (see Table VII) The first blocking variable is the number of suppliers, n, either 2 or 6. The second blocking variable is transportation costs to either \$0.00 or \$0.07. The design used twenty cohorts. Five cohorts for each treatment. The design tests the following hypotheses:

- H_0: Increasing n ceteris paribus decreases observed price dispersion.
- H_1: With transportation costs, increasing n ceteris paribus results in less inefficient cross-hauling.
- H_2: When $n = 6$ subjects behave as if they are price takers.
- H_3: When $n = 2$ subjects are more likely to use their unique equilibrium strategy.

Suppliers are symmetrically endowed in each treatment. We endow the large[8] suppliers with three each period, $x_i = 3$, and we endow the small suppliers with

[8]We will refer to the first and third treatments, which have two suppliers, as large supplier treatments, and the second and forth treatments, which have six suppliers, as small supplier treatments.

one such that $x_i = 1$. Holding the total stock in the economy constant improves the identification of implications that increased market concentration have on the law of one price as well as the incentive to strategically supply to both markets.

The inverse demand function at location j is given by $P_j = 0.70 - 0.11667Q_j$[9]. The equilibrium price for both market locations is \$0.35 in all treatments. The best response functions for the linear case which are used in the experiments are derived from the profit conditions and follow from Equation (3.12) such that the best reponse function for 2 large suppliers without transportation costs is

$$r_i(m_{-ij}) = \frac{3}{4} - \frac{1}{2}m_{-ij} \tag{3.21}$$

and the unique equilibrium allocation is

$$s^*_{ih} = \frac{1}{2} \tag{3.22}$$

The best response function for the treatment with 6 suppliers and without transport costs is

$$r_i(m_{-ij}) = \begin{cases} 0 & if \;\; m_{-ij} > 0.7 \\ (1.75 - 2.5m_{-ij}) & if \;\; 0.3 \leq m_{-ij} \leq 0.7 \\ 1 & if \;\; m_{-ij} < 0.3 \end{cases} \tag{3.23}$$

and the unique equilibrium allocation is

[9]The profit function was chosen because it follows from Meyer et al. [38] where the linear demand function in this paper is tangent to the iso-elastic demand function in Meyer et al.

$$s_{ih}^{*} = \frac{1}{2} \tag{3.24}$$

The equilibrium profits without transport costs become

$$\pi_i^{*} = xP^{*} = \hat{\pi}_i \tag{3.25}$$

due to the fact there is no transport cost to the foreign market, all allocations that satisfy the law of one price, including the equilibrium, are efficient.

The transportation cost in both treatments 3 and 4 is $c_{ij} = \$0.07$. With transportation costs the best response function for the 2 large suppliers becomes

$$r_i(m_{-ij}) = \frac{4}{5} - \frac{1}{2}s_{-ij} \quad \forall \ m_{-ij} \in [0,1] \tag{3.26}$$

where $s_{ih}^{*} = 0.60$. Note how the allocation to the home market increases by including transportation costs from 0.50 to 0.60. And for 6 small suppliers with transport costs the best response function becomes

$$r_i(m_{-ij}) = \begin{cases} 0 & if \ \ m_{-ij} > 0.76 \\ (1.9 - 2.5s_{-ij}) & if \ \ 0.36 \leq m_{-ij} \leq 0.76 \\ 1 & if \ \ m_{-ij} < 0.36 \end{cases} \tag{3.27}$$

where $s_{ih}^{*} = 0.80$. With increased market participation, the amount of cross-hauling decreases. We see that the large suppliers want to deliver 40% to the costly location and the small suppliers only want to deliver 20% to the costly location.

The equilibrium profits for treatment two become

$$\pi_i^{*} = x\left[P^{*} - 0.035\left(1 - \frac{3}{5x_i}\right)\right] \tag{3.28}$$

The efficient profits for the firms when all suppliers strictly deliver all of their allocation to the home market gives

$$\hat{\pi}_i = x_i P^* \tag{3.29}$$

We call $\hat{\pi}_i$ the efficient profits where the supplier is able to capture all of the surplus without incurring any transport costs. If we consider the loss to cross hauling

$$\hat{\pi}_i - \pi^* = 0.035\left(1 - \frac{3}{5x_i}\right) \tag{3.30}$$

If we substitute in the endowment constraint $x = X/n$, we get

$$\hat{\pi}_i - \pi^* = 0.035\left(1 - \frac{3n}{5X}\right) = \mu_i \tag{3.31}$$

where μ is the cross-hauling loss due to strategically supplying the market. Increasing the number of firms to the market affects the strategy and loss to cross hauling we see

$$\frac{\partial \mu_i}{\partial n} = \frac{-.021}{X} < 0 \tag{3.32}$$

Thus we see that increasing the number of suppliers, ceteris paribus, reduces cross-hauling. The profits to each supplier is increased by reducing the incentive to strategically cross-haul.

The loss in producer surplus is a direct result of a coordination failure as well as firms strategically supplying the market with transportation costs. To strategically supply without transportation costs does not decrease producer surplus. It is the suppliers that pay the transportation costs that cause a reduction in profits. The total producer surplus loss to the economy decreases with an increase in firms



Fig. 21. Best response curves with contour (lighter shades represent higher payoffs)

as shown in (3.19).

Figure 21 diagrams the best response functions to the subjects. The vertical axis is the allocation, s_{ih}, of the supplier to their home location. The horizontal axis depicts the average allocation decisions of the suppliers, m_{-ij}. The dark line depicts the best response curve for a supplier as viewed from the home market allocation. Because the axes are denoted in share allocated to the home market, the relevant portion of the figure is from zero to one.

Table VIII depicts the theoretical loss to suppliers that supply at the strategic equilibrium. Suppliers without transportation costs lose nothing by transporting the good to both markets. In aggregate, the total cross-hauling loss is $2\mu_i = \$0.168$ in treatment 3 and for the six small small suppliers in treatment 4, the loss is $6\mu_i = \$0.084$, half the size of the large suppliers. Thus, the theoretical prediction for the suppliers is a reduction in cross-hauling loss with an increase in the number of suppliers.

Table VIII. Loss to suppliers from cross-hauling at strategic equilibrium

Treatment	Suppliers	Transport Costs	Cross-Haul Loss, μ
1	2	No	\$0.00
2	6	No	\$0.00
3	2	Yes	\$0.084
4	6	Yes	\$0.014

The experiment presented tests the theory of strategic suppliers that implies that changing the market concentration and adding transportation costs, ceteris paribus, will change the frequency with which cross-hauling is observed. Each experimental session consisted of 50 periods.

The participants were students that were randomly recruited throughout Texas

A&M University and were allowed to participate in only one session. The subjects were read statements concerning the time required and the nature of the experiments. If more subjects wanted to participate than were needed, the subjects needed were randomly chosen from the group, the others were paid a "show-up" fee and were not allowed to participate. The subjects were then read the instructions as they followed along on their computer. The subjects were also told that their earnings would vary according to the decisions that they made during the experiments and that the experiments would last from one to three hours depending on the decisions of the people in their cohort. After reading the subjects the instructions, but before the session began, the subjects filled out a questionnaire to determine that they could understand how to read the payoff tables. Table IX describes the efficient and equilbrium profits that can be attained in the different treatments.

Table IX. Experimental design - equilibrium profits

Treatment	Suppliers per Session	Stock	Transport Costs	Strategic Equilibrium	Efficient Equilibrium
1	2	3	\$0.00	\$1.05	\$1.05
2	6	1	\$0.00	\$0.35	\$0.35
3	2	3	\$0.07	\$0.966	\$1.05
4	6	1	\$0.07	\$0.336	\$0.35

The experiment uses the ERL (Economics Research Laboratory) Gray Box software (see Figure 22). The subjects participated in a two market design with a specified number of goods. The novelty of the Gray Box software is the clear depiction of the optimization premium to the subjects. The contour shading indicates a better and best response to all allocation choices by rival suppliers. The subject is



Fig. 22. Example of ERL Gray Box GUI (6 suppliers with transportation costs)

not left to randomly search the grid for a better response to a response by other suppliers. The contour clearly demarcates the better and best responses to others allocation choices.

The subjects were not allowed to communicate one with another during the experiment. As each subject looked at the screen, they could determine what they

thought the average of the other market players will supply to Market A, m_{-iA}. This is called the market statistic (MS). The market statistic is the average of the other player's choices. The market statistic excludes the choice made by the individual. This is the viewed by the subjects as a horizontal yellow line in Figure 22. They can slide the market statistic until they find what they think is the expected choice of other suppliers to Market A. They then can move the vertical green line, which is their own participation in market, up and down until they have found a best response to the market statistic.

The graphical user interface (GUI) also displays a contour that reveals optimal allocations for areas of a lighter shade. They then confirm their choice and once all participants have made their choice, their own payoff is displayed along with the true market statistic. This is one period. The game is then repeated for 50 periods. The subjects earned from \$14.37 to \$52.50 plus a \$5.00 fee for participating. After the experiment the subjects were all paid in cash and in private and were allowed to leave. The efficient allocation profits are \$17.50 for the small suppliers and \$52.50 for the large suppliers.

The interface used allows the subjects to know the collective decisions of their cohort, which allows them to strategically determine their dominant strategy given the prior history. All the hypothetical payoffs can be determined before the subject makes a decision on how to proceed. There was no time limit for the subjects to make a choice in any of the periods.

F. Experimental results

Figure 23 through Figure 26 reports the allocation decisions of each supplier throughout the 50 periods. In Figure 25 and Figure 26, the straight line through the data



Fig. 23. Aggregate allocation to Market A by round (2 suppliers - no transport cost)



Fig. 24. Aggregate allocation to Market A by round (2 suppliers - with transport costs)



Fig. 25. Aggregate allocation to Market A by round (6 suppliers - no transport cost)



Fig. 26. Aggregate allocation to Market A by round (6 suppliers - with transport costs)



Fig. 27. Market clearing price in Market A by round (2 suppliers - no transport cost)

is a fitted regression line and denotes the trend in the allocation choices of the players. Figure 25 describes the allocation decisions by cohort and player. Also in Figures 25 and 26, each graph is divided up into cells that represent the cohort and player. Each row is a cohort and the first three cells in each row of Figure 26 depict suppliers that are home to location A and the last three in each row are home to location B.

1. Market concentration and price dispersion

Figures 27 through 30 report the price that clears the market in Market A in each period. The law of one price suggests a market clearing price of $0.35 each period. Deviations from that price represent the inability of suppliers to coordinate on an aggregate allocation that equates the two markets.

Fig. 28. Market clearing price in Market A by round (6 suppliers - no transport cost)

Fig. 29. Market clearing price in Market A by round (2 suppliers - with transport costs)

Fig. 30. Market clearing price in Market A by round (6 suppliers - with transport costs)

Measures of price dispersion that are unitless are helpful when comparing across products. Suppose the prices across markets is drawn from a distribution, F, with mean μ and variance σ^2. The coefficient of variation, $CV = \sigma/\mu$, has been used by Carlson-Pescatrice [9], Sorensen [48] and Baye, Morgan and Scholten [5] and others, to measure price dispersion in traditional retail markets. The coefficient of variation for the two large suppliers treatment without transportation costs is 0.065 and for the six small suppliers treatment without transportation costs the coefficient of variation is 0.155. A t-test indicates that the two coefficients are statistically different from one another with a p 0.000. The coefficient of variation for the two large suppliers treatment with transportation costs is 0.140 and for the six small suppliers treatment with transportation costs the coefficient of variation is 0.163. A t-test indicates that the two coefficients are also statistically different from one another with a p 0.000.

Figures 31 through 34 report the price dispersion by round for the four treatments and Table X reports the price dispersion between the two markets. When we test whether the price dispersion is the same as n increases, we can soundly reject the null hypothesis that increasing n ceteris paribus decreases observed price dispersion with a p-value < 0.000.



Fig. 31. Price dispersion between markets by round (2 suppliers - no transport cost)



Fig. 32. Price dispersion between markets by round (6 suppliers - no transport cost)



Fig. 33. Price dispersion between markets by round (2 suppliers - with transport costs)



Fig. 34. Price dispersion between markets by round (6 suppliers - with transport costs)

Table X. Price dispersion - aggregated

Treatment	Suppliers	Transport Costs	Mean Price Dispersion	Coefficient of Variation
1	2	No	$0.0143	0.065
2	6	No	$0.0794	0.155
3	2	Yes	$0.0647	0.140
4	6	Yes	$0.0902	0.163

2. Inefficient cross-hauling

To measure inefficient cross-hauling, μ_i, it is necessary for transportation costs to be present. Without transport costs it is not inefficient to supply multiple locations, therefore we will focus our attention on treatments 3 and 4 with transport costs. Tables XI and XII report the average allocation of suppliers, grouped by suppliers located in the same location. The periods are also broken down by the first 25 rounds and the last 25 rounds due to stabilized prices.

Table XI. A measure of cross-hauling & variance in play by suppliers (2 firms with transport costs)

Player	Home Market	Unique Equilibrium	Mean	std. dev.	Min	Max
All Rounds						
1	A	60	66.964	10.125	30	100
2	B	40	32.580	12.239	15	99
1st 25 Periods						
1	A	60	65.960	12.313	30	100
2	B	40	35.736	15.165	15	99
Last 25 Periods						
1	A	60	67.968	7.227	34	100
2	B	40	29.424	7.123	16	67

Table XII. A measure of cross-hauling & variance in play by suppliers (6 firms with transport costs)

Player	Home Location	Unique Equilibrium	Mean	std. dev.	Min	Max
All Rounds						
1-3	A	80	66.547	23.569	0	100
4-6	B	20	35.283	18.555	0	100
1st 25 Periods						
1-3	A	80	64.336	25.188	0	100
4-6	B	20	37.629	19.505	0	100
Last 25 Periods						
1-3	A	80	68.757	21.639	0	100
4-6	B	20	32.936	17.263	0	100

In treatment 3 with two firms and transport costs tend to move toward less cross-hauling as the periods increase. The strategic equilibrium for this treatment is 60% of their allocation for those home to location A and they are supplying almost 67% to the home location. The same is true for those home to location B. With the efficient outcome being all of their allocation delivered to the home location. Suppliers were better off coordinating with the rival supplier closer toward the efficient allocation in the equilibrium allocation. The first 25 periods of the suppliers home to location A supplied almost 66% of their allocation to the home location and by the last 25 periods they were supplying almost 68% of their allocation to the home location.

The small suppliers with six firms and transportation costs had a unique equilibrium strategy of supplying 80% of their allocation to the home location. The small suppliers in Table XII should supply 80% to their home location at the equilibrium allocation, however, we see that the suppliers allocating only 66.5% to the home location. By allocating more of their allocation to the foreign location, suppliers were paying transportation costs above and beyond the strategic allocation making the individual firms worse off.

We can also see from Table XII that the firms are actually moving toward the strategic equilibrium. The first 25 periods the suppliers home to location A deliver 64% of their endowment to the home location and by the last 25 periods they are delivering almost 69% of their endowment to the home location. The move toward the unique equilibrium strategy also moves the firms toward the efficient equilibrium as well.

To be able to test the second hypothesis, H_1, that with transportation costs, increasing n ceteris paribus results in less inefficient cross-hauling. In equation 3.33, we wanted to test if increasing n affected the loss to the suppliers. In equation 3.33

the indicator variable is for treatment 3 and 4, where treatment 3 was the ommited variable. The results are displayed in Table XIII. At 6% level of significance we can reject the null that there is no effect on cross-hauling loss by increasing the number of suppliers.

$$\text{Cross-Hauling Loss} = \beta_0 + \beta \text{ TREATMENT} + error \tag{3.33}$$

Table XIII. Cross-hauling loss to economy

Cross-Haul	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P<t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Treatment 4	0.00655	0.00347	1.89000	0.06000	-0.00027	0.01337
Constant	0.13779	0.00245	56.16000	0.00000	0.13297	0.14261

The theoretical cross-hauling loss for the large suppliers, $2\mu = \$0.168$ and for the six small small suppliers, the theoretical loss is $6\mu = \$0.084$. In treatment 3 with two suppliers, the average spent per round on transportion costs is $\$0.138$ and in treatment 4, the average spent per round on transportation costs is $\$0.1443$. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that increases in the number of suppliers, with transportation costs, results in more inefficient cross-hauling.

3. Do subjects in treatment 4 behave as price takers?

Results in experimental economics have demonstrated that it takes very few participants to observe price taking behavior. We wanted to test H_2, with $n = 6$ subjects do we observe price taking behavior? If subjects were to behave as price takers then they would supply at the competitive equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium for the suppliers without transportation costs is any allocation that satisfies

the law of one price. With transportation costs there is only one efficient allocation and that is to supply all of their allocation to their home location. Because price takers behave as if the price is exogeneous, there is no incentive for them to deviate from the competitive equilibrium.

We find evidence of the six small suppliers behaving strategically. With transportation costs, a price taking supplier would not voluntarily choose positive deliveries to the location that is costly to deliver the good, if $\bar{P}_{ik} < \bar{P}_i^{\star}$. This means that we should see each supplier delivering all of their allocation to the home location. In treatment 4, suppliers allocated 34% of their allocation to the foreign location, which is strictly greater than prediction of delivering none to the foreign location with transportation costs.

4. Strategic suppliers

The strategic equilibrium suggests that the small and the large suppliers should extract all the surplus from the location without transport costs. They are also able to allocate efficiently if they can solve one of the many allocations that solve the one price law. In Figure 35 we see the small suppliers without transport costs in treatment 1 are much more efficient than treatment 3 without transport costs in figure 36. The average efficiency for the small suppliers without transport costs is 97.58% which is almost 2% less than the large suppliers. When we compare Figure 37 and Figure 38 we see the same phenomenon happening that we saw with the large suppliers. The suppliers with transportation costs are less efficient than without those costs. The small suppliers with transport costs average 90.41% efficiency. This is over 7% less efficient than the suppliers without transport costs. The level of efficiency is relative to the maximum amount of surplus available to the suppliers. All percentages are statistically significantly different from one another.



Fig. 35. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the efficient equilibrium (2 suppliers - no transport cost)



Fig. 36. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the efficient equilibrium (2 suppliers - with transport costs)



Fig. 37. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the efficient equilibrium (6 suppliers - no transport cost)



Fig. 38. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the efficient equilibrium (6 suppliers - with transport costs)

Figures 39 and 40 examine the level of efficiency that is available to the firms relative to their strategic equilibrium. This is indicative of whether the suppliers are cross-hauling and to what extent. They average 100.59% efficiency relative to their equilibrium in the last 25 periods. This means that they are allocating between their strategic equilibrium and the efficient equilibrium. The small suppliers average 94.18% efficient relative to the strategic equilibrium. The small suppliers are cross-hauling more than their equilibrium strategy and this is reducing their overall efficiency. The inefficiency is derived from the inability to coordinate their decisions with the other firms as well as the transportation costs that are associated with cross-hauling. All firms would be better off if they were to only deliver their allocation to their home location. They are much less efficient than the firms without transportation costs.

In Appendix A4, Table XX describes the test of a difference in the mean efficiency of the small suppliers. The mean for the six small suppliers without transport costs is 97.58% efficient and 90.41% efficient for the suppliers with transport costs. The difference is over 7% efficiency and is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The same is true when we look at the difference between the first and last 25 periods. Both the suppliers with and without transport costs increase their efficiency by about 2% and again the statistical significance holds at the 1% level of significance.



Fig. 39. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the unique, s_i^*, equilibrium (2 suppliers - with transport costs)



Fig. 40. Aggregate earnings by cohort relative to the unique, s_i^*, equilibrium (6 suppliers - with transport costs)

Table XXI describes the means testing on the large suppliers. The overall efficiency of the large suppliers without transport costs is 99.56% efficient. They were able to extract almost all the surplus and maximize revenue. The large suppliers with transport costs were not able to extract as much surplus. Their mean efficiency was 91.48% efficient. Again the means are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. This also holds for the first and last 25 periods.

In Table XXII and Table XXIII, we wanted to test that there was a difference in the large and small suppliers with and without transport costs. All were found to be statistically significant from one another. It is clear that adding market concentration and transport costs changes the amount of surplus that the suppliers are able to extract.

5. Decentralized competition and efficiency

As is clear from Figures 23 through 26, market concentration clearly impedes the ability of the subjects to coordinate. By adding transportation costs we see that the level of efficiency is reduced. In Figures 35 and 36, we see this drop in efficiency. The large suppliers without transport costs depicted in Figure 35 extracts almost all the profits available or about 99.56% of the surplus. Welfare is maximized in this treatment. In Figure 36 the average efficiency is 91.48% for these firms or about an 8% decline in efficiency by adding transportation costs.

Table XXIV through Table XXX in the appendix test the theory as proposed in Meyer et al. [38] that there is a weighted attraction such that once a supplier notices the price below or above P^*, then they remain there in period $t+1$. The tests are chi-square tests and the null hypothesis is that they randomly play each cell. It is clear that the suppliers are not randomly assigning their allocation to the markets.

Table XIV. Times played unique, s_i^*, equilibrium (all treatments)

Treatment	Unique Equilibrium	Suppliers	Transport Costs	Times Played	Times Not Played	% Times Played
1	50% to Home Market	2	No	444	56	88.8%
2	50% to Home Market	6	No	405	1,095	27.0%
3	60% to Home Market	2	Yes	12	488	2.4%
4	80% to Home Market	6	Yes	62	1,438	4.1%

Table XIV reports the quantity and percentage of times that the supplier allocates at the strategic equilibrium. The suppliers without transport costs are much more likely to allocate as such. Also, market concentration leads to diminished strategic equilibrium allocation. However, for the suppliers with transport costs, the suppliers with more firms in the market tend to find the equilibrium with greater frequency.

G. Conclusion

The law of one price is routinely rejected empirically. This paper has considered the possibility that even in a complete information framework, it is difficult for suppliers to eliminate price dispersion. Market concentration is one of the key components in coordination for strategic firms. As the optimization premium is increased, more subjects use their unique equilibrium strategy. As the number of suppliers increases in the market, price dispersion increases.

With heterogeneous transportation costs, increasing the number of suppliers in a market increases inefficiencies by making it costly to strategically supply both markets. We do not see suppliers behave as price takers and supply at the Pareto optimal allocation, which is for suppliers to solely supply the market with the

smallest transportation cost. We find that decreased market concentration and transportation costs lead to firms cross-hauling more inefficiently than with increased market concentration. Strategy coordination failure decreases welfare in the economy by creating price dispersion and inefficient cross-hauling.

Treatments with transportion costs had greater price dispersion than the treatments without the transport costs. The ability of suppliers to coordinate in this setting is directly correlated with the optimization premium. The number of subjects that play the unique strategic equilibrium as a percentage of the whole cohort is reduced as the market concentration decreases. Increasing the number of firms ceteris paribus decreases the likelihood of satisfying the law of one price.

The conclusion to this paper is that market concentration matters. In contrast to the notion that with increased market concentration or as you approach perfect competition that price dispersion decreases, we find just the opposite. We find that with increased suppliers to an economy leads to increased price disperion and inefficient allocations due to cross-hauling when transportation costs are included.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Price dispersion is not fully explained by trade barriers, exchange rates, borders, transportation costs or information costs. My thesis is that observed price dispersion or violations in the law of one price are the result of a difficult strategy coordination problem and that sufficiently small suppliers will not have a large enough optimization premium or incentive to eliminate price dispersion.

When there are very few suppliers in a market, the incentives or optimization premium is greater than when there are many suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases, the incentive to best respond becomes very small. The number of suppliers also increases the complexity of the best response decision and it becomes costly and complex to make such calculations. When the decisions to optimize accurately has a small penalty, the market participant may not do so with price dispersion being the end result.

Information costs are greater and incentives to do the right thing are smaller as the number of suppliers increase in a market. As the optimization premium increases suppliers will behave more strategically. Brander [6] showed that strategic suppliers will engage in cross-hauling. As the number of firms supplying the market increases, the optimization premium falls and the amount of inefficient cross-hauling falls. Transportation costs may answer the question of which supplier should respond to a violation of the law of one price. Transportation costs help coordinate the market allocation but introduce inefficient cross-hauling.

This dissertation examined the theoretical arguments surrounding the law of one price. It also highlighted some of the literature describing failure of the law to hold empirically. I examined the influence the number of suppliers had on the abil-

ity of suppliers to eliminate price dispersion. I show that without transportation costs, any aggregate allocation that solves the law of one price is efficient. However, a strategic supplier has an incentive to deviate if the aggregate allocation is not at the unique equilibrium allocation.

I implement experiments to test the law of one price in a laboratory setting and find that neither price signals nor transportation costs signal effectively to the suppliers where they should allocate. I find that subjects do not behave as price takers. I also find that by increasing the number of suppliers, price dispersion increases.

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APPENDIX A

A1: Chapter II data

Table XV. Means test of efficiency from s_i^* (6 & 12 suppliers)

Firms	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**s.e.**	**std. dev.**	95% **Conf.**	**Int.**
All Rounds						
6	1,500	0.9817	0.0009	0.0359	0.9799	0.9835
12	3,000	0.9745	0.0008	0.0419	0.9730	0.9760
Combined	4,500	0.9769	0.0006	0.0402	0.9757	0.9781
Difference		0.0072***	0.0012		0.0049	0.0096
		(6.0046)				
First 25 Periods						
6	750	0.9699	0.0017	0.0468	0.9665	0.9732
12	1,500	0.9667	0.0014	0.0533	0.9640	0.9694
Combined	2,250	0.9678	0.0011	0.0512	0.9656	0.9699
Difference		0.0032*	0.0022		-0.0011	0.0075
		(1.4539)				
Last 25 Periods						
6	300	0.9935	0.0004	0.0104	0.9928	0.9943
12	1,500	0.9823	0.0006	0.0233	0.9811	0.9835
Combined	2,250	0.9860	0.0004	0.0207	0.9852	0.9869
Difference		0.0112***	0.0007		0.0098	0.0127
		(15.7866)				

* Significant at the 10% level, t-statistic in parentheses
*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Absolute difference from unique equilibrium.

Table XVI. Basin of attraction relative to random play (6 large suppliers)

	$< p_(t+1)^*$	$= p_(t+1)^*$	$> p_(t+1)^*$	**Total**	$p-value$	χ_2^2
6 Large Suppliers						
$< p^*$	56	6	57	119	0.0000	42.874
$= p^*$	4	11	4	19	0.9730	5.158
$> p^*$	59	4	44	107	0.0000	45.327
Total	119	21	105	245		
χ_8^2					0.0000	196.074

Table XVII. Basin of attraction relative to random play (12 small suppliers)

	$< p_(t+1)^*$	$= p_(t+1)^*$	$> p_(t+1)^*$	**Total**	$p-value$	χ_2^2
12 Small Suppliers						
$< p^*$	55	1	73	129	0.0000	65.30
$= p^*$	2	0	0	2	0.1353	5.158
$> p^*$	71	1	42	114	0.0000	65.11
Total	128	2	115	245		
χ_8^2					0.0000	312.08

Table XVIII. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (6 large suppliers)

	$< p_(t+1)^*$	$> p_(t+1)^*$	**Total**	$p-value$	χ_2^2
12 Small Suppliers					
$< p^*$	56	57	113	0.9250	0.0089
$> p^*$	59	44	103	0.1394	2.1845
Total	115	101	216		
χ_3^2				0.1099	6.0353

Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.

Table XIX. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (12 small suppliers)

	$< p_(t+1)^*$	$> p_(t+1)^*$	**Total**	$p-value$	χ_2^2
12 Small Suppliers					
$< p^*$	55	73	128	0.1116	2.5313
$> p^*$	71	42	113	0.0064	7.4425
Total	126	115	241		
χ_3^2				0.0001	20.648

Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.

A2: Proof of expected variance with random play

X = total stock in the economy

$x_i = x$ the endowment for each supplier is symmetric $N =$ total number of suppliers

$X = \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_i = Nx$

The total stock in the economy remains constant as the number of suppliers increases their individual share decreases.

$b = \frac{a}{X} = \frac{a}{Nx}$

$P_1 = a - bx \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i$

$P_2 = a - bx(N - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i)$

$$\begin{aligned}(P_1 - P_2) &= a - bx \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i - a + bx(N - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i) \\ &= bxN - 2bx \sum s_i \\ &= bx(N - 2 \sum s_i)\end{aligned}$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
(P_1 - P_2)^2 &= (bx)^2(N - 2\sum s_i)^2 \\
&= (bx)^2[N^2 - 4N\sum s_i + 4(\sum s_i)^2] \\
&= (bx)^2[N^2 - 4N\sum s_i + 4(\sum s_i^2 + \sum_{i \neq j} s_i s_j)]
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
E[(P_1 - P_2)^2] &= (bx)^2[N^2 - E[4N\sum s_i] + E[4(\sum s_i^2 + \sum_{i \neq j} s_i s_j)]] \\
&= (bx)^2\left[N^2 - 2N^2 + 4\left(\frac{N}{3} + \frac{N(N-1)}{4}\right)\right] \\
&= ((bx)^2\left[-N^2 + \frac{N}{3} + N^2\right] \\
&= (bx)^2\left[\frac{N}{3}\right] \\
&= \left[\frac{a}{N}\right]^2\left[\frac{N}{3}\right] \\
&= \frac{a^2}{3N}
\end{aligned}
$$

For the case where $N = 6,\ 12$

The theoretical predictions when $s \sim U[0, 1]$ are:

$$E[(P_1 - P_2)^2]_6 = \$0.02722$$

$$E[(P_1 - P_2)^2]_{12} = \$0.013611$$

A3: Proof of uniqueness for the stage game with symmetric markets and linear demand

Firm i's profit while allocating to 2 markets with a given allocation x_i is given by the following

$$\pi_i = (a - bx_i \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i)s_i x_i + (a - bx_i \sum_{i=1}^{n} (1 - s_i))(1 - s_i)x_i$$

To simplify notation, $\sigma = \sum_{k \neq i} s_k$. All allocations to all firms is symmetric such that $x_i = x$. We will also drop the subscript for the allocation of the i^th firm such that $s_i = s$.

The firm's profit function then becomes

$$\pi_i = (a - bx(s + \sigma)sx + (a - bx(N - s - \sigma))(1 - s)x$$

If we integrate over firm i's profit for all possible distributions of σ, $f(\sigma)$ is defined as the p.d.f. of σ, we get

$$\pi_i = \int [(a - bx(s + \sigma)sx + (a - bx(N - s - \sigma))(1 - s)x] f(\sigma) d\sigma$$

To maximize profit we will find the first order conditions that maximize his profit.

FOC

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial s} = -bx^2 \int (4s - 2\sigma + 1 + N) f(\sigma) d\sigma = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow s = \frac{\int (2\sigma - 1 - N) f(\sigma) d\sigma}{4 \int f(\sigma) d\sigma}$$

For any distribution of σ, s has a single best response. Q.E.D.

A4: Chapter III Figures

Table XX. Means test of efficiency from s_i^* (6 suppliers with and without transport costs)

Firms	Transport Costs	Mean	s.e.	std. dev.	95% Conf.	Int.
All Rounds						
6	Yes	0.9041	0.0030	0.0479	0.8981	0.9101
6	No	0.9758	0.0030	0.0480	0.9698	0.9818
Combined		0.9400	0.0027	0.0598	0.9347	0.9452
Difference		0.0717**	0.0043		-0.0801	-0.0633
		(-16.726)				
1st 25 Periods						
6	Yes	0.8909	0.0050	0.0557	0.8810	0.9007
6	No	0.9646	0.0056	0.0623	0.9536	0.9756
Combined		0.9277	0.0044	0.0696	0.9191	0.9364
Difference		−0.0737***	0.0075		-0.0884	-0.0590
		(-9.861)				
Last 25 Periods						
6	Yes	0.9174	0.0030	0.0339	0.9114	0.9233
6	No	0.9870	0.0020	0.0221	0.9831	0.9910
Combined		0.9522	0.0029	0.0451	0.9466	0.9578
Difference		0.0697***	0.0036		-0.0768	-0.0626
		(-19.274)				

*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses

Note: Efficiency relative to the all suppliers allocating at the unique, s_i^*, equilibrium.

Table XXI. Means test of efficiency from s_i^* (2 suppliers with and without transport costs)

Firms	Transport Costs	Mean	s.e.	std. dev.	95% Conf.	Int.
All Rounds						
2	Yes	0.9148	0.0037	0.0577	0.9076	0.9220
2	No	0.9956	0.0014	0.0214	0.9929	0.9983
Combined		0.9552	0.0027	0.0594	0.9500	0.9604
Difference		-0.0808^{**}	0.0039		-0.0884	-0.0731
		(-20.755)				
1st 25 Periods						
2	Yes	0.9008	0.0065	0.0729	0.8879	0.9137
2	No	0.9920	0.0026	0.0294	0.9868	0.9972
Combined		0.9464	0.0045	0.0719	0.9374	0.9554
Difference		-0.0912^{***}	0.0070		-0.1051	-0.0773
		(-12.961)				
Last 25 Periods						
2	Yes	0.9288	0.0028	0.0312	0.9233	0.9343
2	No	0.9992	0.0005	0.0052	0.9983	1.0001
Combined		0.9640	0.0026	0.0417	0.9588	0.9692
Difference		-0.0704^{***}	0.0028		-0.0760	-0.0648
		(-24.881)				

*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Efficiency relative to the all suppliers allocating at the unique, s_i^*, equilibrium.

Table XXII. Means test of efficiency from s_i^* (2 & 6 suppliers with transport costs)

Firms	Transport Costs	Mean	s.e.	std. dev.	95% Conf.	Int.
All Rounds						
2	Yes	0.9148	0.0037	0.0577	0.9076	0.9220
6	Yes	0.9041	0.0030	0.0479	0.8981	0.9101
Combined		0.9095	0.0024	0.0532	0.9048	0.9141
Difference		0.0107^{**}	0.0047		0.0014	0.0200
		(2.2531)				
1st 25 Periods						
2	Yes	0.9008	0.0065	0.0729	0.8879	0.9137
6	Yes	0.8909	0.0050	0.0557	0.8810	0.9007
Combined		0.8958	0.0041	0.0650	0.8878	0.9039
Difference		0.0099	0.0082		-0.006	0.0261
		(1.2112)				
Last 25 Periods						
2	Yes	0.9288	0.0028	0.0312	0.9233	0.9343
6	Yes	0.9174	0.0030	0.0339	0.9114	0.9233
Combined		0.9231	0.0021	0.0330	0.9190	0.9272
Difference		0.0114^{***}	0.0041		0.0033	0.0195
		(2.7752)				

** Significant at the 5% level, t-statistic in parentheses
*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Efficiency relative to the all suppliers allocating at the unique, s_i^*, equilibrium.

Table XXIII. Means test of efficiency from s_i^* (2 & 6 suppliers without transport costs)

Firms	Transport Costs	Mean	s.e.	std. dev.	95% Conf.	Int.
All Rounds						
2	No	0.9956	0.0014	0.0214	0.9929	0.9983
6	No	0.9758	0.0030	0.0480	0.9698	0.9818
Combined		0.9857	0.0017	0.0384	0.9823	0.9891
Difference		0.0198***	0.0033		0.0132	0.0263
		(5.9539)				
1st 25 Periods						
2	No	0.9920	0.0026	0.0294	0.9868	0.9972
6	No	0.9646	0.0056	0.0623	0.9536	0.9756
Combined		0.9783	0.0032	0.0505	0.9720	0.9846
Difference		0.0274***	0.0062		0.0152	0.0396
		(4.4491)				
Last 25 Periods						
2	No	0.9992	0.0005	0.0052	0.9983	1.0001
6	No	0.9870	0.0020	0.0221	0.9831	0.9910
Combined		0.9931	0.0011	0.0171	0.9910	0.9953
Difference		0.0121***	0.0020		0.0081	0.0162
		(5.9825)				

*** Significant at the 1% level, t-statistic in parentheses
Note: Efficiency relative to the all suppliers allocating at the unique, s_i^*, equilibrium.

Table XXIV. Basin of attraction relative to random play (6 small suppliers with transport costs)

	$< p_{t+1}^*$	$= p_{t+1}^*$	$> p_{t+1}^*$	**Total**	$p - value$	χ_2^2
6 Large Suppliers						
$< p^*$	68	3	68	139	0.000	60.79
$= p^*$	3	0	1	4	0.174	3.50
$> p^*$	66	2	34	102	0.000	60.24
Total	137	5	103	245		
χ_8^2					0.000	858.9

Table XXV. Basin of attraction relative to random play (6 small suppliers without transport costs)

	$< p_{t+1}^*$	$= p_{t+1}^*$	$> p_{t+1}^*$	**Total**	$p - value$	χ_2^2
6 Large Suppliers						
$< p^*$	68	0	63	131	0.000	65.78
$= p^*$	1	0	0	1	0.368	2.00
$> p^*$	61	1	51	113	0.000	54.87
Total	130	1	114	245		
χ_8^2					0.000	856.9

Table XXVI. Basin of attraction relative to random play (2 large suppliers with transport costs)

	$< p^*_{t+1}$	$= p^*_{t+1}$	$> p^*_{t+1}$	**Total**	$p - value$	χ^2_2
6 Large Suppliers						
$< p^*$	61	2	38	101	0.000	52.53
$= p^*$	6	3	5	14	0.607	1.00
$> p^*$	35	8	87	130	0.000	74.42
Total	102	13	130	245		
χ^2_8					0.000	835.9

Table XXVII. Basin of attraction relative to random play (2 large suppliers without transport costs)

	$< p^*_{t+1}$	$= p^*_{t+1}$	$> p^*_{t+1}$	**Total**	$p - value$	χ^2_2
6 Large Suppliers						
$< p^*$	19	12	4	35	0.008	9.66
$= p^*$	10	187	3	200	0.000	326.17
$> p^*$	4	4	2	10	0.670	0.80
Total	33	203	9	245		
χ^2_8					0.000	1,623.6

Table XXVIII. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (6 small suppliers with transport costs)

	$< p^*_{t+1}$	$> p^*_{t+1}$	**Total**	$p - value$	χ^2_2
12 Small Suppliers					
$< p^*$	68	68	136	1.000	0.00
$> p^*$	66	34	100	0.001	10.24
Total	134	102	236		
χ^2_3				0.003	14.17

Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.

Table XXIX. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (6 small suppliers without transport costs)

	$< p^*_{t+1}$	$> p^*_{t+1}$	**Total**	$p - value$	χ^2_2
12 Small Suppliers					
$< p^*$	68	63	131	0.662	0.19
$> p^*$	61	51	112	0.345	0.89
Total	129	114	243		
χ^2_3				0.427	2.51

Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.

Table XXX. Basin of attraction relative to random play without equilibrium (2 large suppliers with transport costs)

	$< p^*_{t+1}$	$> p^*_{t+1}$	**Total**	$p - value$	χ^2_2
12 Small Suppliers					
$< p^*$	61	38	99	0.021	5.34
$> p^*$	35	87	122	0.000	22.16
Total	96	125	221		
χ^2_3				0.000	31.65

Note: Removing equilibrium play allows us to measure the basin of attraction for out of equilibrium play.

A5: Uniqueness

Proof of uniqueness for the stage game with symmetric markets and linear demand.

Firm i's profit while allocating to 2 markets with a given allocation x_i is given by the following

$$\pi_i = (a - bx_i \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i)s_i x_i + (a - bx_i \sum_{i=1}^{n} (1 - s_i) - c_{ij})(1 - s_i)x_i$$

To simplify notation, $\sigma = \sum_{k \neq i} s_k$. All allocations to all firms is symmetric such that $x_i = x$. We also drop the subscript for the allocation of the i^th firm such that $s_i = s$ and $c_{ij} = c$.

The firm's profit function then becomes

$$\pi_i = (a - bx(s + \sigma))sx + (a - bx(N - s - \sigma) - c)(1 - s)x$$

If we integrate over firm i's profit for all possible distributions of σ, $f(\sigma)$ is defined as the p.d.f. of σ, we get

$$\pi_i = \int [(a - bx(s + \sigma))sx + (a - bx(N - s - \sigma) - c)(1 - s)x] f(\sigma) d\sigma$$

To maximize profit we find the first order conditions that maximize his profit.

FOC

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial s} = -bx^2 \int (4s - 2\sigma + 1 + N) f(\sigma) d\sigma - cx \int f(\sigma) d\sigma = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow s = \frac{\int (N - 2\sigma - 1) f(\sigma) d\sigma}{4 \int f(\sigma) d\sigma} - \frac{c}{4bx}$$

For any distribution of σ, s has a single best response. Q.E.D.

APPENDIX B

B1: Instructions 6 Large Suppliers No Transport Costs

I. Introduction [1]

This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various agencies have provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. At the end of today's session, you will be paid in private and in cash.

It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an investigator will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.

II. Main Screen

In this session, you will participate in a group of six people. You will be randomly grouped with five other participants. You will remain grouped with these participants throughout the session. The session will last fifty periods.

In each period, every participant will pick a value for YOUR CHOICE. The values of YOUR CHOICE that can be chosen are the numbers 0, 1, 2,. . . , 99, or 100. Each

[1] The following is the instructions for 6 subjects, the instructions for other treatments is similar and is available upon request.

period the choice made by the other participants in your group will be called the MARKET STATISTIC. The value you pick for YOUR CHOICE and the MARKET STATISTIC will determine the payoff you receive for that period. The relationship between choices and earnings will not change.

Each period the choices made by the other five participants in your group will be added together and divided by five.

- For example, to find the average value of the following five numbers: 300, 100, 250, 150, 200
- add the five numbers: 300 + 100 + 250 + 150 + 200 = 1000
- then divide by five: 1000 / 5 = 200
- So, in this example, the average is 200

You use the main screen to make your choices each period.



Fig. 41. Main Screen

This screen contains:

- Two gray bars and a gray square that will help you understand how your choice and the MARKET STATISTIC influences your earnings each period,
- a confirmation button at the bottom of the screen you must use to enter your choice,
- and a record of the session.

The gray bar located at the top of the screen is labeled MARKET STATISTIC.



Fig. 42. Market Statistic Gray Bar

If you click in this gray bar, the mouse cursor will be replaced by a yellow vertical line, and a yellow vertical line also appears in the gray square. Immediately below the gray square the current value that you have chosen for the hypothetical market statistic appears as a yellow number. Directly below the value for the hypothetical market statistic are three yellow question marks, ???. The question marks are there to remind you that you do not select the market statistic. During the session the market statistic will be determined each period by the other participant in your group.

By moving your mouse left and right you can select any value between 0 and 100 for your choice of the hypothetical market statistic. You can click the mouse a second time to select a value for the hypothetical market statistic and to restore the cursor.

You can determine what your payoff would be for that hypothetical market statistic by clicking on the gray bar labeled YOUR CHOICE and selecting a value. Your mouse cursor is replaced by a green horizontal line in the gray bar labeled YOUR CHOICE and in the gray square.



Fig. 43. Hypothetical MARKET STATISTIC



Fig. 44. YOUR CHOICE Gray Bar

The earnings associated with YOUR CHOICE and the current hypothetical MARKET STATISTIC appears immediately to the right of the gray square. By moving your mouse up and down you can read off the earnings associated with all of your feasible choices and the currently selected hypothetical MARKET STATISTIC. Click the mouse a second time to select a value for YOUR CHOICE and to restore the cursor. At this point, your selection is not final. The procedure to confirm YOUR CHOICE will be discussed below. *Higher payoffs* are associated with *lighter shades* in the gray square.



Fig. 45. Hypothetical Earnings

You can click again on the gray bar labeled MARKET STATISTIC. By moving the mouse left and right, you can read off the earnings associated with changes in the MARKET STATISTIC and your currently selected choice. However, during the session the MARKET STATISTIC is determined by the value chosen by the other participant in your group.

An alternate method to determine hypothetical earnings involves clicking the mouse in the gray square.

Moving the mouse here lets you change both YOUR CHOICE and the MARKET STATISTIC. You may select any pair of values. Click the mouse a second time to

Fig. 46. Gray Square

select a value of YOUR CHOICE and restore the cursor.

You can also choose a value without first selecting a hypothetical MARKET STATISTIC. If you do so, three question marks will appear to the right of the value you have chosen to remind you that your earnings will depend on the MARKET STATISTIC selected by the other participant in your group.

In summary, the difference in the three active boxes is in what they control. Clicking on the horizontal bar allows you to change the hypothetical MARKET STATISTIC, while leaving the value of YOUR CHOICE unchanged. Clicking on the vertical bar allows you to change the value of YOUR CHOICE, while leaving the value of the hypothetical MARKET STATISTIC unchanged. Clicking in the gray square allows you to change both values simultaneously.



Fig. 47. Confirm YOUR CHOICE

When you are ready to enter YOUR CHOICE click again to restore the cursor, then click on the confirmation button located below the gray square. This button will display YOUR CHOICE. If this is the value you wish to enter, you proceed by clicking on the confirmation button. If you do not wish to enter the current value of YOUR CHOICE, you can change YOUR CHOICE by clicking in the gray square or in the gray bars. You may then make another choice by clicking on that value and once again restoring the cursor. To proceed, click on the confirmation button below the gray square.

To review, you make a choice by clicking on the gray square or the gray column labeled YOUR CHOICE. Click the mouse a second time to select a value and to restore the cursor. Click on CONFIRM. This is how YOUR CHOICE is selected during the session.



Fig. 48. Record Grid

The five columns on the right side of the screen report the following:

- the period of the outcome (the column labeled ”Period”)
- a record of your past choices (the column labeled ”Choice”)
- a record of the MARKET STATISTIC (the column labeled ”MS”)
- your earnings for each period of the session (the column labeled ”Earned”)
- and a running total of your earnings (the column labeled ”Balance”)

At the beginning of the first period your balance is zero. At the end of each period your current period earnings will be added to your balance. At the end of this session you will be paid your ending balance (the sum of all of your period earnings) in cash.

III. Outcome Screen

During a period, after everyone has made their choices, the outcome screen will appear for fifteen seconds. The outcome screen summarizes what happened each period. Your choice will be highlighted in green. The MARKET STATISTIC, determined by the other participant in your group, will be highlighted in red. Your earnings are reported next to your choice and on the record grid.

After each period's outcome screen has been displayed for fifteen seconds, you will automatically advance to the next period. You will remain in your group for the entire session. Your main screen for the next period will appear and you may then make a choice for that period whenever you are ready.



Fig. 49. Outcome and Period Earnings

The example illustates an outcome for the arbitrarily chosen values of 71 as YOUR CHOICE and 73 for the MARKET STATISTIC. The outcome screen will not be active and your mouse cursor will not be present. The value displayed on the outcome screen for YOUR CHOICE is the selection that you made, and the MARKET STATISTIC is the choice of the other participants in your group.

IV. Questionnaire

We will now pass out a handout that summarizes how to determine your earnings from YOUR CHOICE and the MARKET STATISTIC. Notice that outcomes with higher earnings in the handout correspond to lighter shades in the gray square.

We will now pass out a questionnaire to make sure that all participants understand how to calculate their earnings. Please fill out the questionnaire now. Do not put your name on the questionnaire. Raise your hand when you are finished. If there are any mistakes on any questionnaire, I will go over the relevant part of the instructions again.

V. Summary

- Each of the participants in this room will be randomly assigned to a group of size six.

- You will remain in the same group for the duration of the session: 50 periods.

- You make a choice by

    1) selecting a value between 0 and 100 for YOUR CHOICE using the gray bars and/or the gray square,

    2) clicking the mouse a second time, to select YOUR CHOICE and restore your cursor,

    3) and then clicking on CONFIRM to enter and confirm YOUR CHOICE for the current period.

- The value you pick for YOUR CHOICE and the value of the MARKET STATISTIC (determined by the other participants in your group) will determine the

payoff you receive for that period.

- The relationship between choices and earnings will not change.

- Your balance at the end of the session will be paid to you in private and in cash.

We have completed the instructions. Again, it is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work.

If you have a question, please raise your hand, and an investigator will come to assist you. If there are no questions, period one of the session will begin.

The End

APPENDIX C

C1: Data Appendix

Table XXXI.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 1

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	94	51	0.59939	0.59939	94	58	0	50	95	50
0	1	58	58	0.68208	0.68208	94	58	0	50	95	50
0	2	0	69	0.80500	0.80500	94	58	0	50	95	50
0	3	50	59	0.70000	0.70000	94	58	0	50	95	50
0	4	95	50	0.60550	0.60550	94	58	0	50	95	50
0	5	50	59	0.70000	0.70000	94	58	0	50	95	50
1	0	100	51	0.57167	1.17105	100	60	100	50	1	43
1	1	60	59	0.67433	1.35641	100	60	100	50	1	43
1	2	100	51	0.57167	1.37667	100	60	100	50	1	43
1	3	50	61	0.70000	1.40000	100	60	100	50	1	43
1	4	1	71	0.82805	1.43355	100	60	100	50	1	43
1	5	43	62	0.71731	1.41731	100	60	100	50	1	43
2	0	52	35	0.70681	1.87787	52	61	50	30	1	34
2	1	61	33	0.73799	2.09440	52	61	50	30	1	34
2	2	50	36	0.70000	2.07667	52	61	50	30	1	34
2	3	30	40	0.63467	2.03467	52	61	50	30	1	34
2	4	1	45	0.53079	1.96434	52	61	50	30	1	34
2	5	34	39	0.64699	2.06430	52	61	50	30	1	34
3	0	99	76	0.29069	2.16855	99	34	100	50	100	95
3	1	34	89	0.83365	2.92805	99	34	100	50	100	95
3	2	100	76	0.28000	2.35667	99	34	100	50	100	95
3	3	50	86	0.70000	2.73467	99	34	100	50	100	95
3	4	100	76	0.28000	2.24434	99	34	100	50	100	95
3	5	95	77	0.32200	2.38630	99	34	100	50	100	95
4	0	2	56	0.65968	2.82823	2	84	100	17	1	80
4	1	84	40	0.72539	3.65344	2	84	100	17	1	80
4	2	100	37	0.73500	3.09167	2	84	100	17	1	80
4	3	17	53	0.67228	3.40695	2	84	100	17	1	80
4	4	1	57	0.66799	2.91232	2	84	100	17	1	80
4	5	80	41	0.72100	3.10730	2	84	100	17	1	80
5	0	2	42	0.50288	3.33111	2	87	51	20	0	50
5	1	87	25	0.85195	4.50539	2	87	51	20	0	50
5	2	51	32	0.70415	3.79582	2	87	51	20	0	50
5	3	20	38	0.57400	3.98095	2	87	51	20	0	50
5	4	0	42	0.49000	3.40232	2	87	51	20	0	50
5	5	50	32	0.70000	3.80730	2	87	51	20	0	50
6	0	80	36	0.75600	4.08711	80	72	0	50	50	10
6	1	72	38	0.73901	5.24440	80	72	0	50	50	10
6	2	0	52	0.60667	4.40249	80	72	0	50	50	10
6	3	50	42	0.70000	4.68095	80	72	0	50	50	10
6	4	50	42	0.70000	4.10232	80	72	0	50	50	10
6	5	10	50	0.62533	4.43263	80	72	0	50	50	10
7	0	90	49	0.63467	4.72178	90	93	0	50	50	50
7	1	93	48	0.63378	5.87818	90	93	0	50	50	50
7	2	0	67	0.78167	5.18415	90	93	0	50	50	50
7	3	50	57	0.70000	5.38095	90	93	0	50	50	50
7	4	50	57	0.70000	4.80232	90	93	0	50	50	50
7	5	50	57	0.70000	5.13263	90	93	0	50	50	50
8	0	94	68	0.42485	5.14663	94	100	100	45	47	50
8	1	100	67	0.38500	6.26318	94	100	100	45	47	50
8	2	100	67	0.38500	5.56915	94	100	100	45	47	50
8	3	45	78	0.73150	6.11245	94	100	100	45	47	50
8	4	47	78	0.71918	5.52150	94	100	100	45	47	50
8	5	50	77	0.70000	5.83263	94	100	100	45	47	50
9	0	83	62	0.55678	5.70341	83	67	100	20	45	78
9	1	67	65	0.62701	6.89019	83	67	100	20	45	78
9	2	100	59	0.47833	6.04748	83	67	100	20	45	78
9	3	20	75	0.83300	6.94545	83	67	100	20	45	78
9	4	45	70	0.72217	6.24367	83	67	100	20	45	78
9	5	78	63	0.57848	6.41111	83	67	100	20	45	78
10	0	3	42	0.50918	6.21259	3	54	49	30	0	75
10	1	54	31	0.71699	7.60718	3	54	49	30	0	75
10	2	49	32	0.69575	6.74324	3	54	49	30	0	75
10	3	30	36	0.61600	7.56145	3	54	49	30	0	75
10	4	0	42	0.49000	6.73367	3	54	49	30	0	75
10	5	75	27	0.80500	7.21611	3	54	49	30	0	75
11	0	10	65	0.76533	6.97792	10	65	100	40	45	75
11	1	65	54	0.67550	8.28268	10	65	100	40	45	75
11	2	100	47	0.61833	7.36157	10	65	100	40	45	75
11	3	40	59	0.71633	8.27778	10	65	100	40	45	75

Table XXXI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
11	4	45	58	0.70817	7.44184	10	65	100	40	45	75
11	5	75	52	0.65917	7.87528	10	65	100	40	45	75
12	0	9	49	0.61199	7.58991	9	76	48	36	40	46
12	1	76	36	0.75339	9.03607	9	76	48	36	40	46
12	2	48	41	0.69561	8.05718	9	76	48	36	40	46
12	3	36	44	0.67125	8.94903	9	76	48	36	40	46
12	4	40	43	0.67900	8.12084	9	76	48	36	40	46
12	5	46	42	0.69179	8.56707	9	76	48	36	40	46
13	0	20	68	0.78400	8.37391	20	100	100	40	50	50
13	1	100	52	0.56000	9.59607	20	100	100	40	50	50
13	2	100	52	0.56000	8.61718	20	100	100	40	50	50
13	3	40	64	0.72800	9.67703	20	100	100	40	50	50
13	4	50	62	0.70000	8.82084	20	100	100	40	50	50
13	5	50	62	0.70000	9.26707	20	100	100	40	50	50
14	0	4	53	0.63345	9.00736	4	72	52	40	50	53
14	1	72	40	0.72875	10.32481	4	72	52	40	50	53
14	2	52	44	0.70261	9.31980	4	72	52	40	50	53
14	3	40	46	0.68600	10.36303	4	72	52	40	50	53
14	4	50	44	0.70000	9.52084	4	72	52	40	50	53
14	5	53	44	0.70378	9.97085	4	72	52	40	50	53
15	0	50	51	0.70000	9.70736	50	67	50	40	50	50
15	1	67	48	0.69445	11.01926	50	67	50	40	50	50
15	2	50	51	0.70000	10.01980	50	67	50	40	50	50
15	3	40	53	0.70233	11.06537	50	67	50	40	50	50
15	4	50	51	0.70000	10.22084	50	67	50	40	50	50
15	5	50	51	0.70000	10.67085	50	67	50	40	50	50
16	0	65	56	0.66850	10.37586	65	75	48	40	50	65
16	1	75	54	0.64750	11.66676	65	75	48	40	50	65
16	2	48	59	0.70401	10.72381	65	75	48	40	50	65
16	3	40	61	0.72100	11.78637	65	75	48	40	50	65
16	4	50	59	0.70000	10.92084	65	75	48	40	50	65
16	5	65	56	0.66850	11.33935	65	75	48	40	50	65
17	0	30	39	0.63000	11.00586	30	0	55	40	50	50
17	1	0	45	0.52500	12.19176	30	0	55	40	50	50
17	2	55	34	0.71750	11.44131	30	0	55	40	50	50
17	3	40	37	0.66500	12.45137	30	0	55	40	50	50
17	4	50	35	0.70000	11.62084	30	0	55	40	50	50
17	5	50	35	0.70000	12.03935	30	0	55	40	50	50
18	0	50	40	0.70000	11.70586	50	23	60	40	50	28
18	1	23	46	0.64078	12.83254	50	23	60	40	50	28
18	2	60	38	0.72333	12.16464	50	23	60	40	50	28
18	3	40	42	0.67667	13.12803	50	23	60	40	50	28
18	4	50	40	0.70000	12.32084	50	23	60	40	50	28
18	5	28	45	0.65175	12.69109	50	23	60	40	50	28
19	0	57	52	0.69445	12.40031	57	84	53	55	50	20
19	1	84	47	0.66985	13.50239	57	84	53	55	50	20
19	2	53	53	0.69748	12.86212	57	84	53	55	50	20
19	3	55	53	0.69533	13.82337	57	84	53	55	50	20
19	4	50	54	0.70000	13.02084	57	84	53	55	50	20
19	5	20	60	0.72800	13.41909	57	84	53	55	50	20
20	0	20	50	0.65800	13.05831	20	70	60	20	50	50
20	1	70	40	0.72800	14.23039	20	70	60	20	50	50
20	2	60	42	0.71400	13.57612	20	70	60	20	50	50
20	3	20	50	0.65800	14.48137	20	70	60	20	50	50
20	4	50	44	0.70000	13.72084	20	70	60	20	50	50
20	5	50	44	0.70000	14.11909	20	70	60	20	50	50
21	0	17	52	0.66458	13.72289	17	70	69	20	50	50
21	1	70	41	0.72333	14.95373	17	70	69	20	50	50
21	2	69	41	0.72305	14.29918	17	70	69	20	50	50
21	3	20	51	0.66500	15.14637	17	70	69	20	50	50
21	4	50	45	0.70000	14.42084	17	70	69	20	50	50
21	5	50	45	0.70000	14.81909	17	70	69	20	50	50
22	0	39	63	0.72772	14.45061	39	67	70	80	50	50
22	1	67	58	0.65478	15.60851	39	67	70	80	50	50
22	2	70	57	0.64867	14.94784	39	67	70	80	50	50
22	3	80	55	0.62300	15.76937	39	67	70	80	50	50
22	4	50	61	0.70000	15.12084	39	67	70	80	50	50
22	5	50	61	0.70000	15.51909	39	67	70	80	50	50
23	0	25	49	0.66500	15.11561	25	40	55	50	50	52
23	1	40	46	0.68600	16.29451	25	40	55	50	50	52
23	2	55	43	0.70700	15.65484	25	40	55	50	50	52
23	3	50	44	0.70000	16.46937	25	40	55	50	50	52
23	4	50	44	0.70000	15.82084	25	40	55	50	50	52
23	5	52	44	0.70261	16.22171	25	40	55	50	50	52
24	0	3	59	0.69561	15.81122	3	50	53	50	50	90
24	1	50	49	0.70000	16.99451	3	50	53	50	50	90
24	2	53	49	0.70028	16.35512	3	50	53	50	50	90
24	3	50	49	0.70000	17.16937	3	50	53	50	50	90
24	4	50	49	0.70000	16.52084	3	50	53	50	50	90
24	5	90	41	0.70933	16.93104	3	50	53	50	50	90
25	0	16	44	0.59845	16.40967	16	50	58	50	50	10
25	1	50	37	0.70000	17.69451	16	50	58	50	50	10
25	2	58	35	0.72501	17.08014	16	50	58	50	50	10
25	3	50	37	0.70000	17.86937	16	50	58	50	50	10
25	4	50	37	0.70000	17.22084	16	50	58	50	50	10

Table XXXI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
25	5	10	45	0.57867	17.50970	16	50	58	50	50	10
26	0	80	47	0.67900	17.08867	80	50	55	70	50	10
26	1	50	53	0.70000	18.39451	80	50	55	70	50	10
26	2	55	52	0.69650	17.77664	80	50	55	70	50	10
26	3	70	49	0.68600	18.55537	80	50	55	70	50	10
26	4	50	53	0.70000	17.92084	80	50	55	70	50	10
26	5	10	61	0.72800	18.23770	80	50	55	70	50	10
27	0	50	54	0.70000	17.78867	50	50	50	70	50	50
27	1	50	54	0.70000	19.09451	50	50	50	70	50	50
27	2	50	54	0.70000	18.47664	50	50	50	70	50	50
27	3	70	50	0.68133	19.23670	50	50	50	70	50	50
27	4	50	54	0.70000	18.62084	50	50	50	70	50	50
27	5	50	54	0.70000	18.93770	50	50	50	70	50	50
28	0	50	55	0.70000	18.48867	50	54	50	71	50	50
28	1	54	54	0.69552	19.79003	50	54	50	71	50	50
28	2	50	55	0.70000	19.17664	50	54	50	71	50	50
28	3	71	51	0.67452	19.91122	50	54	50	71	50	50
28	4	50	55	0.70000	19.32084	50	54	50	71	50	50
28	5	50	55	0.70000	19.63770	50	54	50	71	50	50
29	0	42	57	0.71008	19.19875	42	50	56	80	50	49
29	1	50	55	0.70000	20.49003	42	50	56	80	50	49
29	2	56	54	0.69272	19.86936	42	50	56	80	50	49
29	3	80	49	0.66500	20.57622	42	50	56	80	50	49
29	4	50	55	0.70000	20.02084	42	50	56	80	50	49
29	5	49	56	0.70135	20.33906	42	50	56	80	50	49
30	0	20	48	0.64400	19.84275	20	50	50	40	50	50
30	1	50	42	0.70000	21.19003	20	50	50	40	50	50
30	2	50	42	0.70000	20.56936	20	50	50	40	50	50
30	3	40	44	0.68133	21.25755	20	50	50	40	50	50
30	4	50	42	0.70000	20.72084	20	50	50	40	50	50
30	5	50	42	0.70000	21.03906	20	50	50	40	50	50
31	0	42	51	0.69888	20.54163	42	50	45	60	50	50
31	1	50	49	0.70000	21.89003	42	50	45	60	50	50
31	2	45	50	0.69883	21.26819	42	50	45	60	50	50
31	3	60	47	0.70233	21.95989	42	50	45	60	50	50
31	4	50	49	0.70000	21.42084	42	50	45	60	50	50
31	5	50	49	0.70000	21.73906	42	50	45	60	50	50
32	0	55	52	0.69650	21.23813	55	50	50	60	50	50
32	1	50	53	0.70000	22.59003	55	50	50	60	50	50
32	2	50	53	0.70000	21.96819	55	50	50	60	50	50
32	3	60	51	0.69300	22.65289	55	50	50	60	50	50
32	4	50	53	0.70000	22.12084	55	50	50	60	50	50
32	5	50	53	0.70000	22.43906	55	50	50	60	50	50
33	0	51	52	0.69949	21.93762	51	50	50	60	50	48
33	1	50	52	0.70000	23.29003	51	50	50	60	50	48
33	2	50	52	0.70000	22.66819	51	50	50	60	50	48
33	3	60	50	0.69533	23.34822	51	50	50	60	50	48
33	4	50	52	0.70000	22.82084	51	50	50	60	50	48
33	5	48	52	0.70075	23.13980	51	50	50	60	50	48
34	0	40	52	0.70000	22.63762	40	50	50	60	50	50
34	1	50	50	0.70000	23.99003	40	50	50	60	50	50
34	2	50	50	0.70000	23.36819	40	50	50	60	50	50
34	3	60	48	0.70000	24.04822	40	50	50	60	50	50
34	4	50	50	0.70000	23.52084	40	50	50	60	50	50
34	5	50	50	0.70000	23.83980	40	50	50	60	50	50
35	0	36	57	0.71372	23.35134	36	50	56	59	50	70
35	1	50	54	0.70000	24.69003	36	50	56	59	50	70
35	2	56	53	0.69412	24.06231	36	50	56	59	50	70
35	3	59	52	0.69202	24.74024	36	50	56	59	50	70
35	4	50	54	0.70000	24.22084	36	50	56	59	50	70
35	5	70	50	0.68133	24.52114	36	50	56	59	50	70
36	0	35	54	0.70350	24.05484	35	50	50	59	50	60
36	1	50	51	0.70000	25.39003	35	50	50	59	50	60
36	2	50	51	0.70000	24.76231	35	50	50	59	50	60
36	3	59	49	0.69832	25.43856	35	50	50	59	50	60
36	4	50	51	0.70000	24.92084	35	50	50	59	50	60
36	5	60	49	0.69767	25.21880	35	50	50	59	50	60
37	0	34	51	0.69179	24.74663	34	50	50	39	50	68
37	1	50	48	0.70000	26.09003	34	50	50	39	50	68
37	2	50	48	0.70000	25.46231	34	50	50	39	50	68
37	3	39	50	0.69435	26.13291	34	50	50	39	50	68
37	4	50	48	0.70000	25.62084	34	50	50	39	50	68
37	5	68	45	0.70588	25.92468	34	50	50	39	50	68
38	0	40	45	0.68367	25.43029	40	50	52	40	50	35
38	1	50	43	0.70000	26.79003	40	50	52	40	50	35
38	2	52	43	0.70308	26.16539	40	50	52	40	50	35
38	3	40	45	0.68367	26.81658	40	50	52	40	50	35
38	4	50	43	0.70000	26.32084	40	50	52	40	50	35
38	5	35	46	0.67550	26.60018	40	50	52	40	50	35
39	0	50	47	0.70000	26.13029	50	50	47	60	50	30
39	1	50	47	0.70000	27.49003	50	50	47	60	50	30
39	2	47	48	0.69818	26.86357	50	50	47	60	50	30
39	3	60	45	0.70700	27.52358	50	50	47	60	50	30
39	4	50	47	0.70000	27.02084	50	50	47	60	50	30
39	5	30	51	0.68600	27.28618	50	50	47	60	50	30

Table XXXI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
40	0	52	46	0.70168	26.83197	52	50	50	60	50	20
40	1	50	46	0.70000	28.19003	52	50	50	60	50	20
40	2	50	46	0.70000	27.56357	52	50	50	60	50	20
40	3	60	44	0.70933	28.23291	52	50	50	60	50	20
40	4	50	46	0.70000	27.72084	52	50	50	60	50	20
40	5	20	52	0.67200	27.95818	52	50	50	60	50	20
41	0	55	54	0.69417	27.52614	55	50	54	60	64	40
41	1	50	55	0.70000	28.89003	55	50	54	60	64	40
41	2	54	54	0.69552	28.25909	55	50	54	60	64	40
41	3	60	53	0.68833	28.92125	55	50	54	60	64	40
41	4	64	52	0.68432	28.40516	55	50	54	60	64	40
41	5	40	57	0.71167	28.66985	55	50	54	60	64	40
42	0	43	51	0.69935	28.22549	43	50	50	60	50	45
42	1	50	50	0.70000	29.59003	43	50	50	60	50	45
42	2	50	50	0.70000	28.95909	43	50	50	60	50	45
42	3	60	48	0.70000	29.62125	43	50	50	60	50	45
42	4	50	50	0.70000	29.10516	43	50	50	60	50	45
42	5	45	51	0.70000	29.36985	43	50	50	60	50	45
43	0	47	52	0.70098	28.92647	47	50	50	59	50	49
43	1	50	51	0.70000	30.29003	47	50	50	59	50	49
43	2	50	51	0.70000	29.65909	47	50	50	59	50	49
43	3	59	49	0.69832	30.31957	47	50	50	59	50	49
43	4	50	51	0.70000	29.80516	47	50	50	59	50	49
43	5	49	51	0.70019	30.07004	47	50	50	59	50	49
44	0	45	48	0.69650	29.62297	45	50	50	40	50	49
44	1	50	47	0.70000	30.99003	45	50	50	40	50	49
44	2	50	47	0.70000	30.35909	45	50	50	40	50	49
44	3	40	49	0.69300	31.01257	45	50	50	40	50	49
44	4	50	47	0.70000	30.50516	45	50	50	40	50	49
44	5	49	47	0.69925	30.76929	45	50	50	40	50	49
45	0	50	55	0.70000	30.32297	50	50	52	60	51	60
45	1	50	55	0.70000	31.69003	50	50	52	60	51	60
45	2	52	54	0.69795	31.05704	50	50	52	60	51	60
45	3	60	53	0.68833	31.70090	50	50	52	60	51	60
45	4	51	54	0.69902	31.20418	50	50	52	60	51	60
45	5	60	53	0.68833	31.45762	50	50	52	60	51	60
46	0	43	47	0.69281	31.01578	43	50	50	40	50	47
46	1	50	46	0.70000	32.39003	43	50	50	40	50	47
46	2	50	46	0.70000	31.75704	43	50	50	40	50	47
46	3	40	48	0.69067	32.39157	43	50	50	40	50	47
46	4	50	46	0.70000	31.90418	43	50	50	40	50	47
46	5	47	47	0.69748	32.15510	43	50	50	40	50	47
47	0	50	48	0.70000	31.71578	50	50	48	40	50	50
47	1	50	48	0.70000	33.09003	50	50	48	40	50	50
47	2	48	48	0.69888	32.45592	50	50	48	40	50	50
47	3	40	50	0.69533	33.08690	50	50	48	40	50	50
47	4	50	48	0.70000	32.60418	50	50	48	40	50	50
47	5	50	48	0.70000	32.85510	50	50	48	40	50	50
48	0	51	48	0.70042	32.41620	51	50	50	40	50	50
48	1	50	48	0.70000	33.79003	51	50	50	40	50	50
48	2	50	48	0.70000	33.15592	51	50	50	40	50	50
48	3	40	50	0.69533	33.78223	51	50	50	40	50	50
48	4	50	48	0.70000	33.30418	51	50	50	40	50	50
48	5	50	48	0.70000	33.55510	51	50	50	40	50	50
49	0	50	48	0.70000	33.11620	50	50	50	40	50	51
49	1	50	48	0.70000	34.49003	50	50	50	40	50	51
49	2	50	48	0.70000	33.85592	50	50	50	40	50	51
49	3	40	50	0.69533	34.47757	50	50	50	40	50	51
49	4	50	48	0.70000	34.00418	50	50	50	40	50	51
49	5	51	48	0.70042	34.25552	50	50	50	40	50	51

Table XXXII.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 2

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	6	51	0.61992	0.61992	6	0	50	50	100	56
0	1	0	52	0.60667	0.60667	6	0	50	50	100	56
0	2	50	42	0.70000	0.70000	6	0	50	50	100	56
0	3	50	42	0.70000	0.70000	6	0	50	50	100	56
0	4	100	32	0.79333	0.79333	6	0	50	50	100	56
0	5	56	41	0.71092	0.71092	6	0	50	50	100	56
1	0	50	65	0.70000	1.31992	50	51	50	50	100	72
1	1	51	64	0.69669	1.30335	50	51	50	50	100	72
1	2	50	65	0.70000	1.40000	50	51	50	50	100	72
1	3	50	65	0.70000	1.40000	50	51	50	50	100	72
1	4	100	55	0.52500	1.31833	50	51	50	50	100	72

Table XXXII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
1	5	72	60	0.62608	1.33700	50	51	50	50	100	72
2	0	100	34	0.77000	2.08992	100	41	50	50	0	30
2	1	41	46	0.68782	1.99117	100	41	50	50	0	30
2	2	50	44	0.70000	2.10000	100	41	50	50	0	30
2	3	50	44	0.70000	2.10000	100	41	50	50	0	30
2	4	0	54	0.63000	1.94833	100	41	50	50	0	30
2	5	30	48	0.67200	2.00900	100	41	50	50	0	30
3	0	0	41	0.47833	2.56825	0	55	50	50	0	50
3	1	55	30	0.72217	2.71334	0	55	50	50	0	50
3	2	50	31	0.70000	2.80000	0	55	50	50	0	50
3	3	50	31	0.70000	2.80000	0	55	50	50	0	50
3	4	0	41	0.47833	2.42667	0	55	50	50	0	50
3	5	50	31	0.70000	2.70900	0	55	50	50	0	50
4	0	50	52	0.70000	3.26825	50	0	50	52	79	80
4	1	0	62	0.72333	3.43667	50	0	50	52	79	80
4	2	50	52	0.70000	3.50000	50	0	50	52	79	80
4	3	52	52	0.69888	3.49888	50	0	50	52	79	80
4	4	79	46	0.68782	3.11449	50	0	50	52	79	80
4	5	80	46	0.68600	3.39500	50	0	50	52	79	80
5	0	100	67	0.38500	3.65325	100	100	50	51	85	50
5	1	100	67	0.38500	3.82167	100	100	50	51	85	50
5	2	50	77	0.70000	4.20000	100	100	50	51	85	50
5	3	51	77	0.69365	4.19253	100	100	50	51	85	50
5	4	85	70	0.47950	3.59398	100	100	50	51	85	50
5	5	50	77	0.70000	4.09500	100	100	50	51	85	50
6	0	100	42	0.67667	4.32992	100	100	50	50	0	11
6	1	100	42	0.67667	4.49834	100	100	50	50	0	11
6	2	50	52	0.70000	4.90000	100	100	50	50	0	11
6	3	50	52	0.70000	4.89253	100	100	50	50	0	11
6	4	0	62	0.72333	4.31732	100	100	50	50	0	11
6	5	11	60	0.72002	4.81502	100	100	50	50	0	11
7	0	18	33	0.52528	4.85520	18	51	50	50	0	13
7	1	51	26	0.70555	5.20389	18	51	50	50	0	13
7	2	50	26	0.70000	5.60000	18	51	50	50	0	13
7	3	50	26	0.70000	5.59253	18	51	50	50	0	13
7	4	0	36	0.42000	4.73732	18	51	50	50	0	13
7	5	13	34	0.49798	5.31300	18	51	50	50	0	13
8	0	22	38	0.58501	5.44021	22	0	50	51	21	68
8	1	0	42	0.49000	5.69389	22	0	50	51	21	68
8	2	50	32	0.70000	6.30000	22	0	50	51	21	68
8	3	51	32	0.70415	6.29669	22	0	50	51	21	68
8	4	21	38	0.57955	5.31687	22	0	50	51	21	68
8	5	68	29	0.77308	6.08608	22	0	50	51	21	68
9	0	49	49	0.69972	6.13993	49	51	50	51	20	71
9	1	51	48	0.70042	6.39431	49	51	50	51	20	71
9	2	50	48	0.70000	7.00000	49	51	50	51	20	71
9	3	51	48	0.70042	6.99711	49	51	50	51	20	71
9	4	20	54	0.68600	6.00287	49	51	50	51	20	71
9	5	71	44	0.70882	6.79490	49	51	50	51	20	71
10	0	81	49	0.66239	6.80232	81	50	50	50	28	68
10	1	50	55	0.70000	7.09431	81	50	50	50	28	68
10	2	50	55	0.70000	7.70000	81	50	50	50	28	68
10	3	50	55	0.70000	7.69711	81	50	50	50	28	68
10	4	28	60	0.72875	6.73162	81	50	50	50	28	68
10	5	68	52	0.67648	7.47138	81	50	50	50	28	68
11	0	68	49	0.68908	7.49140	68	60	50	50	17	69
11	1	60	51	0.69300	7.78731	68	60	50	50	17	69
11	2	50	53	0.70000	8.40000	68	60	50	50	17	69
11	3	50	53	0.70000	8.39711	68	60	50	50	17	69
11	4	17	59	0.71848	7.45010	68	60	50	50	17	69
11	5	69	49	0.68759	8.15897	68	60	50	50	17	69
12	0	0	45	0.52500	8.01640	0	60	50	50	17	50
12	1	60	33	0.73500	8.52231	0	60	50	50	17	50
12	2	50	35	0.70000	9.10000	0	60	50	50	17	50
12	3	50	35	0.70000	9.09711	0	60	50	50	17	50
12	4	17	42	0.58758	8.03768	0	60	50	50	17	50
12	5	50	35	0.70000	8.85897	0	60	50	50	17	50
13	0	100	59	0.47833	8.49473	100	40	50	51	83	72
13	1	40	71	0.74433	9.26665	100	40	50	51	83	72
13	2	50	69	0.70000	9.80000	100	40	50	51	83	72
13	3	51	69	0.69552	9.79263	100	40	50	51	83	72
13	4	83	63	0.54908	8.58676	100	40	50	51	83	72
13	5	72	65	0.60041	9.45938	100	40	50	51	83	72
14	0	64	56	0.67125	9.16598	64	61	50	51	35	83
14	1	61	57	0.67639	9.94303	64	61	50	51	35	83
14	2	50	59	0.70000	10.50000	64	61	50	51	35	83
14	3	51	59	0.69785	10.49048	64	61	50	51	35	83
14	4	35	62	0.73150	9.31826	64	61	50	51	35	83
14	5	83	52	0.63378	10.09316	64	61	50	51	35	83
15	0	28	52	0.68768	9.85366	28	65	50	49	32	63
15	1	65	44	0.71050	10.65353	28	65	50	49	32	63
15	2	50	47	0.70000	11.20000	28	65	50	49	32	63
15	3	49	48	0.69949	11.18997	28	65	50	49	32	63
15	4	32	51	0.68908	10.00734	28	65	50	49	32	63
15	5	63	45	0.70728	10.80044	28	65	50	49	32	63

Table XXXII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
16	0	28	40	0.62608	10.47974	28	29	50	52	37	32
16	1	29	40	0.63042	11.28395	28	29	50	52	37	32
16	2	50	36	0.70000	11.90000	28	29	50	52	37	32
16	3	52	35	0.70681	11.89678	28	29	50	52	37	32
16	4	37	38	0.65571	10.66305	28	29	50	52	37	32
16	5	32	39	0.63868	11.43912	28	29	50	52	37	32
17	0	67	36	0.74205	11.22179	67	51	50	48	0	33
17	1	51	40	0.70229	11.98624	67	51	50	48	0	33
17	2	50	40	0.70000	12.60000	67	51	50	48	0	33
17	3	48	40	0.69515	12.59193	67	51	50	48	0	33
17	4	0	50	0.58333	11.24638	67	51	50	48	0	33
17	5	33	43	0.65875	12.09787	67	51	50	48	0	33
18	0	67	60	0.64685	11.86864	67	55	50	50	100	45
18	1	55	62	0.68483	12.67107	67	55	50	50	100	45
18	2	50	63	0.70000	13.30000	67	55	50	50	100	45
18	3	50	63	0.70000	13.29193	67	55	50	50	100	45
18	4	100	53	0.54833	11.79472	67	55	50	50	100	45
18	5	45	64	0.71517	12.81303	67	55	50	50	100	45
19	0	35	38	0.64750	12.51614	35	55	50	50	0	35
19	1	55	34	0.71750	13.38857	35	55	50	50	0	35
19	2	50	35	0.70000	14.00000	35	55	50	50	0	35
19	3	50	35	0.70000	13.99193	35	55	50	50	0	35
19	4	0	45	0.52500	12.31972	35	55	50	50	0	35
19	5	35	38	0.64750	13.46053	35	55	50	50	0	35
20	0	68	45	0.70588	13.22202	68	40	50	51	32	50
20	1	40	50	0.69533	14.08390	68	40	50	51	32	50
20	2	50	48	0.70000	14.70000	68	40	50	51	32	50
20	3	51	48	0.70042	14.69235	68	40	50	51	32	50
20	4	32	52	0.69328	13.01300	68	40	50	51	32	50
20	5	50	48	0.70000	14.16053	68	40	50	51	32	50
21	0	65	46	0.70350	13.92552	65	50	50	47	32	50
21	1	50	49	0.70000	14.78390	65	50	50	47	32	50
21	2	50	49	0.70000	15.40000	65	50	50	47	32	50
21	3	47	49	0.69888	15.39123	65	50	50	47	32	50
21	4	32	52	0.69328	13.70628	65	50	50	47	32	50
21	5	50	49	0.70000	14.86053	65	50	50	47	32	50
22	0	13	66	0.77425	14.69976	13	80	50	50	59	90
22	1	80	52	0.64400	15.42790	13	80	50	50	59	90
22	2	50	58	0.70000	16.10000	13	80	50	50	59	90
22	3	50	58	0.70000	16.09123	13	80	50	50	59	90
22	4	59	57	0.68152	14.38780	13	80	50	50	59	90
22	5	90	50	0.62533	15.48586	13	80	50	50	59	90
23	0	91	59	0.53545	15.23522	91	47	50	50	100	50
23	1	47	68	0.71218	16.14008	91	47	50	50	100	50
23	2	50	68	0.70000	16.80000	91	47	50	50	100	50
23	3	50	68	0.70000	16.79123	91	47	50	50	100	50
23	4	100	58	0.49000	14.87779	91	47	50	50	100	50
23	5	50	68	0.70000	16.18586	91	47	50	50	100	50
24	0	18	46	0.62235	15.85756	18	51	50	50	49	31
24	1	51	40	0.70229	16.84237	18	51	50	50	49	31
24	2	50	40	0.70000	17.50000	18	51	50	50	49	31
24	3	50	40	0.70000	17.49123	18	51	50	50	49	31
24	4	49	40	0.69762	15.57541	18	51	50	50	49	31
24	5	31	44	0.65655	16.84242	18	51	50	50	49	31
25	0	56	49	0.69972	16.55728	56	40	50	50	56	50
25	1	40	52	0.70000	17.54237	56	40	50	50	56	50
25	2	50	50	0.70000	18.20000	56	40	50	50	56	50
25	3	50	50	0.70000	18.19123	56	40	50	50	56	50
25	4	56	49	0.69972	16.27513	56	40	50	50	56	50
25	5	50	50	0.70000	17.54242	56	40	50	50	56	50
26	0	56	51	0.69692	17.25420	56	41	50	50	73	41
26	1	41	54	0.70462	18.24699	56	41	50	50	73	41
26	2	50	52	0.70000	18.90000	56	41	50	50	73	41
26	3	50	52	0.70000	18.89123	56	41	50	50	73	41
26	4	73	48	0.68605	16.96118	56	41	50	50	73	41
26	5	41	54	0.70462	18.24704	56	41	50	50	73	41
27	0	56	55	0.69132	17.94552	56	55	50	50	83	38
27	1	55	55	0.69300	18.93999	56	55	50	50	83	38
27	2	50	56	0.70000	19.60000	56	55	50	50	83	38
27	3	50	56	0.70000	19.59123	56	55	50	50	83	38
27	4	83	50	0.64918	17.61036	56	55	50	50	83	38
27	5	38	59	0.71848	18.96552	56	55	50	50	83	38
28	0	27	48	0.66458	18.61010	27	50	50	50	55	34
28	1	50	43	0.70000	19.63999	27	50	50	50	55	34
28	2	50	43	0.70000	20.30000	27	50	50	50	55	34
28	3	50	43	0.70000	20.29123	27	50	50	50	55	34
28	4	55	42	0.70817	18.31853	27	50	50	50	55	34
28	5	34	46	0.67312	19.63864	27	50	50	50	55	34
29	0	53	53	0.69748	19.30758	53	50	50	50	52	62
29	1	50	53	0.70000	20.33999	53	50	50	50	52	62
29	2	50	53	0.70000	21.00000	53	50	50	50	52	62
29	3	50	53	0.70000	20.99123	53	50	50	50	52	62
29	4	52	53	0.69841	19.01694	53	50	50	50	52	62
29	5	62	51	0.69048	20.32912	53	50	50	50	52	62
30	0	72	49	0.68255	19.99013	72	50	50	49	45	50

Table XXXII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
30	1	50	53	0.70000	21.03999	72	50	50	49	45	50
30	2	50	53	0.70000	21.70000	72	50	50	49	45	50
30	3	49	53	0.70065	21.69188	72	50	50	49	45	50
30	4	45	54	0.70350	19.72044	72	50	50	49	45	50
30	5	50	53	0.70000	21.02912	72	50	50	49	45	50
31	0	72	50	0.67741	20.66754	72	51	50	50	50	47
31	1	51	54	0.69902	21.73901	72	51	50	50	50	47
31	2	50	54	0.70000	22.40000	72	51	50	50	50	47
31	3	50	54	0.70000	22.39188	72	51	50	50	50	47
31	4	50	54	0.70000	20.42044	72	51	50	50	50	47
31	5	47	55	0.70308	21.73220	72	51	50	50	50	47
32	0	53	50	0.69958	21.36712	53	51	50	51	51	45
32	1	51	50	0.69995	22.43896	53	51	50	51	51	45
32	2	50	50	0.70000	23.10000	53	51	50	51	51	45
32	3	51	50	0.69995	23.09183	53	51	50	51	51	45
32	4	51	50	0.69995	21.12039	53	51	50	51	51	45
32	5	45	51	0.70000	22.43220	53	51	50	51	51	45
33	0	52	50	0.69981	22.06694	52	50	50	50	48	53
33	1	50	51	0.70000	23.13896	52	50	50	50	48	53
33	2	50	51	0.70000	23.80000	52	50	50	50	48	53
33	3	50	51	0.70000	23.79183	52	50	50	50	48	53
33	4	48	51	0.70028	21.82067	52	50	50	50	48	53
33	5	53	50	0.69958	23.13178	52	50	50	50	48	53
34	0	52	54	0.69795	22.76488	52	50	50	49	70	50
34	1	50	54	0.70000	23.83896	52	50	50	49	70	50
34	2	50	54	0.70000	24.50000	52	50	50	49	70	50
34	3	49	54	0.70089	24.49272	52	50	50	49	70	50
34	4	70	50	0.68133	22.50201	52	50	50	49	70	50
34	5	50	54	0.70000	23.83178	52	50	50	49	70	50
35	0	50	47	0.70000	23.46488	50	52	50	50	45	40
35	1	52	47	0.70121	24.54018	50	52	50	50	45	40
35	2	50	47	0.70000	25.20000	50	52	50	50	45	40
35	3	50	47	0.70000	25.19272	50	52	50	50	45	40
35	4	45	48	0.69650	23.19851	50	52	50	50	45	40
35	5	40	49	0.69300	24.52478	50	52	50	50	45	40
36	0	51	49	0.70019	24.16507	51	47	50	50	50	50
36	1	47	50	0.69958	25.23976	51	47	50	50	50	50
36	2	50	50	0.70000	25.90000	51	47	50	50	50	50
36	3	50	50	0.70000	25.89272	51	47	50	50	50	50
36	4	50	50	0.70000	23.89851	51	47	50	50	50	50
36	5	50	50	0.70000	25.22478	51	47	50	50	50	50
37	0	51	61	0.69739	24.86246	51	50	50	50	100	55
37	1	50	61	0.70000	25.93976	51	50	50	50	100	55
37	2	50	61	0.70000	26.60000	51	50	50	50	100	55
37	3	50	61	0.70000	26.59272	51	50	50	50	100	55
37	4	100	51	0.57167	24.47017	51	50	50	50	100	55
37	5	55	60	0.68717	25.91194	51	50	50	50	100	55
38	0	47	46	0.69678	25.55924	47	50	50	50	32	50
38	1	50	46	0.70000	26.63976	47	50	50	50	32	50
38	2	50	46	0.70000	27.30000	47	50	50	50	32	50
38	3	50	46	0.70000	27.29272	47	50	50	50	32	50
38	4	32	49	0.68068	25.15085	47	50	50	50	32	50
38	5	50	46	0.70000	26.61194	47	50	50	50	32	50
39	0	49	42	0.69809	26.25732	49	50	50	50	48	10
39	1	50	41	0.70000	27.33976	49	50	50	50	48	10
39	2	50	41	0.70000	28.00000	49	50	50	50	48	10
39	3	50	41	0.70000	27.99272	49	50	50	50	48	10
39	4	48	42	0.69608	25.84693	49	50	50	50	48	10
39	5	10	49	0.61600	27.22794	49	50	50	50	48	10
40	0	50	51	0.70000	26.95732	50	50	50	50	53	50
40	1	50	51	0.70000	28.03976	50	50	50	50	53	50
40	2	50	51	0.70000	28.70000	50	50	50	50	53	50
40	3	50	51	0.70000	28.69272	50	50	50	50	53	50
40	4	53	50	0.69958	26.54651	50	50	50	50	53	50
40	5	50	51	0.70000	27.92794	50	50	50	50	53	50
41	0	50	51	0.70000	27.65732	50	50	50	50	53	50
41	1	50	51	0.70000	28.73976	50	50	50	50	53	50
41	2	50	51	0.70000	29.40000	50	50	50	50	53	50
41	3	50	51	0.70000	29.39272	50	50	50	50	53	50
41	4	53	50	0.69958	27.24609	50	50	50	50	53	50
41	5	50	51	0.70000	28.62794	50	50	50	50	53	50
42	0	50	50	0.70000	28.35732	50	51	50	51	50	50
42	1	51	50	0.69995	29.43971	50	51	50	51	50	50
42	2	50	50	0.70000	30.10000	50	51	50	51	50	50
42	3	51	50	0.69995	30.09267	50	51	50	51	50	50
42	4	50	50	0.70000	27.94609	50	51	50	51	50	50
42	5	50	50	0.70000	29.32794	50	51	50	51	50	50
43	0	50	47	0.70000	29.05732	50	49	50	50	34	50
43	1	49	47	0.69925	30.13896	50	49	50	50	34	50
43	2	50	47	0.70000	30.80000	50	49	50	50	34	50
43	3	50	47	0.70000	30.79267	50	49	50	50	34	50
43	4	34	50	0.68805	28.63415	50	49	50	50	34	50
43	5	50	47	0.70000	30.02794	50	49	50	50	34	50
44	0	50	54	0.70000	29.75732	50	49	50	50	50	71
44	1	49	54	0.70089	30.83985	50	49	50	50	50	71

Table XXXII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
44	2	50	54	0.70000	31.50000	50	49	50	50	50	71
44	3	50	54	0.70000	31.49267	50	49	50	50	50	71
44	4	50	54	0.70000	29.33415	50	49	50	50	50	71
44	5	71	50	0.67942	30.70736	50	49	50	50	50	71
45	0	50	49	0.70000	30.45732	50	50	50	50	45	50
45	1	50	49	0.70000	31.53985	50	50	50	50	45	50
45	2	50	49	0.70000	32.20000	50	50	50	50	45	50
45	3	50	49	0.70000	32.19267	50	50	50	50	45	50
45	4	45	50	0.69883	30.03298	50	50	50	50	45	50
45	5	50	49	0.70000	31.40736	50	50	50	50	45	50
46	0	50	50	0.70000	31.15732	50	50	50	50	50	50
46	1	50	50	0.70000	32.23985	50	50	50	50	50	50
46	2	50	50	0.70000	32.90000	50	50	50	50	50	50
46	3	50	50	0.70000	32.89267	50	50	50	50	50	50
46	4	50	50	0.70000	30.73298	50	50	50	50	50	50
46	5	50	50	0.70000	32.10736	50	50	50	50	50	50
47	0	49	50	0.69995	31.85728	49	50	50	50	50	50
47	1	50	50	0.70000	32.93985	49	50	50	50	50	50
47	2	50	50	0.70000	33.60000	49	50	50	50	50	50
47	3	50	50	0.70000	33.59267	49	50	50	50	50	50
47	4	50	50	0.70000	31.43298	49	50	50	50	50	50
47	5	50	50	0.70000	32.80736	49	50	50	50	50	50
48	0	51	50	0.69995	32.55723	51	50	50	50	50	50
48	1	50	50	0.70000	33.63985	51	50	50	50	50	50
48	2	50	50	0.70000	34.30000	51	50	50	50	50	50
48	3	50	50	0.70000	34.29267	51	50	50	50	50	50
48	4	50	50	0.70000	32.13298	51	50	50	50	50	50
48	5	50	50	0.70000	33.50736	51	50	50	50	50	50
49	0	50	50	0.70000	33.25723	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	1	50	50	0.70000	34.33985	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	2	50	50	0.70000	35.00000	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	3	50	50	0.70000	34.99267	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	4	50	50	0.70000	32.83298	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	5	50	50	0.70000	34.20736	50	50	50	50	50	50

Table XXXIII.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 3

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	85	34	0.77350	0.77350	85	6	50	80	13	23
0	1	6	50	0.60965	0.60965	85	6	50	80	13	23
0	2	50	41	0.70000	0.70000	85	6	50	80	13	23
0	3	80	35	0.76300	0.76300	85	6	50	80	13	23
0	4	13	49	0.62748	0.62748	85	6	50	80	13	23
0	5	23	47	0.64708	0.64708	85	6	50	80	13	23
1	0	73	56	0.64311	1.41661	73	79	45	43	60	51
1	1	79	54	0.63369	1.24334	73	79	45	43	60	51
1	2	45	61	0.71167	1.41167	73	79	45	43	60	51
1	3	43	62	0.71731	1.48031	73	79	45	43	60	51
1	4	60	58	0.67667	1.30415	73	79	45	43	60	51
1	5	51	60	0.69762	1.34470	73	79	45	43	60	51
2	0	63	52	0.68605	2.10266	63	58	56	78	30	37
2	1	58	53	0.69141	1.93475	63	58	56	78	30	37
2	2	56	53	0.69412	2.10579	63	58	56	78	30	37
2	3	78	49	0.66995	2.15026	63	58	56	78	30	37
2	4	30	58	0.71867	2.02281	63	58	56	78	30	37
2	5	37	57	0.71335	2.05805	63	58	56	78	30	37
3	0	70	37	0.74200	2.84466	70	44	50	20	25	44
3	1	44	42	0.68712	2.62187	70	44	50	20	25	44
3	2	50	41	0.70000	2.80579	70	44	50	20	25	44
3	3	20	47	0.63700	2.78726	70	44	50	20	25	44
3	4	25	46	0.64750	2.67031	70	44	50	20	25	44
3	5	44	42	0.68712	2.74517	70	44	50	20	25	44
4	0	64	47	0.70065	3.54531	64	44	45	57	20	70
4	1	44	51	0.69972	3.32159	64	44	45	57	20	70
4	2	45	51	0.70000	3.50579	64	44	45	57	20	70
4	3	57	49	0.69935	3.48661	64	44	45	57	20	70
4	4	20	56	0.70000	3.37031	64	44	45	57	20	70
4	5	70	46	0.70000	3.44517	64	44	45	57	20	70
5	0	73	34	0.76118	4.30649	73	55	50	0	10	55
5	1	55	38	0.71283	4.03443	73	55	50	0	10	55
5	2	50	39	0.70000	4.20579	73	55	50	0	10	55
5	3	0	49	0.57167	4.05827	73	55	50	0	10	55
5	4	10	47	0.59733	3.96765	73	55	50	0	10	55
5	5	55	38	0.71283	4.15800	73	55	50	0	10	55
6	0	87	50	0.63611	4.94261	87	65	50	45	15	75

Table XXXIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
6	1	65	54	0.67550	4.70993	87	65	50	45	15	75
6	2	50	57	0.70000	4.90579	87	65	50	45	15	75
6	3	45	58	0.70817	4.76644	87	65	50	45	15	75
6	4	15	64	0.75717	4.72481	87	65	50	45	15	75
6	5	75	52	0.65917	4.81717	87	65	50	45	15	75
7	0	11	65	0.76552	5.70813	11	55	50	54	90	75
7	1	55	56	0.69183	5.40176	11	55	50	54	90	75
7	2	50	57	0.70000	5.60579	11	55	50	54	90	75
7	3	54	56	0.69365	5.46009	11	55	50	54	90	75
7	4	90	49	0.63467	5.35948	11	55	50	54	90	75
7	5	75	52	0.65917	5.47633	11	55	50	54	90	75
8	0	95	57	0.53200	6.24013	95	45	57	40	90	53
8	1	45	67	0.71867	6.12043	95	45	57	40	90	53
8	2	57	65	0.67321	6.27900	95	45	57	40	90	53
8	3	40	68	0.73733	6.19743	95	45	57	40	90	53
8	4	90	58	0.55067	5.91015	95	45	57	40	90	53
8	5	53	65	0.68908	6.16541	95	45	57	40	90	53
9	0	91	31	0.80332	7.04345	91	8	57	34	15	40
9	1	8	47	0.58828	6.70871	91	8	57	34	15	40
9	2	57	38	0.71731	6.99631	91	8	57	34	15	40
9	3	34	42	0.65819	6.85561	91	8	57	34	15	40
9	4	15	46	0.61017	6.52031	91	8	57	34	15	40
9	5	40	41	0.67433	6.83975	91	8	57	34	15	40
10	0	85	55	0.60200	7.64545	85	50	50	56	47	73
10	1	50	62	0.70000	7.40871	85	50	50	56	47	73
10	2	50	62	0.70000	7.69631	85	50	50	56	47	73
10	3	56	61	0.68292	7.53853	85	50	50	56	47	73
10	4	47	63	0.70868	7.22899	85	50	50	56	47	73
10	5	73	58	0.63238	7.47213	85	50	50	56	47	73
11	0	67	40	0.72618	8.37163	67	14	50	47	45	46
11	1	14	51	0.64792	8.05663	67	14	50	47	45	46
11	2	50	44	0.70000	8.39631	67	14	50	47	45	46
11	3	47	44	0.69538	8.23391	67	14	50	47	45	46
11	4	45	45	0.69300	7.92199	67	14	50	47	45	46
11	5	46	45	0.69459	8.16671	67	14	50	47	45	46
12	0	81	40	0.72749	9.09911	81	24	54	19	50	53
12	1	24	51	0.67452	8.73115	81	24	54	19	50	53
12	2	54	45	0.70392	9.10023	81	24	54	19	50	53
12	3	19	52	0.66962	8.90353	81	24	54	19	50	53
12	4	50	46	0.70000	8.62199	81	24	54	19	50	53
12	5	53	46	0.70238	8.86909	81	24	54	19	50	53
13	0	81	51	0.64792	9.74703	81	50	48	50	56	50
13	1	50	57	0.70000	9.43115	81	50	48	50	56	50
13	2	48	57	0.70308	9.80331	81	50	48	50	56	50
13	3	50	57	0.70000	9.60353	81	50	48	50	56	50
13	4	56	56	0.68992	9.31191	81	50	48	50	56	50
13	5	50	57	0.70000	9.56909	81	50	48	50	56	50
14	0	74	54	0.65072	10.39775	74	36	47	71	76	39
14	1	36	61	0.72679	10.15793	74	36	47	71	76	39
14	2	47	59	0.70588	10.50919	74	36	47	71	76	39
14	3	71	54	0.65982	10.26335	74	36	47	71	76	39
14	4	76	53	0.65025	9.96217	74	36	47	71	76	39
14	5	39	61	0.72259	10.29168	74	36	47	71	76	39
15	0	85	43	0.70000	11.09775	85	26	50	48	54	36
15	1	26	55	0.70112	10.85905	85	26	50	48	54	36
15	2	50	50	0.70000	11.20919	85	26	50	48	54	36
15	3	48	50	0.69981	10.96317	85	26	50	48	54	36
15	4	54	49	0.70019	10.66235	85	26	50	48	54	36
15	5	36	53	0.70065	10.99233	85	26	50	48	54	36
16	0	86	43	0.69832	11.79607	86	37	46	50	46	34
16	1	37	52	0.69818	11.55723	86	37	46	50	46	34
16	2	46	51	0.70019	11.90938	86	37	46	50	46	34
16	3	50	50	0.70000	11.66317	86	37	46	50	46	34
16	4	46	51	0.70019	11.36254	86	37	46	50	46	34
16	5	34	53	0.69925	11.69159	86	37	46	50	46	34
17	0	64	49	0.69412	12.49019	64	37	50	52	54	50
17	1	37	54	0.70425	12.26148	64	37	50	52	54	50
17	2	50	51	0.70000	12.60938	64	37	50	52	54	50
17	3	52	51	0.69935	12.36251	64	37	50	52	54	50
17	4	54	51	0.69832	12.06086	64	37	50	52	54	50
17	5	50	51	0.70000	12.39159	64	37	50	52	54	50
18	0	89	51	0.61992	13.11011	89	37	51	53	56	59
18	1	37	62	0.72851	12.98999	89	37	51	53	56	59
18	2	51	59	0.69785	13.30723	89	37	51	53	56	59
18	3	53	58	0.69398	13.05649	89	37	51	53	56	59
18	4	56	58	0.68712	12.74798	89	37	51	53	56	59
18	5	59	57	0.68152	13.07311	89	37	51	53	56	59
19	0	51	45	0.70112	13.81123	51	32	50	50	25	69
19	1	32	49	0.68068	13.67067	51	32	50	50	25	69
19	2	50	45	0.70000	14.00723	51	32	50	50	25	69
19	3	50	45	0.70000	13.75649	51	32	50	50	25	69
19	4	25	50	0.67083	13.41881	51	32	50	50	25	69
19	5	69	42	0.71862	13.79173	51	32	50	50	25	69
20	0	55	46	0.70350	14.51473	55	37	50	61	50	30
20	1	37	49	0.68908	14.35975	55	37	50	61	50	30

Table XXXIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
20	2	50	47	0.70000	14.70723	55	37	50	61	50	30
20	3	61	44	0.70975	14.46625	55	37	50	61	50	30
20	4	50	47	0.70000	14.11881	55	37	50	61	50	30
20	5	30	51	0.68600	14.47773	55	37	50	61	50	30
21	0	56	49	0.69972	15.21445	56	50	48	48	48	50
21	1	50	50	0.70000	15.05975	56	50	48	48	48	50
21	2	48	50	0.69981	15.40705	56	50	48	48	48	50
21	3	48	50	0.69981	15.16606	56	50	48	48	48	50
21	4	48	50	0.69981	14.81863	56	50	48	48	48	50
21	5	50	50	0.70000	15.17773	56	50	48	48	48	50
22	0	61	51	0.69179	15.90624	61	52	50	53	51	50
22	1	52	53	0.69841	15.75817	61	52	50	53	51	50
22	2	50	53	0.70000	16.10705	61	52	50	53	51	50
22	3	53	53	0.69748	15.86354	61	52	50	53	51	50
22	4	51	53	0.69925	15.51788	61	52	50	53	51	50
22	5	50	53	0.70000	15.87773	61	52	50	53	51	50
23	0	54	52	0.69739	16.60363	54	38	50	58	52	60
23	1	38	55	0.70728	16.46545	54	38	50	58	52	60
23	2	50	52	0.70000	16.80705	54	38	50	58	52	60
23	3	58	51	0.69515	16.55869	54	38	50	58	52	60
23	4	52	52	0.69888	16.21676	54	38	50	58	52	60
23	5	60	50	0.69533	16.57306	54	38	50	58	52	60
24	0	56	48	0.70112	17.30475	56	40	50	50	49	50
24	1	40	51	0.69767	17.16311	56	40	50	50	49	50
24	2	50	49	0.70000	17.50705	56	40	50	50	49	50
24	3	50	49	0.70000	17.25869	56	40	50	50	49	50
24	4	49	49	0.69972	16.91648	56	40	50	50	49	50
24	5	50	49	0.70000	17.27306	56	40	50	50	49	50
25	0	61	56	0.67895	17.98370	61	50	50	47	80	52
25	1	50	58	0.70000	17.86311	61	50	50	47	80	52
25	2	50	58	0.70000	18.20705	61	50	50	47	80	52
25	3	47	59	0.70588	17.96457	61	50	50	47	80	52
25	4	80	52	0.64400	17.56048	61	50	50	47	80	52
25	5	52	58	0.69608	17.96914	61	50	50	47	80	52
26	0	52	47	0.70121	18.68491	52	34	52	55	43	50
26	1	34	50	0.68805	18.55117	52	34	52	55	43	50
26	2	52	47	0.70121	18.90826	52	34	52	55	43	50
26	3	55	46	0.70350	18.66807	52	34	52	55	43	50
26	4	43	49	0.69608	18.25656	52	34	52	55	43	50
26	5	50	47	0.70000	18.66914	52	34	52	55	43	50
27	0	59	51	0.69412	19.37903	59	58	50	50	49	50
27	1	58	52	0.69328	19.24445	59	58	50	50	49	50
27	2	50	53	0.70000	19.60826	59	58	50	50	49	50
27	3	50	53	0.70000	19.36807	59	58	50	50	49	50
27	4	49	53	0.70065	18.95721	59	58	50	50	49	50
27	5	50	53	0.70000	19.36914	59	58	50	50	49	50
28	0	56	51	0.69692	20.07595	56	42	50	57	54	51
28	1	42	54	0.70448	19.94893	56	42	50	57	54	51
28	2	50	52	0.70000	20.30826	56	42	50	57	54	51
28	3	57	51	0.69608	20.06415	56	42	50	57	54	51
28	4	54	51	0.69832	19.65553	56	42	50	57	54	51
28	5	51	52	0.69949	20.06863	56	42	50	57	54	51
29	0	87	49	0.64475	20.72070	87	45	50	52	47	50
29	1	45	57	0.70700	20.65593	87	45	50	52	47	50
29	2	50	56	0.70000	21.00826	87	45	50	52	47	50
29	3	52	56	0.69701	20.76116	87	45	50	52	47	50
29	4	47	57	0.70448	20.36001	87	45	50	52	47	50
29	5	50	56	0.70000	20.76863	87	45	50	52	47	50
30	0	55	45	0.70467	21.42537	55	43	50	34	63	36
30	1	43	48	0.69445	21.35037	55	43	50	34	63	36
30	2	50	46	0.70000	21.70826	55	43	50	34	63	36
30	3	34	49	0.68432	21.44548	55	43	50	34	63	36
30	4	63	44	0.71031	21.07032	55	43	50	34	63	36
30	5	36	49	0.68759	21.45621	55	43	50	34	63	36
31	0	55	48	0.70117	22.12653	55	54	51	50	43	40
31	1	54	48	0.70112	22.05149	55	54	51	50	43	40
31	2	51	48	0.70042	22.40868	55	54	51	50	43	40
31	3	50	49	0.70000	22.14548	55	54	51	50	43	40
31	4	43	50	0.69771	21.76804	55	54	51	50	43	40
31	5	40	51	0.69767	22.15388	55	54	51	50	43	40
32	0	49	50	0.69995	22.82649	49	57	50	50	46	49
32	1	57	49	0.69935	22.75084	49	57	50	50	46	49
32	2	50	50	0.70000	23.10868	49	57	50	50	46	49
32	3	50	50	0.70000	22.84548	49	57	50	50	46	49
32	4	46	51	0.70019	22.46822	49	57	50	50	46	49
32	5	49	50	0.69995	22.85383	49	57	50	50	46	49
33	0	50	49	0.70000	23.52649	50	50	50	40	51	55
33	1	50	49	0.70000	23.45084	50	50	50	40	51	55
33	2	50	49	0.70000	23.80868	50	50	50	40	51	55
33	3	40	51	0.69767	23.54315	50	50	50	40	51	55
33	4	51	49	0.70019	23.16841	50	50	50	40	51	55
33	5	55	48	0.70117	23.55500	50	50	50	40	51	55
34	0	51	50	0.69995	24.22644	51	53	50	50	46	53
34	1	53	50	0.69958	24.15042	51	53	50	50	46	53
34	2	50	51	0.70000	24.50868	51	53	50	50	46	53

Table XXXIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
34	3	50	51	0.70000	24.24315	51	53	50	50	46	53
34	4	46	51	0.70019	23.86860	51	53	50	50	46	53
34	5	53	50	0.69958	24.25458	51	53	50	50	46	53
35	0	50	50	0.70000	24.92644	50	51	50	48	53	50
35	1	51	50	0.69995	24.85037	50	51	50	48	53	50
35	2	50	50	0.70000	25.20868	50	51	50	48	53	50
35	3	48	51	0.70028	24.94343	50	51	50	48	53	50
35	4	53	50	0.69958	24.56818	50	51	50	48	53	50
35	5	50	50	0.70000	24.95458	50	51	50	48	53	50
36	0	50	48	0.70000	25.62644	50	51	50	48	44	49
36	1	51	48	0.70042	25.55079	50	51	50	48	44	49
36	2	50	48	0.70000	25.90868	50	51	50	48	44	49
36	3	48	49	0.69935	25.64277	50	51	50	48	44	49
36	4	44	50	0.69832	25.26650	50	51	50	48	44	49
36	5	49	49	0.69972	25.65430	50	51	50	48	44	49
37	0	50	45	0.70000	26.32644	50	53	50	50	24	50
37	1	53	45	0.70308	26.25387	50	53	50	50	24	50
37	2	50	45	0.70000	26.60868	50	53	50	50	24	50
37	3	50	45	0.70000	26.34277	50	53	50	50	24	50
37	4	24	51	0.67452	25.94102	50	53	50	50	24	50
37	5	50	45	0.70000	26.35430	50	53	50	50	24	50
38	0	56	53	0.69412	27.02056	56	55	50	58	55	45
38	1	55	53	0.69533	26.94921	56	55	50	58	55	45
38	2	50	54	0.70000	27.30868	56	55	50	58	55	45
38	3	58	52	0.69328	27.03605	56	55	50	58	55	45
38	4	55	53	0.69533	26.63635	56	55	50	58	55	45
38	5	45	55	0.70467	27.05897	56	55	50	58	55	45
39	0	51	48	0.70042	27.72098	51	38	50	47	56	49
39	1	38	51	0.69608	27.64529	51	38	50	47	56	49
39	2	50	48	0.70000	28.00868	51	38	50	47	56	49
39	3	47	49	0.69888	27.73493	51	38	50	47	56	49
39	4	56	47	0.70252	27.33887	51	38	50	47	56	49
39	5	49	48	0.69949	27.75845	51	38	50	47	56	49
40	0	51	47	0.70065	28.42163	51	44	48	50	46	49
40	1	44	49	0.69692	28.34221	51	44	48	50	46	49
40	2	48	48	0.69888	28.70756	51	44	48	50	46	49
40	3	50	48	0.70000	28.43493	51	44	48	50	46	49
40	4	46	48	0.69739	28.03626	51	44	48	50	46	49
40	5	49	48	0.69949	28.45794	51	44	48	50	46	49
41	0	53	50	0.69958	29.12121	53	53	50	50	45	50
41	1	53	50	0.69958	29.04179	53	53	50	50	45	50
41	2	50	50	0.70000	29.40756	53	53	50	50	45	50
41	3	50	50	0.70000	29.13493	53	53	50	50	45	50
41	4	45	51	0.70000	28.73626	53	53	50	50	45	50
41	5	50	50	0.70000	29.15794	53	53	50	50	45	50
42	0	50	56	0.70000	29.82121	50	53	50	45	80	50
42	1	53	55	0.69608	29.73787	50	53	50	45	80	50
42	2	50	56	0.70000	30.10756	50	53	50	45	80	50
42	3	45	57	0.70700	29.84193	50	53	50	45	80	50
42	4	80	50	0.65800	29.39426	50	53	50	45	80	50
42	5	50	56	0.70000	29.85794	50	53	50	45	80	50
43	0	50	40	0.70000	30.52121	50	53	50	38	60	1
43	1	53	40	0.70658	30.44445	50	53	50	38	60	1
43	2	50	40	0.70000	30.80756	50	53	50	38	60	1
43	3	38	43	0.67368	30.51561	50	53	50	38	60	1
43	4	60	38	0.72333	30.11759	50	53	50	38	60	1
43	5	1	50	0.58795	30.44589	50	53	50	38	60	1
44	0	79	45	0.69459	31.21580	79	57	50	59	14	46
44	1	57	50	0.69771	31.14216	79	57	50	59	14	46
44	2	50	51	0.70000	31.50756	79	57	50	59	14	46
44	3	59	49	0.69832	31.21393	79	57	50	59	14	46
44	4	14	58	0.70672	30.82431	79	57	50	59	14	46
44	5	46	52	0.70112	31.14701	79	57	50	59	14	46
45	0	66	56	0.66565	31.88145	66	59	50	50	68	53
45	1	59	57	0.68152	31.82368	66	59	50	50	68	53
45	2	50	59	0.70000	32.20756	66	59	50	50	68	53
45	3	50	59	0.70000	31.91393	66	59	50	50	68	53
45	4	68	56	0.65968	31.48399	66	59	50	50	68	53
45	5	53	59	0.69328	31.84029	66	59	50	50	68	53
46	0	54	44	0.70485	32.58631	54	30	50	37	60	44
46	1	30	49	0.67667	32.50035	54	30	50	37	60	44
46	2	50	45	0.70000	32.90756	54	30	50	37	60	44
46	3	37	48	0.68605	32.59998	54	30	50	37	60	44
46	4	60	43	0.71167	32.19566	54	30	50	37	60	44
46	5	44	46	0.69272	32.53301	54	30	50	37	60	44
47	0	50	48	0.70000	33.28631	50	50	50	50	40	50
47	1	50	48	0.70000	33.20035	50	50	50	50	40	50
47	2	50	48	0.70000	33.60756	50	50	50	50	40	50
47	3	50	48	0.70000	33.29998	50	50	50	50	40	50
47	4	40	50	0.69533	32.89099	50	50	50	50	40	50
47	5	50	48	0.70000	33.23301	50	50	50	50	40	50
48	0	57	50	0.69771	33.98402	57	55	50	50	46	50
48	1	55	51	0.69767	33.89801	57	55	50	50	46	50
48	2	50	52	0.70000	34.30756	57	55	50	50	46	50
48	3	50	52	0.70000	33.99998	57	55	50	50	46	50

Table XXXIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
48	4	46	52	0.70112	33.59211	57	55	50	50	46	50
48	5	50	52	0.70000	33.93301	57	55	50	50	46	50
49	0	50	51	0.70000	34.68402	50	50	50	50	56	50
49	1	50	51	0.70000	34.59801	50	50	50	50	56	50
49	2	50	51	0.70000	35.00756	50	50	50	50	56	50
49	3	50	51	0.70000	34.69998	50	50	50	50	56	50
49	4	56	50	0.69832	34.29043	50	50	50	50	56	50
49	5	50	51	0.70000	34.63301	50	50	50	50	56	50

Table XXXIV.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 4

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	30	44	0.65333	0.65333	30	100	50	0	50	20
0	1	100	30	0.81667	0.81667	30	100	50	0	50	20
0	2	50	40	0.70000	0.70000	30	100	50	0	50	20
0	3	0	50	0.58333	0.58333	30	100	50	0	50	20
0	4	50	40	0.70000	0.70000	30	100	50	0	50	20
0	5	20	46	0.63000	0.63000	30	100	50	0	50	20
1	0	100	55	0.52500	1.17833	100	94	50	0	59	70
1	1	94	56	0.54805	1.36472	100	94	50	0	59	70
1	2	50	65	0.70000	1.40000	100	94	50	0	59	70
1	3	0	75	0.87500	1.45833	100	94	50	0	59	70
1	4	59	63	0.66892	1.36892	100	94	50	0	59	70
1	5	70	61	0.63000	1.26000	100	94	50	0	59	70
2	0	50	32	0.70000	1.87833	50	8	51	0	2	100
2	1	8	41	0.52948	1.89420	50	8	51	0	2	100
2	2	51	32	0.70415	2.10415	50	8	51	0	2	100
2	3	0	42	0.49000	1.94833	50	8	51	0	2	100
2	4	2	42	0.50288	1.87180	50	8	51	0	2	100
2	5	100	22	0.91000	2.17000	50	8	51	0	2	100
3	0	40	46	0.68600	2.56433	40	100	53	0	50	25
3	1	100	34	0.77000	2.66420	40	100	53	0	50	25
3	2	53	43	0.70448	2.80863	40	100	53	0	50	25
3	3	0	54	0.63000	2.57833	40	100	53	0	50	25
3	4	50	44	0.70000	2.57180	40	100	53	0	50	25
3	5	25	49	0.66500	2.83500	40	100	53	0	50	25
4	0	0	50	0.58333	3.14767	0	100	50	1	50	50
4	1	100	30	0.81667	3.48087	0	100	50	1	50	50
4	2	50	40	0.70000	3.50863	0	100	50	1	50	50
4	3	1	50	0.58795	3.16629	0	100	50	1	50	50
4	4	50	40	0.70000	3.27180	0	100	50	1	50	50
4	5	50	40	0.70000	3.53500	0	100	50	1	50	50
5	0	50	44	0.70000	3.84767	50	100	50	0	50	20
5	1	100	34	0.77000	4.25087	50	100	50	0	50	20
5	2	50	44	0.70000	4.20863	50	100	50	0	50	20
5	3	0	54	0.63000	3.79629	50	100	50	0	50	20
5	4	50	44	0.70000	3.97180	50	100	50	0	50	20
5	5	20	50	0.65800	4.19300	50	100	50	0	50	20
6	0	60	67	0.65567	4.50333	60	100	50	83	50	50
6	1	100	59	0.47833	4.72920	60	100	50	83	50	50
6	2	50	69	0.70000	4.90863	60	100	50	83	50	50
6	3	83	62	0.55678	4.35307	60	100	50	83	50	50
6	4	50	69	0.70000	4.67180	60	100	50	83	50	50
6	5	50	69	0.70000	4.89300	60	100	50	83	50	50
7	0	100	29	0.82833	5.33167	100	90	50	2	4	0
7	1	90	31	0.80267	5.53187	100	90	50	2	4	0
7	2	50	39	0.70000	5.60863	100	90	50	2	4	0
7	3	2	49	0.58128	4.93434	100	90	50	2	4	0
7	4	4	48	0.57979	5.25159	100	90	50	2	4	0
7	5	0	49	0.57167	5.46467	100	90	50	2	4	0
8	0	60	57	0.67900	6.01067	60	99	52	36	50	50
8	1	99	50	0.58795	6.11982	60	99	52	36	50	50
8	2	52	59	0.69561	6.30425	60	99	52	36	50	50
8	3	36	62	0.73005	5.66440	60	99	52	36	50	50
8	4	50	59	0.70000	5.95159	60	99	52	36	50	50
8	5	50	59	0.70000	6.16467	60	99	52	36	50	50
9	0	100	44	0.65333	6.66400	100	85	49	16	50	20
9	1	85	47	0.66733	6.78715	100	85	49	16	50	20
9	2	49	54	0.70089	7.00513	100	85	49	16	50	20
9	3	16	61	0.73332	6.39772	100	85	49	16	50	20
9	4	50	54	0.70000	6.65159	100	85	49	16	50	20
9	5	20	60	0.72800	6.89267	100	85	49	16	50	20
10	0	50	62	0.70000	7.36400	50	100	50	40	50	70
10	1	100	52	0.56000	7.34715	50	100	50	40	50	70
10	2	50	62	0.70000	7.70513	50	100	50	40	50	70

Table XXXIV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
10	3	40	64	0.72800	7.12572	50	100	50	40	50	70
10	4	50	62	0.70000	7.35159	50	100	50	40	50	70
10	5	70	58	0.64400	7.53667	50	100	50	40	50	70
11	0	100	44	0.65333	8.01733	100	52	50	25	50	45
11	1	52	54	0.69795	8.04510	100	52	50	25	50	45
11	2	50	54	0.70000	8.40513	100	52	50	25	50	45
11	3	25	59	0.72333	7.84905	100	52	50	25	50	45
11	4	50	54	0.70000	8.05159	100	52	50	25	50	45
11	5	45	55	0.70467	8.24133	100	52	50	25	50	45
12	0	40	50	0.69533	8.71267	40	100	50	19	50	29
12	1	100	38	0.72333	8.76843	40	100	50	19	50	29
12	2	50	48	0.70000	9.10513	40	100	50	19	50	29
12	3	19	54	0.68409	8.53314	40	100	50	19	50	29
12	4	50	48	0.70000	8.75159	40	100	50	19	50	29
12	5	29	52	0.68922	8.93055	40	100	50	19	50	29
13	0	60	59	0.67433	9.38700	60	100	50	47	50	48
13	1	100	51	0.57167	9.34010	60	100	50	47	50	48
13	2	50	61	0.70000	9.80513	60	100	50	47	50	48
13	3	47	62	0.70798	9.24112	60	100	50	47	50	48
13	4	50	61	0.70000	9.45159	60	100	50	47	50	48
13	5	48	61	0.70495	9.63550	60	100	50	47	50	48
14	0	80	50	0.65800	10.04500	80	90	50	17	53	40
14	1	90	48	0.64400	9.98410	80	90	50	17	53	40
14	2	50	56	0.70000	10.50513	80	90	50	17	53	40
14	3	17	63	0.74928	9.99040	80	90	50	17	53	40
14	4	53	55	0.69608	10.14767	80	90	50	17	53	40
14	5	40	58	0.71400	10.34950	80	90	50	17	53	40
15	0	80	50	0.65800	10.70300	80	80	50	22	51	46
15	1	80	50	0.65800	10.64210	80	80	50	22	51	46
15	2	50	56	0.70000	11.20513	80	80	50	22	51	46
15	3	22	61	0.73528	10.72568	80	80	50	22	51	46
15	4	51	56	0.69855	10.84622	80	80	50	22	51	46
15	5	46	57	0.70579	11.05529	80	80	50	22	51	46
16	0	50	45	0.70000	11.40300	50	54	48	18	58	45
16	1	54	44	0.70485	11.34695	50	54	48	18	58	45
16	2	48	45	0.69748	11.90261	50	54	48	18	58	45
16	3	18	51	0.65968	11.38536	50	54	48	18	58	45
16	4	58	43	0.71008	11.55630	50	54	48	18	58	45
16	5	45	46	0.69417	11.74945	50	54	48	18	58	45
17	0	50	58	0.70000	12.10300	50	100	50	27	62	50
17	1	100	48	0.60667	11.95362	50	100	50	27	62	50
17	2	50	58	0.70000	12.60261	50	100	50	27	62	50
17	3	27	62	0.73971	12.12507	50	100	50	27	62	50
17	4	62	55	0.67928	12.23558	50	100	50	27	62	50
17	5	50	58	0.70000	12.44945	50	100	50	27	62	50
18	0	50	45	0.70000	12.80300	50	75	50	18	56	25
18	1	75	40	0.72917	12.68278	50	75	50	18	56	25
18	2	50	45	0.70000	13.30261	50	75	50	18	56	25
18	3	18	51	0.65968	12.78475	50	75	50	18	56	25
18	4	56	44	0.70672	12.94230	50	75	50	18	56	25
18	5	25	50	0.67083	13.12029	50	75	50	18	56	25
19	0	32	50	0.68488	13.48788	32	69	50	26	55	50
19	1	69	43	0.71419	13.39697	32	69	50	26	55	50
19	2	50	46	0.70000	14.00261	32	69	50	26	55	50
19	3	26	51	0.67872	13.46347	32	69	50	26	55	50
19	4	55	45	0.70467	13.64697	32	69	50	26	55	50
19	5	50	46	0.70000	13.82029	32	69	50	26	55	50
20	0	62	55	0.67928	14.16716	62	74	50	45	55	50
20	1	74	52	0.66192	14.05889	62	74	50	45	55	50
20	2	50	57	0.70000	14.70261	62	74	50	45	55	50
20	3	45	58	0.70817	14.17164	62	74	50	45	55	50
20	4	55	56	0.69183	14.33880	62	74	50	45	55	50
20	5	50	57	0.70000	14.52029	62	74	50	45	55	50
21	0	62	46	0.70448	14.87164	62	49	50	32	50	50
21	1	49	49	0.69972	14.75861	62	49	50	32	50	50
21	2	50	49	0.70000	15.40261	62	49	50	32	50	50
21	3	32	52	0.69328	14.86492	62	49	50	32	50	50
21	4	50	49	0.70000	15.03880	62	49	50	32	50	50
21	5	50	49	0.70000	15.22029	62	49	50	32	50	50
22	0	32	45	0.66388	15.53552	32	51	50	53	50	19
22	1	51	41	0.70205	15.46066	32	51	50	53	50	19
22	2	50	41	0.70000	16.10261	32	51	50	53	50	19
22	3	53	40	0.70658	15.57150	32	51	50	53	50	19
22	4	50	41	0.70000	15.73880	32	51	50	53	50	19
22	5	19	47	0.63345	15.85374	32	51	50	53	50	19
23	0	32	54	0.70168	16.23720	32	79	53	73	47	20
23	1	79	45	0.69459	16.15525	32	79	53	73	47	20
23	2	53	50	0.69958	16.80219	32	79	53	73	47	20
23	3	73	46	0.69678	16.26828	32	79	53	73	47	20
23	4	47	51	0.70028	16.43908	32	79	53	73	47	20
23	5	20	57	0.70700	16.56074	32	79	53	73	47	20
24	0	52	48	0.70075	16.93795	52	69	50	55	48	20
24	1	69	45	0.70532	16.86057	52	69	50	55	48	20
24	2	50	49	0.70000	17.50219	52	69	50	55	48	20
24	3	55	48	0.70117	16.96945	52	69	50	55	48	20

Table XXXIV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
24	4	48	49	0.69935	17.13843	52	69	50	55	48	20
24	5	20	55	0.69300	17.25374	52	69	50	55	48	20
25	0	32	52	0.69328	17.63123	32	75	50	65	50	20
25	1	75	43	0.71167	17.57224	32	75	50	65	50	20
25	2	50	48	0.70000	18.20219	32	75	50	65	50	20
25	3	65	45	0.70700	17.67645	32	75	50	65	50	20
25	4	50	48	0.70000	17.83843	32	75	50	65	50	20
25	5	20	54	0.68600	17.93974	32	75	50	65	50	20
26	0	53	61	0.69188	18.32311	53	70	50	52	100	35
26	1	70	58	0.64400	18.21624	53	70	50	52	100	35
26	2	50	62	0.70000	18.90219	53	70	50	52	100	35
26	3	52	62	0.69421	18.37066	53	70	50	52	100	35
26	4	100	52	0.56000	18.39843	53	70	50	52	100	35
26	5	35	65	0.74200	18.68174	53	70	50	52	100	35
27	0	62	44	0.71008	19.03319	62	64	49	31	50	24
27	1	64	43	0.71372	18.92996	62	64	49	31	50	24
27	2	49	46	0.69902	19.60121	62	64	49	31	50	24
27	3	31	50	0.68315	19.05381	62	64	49	31	50	24
27	4	50	46	0.70000	19.09843	62	64	49	31	50	24
27	5	24	51	0.67452	19.35626	62	64	49	31	50	24
28	0	32	48	0.67648	19.70966	32	70	50	58	50	10
28	1	70	40	0.72800	19.65796	32	70	50	58	50	10
28	2	50	44	0.70000	20.30121	32	70	50	58	50	10
28	3	58	42	0.71195	19.76576	32	70	50	58	50	10
28	4	50	44	0.70000	19.79843	32	70	50	58	50	10
28	5	10	52	0.64400	20.00026	32	70	50	58	50	10
29	0	10	50	0.62533	20.33500	10	73	50	63	50	13
29	1	73	37	0.74508	20.40304	10	73	50	63	50	13
29	2	50	42	0.70000	21.00121	10	73	50	63	50	13
29	3	63	39	0.72548	20.49124	10	73	50	63	50	13
29	4	50	42	0.70000	20.49843	10	73	50	63	50	13
29	5	13	49	0.62748	20.62774	10	73	50	63	50	13
30	0	32	61	0.73108	21.06608	32	73	50	82	50	50
30	1	73	53	0.65921	21.06225	32	73	50	82	50	50
30	2	50	57	0.70000	21.70121	32	73	50	82	50	50
30	3	82	51	0.64475	21.13599	32	73	50	82	50	50
30	4	50	57	0.70000	21.19843	32	73	50	82	50	50
30	5	50	57	0.70000	21.32774	32	73	50	82	50	50
31	0	62	50	0.69328	21.75936	62	60	50	20	40	80
31	1	60	50	0.69533	21.75758	62	60	50	20	40	80
31	2	50	52	0.70000	22.40121	62	60	50	20	40	80
31	3	20	58	0.71400	21.84999	62	60	50	20	40	80
31	4	40	54	0.70467	21.90309	62	60	50	20	40	80
31	5	80	46	0.68600	22.01374	62	60	50	20	40	80
32	0	15	41	0.56933	22.32869	15	50	51	40	38	24
32	1	50	34	0.70000	22.45758	15	50	51	40	38	24
32	2	51	33	0.70392	23.10513	15	50	51	40	38	24
32	3	40	36	0.66267	22.51265	15	50	51	40	38	24
32	4	38	36	0.65408	22.55717	15	50	51	40	38	24
32	5	24	39	0.60172	22.61546	15	50	51	40	38	24
33	0	32	55	0.70588	23.03457	32	90	55	70	50	12
33	1	90	44	0.68133	23.13892	32	90	55	70	50	12
33	2	55	51	0.69767	23.80280	32	90	55	70	50	12
33	3	70	48	0.69067	23.20332	32	90	55	70	50	12
33	4	50	52	0.70000	23.25717	32	90	55	70	50	12
33	5	12	59	0.71241	23.32787	32	90	55	70	50	12
34	0	62	58	0.67088	23.70545	62	76	50	50	50	63
34	1	76	55	0.63812	23.77704	62	76	50	50	50	63
34	2	50	60	0.70000	24.50280	62	76	50	50	50	63
34	3	50	60	0.70000	23.90332	62	76	50	50	50	63
34	4	50	60	0.70000	23.95717	62	76	50	50	50	63
34	5	63	58	0.66785	23.99572	62	76	50	50	50	63
35	0	62	49	0.69608	24.40153	62	53	50	37	42	63
35	1	53	51	0.69888	24.47592	62	53	50	37	42	63
35	2	50	51	0.70000	25.20280	62	53	50	37	42	63
35	3	37	54	0.70425	24.60756	62	53	50	37	42	63
35	4	42	53	0.70261	24.65979	62	53	50	37	42	63
35	5	63	49	0.69515	24.69087	62	53	50	37	42	63
36	0	45	48	0.69650	25.09803	45	50	50	45	47	50
36	1	50	47	0.70000	25.17592	45	50	50	45	47	50
36	2	50	47	0.70000	25.90280	45	50	50	45	47	50
36	3	45	48	0.69650	25.30406	45	50	50	45	47	50
36	4	47	48	0.69818	25.35797	45	50	50	45	47	50
36	5	50	47	0.70000	25.39087	45	50	50	45	47	50
37	0	32	55	0.70588	25.80391	32	59	51	67	50	50
37	1	59	50	0.69622	25.87214	32	59	51	67	50	50
37	2	51	52	0.69949	26.60229	32	59	51	67	50	50
37	3	67	48	0.69445	25.99851	32	59	51	67	50	50
37	4	50	52	0.70000	26.05797	32	59	51	67	50	50
37	5	50	52	0.70000	26.09087	32	59	51	67	50	50
38	0	38	44	0.67648	26.48039	38	50	50	20	50	50
38	1	50	42	0.70000	26.57214	38	50	50	20	50	50
38	2	50	42	0.70000	27.30229	38	50	50	20	50	50
38	3	20	48	0.64400	26.64251	38	50	50	20	50	50
38	4	50	42	0.70000	26.75797	38	50	50	20	50	50

Table XXXIV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
38	5	50	42	0.70000	26.79087	38	50	50	20	50	50
39	0	50	45	0.70000	27.18039	50	50	50	35	50	42
39	1	50	45	0.70000	27.27214	50	50	50	35	50	42
39	2	50	45	0.70000	28.00229	50	50	50	35	50	42
39	3	35	48	0.68250	27.32501	50	50	50	35	50	42
39	4	50	45	0.70000	27.45797	50	50	50	35	50	42
39	5	42	47	0.69141	27.48228	50	50	50	35	50	42
40	0	32	52	0.69328	27.87367	32	69	50	55	50	37
40	1	69	45	0.70532	27.97746	32	69	50	55	50	37
40	2	50	49	0.70000	28.70229	32	69	50	55	50	37
40	3	55	48	0.70117	28.02618	32	69	50	55	50	37
40	4	50	49	0.70000	28.15797	32	69	50	55	50	37
40	5	37	51	0.69515	28.17743	32	69	50	55	50	37
41	0	50	55	0.70000	28.57367	50	68	50	55	54	50
41	1	68	52	0.67648	28.65394	50	68	50	55	54	50
41	2	50	55	0.70000	29.40229	50	68	50	55	54	50
41	3	55	54	0.69417	28.72034	50	68	50	55	54	50
41	4	54	55	0.69459	28.85255	50	68	50	55	54	50
41	5	50	55	0.70000	28.87743	50	68	50	55	54	50
42	0	62	48	0.69888	29.27255	62	50	50	37	51	50
42	1	50	50	0.70000	29.35394	62	50	50	37	51	50
42	2	50	50	0.70000	30.10229	62	50	50	37	51	50
42	3	37	53	0.70121	29.42156	62	50	50	37	51	50
42	4	51	50	0.69995	29.55251	62	50	50	37	51	50
42	5	50	50	0.70000	29.57743	62	50	50	37	51	50
43	0	50	51	0.70000	29.97255	50	54	50	52	50	50
43	1	54	50	0.69925	30.05319	50	54	50	52	50	50
43	2	50	51	0.70000	30.80229	50	54	50	52	50	50
43	3	52	51	0.69935	30.12090	50	54	50	52	50	50
43	4	50	51	0.70000	30.25251	50	54	50	52	50	50
43	5	50	51	0.70000	30.27743	50	54	50	52	50	50
44	0	50	53	0.70000	30.67255	50	52	50	60	50	51
44	1	52	52	0.69888	30.75207	50	52	50	60	50	51
44	2	50	53	0.70000	31.50229	50	52	50	60	50	51
44	3	60	51	0.69300	30.81390	50	52	50	60	50	51
44	4	50	53	0.70000	30.95251	50	52	50	60	50	51
44	5	51	52	0.69949	30.97691	50	52	50	60	50	51
45	0	58	50	0.69701	31.36956	58	50	50	50	50	51
45	1	50	52	0.70000	31.45207	58	50	50	50	50	51
45	2	50	52	0.70000	32.20229	58	50	50	50	50	51
45	3	50	52	0.70000	31.51390	58	50	50	50	50	51
45	4	50	52	0.70000	31.65251	58	50	50	50	50	51
45	5	51	52	0.69949	31.67640	58	50	50	50	50	51
46	0	50	49	0.70000	32.06956	50	47	50	48	50	51
46	1	47	50	0.69958	32.15165	50	47	50	48	50	51
46	2	50	49	0.70000	32.90229	50	47	50	48	50	51
46	3	48	50	0.69981	32.21372	50	47	50	48	50	51
46	4	50	49	0.70000	32.35251	50	47	50	48	50	51
46	5	51	49	0.70019	32.37659	50	47	50	48	50	51
47	0	50	52	0.70000	32.76956	50	50	50	60	50	49
47	1	50	52	0.70000	32.85165	50	50	50	60	50	49
47	2	50	52	0.70000	33.60229	50	50	50	60	50	49
47	3	60	50	0.69533	32.90905	50	50	50	60	50	49
47	4	50	52	0.70000	33.05251	50	50	50	60	50	49
47	5	49	52	0.70042	33.07701	50	50	50	60	50	49
48	0	50	50	0.70000	33.46956	50	50	50	50	50	51
48	1	50	50	0.70000	33.55165	50	50	50	50	50	51
48	2	50	50	0.70000	34.30229	50	50	50	50	50	51
48	3	50	50	0.70000	33.60905	50	50	50	50	50	51
48	4	50	50	0.70000	33.75251	50	50	50	50	50	51
48	5	51	50	0.69995	33.77696	50	50	50	50	50	51
49	0	100	50	0.58333	34.05290	100	50	50	50	50	50
49	1	50	60	0.70000	34.25165	100	50	50	50	50	50
49	2	50	60	0.70000	35.00229	100	50	50	50	50	50
49	3	50	60	0.70000	34.30905	100	50	50	50	50	50
49	4	50	60	0.70000	34.45251	100	50	50	50	50	50
49	5	50	60	0.70000	34.47696	100	50	50	50	50	50

Table XXXV.: Data from experiments: 6 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 5

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	96	45	0.65492	0.65492	96	68	44	50	50	12
0	1	68	50	0.68488	0.68488	96	68	44	50	50	12
0	2	44	55	0.70532	0.70532	96	68	44	50	50	12
0	3	50	54	0.70000	0.70000	96	68	44	50	50	12

Table XXXV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	4	50	54	0.70000	0.70000	96	68	44	50	50	12
0	5	12	62	0.73901	0.73901	96	68	44	50	50	12
1	0	72	40	0.72875	1.38367	72	0	99	47	52	2
1	1	0	54	0.63000	1.31488	72	0	99	47	52	2
1	2	99	35	0.75945	1.46477	72	0	99	47	52	2
1	3	47	45	0.69608	1.39608	72	0	99	47	52	2
1	4	52	44	0.70261	1.40261	72	0	99	47	52	2
1	5	2	54	0.63728	1.37629	72	0	99	47	52	2
2	0	61	33	0.73799	2.12165	61	56	5	45	49	11
2	1	56	34	0.72072	2.03560	61	56	5	45	49	11
2	2	5	44	0.54250	2.00727	61	56	5	45	49	11
2	3	45	36	0.68250	2.07858	61	56	5	45	49	11
2	4	49	36	0.69669	2.09930	61	56	5	45	49	11
2	5	11	43	0.56532	1.94161	61	56	5	45	49	11
3	0	32	66	0.75208	2.87373	32	34	100	60	54	82
3	1	34	66	0.74779	2.78339	32	34	100	60	54	82
3	2	100	52	0.56000	2.56727	32	34	100	60	54	82
3	3	60	60	0.67200	2.75058	32	34	100	60	54	82
3	4	54	62	0.68805	2.78735	32	34	100	60	54	82
3	5	82	56	0.60741	2.54903	32	34	100	60	54	82
4	0	50	47	0.70000	3.57373	50	56	66	45	50	18
4	1	56	46	0.70392	3.48731	50	56	66	45	50	18
4	2	66	44	0.71045	3.27773	50	56	66	45	50	18
4	3	45	48	0.69650	3.44708	50	56	66	45	50	18
4	4	50	47	0.70000	3.48735	50	56	66	45	50	18
4	5	18	53	0.67461	3.22364	50	56	66	45	50	18
5	0	68	57	0.65548	4.22921	68	37	100	48	48	50
5	1	37	63	0.73155	4.21885	68	37	100	48	48	50
5	2	100	50	0.58333	3.86106	68	37	100	48	48	50
5	3	48	61	0.70495	4.15203	68	37	100	48	48	50
5	4	48	61	0.70495	4.19230	68	37	100	48	48	50
5	5	50	60	0.70000	3.92364	68	37	100	48	48	50
6	0	25	55	0.70000	4.92921	25	69	50	60	48	50
6	1	69	47	0.69645	4.91531	25	69	50	60	48	50
6	2	50	50	0.70000	4.56106	25	69	50	60	48	50
6	3	60	48	0.70000	4.85203	25	69	50	60	48	50
6	4	48	51	0.70028	4.89258	25	69	50	60	48	50
6	5	50	50	0.70000	4.62364	25	69	50	60	48	50
7	0	59	49	0.69832	5.62753	59	50	50	50	47	50
7	1	50	51	0.70000	5.61531	59	50	50	50	47	50
7	2	50	51	0.70000	5.26106	59	50	50	50	47	50
7	3	50	51	0.70000	5.55203	59	50	50	50	47	50
7	4	47	52	0.70098	5.59356	59	50	50	50	47	50
7	5	50	51	0.70000	5.32364	59	50	50	50	47	50
8	0	68	55	0.66388	6.29141	68	50	57	50	47	70
8	1	50	58	0.70000	6.31531	68	50	57	50	47	70
8	2	57	57	0.68628	5.94734	68	50	57	50	47	70
8	3	50	58	0.70000	6.25203	68	50	57	50	47	70
8	4	47	59	0.70588	6.29944	68	50	57	50	47	70
8	5	70	54	0.66267	5.98631	68	50	57	50	47	70
9	0	92	40	0.71568	7.00709	92	40	18	50	46	48
9	1	40	51	0.69767	7.01297	92	40	18	50	46	48
9	2	18	55	0.68955	6.63689	92	40	18	50	46	48
9	3	50	49	0.70000	6.95203	92	40	18	50	46	48
9	4	46	50	0.69925	6.99869	92	40	18	50	46	48
9	5	48	49	0.69935	6.68565	92	40	18	50	46	48
10	0	27	53	0.69141	7.69851	27	53	50	60	50	54
10	1	53	48	0.70098	7.71395	27	53	50	60	50	54
10	2	50	49	0.70000	7.33689	27	53	50	60	50	54
10	3	60	47	0.70233	7.65436	27	53	50	60	50	54
10	4	50	49	0.70000	7.69869	27	53	50	60	50	54
10	5	54	48	0.70112	7.38677	27	53	50	60	50	54
11	0	55	54	0.69417	8.39267	55	49	60	60	48	52
11	1	49	55	0.70112	8.41507	55	49	60	60	48	52
11	2	60	53	0.68833	8.02522	55	49	60	60	48	52
11	3	60	53	0.68833	8.34269	55	49	60	60	48	52
11	4	48	55	0.70215	8.40084	55	49	60	60	48	52
11	5	52	54	0.69795	8.08472	55	49	60	60	48	52
12	0	55	47	0.70233	9.09501	55	51	50	40	47	48
12	1	51	48	0.70042	9.11549	55	51	50	40	47	48
12	2	50	48	0.70000	8.72522	55	51	50	40	47	48
12	3	40	50	0.69533	9.03803	55	51	50	40	47	48
12	4	47	49	0.69888	9.09972	55	51	50	40	47	48
12	5	48	49	0.69935	8.78407	55	51	50	40	47	48
13	0	100	49	0.59500	9.69001	100	39	57	50	53	48
13	1	39	62	0.72515	9.84065	100	39	57	50	53	48
13	2	57	58	0.68465	9.40987	100	39	57	50	53	48
13	3	50	59	0.70000	9.73803	100	39	57	50	53	48
13	4	53	59	0.69328	9.79300	100	39	57	50	53	48
13	5	48	60	0.70448	9.48855	100	39	57	50	53	48
14	0	43	53	0.70261	10.39262	43	46	99	50	50	20
14	1	46	52	0.70112	10.54177	43	46	99	50	50	20
14	2	99	42	0.67942	10.08929	43	46	99	50	50	20
14	3	50	52	0.70000	10.43803	43	46	99	50	50	20
14	4	50	52	0.70000	10.49300	43	46	99	50	50	20

Table XXXV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
14	5	20	58	0.71400	10.20255	43	46	99	50	50	20
15	0	51	51	0.69972	11.09234	51	50	62	60	49	32
15	1	50	51	0.70000	11.24177	51	50	62	60	49	32
15	2	62	48	0.69888	10.78817	51	50	62	60	49	32
15	3	60	49	0.69767	11.13569	51	50	62	60	49	32
15	4	49	51	0.70019	11.19319	51	50	62	60	49	32
15	5	32	54	0.70168	10.90423	51	50	62	60	49	32
16	0	39	40	0.66869	11.76103	39	49	52	50	49	2
16	1	49	38	0.69715	11.93892	39	49	52	50	49	2
16	2	52	38	0.70541	11.49358	39	49	52	50	49	2
16	3	50	38	0.70000	11.83569	39	49	52	50	49	2
16	4	49	38	0.69715	11.89034	39	49	52	50	49	2
16	5	2	48	0.57008	11.47431	39	49	52	50	49	2
17	0	53	50	0.69958	12.46061	53	50	39	55	56	52
17	1	50	51	0.70000	12.63892	53	50	39	55	56	52
17	2	39	53	0.70205	12.19563	53	50	39	55	56	52
17	3	55	50	0.69883	12.53453	53	50	39	55	56	52
17	4	56	50	0.69832	12.58866	53	50	39	55	56	52
17	5	52	51	0.69935	12.17365	53	50	39	55	56	52
18	0	65	43	0.71400	13.17461	65	30	40	45	50	50
18	1	30	50	0.68133	13.32025	65	30	40	45	50	50
18	2	40	48	0.69067	12.88630	65	30	40	45	50	50
18	3	45	47	0.69533	13.22986	65	30	40	45	50	50
18	4	50	46	0.70000	13.28866	65	30	40	45	50	50
18	5	50	46	0.70000	12.87365	65	30	40	45	50	50
19	0	38	47	0.68488	13.85949	38	49	50	50	52	35
19	1	49	45	0.69879	14.01904	38	49	50	50	52	35
19	2	50	45	0.70000	13.58630	38	49	50	50	52	35
19	3	50	45	0.70000	13.92986	38	49	50	50	52	35
19	4	52	44	0.70261	13.99127	38	49	50	50	52	35
19	5	35	48	0.68250	13.55615	38	49	50	50	52	35
20	0	4	51	0.61199	14.47147	4	45	47	50	57	54
20	1	45	42	0.68950	14.70854	4	45	47	50	57	54
20	2	47	42	0.69398	14.28028	4	45	47	50	57	54
20	3	50	41	0.70000	14.62986	4	45	47	50	57	54
20	4	57	40	0.71405	14.70532	4	45	47	50	57	54
20	5	54	41	0.70765	14.26381	4	45	47	50	57	54
21	0	40	53	0.70233	15.17381	40	55	50	50	60	50
21	1	55	50	0.69883	15.40737	40	55	50	50	60	50
21	2	50	51	0.70000	14.98028	40	55	50	50	60	50
21	3	50	51	0.70000	15.32986	40	55	50	50	60	50
21	4	60	49	0.69767	15.40299	40	55	50	50	60	50
21	5	50	51	0.70000	14.96381	40	55	50	50	60	50
22	0	52	50	0.69981	15.87362	52	50	50	50	50	49
22	1	50	50	0.70000	16.10737	52	50	50	50	50	49
22	2	50	50	0.70000	15.68028	52	50	50	50	50	49
22	3	50	50	0.70000	16.02986	52	50	50	50	50	49
22	4	50	50	0.70000	16.10299	52	50	50	50	50	49
22	5	49	50	0.69995	15.66376	52	50	50	50	50	49
23	0	40	50	0.69533	16.56895	40	48	50	50	50	50
23	1	48	48	0.69888	16.80625	40	48	50	50	50	50
23	2	50	48	0.70000	16.38028	40	48	50	50	50	50
23	3	50	48	0.70000	16.72986	40	48	50	50	50	50
23	4	50	48	0.70000	16.80299	40	48	50	50	50	50
23	5	50	48	0.70000	16.36376	40	48	50	50	50	50
24	0	51	51	0.69972	17.26867	51	50	50	65	50	38
24	1	50	51	0.70000	17.50625	51	50	50	65	50	38
24	2	50	51	0.70000	17.08028	51	50	50	65	50	38
24	3	65	48	0.69650	17.42636	51	50	50	65	50	38
24	4	50	51	0.70000	17.50299	51	50	50	65	50	38
24	5	38	53	0.70168	17.06544	51	50	50	65	50	38
25	0	77	51	0.65968	17.92835	77	50	50	60	50	47
25	1	50	57	0.70000	18.20625	77	50	50	60	50	47
25	2	50	57	0.70000	17.78028	77	50	50	60	50	47
25	3	60	55	0.68367	18.11003	77	50	50	60	50	47
25	4	50	57	0.70000	18.20299	77	50	50	60	50	47
25	5	47	57	0.70448	17.76992	77	50	50	60	50	47
26	0	51	51	0.69972	18.62807	51	50	51	50	48	55
26	1	50	51	0.70000	18.90625	51	50	51	50	48	55
26	2	51	51	0.69972	18.48000	51	50	51	50	48	55
26	3	50	51	0.70000	18.81003	51	50	51	50	48	55
26	4	48	51	0.70028	18.90327	51	50	51	50	48	55
26	5	55	50	0.69883	18.46875	51	50	51	50	48	55
27	0	50	51	0.70000	19.32807	50	57	50	50	48	50
27	1	57	50	0.69771	19.60397	50	57	50	50	48	50
27	2	50	51	0.70000	19.18000	50	57	50	50	48	50
27	3	50	51	0.70000	19.51003	50	57	50	50	48	50
27	4	48	51	0.70028	19.60355	50	57	50	50	48	50
27	5	50	51	0.70000	19.16875	50	57	50	50	48	50
28	0	51	50	0.69995	20.02803	51	50	50	50	48	50
28	1	50	50	0.70000	20.30397	51	50	50	50	48	50
28	2	50	50	0.70000	19.88000	51	50	50	50	48	50
28	3	50	50	0.70000	20.21003	51	50	50	50	48	50
28	4	48	50	0.69981	20.30336	51	50	50	50	48	50
28	5	50	50	0.70000	19.86875	51	50	50	50	48	50

Table XXXV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
29	0	51	50	0.69995	20.72798	51	50	50	50	50	50
29	1	50	50	0.70000	21.00397	51	50	50	50	50	50
29	2	50	50	0.70000	20.58000	51	50	50	50	50	50
29	3	50	50	0.70000	20.91003	51	50	50	50	50	50
29	4	50	50	0.70000	21.00336	51	50	50	50	50	50
29	5	50	50	0.70000	20.56875	51	50	50	50	50	50
30	0	50	50	0.70000	21.42798	50	50	50	50	50	50
30	1	50	50	0.70000	21.70397	50	50	50	50	50	50
30	2	50	50	0.70000	21.28000	50	50	50	50	50	50
30	3	50	50	0.70000	21.61003	50	50	50	50	50	50
30	4	50	50	0.70000	21.70336	50	50	50	50	50	50
30	5	50	50	0.70000	21.26875	50	50	50	50	50	50
31	0	50	51	0.70000	22.12798	50	50	50	50	50	53
31	1	50	51	0.70000	22.40397	50	50	50	50	50	53
31	2	50	51	0.70000	21.98000	50	50	50	50	50	53
31	3	50	51	0.70000	22.31003	50	50	50	50	50	53
31	4	50	51	0.70000	22.40336	50	50	50	50	50	53
31	5	53	50	0.69958	21.96833	50	50	50	50	50	53
32	0	50	50	0.70000	22.82798	50	50	50	50	50	50
32	1	50	50	0.70000	23.10397	50	50	50	50	50	50
32	2	50	50	0.70000	22.68000	50	50	50	50	50	50
32	3	50	50	0.70000	23.01003	50	50	50	50	50	50
32	4	50	50	0.70000	23.10336	50	50	50	50	50	50
32	5	50	50	0.70000	22.66833	50	50	50	50	50	50
33	0	45	50	0.69883	23.52681	45	50	50	50	50	50
33	1	50	49	0.70000	23.80397	45	50	50	50	50	50
33	2	50	49	0.70000	23.38000	45	50	50	50	50	50
33	3	50	49	0.70000	23.71003	45	50	50	50	50	50
33	4	50	49	0.70000	23.80336	45	50	50	50	50	50
33	5	50	49	0.70000	23.36833	45	50	50	50	50	50
34	0	50	48	0.70000	24.22681	50	50	40	50	51	50
34	1	50	48	0.70000	24.50397	50	50	40	50	51	50
34	2	40	50	0.69533	24.07533	50	50	40	50	51	50
34	3	50	48	0.70000	24.41003	50	50	40	50	51	50
34	4	51	48	0.70042	24.50378	50	50	40	50	51	50
34	5	50	48	0.70000	24.06833	50	50	40	50	51	50
35	0	51	50	0.69995	24.92677	51	50	50	50	50	52
35	1	50	51	0.70000	25.20397	51	50	50	50	50	52
35	2	50	51	0.70000	24.77533	51	50	50	50	50	52
35	3	50	51	0.70000	25.11003	51	50	50	50	50	52
35	4	50	51	0.70000	25.20378	51	50	50	50	50	52
35	5	52	50	0.69981	24.76815	51	50	50	50	50	52
36	0	50	50	0.70000	25.62677	50	50	50	50	50	50
36	1	50	50	0.70000	25.90397	50	50	50	50	50	50
36	2	50	50	0.70000	25.47533	50	50	50	50	50	50
36	3	50	50	0.70000	25.81003	50	50	50	50	50	50
36	4	50	50	0.70000	25.90378	50	50	50	50	50	50
36	5	50	50	0.70000	25.46815	50	50	50	50	50	50
37	0	50	50	0.70000	26.32677	50	50	50	50	50	50
37	1	50	50	0.70000	26.60397	50	50	50	50	50	50
37	2	50	50	0.70000	26.17533	50	50	50	50	50	50
37	3	50	50	0.70000	26.51003	50	50	50	50	50	50
37	4	50	50	0.70000	26.60378	50	50	50	50	50	50
37	5	50	50	0.70000	26.16815	50	50	50	50	50	50
38	0	50	50	0.70000	27.02677	50	50	50	50	50	50
38	1	50	50	0.70000	27.30397	50	50	50	50	50	50
38	2	50	50	0.70000	26.87533	50	50	50	50	50	50
38	3	50	50	0.70000	27.21003	50	50	50	50	50	50
38	4	50	50	0.70000	27.30378	50	50	50	50	50	50
38	5	50	50	0.70000	26.86815	50	50	50	50	50	50
39	0	50	50	0.70000	27.72677	50	50	50	50	50	50
39	1	50	50	0.70000	28.00397	50	50	50	50	50	50
39	2	50	50	0.70000	27.57533	50	50	50	50	50	50
39	3	50	50	0.70000	27.91003	50	50	50	50	50	50
39	4	50	50	0.70000	28.00378	50	50	50	50	50	50
39	5	50	50	0.70000	27.56815	50	50	50	50	50	50
40	0	50	50	0.70000	28.42677	50	50	50	50	50	50
40	1	50	50	0.70000	28.70397	50	50	50	50	50	50
40	2	50	50	0.70000	28.27533	50	50	50	50	50	50
40	3	50	50	0.70000	28.61003	50	50	50	50	50	50
40	4	50	50	0.70000	28.70378	50	50	50	50	50	50
40	5	50	50	0.70000	28.26815	50	50	50	50	50	50
41	0	50	50	0.70000	29.12677	50	50	50	50	50	50
41	1	50	50	0.70000	29.40397	50	50	50	50	50	50
41	2	50	50	0.70000	28.97533	50	50	50	50	50	50
41	3	50	50	0.70000	29.31003	50	50	50	50	50	50
41	4	50	50	0.70000	29.40378	50	50	50	50	50	50
41	5	50	50	0.70000	28.96815	50	50	50	50	50	50
42	0	50	50	0.70000	29.82677	50	50	50	50	50	50
42	1	50	50	0.70000	30.10397	50	50	50	50	50	50
42	2	50	50	0.70000	29.67533	50	50	50	50	50	50
42	3	50	50	0.70000	30.01003	50	50	50	50	50	50
42	4	50	50	0.70000	30.10378	50	50	50	50	50	50
42	5	50	50	0.70000	29.66815	50	50	50	50	50	50
43	0	50	50	0.70000	30.52677	50	50	50	50	50	50

Table XXXV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
43	1	50	50	0.70000	30.80397	50	50	50	50	50	50
43	2	50	50	0.70000	30.37533	50	50	50	50	50	50
43	3	50	50	0.70000	30.71003	50	50	50	50	50	50
43	4	50	50	0.70000	30.80378	50	50	50	50	50	50
43	5	50	50	0.70000	30.36815	50	50	50	50	50	50
44	0	50	50	0.70000	31.22677	50	50	50	50	50	50
44	1	50	50	0.70000	31.50397	50	50	50	50	50	50
44	2	50	50	0.70000	31.07533	50	50	50	50	50	50
44	3	50	50	0.70000	31.41003	50	50	50	50	50	50
44	4	50	50	0.70000	31.50378	50	50	50	50	50	50
44	5	50	50	0.70000	31.06815	50	50	50	50	50	50
45	0	50	50	0.70000	31.92677	50	50	50	50	50	50
45	1	50	50	0.70000	32.20397	50	50	50	50	50	50
45	2	50	50	0.70000	31.77533	50	50	50	50	50	50
45	3	50	50	0.70000	32.11003	50	50	50	50	50	50
45	4	50	50	0.70000	32.20378	50	50	50	50	50	50
45	5	50	50	0.70000	31.76815	50	50	50	50	50	50
46	0	50	50	0.70000	32.62677	50	50	50	50	48	50
46	1	50	50	0.70000	32.90397	50	50	50	50	48	50
46	2	50	50	0.70000	32.47533	50	50	50	50	48	50
46	3	50	50	0.70000	32.81003	50	50	50	50	48	50
46	4	48	50	0.69981	32.90359	50	50	50	50	48	50
46	5	50	50	0.70000	32.46815	50	50	50	50	48	50
47	0	50	50	0.70000	33.32677	50	50	50	50	50	50
47	1	50	50	0.70000	33.60397	50	50	50	50	50	50
47	2	50	50	0.70000	33.17533	50	50	50	50	50	50
47	3	50	50	0.70000	33.51003	50	50	50	50	50	50
47	4	50	50	0.70000	33.60359	50	50	50	50	50	50
47	5	50	50	0.70000	33.16815	50	50	50	50	50	50
48	0	50	50	0.70000	34.02677	50	50	50	50	50	50
48	1	50	50	0.70000	34.30397	50	50	50	50	50	50
48	2	50	50	0.70000	33.87533	50	50	50	50	50	50
48	3	50	50	0.70000	34.21003	50	50	50	50	50	50
48	4	50	50	0.70000	34.30359	50	50	50	50	50	50
48	5	50	50	0.70000	33.86815	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	0	50	50	0.70000	34.72677	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	1	50	50	0.70000	35.00397	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	2	50	50	0.70000	34.57533	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	3	50	50	0.70000	34.91003	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	4	50	50	0.70000	35.00359	50	50	50	50	50	50
49	5	50	50	0.70000	34.56815	50	50	50	50	50	50

Table XXXVI.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 1

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
0	0	25	56	0.36196	0.36196	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	1	65	53	0.34160	0.34160	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	2	25	56	0.36196	0.36196	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	3	59	53	0.34559	0.34559	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	4	45	55	0.35292	0.35292	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	5	39	55	0.35565	0.35565	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	6	58	53	0.34617	0.34617	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	7	100	50	0.32083	0.32083	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	8	79	51	0.33647	0.33647	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	9	50	54	0.35000	0.35000	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	10	80	51	0.33565	0.33565	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
0	11	20	57	0.36645	0.36645	25	65	25	59	45	39	58	100	79	50	80	20
1	0	45	49	0.34907	0.71103	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	1	62	47	0.35294	0.69454	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	2	65	47	0.35315	0.71511	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	3	18	51	0.34216	0.68775	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	4	43	49	0.34853	0.70145	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	5	75	46	0.35554	0.71119	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	6	53	48	0.35067	0.69684	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	7	50	48	0.35000	0.67083	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	8	50	48	0.35000	0.68647	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	9	50	48	0.35000	0.70000	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	10	50	48	0.35000	0.68565	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
1	11	20	51	0.34335	0.70980	45	62	65	18	43	75	53	50	50	50	50	20
2	0	70	62	0.31453	1.02556	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	1	45	64	0.35869	1.05323	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	2	69	62	0.31653	1.03164	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	3	100	59	0.26308	0.95083	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	4	47	64	0.35529	1.05673	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	5	48	64	0.35355	1.06474	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95

Table XXXVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
2	6	50	64	0.35000	1.04684	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	7	61	63	0.33024	1.00107	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	8	16	67	0.41069	1.09716	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	9	50	64	0.35000	1.05000	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	10	100	59	0.26308	0.94873	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
2	11	95	60	0.26862	0.97842	70	45	69	100	47	48	50	61	16	50	100	95
3	0	40	44	0.34113	1.36669	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	1	19	46	0.32287	1.37611	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	2	77	41	0.37268	1.40432	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	3	63	42	0.36138	1.31221	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	4	31	45	0.33360	1.39033	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	5	35	45	0.33775	1.40249	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	6	65	42	0.36278	1.40961	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	7	100	39	0.39142	1.39249	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	8	68	42	0.36470	1.46186	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	9	30	45	0.33250	1.38250	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	10	0	48	0.30800	1.25673	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
3	11	0	48	0.30800	1.28642	40	19	77	63	31	35	65	100	68	30	0	0
4	0	70	52	0.34020	1.70689	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	1	51	53	0.34960	1.72571	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	2	40	54	0.35397	1.75828	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	3	72	51	0.34153	1.65374	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	4	45	54	0.35228	1.74260	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	5	52	53	0.34918	1.75167	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	6	57	53	0.34673	1.75635	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	7	100	49	0.32725	1.71974	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	8	100	49	0.32725	1.78911	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	9	50	53	0.35000	1.73250	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	10	0	58	0.37217	1.62890	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
4	11	0	58	0.37217	1.65859	70	51	40	72	45	52	57	100	100	50	0	0
5	0	60	40	0.36167	2.06856	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	1	56	40	0.35728	2.08299	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	2	14	44	0.30716	2.06544	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	3	75	38	0.38121	2.03495	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	4	44	41	0.34265	2.08525	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	5	75	38	0.38121	2.13288	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	6	52	40	0.35252	2.10887	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	7	0	45	0.28875	2.00849	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	8	0	45	0.28875	2.07786	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	9	60	40	0.36167	2.09417	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	10	61	40	0.36271	1.99160	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
5	11	0	45	0.28875	1.94734	60	56	14	75	44	75	52	0	0	60	61	0
6	0	50	45	0.35000	2.41856	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	1	51	45	0.35063	2.43362	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	2	15	48	0.32672	2.39217	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	3	19	48	0.33083	2.36578	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	4	51	45	0.35063	2.43588	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	5	30	47	0.33763	2.47051	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	6	52	45	0.35124	2.46010	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	7	100	40	0.38500	2.39349	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	8	45	45	0.34650	2.42436	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	9	40	46	0.34370	2.43787	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	10	0	49	0.31442	2.30602	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
6	11	90	41	0.37753	2.32487	50	51	15	19	51	30	52	100	45	40	0	90
7	0	90	69	0.23380	2.65236	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	1	55	72	0.33559	2.76921	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	2	75	70	0.27854	2.67071	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	3	81	69	0.26320	2.62898	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	4	49	72	0.35281	2.78869	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	5	41	73	0.37562	2.84613	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	6	78	70	0.26899	2.72909	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	7	100	68	0.20533	2.59882	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	8	46	73	0.36162	2.78598	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	9	40	73	0.37835	2.81622	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	10	100	68	0.20533	2.51135	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
7	11	90	69	0.23380	2.55867	90	55	75	81	49	41	78	100	46	40	100	90
8	0	40	45	0.34242	2.99477	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	1	47	44	0.34758	3.11680	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	2	15	47	0.32223	2.99294	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	3	74	42	0.36792	2.99690	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	4	50	44	0.35000	3.13869	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	5	57	43	0.35572	3.20185	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	6	71	42	0.36642	3.09550	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	7	0	49	0.31442	2.91324	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	8	45	44	0.34586	3.13183	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	9	35	45	0.33775	3.15397	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	10	100	39	0.39142	2.90277	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
8	11	0	49	0.31442	2.87309	40	47	15	74	50	57	71	0	45	35	100	0
9	0	60	50	0.34883	3.34361	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	1	45	52	0.35099	3.46779	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	2	20	54	0.35490	3.34784	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	3	83	48	0.34576	3.34266	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	4	48	52	0.35047	3.48916	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	5	48	52	0.35047	3.55231	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	6	53	51	0.34951	3.44501	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60

Table XXXVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
9	7	100	47	0.34008	3.25332	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	8	48	52	0.35047	3.48230	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	9	50	51	0.35000	3.50397	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	10	0	56	0.35933	3.26210	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
9	11	60	50	0.34883	3.22192	60	45	20	83	48	48	53	100	48	50	0	60
10	0	65	48	0.35123	3.69483	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	1	46	49	0.34930	3.81709	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	2	12	52	0.34291	3.69075	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	3	14	52	0.34412	3.68678	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	4	45	49	0.34907	3.83823	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	5	51	49	0.35012	3.90243	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	6	63	48	0.35137	3.79638	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	7	50	49	0.35000	3.60332	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	8	42	50	0.34925	3.83155	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	9	50	49	0.35000	3.85397	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	10	100	44	0.35933	3.62144	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
10	11	50	49	0.35000	3.57192	65	46	12	14	45	51	63	50	42	50	100	50
11	0	70	53	0.33763	4.03247	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	1	47	55	0.35182	4.16891	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	2	10	58	0.37240	4.06315	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	3	81	52	0.33083	4.01761	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	4	44	55	0.35343	4.19166	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	5	49	55	0.35063	4.25306	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	6	55	54	0.34714	4.14352	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	7	50	55	0.35000	3.95332	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	8	94	51	0.32177	4.15332	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	9	50	55	0.35000	4.20397	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	10	0	59	0.37858	4.00002	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
11	11	100	50	0.32083	3.89276	70	47	10	81	44	49	55	50	94	50	0	100
12	0	80	46	0.35490	4.38737	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	1	59	48	0.35137	4.52027	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	2	6	52	0.33871	4.40186	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	3	28	50	0.34435	4.36197	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	4	37	50	0.34803	4.53969	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	5	0	53	0.34008	4.59314	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	6	53	48	0.35067	4.49419	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	7	23	51	0.34496	4.29828	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	8	52	48	0.35047	4.50379	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	9	45	49	0.34907	4.55303	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	10	100	44	0.35933	4.35935	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
12	11	100	44	0.35933	4.25209	80	59	6	28	37	0	53	23	52	45	100	100
13	0	80	51	0.33565	4.72302	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	1	50	54	0.35000	4.87027	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	2	22	56	0.36241	4.76427	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	3	50	54	0.35000	4.71197	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	4	42	54	0.35336	4.89305	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	5	100	49	0.32725	4.92039	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	6	53	53	0.34874	4.84293	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	7	50	54	0.35000	4.64828	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	8	50	54	0.35000	4.85379	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	9	43	54	0.35302	4.90606	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	10	0	58	0.37217	4.73152	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
13	11	100	49	0.32725	4.57934	80	50	22	50	42	100	53	50	50	43	0	100
14	0	70	52	0.34020	5.06322	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	1	57	54	0.34583	5.21611	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	2	3	59	0.37851	5.14278	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	3	35	56	0.35893	5.07089	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	4	32	56	0.36008	5.25313	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	5	100	50	0.32083	5.24123	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	6	51	54	0.34947	5.19240	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	7	0	59	0.37858	5.02686	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	8	94	50	0.32741	5.18120	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	9	55	54	0.34714	5.25320	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	10	100	50	0.32083	5.05235	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
14	11	50	54	0.35000	4.92934	70	57	3	35	32	100	51	0	94	55	100	50
15	0	50	33	0.35000	5.41322	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	1	55	33	0.36062	5.57672	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	2	2	37	0.24304	5.38582	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	3	28	35	0.30200	5.37290	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	4	36	34	0.31897	5.57209	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	5	71	31	0.39606	5.63729	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	6	50	33	0.35000	5.54240	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	7	0	38	0.24383	5.27070	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	8	16	36	0.27543	5.45663	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	9	55	33	0.36062	5.61381	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	10	50	33	0.35000	5.40235	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
15	11	0	38	0.24383	5.17317	50	55	2	28	36	71	50	0	16	55	50	0
16	0	30	32	0.29913	5.71235	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	1	48	31	0.34508	5.92180	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	2	5	35	0.23975	5.62557	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	3	32	32	0.30464	5.67754	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	4	44	31	0.33495	5.90704	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	5	58	30	0.36979	6.00707	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	6	67	29	0.39244	5.93484	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	7	0	35	0.22458	5.49528	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0

Table XXXVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
16	8	48	31	0.34508	5.80170	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	9	55	30	0.36254	5.97636	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	10	0	35	0.22458	5.62694	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
16	11	0	35	0.22458	5.39776	30	48	5	32	44	58	67	0	48	55	0	0
17	0	85	64	0.27282	5.98517	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	1	38	68	0.37604	6.29784	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	2	90	64	0.25947	5.88504	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	3	34	69	0.38603	6.06356	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	4	60	66	0.32830	6.23534	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	5	47	67	0.35644	6.36351	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	6	38	68	0.37604	6.31089	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	7	100	63	0.23742	5.73270	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	8	62	66	0.32368	6.12538	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	9	35	69	0.38395	6.36031	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	10	100	63	0.23742	5.86435	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
17	11	100	63	0.23742	5.63517	85	38	90	34	60	47	38	100	62	35	100	100
18	0	94	43	0.36694	6.35211	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	1	65	45	0.35700	6.65484	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	2	3	51	0.33026	6.21530	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	3	29	49	0.34216	6.40572	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	4	40	48	0.34627	6.58161	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	5	33	48	0.34226	6.70578	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	6	74	45	0.35868	6.66957	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	7	0	51	0.32725	6.05994	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	8	61	46	0.35424	6.47962	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	9	65	45	0.35700	6.71731	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	10	100	42	0.37217	6.23652	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
18	11	0	51	0.32725	5.96242	94	65	3	29	40	33	74	0	61	65	100	0
19	0	70	51	0.34277	6.69488	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	1	48	53	0.35072	7.00557	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	2	50	53	0.35000	6.56530	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	3	75	50	0.34271	6.74843	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	4	58	52	0.34720	6.92881	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	5	36	54	0.35490	7.06068	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	6	53	52	0.34912	7.01869	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	7	50	53	0.35000	6.40994	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	8	46	53	0.35135	6.83097	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	9	44	53	0.35189	7.06920	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	10	0	57	0.36575	6.60227	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
19	11	100	48	0.33367	6.29609	70	48	50	75	58	36	53	50	46	44	0	100
20	0	51	53	0.34960	7.04448	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	1	55	52	0.34842	7.35399	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	2	50	53	0.35000	6.91530	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	3	72	51	0.34153	7.08996	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	4	47	53	0.35105	7.27986	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	5	34	54	0.35523	7.41591	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	6	41	54	0.35368	7.37237	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	7	11	56	0.36229	6.77223	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	8	56	52	0.34804	7.17901	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	9	55	52	0.34842	7.41762	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	10	100	48	0.33367	6.93594	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
20	11	60	52	0.34627	6.64236	51	55	50	72	47	34	41	11	56	55	100	60
21	0	49	45	0.34935	7.39383	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	1	55	45	0.35292	7.70691	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	2	31	47	0.33847	7.25377	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	3	76	43	0.36547	7.45543	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	4	48	45	0.34867	7.62853	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	5	50	45	0.35000	7.76591	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	6	34	47	0.34085	7.71322	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	7	0	50	0.32083	7.09306	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	8	55	45	0.35292	7.53193	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	9	50	45	0.35000	7.76762	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	10	50	45	0.35000	7.28594	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
21	11	50	45	0.35000	6.99236	49	55	31	76	48	50	34	0	55	50	50	50
22	0	50	55	0.35000	7.74383	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	1	50	55	0.35000	8.05691	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	2	87	52	0.32453	7.57830	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	3	42	56	0.35541	7.81084	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	4	54	55	0.34725	7.97578	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	5	38	56	0.35756	8.12347	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	6	55	54	0.34714	8.06036	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	7	22	57	0.36601	7.45907	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	8	56	54	0.34650	7.87843	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	9	50	55	0.35000	8.11762	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	10	50	55	0.35000	7.63594	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
22	11	100	50	0.32083	7.31319	50	50	87	42	54	38	55	22	56	50	50	100
23	0	40	52	0.35140	8.09523	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	1	53	51	0.34951	8.40642	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	2	90	47	0.34673	7.92504	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	3	13	54	0.35302	8.16387	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	4	50	51	0.35000	8.32578	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	5	52	51	0.34970	8.47316	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	6	66	49	0.34907	8.40943	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	7	0	55	0.35292	7.81199	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	8	60	50	0.34883	8.22726	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50

Table XXXVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
23	9	85	48	0.34469	8.46231	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	10	50	51	0.35000	7.98594	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
23	11	50	51	0.35000	7.66319	40	53	90	13	50	52	66	0	60	85	50	50
24	0	42	47	0.34617	8.44140	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	1	62	45	0.35602	8.76244	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	2	90	43	0.36727	8.29230	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	3	54	46	0.35187	8.51573	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	4	46	47	0.34827	8.67405	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	5	46	47	0.34827	8.82144	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	6	46	47	0.34827	8.75770	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	7	0	51	0.32725	8.13924	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	8	47	46	0.34835	8.57562	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	9	25	48	0.33629	8.79860	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	10	50	46	0.35000	8.33594	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
24	11	50	46	0.35000	8.01319	42	62	90	54	46	46	46	0	47	25	50	50
25	0	25	40	0.31062	8.75203	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	1	51	37	0.35166	9.11409	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	2	90	34	0.41347	8.70577	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	3	65	36	0.37433	8.89006	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	4	35	39	0.32620	9.00025	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	5	3	42	0.27597	9.09741	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	6	51	37	0.35166	9.10936	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	7	0	42	0.26950	8.40874	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	8	47	38	0.34527	8.92089	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	9	50	37	0.35000	9.14860	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	10	45	38	0.34201	8.67795	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
25	11	0	42	0.26950	8.28269	25	51	90	65	35	3	51	0	47	50	45	0
26	0	15	56	0.36266	9.11469	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	1	47	54	0.35144	9.46553	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	2	95	49	0.33215	9.03792	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	3	78	51	0.33726	9.22732	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	4	45	54	0.35228	9.35252	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	5	48	53	0.35072	9.44813	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	6	61	52	0.34576	9.45512	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	7	50	53	0.35000	8.75874	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	8	32	55	0.35777	9.27866	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	9	65	52	0.34352	9.49213	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	10	50	53	0.35000	9.02795	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
26	11	50	53	0.35000	8.63269	15	47	95	78	45	48	61	50	32	65	50	50
27	0	50	48	0.35000	9.46469	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	1	59	47	0.35252	9.81805	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	2	95	44	0.36103	9.39895	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	3	40	49	0.34755	9.57487	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	4	47	48	0.34912	9.70165	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	5	56	47	0.35189	9.80002	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	6	48	48	0.34944	9.80456	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	7	0	53	0.34008	9.09882	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	8	34	49	0.34496	9.62362	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	9	50	48	0.35000	9.84213	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	10	79	45	0.35880	9.38674	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
27	11	20	51	0.34335	8.97604	50	59	95	40	47	56	48	0	34	50	79	20
28	0	50	50	0.35000	9.81469	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	1	52	50	0.34995	10.16800	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	2	97	46	0.34835	9.74730	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	3	32	52	0.35084	9.92571	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	4	45	51	0.35035	10.05200	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	5	40	51	0.35012	10.15014	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	6	49	51	0.35012	10.15468	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	7	34	52	0.35112	9.44994	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	8	32	52	0.35084	9.97446	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	9	50	50	0.35000	10.19213	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	10	34	52	0.35112	9.73786	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
28	11	90	47	0.34673	9.32277	50	52	97	32	45	40	49	34	32	50	34	90
29	0	40	48	0.34627	10.16095	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	1	55	46	0.35228	10.52028	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	2	78	44	0.36241	10.10971	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	3	32	49	0.34391	10.26962	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	4	43	48	0.34763	10.39963	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	5	57	46	0.35302	10.50316	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	6	50	47	0.35000	10.50468	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	7	0	51	0.32725	9.77719	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	8	45	47	0.34778	10.32225	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	9	50	47	0.35000	10.54213	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	10	66	45	0.35728	10.09514	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
29	11	50	47	0.35000	9.67277	40	55	78	32	43	57	50	0	45	50	66	50
30	0	50	56	0.35000	10.51095	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	1	53	56	0.34758	10.86786	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	2	80	53	0.32795	10.43766	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	3	68	54	0.33698	10.60660	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	4	45	56	0.35356	10.75319	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	5	49	56	0.35076	10.85392	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	6	50	56	0.35000	10.85468	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	7	100	51	0.31442	10.09161	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	8	47	56	0.35221	10.67445	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	9	40	57	0.35782	10.89995	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50

Table XXXVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
30	10	33	57	0.36190	10.45704	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
30	11	50	56	0.35000	10.02277	50	53	80	68	45	49	50	100	47	40	33	50
31	0	48	48	0.34944	10.86039	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	1	45	49	0.34907	11.21693	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	2	20	51	0.34335	10.78101	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	3	71	46	0.35564	10.96223	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	4	43	49	0.34853	11.10172	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	5	44	49	0.34881	11.20273	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	6	50	48	0.35000	11.20468	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	7	17	51	0.34153	10.43314	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	8	60	47	0.35268	11.02713	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	9	60	47	0.35268	11.25263	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	10	76	46	0.35546	10.81250	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
31	11	45	49	0.34907	10.37184	48	45	20	71	43	44	50	17	60	60	76	45
32	0	48	49	0.34970	11.21009	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	1	49	49	0.34986	11.56679	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	2	95	45	0.35525	11.13626	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	3	37	50	0.34803	11.31026	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	4	45	50	0.34971	11.45143	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	5	54	49	0.35033	11.55306	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	6	50	49	0.35000	11.55468	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	7	50	49	0.35000	10.78314	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	8	57	49	0.35033	11.37746	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	9	40	50	0.34883	11.60146	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	10	22	52	0.34804	11.16054	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
32	11	45	50	0.34971	10.72155	48	49	95	37	45	54	50	50	57	40	22	45
33	0	48	64	0.35355	11.56364	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	1	53	64	0.34450	11.91129	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	2	95	60	0.26862	11.40489	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	3	63	63	0.32634	11.63660	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	4	58	63	0.33591	11.78733	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	5	42	65	0.36465	11.91771	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	6	60	63	0.33215	11.88683	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	7	72	62	0.31047	11.09361	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	8	53	64	0.34450	11.72197	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	9	40	65	0.36808	11.96955	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	10	72	62	0.31047	11.47102	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
33	11	100	60	0.25667	10.97821	48	53	95	63	58	42	60	72	53	40	72	100
34	0	50	44	0.35000	11.91364	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	1	57	44	0.35482	12.26611	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	2	5	48	0.31482	11.71971	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	3	68	43	0.36239	11.99899	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	4	47	44	0.34758	12.13492	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	5	42	45	0.34412	12.26183	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	6	50	44	0.35000	12.23683	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	7	0	49	0.31442	11.40803	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	8	55	44	0.35356	12.07552	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	9	65	43	0.36085	12.33040	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	10	0	49	0.31442	11.78543	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
34	11	97	40	0.38455	11.36276	50	57	5	68	47	42	50	0	55	65	0	97
35	0	47	59	0.35336	12.26700	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	1	49	59	0.35114	12.61726	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	2	70	57	0.32737	12.04708	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	3	36	60	0.36568	12.36467	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	4	45	59	0.35548	12.49040	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	5	45	59	0.35548	12.61731	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	6	50	58	0.35000	12.58683	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	7	50	58	0.35000	11.75803	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	8	51	58	0.34896	12.42449	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	9	50	58	0.35000	12.68040	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	10	100	54	0.29517	12.08060	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
35	11	100	54	0.29517	11.65793	47	49	70	36	45	45	50	50	51	50	100	100
36	0	48	49	0.34970	12.61669	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	1	54	49	0.35033	12.96758	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	2	90	45	0.35700	12.40408	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	3	34	50	0.34701	12.71168	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	4	45	49	0.34907	12.83947	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	5	46	49	0.34930	12.96661	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	6	50	49	0.35000	12.93683	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	7	50	49	0.35000	12.10803	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	8	53	49	0.35028	12.77477	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	9	58	48	0.35131	13.03170	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	10	0	53	0.34008	12.42068	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
36	11	60	48	0.35140	12.00933	48	54	90	34	45	46	50	50	53	58	0	60
37	0	48	53	0.35072	12.96742	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	1	53	53	0.34874	13.31632	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	2	15	56	0.36266	12.76674	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	3	59	52	0.34674	13.05843	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	4	45	53	0.35163	13.19110	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	5	57	52	0.34763	13.31425	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	6	50	53	0.35000	13.28683	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	7	50	53	0.35000	12.45803	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	8	47	53	0.35105	13.12582	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	9	48	53	0.35072	13.38243	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
37	10	100	48	0.33367	12.75435	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60

Table XXXVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
37	11	60	52	0.34627	12.35559	48	53	15	59	45	57	50	50	47	48	100	60
38	0	35	55	0.35700	13.32442	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	1	48	54	0.35098	13.66730	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	2	84	51	0.33215	13.09889	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	3	30	56	0.36073	13.41916	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	4	45	55	0.35292	13.54402	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	5	43	55	0.35392	13.66817	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	6	54	54	0.34776	13.63459	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	7	50	54	0.35000	12.80803	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	8	46	54	0.35187	13.47768	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	9	50	54	0.35000	13.73243	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	10	100	50	0.32083	13.07518	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
38	11	60	53	0.34498	12.70058	35	48	84	30	45	43	54	50	46	50	100	60
39	0	52	51	0.34970	13.67411	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	1	50	51	0.35000	14.01730	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	2	40	52	0.35140	13.45029	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	3	50	51	0.35000	13.76916	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	4	41	52	0.35137	13.89538	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	5	48	51	0.35021	14.01838	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	6	50	51	0.35000	13.98459	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	7	48	51	0.35021	13.15824	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	8	53	51	0.34951	13.82719	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	9	58	50	0.34925	14.08168	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	10	50	51	0.35000	13.42518	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
39	11	70	49	0.34790	13.04848	52	50	40	50	41	48	50	48	53	58	50	70
40	0	49	48	0.34973	14.02385	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	1	41	49	0.34790	14.36520	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	2	30	50	0.34533	13.79562	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	3	50	48	0.35000	14.11916	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	4	47	48	0.34912	14.24451	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	5	46	48	0.34879	14.36716	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	6	50	48	0.35000	14.33459	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	7	58	47	0.35233	13.51057	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	8	46	48	0.34879	14.17598	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	9	50	48	0.35000	14.43168	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	10	50	48	0.35000	13.77518	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
40	11	60	47	0.35268	13.40116	49	41	30	50	47	46	50	58	46	50	50	60
41	0	54	50	0.34981	14.37366	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	1	44	51	0.35035	14.71555	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	2	60	50	0.34883	14.14446	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	3	50	51	0.35000	14.46916	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	4	46	51	0.35033	14.59484	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	5	17	54	0.35424	14.72140	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	6	50	51	0.35000	14.68459	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	7	100	46	0.34650	13.85707	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	8	18	54	0.35448	14.53046	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	9	48	51	0.35021	14.78189	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	10	50	51	0.35000	14.12518	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
41	11	70	49	0.34790	13.74906	54	44	60	50	46	17	50	100	18	48	50	70
42	0	48	49	0.34970	14.72336	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	1	54	48	0.35084	15.06639	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	2	75	46	0.35554	14.50000	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	3	50	48	0.35000	14.81916	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	4	45	49	0.34907	14.94390	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	5	79	46	0.35508	15.07647	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	6	50	48	0.35000	15.03459	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	7	40	49	0.34755	14.20462	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	8	18	51	0.34216	14.87262	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	9	50	48	0.35000	15.13189	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	10	54	48	0.35084	14.47602	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
42	11	20	51	0.34335	14.09241	48	54	75	50	45	79	50	40	18	50	54	20
43	0	49	53	0.35037	15.07373	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	1	53	52	0.34912	15.41552	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	2	75	50	0.34271	14.84271	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	3	50	53	0.35000	15.16916	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	4	45	53	0.35163	15.29554	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	5	48	53	0.35072	15.42720	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	6	50	53	0.35000	15.38459	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	7	50	53	0.35000	14.55462	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	8	58	52	0.34720	15.21982	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	9	50	53	0.35000	15.48189	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	10	42	53	0.35233	14.82836	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
43	11	60	52	0.34627	14.43868	49	53	75	50	45	48	50	50	58	50	42	60
44	0	46	58	0.35392	15.42765	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	1	58	56	0.34309	15.75861	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	2	76	55	0.32543	15.16814	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	3	50	57	0.35000	15.51916	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	4	45	58	0.35484	15.65038	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	5	64	56	0.33693	15.76413	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	6	50	57	0.35000	15.73459	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	7	92	53	0.31325	14.86787	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	8	32	59	0.36701	15.58683	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	9	50	57	0.35000	15.83189	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	10	61	56	0.34012	15.16847	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55
44	11	55	57	0.34522	14.78389	46	58	76	50	45	64	50	92	32	50	61	55

Table XXXVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
45	0	52	47	0.35072	15.77837	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	1	58	47	0.35233	16.11094	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	2	80	45	0.35875	15.52689	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	3	49	47	0.34960	15.86877	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	4	45	48	0.34842	15.99880	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	5	41	48	0.34674	16.11087	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	6	50	47	0.35000	16.08459	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	7	50	47	0.35000	15.21787	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	8	32	49	0.34391	15.93074	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	9	60	46	0.35397	16.18586	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	10	54	47	0.35135	15.51983	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
45	11	0	52	0.33367	15.11756	52	58	80	49	45	41	50	50	32	60	54	0
46	0	48	46	0.34893	16.12730	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	1	57	45	0.35392	16.46486	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	2	40	47	0.34498	15.87187	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	3	50	46	0.35000	16.21877	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	4	45	46	0.34714	16.34594	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	5	44	47	0.34727	16.45814	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	6	50	46	0.35000	16.43459	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	7	1	50	0.32199	15.53986	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	8	32	48	0.34160	16.27234	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	9	45	46	0.34714	16.53300	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	10	100	41	0.37858	15.89841	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
46	11	44	47	0.34727	15.46483	48	57	40	50	45	44	50	1	32	45	100	44
47	0	50	47	0.35000	16.47730	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	1	53	47	0.35105	16.81591	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	2	85	44	0.36266	16.23453	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	3	51	47	0.35037	16.56914	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	4	50	47	0.35000	16.69594	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	5	45	47	0.34778	16.80593	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	6	50	47	0.35000	16.78459	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	7	50	47	0.35000	15.88986	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	8	46	47	0.34827	16.62061	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	9	40	48	0.34627	16.87926	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	10	0	51	0.32725	16.22566	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
47	11	45	47	0.34778	15.81261	50	53	85	51	50	45	50	50	46	40	0	45
48	0	50	53	0.35000	16.82730	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	1	60	52	0.34627	17.16218	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	2	55	53	0.34778	16.58231	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	3	52	53	0.34918	16.91832	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	4	54	53	0.34827	17.04422	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	5	49	53	0.35037	17.15630	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	6	50	53	0.35000	17.13459	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	7	50	53	0.35000	16.23986	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	8	48	53	0.35072	16.97134	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	9	50	53	0.35000	17.22926	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	10	50	53	0.35000	16.57566	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
48	11	68	52	0.34160	16.15421	50	60	55	52	54	49	50	50	48	50	50	68
49	0	49	49	0.34986	17.17716	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	1	57	49	0.35033	17.51251	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	2	15	52	0.34469	16.92700	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	3	50	49	0.35000	17.26832	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	4	45	50	0.34971	17.39393	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	5	55	49	0.35035	17.50665	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	6	49	49	0.34986	17.48445	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	7	100	45	0.35292	16.59277	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	8	33	51	0.34881	17.32015	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	9	50	49	0.35000	17.57926	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	10	50	49	0.35000	16.92566	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39
49	11	39	50	0.34859	16.50280	49	57	15	50	45	55	49	100	33	50	50	39

Table XXXVII.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 2

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
0	0	52	71	0.34456	0.34456	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	1	76	68	0.28205	0.28205	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	2	55	70	0.33687	0.33687	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	3	82	68	0.26413	0.26413	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	4	96	67	0.22496	0.22496	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	5	70	69	0.29657	0.29657	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	6	100	66	0.21817	0.21817	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	7	99	66	0.22137	0.22137	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	8	89	67	0.24717	0.24717	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	9	66	69	0.30800	0.30800	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
0	10	9	75	0.46193	0.46193	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35

Table XXXVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
0	11	35	72	0.38973	0.38973	52	76	55	82	96	70	100	99	89	66	9	35
1	0	65	43	0.36085	0.70541	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	1	50	44	0.35000	0.63205	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	2	45	45	0.34650	0.68337	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	3	86	41	0.37646	0.64059	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	4	3	49	0.31820	0.54315	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	5	40	45	0.34242	0.63898	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	6	0	49	0.31442	0.53258	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	7	49	44	0.34922	0.57059	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	8	75	42	0.36838	0.61554	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	9	90	41	0.37753	0.68553	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	10	0	49	0.31442	0.77635	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
1	11	35	46	0.33967	0.72940	65	50	45	86	3	40	0	49	75	90	0	35
2	0	54	44	0.35289	1.05831	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	1	55	44	0.35356	0.98561	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	2	60	44	0.35653	1.03991	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	3	21	47	0.32902	0.96962	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	4	3	49	0.31820	0.86135	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	5	84	42	0.37142	1.01040	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	6	0	49	0.31442	0.84700	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	7	70	43	0.36330	0.93389	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	8	94	41	0.37823	0.99378	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	9	8	49	0.32403	1.00956	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	10	70	43	0.36330	1.13965	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
2	11	24	47	0.33210	1.06150	54	55	60	21	3	84	0	70	94	8	70	24
3	0	71	60	0.31790	1.37621	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	1	69	60	0.32140	1.30702	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	2	76	60	0.30875	1.34865	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	3	100	58	0.26950	1.23912	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	4	84	59	0.29724	1.15859	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	5	0	67	0.42992	1.44032	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	6	78	60	0.30492	1.15192	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	7	26	64	0.38640	1.32029	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	8	11	66	0.41234	1.40611	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	9	93	58	0.28428	1.29384	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	10	85	59	0.29528	1.43493	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
3	11	40	63	0.36552	1.42702	71	69	76	100	84	0	78	26	11	93	85	40
4	0	67	53	0.34008	1.71629	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	1	38	55	0.35602	1.66304	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	2	21	57	0.36624	1.71489	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	3	60	53	0.34498	1.58410	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	4	100	50	0.32083	1.47943	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	5	100	50	0.32083	1.76115	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	6	72	52	0.33871	1.49063	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	7	71	52	0.33946	1.65976	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	8	70	52	0.34020	1.74631	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	9	46	55	0.35238	1.64622	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	10	0	59	0.37858	1.81351	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
4	11	1	59	0.37858	1.80560	67	38	21	60	100	100	72	71	70	46	0	1
5	0	61	41	0.36129	2.07759	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	1	32	44	0.33236	1.99540	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	2	20	45	0.32025	2.03514	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	3	71	40	0.37181	1.95590	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	4	0	47	0.30158	1.78101	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	5	90	38	0.39293	2.15409	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	6	51	42	0.35102	1.84164	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	7	100	37	0.40425	2.06401	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	8	20	45	0.32025	2.06656	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	9	60	41	0.36038	2.00661	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	10	7	46	0.30635	2.11987	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
5	11	0	47	0.30158	2.10719	61	32	20	71	0	90	51	100	20	60	7	0
6	0	60	63	0.33215	2.40974	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	1	58	63	0.33591	2.33130	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	2	66	63	0.32032	2.35546	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	3	38	65	0.37142	2.32732	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	4	72	62	0.31047	2.09148	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	5	0	69	0.44275	2.59684	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	6	50	64	0.35000	2.19164	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	7	97	60	0.26391	2.32792	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	8	91	60	0.27777	2.34433	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	9	81	61	0.29503	2.30163	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	10	43	65	0.36290	2.48277	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
6	11	98	60	0.26152	2.36871	60	58	66	38	72	0	50	97	91	81	43	98
7	0	63	30	0.38140	2.79113	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	1	8	35	0.24857	2.57987	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	2	22	33	0.27977	2.63523	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	3	35	32	0.31272	2.64005	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	4	0	35	0.22458	2.31607	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	5	0	35	0.22458	2.82142	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	6	68	29	0.39473	2.58637	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	7	19	34	0.27513	2.60305	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	8	65	29	0.38780	2.73213	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	9	55	30	0.36254	2.66418	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	10	51	31	0.35243	2.83520	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3
7	11	3	35	0.23375	2.60246	63	8	22	35	0	0	68	19	65	55	51	3

Table XXXVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
8	0	62	51	0.34678	3.13791	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	1	60	51	0.34755	2.92742	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	2	56	51	0.34881	2.98404	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	3	70	50	0.34533	2.98538	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	4	0	56	0.35933	2.67540	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	5	100	47	0.34008	3.16150	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	6	83	49	0.34153	2.92790	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	7	17	55	0.35847	2.96152	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	8	7	56	0.36154	3.09367	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	9	65	50	0.34737	3.01155	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	10	51	52	0.34973	3.18493	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
8	11	48	52	0.35047	2.95293	62	60	56	70	0	100	83	17	7	65	51	48
9	0	63	66	0.32133	3.45925	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	1	56	66	0.33726	3.26468	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	2	48	67	0.35432	3.33836	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	3	43	68	0.36560	3.35098	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	4	94	63	0.25401	2.92941	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	5	100	62	0.24383	3.40534	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	6	77	64	0.29298	3.22089	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	7	25	69	0.40367	3.36519	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	8	95	63	0.25130	3.34497	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	9	38	68	0.37604	3.38759	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	10	100	62	0.24383	3.42876	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
9	11	47	67	0.35644	3.30937	63	56	48	43	94	100	77	25	95	38	100	47
10	0	58	47	0.35233	3.81158	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	1	50	48	0.35000	3.61468	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	2	20	50	0.33950	3.67786	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	3	71	46	0.35564	3.70662	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	4	100	43	0.36575	3.29516	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	5	0	52	0.33367	3.73900	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	6	76	45	0.35880	3.57968	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	7	21	50	0.34019	3.70538	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	8	81	45	0.35868	3.70365	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	9	69	46	0.35554	3.74313	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	10	0	52	0.33367	3.76243	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
10	11	27	50	0.34383	3.65319	58	50	20	71	100	0	76	21	81	69	0	27
11	0	59	52	0.34674	4.15833	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	1	50	53	0.35000	3.96468	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	2	68	51	0.34391	4.02177	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	3	40	54	0.35397	4.06058	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	4	90	49	0.33647	3.63162	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	5	70	51	0.34277	4.08177	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	6	87	50	0.33403	3.91371	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	7	31	55	0.35798	4.06336	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	8	73	51	0.34088	4.04453	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	9	37	54	0.35470	4.09783	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	10	0	58	0.37217	4.13460	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
11	11	28	55	0.35847	4.01166	59	50	68	40	90	70	87	31	73	37	0	28
12	0	72	43	0.36412	4.52244	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	1	53	44	0.35221	4.31689	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	2	45	45	0.34650	4.36827	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	3	57	44	0.35482	4.41540	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	4	10	48	0.32107	3.95269	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	5	19	47	0.32685	4.40862	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	6	77	42	0.36922	4.28293	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	7	25	47	0.33308	4.39644	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	8	67	43	0.36190	4.40643	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	9	63	43	0.35971	4.45754	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	10	34	46	0.33880	4.47340	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
12	11	19	47	0.32685	4.33852	72	53	45	57	10	19	77	25	67	63	34	19
13	0	64	51	0.34592	4.86836	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	1	44	53	0.35189	4.66878	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	2	80	50	0.33950	4.70777	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	3	40	53	0.35268	4.76808	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	4	50	52	0.35000	4.30269	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	5	50	52	0.35000	4.75862	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	6	85	49	0.34020	4.62313	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	7	35	54	0.35508	4.75152	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	8	40	53	0.35268	4.75911	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	9	33	54	0.35536	4.81290	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	10	83	49	0.34153	4.81493	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
13	11	21	55	0.35880	4.69731	64	44	80	40	50	50	85	35	40	33	83	21
14	0	54	45	0.35238	5.22074	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	1	60	44	0.35653	5.02531	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	2	50	45	0.35000	5.05777	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	3	38	46	0.34216	5.11024	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	4	50	45	0.35000	4.65269	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	5	50	45	0.35000	5.10862	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	6	52	45	0.35124	4.97436	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	7	39	46	0.34294	5.09446	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	8	52	45	0.35124	5.11035	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	9	74	43	0.36484	5.17774	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	10	0	50	0.32083	5.13576	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
14	11	28	47	0.33588	5.03320	54	60	50	38	50	50	52	39	52	74	0	28
15	0	75	44	0.36196	5.58270	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0

Table XXXVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
15	1	40	47	0.34498	5.37029	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	2	53	46	0.35144	5.40920	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	3	63	45	0.35637	5.46661	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	4	50	46	0.35000	5.00269	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	5	50	46	0.35000	5.45862	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	6	69	45	0.35798	5.33234	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	7	37	48	0.34469	5.43915	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	8	16	50	0.33651	5.44686	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	9	66	45	0.35728	5.53502	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	10	42	47	0.34617	5.48193	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
15	11	0	51	0.32725	5.36045	75	40	53	63	50	50	69	37	16	66	42	0
16	0	60	54	0.34370	5.92640	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	1	60	54	0.34370	5.71399	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	2	30	56	0.36073	5.76994	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	3	58	54	0.34515	5.81176	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	4	50	55	0.35000	5.35269	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	5	94	51	0.32177	5.78039	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	6	62	54	0.34216	5.67450	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	7	61	54	0.34294	5.78209	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	8	27	57	0.36449	5.81135	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	9	42	55	0.35439	5.88940	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	10	87	51	0.32928	5.81121	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
16	11	20	57	0.36645	5.72690	60	60	30	58	50	94	62	61	27	42	87	20
17	0	66	49	0.34907	6.27546	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	1	69	49	0.34823	6.06222	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	2	10	54	0.35187	6.12180	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	3	40	51	0.35012	6.16188	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	4	20	53	0.35105	5.70374	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	5	50	50	0.35000	6.13039	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	6	85	47	0.34918	6.02369	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	7	50	50	0.35000	6.13209	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	8	84	47	0.34960	6.16096	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	9	67	49	0.34881	6.23821	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	10	50	50	0.35000	6.16121	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
17	11	14	54	0.35336	6.08026	66	69	10	40	20	50	85	50	84	67	50	14
18	0	71	54	0.33407	6.60954	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	1	50	55	0.35000	6.41222	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	2	64	54	0.34053	6.46233	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	3	30	57	0.36330	6.52518	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	4	100	51	0.31442	6.01815	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	5	50	55	0.35000	6.48039	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	6	88	52	0.32340	6.34709	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	7	50	55	0.35000	6.48209	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	8	12	59	0.37704	6.53800	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	9	77	53	0.33110	6.56931	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	10	52	55	0.34867	6.50988	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
18	11	16	59	0.37578	6.45604	71	50	64	30	100	50	88	50	12	77	52	16
19	0	58	45	0.35439	6.96393	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	1	65	45	0.35700	6.76922	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	2	24	48	0.33544	6.79777	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	3	30	48	0.34020	6.86538	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	4	49	46	0.34947	6.36763	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	5	60	45	0.35525	6.83564	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	6	72	44	0.36129	6.70838	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	7	40	47	0.34498	6.82708	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	8	88	43	0.36729	6.90529	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	9	47	46	0.34835	6.91767	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	10	0	51	0.32725	6.83713	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
19	11	23	48	0.33456	6.79061	58	65	24	30	49	60	72	40	88	47	0	23
20	0	52	56	0.34841	7.31234	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	1	43	57	0.35572	7.12494	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	2	50	56	0.35000	7.14777	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	3	8	60	0.38332	7.24870	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	4	100	52	0.30800	6.67563	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	5	70	55	0.33250	7.16814	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	6	28	58	0.36694	7.07532	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	7	60	56	0.34113	7.16821	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	8	47	57	0.35259	7.25788	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	9	97	52	0.31216	7.22983	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	10	66	55	0.33675	7.17388	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
20	11	50	56	0.35000	7.14061	52	43	50	8	100	70	28	60	47	97	66	50
21	0	58	55	0.34412	7.65646	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	1	66	55	0.33675	7.46168	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	2	50	56	0.35000	7.49777	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	3	76	54	0.32877	7.57746	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	4	100	51	0.31442	6.99005	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	5	5	60	0.38413	7.55226	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	6	73	54	0.33202	7.40734	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	7	66	55	0.33675	7.50496	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	8	14	59	0.37646	7.63434	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	9	89	52	0.32224	7.55208	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	10	47	56	0.35221	7.52608	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
21	11	22	59	0.37319	7.51380	58	66	50	76	100	5	73	66	14	89	47	22
22	0	67	40	0.36845	8.02490	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	1	68	40	0.36932	7.83100	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19

Table XXXVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
22	2	19	45	0.31890	7.81667	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	3	69	40	0.37017	7.94764	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	4	50	42	0.35000	7.34005	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	5	0	46	0.29517	7.84743	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	6	48	42	0.34790	7.75524	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	7	36	43	0.33514	7.84009	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	8	33	43	0.33136	7.96570	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	9	59	41	0.35945	7.91153	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	10	43	43	0.34314	7.86922	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
22	11	19	45	0.31890	7.83270	67	68	19	69	50	0	48	36	33	59	43	19
23	0	67	34	0.38154	8.40644	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	1	40	36	0.33087	8.16187	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	2	80	33	0.40495	8.22162	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	3	24	38	0.30207	8.24971	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	4	0	40	0.25667	7.59671	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	5	30	37	0.31197	8.15940	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	6	29	37	0.30982	8.06506	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	7	50	35	0.35000	8.19009	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	8	18	38	0.28877	8.25447	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	9	8	39	0.27013	8.18166	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	10	48	36	0.34636	8.21558	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
23	11	46	36	0.34263	8.17532	67	40	80	24	0	30	29	50	18	8	48	46
24	0	67	64	0.31608	8.72252	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	1	40	67	0.37065	8.53252	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	2	76	64	0.29540	8.51702	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	3	39	67	0.37259	8.62230	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	4	0	70	0.44917	8.04588	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	5	89	62	0.27219	8.43159	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	6	60	65	0.32958	8.39464	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	7	60	65	0.32958	8.51968	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	8	92	62	0.26474	8.51921	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	9	52	66	0.34585	8.52750	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	10	100	61	0.25025	8.46583	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
24	11	100	61	0.25025	8.42557	67	40	76	39	0	89	60	60	92	52	100	100
25	0	64	50	0.34771	9.07024	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	1	69	50	0.34579	8.87831	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	2	46	52	0.35084	8.86786	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	3	65	50	0.34737	8.96967	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	4	100	47	0.34008	8.38596	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	5	22	54	0.35523	8.78682	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	6	66	50	0.34701	8.74166	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	7	30	53	0.35303	8.87271	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	8	50	51	0.35000	8.86921	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	9	62	50	0.34832	8.87582	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	10	21	54	0.35508	8.82091	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
25	11	20	54	0.35490	8.78047	64	69	46	65	100	22	66	30	50	62	21	20
26	0	63	59	0.33301	9.40325	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	1	68	58	0.32774	9.20605	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	2	61	59	0.33588	9.20374	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	3	98	56	0.28616	9.25583	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	4	100	55	0.28875	8.67471	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	5	31	62	0.37505	9.16187	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	6	88	56	0.30389	9.04555	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	7	30	62	0.37613	9.24884	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	8	55	59	0.34393	9.21314	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	9	55	59	0.34393	9.21976	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	10	30	62	0.37613	9.19704	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
26	11	30	62	0.37613	9.15661	63	68	61	98	100	31	88	30	55	55	30	30
27	0	77	37	0.38654	9.78979	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	1	70	37	0.37870	9.58475	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	2	25	41	0.31383	9.51757	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	3	76	37	0.38549	9.64132	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	4	50	39	0.35000	9.02471	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	5	10	43	0.29540	9.45727	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	6	37	40	0.33134	9.37690	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	7	29	41	0.32060	9.56944	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	8	1	44	0.28426	9.49740	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	9	61	38	0.36553	9.58529	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	10	36	40	0.32975	9.52679	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
27	11	9	43	0.29356	9.45016	77	70	25	76	50	10	37	29	1	61	36	9
28	0	87	50	0.33403	10.12382	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	1	44	54	0.35266	9.93741	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	2	50	54	0.35000	9.86757	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	3	36	55	0.35670	9.99802	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	4	49	54	0.35050	9.37521	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	5	100	49	0.32725	9.78452	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	6	50	54	0.35000	9.72690	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	7	35	55	0.35700	9.92644	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	8	69	52	0.34091	9.83831	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	9	72	52	0.33871	9.92399	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	10	19	56	0.36266	9.88945	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
28	11	29	56	0.36103	9.81119	87	44	50	36	49	100	50	35	69	72	19	29
29	0	81	36	0.39449	10.51831	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	1	45	40	0.34329	10.28070	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	2	50	39	0.35000	10.21757	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17

Table XXXVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
29	3	30	41	0.32223	10.32025	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	4	3	44	0.28804	9.66325	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	5	40	40	0.33600	10.12052	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	6	50	39	0.35000	10.07690	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	7	30	41	0.32223	10.24868	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	8	79	37	0.38857	10.22688	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	9	57	39	0.35931	10.28330	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	10	0	44	0.28233	10.17178	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
29	11	17	42	0.30341	10.11460	81	45	50	30	3	40	50	30	79	57	0	17
30	0	81	54	0.32287	10.84118	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	1	40	58	0.35910	10.63980	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	2	94	53	0.31047	10.52805	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	3	65	56	0.33582	10.65608	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	4	50	57	0.35000	10.01325	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	5	20	60	0.37800	10.49852	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	6	99	52	0.30941	10.38631	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	7	33	58	0.36408	10.61276	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	8	36	58	0.36209	10.58897	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	9	99	52	0.30941	10.59271	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	10	18	60	0.37912	10.55090	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
30	11	41	58	0.35830	10.47290	81	40	94	65	50	20	99	33	36	99	18	41
31	0	76	46	0.35546	11.19664	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	1	68	47	0.35315	10.99295	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	2	17	51	0.34153	10.86958	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	3	34	50	0.34701	11.00309	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	4	100	44	0.35933	10.37259	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	5	40	49	0.34755	10.84607	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	6	50	48	0.35000	10.73631	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	7	29	50	0.34485	10.95761	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	8	89	45	0.35728	10.94625	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	9	43	49	0.34853	10.94124	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	10	18	51	0.34216	10.89306	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
31	11	18	51	0.34216	10.81506	76	68	17	34	100	40	50	29	89	43	18	18
32	0	79	46	0.35508	11.55172	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	1	70	46	0.35560	11.34855	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	2	91	45	0.35670	11.22627	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	3	34	50	0.34701	11.35010	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	4	60	47	0.35268	10.72527	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	5	20	51	0.34335	11.18942	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	6	56	48	0.35112	11.08743	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	7	38	49	0.34678	11.30439	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	8	21	51	0.34391	11.29016	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	9	63	47	0.35303	11.29428	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	10	15	51	0.34020	11.23326	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
32	11	34	50	0.34701	11.16207	79	70	91	34	60	20	56	38	21	63	15	34
33	0	87	36	0.40051	11.95222	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	1	36	40	0.32975	11.67830	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	2	21	42	0.31041	11.53669	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	3	39	40	0.33447	11.68457	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	4	0	44	0.28233	11.00760	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	5	50	39	0.35000	11.53942	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	6	60	38	0.36423	11.45166	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	7	35	40	0.32812	11.63252	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	8	31	41	0.32384	11.61400	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	9	65	38	0.37048	11.66475	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	10	14	42	0.29792	11.53118	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
33	11	42	40	0.33899	11.50106	87	36	21	39	0	50	60	35	31	65	14	42
34	0	84	39	0.38451	12.33673	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	1	34	43	0.33264	12.01094	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	2	20	44	0.31640	11.85309	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	3	32	43	0.33005	12.01462	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	4	4	46	0.30170	11.30930	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	5	50	42	0.35000	11.88942	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	6	64	40	0.36568	11.81734	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	7	37	43	0.33635	11.96887	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	8	13	45	0.31029	11.92429	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	9	68	40	0.36932	12.03407	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	10	53	41	0.35336	11.88454	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
34	11	50	42	0.35000	11.85106	84	34	20	32	4	50	64	37	13	68	53	50
35	0	86	54	0.31640	12.65313	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	1	35	58	0.36278	12.37371	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	2	22	60	0.37679	12.22987	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	3	59	56	0.34212	12.35675	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	4	51	57	0.34909	11.65839	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	5	78	55	0.32289	12.21230	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	6	68	55	0.33467	12.15201	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	7	42	58	0.35747	12.32633	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	8	82	54	0.32163	12.24592	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	9	59	56	0.34212	12.37620	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	10	46	57	0.35341	12.23795	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
35	11	50	57	0.35000	12.20106	86	35	22	59	51	78	68	42	82	59	46	50
36	0	62	54	0.34216	12.99529	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	1	31	57	0.36286	12.73657	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	2	50	55	0.35000	12.57987	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	3	62	54	0.34216	12.69891	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50

Table XXXVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
36	4	55	55	0.34650	12.00489	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	5	30	57	0.36330	12.57560	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	6	34	57	0.36139	12.51340	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	7	40	56	0.35653	12.68287	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	8	83	52	0.32882	12.57474	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	9	61	54	0.34294	12.71914	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	10	100	51	0.31442	12.55236	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
36	11	50	55	0.35000	12.55106	62	31	50	62	55	30	34	40	83	61	100	50
37	0	75	50	0.34271	13.33800	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	1	70	50	0.34533	13.08190	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	2	50	52	0.35000	12.92987	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	3	59	51	0.34790	13.04681	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	4	60	51	0.34755	12.35244	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	5	30	54	0.35560	12.93120	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	6	26	54	0.35560	12.86900	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	7	39	53	0.35282	13.03569	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	8	85	49	0.34020	12.91494	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	9	43	53	0.35212	13.07126	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	10	35	53	0.35315	12.90551	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
37	11	50	52	0.35000	12.90106	75	70	50	59	60	30	26	39	85	43	35	50
38	0	80	50	0.33950	13.67750	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	1	80	50	0.33950	13.42140	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	2	60	51	0.34755	13.27742	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	3	60	51	0.34755	13.39436	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	4	51	52	0.34973	12.70217	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	5	19	55	0.35868	13.28988	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	6	11	56	0.36229	13.23128	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	7	35	54	0.35508	13.39077	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	8	87	49	0.33878	13.25372	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	9	58	52	0.34720	13.41846	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	10	34	54	0.35523	13.26074	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
38	11	50	52	0.35000	13.25106	80	80	60	60	51	19	11	35	87	58	34	50
39	0	89	64	0.26218	13.93968	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	1	80	65	0.28175	13.70315	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	2	52	67	0.34559	13.62301	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	3	59	67	0.32942	13.72378	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	4	49	67	0.35217	13.05434	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	5	100	63	0.23742	13.52730	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	6	89	64	0.26218	13.49347	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	7	34	69	0.38603	13.77679	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	8	98	63	0.24304	13.49676	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	9	50	67	0.35000	13.76846	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	10	41	68	0.36985	13.63059	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
39	11	50	67	0.35000	13.60106	89	80	52	59	49	100	89	34	98	50	41	50
40	0	63	48	0.35137	14.29105	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	1	30	51	0.34790	14.05105	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	2	49	49	0.34986	13.97287	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	3	56	49	0.35035	14.07413	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	4	60	48	0.35140	13.40574	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	5	81	47	0.35072	13.87802	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	6	51	49	0.35012	13.84358	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	7	33	51	0.34881	14.12560	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	8	29	51	0.34755	13.84431	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	9	50	49	0.35000	14.11846	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	10	41	50	0.34905	13.97964	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
40	11	50	49	0.35000	13.95106	63	30	49	56	60	81	51	33	29	50	41	50
41	0	65	49	0.34930	14.64035	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	1	40	52	0.35140	14.40245	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	2	84	48	0.34524	14.31811	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	3	86	48	0.34412	14.41825	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	4	49	51	0.35012	13.75586	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	5	51	51	0.34986	14.22788	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	6	22	53	0.35163	14.19522	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	7	35	52	0.35123	14.47683	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	8	30	53	0.35303	14.19734	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	9	62	50	0.34832	14.46678	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	10	35	52	0.35123	14.33087	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
41	11	50	51	0.35000	14.30106	65	40	84	86	49	51	22	35	30	62	35	50
42	0	69	48	0.35067	14.99101	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	1	97	46	0.34835	14.75081	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	2	42	51	0.35028	14.66839	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	3	78	48	0.34804	14.76629	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	4	55	50	0.34971	14.10557	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	5	6	54	0.35000	14.57788	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	6	27	52	0.34973	14.54495	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	7	29	52	0.35025	14.82707	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	8	32	52	0.35084	14.54818	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	9	56	50	0.34958	14.81636	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	10	60	49	0.35012	14.68098	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
42	11	50	50	0.35000	14.65106	69	97	42	78	55	6	27	29	32	56	60	50
43	0	74	61	0.30940	15.30041	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	1	95	59	0.27440	15.02521	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	2	50	63	0.35000	15.01839	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	3	72	61	0.31330	15.07959	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	4	50	63	0.35000	14.45557	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83

Table XXXVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
43	5	50	63	0.35000	14.92788	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	6	82	60	0.29699	14.84194	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	7	31	65	0.38236	15.20944	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	8	35	64	0.37433	14.92251	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	9	51	63	0.34832	15.16468	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	10	71	61	0.31521	14.99619	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
43	11	83	60	0.29494	14.94600	74	95	50	72	50	50	82	31	35	51	71	83
44	0	56	58	0.34342	15.64383	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	1	97	55	0.29407	15.31928	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	2	31	61	0.37261	15.39100	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	3	14	62	0.39032	15.46991	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	4	100	54	0.29517	14.75074	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	5	100	54	0.29517	15.22305	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	6	46	59	0.35443	15.19637	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	7	30	61	0.37357	15.58300	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	8	61	58	0.33729	15.25980	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	9	42	60	0.35952	15.52420	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	10	71	57	0.32599	15.32218	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
44	11	50	59	0.35000	15.29600	56	97	31	14	100	100	46	30	61	42	71	50
45	0	67	36	0.37717	16.02100	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	1	10	41	0.28513	15.60441	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	2	22	40	0.30492	15.69592	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	3	3	42	0.27597	15.74588	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	4	52	37	0.35329	15.10403	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	5	67	36	0.37717	15.60022	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	6	42	38	0.33693	15.53330	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	7	25	40	0.31062	15.89363	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	8	67	36	0.37717	15.63697	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	9	40	38	0.33343	15.85764	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	10	16	41	0.29724	15.61943	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
45	11	51	37	0.35166	15.64766	67	10	22	3	52	67	42	25	67	40	16	51
46	0	65	43	0.36085	16.38185	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	1	7	49	0.32291	15.92732	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	2	58	44	0.35541	16.05134	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	3	92	41	0.37793	16.12381	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	4	51	45	0.35063	15.45466	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	5	10	48	0.32107	15.92129	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	6	50	45	0.35000	15.88330	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	7	26	47	0.33404	16.22767	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	8	9	48	0.31986	15.95684	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	9	50	45	0.35000	16.20764	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	10	72	43	0.36412	15.98354	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
46	11	51	45	0.35063	15.99829	65	7	58	92	51	10	50	26	9	50	72	51
47	0	68	54	0.33698	16.71883	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	1	41	57	0.35714	16.28446	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	2	54	55	0.34725	16.39858	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	3	79	53	0.32902	16.45283	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	4	50	56	0.35000	15.80466	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	5	77	53	0.33110	16.25239	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	6	53	55	0.34797	16.23127	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	7	27	58	0.36744	16.59511	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	8	19	59	0.37459	16.33143	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	9	58	55	0.34412	16.55176	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	10	87	52	0.32453	16.30807	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
47	11	50	56	0.35000	16.34829	68	41	54	79	50	77	53	27	19	58	87	50
48	0	53	42	0.35298	17.07181	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	1	58	41	0.35849	16.64295	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	2	29	44	0.32868	16.72727	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	3	13	46	0.31503	16.76787	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	4	1	47	0.30312	16.10778	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	5	94	38	0.39517	16.64756	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	6	49	42	0.34896	16.58023	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	7	28	44	0.32741	16.92252	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	8	39	43	0.33871	16.67014	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	9	50	42	0.35000	16.90176	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	10	50	42	0.35000	16.65807	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
48	11	50	42	0.35000	16.69829	53	58	29	13	1	94	49	28	39	50	50	50
49	0	60	50	0.34883	17.42064	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	1	39	52	0.35141	16.99437	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	2	51	51	0.34986	17.07713	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	3	13	54	0.35302	17.12089	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	4	0	56	0.35933	16.46711	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	5	89	48	0.34226	16.98983	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	6	72	49	0.34718	16.92741	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	7	28	53	0.35282	17.27535	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	8	48	51	0.35021	17.02035	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	9	62	50	0.34832	17.25008	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	10	100	47	0.34008	16.99816	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50
49	11	50	51	0.35000	17.04829	60	39	51	13	0	89	72	28	48	62	100	50

Table XXXVIII.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 3

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
0	0	50	52	0.35000	0.35000	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	1	90	48	0.34160	0.34160	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	2	10	56	0.36213	0.36213	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	3	60	51	0.34755	0.34755	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	4	50	52	0.35000	0.35000	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	5	38	53	0.35294	0.35294	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	6	66	51	0.34496	0.34496	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	7	50	52	0.35000	0.35000	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	8	99	48	0.33456	0.33456	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	9	50	52	0.35000	0.35000	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	10	50	52	0.35000	0.35000	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
0	11	10	56	0.36213	0.36213	50	90	10	60	50	38	66	50	99	50	50	10
1	0	50	57	0.35000	0.70000	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	1	95	53	0.30905	0.65065	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	2	98	53	0.30464	0.66677	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	3	47	58	0.35298	0.70053	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	4	50	57	0.35000	0.70000	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	5	30	59	0.36843	0.72137	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	6	50	57	0.35000	0.69496	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	7	50	57	0.35000	0.70000	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	8	90	54	0.31080	0.64536	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	9	50	57	0.35000	0.70000	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	10	50	57	0.35000	0.70000	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
1	11	22	60	0.37679	0.73892	50	95	98	47	50	30	50	50	90	50	50	22
2	0	47	43	0.34720	1.04720	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	1	25	45	0.32667	0.97732	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	2	100	38	0.39783	1.06461	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	3	24	45	0.32543	1.02595	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	4	39	44	0.34012	1.04012	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	5	20	45	0.32025	1.04162	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	6	50	43	0.35000	1.04496	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	7	50	43	0.35000	1.05000	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	8	0	47	0.30158	0.94695	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	9	50	43	0.35000	1.05000	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	10	50	43	0.35000	1.05000	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
2	11	65	41	0.36470	1.10362	47	25	100	24	39	20	50	50	0	50	50	65
3	0	40	49	0.34755	1.39475	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	1	47	48	0.34912	1.32644	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	2	0	53	0.34008	1.40469	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	3	40	49	0.34755	1.37350	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	4	40	49	0.34755	1.38767	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	5	60	47	0.35268	1.39431	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	6	100	44	0.35933	1.40429	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	7	50	48	0.35000	1.40000	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	8	100	44	0.35933	1.30628	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	9	50	48	0.35000	1.40000	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	10	50	48	0.35000	1.40000	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
3	11	2	52	0.33544	1.43906	40	47	0	40	40	60	100	50	100	50	50	2
4	0	55	58	0.34457	1.73932	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	1	94	55	0.29918	1.62562	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	2	0	63	0.40425	1.80894	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	3	48	59	0.35226	1.72577	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	4	50	59	0.35000	1.73767	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	5	60	58	0.33857	1.73287	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	6	100	54	0.29517	1.69946	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	7	50	59	0.35000	1.75000	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	8	90	55	0.30567	1.61195	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	9	50	59	0.35000	1.75000	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	10	50	59	0.35000	1.75000	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
4	11	49	59	0.35114	1.79020	55	94	0	48	50	60	100	50	90	50	50	49
5	0	53	51	0.34951	2.08883	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	1	29	53	0.35294	1.97856	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	2	100	46	0.34650	2.15544	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	3	22	54	0.35523	2.08099	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	4	50	51	0.35000	2.08767	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	5	20	54	0.35490	2.08777	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	6	0	56	0.35933	2.05879	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	7	50	51	0.35000	2.10000	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	8	100	46	0.34650	1.95845	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	9	50	51	0.35000	2.10000	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	10	50	51	0.35000	2.10000	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
5	11	87	48	0.34352	2.13373	53	29	100	22	50	20	0	50	100	50	50	87
6	0	50	41	0.35000	2.43883	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	1	51	41	0.35114	2.32970	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	2	100	37	0.40425	2.55969	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	3	10	45	0.30567	2.38666	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	4	42	42	0.34104	2.42871	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	5	30	43	0.32737	2.41514	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	6	20	44	0.31640	2.37519	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	7	50	41	0.35000	2.45000	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	8	50	41	0.35000	2.30845	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	9	50	41	0.35000	2.45000	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	10	50	41	0.35000	2.45000	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
6	11	0	46	0.29517	2.42889	50	51	100	10	42	30	20	50	50	50	50	0
7	0	50	57	0.35000	2.78883	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71

Table XXXVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
7	1	20	60	0.37800	2.70770	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	2	0	62	0.39783	2.95752	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	3	55	57	0.34522	2.73188	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	4	42	58	0.35747	2.78617	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	5	90	53	0.31593	2.73107	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	6	50	57	0.35000	2.72519	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	7	50	57	0.35000	2.80000	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	8	100	53	0.30158	2.61003	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	9	50	57	0.35000	2.80000	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	10	100	53	0.30158	2.75158	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
7	11	71	55	0.33138	2.76027	50	20	0	55	42	90	50	50	100	50	100	71
8	0	64	48	0.35131	3.14014	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	1	5	53	0.34370	3.05140	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	2	0	54	0.34650	3.30402	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	3	44	50	0.34958	3.08146	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	4	56	49	0.35035	3.13652	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	5	50	49	0.35000	3.08107	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	6	59	49	0.35021	3.07540	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	7	50	49	0.35000	3.15000	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	8	47	50	0.34989	2.95993	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	9	50	49	0.35000	3.15000	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	10	100	45	0.35292	3.10450	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
8	11	68	48	0.35084	3.11111	64	5	0	44	56	50	59	50	47	50	100	68
9	0	39	64	0.36835	3.50849	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	1	92	59	0.28091	3.33231	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	2	95	59	0.27440	3.57842	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	3	57	62	0.33865	3.42011	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	4	40	64	0.36680	3.50333	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	5	50	63	0.35000	3.43107	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	6	41	64	0.36523	3.44063	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	7	50	63	0.35000	3.50000	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	8	47	63	0.35490	3.31483	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	9	50	63	0.35000	3.50000	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	10	100	58	0.26950	3.37400	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
9	11	79	60	0.30297	3.41409	39	92	95	57	40	50	41	50	47	50	100	79
10	0	68	49	0.34853	3.85702	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	1	16	54	0.35397	3.68628	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	2	100	47	0.34008	3.91851	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	3	50	51	0.35000	3.77011	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	4	57	50	0.34943	3.85275	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	5	50	51	0.35000	3.78107	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	6	50	51	0.35000	3.79063	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	7	50	51	0.35000	3.85000	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	8	2	55	0.35392	3.66875	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	9	50	51	0.35000	3.85000	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	10	100	47	0.34008	3.71408	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
10	11	19	54	0.35470	3.76879	68	16	100	50	57	50	50	50	2	50	100	19
11	0	42	52	0.35131	4.20833	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	1	15	54	0.35368	4.03996	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	2	100	47	0.34008	4.25859	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	3	53	51	0.34951	4.11962	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	4	50	51	0.35000	4.20275	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	5	50	51	0.35000	4.13107	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	6	59	50	0.34905	4.13968	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	7	70	49	0.34790	4.19790	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	8	4	55	0.35483	4.02358	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	9	50	51	0.35000	4.20000	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	10	100	47	0.34008	4.05417	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
11	11	19	54	0.35470	4.12349	42	15	100	53	50	50	59	70	4	50	100	19
12	0	70	33	0.38897	4.59730	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	1	3	40	0.26391	4.30387	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	2	0	40	0.25667	4.51526	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	3	50	35	0.35000	4.46962	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	4	48	35	0.34610	4.54886	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	5	1	40	0.25910	4.39018	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	6	60	34	0.36937	4.50905	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	7	70	33	0.38897	4.58687	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	8	0	40	0.25667	4.28024	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	9	50	35	0.35000	4.55000	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	10	66	34	0.37987	4.43403	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
12	11	20	38	0.29330	4.41679	70	3	0	50	48	1	60	70	0	50	66	20
13	0	33	57	0.36190	4.95920	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	1	26	57	0.36484	4.66871	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	2	0	60	0.38500	4.90026	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	3	80	52	0.33180	4.80142	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	4	30	57	0.36330	4.91216	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	5	90	51	0.32620	4.71638	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	6	63	54	0.34135	4.85040	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	7	50	55	0.35000	4.93687	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	8	100	51	0.31442	4.59466	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	9	10	59	0.37753	4.92753	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	10	100	51	0.31442	4.74845	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
13	11	74	53	0.33404	4.75083	33	26	0	80	30	90	63	50	100	10	100	74
14	0	75	48	0.34912	5.30832	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	1	9	54	0.35144	5.02014	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66

Table XXXVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
14	2	0	54	0.34650	5.24676	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	3	65	49	0.34930	5.15072	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	4	64	49	0.34951	5.26167	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	5	50	50	0.35000	5.06638	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	6	45	50	0.34971	5.20011	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	7	35	51	0.34930	5.28617	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	8	0	54	0.34650	4.94116	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	9	90	46	0.35187	5.27940	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	10	100	45	0.35292	5.10137	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
14	11	66	48	0.35112	5.10195	75	9	0	65	64	50	45	35	0	90	100	66
15	0	33	48	0.34226	5.65059	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	1	6	51	0.33306	5.35320	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	2	100	42	0.37217	5.61892	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	3	50	47	0.35000	5.50072	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	4	38	48	0.34524	5.60691	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	5	50	47	0.35000	5.41638	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	6	50	47	0.35000	5.55011	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	7	50	47	0.35000	5.63617	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	8	30	49	0.34277	5.28393	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	9	20	50	0.33950	5.61890	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	10	77	44	0.36229	5.46365	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
15	11	61	46	0.35424	5.45618	33	6	100	50	38	50	50	50	30	20	77	61
16	0	50	54	0.35000	6.00059	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	1	78	52	0.33367	5.68687	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	2	100	50	0.32083	5.93976	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	3	35	56	0.35893	5.85964	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	4	50	54	0.35000	5.95691	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	5	50	54	0.35000	5.76638	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	6	40	55	0.35525	5.90536	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	7	50	54	0.35000	5.98617	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	8	44	55	0.35343	5.63736	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	9	0	59	0.37858	5.99748	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	10	83	51	0.33306	5.79671	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
16	11	67	53	0.34008	5.79627	50	78	100	35	50	50	40	50	44	0	83	67
17	0	60	47	0.35268	6.35327	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	1	4	52	0.33712	6.02399	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	2	100	43	0.36575	6.30551	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	3	39	49	0.34718	6.20682	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	4	45	48	0.34842	6.30533	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	5	50	48	0.35000	6.11638	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	6	38	49	0.34678	6.25214	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	7	40	48	0.34627	6.33243	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	8	25	50	0.34271	5.98006	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	9	90	44	0.36213	6.35962	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	10	44	48	0.34804	6.14475	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
17	11	38	49	0.34678	6.14305	60	4	100	39	45	50	38	40	25	90	44	38
18	0	60	44	0.35653	6.70980	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	1	37	46	0.34135	6.36534	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	2	0	49	0.31442	6.61992	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	3	57	44	0.35482	6.56164	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	4	48	45	0.34867	6.65400	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	5	50	45	0.35000	6.46638	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	6	50	45	0.35000	6.60214	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	7	70	43	0.36330	6.69573	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	8	98	41	0.37856	6.35862	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	9	0	49	0.31442	6.67403	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	10	61	44	0.35706	6.50181	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
18	11	13	48	0.32453	6.46758	60	37	0	57	48	50	50	70	98	0	61	13
19	0	33	53	0.35317	7.06298	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	1	45	52	0.35099	6.71634	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	2	0	56	0.35933	6.97926	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	3	71	50	0.34485	6.90649	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	4	50	51	0.35000	7.00400	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	5	50	51	0.35000	6.81638	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	6	46	52	0.35084	6.95298	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	7	50	51	0.35000	7.04573	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	8	58	51	0.34823	6.70685	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	9	50	51	0.35000	7.02403	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	10	83	48	0.34576	6.84757	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
19	11	80	49	0.34335	6.81093	33	45	0	71	50	50	46	50	58	50	83	80
20	0	65	58	0.33197	7.39495	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	1	87	56	0.30554	7.02187	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	2	99	54	0.29683	7.27609	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	3	63	58	0.33468	7.24117	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	4	47	59	0.35336	7.35736	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	5	50	59	0.35000	7.16638	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	6	41	60	0.36061	7.31359	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	7	30	61	0.37357	7.41930	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	8	45	59	0.35548	7.06233	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	9	50	59	0.35000	7.37403	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	10	61	58	0.33729	7.18487	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
20	11	60	58	0.33857	7.14950	65	87	99	63	47	50	41	30	45	50	61	60
21	0	65	52	0.34352	7.73848	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	1	13	57	0.36727	7.38914	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	2	50	54	0.35000	7.62609	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60

Table XXXVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
21	3	52	53	0.34918	7.59036	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	4	50	54	0.35000	7.70736	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	5	50	54	0.35000	7.51638	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	6	48	54	0.35098	7.66457	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	7	50	54	0.35000	7.76930	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	8	1	58	0.37230	7.43463	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	9	100	49	0.32725	7.70128	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	10	100	49	0.32725	7.51212	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
21	11	60	53	0.34498	7.49448	65	13	50	52	50	50	48	50	1	100	100	60
22	0	50	50	0.35000	8.08848	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	1	22	53	0.35163	7.74077	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	2	56	50	0.34958	7.97567	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	3	50	50	0.35000	7.94036	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	4	48	51	0.35021	8.05757	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	5	50	50	0.35000	7.86638	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	6	57	50	0.34943	8.01400	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	7	100	46	0.34650	8.11580	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	8	20	53	0.35105	7.78568	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	9	50	50	0.35000	8.05128	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	10	50	50	0.35000	7.86212	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
22	11	52	50	0.34995	7.84443	50	22	56	50	48	50	57	100	20	50	50	52
23	0	50	42	0.35000	8.43848	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	1	18	45	0.31752	8.05829	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	2	0	46	0.29517	8.27084	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	3	55	41	0.35548	8.29584	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	4	47	42	0.34681	8.40439	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	5	50	42	0.35000	8.21638	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	6	70	40	0.37100	8.38500	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	7	50	42	0.35000	8.46580	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	8	16	45	0.31470	8.10038	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	9	50	42	0.35000	8.40128	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	10	100	37	0.40425	8.26637	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
23	11	5	46	0.30327	8.14771	50	18	0	55	47	50	70	50	16	50	100	5
24	0	40	52	0.35140	8.78988	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	1	24	54	0.35546	8.41375	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	2	0	56	0.35933	8.63017	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	3	63	50	0.34803	8.64387	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	4	44	52	0.35112	8.75551	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	5	50	51	0.35000	8.56638	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	6	50	51	0.35000	8.73500	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	7	50	51	0.35000	8.81580	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	8	89	48	0.34226	8.44264	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	9	50	51	0.35000	8.75128	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	10	100	47	0.34008	8.60645	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
24	11	53	51	0.34951	8.49722	40	24	0	63	44	50	50	50	89	50	100	53
25	0	60	56	0.34113	9.13101	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	1	40	57	0.35782	8.77157	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	2	100	52	0.30800	8.93817	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	3	27	59	0.37039	9.01426	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	4	56	56	0.34496	9.10047	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	5	50	57	0.35000	8.91638	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	6	31	58	0.36530	9.10029	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	7	50	57	0.35000	9.16580	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	8	50	57	0.35000	8.79264	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	9	50	57	0.35000	9.10128	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	10	100	52	0.30800	8.91445	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
25	11	58	56	0.34309	8.84031	60	40	100	27	56	50	31	50	50	50	100	58
26	0	60	50	0.34883	9.47984	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	1	84	48	0.34524	9.11681	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	2	50	51	0.35000	9.28817	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	3	50	51	0.35000	9.36426	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	4	52	50	0.34995	9.45042	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	5	50	51	0.35000	9.26638	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	6	46	51	0.35033	9.45062	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	7	30	52	0.35047	9.51627	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	8	6	55	0.35565	9.14829	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	9	50	51	0.35000	9.45128	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	10	100	46	0.34650	9.26095	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
26	11	29	53	0.35294	9.19325	60	84	50	50	52	50	46	30	6	50	100	29
27	0	50	57	0.35000	9.82984	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	1	69	56	0.33116	9.44797	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	2	50	57	0.35000	9.63817	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	3	50	57	0.35000	9.71426	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	4	50	57	0.35000	9.80042	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	5	50	57	0.35000	9.61638	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	6	63	56	0.33802	9.78864	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	7	70	56	0.32993	9.84620	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	8	50	57	0.35000	9.49829	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	9	50	57	0.35000	9.80128	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	10	100	53	0.30158	9.56254	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
27	11	30	59	0.36843	9.56168	50	69	50	50	50	50	63	70	50	50	100	30
28	0	50	49	0.35000	10.17984	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	1	28	51	0.34718	9.79515	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	2	50	49	0.35000	9.98817	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	3	25	51	0.34592	10.06018	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30

Table XXXVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
28	4	54	48	0.35084	10.15126	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	5	50	49	0.35000	9.96638	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	6	63	47	0.35303	10.14167	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	7	75	46	0.35554	10.20174	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	8	10	52	0.34160	9.83989	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	9	50	49	0.35000	10.15128	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	10	100	44	0.35933	9.92187	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
28	11	30	50	0.34533	9.90702	50	28	50	25	54	50	63	75	10	50	100	30
29	0	50	53	0.35000	10.52984	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	1	33	55	0.35754	10.15268	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	2	50	53	0.35000	10.33817	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	3	69	51	0.34335	10.40353	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	4	52	53	0.34918	10.50044	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	5	50	53	0.35000	10.31638	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	6	51	53	0.34960	10.49127	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	7	50	53	0.35000	10.55174	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	8	70	51	0.34277	10.18265	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	9	50	53	0.35000	10.50128	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	10	100	49	0.32725	10.24912	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
29	11	9	57	0.36722	10.27424	50	33	50	69	52	50	51	50	70	50	100	9
30	0	50	50	0.35000	10.87984	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	1	28	52	0.35000	10.50268	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	2	50	50	0.35000	10.68817	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	3	50	50	0.35000	10.75353	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	4	51	49	0.35012	10.85056	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	5	50	50	0.35000	10.66638	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	6	50	50	0.35000	10.84127	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	7	35	51	0.34930	10.90104	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	8	50	50	0.35000	10.53265	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	9	50	50	0.35000	10.85128	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	10	100	45	0.35292	10.60204	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
30	11	31	51	0.34823	10.62246	50	28	50	50	51	50	50	35	50	50	100	31
31	0	50	54	0.35000	11.22984	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	1	23	56	0.36229	10.86497	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	2	50	54	0.35000	11.03817	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	3	50	54	0.35000	11.10353	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	4	48	54	0.35098	11.20154	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	5	50	54	0.35000	11.01638	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	6	50	54	0.35000	11.19127	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	7	35	55	0.35700	11.25804	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	8	73	52	0.33792	10.87058	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	9	50	54	0.35000	11.20128	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	10	100	49	0.32725	10.92929	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
31	11	62	53	0.34370	10.96616	50	23	50	50	48	50	50	35	73	50	100	62
32	0	50	51	0.35000	11.57984	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	1	22	53	0.35163	11.21660	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	2	50	51	0.35000	11.38817	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	3	44	51	0.35035	11.45388	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	4	52	50	0.34995	11.55149	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	5	50	51	0.35000	11.36638	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	6	30	52	0.35047	11.54174	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	7	50	51	0.35000	11.60804	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	8	50	51	0.35000	11.22058	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	9	50	51	0.35000	11.55128	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	10	100	46	0.34650	11.27579	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
32	11	58	50	0.34925	11.31542	50	22	50	44	52	50	30	50	50	50	100	58
33	0	50	55	0.35000	11.92984	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	1	13	58	0.37202	11.58862	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	2	50	55	0.35000	11.73817	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	3	70	53	0.33763	11.79151	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	4	46	55	0.35238	11.90387	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	5	50	55	0.35000	11.71638	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	6	50	55	0.35000	11.89174	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	7	50	55	0.35000	11.95804	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	8	40	56	0.35653	11.57711	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	9	50	55	0.35000	11.90128	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	10	100	51	0.31442	11.59020	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
33	11	87	52	0.32453	11.63995	50	13	50	70	46	50	50	50	40	50	100	87
34	0	50	51	0.35000	12.27984	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	1	6	55	0.35565	11.94426	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	2	50	51	0.35000	12.08817	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	3	60	50	0.34883	12.14034	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	4	50	51	0.35000	12.25387	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	5	50	51	0.35000	12.06638	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	6	47	51	0.35028	12.24202	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	7	60	50	0.34883	12.30688	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	8	8	55	0.35637	11.93348	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	9	50	51	0.35000	12.25128	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	10	100	46	0.34650	11.93670	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
34	11	77	48	0.34842	11.98837	50	6	50	60	50	50	47	60	8	50	100	77
35	0	50	43	0.35000	12.62984	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	1	12	47	0.31852	12.26279	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	2	50	43	0.35000	12.43817	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	3	50	43	0.35000	12.49034	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	4	53	43	0.35259	12.60646	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15

Table XXXVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
35	5	50	43	0.35000	12.41638	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	6	43	44	0.34404	12.58606	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	7	50	43	0.35000	12.65688	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	8	4	48	0.31351	12.24699	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	9	50	43	0.35000	12.60128	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	10	100	39	0.39142	12.32812	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
35	11	15	47	0.32223	12.31061	50	12	50	50	53	50	43	50	4	50	100	15
36	0	50	57	0.35000	12.97984	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	1	34	58	0.36344	12.62623	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	2	50	57	0.35000	12.78817	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	3	50	57	0.35000	12.84034	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	4	45	57	0.35420	12.96066	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	5	50	57	0.35000	12.76638	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	6	48	57	0.35175	12.93781	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	7	45	57	0.35420	13.01108	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	8	50	57	0.35000	12.59699	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	9	50	57	0.35000	12.95128	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	10	100	52	0.30800	12.63612	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
36	11	100	52	0.30800	12.61861	50	34	50	50	45	50	48	45	50	50	100	100
37	0	50	45	0.35000	13.32984	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	1	11	48	0.32224	12.94847	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	2	50	45	0.35000	13.13817	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	3	63	44	0.35804	13.19838	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	4	56	44	0.35420	13.31486	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	5	50	45	0.35000	13.11638	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	6	45	45	0.34650	13.28431	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	7	50	45	0.35000	13.36108	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	8	18	48	0.32984	12.92683	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	9	50	45	0.35000	13.30128	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	10	100	40	0.38500	13.02112	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
37	11	0	49	0.31442	12.93302	50	11	50	63	56	50	45	50	18	50	100	0
38	0	40	55	0.35525	13.68509	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	1	66	53	0.34085	13.28932	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	2	50	55	0.35000	13.48817	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	3	50	55	0.35000	13.54838	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	4	45	55	0.35292	13.66778	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	5	50	55	0.35000	13.46638	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	6	50	55	0.35000	13.63431	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	7	50	55	0.35000	13.71108	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	8	50	55	0.35000	13.27683	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	9	50	55	0.35000	13.65128	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	10	100	50	0.32083	13.34195	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
38	11	49	55	0.35063	13.28365	40	66	50	50	45	50	50	50	50	50	100	49
39	0	50	53	0.35000	14.03509	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	1	13	56	0.36252	13.65184	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	2	50	53	0.35000	13.83817	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	3	50	53	0.35000	13.89838	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	4	53	52	0.34912	14.01691	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	5	50	53	0.35000	13.81638	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	6	48	53	0.35072	13.98503	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	7	35	54	0.35508	14.06615	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	8	87	49	0.33878	13.61561	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	9	50	53	0.35000	14.00128	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	10	100	48	0.33367	13.67562	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
39	11	44	53	0.35189	13.63554	50	13	50	50	53	50	48	35	87	50	100	44
40	0	50	47	0.35000	14.38509	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	1	24	49	0.33878	13.99062	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	2	50	47	0.35000	14.18817	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	3	30	49	0.34277	14.24115	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	4	51	47	0.35037	14.36728	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	5	50	47	0.35000	14.16638	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	6	56	46	0.35266	14.33769	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	7	50	47	0.35000	14.41615	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	8	12	50	0.33315	13.94876	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	9	50	47	0.35000	14.35128	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	10	100	42	0.37217	14.04779	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
40	11	41	48	0.34674	13.98229	50	24	50	30	51	50	56	50	12	50	100	41
41	0	40	53	0.35268	14.73778	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	1	36	53	0.35310	14.34372	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	2	50	52	0.35000	14.53817	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	3	40	53	0.35268	14.59383	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	4	48	52	0.35047	14.71775	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	5	50	52	0.35000	14.51638	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	6	47	52	0.35067	14.68836	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	7	30	54	0.35560	14.77175	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	8	50	52	0.35000	14.29876	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	9	50	52	0.35000	14.70128	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	10	100	47	0.34008	14.38787	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
41	11	80	49	0.34335	14.32564	40	36	50	40	48	50	47	30	50	50	100	80
42	0	50	51	0.35000	15.08778	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	1	16	54	0.35397	14.69769	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	2	50	51	0.35000	14.88817	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	3	50	51	0.35000	14.94383	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	4	51	51	0.34986	15.06761	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	5	50	51	0.35000	14.86638	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54

Table XXXVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
42	6	40	52	0.35140	15.03976	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	7	50	51	0.35000	15.12175	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	8	50	51	0.35000	14.64876	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	9	50	51	0.35000	15.05128	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	10	100	46	0.34650	14.73437	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
42	11	54	51	0.34930	14.67494	50	16	50	50	51	50	40	50	50	50	100	54
43	0	50	50	0.35000	15.43778	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	1	11	54	0.35228	15.04996	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	2	50	50	0.35000	15.23817	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	3	57	49	0.35033	15.29416	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	4	50	50	0.35000	15.41761	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	5	50	50	0.35000	15.21638	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	6	38	51	0.34986	15.38962	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	7	50	50	0.35000	15.47175	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	8	50	50	0.35000	14.99876	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	9	50	50	0.35000	15.40128	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	10	100	45	0.35292	15.08729	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
43	11	44	51	0.35035	15.02529	50	11	50	57	50	50	38	50	50	50	100	44
44	0	50	52	0.35000	15.78778	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	1	24	54	0.35546	15.40542	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	2	50	52	0.35000	15.58817	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	3	64	51	0.34592	15.64008	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	4	47	52	0.35067	15.76827	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	5	50	52	0.35000	15.56638	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	6	40	53	0.35268	15.74230	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	7	50	52	0.35000	15.82175	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	8	50	52	0.35000	15.34876	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	9	49	52	0.35025	15.75153	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	10	100	47	0.34008	15.42737	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
44	11	48	52	0.35047	15.37576	50	24	50	64	47	50	40	50	50	49	100	48
45	0	50	52	0.35000	16.13778	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	1	21	55	0.35880	15.76422	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	2	50	52	0.35000	15.93817	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	3	60	51	0.34755	15.98763	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	4	51	52	0.34973	16.11800	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	5	50	52	0.35000	15.91638	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	6	40	53	0.35268	16.09498	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	7	50	52	0.35000	16.17175	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	8	49	52	0.35025	15.69900	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	9	50	52	0.35000	16.10153	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	10	100	47	0.34008	15.76745	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
45	11	50	52	0.35000	15.72576	50	21	50	60	51	50	40	50	49	50	100	50
46	0	50	51	0.35000	16.48778	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	1	21	54	0.35508	16.11930	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	2	50	51	0.35000	16.28817	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	3	50	51	0.35000	16.33763	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	4	51	51	0.34986	16.46786	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	5	50	51	0.35000	16.26638	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	6	41	52	0.35137	16.44635	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	7	55	51	0.34907	16.52082	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	8	45	52	0.35099	16.05000	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	9	50	51	0.35000	16.45153	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	10	100	47	0.34008	16.10754	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
46	11	52	51	0.34970	16.07545	50	21	50	50	51	50	41	55	45	50	100	52
47	0	50	50	0.35000	16.83778	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	1	10	53	0.34673	16.46603	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	2	50	50	0.35000	16.63817	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	3	50	50	0.35000	16.68763	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	4	50	50	0.35000	16.81786	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	5	50	50	0.35000	16.61638	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	6	46	50	0.34981	16.79616	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	7	50	50	0.35000	16.87082	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	8	39	51	0.35000	16.40000	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	9	50	50	0.35000	16.80153	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	10	100	45	0.35292	16.46045	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
47	11	50	50	0.35000	16.42545	50	10	50	50	50	50	46	50	39	50	100	50
48	0	50	52	0.35000	17.18778	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	1	23	55	0.35882	16.82485	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	2	50	52	0.35000	16.98817	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	3	50	52	0.35000	17.03763	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	4	50	52	0.35000	17.16786	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	5	50	52	0.35000	16.96638	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	6	50	52	0.35000	17.14616	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	7	50	52	0.35000	17.22082	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	8	50	52	0.35000	16.75000	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	9	50	52	0.35000	17.15153	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	10	100	48	0.33367	16.79412	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
48	11	50	52	0.35000	16.77545	50	23	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100	50
49	0	80	51	0.33565	17.52343	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	1	23	56	0.36229	17.18713	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	2	50	54	0.35000	17.33817	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	3	43	54	0.35302	17.39065	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	4	51	54	0.34947	17.51734	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	5	50	54	0.35000	17.31638	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	6	50	54	0.35000	17.49616	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50

Table XXXVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
49	7	49	54	0.35050	17.57132	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	8	45	54	0.35228	17.10227	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	9	50	54	0.35000	17.50153	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	10	100	49	0.32725	17.12137	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50
49	11	50	54	0.35000	17.12545	80	23	50	43	51	50	50	49	45	50	100	50

Table XXXIX.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 4

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
0	0	26	39	0.30940	0.30940	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	1	49	37	0.34832	0.34832	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	2	5	41	0.27440	0.27440	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	3	50	37	0.35000	0.35000	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	4	1	41	0.26539	0.26539	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	5	50	37	0.35000	0.35000	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	6	5	41	0.27440	0.27440	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	7	50	37	0.35000	0.35000	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	8	87	33	0.41475	0.41475	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	9	50	37	0.35000	0.35000	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	10	9	40	0.27777	0.27777	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
0	11	70	35	0.38383	0.38383	26	49	5	50	1	50	5	50	87	50	9	70
1	0	98	58	0.27384	0.58324	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	1	54	62	0.34365	0.69197	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	2	92	58	0.28630	0.56070	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	3	50	62	0.35000	0.70000	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	4	0	67	0.42992	0.69531	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	5	100	58	0.26950	0.61950	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	6	0	67	0.42992	0.70432	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	7	50	62	0.35000	0.70000	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	8	61	61	0.33306	0.74781	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	9	55	62	0.34201	0.69201	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	10	75	60	0.31062	0.58840	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
1	11	100	58	0.26950	0.65333	98	54	92	50	0	100	0	50	61	55	75	100
2	0	3	59	0.37851	0.96175	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	1	40	56	0.35653	1.04851	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	2	59	54	0.34443	0.90513	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	3	35	56	0.35893	1.05893	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	4	100	50	0.32083	1.01614	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	5	100	50	0.32083	0.94033	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	6	0	60	0.38500	1.08932	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	7	17	58	0.37118	1.07118	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	8	43	56	0.35482	1.10263	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	9	58	54	0.34515	1.03715	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	10	100	50	0.32083	0.90923	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
2	11	100	50	0.32083	0.97417	3	40	59	35	100	100	0	17	43	58	100	100
3	0	4	57	0.36664	1.32839	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	1	32	55	0.35777	1.40628	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	2	29	55	0.35833	1.26346	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	3	57	52	0.34763	1.40656	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	4	50	53	0.35000	1.36614	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	5	100	48	0.33367	1.27400	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	6	0	57	0.36575	1.45507	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	7	72	51	0.34153	1.41271	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	8	83	50	0.33729	1.43992	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	9	60	52	0.34627	1.38342	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	10	100	48	0.33367	1.24290	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
3	11	45	53	0.35163	1.32580	4	32	29	57	50	100	0	72	83	60	100	45
4	0	100	42	0.37217	1.70056	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	1	28	48	0.33871	1.74498	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	2	44	47	0.34727	1.61073	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	3	60	45	0.35525	1.76181	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	4	0	51	0.32725	1.69339	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	5	100	42	0.37217	1.64617	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	6	39	47	0.34435	1.79942	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	7	66	45	0.35728	1.76999	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	8	1	51	0.32828	1.76820	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	9	60	45	0.35525	1.73867	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	10	50	46	0.35000	1.59290	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
4	11	11	50	0.33225	1.65805	100	28	44	60	0	100	39	66	1	60	50	11
5	0	100	61	0.25025	1.95081	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	1	47	65	0.35567	2.10065	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	2	20	68	0.40880	2.01953	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	3	14	68	0.41804	2.17985	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	4	100	61	0.25025	1.94364	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	5	100	61	0.25025	1.89642	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100

Table XXXIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
5	6	100	61	0.25025	2.04967	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	7	51	65	0.34806	2.11805	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	8	78	63	0.29414	2.06234	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	9	55	65	0.34008	2.07875	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	10	1	70	0.44776	2.04065	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
5	11	100	61	0.25025	1.90830	100	47	20	14	100	100	100	51	78	55	1	100
6	0	0	22	0.14117	2.09197	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	1	28	19	0.25683	2.35748	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	2	19	20	0.21944	2.23897	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	3	72	15	0.44317	2.62302	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	4	0	22	0.14117	2.08481	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	5	0	22	0.14117	2.03758	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	6	0	22	0.14117	2.19084	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	7	35	19	0.28770	2.40575	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	8	28	19	0.25683	2.31917	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	9	50	17	0.35000	2.42875	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	10	0	22	0.14117	2.18182	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
6	11	10	21	0.18247	2.09077	0	28	19	72	0	0	0	35	28	50	0	10
7	0	79	47	0.35135	2.44333	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	1	42	51	0.35028	2.70776	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	2	97	46	0.34835	2.58733	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	3	20	53	0.35105	2.97407	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	4	0	54	0.34650	2.43131	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	5	0	54	0.34650	2.38408	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	6	100	45	0.35292	2.54375	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	7	50	50	0.35000	2.75575	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	8	28	52	0.35000	2.66917	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	9	80	47	0.35105	2.77980	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	10	3	54	0.34835	2.53017	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
7	11	100	45	0.35292	2.44369	79	42	97	20	0	0	100	50	28	80	3	100
8	0	93	38	0.39465	2.83797	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	1	51	42	0.35102	3.05878	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	2	13	46	0.31503	2.90236	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	3	50	42	0.35000	3.32407	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	4	0	47	0.30158	2.73289	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	5	100	38	0.39783	2.78192	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	6	0	47	0.30158	2.84534	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	7	75	40	0.37479	3.13054	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	8	11	46	0.31223	2.98140	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	9	90	39	0.38780	3.16761	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	10	32	44	0.33236	2.86253	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
8	11	0	47	0.30158	2.74527	93	51	13	50	0	100	0	75	11	90	32	0
9	0	98	45	0.35392	3.19189	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	1	39	50	0.34859	3.40737	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	2	58	49	0.35028	3.25264	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	3	42	50	0.34925	3.67332	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	4	50	49	0.35000	3.08289	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	5	0	54	0.34650	3.12842	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	6	83	46	0.35424	3.19957	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	7	27	51	0.34678	3.47732	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	8	33	51	0.34881	3.33021	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	9	94	45	0.35565	3.52325	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	10	69	48	0.35067	3.21320	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
9	11	0	54	0.34650	3.09177	98	39	58	42	50	0	83	27	33	94	69	0
10	0	100	58	0.26950	3.46139	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	1	50	63	0.35000	3.75737	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	2	80	60	0.30100	3.55364	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	3	50	63	0.35000	4.02332	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	4	100	58	0.26950	3.35239	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	5	50	63	0.35000	3.47842	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	6	51	62	0.34845	3.54802	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	7	38	64	0.36988	3.84720	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	8	71	61	0.31521	3.64542	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	9	71	61	0.31521	3.83846	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	10	77	60	0.30684	3.52004	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
10	11	0	67	0.42992	3.52169	100	50	80	50	100	50	51	38	71	71	77	0
11	0	8	39	0.27013	3.73152	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	1	34	37	0.32032	4.07769	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	2	0	40	0.25667	3.81031	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	3	50	35	0.35000	4.37332	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	4	100	31	0.44275	3.79514	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	5	100	31	0.44275	3.92117	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	6	0	40	0.25667	3.80469	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	7	67	34	0.38154	4.22874	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	8	42	36	0.33488	3.98030	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	9	36	36	0.32256	4.16102	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	10	0	40	0.25667	3.77671	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
11	11	0	40	0.25667	3.77835	8	34	0	50	100	100	0	67	42	36	0	0
12	0	80	38	0.38570	4.11722	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	1	58	40	0.35952	4.43721	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	2	74	39	0.37716	4.18747	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	3	21	44	0.31786	4.69118	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	4	0	46	0.29517	4.09031	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	5	0	46	0.29517	4.21633	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	6	0	46	0.29517	4.09985	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100

Table XXXIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
12	7	79	38	0.38485	4.61358	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	8	0	46	0.29517	4.27547	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	9	39	42	0.33729	4.49832	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	10	50	41	0.35000	4.12671	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
12	11	100	36	0.41067	4.18902	80	58	74	21	0	0	0	79	0	39	50	100
13	0	87	53	0.31978	4.43701	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	1	60	55	0.34242	4.77962	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	2	96	52	0.31351	4.50098	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	3	23	59	0.37268	5.06386	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	4	50	56	0.35000	4.44031	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	5	50	56	0.35000	4.56633	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	6	0	61	0.39142	4.49127	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	7	30	58	0.36587	4.97945	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	8	74	54	0.33096	4.60643	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	9	49	56	0.35076	4.84907	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	10	49	56	0.35076	4.47747	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
13	11	100	52	0.30800	4.49702	87	60	96	23	50	50	0	30	74	49	49	100
14	0	72	64	0.30483	4.74183	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	1	47	66	0.35606	5.13568	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	2	79	63	0.29181	4.79278	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	3	56	66	0.33726	5.40112	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	4	100	62	0.24383	4.68414	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	5	100	62	0.24383	4.81017	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	6	100	62	0.24383	4.73510	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	7	29	68	0.39337	5.37282	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	8	75	64	0.29779	4.90422	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	9	65	65	0.31850	5.16757	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	10	54	66	0.34160	4.81907	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
14	11	0	71	0.45558	4.95260	72	47	79	56	100	100	100	29	75	65	54	0
15	0	98	52	0.31080	5.05263	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	1	47	56	0.35221	5.48788	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	2	40	57	0.35782	5.15060	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	3	70	54	0.33507	5.73619	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	4	100	52	0.30800	4.99214	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	5	50	56	0.35000	5.16017	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	6	100	52	0.30800	5.04310	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	7	73	54	0.33202	5.70484	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	8	38	57	0.35910	5.26332	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	9	10	60	0.38267	5.55024	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	10	42	57	0.35644	5.17551	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
15	11	0	61	0.39142	5.34402	98	47	40	70	100	50	100	73	38	10	42	0
16	0	94	41	0.37823	5.43087	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	1	19	48	0.33083	5.81871	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	2	90	41	0.37753	5.52813	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	3	50	45	0.35000	6.08619	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	4	50	45	0.35000	5.34214	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	5	50	45	0.35000	5.51017	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	6	66	43	0.36139	5.40449	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	7	30	47	0.33763	6.04247	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	8	50	45	0.35000	5.61332	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	9	1	49	0.31570	5.86594	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	10	40	46	0.34370	5.51921	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
16	11	3	49	0.31820	5.66222	94	19	90	50	50	50	66	30	50	1	40	3
17	0	8	55	0.35637	5.78724	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	1	51	52	0.34973	6.16845	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	2	70	50	0.34533	5.87347	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	3	50	52	0.35000	6.43619	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	4	0	56	0.35933	5.70147	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	5	100	47	0.34008	5.85025	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	6	0	56	0.35933	5.76382	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	7	63	50	0.34803	6.39050	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	8	62	51	0.34678	5.96010	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	9	50	52	0.35000	6.21594	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	10	64	50	0.34771	5.86692	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
17	11	100	47	0.34008	6.00230	8	51	70	50	0	100	0	63	62	50	64	100
18	0	42	46	0.34515	6.13238	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	1	34	47	0.34085	6.50930	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	2	4	50	0.32531	6.19878	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	3	50	45	0.35000	6.78619	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	4	40	46	0.34370	6.04517	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	5	100	41	0.37858	6.22883	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	6	50	45	0.35000	6.11382	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	7	23	48	0.33456	6.72506	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	8	35	47	0.34160	6.30170	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	9	50	45	0.35000	6.56594	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	10	21	48	0.33274	6.19967	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
18	11	100	41	0.37858	6.38088	42	34	4	50	40	100	50	23	35	50	21	100
19	0	61	57	0.33871	6.47109	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	1	45	58	0.35484	6.86414	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	2	13	61	0.38626	6.58504	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	3	50	58	0.35000	7.13619	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	4	0	62	0.39783	6.44301	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	5	100	53	0.30158	6.53042	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	6	50	58	0.35000	6.46382	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	7	50	58	0.35000	7.07506	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100

Table XXXIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
19	8	65	56	0.33582	6.63753	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	9	71	56	0.32868	6.89463	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	10	81	55	0.31890	6.51856	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
19	11	100	53	0.30158	6.68247	61	45	13	50	0	100	50	50	65	71	81	100
20	0	29	56	0.36103	6.83212	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	1	58	54	0.34515	7.20929	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	2	100	50	0.32083	6.90587	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	3	50	54	0.35000	7.48619	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	4	100	50	0.32083	6.76384	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	5	50	54	0.35000	6.88042	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	6	33	56	0.35972	6.82354	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	7	66	53	0.34085	7.41592	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	8	52	54	0.34893	6.98645	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	9	61	53	0.34435	7.23898	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	10	50	54	0.35000	6.86856	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
20	11	0	59	0.37858	7.06105	29	58	100	50	100	50	33	66	52	61	50	0
21	0	100	44	0.35933	7.19145	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	1	45	49	0.34907	7.55835	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	2	50	49	0.35000	7.25587	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	3	45	49	0.34907	7.83525	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	4	50	49	0.35000	7.11384	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	5	50	49	0.35000	7.23042	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	6	39	50	0.34859	7.17213	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	7	62	48	0.35140	7.76732	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	8	63	48	0.35137	7.33782	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	9	50	49	0.35000	7.58898	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	10	34	50	0.34701	7.21558	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
21	11	0	53	0.34008	7.40113	100	45	50	45	50	50	39	62	63	50	34	0
22	0	50	49	0.35000	7.54145	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	1	44	50	0.34958	7.90793	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	2	14	52	0.34412	7.59999	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	3	50	49	0.35000	8.18525	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	4	50	49	0.35000	7.46384	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	5	50	49	0.35000	7.58042	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	6	50	49	0.35000	7.52213	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	7	37	50	0.34803	8.11535	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	8	59	48	0.35137	7.68918	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	9	35	50	0.34737	7.93635	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	10	50	49	0.35000	7.56558	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
22	11	100	44	0.35933	7.76047	50	44	14	50	50	50	50	37	59	35	50	100
23	0	2	56	0.36008	7.90153	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	1	47	52	0.35067	8.25860	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	2	73	50	0.34383	7.94382	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	3	50	52	0.35000	8.53525	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	4	40	53	0.35268	7.81652	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	5	50	52	0.35000	7.93042	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	6	61	51	0.34718	7.86931	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	7	40	53	0.35268	8.46803	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	8	57	51	0.34853	8.03771	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	9	50	52	0.35000	8.28635	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	10	50	52	0.35000	7.91558	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
23	11	100	47	0.34008	8.10055	2	47	73	50	40	50	61	40	57	50	50	100
24	0	100	49	0.32725	8.22878	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	1	49	54	0.35050	8.60910	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	2	36	55	0.35670	8.30052	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	3	50	54	0.35000	8.88525	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	4	61	53	0.34435	8.16088	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	5	100	49	0.32725	8.25767	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	6	28	56	0.36129	8.23060	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	7	67	52	0.34226	8.81029	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	8	49	54	0.35050	8.38822	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	9	50	54	0.35000	8.63635	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	10	50	54	0.35000	8.26558	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
24	11	0	58	0.37217	8.47272	100	49	36	50	61	100	28	67	49	50	50	0
25	0	29	50	0.34485	8.57363	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	1	47	48	0.34912	8.95823	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	2	58	47	0.35233	8.65285	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	3	50	48	0.35000	9.23525	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	4	100	43	0.36575	8.52663	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	5	50	48	0.35000	8.60767	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	6	34	49	0.34496	8.57556	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	7	44	48	0.34804	9.15833	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	8	53	47	0.35105	8.73927	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	9	55	47	0.35163	8.98799	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	10	55	47	0.35163	8.61721	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
25	11	0	52	0.33367	8.80638	29	47	58	50	100	50	34	44	53	55	55	0
26	0	0	51	0.32725	8.90088	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	1	50	46	0.35000	9.30823	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	2	35	48	0.34352	8.99638	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	3	50	46	0.35000	9.58525	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	4	0	51	0.32725	8.85388	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	5	50	46	0.35000	8.95767	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	6	50	46	0.35000	8.92556	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	7	28	48	0.33871	9.49704	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	8	87	43	0.36727	9.10653	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100

Table XXXIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
26	9	59	45	0.35483	9.34282	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	10	50	46	0.35000	8.96721	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
26	11	100	42	0.37217	9.17855	0	50	35	50	0	50	50	28	87	59	50	100
27	0	0	52	0.33367	9.23455	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	1	54	47	0.35135	9.65958	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	2	35	49	0.34545	9.34183	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	3	50	47	0.35000	9.93525	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	4	0	52	0.33367	9.18754	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	5	50	47	0.35000	9.30767	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	6	27	50	0.34383	9.26939	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	7	50	47	0.35000	9.84704	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	8	87	44	0.36252	9.46905	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	9	60	47	0.35268	9.69550	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	10	59	47	0.35252	9.31973	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
27	11	100	43	0.36575	9.54430	0	54	35	50	0	50	27	50	87	60	59	100
28	0	35	61	0.36855	9.60310	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	1	55	59	0.34393	10.00351	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	2	45	60	0.35613	9.69795	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	3	50	60	0.35000	10.28525	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	4	100	55	0.28875	9.47629	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	5	50	60	0.35000	9.65767	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	6	23	62	0.38308	9.65246	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	7	42	60	0.35952	10.20656	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	8	92	56	0.29708	9.76613	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	9	63	58	0.33468	10.03018	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	10	51	60	0.34870	9.66843	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
28	11	100	55	0.28875	9.83305	35	55	45	50	100	50	23	42	92	63	51	100
29	0	6	48	0.31612	9.91922	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	1	50	44	0.35000	10.35351	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	2	6	48	0.31612	10.01407	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	3	50	44	0.35000	10.63525	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	4	100	39	0.39142	9.86771	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	5	0	48	0.30800	9.96567	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	6	100	39	0.39142	10.04388	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	7	62	43	0.35910	10.56566	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	8	52	44	0.35149	10.11762	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	9	56	43	0.35497	10.38515	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	10	50	44	0.35000	10.01843	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
29	11	0	48	0.30800	10.14105	6	50	6	50	100	0	100	62	52	56	50	0
30	0	46	54	0.35187	10.27109	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	1	54	53	0.34827	10.70179	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	2	28	55	0.35847	10.37254	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	3	50	53	0.35000	10.98525	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	4	0	58	0.37217	10.23988	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	5	20	56	0.36260	10.32827	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	6	49	53	0.35037	10.39425	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	7	64	52	0.34412	10.90978	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	8	87	50	0.33403	10.45165	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	9	60	52	0.34627	10.73142	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	10	77	51	0.33803	10.35646	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
30	11	100	49	0.32725	10.46830	46	54	28	50	0	20	49	64	87	60	77	100
31	0	100	48	0.33367	10.60475	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	1	48	53	0.35072	11.05251	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	2	71	51	0.34216	10.71470	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	3	50	52	0.35000	11.33525	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	4	50	52	0.35000	10.58988	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	5	50	52	0.35000	10.67827	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	6	50	52	0.35000	10.74425	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	7	59	52	0.34674	11.25653	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	8	48	53	0.35072	10.80238	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	9	51	52	0.34973	11.08115	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	10	50	52	0.35000	10.70646	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
31	11	0	57	0.36575	10.83405	100	48	71	50	50	50	50	59	48	51	50	0
32	0	100	43	0.36575	10.97050	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	1	48	48	0.34944	11.40195	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	2	30	50	0.34533	11.06003	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	3	50	48	0.35000	11.68525	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	4	100	43	0.36575	10.95563	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	5	20	51	0.34335	11.02162	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	6	45	48	0.34842	11.09268	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	7	34	49	0.34496	11.60149	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	8	48	48	0.34944	11.15182	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	9	50	48	0.35000	11.43115	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	10	51	48	0.35025	11.05671	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
32	11	0	52	0.33367	11.16772	100	48	30	50	100	20	45	34	48	50	51	0
33	0	100	48	0.33367	11.30417	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	1	50	52	0.35000	11.75195	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	2	56	52	0.34804	11.40807	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	3	52	52	0.34944	12.03469	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	4	0	57	0.36575	11.32138	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	5	50	52	0.35000	11.37162	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	6	50	52	0.35000	11.44268	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	7	56	52	0.34804	11.94953	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	8	7	56	0.36154	11.51335	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	9	54	52	0.34879	11.77994	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100

Table XXXIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
33	10	48	52	0.35047	11.40718	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
33	11	100	48	0.33367	11.50138	100	50	56	52	0	50	50	56	7	54	48	100
34	0	31	62	0.37505	11.67922	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	1	49	60	0.35127	12.10322	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	2	50	60	0.35000	11.75807	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	3	50	60	0.35000	12.38469	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	4	82	57	0.30931	11.63068	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	5	50	60	0.35000	11.72162	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	6	61	59	0.33588	11.77856	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	7	45	60	0.35613	12.30565	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	8	88	56	0.30389	11.81725	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	9	50	60	0.35000	12.12994	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	10	52	60	0.34739	11.75456	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
34	11	100	55	0.28875	11.79013	31	49	50	50	82	50	61	45	88	50	52	100
35	0	15	39	0.28630	11.96552	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	1	44	36	0.33880	12.44202	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	2	17	39	0.29071	12.04878	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	3	52	35	0.35380	12.73850	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	4	80	33	0.40495	12.03564	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	5	50	36	0.35000	12.07162	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	6	0	40	0.25667	12.03523	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	7	38	37	0.32830	12.63395	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	8	50	36	0.35000	12.16725	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	9	40	36	0.33087	12.46080	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	10	55	35	0.35933	12.11390	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
35	11	0	40	0.25667	12.04680	15	44	17	52	80	50	0	38	50	40	55	0
36	0	100	48	0.33367	12.29918	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	1	52	52	0.34944	12.79146	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	2	95	48	0.33792	12.38671	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	3	27	54	0.35564	13.09413	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	4	100	48	0.33367	12.36930	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	5	0	57	0.36575	12.43737	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	6	50	52	0.35000	12.38523	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	7	59	51	0.34790	12.98185	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	8	48	52	0.35047	12.51771	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	9	55	52	0.34842	12.80923	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	10	38	53	0.35294	12.46684	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
36	11	0	57	0.36575	12.41255	100	52	95	27	100	0	50	59	48	55	38	0
37	0	50	55	0.35000	12.64918	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	1	50	55	0.35000	13.14146	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	2	42	55	0.35439	12.74110	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	3	50	55	0.35000	13.44413	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	4	50	55	0.35000	12.71930	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	5	100	50	0.32083	12.75820	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	6	50	55	0.35000	12.73523	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	7	58	54	0.34515	13.32700	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	8	54	54	0.34776	12.86547	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	9	45	55	0.35292	13.16215	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	10	53	54	0.34835	12.81519	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
37	11	50	55	0.35000	12.76255	50	50	42	50	50	100	50	58	54	45	53	50
38	0	100	49	0.32725	12.97643	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	1	45	54	0.35228	13.49374	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	2	3	58	0.37248	13.11358	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	3	50	54	0.35000	13.79413	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	4	100	49	0.32725	13.04655	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	5	50	54	0.35000	13.10820	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	6	61	53	0.34435	13.07958	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	7	50	54	0.35000	13.67700	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	8	48	54	0.35098	13.21645	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	9	40	54	0.35397	13.51611	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	10	36	55	0.35670	13.17189	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
38	11	56	53	0.34727	13.10982	100	45	3	50	100	50	61	50	48	40	36	56
39	0	100	60	0.25667	13.23310	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	1	49	64	0.35179	13.84552	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	2	86	61	0.28406	13.39764	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	3	50	64	0.35000	14.14413	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	4	50	64	0.35000	13.39655	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	5	50	64	0.35000	13.45820	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	6	50	64	0.35000	13.42958	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	7	50	64	0.35000	14.02700	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	8	87	61	0.28180	13.49825	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	9	40	65	0.36808	13.88420	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	10	50	64	0.35000	13.52189	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
39	11	96	60	0.26628	13.37610	100	49	86	50	50	50	50	50	87	40	50	96
40	0	100	64	0.23100	13.46410	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	1	55	69	0.33752	14.18304	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	2	9	73	0.45141	13.84904	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	3	71	67	0.29904	14.44317	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	4	100	64	0.23100	13.62755	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	5	100	64	0.23100	13.68920	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	6	100	64	0.23100	13.66058	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	7	6	73	0.45729	14.48428	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	8	50	69	0.35000	13.84825	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	9	33	71	0.39244	14.27664	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
40	10	85	66	0.26384	13.78573	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100

Table XXXIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
40	11	100	64	0.23100	13.60710	100	55	9	71	100	100	100	6	50	33	85	100
41	0	100	45	0.35292	13.81702	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	1	44	50	0.34958	14.53262	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	2	2	54	0.34776	14.19680	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	3	50	49	0.35000	14.79317	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	4	100	45	0.35292	13.98047	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	5	0	54	0.34650	14.03570	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	6	50	49	0.35000	14.01058	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	7	9	53	0.34617	14.83046	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	8	61	48	0.35141	14.19966	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	9	27	52	0.34973	14.62637	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	10	51	49	0.35012	14.13585	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
41	11	100	45	0.35292	13.96002	100	44	2	50	100	0	50	9	61	27	51	100
42	0	100	41	0.37858	14.19560	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	1	51	46	0.35050	14.88312	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	2	88	42	0.37217	14.56897	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	3	50	46	0.35000	15.14317	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	4	26	48	0.33712	14.31759	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	5	50	46	0.35000	14.38570	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	6	0	50	0.32083	14.33141	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	7	10	49	0.32620	15.15666	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	8	55	45	0.35292	14.55258	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	9	50	46	0.35000	14.97637	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	10	72	44	0.36129	14.49714	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
42	11	0	50	0.32083	14.28085	100	51	88	50	26	50	0	10	55	50	72	0
43	0	100	38	0.39783	14.59343	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	1	50	42	0.35000	15.23312	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	2	25	45	0.32667	14.89564	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	3	50	42	0.35000	15.49317	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	4	20	45	0.32025	14.63784	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	5	0	47	0.30158	14.68728	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	6	100	38	0.39783	14.72925	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	7	10	46	0.31080	15.46746	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	8	55	42	0.35484	14.90742	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	9	55	42	0.35484	15.33121	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	10	50	42	0.35000	14.84714	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
43	11	0	47	0.30158	14.58243	100	50	25	50	20	0	100	10	55	55	50	0
44	0	100	45	0.35292	14.94635	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	1	50	50	0.35000	15.58312	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	2	67	48	0.35099	15.24663	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	3	50	50	0.35000	15.84317	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	4	20	53	0.35105	14.98889	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	5	50	50	0.35000	15.03728	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	6	0	55	0.35292	15.08216	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	7	89	46	0.35228	15.81973	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	8	49	50	0.34999	15.25741	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	9	60	49	0.35012	15.68133	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	10	65	49	0.34930	15.19644	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
44	11	0	55	0.35292	14.93535	100	50	67	50	20	50	0	89	49	60	65	0
45	0	72	49	0.34718	15.29353	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	1	48	51	0.35021	15.93333	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	2	50	51	0.35000	15.59663	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	3	50	51	0.35000	16.19317	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	4	50	51	0.35000	15.33889	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	5	50	51	0.35000	15.38728	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	6	50	51	0.35000	15.43216	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	7	82	48	0.34627	16.16600	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	8	57	51	0.34853	15.60594	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	9	55	51	0.34907	16.03040	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	10	50	51	0.35000	15.54644	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
45	11	0	56	0.35933	15.29468	72	48	50	50	50	50	50	82	57	55	50	0
46	0	0	48	0.30800	15.60153	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	1	47	43	0.34720	16.28053	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	2	13	46	0.31503	15.91166	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	3	50	43	0.35000	16.54317	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	4	50	43	0.35000	15.68889	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	5	50	43	0.35000	15.73728	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	6	61	42	0.35988	15.79204	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	7	76	41	0.37214	16.53814	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	8	41	44	0.34212	15.94806	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	9	50	43	0.35000	16.38040	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	10	50	43	0.35000	15.89644	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
46	11	35	44	0.33582	15.63051	0	47	13	50	50	50	61	76	41	50	50	35
47	0	100	49	0.32725	15.92878	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	1	50	54	0.35000	16.63053	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	2	78	51	0.33726	16.24892	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	3	50	54	0.35000	16.89317	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	4	0	58	0.37217	16.06105	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	5	50	54	0.35000	16.08728	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	6	50	54	0.35000	16.14204	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	7	93	50	0.32843	16.86657	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	8	50	54	0.35000	16.29806	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	9	45	54	0.35228	16.73267	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	10	50	54	0.35000	16.24644	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24
47	11	24	56	0.36213	15.99264	100	50	78	50	0	50	50	93	50	45	50	24

Table XXXIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
48	0	100	35	0.41708	16.34586	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	1	49	40	0.34870	16.97923	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	2	3	44	0.28804	16.53696	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	3	50	40	0.35000	17.24317	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	4	81	37	0.39051	16.45156	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	5	0	44	0.28233	16.36961	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	6	0	44	0.28233	16.42438	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	7	64	38	0.36927	17.23584	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	8	49	40	0.34870	16.64677	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	9	39	41	0.33588	17.06855	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	10	50	40	0.35000	16.59644	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
48	11	0	44	0.28233	16.27497	100	49	3	50	81	0	0	64	49	39	50	0
49	0	100	45	0.35292	16.69878	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	1	50	49	0.35000	17.32923	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	2	3	54	0.34835	16.88532	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	3	50	49	0.35000	17.59317	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	4	22	52	0.34804	16.79960	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	5	50	49	0.35000	16.71961	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	6	50	49	0.35000	16.77438	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	7	92	46	0.35098	17.58682	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	8	49	50	0.34999	16.99676	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	9	50	49	0.35000	17.41855	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	10	78	47	0.35163	16.94807	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0
49	11	0	54	0.34650	16.62147	100	50	3	50	22	50	50	92	49	50	78	0

Table XL.: Data from experiments: 12 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 5

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
0	0	76	36	0.38883	0.38883	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	1	38	39	0.33138	0.33138	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	2	0	43	0.27592	0.27592	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	3	52	38	0.35303	0.35303	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	4	10	42	0.29027	0.29027	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	5	50	38	0.35000	0.35000	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	6	100	34	0.42350	0.42350	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	7	50	38	0.35000	0.35000	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	8	2	43	0.28000	0.28000	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	9	76	36	0.38883	0.38883	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	10	17	41	0.29918	0.29918	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
0	11	0	43	0.27592	0.27592	76	38	0	52	10	50	100	50	2	76	17	0
1	0	86	36	0.39956	0.78839	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	1	24	41	0.31208	0.64346	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	2	50	39	0.35000	0.62592	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	3	53	39	0.35413	0.70716	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	4	13	42	0.29604	0.58631	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	5	70	37	0.37870	0.72870	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	6	36	40	0.32975	0.75325	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	7	5	43	0.28595	0.63595	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	8	43	40	0.34044	0.62044	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	9	79	36	0.39229	0.78112	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	10	19	42	0.30696	0.60614	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
1	11	0	43	0.27592	0.55183	86	24	50	53	13	70	36	5	43	79	19	0
2	0	100	76	0.15400	0.94239	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	1	85	77	0.21443	0.85790	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	2	100	76	0.15400	0.77992	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	3	61	79	0.30765	1.01481	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	4	100	76	0.15400	0.74031	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	5	80	78	0.23170	0.96040	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	6	43	81	0.37728	1.13052	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	7	60	79	0.31162	0.94757	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	8	97	76	0.16740	0.78785	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	9	100	76	0.15400	0.93512	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	10	88	77	0.20148	0.80762	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
2	11	20	83	0.46655	1.01838	100	85	100	61	100	80	43	60	97	100	88	20
3	0	0	33	0.21175	1.15414	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	1	50	28	0.35000	1.20790	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	2	0	33	0.21175	0.99167	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	3	11	32	0.24216	1.25698	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	4	10	32	0.23893	0.97924	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	5	60	27	0.37835	1.33875	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	6	100	24	0.48767	1.61819	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	7	30	30	0.29400	1.24157	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	8	35	29	0.30695	1.09480	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	9	23	31	0.27566	1.21078	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
3	10	16	31	0.25361	1.06123	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24

Table XL.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
3	11	24	30	0.27538	1.29376	0	50	0	11	10	60	100	30	35	23	16	24
4	0	28	45	0.33024	1.48437	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	1	11	47	0.31724	1.52514	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	2	50	43	0.35000	1.34167	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	3	50	43	0.35000	1.60698	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	4	10	47	0.31593	1.29517	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	5	28	45	0.33024	1.66899	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	6	100	39	0.39142	2.00961	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	7	50	43	0.35000	1.59157	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	8	30	45	0.33250	1.42730	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	9	55	43	0.35420	1.56498	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	10	15	47	0.32223	1.38347	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
4	11	100	39	0.39142	1.68518	28	11	50	50	10	28	100	50	30	55	15	100
5	0	70	48	0.35047	1.83484	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	1	32	51	0.34853	1.87367	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	2	50	50	0.35000	1.69167	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	3	56	49	0.35035	1.95733	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	4	10	53	0.34673	1.64191	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	5	55	49	0.35035	2.01934	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	6	45	50	0.34971	2.35932	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	7	80	47	0.35105	1.94262	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	8	64	48	0.35131	1.77861	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	9	24	52	0.34879	1.91376	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	10	16	53	0.34960	1.73307	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
5	11	95	46	0.34947	2.03465	70	32	50	56	10	55	45	80	64	24	16	95
6	0	26	53	0.35252	2.18736	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	1	70	49	0.34790	2.22157	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	2	50	50	0.35000	2.04167	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	3	25	53	0.35233	2.30966	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	4	100	46	0.34650	1.98841	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	5	65	49	0.34930	2.36864	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	6	21	53	0.35135	2.71067	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	7	50	50	0.35000	2.29262	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	8	45	51	0.35035	2.12896	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	9	50	50	0.35000	2.26376	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	10	2	55	0.35392	2.08699	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
6	11	100	46	0.34650	2.38115	26	70	50	25	100	65	21	50	45	50	2	100
7	0	46	60	0.35495	2.54231	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	1	70	57	0.32737	2.54893	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	2	50	59	0.35000	2.39167	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	3	100	55	0.28875	2.59841	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	4	100	55	0.28875	2.27716	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	5	50	59	0.35000	2.71864	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	6	76	57	0.31876	3.02943	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	7	50	59	0.35000	2.64262	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	8	62	58	0.33600	2.46496	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	9	50	59	0.35000	2.61376	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	10	48	59	0.35226	2.43925	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
7	11	0	64	0.41067	2.79182	46	70	50	100	100	50	76	50	62	50	48	0
8	0	14	41	0.29330	2.83561	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	1	36	39	0.32795	2.87688	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	2	50	37	0.35000	2.74167	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	3	66	36	0.37576	2.97417	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	4	100	33	0.42992	2.70707	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	5	70	35	0.38383	3.10247	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	6	10	41	0.28513	3.31456	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	7	80	35	0.39725	3.03987	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	8	31	39	0.31897	2.78392	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	9	3	42	0.27597	2.88974	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	10	0	42	0.26950	2.70875	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
8	11	0	42	0.26950	3.06132	14	36	50	66	100	70	10	80	31	3	0	0
9	0	74	37	0.38332	3.21893	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	1	21	42	0.31041	3.18730	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	2	50	39	0.35000	3.09167	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	3	81	37	0.39051	3.36468	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	4	0	44	0.28233	2.98941	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	5	30	41	0.32223	3.42470	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	6	26	42	0.31864	3.63320	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	7	40	40	0.33600	3.37587	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	8	40	40	0.33600	3.11992	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	9	21	42	0.31041	3.20015	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	10	100	35	0.41708	3.12584	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
9	11	0	44	0.28233	3.34365	74	21	50	81	0	30	26	40	40	21	100	0
10	0	100	29	0.45558	3.67451	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	1	1	38	0.24653	3.43383	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	2	0	38	0.24383	3.33550	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	3	26	36	0.30016	3.66484	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	4	5	38	0.25707	3.24648	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	5	50	34	0.35000	3.77470	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	6	42	34	0.33283	3.96603	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	7	50	34	0.35000	3.72587	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	8	30	35	0.30683	3.42676	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	9	16	37	0.27979	3.47994	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	10	100	29	0.45558	3.58142	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0
10	11	0	38	0.24383	3.58749	100	1	0	26	5	50	42	50	30	16	100	0

Table XL.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
11	0	75	67	0.28817	3.96268	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	1	99	65	0.22766	3.66149	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	2	0	74	0.47483	3.81033	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	3	100	65	0.22458	3.88942	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	4	50	70	0.35000	3.59648	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	5	1	74	0.47291	4.24761	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	6	60	69	0.32445	4.29048	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	7	50	70	0.35000	4.07587	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	8	93	66	0.24013	3.66689	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	9	90	66	0.24920	3.72914	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	10	100	65	0.22458	3.80600	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
11	11	99	65	0.22766	3.81515	75	99	0	100	50	1	60	50	93	90	100	99
12	0	0	53	0.34008	4.30276	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	1	62	47	0.35294	4.01443	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	2	100	44	0.35933	4.16967	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	3	50	49	0.35000	4.23942	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	4	100	44	0.35933	3.95581	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	5	50	49	0.35000	4.59761	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	6	19	51	0.34277	4.63324	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	7	100	44	0.35933	4.43520	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	8	75	46	0.35554	4.02243	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	9	23	51	0.34496	4.07410	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	10	1	53	0.34085	4.14686	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
12	11	4	53	0.34302	4.15817	0	62	100	50	100	50	19	100	75	23	1	4
13	0	0	44	0.28233	4.58509	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	1	62	39	0.36526	4.37969	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	2	50	40	0.35000	4.51967	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	3	50	40	0.35000	4.58942	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	4	0	44	0.28233	4.23815	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	5	80	37	0.38955	4.98716	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	6	29	42	0.32329	4.95654	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	7	90	36	0.40320	4.83840	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	8	69	38	0.37505	4.39748	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	9	45	40	0.34329	4.41740	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	10	11	43	0.29722	4.44408	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
13	11	2	44	0.28616	4.44433	0	62	50	50	0	80	29	90	69	45	11	2
14	0	86	62	0.27944	4.86453	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	1	62	64	0.32676	4.70645	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	2	100	61	0.25025	4.76992	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	3	100	61	0.25025	4.83967	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	4	20	68	0.40880	4.64695	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	5	45	66	0.35998	5.34714	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	6	64	64	0.32256	5.27910	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	7	50	65	0.35000	5.18840	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	8	81	62	0.29105	4.68853	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	9	40	66	0.36937	4.78676	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	10	100	61	0.25025	4.69433	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
14	11	19	68	0.41040	4.85473	86	62	100	100	20	45	64	50	81	40	100	19
15	0	34	63	0.37371	5.23824	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	1	62	60	0.33292	5.03937	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	2	100	57	0.27592	5.04583	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	3	50	62	0.35000	5.18967	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	4	80	59	0.30485	4.95180	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	5	55	61	0.34265	5.68979	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	6	50	62	0.35000	5.62910	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	7	92	58	0.28630	5.47470	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	8	95	57	0.28595	4.97448	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	9	90	58	0.29027	5.07703	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	10	0	66	0.42350	5.11783	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
15	11	19	64	0.39449	5.24922	34	62	100	50	80	55	50	92	95	90	0	19
16	0	0	65	0.41708	5.65532	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	1	42	61	0.36055	5.39992	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	2	100	56	0.28233	5.32816	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	3	100	56	0.28233	5.47200	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	4	85	57	0.30427	5.25606	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	5	90	57	0.29540	5.98519	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	6	50	60	0.35000	5.97910	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	7	90	57	0.29540	5.77010	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	8	51	60	0.34870	5.32318	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	9	84	57	0.30597	5.38300	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	10	0	65	0.41708	5.53491	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
16	11	20	63	0.38955	5.63877	0	42	100	100	85	90	50	90	51	84	0	20
17	0	36	50	0.34771	6.00304	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	1	32	51	0.34853	5.74845	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	2	100	44	0.35933	5.68750	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	3	55	49	0.35035	5.82235	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	4	89	45	0.35728	5.61334	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	5	50	49	0.35000	6.33519	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	6	50	49	0.35000	6.32910	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	7	50	49	0.35000	6.12010	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	8	20	52	0.34720	5.67038	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	9	90	45	0.35700	5.74000	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	10	0	54	0.34650	5.88141	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
17	11	17	52	0.34576	5.98453	36	32	100	55	89	50	50	50	20	90	0	17
18	0	100	48	0.33367	6.33670	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23

Table XL.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
18	1	70	50	0.34533	6.09378	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	2	100	48	0.33367	6.02116	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	3	36	54	0.35490	6.17725	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	4	18	55	0.35859	5.97193	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	5	63	51	0.34636	6.68155	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	6	60	51	0.34755	6.67665	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	7	30	54	0.35560	6.47570	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	8	50	52	0.35000	6.02038	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	9	75	50	0.34271	6.08271	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	10	0	57	0.36575	6.24716	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
18	11	23	55	0.35882	6.34335	100	70	100	36	18	63	60	30	50	75	0	23
19	0	17	53	0.35000	6.68670	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	1	73	48	0.34973	6.44351	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	2	50	50	0.35000	6.37116	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	3	50	50	0.35000	6.52725	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	4	81	47	0.35072	6.32265	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	5	100	45	0.35292	7.03446	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	6	50	50	0.35000	7.02665	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	7	50	50	0.35000	6.82570	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	8	40	51	0.35012	6.37050	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	9	70	48	0.35047	6.43317	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	10	0	54	0.34650	6.59366	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
19	11	18	53	0.35037	6.69373	17	73	50	50	81	100	50	50	40	70	0	18
20	0	52	48	0.35047	7.03717	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	1	73	47	0.35268	6.79619	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	2	50	49	0.35000	6.72116	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	3	75	46	0.35554	6.88280	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	4	12	52	0.34291	6.66556	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	5	80	46	0.35490	7.38936	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	6	50	49	0.35000	7.37665	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	7	80	46	0.35490	7.18060	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	8	53	48	0.35067	6.72116	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	9	28	51	0.34718	6.78035	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	10	0	53	0.34008	6.93374	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
20	11	32	50	0.34622	7.03995	52	73	50	75	12	80	50	80	53	28	0	32
21	0	40	52	0.35140	7.38857	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	1	73	49	0.34678	7.14297	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	2	50	51	0.35000	7.07116	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	3	55	51	0.34907	7.23186	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	4	14	55	0.35798	7.02354	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	5	90	48	0.34160	7.73096	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	6	55	51	0.34907	7.72571	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	7	85	48	0.34469	7.52529	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	8	72	49	0.34718	7.06834	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	9	50	51	0.35000	7.13035	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	10	0	56	0.35933	7.29308	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
21	11	30	53	0.35303	7.39298	40	73	50	55	14	90	55	85	72	50	0	30
22	0	62	44	0.35756	7.74613	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	1	71	43	0.36372	7.50669	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	2	50	45	0.35000	7.42116	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	3	45	46	0.34714	7.57900	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	4	20	48	0.33180	7.35534	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	5	100	41	0.37858	8.10955	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	6	32	47	0.33929	8.06500	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	7	10	49	0.32620	7.85149	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	8	84	42	0.37142	7.43976	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	9	45	46	0.34714	7.47749	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	10	0	50	0.32083	7.61391	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
22	11	29	47	0.33677	7.72975	62	71	50	45	20	100	32	10	84	45	0	29
23	0	26	48	0.33712	8.08325	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	1	71	44	0.36103	7.86772	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	2	50	46	0.35000	7.77116	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	3	56	46	0.35266	7.93166	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	4	81	43	0.36664	7.72198	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	5	50	46	0.35000	8.45955	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	6	50	46	0.35000	8.41500	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	7	10	50	0.33133	8.18282	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	8	81	43	0.36664	7.80640	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	9	33	48	0.34226	7.81976	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	10	0	51	0.32725	7.94116	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
23	11	50	46	0.35000	8.07975	26	71	50	56	81	50	50	10	81	33	0	50
24	0	39	49	0.34718	8.43043	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	1	71	46	0.35564	8.22335	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	2	50	48	0.35000	8.12116	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	3	34	50	0.34701	8.27868	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	4	12	52	0.34291	8.06488	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	5	40	49	0.34755	8.80710	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	6	50	48	0.35000	8.76500	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	7	50	48	0.35000	8.53282	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	8	95	44	0.36103	8.16742	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	9	55	48	0.35099	8.17075	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	10	34	50	0.34701	8.28817	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
24	11	50	48	0.35000	8.42975	39	71	50	34	12	40	50	50	95	55	34	50
25	0	40	60	0.36167	8.79209	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	1	29	61	0.37450	8.59785	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81

Table XL.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
25	2	50	59	0.35000	8.47116	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	3	50	59	0.35000	8.62868	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	4	97	55	0.29407	8.35895	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	5	50	59	0.35000	9.15710	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	6	50	59	0.35000	9.11500	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	7	50	59	0.35000	8.88282	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	8	100	55	0.28875	8.45617	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	9	63	58	0.33468	8.50543	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	10	42	60	0.35952	8.64769	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
25	11	81	56	0.31492	8.74467	40	29	50	50	97	50	50	50	100	63	42	81
26	0	0	37	0.23742	9.02951	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	1	27	35	0.29955	8.89741	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	2	50	33	0.35000	8.82116	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	3	0	37	0.23742	8.86609	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	4	73	31	0.39991	8.75886	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	5	1	37	0.24024	9.39734	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	6	50	33	0.35000	9.46500	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	7	60	32	0.37193	9.25476	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	8	65	31	0.38395	8.84012	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	9	33	34	0.31172	8.81715	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	10	0	37	0.23742	8.88511	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
26	11	50	33	0.35000	9.09467	0	27	50	0	73	1	50	60	65	33	0	50
27	0	30	67	0.38897	9.41848	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	1	29	67	0.39067	9.28808	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	2	50	66	0.35000	9.17116	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	3	50	66	0.35000	9.21609	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	4	96	61	0.26038	9.01924	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	5	59	65	0.33173	9.72907	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	6	50	66	0.35000	9.81500	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	7	90	62	0.26973	9.52449	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	8	100	61	0.25025	9.09037	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	9	25	68	0.40046	9.21761	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	10	100	61	0.25025	9.13536	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
27	11	92	62	0.26474	9.35941	30	29	50	50	96	59	50	90	100	25	100	92
28	0	0	52	0.33367	9.75214	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	1	29	49	0.34216	9.63024	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	2	50	47	0.35000	9.52116	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	3	66	46	0.35523	9.57132	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	4	84	44	0.36269	9.38193	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	5	65	46	0.35508	10.08414	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	6	50	47	0.35000	10.16500	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	7	50	47	0.35000	9.87449	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	8	100	42	0.37217	9.46254	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	9	23	49	0.33803	9.55564	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	10	0	52	0.33367	9.46903	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
28	11	50	47	0.35000	9.70941	0	29	50	66	84	65	50	50	100	23	0	50
29	0	0	46	0.29517	10.04731	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	1	25	44	0.32346	9.95370	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	2	50	42	0.35000	9.87116	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	3	46	42	0.34571	9.91703	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	4	16	45	0.31470	9.69663	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	5	50	42	0.35000	10.43414	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	6	50	42	0.35000	10.51500	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	7	50	42	0.35000	10.22449	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	8	100	37	0.40425	9.86679	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	9	72	40	0.37259	9.92823	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	10	0	46	0.29517	9.76419	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
29	11	50	42	0.35000	10.05941	0	25	50	46	16	50	50	50	100	72	0	50
30	0	28	53	0.35282	10.40013	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	1	50	51	0.35000	10.30370	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	2	50	51	0.35000	10.22116	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	3	0	55	0.35292	10.26994	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	4	50	51	0.35000	10.04663	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	5	60	50	0.34883	10.78297	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	6	50	51	0.35000	10.86500	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	7	50	51	0.35000	10.57449	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	8	100	46	0.34650	10.21329	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	9	69	49	0.34823	10.27645	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	10	100	46	0.34650	10.11069	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
30	11	0	55	0.35292	10.41232	28	50	50	0	50	60	50	50	100	69	100	0
31	0	67	53	0.34008	10.74022	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	1	29	57	0.36372	10.66742	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	2	50	55	0.35000	10.57116	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	3	60	54	0.34370	10.61364	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	4	25	57	0.36517	10.41180	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	5	80	52	0.33180	11.11477	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	6	50	55	0.35000	11.21500	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	7	50	55	0.35000	10.92449	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	8	100	50	0.32083	10.53412	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	9	40	56	0.35653	10.63299	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	10	100	50	0.32083	10.43153	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
31	11	0	59	0.37858	10.79091	67	29	50	60	25	80	50	50	100	40	100	0
32	0	100	42	0.37217	11.11238	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	1	71	45	0.35833	11.02575	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	2	50	47	0.35000	10.92116	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0

Table XL.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
32	3	50	47	0.35000	10.96364	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	4	0	51	0.32725	10.73905	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	5	80	44	0.36260	11.47737	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	6	50	47	0.35000	11.56500	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	7	50	47	0.35000	11.27449	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	8	100	42	0.37217	10.90629	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	9	12	50	0.33315	10.96614	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	10	0	51	0.32725	10.75878	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
32	11	0	51	0.32725	11.11816	100	71	50	50	0	80	50	50	100	12	0	0
33	0	100	50	0.32083	11.43322	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	1	74	52	0.33712	11.36287	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	2	50	54	0.35000	11.27116	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	3	50	54	0.35000	11.31364	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	4	34	56	0.35933	11.09838	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	5	90	51	0.32620	11.80357	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	6	50	54	0.35000	11.91500	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	7	50	54	0.35000	11.62449	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	8	100	50	0.32083	11.22712	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	9	50	54	0.35000	11.31614	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	10	0	59	0.37858	11.13736	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
33	11	0	59	0.37858	11.49674	100	74	50	50	34	90	50	50	100	50	0	0
34	0	53	42	0.35298	11.78619	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	1	40	43	0.33985	11.70272	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	2	50	42	0.35000	11.62116	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	3	45	43	0.34522	11.65886	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	4	16	45	0.31470	11.41308	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	5	50	42	0.35000	12.15357	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	6	50	42	0.35000	12.26500	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	7	50	42	0.35000	11.97449	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	8	100	38	0.39783	11.62496	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	9	60	41	0.36038	11.67652	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	10	0	47	0.30158	11.43894	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
34	11	0	47	0.30158	11.79832	53	40	50	45	16	50	50	50	100	60	0	0
35	0	43	48	0.34763	12.13382	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	1	43	48	0.34763	12.05035	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	2	50	47	0.35000	11.97116	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	3	50	47	0.35000	12.00886	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	4	17	50	0.33729	11.75037	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	5	30	49	0.34277	12.49634	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	6	50	47	0.35000	12.61500	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	7	50	47	0.35000	12.32449	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	8	93	43	0.36706	11.99201	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	9	40	48	0.34627	12.02279	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	10	0	51	0.32725	11.76619	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
35	11	100	42	0.37217	12.17049	43	43	50	50	17	30	50	50	93	40	0	100
36	0	100	50	0.32083	12.45466	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	1	10	58	0.37240	12.42275	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	2	50	54	0.35000	12.32116	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	3	59	54	0.34443	12.35329	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	4	35	56	0.35893	12.10930	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	5	40	55	0.35525	12.85159	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	6	50	54	0.35000	12.96500	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	7	50	54	0.35000	12.67449	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	8	95	50	0.32637	12.31839	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	9	60	54	0.34370	12.36649	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	10	0	59	0.37858	12.14478	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
36	11	100	50	0.32083	12.49132	100	10	50	59	35	40	50	50	95	60	0	100
37	0	21	52	0.34763	12.80229	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	1	85	46	0.35368	12.77642	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	2	50	50	0.35000	12.67116	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	3	44	50	0.34958	12.70287	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	4	85	46	0.35368	12.46297	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	5	70	48	0.35047	13.20206	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	6	50	50	0.35000	13.31500	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	7	50	50	0.35000	13.02449	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	8	100	45	0.35292	12.67130	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	9	40	50	0.34883	12.71532	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	10	0	54	0.34650	12.49128	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
37	11	0	54	0.34650	12.83782	21	85	50	44	85	70	50	50	100	40	0	0
38	0	50	45	0.35000	13.15229	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	1	85	42	0.37164	13.14806	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	2	50	45	0.35000	13.02116	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	3	78	43	0.36601	13.06888	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	4	37	47	0.34302	12.80600	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	5	50	45	0.35000	13.55206	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	6	50	45	0.35000	13.66500	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	7	50	45	0.35000	13.37449	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	8	39	46	0.34294	13.01425	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	9	60	44	0.35653	13.07186	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	10	0	50	0.32083	12.81211	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
38	11	0	50	0.32083	13.15866	50	85	50	78	37	50	50	50	39	60	0	0
39	0	61	44	0.35706	13.50935	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	1	62	44	0.35756	13.50562	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	2	50	45	0.35000	13.37116	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	3	28	47	0.33588	13.40476	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50

Table XL.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
39	4	88	41	0.37704	13.18304	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	5	64	44	0.35849	13.91055	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	6	50	45	0.35000	14.01500	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	7	50	45	0.35000	13.72449	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	8	0	49	0.31442	13.32866	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	9	40	46	0.34370	13.41556	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	10	0	49	0.31442	13.12653	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
39	11	50	45	0.35000	13.50866	61	62	50	28	88	64	50	50	0	40	0	50
40	0	91	52	0.31986	13.82921	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	1	8	60	0.38332	13.88894	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	2	50	56	0.35000	13.72116	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	3	64	55	0.33873	13.74349	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	4	83	53	0.32459	13.50763	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	5	80	53	0.32795	14.23850	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	6	50	56	0.35000	14.36500	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	7	50	56	0.35000	14.07449	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	8	0	61	0.39142	13.72008	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	9	60	55	0.34242	13.75797	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	10	32	58	0.36470	13.49123	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
40	11	100	52	0.30800	13.81666	91	8	50	64	83	80	50	50	0	60	32	100
41	0	50	34	0.35000	14.17921	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	1	29	36	0.30712	14.19607	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	2	50	34	0.35000	14.07116	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	3	61	33	0.37259	14.11608	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	4	38	35	0.32522	13.83285	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	5	40	35	0.32958	14.56808	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	6	50	34	0.35000	14.71500	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	7	50	34	0.35000	14.42449	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	8	0	39	0.25025	13.97033	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	9	9	38	0.26725	14.02522	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	10	0	39	0.25025	13.74148	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
41	11	50	34	0.35000	14.16666	50	29	50	61	38	40	50	50	0	9	0	50
42	0	100	41	0.37858	14.55779	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	1	25	48	0.33629	14.53236	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	2	50	46	0.35000	14.42116	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	3	33	48	0.34226	14.45835	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	4	23	48	0.33456	14.16741	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	5	10	50	0.33133	14.89942	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	6	50	46	0.35000	15.06500	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	7	50	46	0.35000	14.77449	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	8	0	51	0.32725	14.29758	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	9	15	49	0.33122	14.35644	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	10	100	41	0.37858	14.12006	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
42	11	100	41	0.37858	14.54524	100	25	50	33	23	10	50	50	0	15	100	100
43	0	0	51	0.32725	14.88504	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	1	28	49	0.34153	14.87389	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	2	50	47	0.35000	14.77116	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	3	13	50	0.33403	14.79237	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	4	72	45	0.35847	14.52588	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	5	50	47	0.35000	15.24942	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	6	50	47	0.35000	15.41500	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	7	50	47	0.35000	15.12449	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	8	0	51	0.32725	14.62483	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	9	50	47	0.35000	14.70644	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	10	100	42	0.37217	14.49223	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
43	11	100	42	0.37217	14.91741	0	28	50	13	72	50	50	50	0	50	100	100
44	0	100	60	0.25667	15.14171	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	1	29	67	0.39067	15.26456	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	2	50	65	0.35000	15.12116	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	3	78	62	0.29773	15.09011	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	4	92	61	0.27013	14.79601	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	5	70	63	0.31197	15.56138	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	6	50	65	0.35000	15.76500	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	7	50	65	0.35000	15.47449	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	8	0	69	0.44275	15.06758	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	9	45	65	0.35933	15.06577	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	10	100	60	0.25667	14.74889	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
44	11	100	60	0.25667	15.17407	100	29	50	78	92	70	50	50	0	45	100	100
45	0	0	47	0.30158	15.44329	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	1	68	41	0.36701	15.63157	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	2	50	42	0.35000	15.47116	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	3	100	38	0.39783	15.48794	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	4	17	45	0.31612	15.11213	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	5	80	40	0.37800	15.93938	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	6	50	42	0.35000	16.11500	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	7	50	42	0.35000	15.82449	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	8	20	45	0.32025	15.38783	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	9	80	40	0.37800	15.44377	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	10	0	47	0.30158	15.05048	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
45	11	0	47	0.30158	15.47566	0	68	50	100	17	80	50	50	20	80	0	0
46	0	0	55	0.35292	15.79621	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	1	68	49	0.34853	15.98010	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	2	50	51	0.35000	15.82116	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	3	0	55	0.35292	15.84086	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	4	42	52	0.35131	15.46344	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50

Table XL.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnM	MS	Earn	SubTot	Pl0	Pl1	Pl2	Pl3	Pl4	Pl5	Pl6	Pl7	Pl8	Pl9	Pl10	Pl11
46	5	49	51	0.35012	16.28950	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	6	100	46	0.34650	16.46150	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	7	50	51	0.35000	16.17449	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	8	0	55	0.35292	15.74075	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	9	100	46	0.34650	15.79027	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	10	100	46	0.34650	15.39698	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
46	11	50	51	0.35000	15.82566	0	68	50	0	42	49	100	50	0	100	100	50
47	0	100	53	0.30158	16.09779	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	1	29	59	0.36911	16.34921	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	2	50	57	0.35000	16.17116	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	3	100	53	0.30158	16.14244	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	4	63	56	0.33802	15.80146	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	5	39	58	0.35988	16.64938	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	6	50	57	0.35000	16.81150	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	7	50	57	0.35000	16.52449	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	8	0	62	0.39783	16.13858	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	9	50	57	0.35000	16.14027	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	10	100	53	0.30158	15.69856	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
47	11	50	57	0.35000	16.17566	100	29	50	100	63	39	50	50	0	50	100	50
48	0	100	37	0.40425	16.50204	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	1	29	43	0.32599	16.67520	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	2	50	42	0.35000	16.52116	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	3	0	46	0.29517	16.43761	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	4	51	41	0.35114	16.15260	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	5	51	41	0.35114	17.00053	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	6	50	42	0.35000	17.16150	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	7	50	42	0.35000	16.87449	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	8	0	46	0.29517	16.43375	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	9	55	41	0.35548	16.49575	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	10	71	40	0.37181	16.07036	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
48	11	0	46	0.29517	16.47082	100	29	50	0	51	51	50	50	0	55	71	0
49	0	0	47	0.30158	16.80363	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	1	43	43	0.34314	17.01834	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	2	50	42	0.35000	16.87116	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	3	0	47	0.30158	16.73919	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	4	77	40	0.37615	16.52875	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	5	47	42	0.34681	17.34734	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	6	50	42	0.35000	17.51150	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	7	50	42	0.35000	17.22449	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	8	0	47	0.30158	16.73533	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	9	45	42	0.34457	16.84033	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	10	100	37	0.40425	16.47461	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50
49	11	50	42	0.35000	16.82082	0	43	50	0	77	47	50	50	0	45	100	50

Table XLI.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 1

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	51	54	1.04895	1.04895	51	54
0	1	54	51	1.04580	1.04580	51	54
1	0	50	78	1.05000	2.09895	50	78
1	1	78	50	0.88536	1.93116	50	78
2	0	55	70	1.02375	3.12270	55	70
2	1	70	55	0.94500	2.87616	55	70
3	0	60	66	0.99540	4.11810	60	66
3	1	66	60	0.96264	3.83880	60	66
4	0	100	50	0.52500	4.64310	100	50
4	1	50	100	1.05000	4.88880	100	50
5	0	49	54	1.05063	5.69373	49	54
5	1	54	49	1.04748	5.93628	49	54
6	0	68	54	0.96684	6.66057	68	54
6	1	54	68	1.03152	6.96780	68	54
7	0	45	54	1.04895	7.70952	45	54
7	1	54	45	1.05084	8.01864	45	54
8	0	52	54	1.04748	8.75700	52	54
8	1	54	52	1.04496	9.06360	52	54
9	0	51	58	1.04811	9.80511	51	58
9	1	58	51	1.03488	10.09848	51	58
10	0	53	50	1.04811	10.85322	53	50
10	1	50	53	1.05000	11.14848	53	50
11	0	45	50	1.04475	11.89797	45	50
11	1	50	45	1.05000	12.19848	45	50
12	0	56	50	1.04244	12.94041	56	50
12	1	50	56	1.05000	13.24848	56	50
13	0	50	50	1.05000	13.99041	50	50
13	1	50	50	1.05000	14.29848	50	50

Table XLI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
14	0	48	50	1.04916	15.03957	48	50
14	1	50	48	1.05000	15.34848	48	50
15	0	51	50	1.04979	16.08936	51	50
15	1	50	51	1.05000	16.39848	51	50
16	0	50	50	1.05000	17.13936	50	50
16	1	50	50	1.05000	17.44848	50	50
17	0	53	50	1.04811	18.18747	53	50
17	1	50	53	1.05000	18.49848	53	50
18	0	50	50	1.05000	19.23747	50	50
18	1	50	50	1.05000	19.54848	50	50
19	0	50	50	1.05000	20.28747	50	50
19	1	50	50	1.05000	20.59848	50	50
20	0	50	50	1.05000	21.33747	50	50
20	1	50	50	1.05000	21.64848	50	50
21	0	50	50	1.05000	22.38747	50	50
21	1	50	50	1.05000	22.69848	50	50
22	0	50	50	1.05000	23.43747	50	50
22	1	50	50	1.05000	23.74848	50	50
23	0	50	50	1.05000	24.48747	50	50
23	1	50	50	1.05000	24.79848	50	50
24	0	50	50	1.05000	25.53747	50	50
24	1	50	50	1.05000	25.84848	50	50
25	0	51	50	1.04979	26.58726	51	50
25	1	50	51	1.05000	26.89848	51	50
26	0	50	50	1.05000	27.63726	50	50
26	1	50	50	1.05000	27.94848	50	50
27	0	50	50	1.05000	28.68726	50	50
27	1	50	50	1.05000	28.99848	50	50
28	0	50	50	1.05000	29.73726	50	50
28	1	50	50	1.05000	30.04848	50	50
29	0	50	50	1.05000	30.78726	50	50
29	1	50	50	1.05000	31.09848	50	50
30	0	50	50	1.05000	31.83726	50	50
30	1	50	50	1.05000	32.14848	50	50
31	0	50	50	1.05000	32.88726	50	50
31	1	50	50	1.05000	33.19848	50	50
32	0	50	50	1.05000	33.93726	50	50
32	1	50	50	1.05000	34.24848	50	50
33	0	52	50	1.04916	34.98642	52	50
33	1	50	52	1.05000	35.29848	52	50
34	0	50	50	1.05000	36.03642	50	50
34	1	50	50	1.05000	36.34848	50	50
35	0	49	50	1.04979	37.08621	49	50
35	1	50	49	1.05000	37.39848	49	50
36	0	50	50	1.05000	38.13621	50	50
36	1	50	50	1.05000	38.44848	50	50
37	0	50	50	1.05000	39.18621	50	50
37	1	50	50	1.05000	39.49848	50	50
38	0	51	50	1.04979	40.23600	51	50
38	1	50	51	1.05000	40.54848	51	50
39	0	50	50	1.05000	41.28600	50	50
39	1	50	50	1.05000	41.59848	50	50
40	0	50	50	1.05000	42.33600	50	50
40	1	50	50	1.05000	42.64848	50	50
41	0	50	50	1.05000	43.38600	50	50
41	1	50	50	1.05000	43.69848	50	50
42	0	50	50	1.05000	44.43600	50	50
42	1	50	50	1.05000	44.74848	50	50
43	0	50	50	1.05000	45.48600	50	50
43	1	50	50	1.05000	45.79848	50	50
44	0	50	50	1.05000	46.53600	50	50
44	1	50	50	1.05000	46.84848	50	50
45	0	50	50	1.05000	47.58600	50	50
45	1	50	50	1.05000	47.89848	50	50
46	0	50	50	1.05000	48.63600	50	50
46	1	50	50	1.05000	48.94848	50	50
47	0	50	50	1.05000	49.68600	50	50
47	1	50	50	1.05000	49.99848	50	50
48	0	50	50	1.05000	50.73600	50	50
48	1	50	50	1.05000	51.04848	50	50
49	0	50	50	1.05000	51.78600	50	50
49	1	50	50	1.05000	52.09848	50	50

Table XLII.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 2

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	50	50	1.05000	1.05000	50	50
0	1	50	50	1.05000	1.05000	50	50
1	0	50	41	1.05000	2.10000	50	41
1	1	41	50	1.03299	2.08299	50	41
2	0	50	50	1.05000	3.15000	50	50
2	1	50	50	1.05000	3.13299	50	50
3	0	50	50	1.05000	4.20000	50	50
3	1	50	50	1.05000	4.18299	50	50
4	0	50	50	1.05000	5.25000	50	50
4	1	50	50	1.05000	5.23299	50	50
5	0	50	50	1.05000	6.30000	50	50
5	1	50	50	1.05000	6.28299	50	50
6	0	50	50	1.05000	7.35000	50	50
6	1	50	50	1.05000	7.33299	50	50
7	0	50	50	1.05000	8.40000	50	50
7	1	50	50	1.05000	8.38299	50	50
8	0	50	50	1.05000	9.45000	50	50
8	1	50	50	1.05000	9.43299	50	50
9	0	50	50	1.05000	10.50000	50	50
9	1	50	50	1.05000	10.48299	50	50
10	0	50	50	1.05000	11.55000	50	50
10	1	50	50	1.05000	11.53299	50	50
11	0	50	50	1.05000	12.60000	50	50
11	1	50	50	1.05000	12.58299	50	50
12	0	50	50	1.05000	13.65000	50	50
12	1	50	50	1.05000	13.63299	50	50
13	0	50	50	1.05000	14.70000	50	50
13	1	50	50	1.05000	14.68299	50	50
14	0	50	50	1.05000	15.75000	50	50
14	1	50	50	1.05000	15.73299	50	50
15	0	50	50	1.05000	16.80000	50	50
15	1	50	50	1.05000	16.78299	50	50
16	0	50	50	1.05000	17.85000	50	50
16	1	50	50	1.05000	17.83299	50	50
17	0	50	50	1.05000	18.90000	50	50
17	1	50	50	1.05000	18.88299	50	50
18	0	50	50	1.05000	19.95000	50	50
18	1	50	50	1.05000	19.93299	50	50
19	0	50	50	1.05000	21.00000	50	50
19	1	50	50	1.05000	20.98299	50	50
20	0	50	50	1.05000	22.05000	50	50
20	1	50	50	1.05000	22.03299	50	50
21	0	50	60	1.05000	23.10000	50	60
21	1	60	50	1.02900	23.06199	50	60
22	0	50	60	1.05000	24.15000	50	60
22	1	60	50	1.02900	24.09099	50	60
23	0	50	50	1.05000	25.20000	50	50
23	1	50	50	1.05000	25.14099	50	50
24	0	50	70	1.05000	26.25000	50	70
24	1	70	50	0.96600	26.10699	50	70
25	0	50	50	1.05000	27.30000	50	50
25	1	50	50	1.05000	27.15699	50	50
26	0	50	50	1.05000	28.35000	50	50
26	1	50	50	1.05000	28.20699	50	50
27	0	50	50	1.05000	29.40000	50	50
27	1	50	50	1.05000	29.25699	50	50
28	0	50	50	1.05000	30.45000	50	50
28	1	50	50	1.05000	30.30699	50	50
29	0	50	50	1.05000	31.50000	50	50
29	1	50	50	1.05000	31.35699	50	50
30	0	50	50	1.05000	32.55000	50	50
30	1	50	50	1.05000	32.40699	50	50
31	0	50	50	1.05000	33.60000	50	50
31	1	50	50	1.05000	33.45699	50	50
32	0	50	50	1.05000	34.65000	50	50
32	1	50	50	1.05000	34.50699	50	50
33	0	50	50	1.05000	35.70000	50	50
33	1	50	50	1.05000	35.55699	50	50
34	0	50	50	1.05000	36.75000	50	50
34	1	50	50	1.05000	36.60699	50	50
35	0	50	50	1.05000	37.80000	50	50
35	1	50	50	1.05000	37.65699	50	50
36	0	50	50	1.05000	38.85000	50	50
36	1	50	50	1.05000	38.70699	50	50
37	0	50	50	1.05000	39.90000	50	50
37	1	50	50	1.05000	39.75699	50	50
38	0	50	50	1.05000	40.95000	50	50
38	1	50	50	1.05000	40.80699	50	50
39	0	50	50	1.05000	42.00000	50	50
39	1	50	50	1.05000	41.85699	50	50
40	0	50	50	1.05000	43.05000	50	50
40	1	50	50	1.05000	42.90699	50	50
41	0	50	50	1.05000	44.10000	50	50
41	1	50	50	1.05000	43.95699	50	50
42	0	50	50	1.05000	45.15000	50	50

Table XLII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
42	1	50	50	1.05000	45.00699	50	50
43	0	50	50	1.05000	46.20000	50	50
43	1	50	50	1.05000	46.05699	50	50
44	0	50	60	1.05000	47.25000	50	60
44	1	60	50	1.02900	47.08599	50	60
45	0	50	70	1.05000	48.30000	50	70
45	1	70	50	0.96600	48.05199	50	70
46	0	50	40	1.05000	49.35000	50	40
46	1	40	50	1.02900	49.08099	50	40
47	0	50	30	1.05000	50.40000	50	30
47	1	30	50	0.96600	50.04699	50	30
48	0	50	50	1.05000	51.45000	50	50
48	1	50	50	1.05000	51.09699	50	50
49	0	50	50	1.05000	52.50000	50	50
49	1	50	50	1.05000	52.14699	50	50

Table XLIII.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 3

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	55	50	1.04475	1.04475	55	50
0	1	50	55	1.05000	1.05000	55	50
1	0	60	50	1.02900	2.07375	60	50
1	1	50	60	1.05000	2.10000	60	50
2	0	50	50	1.05000	3.12375	50	50
2	1	50	50	1.05000	3.15000	50	50
3	0	50	50	1.05000	4.17375	50	50
3	1	50	50	1.05000	4.20000	50	50
4	0	50	50	1.05000	5.22375	50	50
4	1	50	50	1.05000	5.25000	50	50
5	0	50	50	1.05000	6.27375	50	50
5	1	50	50	1.05000	6.30000	50	50
6	0	50	50	1.05000	7.32375	50	50
6	1	50	50	1.05000	7.35000	50	50
7	0	50	50	1.05000	8.37375	50	50
7	1	50	50	1.05000	8.40000	50	50
8	0	50	50	1.05000	9.42375	50	50
8	1	50	50	1.05000	9.45000	50	50
9	0	50	50	1.05000	10.47375	50	50
9	1	50	50	1.05000	10.50000	50	50
10	0	50	50	1.05000	11.52375	50	50
10	1	50	50	1.05000	11.55000	50	50
11	0	50	50	1.05000	12.57375	50	50
11	1	50	50	1.05000	12.60000	50	50
12	0	50	50	1.05000	13.62375	50	50
12	1	50	50	1.05000	13.65000	50	50
13	0	50	50	1.05000	14.67375	50	50
13	1	50	50	1.05000	14.70000	50	50
14	0	50	50	1.05000	15.72375	50	50
14	1	50	50	1.05000	15.75000	50	50
15	0	50	50	1.05000	16.77375	50	50
15	1	50	50	1.05000	16.80000	50	50
16	0	50	50	1.05000	17.82375	50	50
16	1	50	50	1.05000	17.85000	50	50
17	0	50	50	1.05000	18.87375	50	50
17	1	50	50	1.05000	18.90000	50	50
18	0	50	50	1.05000	19.92375	50	50
18	1	50	50	1.05000	19.95000	50	50
19	0	50	50	1.05000	20.97375	50	50
19	1	50	50	1.05000	21.00000	50	50
20	0	50	50	1.05000	22.02375	50	50
20	1	50	50	1.05000	22.05000	50	50
21	0	50	50	1.05000	23.07375	50	50
21	1	50	50	1.05000	23.10000	50	50
22	0	50	50	1.05000	24.12375	50	50
22	1	50	50	1.05000	24.15000	50	50
23	0	50	50	1.05000	25.17375	50	50
23	1	50	50	1.05000	25.20000	50	50
24	0	50	50	1.05000	26.22375	50	50
24	1	50	50	1.05000	26.25000	50	50
25	0	50	50	1.05000	27.27375	50	50
25	1	50	50	1.05000	27.30000	50	50
26	0	50	50	1.05000	28.32375	50	50
26	1	50	50	1.05000	28.35000	50	50
27	0	50	50	1.05000	29.37375	50	50
27	1	50	50	1.05000	29.40000	50	50

Table XLIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
28	0	50	50	1.05000	30.42375	50	50
28	1	50	50	1.05000	30.45000	50	50
29	0	50	50	1.05000	31.47375	50	50
29	1	50	50	1.05000	31.50000	50	50
30	0	50	50	1.05000	32.52375	50	50
30	1	50	50	1.05000	32.55000	50	50
31	0	50	50	1.05000	33.57375	50	50
31	1	50	50	1.05000	33.60000	50	50
32	0	50	50	1.05000	34.62375	50	50
32	1	50	50	1.05000	34.65000	50	50
33	0	50	50	1.05000	35.67375	50	50
33	1	50	50	1.05000	35.70000	50	50
34	0	50	50	1.05000	36.72375	50	50
34	1	50	50	1.05000	36.75000	50	50
35	0	50	50	1.05000	37.77375	50	50
35	1	50	50	1.05000	37.80000	50	50
36	0	50	50	1.05000	38.82375	50	50
36	1	50	50	1.05000	38.85000	50	50
37	0	50	50	1.05000	39.87375	50	50
37	1	50	50	1.05000	39.90000	50	50
38	0	50	50	1.05000	40.92375	50	50
38	1	50	50	1.05000	40.95000	50	50
39	0	50	50	1.05000	41.97375	50	50
39	1	50	50	1.05000	42.00000	50	50
40	0	50	50	1.05000	43.02375	50	50
40	1	50	50	1.05000	43.05000	50	50
41	0	50	50	1.05000	44.07375	50	50
41	1	50	50	1.05000	44.10000	50	50
42	0	50	50	1.05000	45.12375	50	50
42	1	50	50	1.05000	45.15000	50	50
43	0	50	50	1.05000	46.17375	50	50
43	1	50	50	1.05000	46.20000	50	50
44	0	50	50	1.05000	47.22375	50	50
44	1	50	50	1.05000	47.25000	50	50
45	0	50	50	1.05000	48.27375	50	50
45	1	50	50	1.05000	48.30000	50	50
46	0	50	50	1.05000	49.32375	50	50
46	1	50	50	1.05000	49.35000	50	50
47	0	50	50	1.05000	50.37375	50	50
47	1	50	50	1.05000	50.40000	50	50
48	0	50	50	1.05000	51.42375	50	50
48	1	50	50	1.05000	51.45000	50	50
49	0	50	50	1.05000	52.47375	50	50
49	1	50	50	1.05000	52.50000	50	50

Table XLIV.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 4

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	50	49	1.05000	1.05000	50	49
0	1	49	50	1.04979	1.04979	50	49
1	0	50	49	1.05000	2.10000	50	49
1	1	49	50	1.04979	2.09958	50	49
2	0	50	68	1.05000	3.15000	50	68
2	1	68	50	0.98196	3.08154	50	68
3	0	50	52	1.05000	4.20000	50	52
3	1	52	50	1.04916	4.13070	50	52
4	0	50	50	1.05000	5.25000	50	50
4	1	50	50	1.05000	5.18070	50	50
5	0	50	65	1.05000	6.30000	50	65
5	1	65	50	1.00275	6.18345	50	65
6	0	50	65	1.05000	7.35000	50	65
6	1	65	50	1.00275	7.18620	50	65
7	0	50	60	1.05000	8.40000	50	60
7	1	60	50	1.02900	8.21520	50	60
8	0	50	51	1.05000	9.45000	50	51
8	1	51	50	1.04979	9.26499	50	51
9	0	50	60	1.05000	10.50000	50	60
9	1	60	50	1.02900	10.29399	50	60
10	0	50	50	1.05000	11.55000	50	50
10	1	50	50	1.05000	11.34399	50	50
11	0	50	50	1.05000	12.60000	50	50
11	1	50	50	1.05000	12.39399	50	50
12	0	50	50	1.05000	13.65000	50	50
12	1	50	50	1.05000	13.44399	50	50
13	0	50	50	1.05000	14.70000	50	50

Table XLIV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
13	1	50	50	1.05000	14.49399	50	50
14	0	50	50	1.05000	15.75000	50	50
14	1	50	50	1.05000	15.54399	50	50
15	0	50	50	1.05000	16.80000	50	50
15	1	50	50	1.05000	16.59399	50	50
16	0	50	50	1.05000	17.85000	50	50
16	1	50	50	1.05000	17.64399	50	50
17	0	50	50	1.05000	18.90000	50	50
17	1	50	50	1.05000	18.69399	50	50
18	0	50	50	1.05000	19.95000	50	50
18	1	50	50	1.05000	19.74399	50	50
19	0	50	50	1.05000	21.00000	50	50
19	1	50	50	1.05000	20.79399	50	50
20	0	50	50	1.05000	22.05000	50	50
20	1	50	50	1.05000	21.84399	50	50
21	0	50	50	1.05000	23.10000	50	50
21	1	50	50	1.05000	22.89399	50	50
22	0	50	60	1.05000	24.15000	50	60
22	1	60	50	1.02900	23.92299	50	60
23	0	50	50	1.05000	25.20000	50	50
23	1	50	50	1.05000	24.97299	50	50
24	0	50	50	1.05000	26.25000	50	50
24	1	50	50	1.05000	26.02299	50	50
25	0	50	50	1.05000	27.30000	50	50
25	1	50	50	1.05000	27.07299	50	50
26	0	50	50	1.05000	28.35000	50	50
26	1	50	50	1.05000	28.12299	50	50
27	0	50	50	1.05000	29.40000	50	50
27	1	50	50	1.05000	29.17299	50	50
28	0	50	50	1.05000	30.45000	50	50
28	1	50	50	1.05000	30.22299	50	50
29	0	50	50	1.05000	31.50000	50	50
29	1	50	50	1.05000	31.27299	50	50
30	0	50	50	1.05000	32.55000	50	50
30	1	50	50	1.05000	32.32299	50	50
31	0	50	50	1.05000	33.60000	50	50
31	1	50	50	1.05000	33.37299	50	50
32	0	50	50	1.05000	34.65000	50	50
32	1	50	50	1.05000	34.42299	50	50
33	0	50	50	1.05000	35.70000	50	50
33	1	50	50	1.05000	35.47299	50	50
34	0	50	50	1.05000	36.75000	50	50
34	1	50	50	1.05000	36.52299	50	50
35	0	50	50	1.05000	37.80000	50	50
35	1	50	50	1.05000	37.57299	50	50
36	0	50	50	1.05000	38.85000	50	50
36	1	50	50	1.05000	38.62299	50	50
37	0	50	50	1.05000	39.90000	50	50
37	1	50	50	1.05000	39.67299	50	50
38	0	50	50	1.05000	40.95000	50	50
38	1	50	50	1.05000	40.72299	50	50
39	0	50	50	1.05000	42.00000	50	50
39	1	50	50	1.05000	41.77299	50	50
40	0	50	50	1.05000	43.05000	50	50
40	1	50	50	1.05000	42.82299	50	50
41	0	50	50	1.05000	44.10000	50	50
41	1	50	50	1.05000	43.87299	50	50
42	0	50	50	1.05000	45.15000	50	50
42	1	50	50	1.05000	44.92299	50	50
43	0	50	50	1.05000	46.20000	50	50
43	1	50	50	1.05000	45.97299	50	50
44	0	50	50	1.05000	47.25000	50	50
44	1	50	50	1.05000	47.02299	50	50
45	0	50	50	1.05000	48.30000	50	50
45	1	50	50	1.05000	48.07299	50	50
46	0	50	50	1.05000	49.35000	50	50
46	1	50	50	1.05000	49.12299	50	50
47	0	50	50	1.05000	50.40000	50	50
47	1	50	50	1.05000	50.17299	50	50
48	0	50	50	1.05000	51.45000	50	50
48	1	50	50	1.05000	51.22299	50	50
49	0	50	50	1.05000	52.50000	50	50
49	1	50	50	1.05000	52.27299	50	50

Table XLV.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 5

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	50	50	1.05000	1.05000	50	50
0	1	50	50	1.05000	1.05000	50	50
1	0	50	50	1.05000	2.10000	50	50
1	1	50	50	1.05000	2.10000	50	50
2	0	50	50	1.05000	3.15000	50	50
2	1	50	50	1.05000	3.15000	50	50
3	0	50	50	1.05000	4.20000	50	50
3	1	50	50	1.05000	4.20000	50	50
4	0	50	50	1.05000	5.25000	50	50
4	1	50	50	1.05000	5.25000	50	50
5	0	50	50	1.05000	6.30000	50	50
5	1	50	50	1.05000	6.30000	50	50
6	0	50	50	1.05000	7.35000	50	50
6	1	50	50	1.05000	7.35000	50	50
7	0	50	50	1.05000	8.40000	50	50
7	1	50	50	1.05000	8.40000	50	50
8	0	50	50	1.05000	9.45000	50	50
8	1	50	50	1.05000	9.45000	50	50
9	0	50	50	1.05000	10.50000	50	50
9	1	50	50	1.05000	10.50000	50	50
10	0	50	50	1.05000	11.55000	50	50
10	1	50	50	1.05000	11.55000	50	50
11	0	50	50	1.05000	12.60000	50	50
11	1	50	50	1.05000	12.60000	50	50
12	0	50	50	1.05000	13.65000	50	50
12	1	50	50	1.05000	13.65000	50	50
13	0	50	70	1.05000	14.70000	50	70
13	1	70	50	0.96600	14.61600	50	70
14	0	40	70	1.07100	15.77100	40	70
14	1	70	40	1.00800	15.62400	40	70
15	0	40	70	1.07100	16.84200	40	70
15	1	70	40	1.00800	16.63200	40	70
16	0	40	100	1.13400	17.97600	40	100
16	1	100	40	0.63000	17.26200	40	100
17	0	25	50	0.91875	18.89475	25	50
17	1	50	25	1.05000	18.31200	25	50
18	0	50	50	1.05000	19.94475	50	50
18	1	50	50	1.05000	19.36200	50	50
19	0	50	50	1.05000	20.99475	50	50
19	1	50	50	1.05000	20.41200	50	50
20	0	50	50	1.05000	22.04475	50	50
20	1	50	50	1.05000	21.46200	50	50
21	0	50	50	1.05000	23.09475	50	50
21	1	50	50	1.05000	22.51200	50	50
22	0	50	50	1.05000	24.14475	50	50
22	1	50	50	1.05000	23.56200	50	50
23	0	50	50	1.05000	25.19475	50	50
23	1	50	50	1.05000	24.61200	50	50
24	0	50	50	1.05000	26.24475	50	50
24	1	50	50	1.05000	25.66200	50	50
25	0	50	50	1.05000	27.29475	50	50
25	1	50	50	1.05000	26.71200	50	50
26	0	50	50	1.05000	28.34475	50	50
26	1	50	50	1.05000	27.76200	50	50
27	0	50	50	1.05000	29.39475	50	50
27	1	50	50	1.05000	28.81200	50	50
28	0	50	50	1.05000	30.44475	50	50
28	1	50	50	1.05000	29.86200	50	50
29	0	50	50	1.05000	31.49475	50	50
29	1	50	50	1.05000	30.91200	50	50
30	0	50	50	1.05000	32.54475	50	50
30	1	50	50	1.05000	31.96200	50	50
31	0	50	50	1.05000	33.59475	50	50
31	1	50	50	1.05000	33.01200	50	50
32	0	50	50	1.05000	34.64475	50	50
32	1	50	50	1.05000	34.06200	50	50
33	0	50	50	1.05000	35.69475	50	50
33	1	50	50	1.05000	35.11200	50	50
34	0	50	50	1.05000	36.74475	50	50
34	1	50	50	1.05000	36.16200	50	50
35	0	50	50	1.05000	37.79475	50	50
35	1	50	50	1.05000	37.21200	50	50
36	0	50	50	1.05000	38.84475	50	50
36	1	50	50	1.05000	38.26200	50	50
37	0	50	50	1.05000	39.89475	50	50
37	1	50	50	1.05000	39.31200	50	50
38	0	50	50	1.05000	40.94475	50	50
38	1	50	50	1.05000	40.36200	50	50
39	0	50	50	1.05000	41.99475	50	50
39	1	50	50	1.05000	41.41200	50	50
40	0	50	50	1.05000	43.04475	50	50
40	1	50	50	1.05000	42.46200	50	50
41	0	50	50	1.05000	44.09475	50	50
41	1	50	50	1.05000	43.51200	50	50
42	0	50	50	1.05000	45.14475	50	50

Table XLV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
42	1	50	50	1.05000	44.56200	50	50
43	0	50	50	1.05000	46.19475	50	50
43	1	50	50	1.05000	45.61200	50	50
44	0	50	50	1.05000	47.24475	50	50
44	1	50	50	1.05000	46.66200	50	50
45	0	50	50	1.05000	48.29475	50	50
45	1	50	50	1.05000	47.71200	50	50
46	0	50	50	1.05000	49.34475	50	50
46	1	50	50	1.05000	48.76200	50	50
47	0	50	50	1.05000	50.39475	50	50
47	1	50	50	1.05000	49.81200	50	50
48	0	50	50	1.05000	51.44475	50	50
48	1	50	50	1.05000	50.86200	50	50
49	0	50	50	1.05000	52.49475	50	50
49	1	50	50	1.05000	51.91200	50	50

Table XLVI.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 1 (Player 0 - Home to Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	52	50	0.94836	0.94836	52	50
0	1	50	52	0.94500	0.94500	52	50
1	0	56	70	0.92484	1.87320	56	70
1	1	70	56	0.79380	1.73880	56	70
2	0	73	34	0.95949	2.83269	73	34
2	1	34	73	1.00212	2.74092	73	34
3	0	78	26	0.98028	3.81297	78	26
3	1	26	78	1.01556	3.75648	78	26
4	0	86	68	0.61236	4.42533	86	68
4	1	68	86	0.70308	4.45956	86	68
5	0	57	21	0.99204	5.41737	57	21
5	1	21	57	0.87192	5.33148	57	21
6	0	64	54	0.92148	6.33885	64	54
6	1	54	64	0.92148	6.25296	64	54
7	0	41	67	0.94122	7.28007	41	67
7	1	67	41	0.88074	7.13370	41	67
8	0	70	63	0.84840	8.12847	70	63
8	1	63	70	0.82761	7.96131	70	63
9	0	47	74	0.95193	9.08040	47	74
9	1	74	47	0.78876	8.75007	47	74
10	0	45	26	0.90405	9.98445	45	26
10	1	26	45	0.84924	9.59931	45	26
11	0	51	99	0.93660	10.92105	51	99
11	1	99	51	0.32760	9.92691	51	99
12	0	33	68	0.91287	11.83392	33	68
12	1	68	33	0.90342	10.83033	33	68
13	0	87	68	0.59535	12.42927	87	68
13	1	68	87	0.69930	11.52963	87	68
14	0	40	49	0.90090	13.33017	40	49
14	1	49	40	0.94479	12.47442	40	49
15	0	73	57	0.84840	14.17857	73	57
15	1	57	73	0.88620	13.36062	73	57
16	0	50	53	0.94500	15.12357	50	53
16	1	53	50	0.93681	14.29743	50	53
17	0	57	29	0.98028	16.10385	57	29
17	1	29	57	0.92736	15.22479	57	29
18	0	55	28	0.97335	17.07720	55	28
18	1	28	55	0.91266	16.13745	55	28
19	0	87	24	0.93723	18.01443	87	24
19	1	24	87	1.05966	17.19711	87	24
20	0	69	20	1.02879	19.04322	69	20
20	1	20	69	0.93870	18.13581	69	20
21	0	69	18	1.03677	20.07999	69	18
21	1	18	69	0.92484	19.06065	69	18
22	0	72	20	1.02816	21.10815	72	20
22	1	20	72	0.95760	20.01825	72	20
23	0	70	23	1.01640	22.12455	70	23
23	1	23	70	0.96201	20.98026	70	23
24	0	67	21	1.02354	23.14809	67	21
24	1	21	67	0.93282	21.91308	67	21
25	0	69	21	1.02480	24.17289	69	21
25	1	21	69	0.94500	22.85808	69	21
26	0	70	21	1.02480	25.19769	70	21
26	1	21	70	0.95109	23.80917	70	21
27	0	71	21	1.02438	26.22207	71	21

Table XLVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
27	1	21	71	0.95718	24.76635	71	21
28	0	70	30	0.98700	27.20907	70	30
28	1	30	70	0.98700	25.75335	70	30
29	0	34	19	0.75348	27.96255	34	19
29	1	19	34	0.70413	26.45748	34	19
30	0	45	19	0.89670	28.85925	45	19
30	1	19	45	0.77574	27.23322	45	19
31	0	74	21	1.02060	29.87985	74	21
31	1	21	74	0.97545	28.20867	74	21
32	0	69	23	1.01682	30.89667	69	23
32	1	23	69	0.95634	29.16501	69	23
33	0	69	18	1.03677	31.93344	69	18
33	1	18	69	0.92484	30.08985	69	18
34	0	69	23	1.01682	32.95026	69	23
34	1	23	69	0.95634	31.04619	69	23
35	0	70	18	1.03740	33.98766	70	18
35	1	18	70	0.93156	31.97775	70	18
36	0	70	22	1.02060	35.00826	70	22
36	1	22	70	0.95676	32.93451	70	22
37	0	69	29	0.99288	36.00114	69	29
37	1	29	69	0.98028	33.91479	69	29
38	0	64	30	0.99204	36.99318	64	30
38	1	30	64	0.96180	34.87659	64	30
39	0	60	29	0.98910	37.98228	60	29
39	1	29	60	0.94059	35.81718	60	29
40	0	68	34	0.97524	38.95752	68	34
40	1	34	68	0.98532	36.80250	68	34
41	0	67	29	0.99498	39.95250	67	29
41	1	29	67	0.97146	37.77396	67	29
42	0	66	21	1.02228	40.97478	66	21
42	1	21	66	0.92673	38.70069	66	21
43	0	70	18	1.03740	42.01218	70	18
43	1	18	70	0.93156	39.63225	70	18
44	0	70	18	1.03740	43.04958	70	18
44	1	18	70	0.93156	40.56381	70	18
45	0	70	16	1.04580	44.09538	70	16
45	1	16	70	0.91644	41.48025	70	16
46	0	72	20	1.02816	45.12354	72	20
46	1	20	72	0.95760	42.43785	72	20
47	0	74	20	1.02564	46.14918	74	20
47	1	20	74	0.97020	43.40805	74	20
48	0	70	20	1.02900	47.17818	70	20
48	1	20	70	0.94500	44.35305	70	20
49	0	69	33	0.97692	48.15510	69	33
49	1	33	69	0.98784	45.34089	69	33

Table XLVII.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 2 (Player 0 - Home to Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	75	41	0.91350	0.91350	75	41
0	1	41	75	0.99414	0.99414	75	41
1	0	90	39	0.78540	1.69890	90	39
1	1	39	90	1.03509	2.02923	90	39
2	0	81	24	0.97755	2.67645	81	24
2	1	24	81	1.02690	3.05613	81	24
3	0	80	25	0.97650	3.65295	80	25
3	1	25	80	1.02375	4.07988	80	25
4	0	80	28	0.95760	4.61055	80	28
4	1	28	80	1.02816	5.10804	80	28
5	0	78	28	0.96852	5.57907	78	28
5	1	28	78	1.01892	6.12696	78	28
6	0	79	30	0.95109	6.53016	79	30
6	1	30	79	1.02480	7.15176	79	30
7	0	81	30	0.93849	7.46865	81	30
7	1	30	81	1.03320	8.18496	81	30
8	0	30	27	0.72240	8.19105	30	27
8	1	27	30	0.78561	8.97057	30	27
9	0	79	30	0.95109	9.14214	79	30
9	1	30	79	1.02480	9.99537	79	30
10	0	78	28	0.96852	10.11066	78	28
10	1	28	78	1.01892	11.01429	78	28
11	0	77	30	0.96201	11.07267	77	30
11	1	30	77	1.01640	12.03069	77	30
12	0	76	25	0.99414	12.06681	76	25

Table XLVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
12	1	25	76	1.00275	13.03344	76	25
13	0	72	28	0.99120	13.05801	72	28
13	1	28	72	0.99120	14.02464	72	28
14	0	70	28	0.99540	14.05341	70	28
14	1	28	70	0.98196	15.00660	70	28
15	0	70	30	0.98700	15.04041	70	30
15	1	30	70	0.98700	15.99360	70	30
16	0	71	30	0.98469	16.02510	71	30
16	1	30	71	0.99120	16.98480	71	30
17	0	73	30	0.97881	17.00391	73	30
17	1	30	73	0.99960	17.98440	73	30
18	0	72	30	0.98196	17.98587	72	30
18	1	30	72	0.99540	18.97980	72	30
19	0	63	25	1.00506	18.99093	63	25
19	1	25	63	0.93450	19.91430	63	25
20	0	63	25	1.00506	19.99599	63	25
20	1	25	63	0.93450	20.84880	63	25
21	0	62	25	1.00296	20.99895	62	25
21	1	25	62	0.92925	21.77805	62	25
22	0	64	25	1.00674	22.00569	64	25
22	1	25	64	0.93975	22.71780	64	25
23	0	65	25	1.00800	23.01369	65	25
23	1	25	65	0.94500	23.66280	65	25
24	0	64	25	1.00674	24.02043	64	25
24	1	25	64	0.93975	24.60255	64	25
25	0	64	25	1.00674	25.02717	64	25
25	1	25	64	0.93975	25.54230	64	25
26	0	64	25	1.00674	26.03391	64	25
26	1	25	64	0.93975	26.48205	64	25
27	0	64	25	1.00674	27.04065	64	25
27	1	25	64	0.93975	27.42180	64	25
28	0	64	25	1.00674	28.04739	64	25
28	1	25	64	0.93975	28.36155	64	25
29	0	64	38	0.96852	29.01591	64	38
29	1	38	64	0.97524	29.33679	64	38
30	0	64	38	0.96852	29.98443	64	38
30	1	38	64	0.97524	30.31203	64	38
31	0	75	24	1.00275	30.98718	75	24
31	1	24	75	0.99414	31.30617	75	24
32	0	70	25	1.00800	31.99518	70	25
32	1	25	70	0.97125	32.27742	70	25
33	0	65	25	1.00800	33.00318	65	25
33	1	25	65	0.94500	33.22242	65	25
34	0	65	25	1.00800	34.01118	65	25
34	1	25	65	0.94500	34.16742	65	25
35	0	65	37	0.97020	34.98138	65	37
35	1	37	65	0.97776	35.14518	65	37
36	0	71	30	0.98469	35.96607	71	30
36	1	30	71	0.99120	36.13638	71	30
37	0	68	33	0.97902	36.94509	68	33
37	1	33	68	0.98427	37.12065	68	33
38	0	70	32	0.97860	37.92369	70	32
38	1	32	70	0.99036	38.11101	70	32
39	0	68	30	0.99036	38.91405	68	30
39	1	30	68	0.97860	39.08961	68	30
40	0	71	30	0.98469	39.89874	71	30
40	1	30	71	0.99120	40.08081	71	30
41	0	71	32	0.97587	40.87461	71	32
41	1	32	71	0.99414	41.07495	71	32
42	0	74	32	0.96516	41.83977	74	32
42	1	32	74	1.00548	42.08043	74	32
43	0	68	30	0.99036	42.83013	68	30
43	1	30	68	0.97860	43.05903	68	30
44	0	69	30	0.98889	43.81902	69	30
44	1	30	69	0.98280	44.04183	69	30
45	0	69	30	0.98889	44.80791	69	30
45	1	30	69	0.98280	45.02463	69	30
46	0	69	32	0.98091	45.78882	69	32
46	1	32	69	0.98658	46.01121	69	32
47	0	69	30	0.98889	46.77771	69	30
47	1	30	69	0.98280	46.99401	69	30
48	0	69	30	0.98889	47.76660	69	30
48	1	30	69	0.98280	47.97681	69	30
49	0	69	36	0.96495	48.73155	69	36
49	1	36	69	0.98910	48.96591	69	36

Table XLVIII.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 3 (Player 0 - Home to Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	60	50	0.94500	0.94500	60	50
0	1	50	60	0.94500	0.94500	60	50
1	0	65	60	0.89775	1.84275	65	60
1	1	60	65	0.87150	1.81650	65	60
2	0	49	26	0.93765	2.78040	49	26
2	1	26	49	0.86940	2.68590	49	26
3	0	80	70	0.69300	3.47340	80	70
3	1	70	80	0.69300	3.37890	80	70
4	0	50	29	0.94500	4.41840	50	29
4	1	29	50	0.89649	4.27539	50	29
5	0	50	35	0.94500	5.36340	50	35
5	1	35	50	0.92925	5.20464	50	35
6	0	52	59	0.94458	6.30798	52	59
6	1	59	52	0.90531	6.10995	52	59
7	0	50	31	0.94500	7.25298	50	31
7	1	31	50	0.90909	7.01904	50	31
8	0	50	60	0.94500	8.19798	50	60
8	1	60	50	0.90300	7.92204	50	60
9	0	50	42	0.94500	9.14298	50	42
9	1	42	50	0.94836	8.87040	50	42
10	0	50	41	0.94500	10.08798	50	41
10	1	41	50	0.94689	9.81729	50	41
11	0	50	43	0.94500	11.03298	50	43
11	1	43	50	0.94941	10.76670	50	43
12	0	50	45	0.94500	11.97798	50	45
12	1	45	50	0.95025	11.71695	50	45
13	0	50	45	0.94500	12.92298	50	45
13	1	45	50	0.95025	12.66720	50	45
14	0	60	24	0.99960	13.92258	60	24
14	1	24	60	0.91224	13.57944	60	24
15	0	60	22	1.00380	14.92638	60	22
15	1	22	60	0.89796	14.47740	60	22
16	0	79	22	0.99981	15.92619	79	22
16	1	22	79	1.00968	15.48708	79	22
17	0	73	23	1.01262	16.93881	73	23
17	1	23	73	0.97902	16.46610	73	23
18	0	64	23	1.01262	17.95143	64	23
18	1	23	64	0.92799	17.39409	64	23
19	0	76	24	0.99960	18.95103	76	24
19	1	24	76	0.99960	18.39369	76	24
20	0	75	26	0.99225	19.94328	75	26
20	1	26	75	1.00044	19.39413	75	26
21	0	70	29	0.99120	20.93448	70	29
21	1	29	70	0.98469	20.37882	70	29
22	0	70	26	1.00380	21.93828	70	26
22	1	26	70	0.97524	21.35406	70	26
23	0	70	37	0.95760	22.89588	70	37
23	1	37	70	0.99141	22.34547	70	37
24	0	71	26	1.00233	23.89821	71	26
24	1	26	71	0.98028	23.32575	71	26
25	0	70	32	0.97860	24.87681	70	32
25	1	32	70	0.99036	24.31611	70	32
26	0	70	34	0.97020	25.84701	70	34
26	1	34	70	0.99204	25.30815	70	34
27	0	70	22	1.02060	26.86761	70	22
27	1	22	70	0.95676	26.26491	70	22
28	0	70	22	1.02060	27.88821	70	22
28	1	22	70	0.95676	27.22167	70	22
29	0	90	22	0.92820	28.81641	90	22
29	1	22	90	1.07436	28.29603	90	22
30	0	84	22	0.97356	29.78997	84	22
30	1	22	84	1.03908	29.33511	84	22
31	0	70	23	1.01640	30.80637	70	23
31	1	23	70	0.96201	30.29712	70	23
32	0	70	25	1.00800	31.81437	70	25
32	1	25	70	0.97125	31.26837	70	25
33	0	70	34	0.97020	32.78457	70	34
33	1	34	70	0.99204	32.26041	70	34
34	0	70	35	0.96600	33.75057	70	35
34	1	35	70	0.99225	33.25266	70	35
35	0	70	35	0.96600	34.71657	70	35
35	1	35	70	0.99225	34.24491	70	35
36	0	67	25	1.00926	35.72583	67	25
36	1	25	67	0.95550	35.20041	67	25
37	0	70	26	1.00380	36.72963	70	26
37	1	26	70	0.97524	36.17565	70	26
38	0	70	28	0.99540	37.72503	70	28
38	1	28	70	0.98196	37.15761	70	28
39	0	70	35	0.96600	38.69103	70	35
39	1	35	70	0.99225	38.14986	70	35
40	0	70	35	0.96600	39.65703	70	35
40	1	35	70	0.99225	39.14211	70	35
41	0	70	35	0.96600	40.62303	70	35
41	1	35	70	0.99225	40.13436	70	35

Table XLVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
42	0	59	24	0.99603	41.61906	59	24
42	1	24	59	0.90678	41.04114	59	24
43	0	68	24	1.01304	42.63210	68	24
43	1	24	68	0.95592	41.99706	68	24
44	0	68	24	1.01304	43.64514	68	24
44	1	24	68	0.95592	42.95298	68	24
45	0	68	24	1.01304	44.65818	68	24
45	1	24	68	0.95592	43.90890	68	24
46	0	68	35	0.97146	45.62964	68	35
46	1	35	68	0.98595	44.89485	68	35
47	0	60	36	0.97440	46.60404	60	36
47	1	36	60	0.96264	45.85749	60	36
48	0	68	22	1.02060	47.62464	68	22
48	1	22	68	0.94500	46.80249	68	22
49	0	69	37	0.96096	48.58560	69	37
49	1	37	69	0.98868	47.79117	69	37

Table XLIX.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 4 (Player 0 - Home to Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	82	18	1.01220	1.01220	82	18
0	1	18	82	1.01220	1.01220	82	18
1	0	88	70	0.56196	1.57416	88	70
1	1	70	88	0.65940	1.67160	88	70
2	0	50	68	0.94500	2.51916	50	68
2	1	68	50	0.83916	2.51076	50	68
3	0	82	24	0.97188	3.49104	82	24
3	1	24	82	1.03236	3.54312	82	24
4	0	100	33	0.70350	4.19454	100	33
4	1	33	100	1.09851	4.64163	100	33
5	0	56	19	0.98910	5.18364	56	19
5	1	19	56	0.84735	5.48898	56	19
6	0	55	22	0.97965	6.16329	55	22
6	1	22	55	0.86856	6.35754	55	22
7	0	49	46	0.94185	7.10514	49	46
7	1	46	49	0.94920	7.30674	49	46
8	0	61	47	0.94962	8.05476	61	47
8	1	47	61	0.95634	8.26308	61	47
9	0	60	21	1.00590	9.06066	60	21
9	1	21	60	0.89019	9.15327	60	21
10	0	78	70	0.72156	9.78222	78	70
10	1	70	78	0.70140	9.85467	78	70
11	0	62	40	0.96516	10.74738	62	40
11	1	40	62	0.97020	10.82487	62	40
12	0	73	29	0.98364	11.73102	73	29
12	1	29	73	0.99792	11.82279	73	29
13	0	72	22	1.01892	12.74994	72	22
13	1	22	72	0.96852	12.79131	72	22
14	0	78	24	0.99204	13.74198	78	24
14	1	24	78	1.01052	13.80183	78	24
15	0	74	24	1.00548	14.74746	74	24
15	1	24	74	0.98868	14.79051	74	24
16	0	72	24	1.00968	15.75714	72	24
16	1	24	72	0.97776	15.76827	72	24
17	0	73	24	1.00779	16.76493	73	24
17	1	24	73	0.98322	16.75149	73	24
18	0	72	28	0.99120	17.75613	72	28
18	1	28	72	0.99120	17.74269	72	28
19	0	74	28	0.98532	18.74145	74	28
19	1	28	74	1.00044	18.74313	74	28
20	0	66	28	0.99876	19.74021	66	28
20	1	28	66	0.96348	19.70661	66	28
21	0	62	26	1.00044	20.74065	62	26
21	1	26	62	0.93492	20.64153	62	26
22	0	61	25	1.00044	21.74109	61	25
22	1	25	61	0.92400	21.56553	61	25
23	0	62	27	0.99792	22.73901	62	27
23	1	27	62	0.94017	22.50570	62	27
24	0	69	40	0.94899	23.68800	69	40
24	1	40	69	0.98490	23.49060	69	40
25	0	81	37	0.89292	24.58092	81	37
25	1	37	81	1.02144	24.51204	81	37
26	0	56	37	0.96642	25.54734	56	37
26	1	37	56	0.95319	25.46523	56	37

Table XLIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
27	0	60	67	0.90930	26.45664	60	67
27	1	67	60	0.81291	26.27814	60	67
28	0	39	27	0.84336	27.30000	39	27
28	1	27	39	0.82908	27.10722	39	27
29	0	74	26	0.99540	28.29540	74	26
29	1	26	74	0.99540	28.10262	74	26
30	0	74	23	1.01052	29.30592	74	23
30	1	23	74	0.98469	29.08731	74	23
31	0	75	26	0.99225	30.29817	75	26
31	1	26	75	1.00044	30.08775	75	26
32	0	72	24	1.00968	31.30785	72	24
32	1	24	72	0.97776	31.06551	72	24
33	0	74	24	1.00548	32.31333	74	24
33	1	24	74	0.98868	32.05419	74	24
34	0	75	20	1.02375	33.33708	75	20
34	1	20	75	0.97650	33.03069	75	20
35	0	70	32	0.97860	34.31568	70	32
35	1	32	70	0.99036	34.02105	70	32
36	0	70	34	0.97020	35.28588	70	34
36	1	34	70	0.99204	35.01309	70	34
37	0	72	34	0.96348	36.24936	72	34
37	1	34	72	0.99876	36.01185	72	34
38	0	69	34	0.97293	37.22229	69	34
38	1	34	69	0.98868	37.00053	69	34
39	0	68	42	0.94500	38.16729	68	42
39	1	42	68	0.97860	37.97913	68	42
40	0	69	41	0.94500	39.11229	69	41
40	1	41	69	0.98280	38.96193	69	41
41	0	60	36	0.97440	40.08669	60	36
41	1	36	60	0.96264	39.92457	60	36
42	0	73	40	0.93051	41.01720	73	40
42	1	40	73	0.99330	40.91787	73	40
43	0	77	41	0.89964	41.91684	77	41
43	1	41	77	0.99792	41.91579	77	41
44	0	100	30	0.73500	42.65184	100	30
44	1	30	100	1.11300	43.02879	100	30
45	0	75	23	1.00800	43.65984	75	23
45	1	23	75	0.99036	44.01915	75	23
46	0	75	21	1.01850	44.67834	75	21
46	1	21	75	0.98154	45.00069	75	21
47	0	75	34	0.95025	45.62859	75	34
47	1	34	75	1.00884	46.00953	75	34
48	0	68	32	0.98280	46.61139	68	32
48	1	32	68	0.98280	46.99233	68	32
49	0	78	23	0.99792	47.60931	78	23
49	1	23	78	1.00737	47.99970	78	23

Table L.: Data from experiments: 2 large suppliers with transport costs - Cohort 5 (Player 0 - Home to Market A; Player 1 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
0	0	47	50	0.93681	0.93681	47	50
0	1	50	47	0.94500	0.94500	47	50
1	0	57	43	0.95970	1.89651	57	43
1	1	43	57	0.95970	1.90470	57	43
2	0	78	47	0.85680	2.75331	78	47
2	1	47	78	0.96705	2.87175	78	47
3	0	50	15	0.94500	3.69831	50	15
3	1	15	50	0.76125	3.63300	50	15
4	0	53	43	0.95382	4.65213	53	43
4	1	43	53	0.95382	4.58682	53	43
5	0	53	43	0.95382	5.60595	53	43
5	1	43	53	0.95382	5.54064	53	43
6	0	53	42	0.95445	6.56040	53	42
6	1	42	53	0.95340	6.49404	53	42
7	0	60	33	0.98070	7.54110	60	33
7	1	33	60	0.95571	7.44975	60	33
8	0	73	33	0.96432	8.50542	73	33
8	1	33	73	1.00212	8.45187	73	33
9	0	73	33	0.96432	9.46974	73	33
9	1	33	73	1.00212	9.45399	73	33
10	0	64	33	0.98322	10.45296	64	33
10	1	33	64	0.96999	10.42398	64	33
11	0	64	33	0.98322	11.43618	64	33
11	1	33	64	0.96999	11.39397	64	33

Table L.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1
12	0	71	33	0.97146	12.40764	71	33
12	1	33	71	0.99498	12.38895	71	33
13	0	71	33	0.97146	13.37910	71	33
13	1	33	71	0.99498	13.38393	71	33
14	0	71	33	0.97146	14.35056	71	33
14	1	33	71	0.99498	14.37891	71	33
15	0	71	33	0.97146	15.32202	71	33
15	1	33	71	0.99498	15.37389	71	33
16	0	71	33	0.97146	16.29348	71	33
16	1	33	71	0.99498	16.36887	71	33
17	0	71	33	0.97146	17.26494	71	33
17	1	33	71	0.99498	17.36385	71	33
18	0	71	33	0.97146	18.23640	71	33
18	1	33	71	0.99498	18.35883	71	33
19	0	71	34	0.96705	19.20345	71	34
19	1	34	71	0.99540	19.35423	71	34
20	0	71	34	0.96705	20.17050	71	34
20	1	34	71	0.99540	20.34963	71	34
21	0	71	34	0.96705	21.13755	71	34
21	1	34	71	0.99540	21.34503	71	34
22	0	71	32	0.97587	22.11342	71	32
22	1	32	71	0.99414	22.33917	71	32
23	0	71	34	0.96705	23.08047	71	34
23	1	34	71	0.99540	23.33457	71	34
24	0	71	34	0.96705	24.04752	71	34
24	1	34	71	0.99540	24.32997	71	34
25	0	63	34	0.98049	25.02801	63	34
25	1	34	63	0.96852	25.29849	63	34
26	0	63	34	0.98049	26.00850	63	34
26	1	34	63	0.96852	26.26701	63	34
27	0	63	32	0.98595	26.99445	63	32
27	1	32	63	0.96390	27.23091	63	32
28	0	63	32	0.98595	27.98040	63	32
28	1	32	63	0.96390	28.19481	63	32
29	0	64	26	1.00380	28.98420	64	26
29	1	26	64	0.94500	29.13981	64	26
30	0	67	33	0.98070	29.96490	67	33
30	1	33	67	0.98070	30.12051	67	33
31	0	67	33	0.98070	30.94560	67	33
31	1	33	67	0.98070	31.10121	67	33
32	0	67	33	0.98070	31.92630	67	33
32	1	33	67	0.98070	32.08191	67	33
33	0	67	33	0.98070	32.90700	67	33
33	1	33	67	0.98070	33.06261	67	33
34	0	63	33	0.98322	33.89022	63	33
34	1	33	63	0.96642	34.02903	63	33
35	0	67	33	0.98070	34.87092	67	33
35	1	33	67	0.98070	35.00973	67	33
36	0	63	33	0.98322	35.85414	63	33
36	1	33	63	0.96642	35.97615	63	33
37	0	67	50	0.92001	36.77415	67	50
37	1	50	67	0.94500	36.92115	67	50
38	0	63	33	0.98322	37.75737	63	33
38	1	33	63	0.96642	37.88757	63	33
39	0	63	33	0.98322	38.74059	63	33
39	1	33	63	0.96642	38.85399	63	33
40	0	63	33	0.98322	39.72381	63	33
40	1	33	63	0.96642	39.82041	63	33
41	0	63	30	0.99141	40.71522	63	30
41	1	30	63	0.95760	40.77801	63	30
42	0	63	33	0.98322	41.69844	63	33
42	1	33	63	0.96642	41.74443	63	33
43	0	63	33	0.98322	42.68166	63	33
43	1	33	63	0.96642	42.71085	63	33
44	0	63	33	0.98322	43.66488	63	33
44	1	33	63	0.96642	43.67727	63	33
45	0	63	33	0.98322	44.64810	63	33
45	1	33	63	0.96642	44.64369	63	33
46	0	63	33	0.98322	45.63132	63	33
46	1	33	63	0.96642	45.61011	63	33
47	0	63	33	0.98322	46.61454	63	33
47	1	33	63	0.96642	46.57653	63	33
48	0	63	33	0.98322	47.59776	63	33
48	1	33	63	0.96642	47.54295	63	33
49	0	63	33	0.98322	48.58098	63	33
49	1	33	63	0.96642	48.50937	63	33

Table LI.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 1

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	69	70	0.29724	0.29724	69	75	50	50	96	79
0	1	75	69	0.28000	0.28000	69	75	50	50	96	79
0	2	50	74	0.35000	0.35000	69	75	50	50	96	79
0	3	50	74	0.35000	0.35000	69	75	50	50	96	79
0	4	96	65	0.22013	0.22013	69	75	50	50	96	79
0	5	79	68	0.26948	0.26948	69	75	50	50	96	79
1	0	90	63	0.25200	0.54924	90	68	50	74	52	72
1	1	68	68	0.30464	0.58464	90	68	50	74	52	72
1	2	50	71	0.35000	0.70000	90	68	50	74	52	72
1	3	74	66	0.29176	0.64176	90	68	50	74	52	72
1	4	52	71	0.34501	0.56513	90	68	50	74	52	72
1	5	72	67	0.29507	0.56455	90	68	50	74	52	72
2	0	5	37	0.23450	0.78374	5	58	50	0	50	29
2	1	58	27	0.36997	0.95461	5	58	50	0	50	29
2	2	50	28	0.35000	1.05000	5	58	50	0	50	29
2	3	0	38	0.22167	0.86343	5	58	50	0	50	29
2	4	50	28	0.35000	0.91513	5	58	50	0	50	29
2	5	29	33	0.29806	0.86261	5	58	50	0	50	29
3	0	98	54	0.27384	1.05758	98	77	50	56	60	27
3	1	77	58	0.30779	1.26240	98	77	50	56	60	27
3	2	50	64	0.35000	1.40000	98	77	50	56	60	27
3	3	56	62	0.34076	1.20419	98	77	50	56	60	27
3	4	60	62	0.33367	1.24880	98	77	50	56	60	27
3	5	27	68	0.38596	1.24857	98	77	50	56	60	27
4	0	50	49	0.35000	1.40758	50	73	50	56	57	11
4	1	73	45	0.35107	1.61348	50	73	50	56	57	11
4	2	50	49	0.35000	1.75000	50	73	50	56	57	11
4	3	56	48	0.35056	1.55475	50	73	50	56	57	11
4	4	57	48	0.35049	1.59929	50	73	50	56	57	11
4	5	11	57	0.34636	1.59493	50	73	50	56	57	11
5	0	45	47	0.34767	1.75525	45	77	50	45	48	17
5	1	77	41	0.36134	1.97482	45	77	50	45	48	17
5	2	50	46	0.35000	2.10000	45	77	50	45	48	17
5	3	45	47	0.34767	1.90241	45	77	50	45	48	17
5	4	48	47	0.34921	1.94850	45	77	50	45	48	17
5	5	17	53	0.33614	1.93107	45	77	50	45	48	17
6	0	71	58	0.32011	2.07536	71	75	50	37	50	79
6	1	75	57	0.31500	2.28982	71	75	50	37	50	79
6	2	50	62	0.35000	2.45000	71	75	50	37	50	79
6	3	37	65	0.36881	2.27122	71	75	50	37	50	79
6	4	50	62	0.35000	2.29850	71	75	50	37	50	79
6	5	79	57	0.30669	2.23776	71	75	50	37	50	79
7	0	50	51	0.35000	2.42536	50	69	50	36	50	50
7	1	69	47	0.34823	2.63804	50	69	50	36	50	50
7	2	50	51	0.35000	2.80000	50	69	50	36	50	50
7	3	36	54	0.35196	2.62318	50	69	50	36	50	50
7	4	50	51	0.35000	2.64850	50	69	50	36	50	50
7	5	50	51	0.35000	2.58776	50	69	50	36	50	50
8	0	36	46	0.33889	2.76425	36	54	50	61	61	2
8	1	54	42	0.35336	2.99140	36	54	50	61	61	2
8	2	50	43	0.35000	3.15000	36	54	50	61	61	2
8	3	61	41	0.35873	2.98191	36	54	50	61	61	2
8	4	61	41	0.35873	3.00722	36	54	50	61	61	2
8	5	2	52	0.30744	2.89520	36	54	50	61	61	2
9	0	41	54	0.35231	3.11656	41	63	50	65	40	52
9	1	63	50	0.34606	3.33746	41	63	50	65	40	52
9	2	50	52	0.35000	3.50000	41	63	50	65	40	52
9	3	65	49	0.34650	3.32841	41	63	50	65	40	52
9	4	40	54	0.35233	3.35956	41	63	50	65	40	52
9	5	52	52	0.34944	3.24464	41	63	50	65	40	52
10	0	62	56	0.33824	3.45480	62	53	50	40	42	97
10	1	53	58	0.34699	3.68445	62	53	50	40	42	97
10	2	50	59	0.35000	3.85000	62	53	50	40	42	97
10	3	40	61	0.36050	3.68891	62	53	50	40	42	97
10	4	42	60	0.35784	3.71740	62	53	50	40	42	97
10	5	97	49	0.30394	3.54858	62	53	50	40	42	97
11	0	50	52	0.35000	3.80480	50	40	50	68	49	53
11	1	40	54	0.35233	4.03678	50	40	50	68	49	53
11	2	50	52	0.35000	4.20000	50	40	50	68	49	53
11	3	68	48	0.34664	4.03555	50	40	50	68	49	53
11	4	49	52	0.35021	4.06761	50	40	50	68	49	53
11	5	53	51	0.34944	3.89802	50	40	50	68	49	53
12	0	48	49	0.34967	4.15448	48	45	50	50	50	51
12	1	45	50	0.34942	4.38620	48	45	50	50	50	51
12	2	50	49	0.35000	4.55000	48	45	50	50	50	51
12	3	50	49	0.35000	4.38555	48	45	50	50	50	51
12	4	50	49	0.35000	4.41761	48	45	50	50	50	51
12	5	51	49	0.35009	4.24811	48	45	50	50	50	51
13	0	48	49	0.34967	4.50415	48	38	50	50	56	51
13	1	38	51	0.34804	4.73424	48	38	50	50	56	51
13	2	50	49	0.35000	4.90000	48	38	50	50	56	51
13	3	50	49	0.35000	4.73555	48	38	50	50	56	51
13	4	56	47	0.35126	4.76887	48	38	50	50	56	51
13	5	51	48	0.35021	4.59832	48	38	50	50	56	51
14	0	56	48	0.35056	4.85471	56	45	50	50	46	51

Table LI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
14	1	45	51	0.35000	5.08424	56	45	50	50	46	51
14	2	50	50	0.35000	5.25000	56	45	50	50	46	51
14	3	50	50	0.35000	5.08555	56	45	50	50	46	51
14	4	46	50	0.34963	5.11849	56	45	50	50	46	51
14	5	51	49	0.35009	4.94842	56	45	50	50	46	51
15	0	49	51	0.35009	5.20480	49	60	50	50	41	55
15	1	60	49	0.34883	5.43307	49	60	50	50	41	55
15	2	50	51	0.35000	5.60000	49	60	50	50	41	55
15	3	50	51	0.35000	5.43555	49	60	50	50	41	55
15	4	41	53	0.35126	5.46975	49	60	50	50	41	55
15	5	55	50	0.34942	5.29783	49	60	50	50	41	55
16	0	61	50	0.34718	5.55198	61	50	50	50	50	52
16	1	50	53	0.35000	5.78307	61	50	50	50	50	52
16	2	50	53	0.35000	5.95000	61	50	50	50	50	52
16	3	50	53	0.35000	5.78555	61	50	50	50	50	52
16	4	50	53	0.35000	5.81975	61	50	50	50	50	52
16	5	52	52	0.34944	5.64727	61	50	50	50	50	52
17	0	28	55	0.35154	5.90352	28	72	50	50	52	51
17	1	72	46	0.34897	6.13205	28	72	50	50	52	51
17	2	50	51	0.35000	6.30000	28	72	50	50	52	51
17	3	50	51	0.35000	6.13555	28	72	50	50	52	51
17	4	52	50	0.34991	6.16966	28	72	50	50	52	51
17	5	51	50	0.34998	5.99725	28	72	50	50	52	51
18	0	46	58	0.35336	6.25688	46	83	50	50	56	50
18	1	83	50	0.32459	6.45664	46	83	50	50	56	50
18	2	50	57	0.35000	6.65000	46	83	50	50	56	50
18	3	50	57	0.35000	6.48555	46	83	50	50	56	50
18	4	56	56	0.34496	6.51462	46	83	50	50	56	50
18	5	50	57	0.35000	6.34725	46	83	50	50	56	50
19	0	55	41	0.35467	6.61155	55	35	49	43	45	34
19	1	35	45	0.33600	6.79264	55	35	49	43	45	34
19	2	49	42	0.34904	6.99904	55	35	49	43	45	34
19	3	43	44	0.34396	6.82950	55	35	49	43	45	34
19	4	45	43	0.34533	6.85995	55	35	49	43	45	34
19	5	34	45	0.33469	6.68194	55	35	49	43	45	34
20	0	68	53	0.33614	6.94769	68	74	49	57	53	32
20	1	74	52	0.33096	7.12360	68	74	49	57	53	32
20	2	49	57	0.35079	7.34984	68	74	49	57	53	32
20	3	57	55	0.34477	7.17428	68	74	49	57	53	32
20	4	53	56	0.34769	7.20764	68	74	49	57	53	32
20	5	32	60	0.36344	7.04538	68	74	49	57	53	32
21	0	72	47	0.34641	7.29409	72	50	51	65	43	25
21	1	50	51	0.35000	7.47360	72	50	51	65	43	25
21	2	51	51	0.34986	7.69970	72	50	51	65	43	25
21	3	65	48	0.34825	7.52253	72	50	51	65	43	25
21	4	43	53	0.35131	7.55895	72	50	51	65	43	25
21	5	25	56	0.35292	7.39830	72	50	51	65	43	25
22	0	29	48	0.33481	7.62890	29	54	50	70	52	15
22	1	54	43	0.35289	7.82649	29	54	50	70	52	15
22	2	50	44	0.35000	8.04970	29	54	50	70	52	15
22	3	70	40	0.36400	7.88653	29	54	50	70	52	15
22	4	52	44	0.35131	7.91026	29	54	50	70	52	15
22	5	15	51	0.32550	7.72380	29	54	50	70	52	15
23	0	32	61	0.36554	7.99444	32	55	48	75	50	78
23	1	55	57	0.34533	8.17182	32	55	48	75	50	78
23	2	48	58	0.35177	8.40147	32	55	48	75	50	78
23	3	75	53	0.32667	8.21319	32	55	48	75	50	78
23	4	50	58	0.35000	8.26026	32	55	48	75	50	78
23	5	78	52	0.32517	8.04897	32	55	48	75	50	78
24	0	29	57	0.35686	8.35130	29	74	52	60	48	50
24	1	74	48	0.34216	8.51398	29	74	52	60	48	50
24	2	52	52	0.34944	8.75091	29	74	52	60	48	50
24	3	60	51	0.34650	8.55969	29	74	52	60	48	50
24	4	48	53	0.35061	8.61086	29	74	52	60	48	50
24	5	50	53	0.35000	8.39897	29	74	52	60	48	50
25	0	20	58	0.35700	8.70830	20	75	52	51	54	56
25	1	75	47	0.34417	8.85815	20	75	52	51	54	56
25	2	52	51	0.34967	9.10058	20	75	52	51	54	56
25	3	51	51	0.34986	8.90955	20	75	52	51	54	56
25	4	54	51	0.34916	8.96002	20	75	52	51	54	56
25	5	56	50	0.34916	8.74813	20	75	52	51	54	56
26	0	24	55	0.34939	9.05770	24	71	52	49	56	49
26	1	71	46	0.34951	9.20766	24	71	52	49	56	49
26	2	52	50	0.34991	9.45049	24	71	52	49	56	49
26	3	49	50	0.34998	9.25953	24	71	52	49	56	49
26	4	56	49	0.34986	9.30988	24	71	52	49	56	49
26	5	49	50	0.34998	9.09811	24	71	52	49	56	49
27	0	69	52	0.33714	9.39484	69	70	50	49	54	36
27	1	70	52	0.33600	9.54366	69	70	50	49	54	36
27	2	50	56	0.35000	9.80049	69	70	50	49	54	36
27	3	49	56	0.35068	9.61021	69	70	50	49	54	36
27	4	54	55	0.34729	9.65718	69	70	50	49	54	36
27	5	36	58	0.35849	9.45660	69	70	50	49	54	36
28	0	81	50	0.32758	9.72242	81	50	48	40	48	62
28	1	50	56	0.35000	9.89366	81	50	48	40	48	62

Table LI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
28	2	48	56	0.35131	10.15180	81	50	48	40	48	62
28	3	40	58	0.35700	9.96721	81	50	48	40	48	62
28	4	48	56	0.35131	10.00848	81	50	48	40	48	62
28	5	62	53	0.34244	9.79904	81	50	48	40	48	62
29	0	73	38	0.36986	10.09227	73	16	50	37	52	35
29	1	16	49	0.31906	10.21272	73	16	50	37	52	35
29	2	50	43	0.35000	10.50180	73	16	50	37	52	35
29	3	37	45	0.33847	10.30568	73	16	50	37	52	35
29	4	52	42	0.35177	10.36026	73	16	50	37	52	35
29	5	35	46	0.33775	10.13679	73	16	50	37	52	35
30	0	53	47	0.35084	10.44311	53	57	50	50	47	31
30	1	57	46	0.35212	10.56484	53	57	50	50	47	31
30	2	50	48	0.35000	10.85180	53	57	50	50	47	31
30	3	50	48	0.35000	10.65568	53	57	50	50	47	31
30	4	47	48	0.34909	10.70935	53	57	50	50	47	31
30	5	31	51	0.34379	10.48059	53	57	50	50	47	31
31	0	36	52	0.34869	10.79181	36	68	50	50	56	34
31	1	68	45	0.35294	10.91778	36	68	50	50	56	34
31	2	50	49	0.35000	11.20180	36	68	50	50	56	34
31	3	50	49	0.35000	11.00568	36	68	50	50	56	34
31	4	56	48	0.35056	11.05991	36	68	50	50	56	34
31	5	34	52	0.34776	10.82835	36	68	50	50	56	34
32	0	35	55	0.35350	11.14531	35	65	50	50	60	50
32	1	65	49	0.34650	11.26428	35	65	50	50	60	50
32	2	50	52	0.35000	11.55180	35	65	50	50	60	50
32	3	50	52	0.35000	11.35568	35	65	50	50	60	50
32	4	60	50	0.34767	11.40757	35	65	50	50	60	50
32	5	50	52	0.35000	11.17835	35	65	50	50	60	50
33	0	25	51	0.33833	11.48364	25	62	50	45	51	49
33	1	62	44	0.35504	11.61932	25	62	50	45	51	49
33	2	50	46	0.35000	11.90180	25	62	50	45	51	49
33	3	45	47	0.34767	11.70335	25	62	50	45	51	49
33	4	51	46	0.35044	11.75802	25	62	50	45	51	49
33	5	49	47	0.34963	11.52797	25	62	50	45	51	49
34	0	50	56	0.35000	11.83364	50	49	50	50	50	79
34	1	49	56	0.35068	11.97000	50	49	50	50	50	79
34	2	50	56	0.35000	12.25180	50	49	50	50	50	79
34	3	50	56	0.35000	12.05335	50	49	50	50	50	79
34	4	50	56	0.35000	12.10802	50	49	50	50	50	79
34	5	79	50	0.33038	11.85835	50	49	50	50	50	79
35	0	49	50	0.34998	12.18362	49	45	50	50	52	51
35	1	45	50	0.34942	12.31942	49	45	50	50	52	51
35	2	50	49	0.35000	12.60180	49	45	50	50	52	51
35	3	50	49	0.35000	12.40335	49	45	50	50	52	51
35	4	52	49	0.35014	12.45816	49	45	50	50	52	51
35	5	51	49	0.35009	12.20844	49	45	50	50	52	51
36	0	50	55	0.35000	12.53362	50	68	50	50	56	52
36	1	68	52	0.33824	12.65766	50	68	50	50	56	52
36	2	50	55	0.35000	12.95180	50	68	50	50	56	52
36	3	50	55	0.35000	12.75335	50	68	50	50	56	52
36	4	56	54	0.34636	12.80452	50	68	50	50	56	52
36	5	52	55	0.34874	12.55718	50	68	50	50	56	52
37	0	50	50	0.35000	12.88362	50	50	53	50	59	36
37	1	50	50	0.35000	13.00766	50	50	53	50	59	36
37	2	53	49	0.35014	13.30194	50	50	53	50	59	36
37	3	50	50	0.35000	13.10335	50	50	53	50	59	36
37	4	59	48	0.35021	13.15473	50	50	53	50	59	36
37	5	36	52	0.34869	12.90588	50	50	53	50	59	36
38	0	60	49	0.34883	13.23245	60	50	50	50	52	42
38	1	50	51	0.35000	13.35766	60	50	50	50	52	42
38	2	50	51	0.35000	13.65194	60	50	50	50	52	42
38	3	50	51	0.35000	13.45335	60	50	50	50	52	42
38	4	52	50	0.34991	13.50463	60	50	50	50	52	42
38	5	42	52	0.35037	13.25625	60	50	50	50	52	42
39	0	51	48	0.35021	13.58266	51	50	50	50	44	47
39	1	50	48	0.35000	13.70766	51	50	50	50	44	47
39	2	50	48	0.35000	14.00194	51	50	50	50	44	47
39	3	50	48	0.35000	13.80335	51	50	50	50	44	47
39	4	44	50	0.34916	13.85379	51	50	50	50	44	47
39	5	47	49	0.34944	13.60569	51	50	50	50	44	47
40	0	52	52	0.34944	13.93210	52	60	50	50	50	50
40	1	60	50	0.34767	14.05532	52	60	50	50	50	50
40	2	50	52	0.35000	14.35194	52	60	50	50	50	50
40	3	50	52	0.35000	14.15335	52	60	50	50	50	50
40	4	50	52	0.35000	14.20379	52	60	50	50	50	50
40	5	50	52	0.35000	13.95569	52	60	50	50	50	50
41	0	50	47	0.35000	14.28210	50	50	50	50	47	38
41	1	50	47	0.35000	14.40532	50	50	50	50	47	38
41	2	50	47	0.35000	14.70194	50	50	50	50	47	38
41	3	50	47	0.35000	14.50335	50	50	50	50	47	38
41	4	47	48	0.34909	14.55288	50	50	50	50	47	38
41	5	38	49	0.34524	14.30093	50	50	50	50	47	38
42	0	46	49	0.34916	14.63126	46	55	50	50	55	35
42	1	55	47	0.35117	14.75649	46	55	50	50	55	35
42	2	50	48	0.35000	15.05194	46	55	50	50	55	35

Table LI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
42	3	50	48	0.35000	14.85335	46	55	50	50	55	35
42	4	55	47	0.35117	14.90405	46	55	50	50	55	35
42	5	35	51	0.34650	14.64743	46	55	50	50	55	35
43	0	46	50	0.34963	14.98089	46	54	50	50	50	47
43	1	54	49	0.35009	15.10658	46	54	50	50	50	47
43	2	50	49	0.35000	15.40194	46	54	50	50	50	47
43	3	50	49	0.35000	15.20335	46	54	50	50	50	47
43	4	50	49	0.35000	15.25405	46	54	50	50	50	47
43	5	47	50	0.34979	14.99722	46	54	50	50	50	47
44	0	50	52	0.35000	15.33089	50	58	50	50	51	53
44	1	58	51	0.34757	15.45416	50	58	50	50	51	53
44	2	50	52	0.35000	15.75194	50	58	50	50	51	53
44	3	50	52	0.35000	15.55335	50	58	50	50	51	53
44	4	51	52	0.34974	15.60379	50	58	50	50	51	53
44	5	53	52	0.34909	15.34631	50	58	50	50	51	53
45	0	50	52	0.35000	15.68089	50	63	50	50	50	47
45	1	63	49	0.34757	15.80173	50	63	50	50	50	47
45	2	50	52	0.35000	16.10194	50	63	50	50	50	47
45	3	50	52	0.35000	15.90335	50	63	50	50	50	47
45	4	50	52	0.35000	15.95379	50	63	50	50	50	47
45	5	47	53	0.35084	15.69715	50	63	50	50	50	47
46	0	43	49	0.34804	16.02893	43	50	50	50	50	45
46	1	50	48	0.35000	16.15173	43	50	50	50	50	45
46	2	50	48	0.35000	16.45194	43	50	50	50	50	45
46	3	50	48	0.35000	16.25335	43	50	50	50	50	45
46	4	50	48	0.35000	16.30379	43	50	50	50	50	45
46	5	45	49	0.34883	16.04598	43	50	50	50	50	45
47	0	62	51	0.34524	16.37417	62	57	50	50	52	47
47	1	57	52	0.34722	16.49895	62	57	50	50	52	47
47	2	50	54	0.35000	16.80194	62	57	50	50	52	47
47	3	50	54	0.35000	16.60335	62	57	50	50	52	47
47	4	52	53	0.34921	16.65300	62	57	50	50	52	47
47	5	47	54	0.35119	16.39717	62	57	50	50	52	47
48	0	41	53	0.35126	16.72543	41	55	50	50	50	60
48	1	55	50	0.34942	16.84837	41	55	50	50	50	60
48	2	50	51	0.35000	17.15194	41	55	50	50	50	60
48	3	50	51	0.35000	16.95335	41	55	50	50	50	60
48	4	50	51	0.35000	17.00300	41	55	50	50	50	60
48	5	60	49	0.34883	16.74601	41	55	50	50	50	60
49	0	37	49	0.34454	17.06997	37	50	50	50	50	44
49	1	50	46	0.35000	17.19837	37	50	50	50	50	44
49	2	50	46	0.35000	17.50194	37	50	50	50	50	44
49	3	50	46	0.35000	17.30335	37	50	50	50	50	44
49	4	50	46	0.35000	17.35300	37	50	50	50	50	44
49	5	44	47	0.34706	17.09307	37	50	50	50	50	44

Table LII.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 2

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	46	51	0.35009	0.35009	46	75	80	50	50	0
0	1	75	45	0.35000	0.35000	46	75	80	50	50	0
0	2	80	44	0.35000	0.35000	46	75	80	50	50	0
0	3	50	50	0.35000	0.35000	46	75	80	50	50	0
0	4	50	50	0.35000	0.35000	46	75	80	50	50	0
0	5	0	60	0.35000	0.35000	46	75	80	50	50	0
1	0	54	48	0.35056	0.70065	54	58	83	50	50	0
1	1	58	47	0.35131	0.70131	54	58	83	50	50	0
1	2	83	42	0.35539	0.70539	54	58	83	50	50	0
1	3	50	49	0.35000	0.70000	54	58	83	50	50	0
1	4	50	49	0.35000	0.70000	54	58	83	50	50	0
1	5	0	59	0.34417	0.69417	54	58	83	50	50	0
2	0	52	62	0.34711	1.04776	52	79	50	30	50	100
2	1	79	56	0.31008	1.01138	52	79	50	30	50	100
2	2	50	62	0.35000	1.05539	52	79	50	30	50	100
2	3	30	66	0.37800	1.07800	52	79	50	30	50	100
2	4	50	62	0.35000	1.05000	52	79	50	30	50	100
2	5	100	52	0.28000	0.97417	52	79	50	30	50	100
3	0	50	60	0.35000	1.39776	50	50	100	100	52	0
3	1	50	60	0.35000	1.36138	50	50	100	100	52	0
3	2	100	50	0.29167	1.34706	50	50	100	100	52	0
3	3	100	50	0.29167	1.36967	50	50	100	100	52	0
3	4	52	60	0.34757	1.39757	50	50	100	100	52	0
3	5	0	70	0.40833	1.38250	50	50	100	100	52	0
4	0	50	40	0.35000	1.74776	50	19	50	80	50	0
4	1	19	46	0.31311	1.67449	50	19	50	80	50	0

Table LII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
4	2	50	40	0.35000	1.69706	50	19	50	80	50	0
4	3	80	34	0.38500	1.75467	50	19	50	80	50	0
4	4	50	40	0.35000	1.74757	50	19	50	80	50	0
4	5	0	50	0.29167	1.67417	50	19	50	80	50	0
5	0	48	33	0.34594	2.09370	48	40	69	10	45	0
5	1	40	34	0.32900	2.00349	48	40	69	10	45	0
5	2	69	29	0.38813	2.08518	48	40	69	10	45	0
5	3	10	40	0.26600	2.02067	48	40	69	10	45	0
5	4	45	33	0.33950	2.08707	48	40	69	10	45	0
5	5	0	42	0.24500	1.91917	48	40	69	10	45	0
6	0	50	61	0.35000	2.44370	50	76	69	10	50	100
6	1	76	56	0.31603	2.31952	50	76	69	10	50	100
6	2	69	57	0.32606	2.41124	50	76	69	10	50	100
6	3	10	69	0.40133	2.42200	50	76	69	10	50	100
6	4	50	61	0.35000	2.43707	50	76	69	10	50	100
6	5	100	51	0.28583	2.20500	50	76	69	10	50	100
7	0	50	52	0.35000	2.79370	50	50	23	90	45	52
7	1	50	52	0.35000	2.66952	50	50	23	90	45	52
7	2	23	57	0.35504	2.76628	50	50	23	90	45	52
7	3	90	44	0.34067	2.76267	50	50	23	90	45	52
7	4	45	53	0.35117	2.78824	50	50	23	90	45	52
7	5	52	52	0.34944	2.55444	50	50	23	90	45	52
8	0	50	47	0.35000	3.14370	50	57	44	30	55	51
8	1	57	46	0.35212	3.02164	50	57	44	30	55	51
8	2	44	49	0.34846	3.11474	50	57	44	30	55	51
8	3	30	51	0.34300	3.10567	50	57	44	30	55	51
8	4	55	46	0.35175	3.13999	50	57	44	30	55	51
8	5	51	47	0.35033	2.90477	50	57	44	30	55	51
9	0	60	32	0.36867	3.51237	60	55	3	0	50	50
9	1	55	33	0.35933	3.38098	60	55	3	0	50	50
9	2	3	43	0.26007	3.37482	60	55	3	0	50	50
9	3	0	44	0.25667	3.36233	60	55	3	0	50	50
9	4	50	34	0.35000	3.48999	60	55	3	0	50	50
9	5	50	34	0.35000	3.25477	60	55	3	0	50	50
10	0	60	56	0.34067	3.85303	60	80	99	5	46	51
10	1	80	52	0.32200	3.70298	60	80	99	5	46	51
10	2	99	48	0.30541	3.68023	60	80	99	5	46	51
10	3	5	67	0.39200	3.75433	60	80	99	5	46	51
10	4	46	59	0.35383	3.84382	60	80	99	5	46	51
10	5	51	58	0.34904	3.60381	60	80	99	5	46	51
11	0	60	60	0.33600	4.18903	60	74	47	80	50	49
11	1	74	57	0.31696	4.01994	60	74	47	80	50	49
11	2	47	63	0.35434	4.03457	60	74	47	80	50	49
11	3	80	56	0.30800	4.06233	60	74	47	80	50	49
11	4	50	62	0.35000	4.19382	60	74	47	80	50	49
11	5	49	62	0.35138	3.95519	60	74	47	80	50	49
12	0	50	53	0.35000	4.53903	50	56	29	90	60	32
12	1	56	52	0.34776	4.36770	50	56	29	90	60	32
12	2	29	58	0.35931	4.39388	50	56	29	90	60	32
12	3	90	45	0.33600	4.39833	50	56	29	90	60	32
12	4	60	51	0.34650	4.54032	50	56	29	90	60	32
12	5	32	57	0.35714	4.31233	50	56	29	90	60	32
13	0	50	51	0.35000	4.88903	50	51	36	90	50	28
13	1	51	51	0.34986	4.71756	50	51	36	90	50	28
13	2	36	54	0.35196	4.74584	50	51	36	90	50	28
13	3	90	43	0.34533	4.74367	50	51	36	90	50	28
13	4	50	51	0.35000	4.89032	50	51	36	90	50	28
13	5	28	55	0.35154	4.66387	50	51	36	90	50	28
14	0	50	41	0.35000	5.23903	50	50	27	80	50	0
14	1	50	41	0.35000	5.06756	50	50	27	80	50	0
14	2	27	46	0.32692	5.07276	50	50	27	80	50	0
14	3	80	35	0.38150	5.12517	50	50	27	80	50	0
14	4	50	41	0.35000	5.24032	50	50	27	80	50	0
14	5	0	51	0.29750	4.96137	50	50	27	80	50	0
15	0	50	47	0.35000	5.58903	50	80	53	20	50	32
15	1	80	41	0.36050	5.42806	50	80	53	20	50	32
15	2	53	46	0.35119	5.42395	50	80	53	20	50	32
15	3	20	53	0.33950	5.46467	50	80	53	20	50	32
15	4	50	47	0.35000	5.59032	50	80	53	20	50	32
15	5	32	51	0.34454	5.30591	50	80	53	20	50	32
16	0	50	32	0.35000	5.93903	50	72	0	15	48	27
16	1	72	28	0.39517	5.82323	50	72	0	15	48	27
16	2	0	42	0.24500	5.66895	50	72	0	15	48	27
16	3	15	39	0.27650	5.74117	50	72	0	15	48	27
16	4	48	33	0.34594	5.93626	50	72	0	15	48	27
16	5	27	37	0.30277	5.60868	50	72	0	15	48	27
17	0	50	50	0.35000	6.28903	50	81	70	0	46	52
17	1	81	44	0.34928	6.17251	50	81	70	0	46	52
17	2	70	46	0.35000	6.01895	50	81	70	0	46	52
17	3	0	60	0.35000	6.09117	50	81	70	0	46	52
17	4	46	51	0.35009	6.28635	50	81	70	0	46	52
17	5	52	49	0.35014	5.95882	50	81	70	0	46	52
18	0	50	48	0.35000	6.63903	50	69	70	0	50	50
18	1	69	44	0.35488	6.52738	50	69	70	0	50	50
18	2	70	44	0.35467	6.37362	50	69	70	0	50	50

Table LII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
18	3	0	58	0.33833	6.42950	50	69	70	0	50	50
18	4	50	48	0.35000	6.63635	50	69	70	0	50	50
18	5	50	48	0.35000	6.30882	50	69	70	0	50	50
19	0	50	48	0.35000	6.98903	50	82	0	50	50	56
19	1	82	41	0.35971	6.88709	50	82	0	50	50	56
19	2	0	58	0.33833	6.71195	50	82	0	50	50	56
19	3	50	48	0.35000	6.77950	50	82	0	50	50	56
19	4	50	48	0.35000	6.98635	50	82	0	50	50	56
19	5	56	46	0.35196	6.66078	50	82	0	50	50	56
20	0	50	47	0.35000	7.33903	50	87	18	20	50	58
20	1	87	39	0.36554	7.25263	50	87	18	20	50	58
20	2	18	53	0.33731	7.04926	50	87	18	20	50	58
20	3	20	53	0.33950	7.11900	50	87	18	20	50	58
20	4	50	47	0.35000	7.33635	50	87	18	20	50	58
20	5	58	45	0.35317	7.01395	50	87	18	20	50	58
21	0	50	65	0.35000	7.68903	50	100	18	100	50	58
21	1	100	55	0.26250	7.51513	50	100	18	100	50	58
21	2	18	72	0.40824	7.45750	50	100	18	100	50	58
21	3	100	55	0.26250	7.38150	50	100	18	100	50	58
21	4	50	65	0.35000	7.68635	50	100	18	100	50	58
21	5	58	64	0.33544	7.34939	50	100	18	100	50	58
22	0	50	62	0.35000	8.03903	50	94	20	100	47	50
22	1	94	53	0.28943	7.80456	50	94	20	100	47	50
22	2	20	68	0.39200	7.84950	50	94	20	100	47	50
22	3	100	52	0.28000	7.66150	50	94	20	100	47	50
22	4	47	63	0.35434	8.04069	50	94	20	100	47	50
22	5	50	62	0.35000	7.69939	50	94	20	100	47	50
23	0	44	56	0.35336	8.39239	44	57	23	100	51	48
23	1	57	53	0.34641	8.15096	44	57	23	100	51	48
23	2	23	60	0.36449	8.21399	44	57	23	100	51	48
23	3	100	45	0.32083	7.98233	44	57	23	100	51	48
23	4	51	54	0.34951	8.39020	44	57	23	100	51	48
23	5	48	55	0.35107	8.05047	44	57	23	100	51	48
24	0	45	55	0.35233	8.74473	45	53	25	100	49	47
24	1	53	53	0.34874	8.49970	45	53	25	100	49	47
24	2	25	59	0.36167	8.57565	45	53	25	100	49	47
24	3	100	44	0.32667	8.30900	45	53	25	100	49	47
24	4	49	54	0.35044	8.74064	45	53	25	100	49	47
24	5	47	54	0.35119	8.40166	45	53	25	100	49	47
25	0	45	59	0.35467	9.09939	45	94	5	100	50	47
25	1	94	49	0.30996	8.80966	45	94	5	100	50	47
25	2	5	67	0.39200	8.96765	45	94	5	100	50	47
25	3	100	48	0.30333	8.61233	45	94	5	100	50	47
25	4	50	58	0.35000	9.09064	45	94	5	100	50	47
25	5	47	59	0.35294	8.75460	45	94	5	100	50	47
26	0	45	51	0.35000	9.44939	45	50	7	100	50	46
26	1	50	50	0.35000	9.15966	45	50	7	100	50	46
26	2	7	58	0.34699	9.31464	45	50	7	100	50	46
26	3	100	40	0.35000	8.96233	45	50	7	100	50	46
26	4	50	50	0.35000	9.44064	45	50	7	100	50	46
26	5	46	50	0.34963	9.10422	45	50	7	100	50	46
27	0	44	34	0.33796	9.78735	44	51	23	0	50	47
27	1	51	33	0.35196	9.51162	44	51	23	0	50	47
27	2	23	38	0.29519	9.60983	44	51	23	0	50	47
27	3	0	43	0.25083	9.21317	44	51	23	0	50	47
27	4	50	33	0.35000	9.79064	44	51	23	0	50	47
27	5	47	34	0.34419	9.44841	44	51	23	0	50	47
28	0	50	58	0.35000	10.13735	50	70	90	0	54	74
28	1	70	54	0.33133	9.84296	50	70	90	0	54	74
28	2	90	50	0.31267	9.92250	50	70	90	0	54	74
28	3	0	68	0.39667	9.60983	50	70	90	0	54	74
28	4	54	57	0.34636	10.13700	50	70	90	0	54	74
28	5	74	53	0.32816	9.77657	50	70	90	0	54	74
29	0	43	36	0.33742	10.47478	43	51	20	0	50	60
29	1	51	35	0.35173	10.19468	43	51	20	0	50	60
29	2	20	41	0.29750	10.22000	43	51	20	0	50	60
29	3	0	45	0.26250	9.87233	43	51	20	0	50	60
29	4	50	35	0.35000	10.48700	43	51	20	0	50	60
29	5	60	33	0.36750	10.14407	43	51	20	0	50	60
30	0	50	51	0.35000	10.82478	50	50	68	0	55	84
30	1	50	51	0.35000	10.54468	50	50	68	0	55	84
30	2	68	48	0.34664	10.56664	50	50	68	0	55	84
30	3	0	61	0.35583	10.22817	50	50	68	0	55	84
30	4	55	50	0.34942	10.83642	50	50	68	0	55	84
30	5	84	45	0.34286	10.48693	50	50	68	0	55	84
31	0	50	65	0.35000	11.17478	50	89	20	100	50	67
31	1	89	57	0.28266	10.82734	50	89	20	100	50	67
31	2	20	71	0.40250	10.96914	50	89	20	100	50	67
31	3	100	55	0.26250	10.49067	50	89	20	100	50	67
31	4	50	65	0.35000	11.18642	50	89	20	100	50	67
31	5	67	62	0.31946	10.80639	50	89	20	100	50	67
32	0	47	52	0.35049	11.52527	47	51	20	90	50	50
32	1	51	51	0.34986	11.17720	47	51	20	90	50	50
32	2	20	58	0.35700	11.32614	47	51	20	90	50	50
32	3	90	44	0.34067	10.83133	47	51	20	90	50	50

Table LII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
32	4	50	52	0.35000	11.53642	47	51	20	90	50	50
32	5	50	52	0.35000	11.15639	47	51	20	90	50	50
33	0	50	50	0.35000	11.87527	50	50	20	80	50	48
33	1	50	50	0.35000	11.52720	50	50	20	80	50	48
33	2	20	56	0.35000	11.67614	50	50	20	80	50	48
33	3	80	44	0.35000	11.18133	50	50	20	80	50	48
33	4	50	50	0.35000	11.88642	50	50	20	80	50	48
33	5	48	50	0.34991	11.50630	50	50	20	80	50	48
34	0	50	46	0.35000	12.22527	50	49	21	60	50	50
34	1	49	46	0.34951	11.87671	50	49	21	60	50	50
34	2	21	52	0.33714	12.01328	50	49	21	60	50	50
34	3	60	44	0.35467	11.53600	50	49	21	60	50	50
34	4	50	46	0.35000	12.23642	50	49	21	60	50	50
34	5	50	46	0.35000	11.85630	50	49	21	60	50	50
35	0	50	43	0.35000	12.57527	50	49	22	40	50	56
35	1	49	44	0.34928	12.22599	50	49	22	40	50	56
35	2	22	49	0.32844	12.34172	50	49	22	40	50	56
35	3	40	45	0.34183	11.87783	50	49	22	40	50	56
35	4	50	43	0.35000	12.58642	50	49	22	40	50	56
35	5	56	42	0.35476	12.21106	50	49	22	40	50	56
36	0	50	56	0.35000	12.92527	50	50	62	20	50	100
36	1	50	56	0.35000	12.57599	50	50	62	20	50	100
36	2	62	54	0.34104	12.68276	50	50	62	20	50	100
36	3	20	62	0.37100	12.24883	50	50	62	20	50	100
36	4	50	56	0.35000	12.93642	50	50	62	20	50	100
36	5	100	46	0.31500	12.52606	50	50	62	20	50	100
37	0	50	38	0.35000	13.27527	50	58	26	0	50	54
37	1	58	36	0.36157	12.93756	50	58	26	0	50	54
37	2	26	42	0.31416	12.99692	50	58	26	0	50	54
37	3	0	48	0.28000	12.52883	50	58	26	0	50	54
37	4	50	38	0.35000	13.28642	50	58	26	0	50	54
37	5	54	37	0.35569	12.88175	50	58	26	0	50	54
38	0	50	43	0.35000	13.62527	50	58	29	20	50	56
38	1	58	41	0.35691	13.29447	50	58	29	20	50	56
38	2	29	47	0.33236	13.32928	50	58	29	20	50	56
38	3	20	49	0.32550	12.85433	50	58	29	20	50	56
38	4	50	43	0.35000	13.63642	50	58	29	20	50	56
38	5	56	41	0.35546	13.23721	50	58	29	20	50	56
39	0	50	49	0.35000	13.97527	50	59	22	60	50	55
39	1	59	47	0.35126	13.64573	50	59	22	60	50	55
39	2	22	55	0.34804	13.67732	50	59	22	60	50	55
39	3	60	47	0.35117	13.20550	50	59	22	60	50	55
39	4	50	49	0.35000	13.98642	50	59	22	60	50	55
39	5	55	48	0.35058	13.58779	50	59	22	60	50	55
40	0	50	54	0.35000	14.32527	50	61	28	80	50	50
40	1	61	52	0.34461	13.99034	50	61	28	80	50	50
40	2	28	58	0.35924	14.03656	50	61	28	80	50	50
40	3	80	48	0.33600	13.54150	50	61	28	80	50	50
40	4	50	54	0.35000	14.33642	50	61	28	80	50	50
40	5	50	54	0.35000	13.93779	50	61	28	80	50	50
41	0	50	47	0.35000	14.67527	50	58	21	60	50	47
41	1	58	46	0.35224	14.34258	50	58	21	60	50	47
41	2	21	53	0.34053	14.37709	50	58	21	60	50	47
41	3	60	45	0.35350	13.89500	50	58	21	60	50	47
41	4	50	47	0.35000	14.68642	50	58	21	60	50	47
41	5	47	48	0.34909	14.28688	50	58	21	60	50	47
42	0	50	43	0.35000	15.02527	50	57	12	40	51	53
42	1	57	41	0.35621	14.69879	50	57	12	40	51	53
42	2	12	50	0.31631	14.69340	50	57	12	40	51	53
42	3	40	45	0.34183	14.23683	50	57	12	40	51	53
42	4	51	42	0.35091	15.03733	50	57	12	40	51	53
42	5	53	42	0.35259	14.63947	50	57	12	40	51	53
43	0	50	48	0.35000	15.37527	50	58	54	20	50	57
43	1	58	46	0.35224	15.05103	50	58	54	20	50	57
43	2	54	47	0.35103	15.04442	50	58	54	20	50	57
43	3	20	54	0.34300	14.57983	50	58	54	20	50	57
43	4	50	48	0.35000	15.38733	50	58	54	20	50	57
43	5	57	46	0.35212	14.99160	50	58	54	20	50	57
44	0	50	45	0.35000	15.72527	50	57	25	40	50	54
44	1	57	44	0.35376	15.40478	50	57	25	40	50	54
44	2	25	50	0.33542	15.37984	50	57	25	40	50	54
44	3	40	47	0.34417	14.92400	50	57	25	40	50	54
44	4	50	45	0.35000	15.73733	50	57	25	40	50	54
44	5	54	44	0.35243	15.34402	50	57	25	40	50	54
45	0	50	46	0.35000	16.07527	50	50	14	60	50	56
45	1	50	46	0.35000	15.75478	50	50	14	60	50	56
45	2	14	53	0.33236	15.71220	50	50	14	60	50	56
45	3	60	44	0.35467	15.27867	50	50	14	60	50	56
45	4	50	46	0.35000	16.08733	50	50	14	60	50	56
45	5	56	45	0.35266	15.69668	50	50	14	60	50	56
46	0	51	54	0.34951	16.42478	51	62	21	80	50	57
46	1	62	52	0.34384	16.09862	51	62	21	80	50	57
46	2	21	60	0.36421	16.07641	51	62	21	80	50	57
46	3	80	48	0.33600	15.61467	51	62	21	80	50	57
46	4	50	54	0.35000	16.43733	51	62	21	80	50	57

Table LII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
46	5	57	53	0.34641	16.04309	51	62	21	80	50	57
47	0	50	47	0.35000	16.77478	50	57	15	60	50	52
47	1	57	45	0.35294	16.45156	50	57	15	60	50	52
47	2	15	54	0.33775	16.41416	50	57	15	60	50	52
47	3	60	45	0.35350	15.96817	50	57	15	60	50	52
47	4	50	47	0.35000	16.78733	50	57	15	60	50	52
47	5	52	46	0.35084	16.39393	50	57	15	60	50	52
48	0	50	46	0.35000	17.12478	50	58	26	40	50	55
48	1	58	44	0.35411	16.80567	50	58	26	40	50	55
48	2	26	51	0.33936	16.75352	50	58	26	40	50	55
48	3	40	48	0.34533	16.31350	50	58	26	40	50	55
48	4	50	46	0.35000	17.13733	50	58	26	40	50	55
48	5	55	45	0.35233	16.74626	50	58	26	40	50	55
49	0	50	47	0.35000	17.47478	50	60	53	0	50	70
49	1	60	45	0.35350	17.15917	50	60	53	0	50	70
49	2	53	46	0.35119	17.10471	50	60	53	0	50	70
49	3	0	57	0.33250	16.64600	50	60	53	0	50	70
49	4	50	47	0.35000	17.48733	50	60	53	0	50	70
49	5	70	43	0.35700	17.10326	50	60	53	0	50	70

Table LIII.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 3

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	10	62	0.36867	0.36867	10	82	47	60	62	60
0	1	82	48	0.33357	0.33357	10	82	47	60	62	60
0	2	47	55	0.35154	0.35154	10	82	47	60	62	60
0	3	60	52	0.34533	0.34533	10	82	47	60	62	60
0	4	62	52	0.34384	0.34384	10	82	47	60	62	60
0	5	60	52	0.34533	0.34533	10	82	47	60	62	60
1	0	0	59	0.34417	0.71283	0	98	35	92	17	55
1	1	98	40	0.35224	0.68581	0	98	35	92	17	55
1	2	35	52	0.34825	0.69979	0	98	35	92	17	55
1	3	92	41	0.35294	0.69827	0	98	35	92	17	55
1	4	17	56	0.34769	0.69153	0	98	35	92	17	55
1	5	55	48	0.35058	0.69592	0	98	35	92	17	55
2	0	30	64	0.37333	1.08617	30	99	58	13	94	56
2	1	99	50	0.29398	0.97979	30	99	58	13	94	56
2	2	58	58	0.34104	1.04083	30	99	58	13	94	56
2	3	13	67	0.39144	1.08971	30	99	58	13	94	56
2	4	94	51	0.29969	0.99122	30	99	58	13	94	56
2	5	56	59	0.34286	1.03878	30	99	58	13	94	56
3	0	29	32	0.29561	1.38178	29	0	53	12	42	55
3	1	0	38	0.22167	1.20146	29	0	53	12	42	55
3	2	53	28	0.35749	1.39832	29	0	53	12	42	55
3	3	12	36	0.25424	1.34395	29	0	53	12	42	55
3	4	42	30	0.32984	1.32106	29	0	53	12	42	55
3	5	55	27	0.36283	1.40161	29	0	53	12	42	55
4	0	100	62	0.22167	1.60344	100	100	33	89	77	10
4	1	100	62	0.22167	1.42312	100	100	33	89	77	10
4	2	33	75	0.39284	1.79116	100	100	33	89	77	10
4	3	89	64	0.25081	1.59476	100	100	33	89	77	10
4	4	77	66	0.28259	1.60365	100	100	33	89	77	10
4	5	10	80	0.45267	1.85428	100	100	33	89	77	10
5	0	30	39	0.31500	1.91844	30	51	79	14	50	0
5	1	51	35	0.35173	1.77485	30	51	79	14	50	0
5	2	79	29	0.40143	2.19259	30	51	79	14	50	0
5	3	14	42	0.28616	1.88092	30	51	79	14	50	0
5	4	50	35	0.35000	1.95365	30	51	79	14	50	0
5	5	0	45	0.26250	2.11678	30	51	79	14	50	0
6	0	30	54	0.35000	2.26844	30	99	37	75	50	10
6	1	99	40	0.35114	2.12599	30	99	37	75	50	10
6	2	37	53	0.35061	2.54319	30	99	37	75	50	10
6	3	75	45	0.35000	2.23092	30	99	37	75	50	10
6	4	50	50	0.35000	2.30365	30	99	37	75	50	10
6	5	10	58	0.35000	2.46678	30	99	37	75	50	10
7	0	50	87	0.35000	2.61844	50	100	64	85	95	90
7	1	100	77	0.13417	2.26016	50	100	64	85	95	90
7	2	64	84	0.28989	2.83309	50	100	64	85	95	90
7	3	85	80	0.19892	2.42984	50	100	64	85	95	90
7	4	95	78	0.15575	2.45940	50	100	64	85	95	90
7	5	90	79	0.17733	2.64411	50	100	64	85	95	90
8	0	30	16	0.26133	2.87978	30	0	15	26	30	10
8	1	0	22	0.12833	2.38849	30	0	15	26	30	10
8	2	15	19	0.19483	3.02792	30	0	15	26	30	10
8	3	26	17	0.24416	2.67400	30	0	15	26	30	10

Table LIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
8	4	30	16	0.26133	2.72074	30	0	15	26	30	10
8	5	10	20	0.17267	2.81678	30	0	15	26	30	10
9	0	0	43	0.25083	3.13061	0	51	35	24	51	55
9	1	51	33	0.35196	2.74045	0	51	35	24	51	55
9	2	35	36	0.32025	3.34817	0	51	35	24	51	55
9	3	24	38	0.29783	2.97183	0	51	35	24	51	55
9	4	51	33	0.35196	3.07270	0	51	35	24	51	55
9	5	55	32	0.35992	3.17669	0	51	35	24	51	55
10	0	60	62	0.33367	3.46428	60	100	42	39	72	55
10	1	100	54	0.26833	3.00879	60	100	42	39	72	55
10	2	42	65	0.36251	3.71068	60	100	42	39	72	55
10	3	39	66	0.36771	3.33954	60	100	42	39	72	55
10	4	72	59	0.31561	3.38830	60	100	42	39	72	55
10	5	55	63	0.34183	3.51853	60	100	42	39	72	55
11	0	40	45	0.34183	3.80611	40	67	61	50	0	45
11	1	67	39	0.36507	3.37386	40	67	61	50	0	45
11	2	61	40	0.36001	4.07069	40	67	61	50	0	45
11	3	50	43	0.35000	3.68954	40	67	61	50	0	45
11	4	0	53	0.30917	3.69747	40	67	61	50	0	45
11	5	45	44	0.34592	3.86444	40	67	61	50	0	45
12	0	40	49	0.34650	4.15261	40	75	54	21	3	90
12	1	75	42	0.35875	3.73261	40	75	54	21	3	90
12	2	54	46	0.35149	4.42218	40	75	54	21	3	90
12	3	21	52	0.33714	4.02668	40	75	54	21	3	90
12	4	3	56	0.33136	4.02883	40	75	54	21	3	90
12	5	90	39	0.36400	4.22844	40	75	54	21	3	90
13	0	50	48	0.35000	4.50261	50	77	63	18	74	10
13	1	77	43	0.35504	4.08765	50	77	63	18	74	10
13	2	63	46	0.35212	4.77430	50	77	63	18	74	10
13	3	18	55	0.34477	4.37145	50	77	63	18	74	10
13	4	74	44	0.35336	4.38219	50	77	63	18	74	10
13	5	10	56	0.34067	4.56911	50	77	63	18	74	10
14	0	50	65	0.35000	4.85261	50	98	56	66	13	90
14	1	98	55	0.26824	4.35589	50	98	56	66	13	90
14	2	56	63	0.34006	5.11436	50	98	56	66	13	90
14	3	66	61	0.32349	4.69495	50	98	56	66	13	90
14	4	13	72	0.41302	4.79521	50	98	56	66	13	90
14	5	90	57	0.28000	4.84911	50	98	56	66	13	90
15	0	40	64	0.36400	5.21661	40	82	61	87	37	55
15	1	82	56	0.30371	4.65960	40	82	61	87	37	55
15	2	61	60	0.33434	5.44871	40	82	61	87	37	55
15	3	87	55	0.29647	4.99142	40	82	61	87	37	55
15	4	37	65	0.36881	5.16402	40	82	61	87	37	55
15	5	55	61	0.34300	5.19211	40	82	61	87	37	55
16	0	40	50	0.34767	5.56428	40	26	59	29	75	60
16	1	26	53	0.34496	5.00456	40	26	59	29	75	60
16	2	59	46	0.35231	5.80102	40	26	59	29	75	60
16	3	29	52	0.34461	5.33603	40	26	59	29	75	60
16	4	75	43	0.35583	5.51985	40	26	59	29	75	60
16	5	60	46	0.35233	5.54444	40	26	59	29	75	60
17	0	41	42	0.33971	5.90399	41	1	90	54	10	53
17	1	1	50	0.29398	5.29853	41	1	90	54	10	53
17	2	90	32	0.39667	6.19768	41	1	90	54	10	53
17	3	54	39	0.35476	5.69079	41	1	90	54	10	53
17	4	10	48	0.30333	5.82318	41	1	90	54	10	53
17	5	53	39	0.35364	5.89808	41	1	90	54	10	53
18	0	70	49	0.34300	6.24699	70	43	86	55	0	60
18	1	43	54	0.35212	5.65066	70	43	86	55	0	60
18	2	86	46	0.33656	6.53424	70	43	86	55	0	60
18	3	55	52	0.34825	6.03904	70	43	86	55	0	60
18	4	0	63	0.36750	6.19068	70	43	86	55	0	60
18	5	60	51	0.34650	6.24458	70	43	86	55	0	60
19	0	60	62	0.33367	6.58065	60	60	81	47	32	90
19	1	60	62	0.33367	5.98432	60	60	81	47	32	90
19	2	81	58	0.29864	6.83289	60	60	81	47	32	90
19	3	47	65	0.35504	6.39408	60	60	81	47	32	90
19	4	32	68	0.38024	6.57092	60	60	81	47	32	90
19	5	90	56	0.28467	6.52925	60	60	81	47	32	90
20	0	58	58	0.34104	6.92169	58	58	73	60	52	48
20	1	58	58	0.34104	6.32536	58	58	73	60	52	48
20	2	73	55	0.32424	7.15713	58	58	73	60	52	48
20	3	60	58	0.33833	6.73241	58	58	73	60	52	48
20	4	52	59	0.34781	6.91873	58	58	73	60	52	48
20	5	48	60	0.35224	6.88149	58	58	73	60	52	48
21	0	30	43	0.32433	7.24603	30	41	64	36	26	50
21	1	41	41	0.33866	6.66402	30	41	64	36	26	50
21	2	64	37	0.36666	7.52379	30	41	64	36	26	50
21	3	36	42	0.33236	7.06477	30	41	64	36	26	50
21	4	26	44	0.31976	7.23849	30	41	64	36	26	50
21	5	50	39	0.35000	7.23149	30	41	64	36	26	50
22	0	60	52	0.34533	7.59136	60	76	57	42	73	10
22	1	76	48	0.34029	7.00432	60	76	57	42	73	10
22	2	57	52	0.34722	7.87101	60	76	57	42	73	10
22	3	42	55	0.35317	7.41795	60	76	57	42	73	10
22	4	73	49	0.34034	7.57883	60	76	57	42	73	10

Table LIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
22	5	10	62	0.36867	7.60016	60	76	57	42	73	10
23	0	50	44	0.35000	7.94136	50	77	62	36	18	28
23	1	77	39	0.36764	7.37196	50	77	62	36	18	28
23	2	62	42	0.35784	8.22885	50	77	62	36	18	28
23	3	36	47	0.34053	7.75847	50	77	62	36	18	28
23	4	18	51	0.32984	7.90867	50	77	62	36	18	28
23	5	28	49	0.33614	7.93630	50	77	62	36	18	28
24	0	70	47	0.34767	8.28903	70	78	52	50	43	10
24	1	78	45	0.34804	7.72000	70	78	52	50	43	10
24	2	52	50	0.34991	8.57876	70	78	52	50	43	10
24	3	50	51	0.35000	8.10847	70	78	52	50	43	10
24	4	43	52	0.35049	8.25916	70	78	52	50	43	10
24	5	10	59	0.35467	8.29096	70	78	52	50	43	10
25	0	50	40	0.35000	8.63903	50	77	50	41	32	0
25	1	77	35	0.38024	8.10024	50	77	50	41	32	0
25	2	50	40	0.35000	8.92876	50	77	50	41	32	0
25	3	41	42	0.33971	8.44818	50	77	50	41	32	0
25	4	32	44	0.32984	8.58900	50	77	50	41	32	0
25	5	0	50	0.29167	8.58263	50	77	50	41	32	0
26	0	60	72	0.32200	8.96103	60	77	59	61	75	90
26	1	77	69	0.27314	8.37338	60	77	59	61	75	90
26	2	59	73	0.32396	9.25272	60	77	59	61	75	90
26	3	61	72	0.31894	8.76713	60	77	59	61	75	90
26	4	75	69	0.28000	8.86900	60	77	59	61	75	90
26	5	90	66	0.23800	8.82063	60	77	59	61	75	90
27	0	58	39	0.35877	9.31980	58	45	47	30	17	55
27	1	45	41	0.34417	8.71754	58	45	47	30	17	55
27	2	47	41	0.34664	9.59936	58	45	47	30	17	55
27	3	30	44	0.32667	9.09379	58	45	47	30	17	55
27	4	17	47	0.31304	9.18204	58	45	47	30	17	55
27	5	55	39	0.35583	9.17646	58	45	47	30	17	55
28	0	30	50	0.34067	9.66047	30	41	69	52	29	59
28	1	41	48	0.34601	9.06355	30	41	69	52	29	59
28	2	69	42	0.35931	9.95867	30	41	69	52	29	59
28	3	52	46	0.35084	9.44463	30	41	69	52	29	59
28	4	29	50	0.33971	9.52175	30	41	69	52	29	59
28	5	59	44	0.35441	9.53087	30	41	69	52	29	59
29	0	50	54	0.35000	10.01047	50	67	64	44	31	63
29	1	67	50	0.34326	9.40681	50	67	64	44	31	63
29	2	64	51	0.34379	10.30246	50	67	64	44	31	63
29	3	44	55	0.35266	9.79729	50	67	64	44	31	63
29	4	31	58	0.35931	9.88106	50	67	64	44	31	63
29	5	63	51	0.34454	9.87541	50	67	64	44	31	63
30	0	50	51	0.35000	10.36047	50	68	63	59	8	55
30	1	68	47	0.34874	9.75555	50	68	63	59	8	55
30	2	63	48	0.34909	10.65155	50	68	63	59	8	55
30	3	59	49	0.34916	10.14645	50	68	63	59	8	55
30	4	8	59	0.35294	10.23400	50	68	63	59	8	55
30	5	55	50	0.34942	10.22483	50	68	63	59	8	55
31	0	50	52	0.35000	10.71047	50	67	51	50	41	50
31	1	67	48	0.34722	10.10277	50	67	51	50	41	50
31	2	51	52	0.34974	11.00129	50	67	51	50	41	50
31	3	50	52	0.35000	10.49645	50	67	51	50	41	50
31	4	41	54	0.35231	10.58631	50	67	51	50	41	50
31	5	50	52	0.35000	10.57483	50	67	51	50	41	50
32	0	50	47	0.35000	11.06047	50	54	59	50	22	50
32	1	54	46	0.35149	10.45427	50	54	59	50	22	50
32	2	59	45	0.35336	11.35465	50	54	59	50	22	50
32	3	50	47	0.35000	10.84645	50	54	59	50	22	50
32	4	22	53	0.34151	10.92782	50	54	59	50	22	50
32	5	50	47	0.35000	10.92483	50	54	59	50	22	50
33	0	50	58	0.35000	11.41047	50	96	59	25	60	50
33	1	96	49	0.30599	10.76026	50	96	59	25	60	50
33	2	59	56	0.34181	11.69646	50	96	59	25	60	50
33	3	25	63	0.37333	11.21979	50	96	59	25	60	50
33	4	60	56	0.34067	11.26848	50	96	59	25	60	50
33	5	50	58	0.35000	11.27483	50	96	59	25	60	50
34	0	70	50	0.34067	11.75113	70	78	63	15	38	55
34	1	78	48	0.33824	11.09850	70	78	63	15	38	55
34	2	63	51	0.34454	12.04100	70	78	63	15	38	55
34	3	15	61	0.36633	11.58612	70	78	63	15	38	55
34	4	38	56	0.35504	11.62352	70	78	63	15	38	55
34	5	55	53	0.34767	11.62250	70	78	63	15	38	55
35	0	50	40	0.35000	12.10113	50	51	47	21	38	45
35	1	51	40	0.35114	11.44964	50	51	47	21	38	45
35	2	47	41	0.34664	12.38764	50	51	47	21	38	45
35	3	21	46	0.31684	11.90296	50	51	47	21	38	45
35	4	38	43	0.33684	11.96036	50	51	47	21	38	45
35	5	45	41	0.34417	11.96666	50	51	47	21	38	45
36	0	51	53	0.34963	12.45076	51	53	49	50	60	55
36	1	53	53	0.34874	11.79838	51	53	49	50	60	55
36	2	49	54	0.35044	12.73809	51	53	49	50	60	55
36	3	50	54	0.35000	12.25296	51	53	49	50	60	55
36	4	60	52	0.34533	12.30570	51	53	49	50	60	55
36	5	55	53	0.34767	12.31433	51	53	49	50	60	55

Table LIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
37	0	50	51	0.35000	12.80076	50	72	48	50	32	55
37	1	72	47	0.34641	12.14479	50	72	48	50	32	55
37	2	48	52	0.35037	13.08846	50	72	48	50	32	55
37	3	50	51	0.35000	12.60296	50	72	48	50	32	55
37	4	32	55	0.35294	12.65864	50	72	48	50	32	55
37	5	55	50	0.34942	12.66375	50	72	48	50	32	55
38	0	50	50	0.35000	13.15076	50	52	42	64	40	50
38	1	52	49	0.35014	12.49493	50	52	42	64	40	50
38	2	42	51	0.34944	13.43790	50	52	42	64	40	50
38	3	64	47	0.35033	12.95329	50	52	42	64	40	50
38	4	40	52	0.35000	13.00864	50	52	42	64	40	50
38	5	50	50	0.35000	13.01375	50	52	42	64	40	50
39	0	50	52	0.35000	13.50076	50	70	65	30	45	50
39	1	70	48	0.34533	12.84026	50	70	65	30	45	50
39	2	65	49	0.34650	13.78440	50	70	65	30	45	50
39	3	30	56	0.35467	13.30796	50	70	65	30	45	50
39	4	45	53	0.35117	13.35980	50	70	65	30	45	50
39	5	50	52	0.35000	13.36375	50	70	65	30	45	50
40	0	50	38	0.35000	13.85076	50	70	11	24	37	50
40	1	70	34	0.37800	13.21826	50	70	11	24	37	50
40	2	11	46	0.29631	14.08071	50	70	11	24	37	50
40	3	24	44	0.31603	13.62398	50	70	11	24	37	50
40	4	37	41	0.33241	13.69221	50	70	11	24	37	50
40	5	50	38	0.35000	13.71375	50	70	11	24	37	50
41	0	0	65	0.37917	14.22993	0	85	46	91	53	50
41	1	85	48	0.32958	13.54785	0	85	46	91	53	50
41	2	46	56	0.35243	14.43314	0	85	46	91	53	50
41	3	91	47	0.32513	13.94911	0	85	46	91	53	50
41	4	53	54	0.34839	14.04060	0	85	46	91	53	50
41	5	50	55	0.35000	14.06375	0	85	46	91	53	50
42	0	80	59	0.29750	14.52743	80	86	56	66	38	50
42	1	86	58	0.28616	13.83401	80	86	56	66	38	50
42	2	56	64	0.33936	14.77250	80	86	56	66	38	50
42	3	66	62	0.32163	14.27074	80	86	56	66	38	50
42	4	38	68	0.37184	14.41244	80	86	56	66	38	50
42	5	50	65	0.35000	14.41375	80	86	56	66	38	50
43	0	50	53	0.35000	14.87743	50	94	60	27	34	50
43	1	94	44	0.33563	14.16963	50	94	60	27	34	50
43	2	60	51	0.34650	15.11900	50	94	60	27	34	50
43	3	27	58	0.35912	14.62986	50	94	60	27	34	50
43	4	34	56	0.35523	14.76767	50	94	60	27	34	50
43	5	50	53	0.35000	14.76375	50	94	60	27	34	50
44	0	50	56	0.35000	15.22743	50	100	53	25	50	50
44	1	100	46	0.31500	14.48463	50	100	53	25	50	50
44	2	53	55	0.34804	15.46704	50	100	53	25	50	50
44	3	25	61	0.36750	14.99736	50	100	53	25	50	50
44	4	50	56	0.35000	15.11767	50	100	53	25	50	50
44	5	50	56	0.35000	15.11375	50	100	53	25	50	50
45	0	48	45	0.34874	15.57617	48	71	62	10	44	40
45	1	71	41	0.36176	14.84639	48	71	62	10	44	40
45	2	62	43	0.35644	15.82348	48	71	62	10	44	40
45	3	10	53	0.32667	15.32403	48	71	62	10	44	40
45	4	44	46	0.34636	15.46403	48	71	62	10	44	40
45	5	40	47	0.34417	15.45791	48	71	62	10	44	40
46	0	50	54	0.35000	15.92617	50	75	58	46	41	50
46	1	75	49	0.33833	15.18473	50	75	58	46	41	50
46	2	58	52	0.34664	16.17012	50	75	58	46	41	50
46	3	46	55	0.35196	15.67599	50	75	58	46	41	50
46	4	41	56	0.35441	15.81844	50	75	58	46	41	50
46	5	50	54	0.35000	15.80791	50	75	58	46	41	50
47	0	50	58	0.35000	16.27617	50	79	55	68	37	50
47	1	79	52	0.32361	15.50834	50	79	55	68	37	50
47	2	55	57	0.34533	16.51545	50	79	55	68	37	50
47	3	68	54	0.33404	16.01003	50	79	55	68	37	50
47	4	37	60	0.36122	16.17966	50	79	55	68	37	50
47	5	50	58	0.35000	16.15791	50	79	55	68	37	50
48	0	50	47	0.35000	16.62617	50	78	57	22	30	50
48	1	78	42	0.35784	15.86618	50	78	57	22	30	50
48	2	57	46	0.35212	16.86757	50	78	57	22	30	50
48	3	22	53	0.34151	16.35153	50	78	57	22	30	50
48	4	30	51	0.34300	16.52266	50	78	57	22	30	50
48	5	50	47	0.35000	16.50791	50	78	57	22	30	50
49	0	50	64	0.35000	16.97617	50	81	52	94	41	50
49	1	81	57	0.30226	16.16844	50	81	52	94	41	50
49	2	52	63	0.34687	17.21445	50	81	52	94	41	50
49	3	94	55	0.27916	16.63069	50	81	52	94	41	50
49	4	41	65	0.36386	16.88652	50	81	52	94	41	50
49	5	50	64	0.35000	16.85791	50	81	52	94	41	50

Table LIV.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 4

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	100	45	0.32083	0.32083	100	50	78	24	40	35
0	1	50	55	0.35000	0.35000	100	50	78	24	40	35
0	2	78	50	0.33171	0.33171	100	50	78	24	40	35
0	3	24	61	0.36759	0.36759	100	50	78	24	40	35
0	4	40	57	0.35583	0.35583	100	50	78	24	40	35
0	5	35	58	0.35875	0.35875	100	50	78	24	40	35
1	0	97	46	0.32039	0.64122	97	50	6	90	48	38
1	1	50	56	0.35000	0.70000	97	50	6	90	48	38
1	2	6	65	0.38183	0.71353	97	50	6	90	48	38
1	3	90	48	0.32200	0.68959	97	50	6	90	48	38
1	4	48	56	0.35131	0.70714	97	50	6	90	48	38
1	5	38	58	0.35784	0.71659	97	50	6	90	48	38
2	0	76	30	0.39489	1.03612	76	50	6	50	3	40
2	1	50	35	0.35000	1.05000	76	50	6	50	3	40
2	2	6	44	0.27403	0.98756	76	50	6	50	3	40
2	3	50	35	0.35000	1.03959	76	50	6	50	3	40
2	4	3	44	0.26556	0.97270	76	50	6	50	3	40
2	5	40	37	0.33250	1.04909	76	50	6	50	3	40
3	0	85	76	0.21525	1.25137	85	93	50	92	50	94
3	1	93	74	0.18646	1.23646	85	93	50	92	50	94
3	2	50	83	0.35000	1.33756	85	93	50	92	50	94
3	3	92	74	0.19124	1.23083	85	93	50	92	50	94
3	4	50	83	0.35000	1.32270	85	93	50	92	50	94
3	5	94	74	0.18163	1.23072	85	93	50	92	50	94
4	0	50	69	0.35000	1.60137	50	50	83	95	39	78
4	1	50	69	0.35000	1.58646	50	50	83	95	39	78
4	2	83	62	0.27839	1.61595	50	50	83	95	39	78
4	3	95	60	0.25025	1.48108	50	50	83	95	39	78
4	4	39	71	0.37413	1.69682	50	50	83	95	39	78
4	5	78	63	0.28924	1.51996	50	50	83	95	39	78
5	0	30	52	0.34533	1.94670	30	50	83	69	26	33
5	1	50	48	0.35000	1.93646	30	50	83	69	26	33
5	2	83	42	0.35539	1.97134	30	50	83	69	26	33
5	3	69	44	0.35488	1.83596	30	50	83	69	26	33
5	4	26	53	0.34496	2.04178	30	50	83	69	26	33
5	5	33	52	0.34722	1.86718	30	50	83	69	26	33
6	0	65	40	0.36225	2.30895	65	50	48	33	31	40
6	1	50	43	0.35000	2.28646	65	50	48	33	31	40
6	2	48	44	0.34851	2.31985	65	50	48	33	31	40
6	3	33	47	0.33731	2.17327	65	50	48	33	31	40
6	4	31	47	0.33493	2.37671	65	50	48	33	31	40
6	5	40	45	0.34183	2.20901	65	50	48	33	31	40
7	0	80	61	0.29050	2.59945	80	50	60	97	37	60
7	1	50	67	0.35000	2.63646	80	50	60	97	37	60
7	2	60	65	0.33017	2.65001	80	50	60	97	37	60
7	3	97	57	0.26007	2.43334	80	50	60	97	37	60
7	4	37	69	0.37487	2.75158	80	50	60	97	37	60
7	5	60	65	0.33017	2.53918	80	50	60	97	37	60
8	0	46	55	0.35196	2.95141	46	50	82	42	32	70
8	1	50	54	0.35000	2.98646	46	50	82	42	32	70
8	2	82	48	0.33357	2.98359	46	50	82	42	32	70
8	3	42	56	0.35411	2.78745	46	50	82	42	32	70
8	4	32	58	0.35924	3.11082	46	50	82	42	32	70
8	5	70	50	0.34067	2.87985	46	50	82	42	32	70
9	0	40	38	0.33367	3.28508	40	50	0	64	27	50
9	1	50	36	0.35000	3.33646	40	50	0	64	27	50
9	2	0	46	0.26833	3.25192	40	50	0	64	27	50
9	3	64	33	0.37319	3.16064	40	50	0	64	27	50
9	4	27	41	0.31351	3.42433	40	50	0	64	27	50
9	5	50	36	0.35000	3.22985	40	50	0	64	27	50
10	0	60	54	0.34300	3.62808	60	50	84	29	50	55
10	1	50	56	0.35000	3.68646	60	50	84	29	50	55
10	2	84	49	0.32699	3.57891	60	50	84	29	50	55
10	3	29	60	0.36421	3.52485	60	50	84	29	50	55
10	4	50	56	0.35000	3.77433	60	50	84	29	50	55
10	5	55	55	0.34650	3.57635	60	50	84	29	50	55
11	0	41	50	0.34811	3.97619	41	43	48	97	31	30
11	1	43	49	0.34804	4.03450	41	43	48	97	31	30
11	2	48	48	0.34944	3.92835	41	43	48	97	31	30
11	3	97	39	0.35877	3.88362	41	43	48	97	31	30
11	4	31	52	0.34601	4.12034	41	43	48	97	31	30
11	5	30	52	0.34533	3.92168	41	43	48	97	31	30
12	0	54	40	0.35429	4.33048	54	64	49	2	46	37
12	1	64	38	0.36503	4.39952	54	64	49	2	46	37
12	2	49	41	0.34893	4.27728	54	64	49	2	46	37
12	3	2	50	0.29624	4.17986	54	64	49	2	46	37
12	4	46	41	0.34543	4.46577	54	64	49	2	46	37
12	5	37	43	0.33544	4.25712	54	64	49	2	46	37
13	0	70	47	0.34767	4.67815	70	73	45	3	50	66
13	1	73	47	0.34571	4.74523	70	73	45	3	50	66
13	2	45	52	0.35058	4.62786	70	73	45	3	50	66
13	3	3	61	0.35877	4.53864	70	73	45	3	50	66
13	4	50	51	0.35000	4.81577	70	73	45	3	50	66
13	5	66	48	0.34776	4.60488	70	73	45	3	50	66
14	0	29	69	0.38626	5.06441	29	58	50	100	60	75

Table LIV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
14	1	58	63	0.33637	5.08160	29	58	50	100	60	75
14	2	50	64	0.35000	4.97786	29	58	50	100	60	75
14	3	100	54	0.26833	4.80697	29	58	50	100	60	75
14	4	60	62	0.33367	5.14943	29	58	50	100	60	75
14	5	75	59	0.30917	4.91405	29	58	50	100	60	75
15	0	44	66	0.36036	5.42477	44	50	65	94	34	85
15	1	50	64	0.35000	5.43160	44	50	65	94	34	85
15	2	65	61	0.32550	5.30336	44	50	65	94	34	85
15	3	94	56	0.27403	5.08100	44	50	65	94	34	85
15	4	34	68	0.37763	5.52706	44	50	65	94	34	85
15	5	85	57	0.29283	5.20688	44	50	65	94	34	85
16	0	37	48	0.34302	5.76779	37	50	62	4	34	90
16	1	50	45	0.35000	5.78160	37	50	62	4	34	90
16	2	62	43	0.35644	5.65980	37	50	62	4	34	90
16	3	4	55	0.32746	5.40846	37	50	62	4	34	90
16	4	34	49	0.34216	5.86922	37	50	62	4	34	90
16	5	90	37	0.37333	5.58021	37	50	62	4	34	90
17	0	54	66	0.34216	6.10995	54	50	98	51	42	90
17	1	50	67	0.35000	6.13160	54	50	98	51	42	90
17	2	98	57	0.25704	5.91684	54	50	98	51	42	90
17	3	51	67	0.34799	5.75645	54	50	98	51	42	90
17	4	42	69	0.36624	6.23546	54	50	98	51	42	90
17	5	90	59	0.27067	5.85088	54	50	98	51	42	90
18	0	32	37	0.31514	6.42509	32	0	52	0	41	90
18	1	0	43	0.25083	6.38244	32	0	52	0	41	90
18	2	52	33	0.35387	6.27072	32	0	52	0	41	90
18	3	0	43	0.25083	6.00728	32	0	52	0	41	90
18	4	41	35	0.33236	6.56782	32	0	52	0	41	90
18	5	90	25	0.42933	6.28021	32	0	52	0	41	90
19	0	47	51	0.35014	6.77523	47	72	50	3	36	92
19	1	72	46	0.34897	6.73141	47	72	50	3	36	92
19	2	50	50	0.35000	6.62072	47	72	50	3	36	92
19	3	3	59	0.34781	6.35509	47	72	50	3	36	92
19	4	36	53	0.35033	6.91815	47	72	50	3	36	92
19	5	92	42	0.34804	6.62825	47	72	50	3	36	92
20	0	51	66	0.34811	7.12334	51	50	50	97	38	97
20	1	50	67	0.35000	7.08141	51	50	50	97	38	97
20	2	50	67	0.35000	6.97072	51	50	50	97	38	97
20	3	97	57	0.26007	6.61516	51	50	50	97	38	97
20	4	38	69	0.37324	7.29139	51	50	50	97	38	97
20	5	97	57	0.26007	6.88833	51	50	50	97	38	97
21	0	5	51	0.30800	7.43134	5	8	65	50	37	97
21	1	8	51	0.31374	7.39515	5	8	65	50	37	97
21	2	65	39	0.36400	7.33472	5	8	65	50	37	97
21	3	50	42	0.35000	6.96516	5	8	65	50	37	97
21	4	37	45	0.33847	7.62986	5	8	65	50	37	97
21	5	97	33	0.39167	7.28000	5	8	65	50	37	97
22	0	55	53	0.34767	7.77901	55	50	54	25	37	97
22	1	50	54	0.35000	7.74515	55	50	54	25	37	97
22	2	54	53	0.34823	7.68294	55	50	54	25	37	97
22	3	25	59	0.36167	7.32683	55	50	54	25	37	97
22	4	37	56	0.35516	7.98502	55	50	54	25	37	97
22	5	97	44	0.33136	7.61136	55	50	54	25	37	97
23	0	41	63	0.36176	8.14077	41	50	62	39	65	98
23	1	50	61	0.35000	8.09515	41	50	62	39	65	98
23	2	62	59	0.33404	8.01698	41	50	62	39	65	98
23	3	39	63	0.36386	7.69069	41	50	62	39	65	98
23	4	65	58	0.33075	8.31577	41	50	62	39	65	98
23	5	98	51	0.29064	7.90200	41	50	62	39	65	98
24	0	12	64	0.37837	8.51914	12	50	50	60	66	95
24	1	50	57	0.35000	8.44515	12	50	50	60	66	95
24	2	50	57	0.35000	8.36698	12	50	50	60	66	95
24	3	60	55	0.34183	8.03252	12	50	50	60	66	95
24	4	66	53	0.33843	8.65419	12	50	50	60	66	95
24	5	95	48	0.31325	8.21525	12	50	50	60	66	95
25	0	21	56	0.35068	8.86982	21	50	50	51	40	90
25	1	50	50	0.35000	8.79515	21	50	50	51	40	90
25	2	50	50	0.35000	8.71698	21	50	50	51	40	90
25	3	51	50	0.34998	8.38250	21	50	50	51	40	90
25	4	40	52	0.35000	9.00419	21	50	50	51	40	90
25	5	90	42	0.35000	8.56525	21	50	50	51	40	90
26	0	30	56	0.35467	9.22448	30	50	60	45	38	85
26	1	50	52	0.35000	9.14515	30	50	60	45	38	85
26	2	60	50	0.34767	9.06465	30	50	60	45	38	85
26	3	45	53	0.35117	8.73367	30	50	60	45	38	85
26	4	38	54	0.35224	9.35643	30	50	60	45	38	85
26	5	85	45	0.34183	8.90708	30	50	60	45	38	85
27	0	19	55	0.34566	9.57014	19	50	41	63	58	64
27	1	50	49	0.35000	9.49515	19	50	41	63	58	64
27	2	41	51	0.34916	9.41381	19	50	41	63	58	64
27	3	63	46	0.35212	9.08579	19	50	41	63	58	64
27	4	58	47	0.35131	9.70774	19	50	41	63	58	64
27	5	64	46	0.35196	9.25904	19	50	41	63	58	64
28	0	37	54	0.35212	9.92227	37	50	50	46	61	65
28	1	50	52	0.35000	9.84515	37	50	50	46	61	65

Table LIV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
28	2	50	52	0.35000	9.76381	37	50	50	46	61	65
28	3	46	53	0.35103	9.43682	37	50	50	46	61	65
28	4	61	50	0.34718	10.05492	37	50	50	46	61	65
28	5	65	49	0.34650	9.60554	37	50	50	46	61	65
29	0	40	62	0.36167	10.28393	40	50	50	98	57	55
29	1	50	60	0.35000	10.19515	40	50	50	98	57	55
29	2	50	60	0.35000	10.11381	40	50	50	98	57	55
29	3	98	50	0.29624	9.73306	40	50	50	98	57	55
29	4	57	59	0.34151	10.39642	40	50	50	98	57	55
29	5	55	59	0.34417	9.94971	40	50	50	98	57	55
30	0	35	35	0.31850	10.60243	35	50	57	1	34	32
30	1	50	32	0.35000	10.54515	35	50	57	1	34	32
30	2	57	30	0.36519	10.47900	35	50	57	1	34	32
30	3	1	42	0.24824	9.98130	35	50	57	1	34	32
30	4	34	35	0.31603	10.71245	35	50	57	1	34	32
30	5	32	35	0.31094	10.26065	35	50	57	1	34	32
31	0	65	61	0.32550	10.92793	65	50	74	52	40	89
31	1	50	64	0.35000	10.89515	65	50	74	52	40	89
31	2	74	59	0.31136	10.79036	65	50	74	52	40	89
31	3	52	64	0.34664	10.32794	65	50	74	52	40	89
31	4	40	66	0.36633	11.07878	65	50	74	52	40	89
31	5	89	56	0.28721	10.54786	65	50	74	52	40	89
32	0	41	60	0.35861	11.28654	41	50	59	50	47	92
32	1	50	58	0.35000	11.24515	41	50	59	50	47	92
32	2	59	56	0.34181	11.13217	41	50	59	50	47	92
32	3	50	58	0.35000	10.67794	41	50	59	50	47	92
32	4	47	58	0.35259	11.43137	41	50	59	50	47	92
32	5	92	49	0.31374	10.86160	41	50	59	50	47	92
33	0	29	52	0.34461	11.63115	29	50	50	48	41	71
33	1	50	48	0.35000	11.59515	29	50	50	48	41	71
33	2	50	48	0.35000	11.48217	29	50	50	48	41	71
33	3	48	48	0.34944	11.02738	29	50	50	48	41	71
33	4	41	50	0.34811	11.77948	29	50	50	48	41	71
33	5	71	44	0.35441	11.21601	29	50	50	48	41	71
34	0	41	45	0.34286	11.97401	41	50	53	50	37	34
34	1	50	43	0.35000	11.94515	41	50	53	50	37	34
34	2	53	42	0.35259	11.83476	41	50	53	50	37	34
34	3	50	43	0.35000	11.37738	41	50	53	50	37	34
34	4	37	46	0.33999	12.11947	41	50	53	50	37	34
34	5	34	46	0.33656	11.55257	41	50	53	50	37	34
35	0	50	46	0.35000	12.32401	50	50	56	50	55	18
35	1	50	46	0.35000	12.29515	50	50	56	50	55	18
35	2	56	45	0.35266	12.18742	50	50	56	50	55	18
35	3	50	46	0.35000	11.72738	50	50	56	50	55	18
35	4	55	45	0.35233	12.47181	50	50	56	50	55	18
35	5	18	52	0.33357	11.88614	50	50	56	50	55	18
36	0	40	47	0.34417	12.66818	40	50	64	50	53	16
36	1	50	45	0.35000	12.64515	40	50	64	50	53	16
36	2	64	42	0.35849	12.54591	40	50	64	50	53	16
36	3	50	45	0.35000	12.07738	40	50	64	50	53	16
36	4	53	44	0.35189	12.82370	40	50	64	50	53	16
36	5	16	51	0.32699	12.21313	40	50	64	50	53	16
37	0	53	61	0.34594	13.01412	53	50	67	50	55	85
37	1	50	62	0.35000	12.99515	53	50	67	50	55	85
37	2	67	59	0.32541	12.87132	53	50	67	50	55	85
37	3	50	62	0.35000	12.42738	53	50	67	50	55	85
37	4	55	61	0.34300	13.16670	53	50	67	50	55	85
37	5	85	55	0.30100	12.51413	53	50	67	50	55	85
38	0	44	60	0.35616	13.37028	44	50	66	50	51	84
38	1	50	59	0.35000	13.34515	44	50	66	50	51	84
38	2	66	56	0.33283	13.20415	44	50	66	50	51	84
38	3	50	59	0.35000	12.77738	44	50	66	50	51	84
38	4	51	59	0.34893	13.51562	44	50	66	50	51	84
38	5	84	52	0.31509	12.82923	44	50	66	50	51	84
39	0	46	50	0.34963	13.71991	46	50	55	50	47	50
39	1	50	50	0.35000	13.69515	46	50	55	50	47	50
39	2	55	49	0.35000	13.55415	46	50	55	50	47	50
39	3	50	50	0.35000	13.12738	46	50	55	50	47	50
39	4	47	50	0.34979	13.86541	46	50	55	50	47	50
39	5	50	50	0.35000	13.17923	46	50	55	50	47	50
40	0	46	50	0.34963	14.06953	46	50	50	50	52	48
40	1	50	49	0.35000	14.04515	46	50	50	50	52	48
40	2	50	49	0.35000	13.90415	46	50	50	50	52	48
40	3	50	49	0.35000	13.47738	46	50	50	50	52	48
40	4	52	49	0.35014	14.21555	46	50	50	50	52	48
40	5	48	50	0.34991	13.52913	46	50	50	50	52	48
41	0	48	51	0.35014	14.41967	48	50	50	50	53	50
41	1	50	50	0.35000	14.39515	48	50	50	50	53	50
41	2	50	50	0.35000	14.25415	48	50	50	50	53	50
41	3	50	50	0.35000	13.82738	48	50	50	50	53	50
41	4	53	50	0.34979	14.56534	48	50	50	50	53	50
41	5	50	50	0.35000	13.87913	48	50	50	50	53	50
42	0	49	50	0.34998	14.76965	49	50	50	50	52	50
42	1	50	50	0.35000	14.74515	49	50	50	50	52	50
42	2	50	50	0.35000	14.60415	49	50	50	50	52	50

Table LIV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
42	3	50	50	0.35000	14.17738	49	50	50	50	52	50
42	4	52	50	0.34991	14.91525	49	50	50	50	52	50
42	5	50	50	0.35000	14.22913	49	50	50	50	52	50
43	0	50	51	0.35000	15.11965	50	50	50	50	53	50
43	1	50	51	0.35000	15.09515	50	50	50	50	53	50
43	2	50	51	0.35000	14.95415	50	50	50	50	53	50
43	3	50	51	0.35000	14.52738	50	50	50	50	53	50
43	4	53	50	0.34979	15.26504	50	50	50	50	53	50
43	5	50	51	0.35000	14.57913	50	50	50	50	53	50
44	0	52	50	0.34991	15.46956	52	50	50	50	53	48
44	1	50	51	0.35000	15.44515	52	50	50	50	53	48
44	2	50	51	0.35000	15.30415	52	50	50	50	53	48
44	3	50	51	0.35000	14.87738	52	50	50	50	53	48
44	4	53	50	0.34979	15.61483	52	50	50	50	53	48
44	5	48	51	0.35014	14.92927	52	50	50	50	53	48
45	0	50	49	0.35000	15.81956	50	50	50	50	50	45
45	1	50	49	0.35000	15.79515	50	50	50	50	50	45
45	2	50	49	0.35000	15.65415	50	50	50	50	50	45
45	3	50	49	0.35000	15.22738	50	50	50	50	50	45
45	4	50	49	0.35000	15.96483	50	50	50	50	50	45
45	5	45	50	0.34942	15.27869	50	50	50	50	50	45
46	0	48	58	0.35177	16.17133	48	50	50	50	50	92
46	1	50	58	0.35000	16.14515	48	50	50	50	50	92
46	2	50	58	0.35000	16.00415	48	50	50	50	50	92
46	3	50	58	0.35000	15.57738	48	50	50	50	50	92
46	4	50	58	0.35000	16.31483	48	50	50	50	50	92
46	5	92	50	0.30884	15.58753	48	50	50	50	50	92
47	0	46	58	0.35336	16.52469	46	50	50	50	50	91
47	1	50	57	0.35000	16.49515	46	50	50	50	50	91
47	2	50	57	0.35000	16.35415	46	50	50	50	50	91
47	3	50	57	0.35000	15.92738	46	50	50	50	50	91
47	4	50	57	0.35000	16.66483	46	50	50	50	50	91
47	5	91	49	0.31556	15.90309	46	50	50	50	50	91
48	0	47	58	0.35259	16.87728	47	50	49	50	47	94
48	1	50	57	0.35000	16.84515	47	50	49	50	47	94
48	2	49	58	0.35091	16.70506	47	50	49	50	47	94
48	3	50	57	0.35000	16.27738	47	50	49	50	47	94
48	4	47	58	0.35259	17.01742	47	50	49	50	47	94
48	5	94	49	0.30996	16.21305	47	50	49	50	47	94
49	0	43	55	0.35294	17.23022	43	50	34	50	50	92
49	1	50	54	0.35000	17.19515	43	50	34	50	50	92
49	2	34	57	0.35709	17.06215	43	50	34	50	50	92
49	3	50	54	0.35000	16.62738	43	50	34	50	50	92
49	4	50	54	0.35000	17.36742	43	50	34	50	50	92
49	5	92	45	0.33334	16.54639	43	50	34	50	50	92

Table LV.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - no transport costs - Cohort 5

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	3	46	0.27652	0.27652	3	48	40	53	89	0
0	1	48	37	0.34687	0.34687	3	48	40	53	89	0
0	2	40	39	0.33483	0.33483	3	48	40	53	89	0
0	3	53	36	0.35469	0.35469	3	48	40	53	89	0
0	4	89	29	0.41006	0.41006	3	48	40	53	89	0
0	5	0	47	0.27417	0.27417	3	48	40	53	89	0
1	0	68	51	0.34034	0.61686	68	50	20	47	100	40
1	1	50	55	0.35000	0.69687	68	50	20	47	100	40
1	2	20	61	0.36750	0.70233	68	50	20	47	100	40
1	3	47	56	0.35189	0.70658	68	50	20	47	100	40
1	4	100	45	0.32083	0.73089	68	50	20	47	100	40
1	5	40	57	0.35583	0.63000	68	50	20	47	100	40
2	0	45	60	0.35525	0.97211	45	50	70	23	98	60
2	1	50	59	0.35000	1.04687	45	50	70	23	98	60
2	2	70	55	0.32900	1.03133	45	50	70	23	98	60
2	3	23	65	0.38024	1.08682	45	50	70	23	98	60
2	4	98	50	0.29624	1.02713	45	50	70	23	98	60
2	5	60	57	0.33950	0.96950	45	50	70	23	98	60
3	0	37	52	0.34909	1.32120	37	50	10	25	95	80
3	1	50	49	0.35000	1.39687	37	50	10	25	95	80
3	2	10	57	0.34533	1.37667	37	50	10	25	95	80
3	3	25	54	0.34708	1.43390	37	50	10	25	95	80
3	4	95	40	0.35525	1.38238	37	50	10	25	95	80
3	5	80	43	0.35350	1.32300	37	50	10	25	95	80
4	0	40	57	0.35583	1.67704	40	50	21	30	85	100
4	1	50	55	0.35000	1.74687	40	50	21	30	85	100

Table LV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
4	2	21	61	0.36759	1.74426	40	50	21	30	85	100
4	3	30	59	0.36167	1.79557	40	50	21	30	85	100
4	4	85	48	0.32958	1.71197	40	50	21	30	85	100
4	5	100	45	0.32083	1.64383	40	50	21	30	85	100
5	0	38	48	0.34384	2.02088	38	50	50	40	71	28
5	1	50	45	0.35000	2.09687	38	50	50	40	71	28
5	2	50	45	0.35000	2.09426	38	50	50	40	71	28
5	3	40	47	0.34417	2.13974	38	50	50	40	71	28
5	4	71	41	0.36176	2.07373	38	50	50	40	71	28
5	5	28	50	0.33871	1.98254	38	50	50	40	71	28
6	0	38	57	0.35644	2.37732	38	38	50	62	71	65
6	1	38	57	0.35644	2.45331	38	38	50	62	71	65
6	2	50	55	0.35000	2.44426	38	38	50	62	71	65
6	3	62	52	0.34384	2.48358	38	38	50	62	71	65
6	4	71	51	0.33726	2.41099	38	38	50	62	71	65
6	5	65	52	0.34125	2.32379	38	38	50	62	71	65
7	0	38	30	0.31864	2.69596	38	50	1	40	4	55
7	1	50	28	0.35000	2.80331	38	50	1	40	4	55
7	2	1	37	0.21966	2.66392	38	50	1	40	4	55
7	3	40	30	0.32433	2.80791	38	50	1	40	4	55
7	4	4	37	0.23086	2.64185	38	50	1	40	4	55
7	5	55	27	0.36283	2.68662	38	50	1	40	4	55
8	0	38	44	0.33824	3.03420	38	13	1	73	97	35
8	1	13	49	0.31374	3.11705	38	13	1	73	97	35
8	2	1	51	0.29969	2.96361	38	13	1	73	97	35
8	3	73	37	0.37254	3.18045	38	13	1	73	97	35
8	4	97	32	0.39716	3.03900	38	13	1	73	97	35
8	5	35	44	0.33425	3.02087	38	13	1	73	97	35
9	0	50	54	0.35000	3.38420	50	16	27	64	87	75
9	1	16	61	0.36666	3.48371	50	16	27	64	87	75
9	2	27	58	0.35912	3.32274	50	16	27	64	87	75
9	3	64	51	0.34379	3.52424	50	16	27	64	87	75
9	4	87	46	0.33532	3.37433	50	16	27	64	87	75
9	5	75	49	0.33833	3.35921	50	16	27	64	87	75
10	0	50	50	0.35000	3.73420	50	16	73	33	97	30
10	1	16	57	0.35079	3.83451	50	16	73	33	97	30
10	2	73	45	0.35107	3.67381	50	16	73	33	97	30
10	3	33	53	0.34921	3.87345	50	16	73	33	97	30
10	4	97	40	0.35329	3.72762	50	16	73	33	97	30
10	5	30	54	0.35000	3.70921	50	16	73	33	97	30
11	0	50	45	0.35000	4.08420	50	25	64	37	78	20
11	1	25	50	0.33542	4.16992	50	25	64	37	78	20
11	2	64	42	0.35849	4.03230	50	25	64	37	78	20
11	3	37	47	0.34151	4.21496	50	25	64	37	78	20
11	4	78	39	0.36764	4.09526	50	25	64	37	78	20
11	5	20	51	0.33250	4.04171	50	25	64	37	78	20
12	0	50	61	0.35000	4.43420	50	50	36	48	97	75
12	1	50	61	0.35000	4.51992	50	50	36	48	97	75
12	2	36	64	0.36829	4.40060	50	50	36	48	97	75
12	3	48	62	0.35271	4.56766	50	50	36	48	97	75
12	4	97	52	0.28749	4.38275	50	50	36	48	97	75
12	5	75	56	0.31792	4.35962	50	50	36	48	97	75
13	0	50	60	0.35000	4.78420	50	67	48	78	78	30
13	1	67	57	0.32937	4.84930	50	67	48	78	78	30
13	2	48	61	0.35247	4.75307	50	67	48	78	78	30
13	3	78	55	0.31537	4.88304	50	67	48	78	78	30
13	4	78	55	0.31537	4.69812	50	67	48	78	78	30
13	5	30	64	0.37333	4.73296	50	67	48	78	78	30
14	0	50	49	0.35000	5.13420	50	50	39	48	56	50
14	1	50	49	0.35000	5.19930	50	50	39	48	56	50
14	2	39	51	0.34846	5.10153	50	50	39	48	56	50
14	3	48	49	0.34967	5.23271	50	50	39	48	56	50
14	4	56	47	0.35126	5.04938	50	50	39	48	56	50
14	5	50	49	0.35000	5.08296	50	50	39	48	56	50
15	0	50	59	0.35000	5.48420	50	50	54	48	67	75
15	1	50	59	0.35000	5.54930	50	50	54	48	67	75
15	2	54	58	0.34589	5.44742	50	50	54	48	67	75
15	3	48	59	0.35201	5.58472	50	50	54	48	67	75
15	4	67	55	0.33334	5.38272	50	50	54	48	67	75
15	5	75	54	0.32375	5.40671	50	50	54	48	67	75
16	0	50	35	0.35000	5.83420	50	30	55	20	60	8
16	1	30	39	0.31500	5.86430	50	30	55	20	60	8
16	2	55	34	0.35875	5.80617	50	30	55	20	60	8
16	3	20	41	0.29750	5.88222	50	30	55	20	60	8
16	4	60	33	0.36750	5.75022	50	30	55	20	60	8
16	5	8	43	0.27454	5.68125	50	30	55	20	60	8
17	0	50	47	0.35000	6.18420	50	28	27	20	60	100
17	1	28	51	0.34127	6.20557	50	28	27	20	60	100
17	2	27	52	0.34302	6.14920	50	28	27	20	60	100
17	3	20	53	0.33950	6.22172	50	28	27	20	60	100
17	4	60	45	0.35350	6.10372	50	28	27	20	60	100
17	5	100	37	0.36750	6.04875	50	28	27	20	60	100
18	0	50	51	0.35000	6.53420	50	35	22	37	85	75
18	1	35	54	0.35175	6.55732	50	35	22	37	85	75
18	2	22	56	0.35131	6.50050	50	35	22	37	85	75

Table LV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
18	3	37	53	0.35061	6.57232	50	35	22	37	85	75
18	4	85	44	0.34592	6.44964	50	35	22	37	85	75
18	5	75	46	0.34708	6.39583	50	35	22	37	85	75
19	0	50	51	0.35000	6.88420	50	63	41	38	87	25
19	1	63	48	0.34909	6.90641	50	63	41	38	87	25
19	2	41	53	0.35126	6.85176	50	63	41	38	87	25
19	3	38	53	0.35084	6.92316	50	63	41	38	87	25
19	4	87	43	0.34827	6.79791	50	63	41	38	87	25
19	5	25	56	0.35292	6.74875	50	63	41	38	87	25
20	0	50	64	0.35000	7.23420	50	38	76	35	69	100
20	1	38	66	0.36904	7.27545	50	38	76	35	69	100
20	2	76	58	0.30996	7.16172	50	38	76	35	69	100
20	3	35	67	0.37450	7.29766	50	38	76	35	69	100
20	4	69	60	0.31941	7.11732	50	38	76	35	69	100
20	5	100	54	0.26833	7.01708	50	38	76	35	69	100
21	0	50	57	0.35000	7.58420	50	60	50	50	100	25
21	1	60	55	0.34183	7.61728	50	60	50	50	100	25
21	2	50	57	0.35000	7.51172	50	60	50	50	100	25
21	3	50	57	0.35000	7.64766	50	60	50	50	100	25
21	4	100	47	0.30917	7.42649	50	60	50	50	100	25
21	5	25	62	0.37042	7.38750	50	60	50	50	100	25
22	0	50	67	0.35000	7.93420	50	62	83	43	81	65
22	1	62	64	0.32704	7.94432	50	62	83	43	81	65
22	2	83	60	0.28609	7.79781	50	62	83	43	81	65
22	3	43	68	0.36356	8.01122	50	62	83	43	81	65
22	4	81	61	0.28779	7.71428	50	62	83	43	81	65
22	5	65	64	0.32025	7.70775	50	62	83	43	81	65
23	0	50	46	0.35000	8.28420	50	25	81	20	85	20
23	1	25	51	0.33833	8.28266	50	25	81	20	85	20
23	2	81	40	0.36374	8.16156	50	25	81	20	85	20
23	3	20	52	0.33600	8.34722	50	25	81	20	85	20
23	4	85	39	0.36633	8.08061	50	25	81	20	85	20
23	5	20	52	0.33600	8.04375	50	25	81	20	85	20
24	0	50	58	0.35000	8.63420	50	28	67	25	88	80
24	1	28	62	0.36951	8.65216	50	28	67	25	88	80
24	2	67	54	0.33532	8.49688	50	28	67	25	88	80
24	3	25	63	0.37333	8.72055	50	28	67	25	88	80
24	4	88	50	0.31631	8.39692	50	28	67	25	88	80
24	5	80	52	0.32200	8.36575	50	28	67	25	88	80
25	0	50	59	0.35000	8.98420	50	30	78	25	83	81
25	1	30	63	0.37100	9.02316	50	30	78	25	83	81
25	2	78	54	0.31864	8.81552	50	30	78	25	83	81
25	3	25	64	0.37625	9.09680	50	30	78	25	83	81
25	4	83	53	0.31304	8.70996	50	30	78	25	83	81
25	5	81	53	0.31673	8.68247	50	30	78	25	83	81
26	0	50	45	0.35000	9.33420	50	30	50	32	85	30
26	1	30	49	0.33833	9.36150	50	30	50	32	85	30
26	2	50	45	0.35000	9.16552	50	30	50	32	85	30
26	3	32	49	0.34034	9.43714	50	30	50	32	85	30
26	4	85	38	0.37042	9.08038	50	30	50	32	85	30
26	5	30	49	0.33833	9.02081	50	30	50	32	85	30
27	0	50	48	0.35000	9.68420	50	30	50	58	79	25
27	1	30	52	0.34533	9.70683	50	30	50	58	79	25
27	2	50	48	0.35000	9.51552	50	30	50	58	79	25
27	3	58	47	0.35131	9.78845	50	30	50	58	79	25
27	4	79	43	0.35406	9.43444	50	30	50	58	79	25
27	5	25	53	0.34417	9.36497	50	30	50	58	79	25
28	0	50	43	0.35000	10.03420	50	31	25	50	80	28
28	1	31	47	0.33493	10.04176	50	31	25	50	80	28
28	2	25	48	0.32958	9.84510	50	31	25	50	80	28
28	3	50	43	0.35000	10.13845	50	31	25	50	80	28
28	4	80	37	0.37450	9.80894	50	31	25	50	80	28
28	5	28	47	0.33101	9.69598	50	31	25	50	80	28
29	0	50	52	0.35000	10.38420	50	34	25	75	100	25
29	1	34	55	0.35336	10.39512	50	34	25	75	100	25
29	2	25	57	0.35583	10.20094	50	34	25	75	100	25
29	3	75	47	0.34417	10.48262	50	34	25	75	100	25
29	4	100	42	0.33833	10.14727	50	34	25	75	100	25
29	5	25	57	0.35583	10.05181	50	34	25	75	100	25
30	0	50	51	0.35000	10.73420	50	50	50	32	78	43
30	1	50	51	0.35000	10.74512	50	50	50	32	78	43
30	2	50	51	0.35000	10.55094	50	50	50	32	78	43
30	3	32	54	0.35084	10.83346	50	50	50	32	78	43
30	4	78	45	0.34804	10.49531	50	50	50	32	78	43
30	5	43	52	0.35049	10.40230	50	50	50	32	78	43
31	0	50	52	0.35000	11.08420	50	50	37	25	76	70
31	1	50	52	0.35000	11.09512	50	50	37	25	76	70
31	2	37	54	0.35212	10.90306	50	50	37	25	76	70
31	3	25	57	0.35583	11.18929	50	50	37	25	76	70
31	4	76	46	0.34636	10.84167	50	50	37	25	76	70
31	5	70	48	0.34533	10.74764	50	50	37	25	76	70
32	0	50	43	0.35000	11.43420	50	50	50	14	75	25
32	1	50	43	0.35000	11.44512	50	50	50	14	75	25
32	2	50	43	0.35000	11.25306	50	50	50	14	75	25
32	3	14	50	0.31976	11.50905	50	50	50	14	75	25

Table LV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
32	4	75	38	0.37042	11.21209	50	50	50	14	75	25
32	5	25	48	0.32958	11.07722	50	50	50	14	75	25
33	0	50	50	0.35000	11.78420	50	13	75	12	83	65
33	1	13	57	0.34827	11.79339	50	13	75	12	83	65
33	2	75	45	0.35000	11.60306	50	13	75	12	83	65
33	3	12	57	0.34734	11.85639	50	13	75	12	83	65
33	4	83	43	0.35154	11.56363	50	13	75	12	83	65
33	5	65	47	0.35000	11.42722	50	13	75	12	83	65
34	0	50	45	0.35000	12.13420	50	26	25	50	83	41
34	1	26	50	0.33656	12.12995	50	26	25	50	83	41
34	2	25	50	0.33542	11.93848	50	26	25	50	83	41
34	3	50	45	0.35000	12.20639	50	26	25	50	83	41
34	4	83	38	0.37079	11.93442	50	26	25	50	83	41
34	5	41	47	0.34496	11.77218	50	26	25	50	83	41
35	0	50	46	0.35000	12.48420	50	26	20	45	88	52
35	1	26	51	0.33936	12.46931	50	26	20	45	88	52
35	2	20	52	0.33600	12.27448	50	26	20	45	88	52
35	3	45	47	0.34767	12.55406	50	26	20	45	88	52
35	4	88	39	0.36507	12.29949	50	26	20	45	88	52
35	5	52	46	0.35084	12.12302	50	26	20	45	88	52
36	0	50	47	0.35000	12.83420	50	30	9	58	91	46
36	1	30	51	0.34300	12.81231	50	30	9	58	91	46
36	2	9	55	0.33469	12.60917	50	30	9	58	91	46
36	3	58	45	0.35317	12.90723	50	30	9	58	91	46
36	4	91	39	0.36339	12.66288	50	30	9	58	91	46
36	5	46	48	0.34869	12.47171	50	30	9	58	91	46
37	0	50	44	0.35000	13.18420	50	34	10	40	78	56
37	1	34	47	0.33843	13.15074	50	34	10	40	78	56
37	2	10	52	0.32200	12.93117	50	34	10	40	78	56
37	3	40	46	0.34300	13.25023	50	34	10	40	78	56
37	4	78	38	0.37091	13.03379	50	34	10	40	78	56
37	5	56	42	0.35476	12.82647	50	34	10	40	78	56
38	0	50	44	0.35000	13.53420	50	39	10	45	80	46
38	1	39	46	0.34204	13.49278	50	39	10	45	80	46
38	2	10	52	0.32200	13.25317	50	39	10	45	80	46
38	3	45	45	0.34650	13.59673	50	39	10	45	80	46
38	4	80	38	0.37100	13.40479	50	39	10	45	80	46
38	5	46	45	0.34729	13.17377	50	39	10	45	80	46
39	0	50	63	0.35000	13.88420	50	50	50	57	80	77
39	1	50	63	0.35000	13.84278	50	50	50	57	80	77
39	2	50	63	0.35000	13.60317	50	50	50	57	80	77
39	3	57	61	0.33987	13.93660	50	50	50	57	80	77
39	4	80	57	0.30450	13.70929	50	50	50	57	80	77
39	5	77	57	0.31094	13.48471	50	50	50	57	80	77
40	0	50	57	0.35000	14.23420	50	50	90	33	80	33
40	1	50	57	0.35000	14.19278	50	50	90	33	80	33
40	2	90	49	0.31733	13.92050	50	50	90	33	80	33
40	3	33	61	0.36507	14.30168	50	50	90	33	80	33
40	4	80	51	0.32550	14.03479	50	50	90	33	80	33
40	5	33	61	0.36507	13.84978	50	50	90	33	80	33
41	0	50	56	0.35000	14.58420	50	63	90	25	66	37
41	1	63	54	0.33999	14.53277	50	63	90	25	66	37
41	2	90	48	0.32200	14.24250	50	63	90	25	66	37
41	3	25	61	0.36750	14.66918	50	63	90	25	66	37
41	4	66	53	0.33843	14.37322	50	63	90	25	66	37
41	5	37	59	0.35971	14.20949	50	63	90	25	66	37
42	0	50	37	0.35000	14.93420	50	51	25	18	58	32
42	1	51	37	0.35149	14.88426	50	51	25	18	58	32
42	2	25	42	0.31208	14.55459	50	51	25	18	58	32
42	3	18	43	0.29997	14.96915	50	51	25	18	58	32
42	4	58	35	0.36251	14.73572	50	51	25	18	58	32
42	5	32	40	0.32144	14.53093	50	51	25	18	58	32
43	0	50	55	0.35000	15.28420	50	50	5	62	99	59
43	1	50	55	0.35000	15.23426	50	50	5	62	99	59
43	2	5	64	0.37625	14.93084	50	50	5	62	99	59
43	3	62	53	0.34244	15.31159	50	50	5	62	99	59
43	4	99	45	0.32256	15.05828	50	50	5	62	99	59
43	5	59	53	0.34496	14.87589	50	50	5	62	99	59
44	0	50	51	0.35000	15.63420	50	50	5	38	84	78
44	1	50	51	0.35000	15.58426	50	50	5	38	84	78
44	2	5	60	0.35525	15.28609	50	50	5	38	84	78
44	3	38	53	0.35084	15.66243	50	50	5	38	84	78
44	4	84	44	0.34683	15.40511	50	50	5	38	84	78
44	5	78	45	0.34804	15.22393	50	50	5	38	84	78
45	0	50	49	0.35000	15.98420	50	50	15	39	89	50
45	1	50	49	0.35000	15.93426	50	50	15	39	89	50
45	2	15	56	0.34592	15.63200	50	50	15	39	89	50
45	3	39	51	0.34846	16.01089	50	50	15	39	89	50
45	4	89	41	0.35546	15.76057	50	50	15	39	89	50
45	5	50	49	0.35000	15.57393	50	50	15	39	89	50
46	0	50	39	0.35000	16.33420	50	0	10	55	90	40
46	1	0	49	0.28583	16.22010	50	0	10	55	90	40
46	2	10	47	0.29867	15.93067	50	0	10	55	90	40
46	3	55	38	0.35642	16.36731	50	0	10	55	90	40
46	4	90	31	0.40133	16.16190	50	0	10	55	90	40

Table LV.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
46	5	40	41	0.33717	15.91109	50	0	10	55	90	40
47	0	50	40	0.35000	16.68420	50	0	0	18	90	90
47	1	0	50	0.29167	16.51176	50	0	0	18	90	90
47	2	0	50	0.29167	16.22234	50	0	0	18	90	90
47	3	18	46	0.31117	16.67848	50	0	0	18	90	90
47	4	90	32	0.39667	16.55857	50	0	0	18	90	90
47	5	90	32	0.39667	16.30776	50	0	0	18	90	90
48	0	50	39	0.35000	17.03420	50	0	0	38	91	68
48	1	0	49	0.28583	16.79760	50	0	0	38	91	68
48	2	0	49	0.28583	16.50817	50	0	0	38	91	68
48	3	38	42	0.33544	17.01392	50	0	0	38	91	68
48	4	91	31	0.40166	16.96023	50	0	0	38	91	68
48	5	68	36	0.37184	16.67960	50	0	0	38	91	68
49	0	50	59	0.35000	17.38420	50	0	100	74	91	31
49	1	0	69	0.40250	17.20010	50	0	100	74	91	31
49	2	100	49	0.29750	16.80567	50	0	100	74	91	31
49	3	74	54	0.32536	17.33928	50	0	100	74	91	31
49	4	91	51	0.30599	17.26622	50	0	100	74	91	31
49	5	31	63	0.37039	17.04999	50	0	100	74	91	31

Table LVI.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 1 (Players 0-2 - Home to Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	22	51	0.28037	0.28037	22	68	50	31	47	60
0	1	68	42	0.33684	0.33684	22	68	50	31	47	60
0	2	50	46	0.31500	0.31500	22	68	50	31	47	60
0	3	31	49	0.31766	0.31766	22	68	50	31	47	60
0	4	47	46	0.31549	0.31549	22	68	50	31	47	60
0	5	60	44	0.31267	0.31267	22	68	50	31	47	60
1	0	72	61	0.29087	0.57125	72	92	85	30	45	55
1	1	92	57	0.26894	0.60578	72	92	85	30	45	55
1	2	85	59	0.27417	0.58917	72	92	85	30	45	55
1	3	30	70	0.36633	0.68399	72	92	85	30	45	55
1	4	45	67	0.32783	0.64332	72	92	85	30	45	55
1	5	55	65	0.30217	0.61483	72	92	85	30	45	55
2	0	45	48	0.30975	0.88100	45	64	50	25	55	45
2	1	64	44	0.33003	0.93581	45	64	50	25	55	45
2	2	50	47	0.31500	0.90417	45	64	50	25	55	45
2	3	25	52	0.32375	1.00774	45	64	50	25	55	45
2	4	55	46	0.31325	0.95657	45	64	50	25	55	45
2	5	45	48	0.31675	0.93158	45	64	50	25	55	45
3	0	57	47	0.32121	1.20220	57	30	55	29	54	69
3	1	30	53	0.29867	1.23447	57	30	55	29	54	69
3	2	55	48	0.31908	1.22325	57	30	55	29	54	69
3	3	29	53	0.32676	1.33450	57	30	55	29	54	69
3	4	54	48	0.31276	1.26933	57	30	55	29	54	69
3	5	69	45	0.30436	1.23594	57	30	55	29	54	69
4	0	48	53	0.31421	1.51641	48	79	60	27	50	48
4	1	79	47	0.32583	1.56030	48	79	60	27	50	48
4	2	60	50	0.31967	1.54292	48	79	60	27	50	48
4	3	27	57	0.33754	1.67204	48	79	60	27	50	48
4	4	50	52	0.31500	1.58433	48	79	60	27	50	48
4	5	48	53	0.31701	1.55295	48	79	60	27	50	48
5	0	65	57	0.30800	1.82441	65	97	80	20	48	40
5	1	97	51	0.29087	1.85117	65	97	80	20	48	40
5	2	80	54	0.30100	1.84392	65	97	80	20	48	40
5	3	20	66	0.37100	2.04304	65	97	80	20	48	40
5	4	48	60	0.31864	1.90297	65	97	80	20	48	40
5	5	40	62	0.33367	1.88662	65	97	80	20	48	40
6	0	97	46	0.31829	2.14270	97	39	80	19	50	43
6	1	39	58	0.31474	2.16592	97	39	80	19	50	43
6	2	80	50	0.31500	2.15892	97	39	80	19	50	43
6	3	19	62	0.35768	2.40072	97	39	80	19	50	43
6	4	50	56	0.31500	2.21797	97	39	80	19	50	43
6	5	43	57	0.32447	2.21109	97	39	80	19	50	43
7	0	98	46	0.31724	2.45994	98	59	65	24	40	42
7	1	59	54	0.31521	2.48113	98	59	65	24	40	42
7	2	65	53	0.31500	2.47392	98	59	65	24	40	42
7	3	24	61	0.35079	2.75151	98	59	65	24	40	42
7	4	40	58	0.32900	2.54697	98	59	65	24	40	42
7	5	42	57	0.32564	2.53673	98	59	65	24	40	42
8	0	72	45	0.33194	2.79188	72	60	52	20	50	41
8	1	60	47	0.32317	2.80429	72	60	52	20	50	41
8	2	52	49	0.31654	2.79046	72	60	52	20	50	41

Table LVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
8	3	20	55	0.33250	3.08401	72	60	52	20	50	41
8	4	50	49	0.31500	2.86197	72	60	52	20	50	41
8	5	41	51	0.32046	2.85719	72	60	52	20	50	41
9	0	99	47	0.31043	3.10231	99	66	65	19	49	37
9	1	66	54	0.31276	3.11705	99	66	65	19	49	37
9	2	65	54	0.31325	3.10371	99	66	65	19	49	37
9	3	19	63	0.36129	3.44531	99	66	65	19	49	37
9	4	49	57	0.31649	3.17847	99	66	65	19	49	37
9	5	37	60	0.33532	3.19251	99	66	65	19	49	37
10	0	99	43	0.33329	3.43560	99	54	55	15	54	35
10	1	54	52	0.31649	3.43355	99	54	55	15	54	35
10	2	55	51	0.31733	3.42104	99	54	55	15	54	35
10	3	15	59	0.34767	3.79297	99	54	55	15	54	35
10	4	54	52	0.31089	3.48936	99	54	55	15	54	35
10	5	35	55	0.32900	3.52151	99	54	55	15	54	35
11	0	1	52	0.23611	3.67171	1	70	90	13	50	39
11	1	70	39	0.34533	3.77888	1	70	90	13	50	39
11	2	90	35	0.37567	3.79671	1	70	90	13	50	39
11	3	13	50	0.30896	4.10193	1	70	90	13	50	39
11	4	50	43	0.31500	3.80436	1	70	90	13	50	39
11	5	39	45	0.31346	3.83497	1	70	90	13	50	39
12	0	1	50	0.22468	3.89639	1	87	55	22	50	38
12	1	87	33	0.38234	4.16122	1	87	55	22	50	38
12	2	55	40	0.32375	4.12046	1	87	55	22	50	38
12	3	22	46	0.30324	4.40517	1	87	55	22	50	38
12	4	50	41	0.31500	4.11936	1	87	55	22	50	38
12	5	38	43	0.31024	4.14521	1	87	55	22	50	38
13	0	100	70	0.17500	4.07139	100	97	78	57	59	61
13	1	97	71	0.18121	4.34243	100	97	78	57	59	61
13	2	78	75	0.23464	4.35510	100	97	78	57	59	61
13	3	57	79	0.28527	4.69044	100	97	78	57	59	61
13	4	59	79	0.27636	4.39572	100	97	78	57	59	61
13	5	61	78	0.26854	4.41376	100	97	78	57	59	61
14	0	0	43	0.18083	4.25222	0	5	65	25	48	70
14	1	5	42	0.19425	4.53668	0	5	65	25	48	70
14	2	65	30	0.35525	4.71035	0	5	65	25	48	70
14	3	25	38	0.28292	4.97336	0	5	65	25	48	70
14	4	48	33	0.31234	4.70806	0	5	65	25	48	70
14	5	70	29	0.34067	4.75442	0	5	65	25	48	70
15	0	0	37	0.14583	4.39805	0	3	72	25	20	65
15	1	3	36	0.15379	4.69047	0	3	72	25	20	65
15	2	72	23	0.38841	5.09875	0	3	72	25	20	65
15	3	25	32	0.26542	5.23878	0	3	72	25	20	65
15	4	20	33	0.25550	4.96356	0	3	72	25	20	65
15	5	65	24	0.34475	5.09917	0	3	72	25	20	65
16	0	0	42	0.17500	4.57305	0	24	50	50	20	68
16	1	24	38	0.24463	4.93509	0	24	50	50	20	68
16	2	50	32	0.31500	5.41375	0	24	50	50	20	68
16	3	50	32	0.31500	5.55378	0	24	50	50	20	68
16	4	20	38	0.27300	5.23656	0	24	50	50	20	68
16	5	68	29	0.33894	5.43811	0	24	50	50	20	68
17	0	0	74	0.36167	4.93472	0	89	80	65	55	81
17	1	89	56	0.27951	5.21460	0	89	80	65	55	81
17	2	80	58	0.28700	5.70075	0	89	80	65	55	81
17	3	65	61	0.28000	5.83378	0	89	80	65	55	81
17	4	55	63	0.30333	5.53989	0	89	80	65	55	81
17	5	81	58	0.24194	5.68006	0	89	80	65	55	81
18	0	100	50	0.29167	5.22639	100	32	63	50	50	53
18	1	32	63	0.32214	5.53674	100	32	63	50	50	53
18	2	63	57	0.30954	6.01029	100	32	63	50	50	53
18	3	50	60	0.31500	6.14878	100	32	63	50	50	53
18	4	50	60	0.31500	5.85489	100	32	63	50	50	53
18	5	53	59	0.30954	5.98960	100	32	63	50	50	53
19	0	55	36	0.32608	5.55247	55	24	30	34	50	44
19	1	24	43	0.25979	5.79654	55	24	30	34	50	44
19	2	30	41	0.27067	6.28096	55	24	30	34	50	44
19	3	34	41	0.30343	6.45220	55	24	30	34	50	44
19	4	50	37	0.31500	6.16989	55	24	30	34	50	44
19	5	44	39	0.31066	6.30026	55	24	30	34	50	44
20	0	100	59	0.23917	5.79164	100	60	90	50	51	46
20	1	60	67	0.29983	6.09637	100	60	90	50	51	46
20	2	90	61	0.25433	6.53529	100	60	90	50	51	46
20	3	50	69	0.31500	6.76720	100	60	90	50	51	46
20	4	51	69	0.31206	6.48195	100	60	90	50	51	46
20	5	46	70	0.32676	6.62702	100	60	90	50	51	46
21	0	87	63	0.25284	6.04448	87	40	90	60	47	78
21	1	40	72	0.33133	6.42770	87	40	90	60	47	78
21	2	90	62	0.24967	6.78496	87	40	90	60	47	78
21	3	60	68	0.28467	7.05187	87	40	90	60	47	78
21	4	47	71	0.32424	6.80619	87	40	90	60	47	78
21	5	78	65	0.22811	6.85512	87	40	90	60	47	78
22	0	100	48	0.30333	6.34781	100	21	90	60	0	71
22	1	21	64	0.32244	6.75015	100	21	90	60	0	71
22	2	90	50	0.30567	7.09063	100	21	90	60	0	71
22	3	60	56	0.29867	7.35054	100	21	90	60	0	71

Table LVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
22	4	0	68	0.39667	7.20286	100	21	90	60	0	71
22	5	71	54	0.28021	7.13533	100	21	90	60	0	71
23	0	0	63	0.29750	6.64531	0	64	85	36	72	59
23	1	64	50	0.32023	7.07037	0	64	85	36	72	59
23	2	85	46	0.32725	7.41788	0	64	85	36	72	59
23	3	36	56	0.33003	7.68056	0	64	85	36	72	59
23	4	72	49	0.29087	7.49373	0	64	85	36	72	59
23	5	59	51	0.30576	7.44109	0	64	85	36	72	59
24	0	100	60	0.23333	6.87864	100	86	85	35	49	46
24	1	86	63	0.25536	7.32573	100	86	85	35	49	46
24	2	85	63	0.25783	7.67571	100	86	85	35	49	46
24	3	35	73	0.36050	8.04106	100	86	85	35	49	46
24	4	49	70	0.31801	7.81174	100	86	85	35	49	46
24	5	46	71	0.32723	7.76832	100	86	85	35	49	46
25	0	49	40	0.31311	7.19175	49	22	85	20	40	33
25	1	22	45	0.26077	7.58651	49	22	85	20	40	33
25	2	85	33	0.38033	8.05604	49	22	85	20	40	33
25	3	20	46	0.30100	8.34206	49	22	85	20	40	33
25	4	40	42	0.31033	8.12208	49	22	85	20	40	33
25	5	33	43	0.30627	8.07459	49	22	85	20	40	33
26	0	0	51	0.22750	7.41925	0	33	90	50	52	32
26	1	33	45	0.28644	7.87295	0	33	90	50	52	32
26	2	90	33	0.38500	8.44104	0	33	90	50	52	32
26	3	50	41	0.31500	8.65706	0	33	90	50	52	32
26	4	52	41	0.31561	8.43768	0	33	90	50	52	32
26	5	32	45	0.30954	8.38413	0	33	90	50	52	32
27	0	37	58	0.31409	7.73334	37	65	90	50	50	34
27	1	65	52	0.31675	8.18970	37	65	90	50	50	34
27	2	90	47	0.31967	8.76071	37	65	90	50	50	34
27	3	50	55	0.31500	8.97206	37	65	90	50	50	34
27	4	50	55	0.31500	8.75268	37	65	90	50	50	34
27	5	34	58	0.33516	8.71929	37	65	90	50	50	34
28	0	63	55	0.31257	8.04592	63	65	90	40	50	31
28	1	65	55	0.31150	8.50120	63	65	90	40	50	31
28	2	90	50	0.30567	9.06638	63	65	90	40	50	31
28	3	40	60	0.33133	9.30340	63	65	90	40	50	31
28	4	50	58	0.31500	9.06768	63	65	90	40	50	31
28	5	31	62	0.34648	9.06577	63	65	90	40	50	31
29	0	68	49	0.32214	8.36806	68	35	90	40	42	36
29	1	35	55	0.30800	8.80920	68	35	90	40	42	36
29	2	90	44	0.33367	9.40004	68	35	90	40	42	36
29	3	40	54	0.32433	9.62773	68	35	90	40	42	36
29	4	42	54	0.32284	9.39052	68	35	90	40	42	36
29	5	36	55	0.32839	9.39416	68	35	90	40	42	36
30	0	78	51	0.31304	8.68110	78	40	78	38	50	47
30	1	40	58	0.31500	9.12420	78	40	78	38	50	47
30	2	78	51	0.31304	9.71308	78	40	78	38	50	47
30	3	38	59	0.33264	9.96037	78	40	78	38	50	47
30	4	50	56	0.31500	9.70552	78	40	78	38	50	47
30	5	47	57	0.31934	9.71350	78	40	78	38	50	47
31	0	76	46	0.32956	9.01066	76	22	80	30	50	49
31	1	22	57	0.29997	9.42417	76	22	80	30	50	49
31	2	80	45	0.33250	10.04558	76	22	80	30	50	49
31	3	30	55	0.33133	10.29170	76	22	80	30	50	49
31	4	50	51	0.31500	10.02052	76	22	80	30	50	49
31	5	49	52	0.31591	10.02941	76	22	80	30	50	49
32	0	36	58	0.31369	9.32435	36	69	80	40	50	50
32	1	69	51	0.31766	9.74183	36	69	80	40	50	50
32	2	80	49	0.31850	10.36408	36	69	80	40	50	50
32	3	40	57	0.32783	10.61954	36	69	80	40	50	50
32	4	50	55	0.31500	10.33552	36	69	80	40	50	50
32	5	50	55	0.31500	10.34441	36	69	80	40	50	50
33	0	68	53	0.31374	9.63809	68	76	80	33	23	51
33	1	76	51	0.31439	10.05622	68	76	80	33	23	51
33	2	80	50	0.31500	10.67908	68	76	80	33	23	51
33	3	33	60	0.33999	10.95953	68	76	80	33	23	51
33	4	23	62	0.35469	10.69021	68	76	80	33	23	51
33	5	51	56	0.31358	10.65799	68	76	80	33	23	51
34	0	100	56	0.25667	9.89476	100	74	80	30	46	52
34	1	74	62	0.28476	10.34098	100	74	80	30	46	52
34	2	80	60	0.28000	10.95908	100	74	80	30	46	52
34	3	30	70	0.36633	11.32586	100	74	80	30	46	52
34	4	46	67	0.32536	11.01557	100	74	80	30	46	52
34	5	52	66	0.30977	10.96776	100	74	80	30	46	52
35	0	77	44	0.33579	10.23055	77	38	85	0	45	54
35	1	38	52	0.30604	10.64702	77	38	85	0	45	54
35	2	85	43	0.33950	11.29858	77	38	85	0	45	54
35	3	0	60	0.35000	11.67586	77	38	85	0	45	54
35	4	45	51	0.31850	11.33407	77	38	85	0	45	54
35	5	54	49	0.31229	11.28006	77	38	85	0	45	54
36	0	20	69	0.33950	10.57005	20	64	100	100	50	30
36	1	64	60	0.30389	10.95092	20	64	100	100	50	30
36	2	100	53	0.27417	11.57275	20	64	100	100	50	30
36	3	100	53	0.20417	11.88003	20	64	100	100	50	30
36	4	50	63	0.31500	11.64907	20	64	100	100	50	30

Table LVI.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
36	5	30	67	0.35933	11.63939	20	64	100	100	50	30
37	0	72	44	0.33451	10.90455	72	63	97	30	3	29
37	1	63	46	0.32622	11.27714	72	63	97	30	3	29
37	2	97	39	0.35667	11.92942	72	63	97	30	3	29
37	3	30	53	0.32667	12.20669	72	63	97	30	3	29
37	4	3	58	0.34022	11.98930	72	63	97	30	3	29
37	5	29	53	0.32676	11.96615	72	63	97	30	3	29
38	0	36	54	0.30716	11.21171	36	66	95	25	56	28
38	1	66	48	0.32396	11.60110	36	66	95	25	56	28
38	2	95	42	0.34125	12.27067	36	66	95	25	56	28
38	3	25	56	0.33542	12.54211	36	66	95	25	56	28
38	4	56	50	0.30996	12.29926	36	66	95	25	56	28
38	5	28	56	0.33451	12.30066	36	66	95	25	56	28
39	0	0	53	0.23917	11.45088	0	76	90	26	48	26
39	1	76	38	0.35383	11.95493	0	76	90	26	48	26
39	2	90	35	0.37567	12.64634	0	76	90	26	48	26
39	3	26	48	0.31276	12.85487	0	76	90	26	48	26
39	4	48	44	0.31491	12.61416	0	76	90	26	48	26
39	5	26	48	0.31276	12.61342	0	76	90	26	48	26
40	0	0	52	0.23333	11.68421	0	71	60	50	50	27
40	1	71	37	0.35126	12.30619	0	71	60	50	50	27
40	2	60	40	0.33133	12.97767	0	71	60	50	50	27
40	3	50	42	0.31500	13.16987	0	71	60	50	50	27
40	4	50	42	0.31500	12.92916	0	71	60	50	50	27
40	5	27	46	0.30802	12.92144	0	71	60	50	50	27
41	0	90	63	0.24500	11.92921	90	72	65	50	60	66
41	1	72	66	0.27804	12.58423	90	72	65	50	60	66
41	2	65	68	0.28875	13.26642	90	72	65	50	60	66
41	3	50	71	0.31500	13.48487	90	72	65	50	60	66
41	4	60	69	0.28350	13.21266	90	72	65	50	60	66
41	5	66	67	0.26609	13.18753	90	72	65	50	60	66
42	0	60	46	0.32433	12.25355	60	37	75	38	53	25
42	1	37	50	0.30196	12.88618	60	37	75	38	53	25
42	2	75	43	0.33833	13.60476	60	37	75	38	53	25
42	3	38	50	0.32004	13.80491	60	37	75	38	53	25
42	4	53	47	0.31374	13.52640	60	37	75	38	53	25
42	5	25	53	0.32667	13.51420	60	37	75	38	53	25
43	0	81	45	0.33236	12.58591	81	40	75	40	51	19
43	1	40	53	0.30917	13.19535	81	40	75	40	51	19
43	2	75	46	0.32958	13.93434	81	40	75	40	51	19
43	3	40	53	0.32317	14.12808	81	40	75	40	51	19
43	4	51	51	0.31416	13.84056	81	40	75	40	51	19
43	5	19	57	0.33959	13.85379	81	40	75	40	51	19
44	0	75	49	0.32083	12.90674	75	40	80	35	50	39
44	1	40	56	0.31267	13.50802	75	40	80	35	50	39
44	2	80	48	0.32200	14.25634	75	40	80	35	50	39
44	3	35	57	0.33250	14.46058	75	40	80	35	50	39
44	4	50	54	0.31500	14.15556	75	40	80	35	50	39
44	5	39	56	0.32758	14.18137	75	40	80	35	50	39
45	0	19	56	0.29258	13.19932	19	70	80	30	50	51
45	1	70	46	0.32900	13.83702	19	70	80	30	50	51
45	2	80	44	0.33600	14.59234	19	70	80	30	50	51
45	3	30	54	0.32900	14.78958	19	70	80	30	50	51
45	4	50	50	0.31500	14.47056	19	70	80	30	50	51
45	5	51	50	0.31428	14.49565	19	70	80	30	50	51
46	0	96	55	0.27099	13.47031	96	77	80	35	50	32
46	1	77	59	0.28854	14.12556	96	77	80	35	50	32
46	2	80	58	0.28700	14.87934	96	77	80	35	50	32
46	3	35	67	0.35000	15.13958	96	77	80	35	50	32
46	4	50	64	0.31500	14.78556	96	77	80	35	50	32
46	5	32	68	0.35784	14.85349	96	77	80	35	50	32
47	0	81	53	0.30343	13.77374	81	71	85	40	45	24
47	1	71	55	0.30716	14.43272	81	71	85	40	45	24
47	2	85	52	0.30275	15.18209	81	71	85	40	45	24
47	3	40	61	0.33250	15.47208	81	71	85	40	45	24
47	4	45	60	0.32375	15.10931	81	71	85	40	45	24
47	5	24	64	0.35989	15.21338	81	71	85	40	45	24
48	0	49	46	0.31381	14.08755	49	35	85	36	50	24
48	1	35	49	0.29750	14.73022	49	35	85	36	50	24
48	2	85	39	0.35583	15.53792	49	35	85	36	50	24
48	3	36	49	0.31859	15.79067	49	35	85	36	50	24
48	4	50	46	0.31500	15.42431	49	35	85	36	50	24
48	5	24	51	0.32046	15.53384	49	35	85	36	50	24
49	0	0	60	0.28000	14.36755	0	87	86	40	55	32
49	1	87	43	0.33917	15.06939	0	87	86	40	55	32
49	2	86	43	0.33936	15.87728	0	87	86	40	55	32
49	3	40	52	0.32200	16.11267	0	87	86	40	55	32
49	4	55	49	0.31150	15.73581	0	87	86	40	55	32
49	5	32	54	0.32844	15.86228	0	87	86	40	55	32

Table LVII.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 2 (Players 0-2 - Home to Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	81	49	0.31789	0.31789	81	42	94	1	45	64
0	1	42	57	0.31444	0.31444	81	42	94	1	45	64
0	2	94	47	0.31603	0.31603	81	42	94	1	45	64
0	3	1	65	0.37903	0.37903	81	42	94	1	45	64
0	4	45	56	0.32142	0.32142	81	42	94	1	45	64
0	5	64	53	0.29573	0.29573	81	42	94	1	45	64
1	0	91	64	0.23751	0.55540	91	58	96	100	20	44
1	1	58	70	0.30044	0.61488	91	58	96	100	20	44
1	2	96	63	0.22806	0.54409	91	58	96	100	20	44
1	3	100	62	0.15167	0.53069	91	58	96	100	20	44
1	4	20	78	0.41300	0.73442	91	58	96	100	20	44
1	5	44	73	0.33446	0.63019	91	58	96	100	20	44
2	0	48	55	0.31467	0.87008	48	70	100	30	0	73
2	1	70	50	0.31967	0.93455	48	70	100	30	0	73
2	2	100	44	0.32667	0.87075	48	70	100	30	0	73
2	3	30	58	0.33833	0.86903	48	70	100	30	0	73
2	4	0	64	0.37333	1.10775	48	70	100	30	0	73
2	5	73	50	0.28656	0.91674	48	70	100	30	0	73
3	0	31	45	0.28219	1.15227	31	38	100	1	0	86
3	1	38	44	0.29484	1.22939	31	38	100	1	0	86
3	2	100	31	0.40250	1.27325	31	38	100	1	0	86
3	3	1	51	0.29899	1.16802	31	38	100	1	0	86
3	4	0	51	0.29750	1.40525	31	38	100	1	0	86
3	5	86	34	0.32676	1.24350	31	38	100	1	0	86
4	0	84	43	0.33959	1.49186	84	32	73	100	0	12
4	1	32	54	0.30324	1.53263	84	32	73	100	0	12
4	2	73	46	0.32949	1.60274	84	32	73	100	0	12
4	3	100	40	0.28000	1.44802	84	32	73	100	0	12
4	4	0	60	0.35000	1.75525	84	32	73	100	0	12
4	5	12	58	0.34337	1.58688	84	32	73	100	0	12
5	0	100	32	0.39667	1.88853	100	37	79	19	5	21
5	1	37	45	0.29437	1.82700	100	37	79	19	5	21
5	2	79	36	0.36304	1.96579	100	37	79	19	5	21
5	3	19	48	0.30704	1.75506	100	37	79	19	5	21
5	4	5	51	0.30450	2.05975	100	37	79	19	5	21
5	5	21	48	0.30891	1.89579	100	37	79	19	5	21
6	0	88	44	0.33451	2.22304	88	65	100	0	30	26
6	1	65	49	0.32200	2.14900	88	65	100	0	30	26
6	2	100	42	0.33833	2.30412	88	65	100	0	30	26
6	3	0	62	0.36167	2.11673	88	65	100	0	30	26
6	4	30	56	0.33367	2.39342	88	65	100	0	30	26
6	5	26	57	0.33796	2.23375	88	65	100	0	30	26
7	0	0	35	0.13417	2.35720	0	53	99	0	20	5
7	1	53	25	0.32564	2.47464	0	53	99	0	20	5
7	2	99	16	0.48764	2.79176	0	53	99	0	20	5
7	3	0	35	0.20417	2.32090	0	53	99	0	20	5
7	4	20	31	0.24850	2.64192	0	53	99	0	20	5
7	5	5	34	0.21525	2.44900	0	53	99	0	20	5
8	0	58	66	0.30417	2.66138	58	74	94	64	40	58
8	1	74	63	0.28196	2.75660	58	74	94	64	40	58
8	2	94	59	0.25443	3.04619	58	74	94	64	40	58
8	3	64	65	0.27613	2.59702	58	74	94	64	40	58
8	4	40	70	0.34300	2.98492	58	74	94	64	40	58
8	5	58	66	0.29297	2.74197	58	74	94	64	40	58
9	0	100	54	0.26833	2.92971	100	65	97	0	25	84
9	1	65	61	0.30100	3.05760	100	65	97	0	25	84
9	2	97	55	0.26894	3.31513	100	65	97	0	25	84
9	3	0	74	0.43167	3.02869	100	65	97	0	25	84
9	4	25	69	0.37333	3.35825	100	65	97	0	25	84
9	5	84	57	0.23646	2.97843	100	65	97	0	25	84
10	0	96	44	0.33003	3.25974	96	41	100	0	10	70
10	1	41	55	0.31206	3.36966	96	41	100	0	10	70
10	2	100	43	0.33250	3.64763	96	41	100	0	10	70
10	3	0	63	0.36750	3.39619	96	41	100	0	10	70
10	4	10	61	0.35700	3.71525	96	41	100	0	10	70
10	5	70	49	0.29400	3.27243	96	41	100	0	10	70
11	0	90	38	0.36167	3.62140	90	57	97	0	5	32
11	1	57	45	0.32284	3.69250	90	57	97	0	5	32
11	2	97	37	0.36764	4.01527	90	57	97	0	5	32
11	3	0	56	0.32667	3.72286	90	57	97	0	5	32
11	4	5	55	0.32550	4.04075	90	57	97	0	5	32
11	5	32	50	0.32004	3.59247	90	57	97	0	5	32
12	0	97	37	0.36764	3.98904	97	73	95	10	0	7
12	1	73	42	0.34022	4.03272	97	73	95	10	0	7
12	2	95	37	0.36750	4.38277	97	73	95	10	0	7
12	3	10	54	0.32433	4.04719	97	73	95	10	0	7
12	4	0	56	0.32667	4.36742	97	73	95	10	0	7
12	5	7	55	0.32704	3.91951	97	73	95	10	0	7
13	0	92	29	0.40614	4.39518	92	77	7	20	30	9
13	1	77	32	0.37359	4.40631	92	77	7	20	30	9
13	2	7	46	0.22169	4.60446	92	77	7	20	30	9
13	3	20	43	0.29050	4.33769	92	77	7	20	30	9
13	4	30	41	0.29867	4.66608	92	77	7	20	30	9
13	5	9	45	0.28056	4.20007	92	77	7	20	30	9

Table LVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
14	0	94	49	0.30576	4.70094	94	76	96	50	0	25
14	1	76	53	0.30833	4.71464	94	76	96	50	0	25
14	2	96	49	0.30319	4.90765	94	76	96	50	0	25
14	3	50	58	0.31500	4.65269	94	76	96	50	0	25
14	4	0	68	0.39667	5.06275	94	76	96	50	0	25
14	5	25	63	0.35583	4.55590	94	76	96	50	0	25
15	0	62	38	0.33684	5.03778	62	60	94	0	15	23
15	1	60	39	0.33250	5.04714	62	60	94	0	15	23
15	2	94	32	0.39303	5.30068	62	60	94	0	15	23
15	3	0	51	0.29750	4.95019	62	60	94	0	15	23
15	4	15	48	0.30275	5.36550	62	60	94	0	15	23
15	5	23	46	0.30429	4.86019	62	60	94	0	15	23
16	0	11	42	0.21581	5.25359	11	80	100	19	0	13
16	1	80	29	0.38850	5.43564	11	80	100	19	0	13
16	2	100	25	0.43750	5.73818	11	80	100	19	0	13
16	3	19	41	0.28173	5.23192	11	80	100	19	0	13
16	4	0	45	0.26250	5.62800	11	80	100	19	0	13
16	5	13	42	0.27442	5.13462	11	80	100	19	0	13
17	0	8	47	0.22974	5.48333	8	74	50	41	0	69
17	1	74	34	0.36316	5.79880	8	74	50	41	0	69
17	2	50	38	0.31500	6.05318	8	74	50	41	0	69
17	3	41	40	0.30891	5.54083	8	74	50	41	0	69
17	4	0	48	0.28000	5.90800	8	74	50	41	0	69
17	5	69	35	0.32653	5.46114	8	74	50	41	0	69
18	0	83	57	0.28574	5.76907	83	84	90	43	36	34
18	1	84	57	0.28406	6.08286	83	84	90	43	36	34
18	2	90	56	0.27767	6.33085	83	84	90	43	36	34
18	3	43	65	0.33101	5.87183	83	84	90	43	36	34
18	4	36	67	0.34799	6.25599	83	84	90	43	36	34
18	5	34	67	0.35196	5.81310	83	84	90	43	36	34
19	0	63	40	0.33532	6.10440	63	74	96	0	0	32
19	1	74	38	0.35196	6.43482	63	74	96	0	0	32
19	2	96	34	0.38369	6.71454	63	74	96	0	0	32
19	3	0	53	0.30917	6.18100	63	74	96	0	0	32
19	4	0	53	0.30917	6.56516	63	74	96	0	0	32
19	5	32	47	0.31374	6.12684	63	74	96	0	0	32
20	0	49	68	0.31638	6.42077	49	77	96	60	22	84
20	1	77	62	0.27909	6.71391	49	77	96	60	22	84
20	2	96	58	0.25489	6.96943	49	77	96	60	22	84
20	3	60	66	0.28700	6.46800	49	77	96	60	22	84
20	4	22	73	0.39144	6.95660	49	77	96	60	22	84
20	5	84	61	0.22059	6.34744	49	77	96	60	22	84
21	0	79	53	0.30553	6.72630	79	69	95	30	0	71
21	1	69	55	0.30879	7.02270	79	69	95	30	0	71
21	2	95	50	0.29925	7.26868	79	69	95	30	0	71
21	3	30	63	0.35000	6.81800	79	69	95	30	0	71
21	4	0	69	0.40250	7.35910	79	69	95	30	0	71
21	5	71	55	0.27776	6.62520	79	69	95	30	0	71
22	0	100	51	0.28583	7.01213	100	60	100	40	36	18
22	1	60	59	0.30917	7.33187	100	60	100	40	36	18
22	2	100	51	0.28583	7.55452	100	60	100	40	36	18
22	3	40	63	0.33483	7.15283	100	60	100	40	36	18
22	4	36	64	0.34309	7.70219	100	60	100	40	36	18
22	5	18	67	0.37697	7.00217	100	60	100	40	36	18
23	0	98	38	0.36204	7.37417	98	35	97	0	40	20
23	1	35	51	0.30100	7.63287	98	35	97	0	40	20
23	2	97	39	0.35667	7.91119	98	35	97	0	40	20
23	3	0	58	0.33833	7.49117	98	35	97	0	40	20
23	4	40	50	0.31967	8.02186	98	35	97	0	40	20
23	5	20	54	0.32900	7.33117	98	35	97	0	40	20
24	0	90	49	0.31033	7.68451	90	64	97	30	40	15
24	1	64	54	0.31369	7.94656	90	64	97	30	40	15
24	2	97	48	0.30732	8.21851	90	64	97	30	40	15
24	3	30	61	0.34533	7.83650	90	64	97	30	40	15
24	4	40	59	0.33017	8.35203	90	64	97	30	40	15
24	5	15	64	0.36808	7.69925	90	64	97	30	40	15
25	0	92	35	0.37674	8.06125	92	53	96	0	0	26
25	1	53	43	0.31934	8.26590	92	53	96	0	0	26
25	2	96	34	0.38369	8.60221	92	53	96	0	0	26
25	3	0	53	0.30917	8.14567	92	53	96	0	0	26
25	4	0	53	0.30917	8.66119	92	53	96	0	0	26
25	5	26	48	0.31276	8.01201	92	53	96	0	0	26
26	0	86	57	0.28056	8.34181	86	72	95	45	0	75
26	1	72	60	0.29344	8.55934	86	72	95	45	0	75
26	2	95	56	0.26775	8.86996	86	72	95	45	0	75
26	3	45	66	0.32725	8.47292	86	72	95	45	0	75
26	4	0	75	0.43750	9.09869	86	72	95	45	0	75
26	5	75	60	0.25375	8.26576	86	72	95	45	0	75
27	0	71	32	0.36351	8.70532	71	54	95	0	0	13
27	1	54	36	0.32396	8.88330	71	54	95	0	0	13
27	2	95	28	0.41475	9.28471	71	54	95	0	0	13
27	3	0	47	0.27417	8.74708	71	54	95	0	0	13
27	4	0	47	0.27417	9.37286	71	54	95	0	0	13
27	5	13	44	0.28306	8.54882	71	54	95	0	0	13
28	0	86	46	0.32676	9.03208	86	53	98	45	15	19

Table LVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
28	1	53	53	0.31584	9.19914	86	53	98	45	15	19
28	2	98	44	0.32844	9.61315	86	53	98	45	15	19
28	3	45	54	0.32025	9.06733	86	53	98	45	15	19
28	4	15	60	0.35175	9.72461	86	53	98	45	15	19
28	5	19	59	0.34683	8.89565	86	53	98	45	15	19
29	0	95	47	0.31500	9.34708	95	70	96	36	10	24
29	1	70	52	0.31500	9.51414	95	70	96	36	10	24
29	2	96	47	0.31393	9.92707	95	70	96	36	10	24
29	3	36	59	0.33493	9.40226	95	70	96	36	10	24
29	4	10	64	0.37100	10.09561	95	70	96	36	10	24
29	5	24	61	0.35079	9.24644	95	70	96	36	10	24
30	0	5	42	0.19425	9.54133	5	70	97	0	20	22
30	1	70	29	0.36867	9.88281	5	70	97	0	20	22
30	2	97	23	0.44441	10.37148	5	70	97	0	20	22
30	3	0	43	0.25083	9.65309	5	70	97	0	20	22
30	4	20	39	0.27650	10.37211	5	70	97	0	20	22
30	5	22	38	0.27711	9.52355	5	70	97	0	20	22
31	0	12	52	0.26357	9.80490	12	74	98	33	20	36
31	1	74	40	0.34636	10.22917	12	74	98	33	20	36
31	2	98	35	0.37884	10.75032	12	74	98	33	20	36
31	3	33	48	0.31619	9.96928	12	74	98	33	20	36
31	4	20	51	0.31850	10.69061	12	74	98	33	20	36
31	5	36	47	0.31533	9.83887	12	74	98	33	20	36
32	0	89	46	0.32501	10.12991	89	59	99	34	15	23
32	1	59	52	0.31731	10.54648	89	59	99	34	15	23
32	2	99	44	0.32758	11.07790	89	59	99	34	15	23
32	3	34	57	0.33329	10.30258	89	59	99	34	15	23
32	4	15	61	0.35583	11.04644	89	59	99	34	15	23
32	5	23	59	0.34524	10.18411	89	59	99	34	15	23
33	0	94	37	0.36736	10.49727	94	43	97	23	0	21
33	1	43	47	0.30651	10.85299	94	43	97	23	0	21
33	2	97	36	0.37312	11.45102	94	43	97	23	0	21
33	3	23	51	0.32004	10.62262	94	43	97	23	0	21
33	4	0	56	0.32667	11.37311	94	43	97	23	0	21
33	5	21	51	0.31906	10.50317	94	43	97	23	0	21
34	0	94	43	0.33656	10.83383	94	73	98	31	0	15
34	1	73	48	0.32412	11.17711	94	73	98	31	0	15
34	2	98	43	0.33404	11.78506	94	73	98	31	0	15
34	3	31	56	0.33318	10.95579	94	73	98	31	0	15
34	4	0	62	0.36167	11.73478	94	73	98	31	0	15
34	5	15	59	0.34767	10.85084	94	73	98	31	0	15
35	0	94	39	0.35709	11.19092	94	63	97	0	18	16
35	1	63	45	0.32774	11.50485	94	63	97	0	18	16
35	2	97	38	0.36216	12.14722	94	63	97	0	18	16
35	3	0	58	0.33833	11.29413	94	63	97	0	18	16
35	4	18	54	0.32844	12.06322	94	63	97	0	18	16
35	5	16	54	0.32769	11.17853	94	63	97	0	18	16
36	0	79	47	0.32583	11.51675	79	73	97	6	45	13
36	1	73	48	0.32412	11.82897	79	73	97	6	45	13
36	2	97	43	0.33474	12.48196	79	73	97	6	45	13
36	3	6	61	0.35709	11.65122	79	73	97	6	45	13
36	4	45	54	0.32025	12.38347	79	73	97	6	45	13
36	5	13	60	0.35212	11.53066	79	73	97	6	45	13
37	0	92	53	0.28854	11.80529	92	68	96	41	45	16
37	1	68	58	0.30324	12.13221	92	68	96	41	45	16
37	2	96	52	0.28709	12.76905	92	68	96	41	45	16
37	3	41	63	0.33306	11.98428	92	68	96	41	45	16
37	4	45	63	0.32550	12.70897	92	68	96	41	45	16
37	5	16	68	0.38323	11.91388	92	68	96	41	45	16
38	0	94	47	0.31603	12.12132	94	74	98	0	47	18
38	1	74	51	0.31556	12.44777	94	74	98	0	47	18
38	2	98	47	0.31164	13.08069	94	74	98	0	47	18
38	3	0	66	0.38500	12.36928	94	74	98	0	47	18
38	4	47	57	0.31934	13.02831	94	74	98	0	47	18
38	5	18	63	0.36204	12.27592	94	74	98	0	47	18
39	0	100	46	0.31500	12.43632	100	69	97	0	45	20
39	1	69	52	0.31544	12.76322	100	69	97	0	45	20
39	2	97	47	0.31281	13.39350	100	69	97	0	45	20
39	3	0	66	0.38500	12.75428	100	69	97	0	45	20
39	4	45	57	0.32200	13.35031	100	69	97	0	45	20
39	5	20	62	0.35700	12.63292	100	69	97	0	45	20
40	0	53	38	0.32109	12.75741	53	76	97	0	0	19
40	1	76	34	0.36596	13.12918	53	76	97	0	0	19
40	2	97	30	0.40602	13.79952	53	76	97	0	0	19
40	3	0	49	0.28583	13.04011	53	76	97	0	0	19
40	4	0	49	0.28583	13.63614	53	76	97	0	0	19
40	5	19	45	0.29619	12.92912	53	76	97	0	0	19
41	0	78	59	0.28691	13.04431	78	76	96	33	15	75
41	1	76	59	0.29013	13.41930	78	76	96	33	15	75
41	2	96	55	0.27099	14.07051	78	76	96	33	15	75
41	3	33	68	0.35586	13.39597	78	76	96	33	15	75
41	4	15	72	0.40075	14.03689	78	76	96	33	15	75
41	5	75	60	0.25375	13.18287	78	76	96	33	15	75
42	0	36	46	0.29409	13.33841	36	60	99	12	20	40
42	1	60	41	0.33017	13.74947	36	60	99	12	20	40

Table LVII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
42	2	99	34	0.38474	14.45526	36	60	99	12	20	40
42	3	12	51	0.31234	13.70831	36	60	99	12	20	40
42	4	20	49	0.31150	14.34839	36	60	99	12	20	40
42	5	40	45	0.31383	13.49670	36	60	99	12	20	40
43	0	38	49	0.30184	13.64025	38	72	97	21	15	38
43	1	72	42	0.33964	14.08911	38	72	97	21	15	38
43	2	97	37	0.36764	14.82290	38	72	97	21	15	38
43	3	21	52	0.32244	14.03075	38	72	97	21	15	38
43	4	15	53	0.32317	14.67156	38	72	97	21	15	38
43	5	38	49	0.31864	13.81534	38	72	97	21	15	38
44	0	40	48	0.30333	13.94358	40	72	97	22	15	32
44	1	72	41	0.34221	14.43132	40	72	97	22	15	32
44	2	97	36	0.37312	15.19602	40	72	97	22	15	32
44	3	22	51	0.31957	14.35033	40	72	97	22	15	32
44	4	15	53	0.32317	14.99472	40	72	97	22	15	32
44	5	32	49	0.31794	14.13328	40	72	97	22	15	32
45	0	7	43	0.20664	14.15022	7	71	95	5	10	34
45	1	71	30	0.36841	14.79973	7	71	95	5	10	34
45	2	95	25	0.43050	15.62652	7	71	95	5	10	34
45	3	5	43	0.26250	14.61283	7	71	95	5	10	34
45	4	10	42	0.26833	15.26306	7	71	95	5	10	34
45	5	34	38	0.29783	14.43111	7	71	95	5	10	34
46	0	95	44	0.33075	14.48097	95	74	95	13	10	28
46	1	74	48	0.32396	15.12369	95	74	95	13	10	28
46	2	95	44	0.33075	15.95727	95	74	95	13	10	28
46	3	13	60	0.35212	14.96495	95	74	95	13	10	28
46	4	10	61	0.35700	15.62006	95	74	95	13	10	28
46	5	28	57	0.33707	14.76818	95	74	95	13	10	28
47	0	72	43	0.33707	14.81804	72	72	97	4	17	24
47	1	72	43	0.33707	15.46076	72	72	97	4	17	24
47	2	97	38	0.36216	16.31943	72	72	97	4	17	24
47	3	4	56	0.33003	15.29498	72	72	97	4	17	24
47	4	17	54	0.32809	15.94815	72	72	97	4	17	24
47	5	24	52	0.32349	15.09167	72	72	97	4	17	24
48	0	33	42	0.28049	15.09853	33	83	97	9	0	19
48	1	83	32	0.38199	15.84275	33	83	97	9	0	19
48	2	97	29	0.41151	16.73093	33	83	97	9	0	19
48	3	9	46	0.28534	15.58032	33	83	97	9	0	19
48	4	0	48	0.28000	16.22815	33	83	97	9	0	19
48	5	19	44	0.29258	15.38425	33	83	97	9	0	19
49	0	91	40	0.35231	15.45084	91	75	97	0	9	20
49	1	75	43	0.33833	16.18108	91	75	97	0	9	20
49	2	97	39	0.35667	17.08761	91	75	97	0	9	20
49	3	0	58	0.33833	15.91865	91	75	97	0	9	20
49	4	9	57	0.33796	16.56611	91	75	97	0	9	20
49	5	20	54	0.32900	15.71325	91	75	97	0	9	20

Table LVIII.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 3 (Players 0-2 - Home to Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	55	41	0.32317	0.32317	55	37	60	49	10	50
0	1	37	45	0.29437	0.29437	55	37	60	49	10	50
0	2	60	40	0.33133	0.33133	55	37	60	49	10	50
0	3	49	42	0.31474	0.31474	55	37	60	49	10	50
0	4	10	50	0.30567	0.30567	55	37	60	49	10	50
0	5	50	42	0.31500	0.31500	55	37	60	49	10	50
1	0	58	52	0.31724	0.64041	58	90	70	4	35	60
1	1	90	45	0.32900	0.62337	58	90	70	4	35	60
1	2	70	49	0.32200	0.65333	58	90	70	4	35	60
1	3	4	63	0.36759	0.68234	58	90	70	4	35	60
1	4	35	56	0.33075	0.63642	58	90	70	4	35	60
1	5	60	51	0.30450	0.61950	58	90	70	4	35	60
2	0	58	51	0.31817	0.95858	58	52	65	26	60	50
2	1	52	52	0.31584	0.93921	58	52	65	26	60	50
2	2	65	49	0.32200	0.97533	58	52	65	26	60	50
2	3	26	57	0.33796	1.02030	58	52	65	26	60	50
2	4	60	50	0.30567	0.94208	58	52	65	26	60	50
2	5	50	52	0.31500	0.93450	58	52	65	26	60	50
3	0	60	59	0.30917	1.26775	60	95	70	13	60	55
3	1	95	52	0.28875	1.22796	60	95	70	13	60	55
3	2	70	57	0.30333	1.27867	60	95	70	13	60	55
3	3	13	68	0.38666	1.40695	60	95	70	13	60	55
3	4	60	59	0.29517	1.23725	60	95	70	13	60	55
3	5	55	60	0.30508	1.23958	60	95	70	13	60	55

Table LVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
4	0	55	43	0.32200	1.58975	55	98	40	28	6	45
4	1	98	35	0.37884	1.60680	55	98	40	28	6	45
4	2	40	46	0.30100	1.57967	55	98	40	28	6	45
4	3	28	49	0.31654	1.72349	55	98	40	28	6	45
4	4	6	53	0.31603	1.55328	55	98	40	28	6	45
4	5	45	45	0.31500	1.55458	55	98	40	28	6	45
5	0	80	58	0.28700	1.87675	80	50	60	40	96	45
5	1	50	64	0.31500	1.92180	80	50	60	40	96	45
5	2	60	62	0.30567	1.88533	80	50	60	40	96	45
5	3	40	66	0.33833	2.06183	80	50	60	40	96	45
5	4	96	55	0.20659	1.75987	80	50	60	40	96	45
5	5	45	65	0.32667	1.88125	80	50	60	40	96	45
6	0	60	36	0.33600	2.21275	60	7	70	9	50	45
6	1	7	47	0.22671	2.14851	60	7	70	9	50	45
6	2	70	34	0.35700	2.24233	60	7	70	9	50	45
6	3	9	46	0.28534	2.34717	60	7	70	9	50	45
6	4	50	38	0.31500	2.07487	60	7	70	9	50	45
6	5	45	39	0.31150	2.19275	60	7	70	9	50	45
7	0	78	49	0.31957	2.53232	78	82	36	40	40	47
7	1	82	48	0.32097	2.46948	78	82	36	40	40	47
7	2	36	57	0.31206	2.55439	78	82	36	40	40	47
7	3	40	57	0.32783	2.67500	78	82	36	40	40	47
7	4	40	57	0.32783	2.40270	78	82	36	40	40	47
7	5	47	55	0.31864	2.51139	78	82	36	40	40	47
8	0	78	67	0.26077	2.79309	78	100	70	40	90	35
8	1	100	63	0.21583	2.68532	78	100	70	40	90	35
8	2	70	69	0.27533	2.82973	78	100	70	40	90	35
8	3	40	75	0.34883	3.02384	78	100	70	40	90	35
8	4	90	65	0.17967	2.58237	78	100	70	40	90	35
8	5	35	76	0.36575	2.87714	78	100	70	40	90	35
9	0	37	21	0.25797	3.05107	37	18	20	40	5	24
9	1	18	25	0.17537	2.86069	37	18	20	40	5	24
9	2	20	25	0.18550	3.01523	37	18	20	40	5	24
9	3	40	21	0.28583	3.30967	37	18	20	40	5	24
9	4	5	28	0.18375	2.76612	37	18	20	40	5	24
9	5	24	24	0.23856	3.11570	37	18	20	40	5	24
10	0	70	20	0.38967	3.44073	70	16	31	15	10	27
10	1	16	31	0.18886	3.04955	70	16	31	15	10	27
10	2	31	28	0.24451	3.25974	70	16	31	15	10	27
10	3	15	31	0.23333	3.54300	70	16	31	15	10	27
10	4	10	32	0.22167	2.98779	70	16	31	15	10	27
10	5	27	28	0.25972	3.37542	70	16	31	15	10	27
11	0	55	34	0.32725	3.76798	55	0	60	36	50	24
11	1	0	45	0.19250	3.24205	55	0	60	36	50	24
11	2	60	33	0.33950	3.59924	55	0	60	36	50	24
11	3	36	38	0.30063	3.84363	55	0	60	36	50	24
11	4	50	35	0.31500	3.30279	55	0	60	36	50	24
11	5	24	40	0.28709	3.66252	55	0	60	36	50	24
12	0	61	52	0.31731	4.08529	61	49	74	49	60	27
12	1	49	54	0.31474	3.55679	61	49	74	49	60	27
12	2	74	49	0.32116	3.92040	61	49	74	49	60	27
12	3	49	54	0.31614	4.15977	61	49	74	49	60	27
12	4	60	52	0.30333	3.60612	61	49	74	49	60	27
12	5	27	59	0.34291	4.00542	61	49	74	49	60	27
13	0	59	37	0.33306	4.41835	59	50	50	49	15	21
13	1	50	39	0.31500	3.87179	59	50	50	49	15	21
13	2	50	39	0.31500	4.23540	59	50	50	49	15	21
13	3	49	39	0.31439	4.47417	59	50	50	49	15	21
13	4	15	46	0.29458	3.90070	59	50	50	49	15	21
13	5	21	45	0.29876	4.30418	59	50	50	49	15	21
14	0	96	59	0.24953	4.66788	96	93	90	59	20	32
14	1	93	59	0.25681	4.12860	96	93	90	59	20	32
14	2	90	60	0.25900	4.49440	96	93	90	59	20	32
14	3	59	66	0.29001	4.76418	96	93	90	59	20	32
14	4	20	74	0.39900	4.29970	96	93	90	59	20	32
14	5	32	72	0.36624	4.67042	96	93	90	59	20	32
15	0	52	53	0.31561	4.98349	52	50	68	42	80	24
15	1	50	53	0.31500	4.44360	52	50	68	42	80	24
15	2	68	50	0.32004	4.81444	52	50	68	42	80	24
15	3	42	55	0.32377	5.08795	52	50	68	42	80	24
15	4	80	47	0.28350	4.58320	52	50	68	42	80	24
15	5	24	58	0.34169	5.01212	52	50	68	42	80	24
16	0	50	62	0.31500	5.29849	50	82	82	19	50	78
16	1	82	56	0.29111	4.73471	50	82	82	19	50	78
16	2	82	56	0.29111	5.10554	50	82	82	19	50	78
16	3	19	68	0.37938	5.46733	50	82	82	19	50	78
16	4	50	62	0.31500	4.89820	50	82	82	19	50	78
16	5	78	57	0.25424	5.26636	50	82	82	19	50	78
17	0	40	41	0.29517	5.59365	40	55	37	41	50	24
17	1	55	38	0.32492	5.05962	40	55	37	41	50	24
17	2	37	42	0.28982	5.39537	40	55	37	41	50	24
17	3	41	41	0.30996	5.77729	40	55	37	41	50	24
17	4	50	39	0.31500	5.21320	40	55	37	41	50	24
17	5	24	45	0.30226	5.56862	40	55	37	41	50	24
18	0	55	26	0.33192	5.92557	55	31	41	37	0	23

Table LVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
18	1	31	31	0.25116	5.31078	55	31	41	37	0	23
18	2	41	29	0.28476	5.68013	55	31	41	37	0	23
18	3	37	30	0.28982	6.06711	55	31	41	37	0	23
18	4	0	37	0.21583	5.42904	55	31	41	37	0	23
18	5	23	33	0.26334	5.83196	55	31	41	37	0	23
19	0	60	71	0.29517	6.22074	60	89	87	46	100	35
19	1	89	66	0.23401	5.54479	60	89	87	46	100	35
19	2	87	66	0.23989	5.92002	60	89	87	46	100	35
19	3	46	74	0.32863	6.39574	60	89	87	46	100	35
19	4	100	63	0.14583	5.57487	60	89	87	46	100	35
19	5	35	76	0.36575	6.19771	60	89	87	46	100	35
20	0	40	46	0.30100	6.52174	40	55	60	40	50	24
20	1	55	43	0.32200	5.86679	40	55	60	40	50	24
20	2	60	42	0.32900	6.24902	40	55	60	40	50	24
20	3	40	46	0.31500	6.71074	40	55	60	40	50	24
20	4	50	44	0.31500	5.88987	40	55	60	40	50	24
20	5	24	49	0.31439	6.51210	40	55	60	40	50	24
21	0	36	38	0.28103	6.80276	36	15	70	48	25	30
21	1	15	42	0.22925	6.09604	36	15	70	48	25	30
21	2	70	31	0.36400	6.61302	36	15	70	48	25	30
21	3	48	35	0.31281	7.02354	36	15	70	48	25	30
21	4	25	40	0.28875	6.17862	36	15	70	48	25	30
21	5	30	39	0.29400	6.80610	36	15	70	48	25	30
22	0	44	57	0.31486	7.11762	44	82	80	51	45	26
22	1	82	49	0.31724	6.41328	44	82	80	51	45	26
22	2	80	50	0.31500	6.92802	44	82	80	51	45	26
22	3	51	55	0.31369	7.33724	44	82	80	51	45	26
22	4	45	57	0.32200	6.50062	44	82	80	51	45	26
22	5	26	60	0.34636	7.15246	44	82	80	51	45	26
23	0	28	45	0.27547	7.39310	28	63	70	22	45	23
23	1	63	38	0.33836	6.75164	28	63	70	22	45	23
23	2	70	36	0.35233	7.28035	28	63	70	22	45	23
23	3	22	46	0.30324	7.64048	28	63	70	22	45	23
23	4	45	41	0.31267	6.81329	28	63	70	22	45	23
23	5	23	46	0.30429	7.45675	28	63	70	22	45	23
24	0	51	52	0.31544	7.70854	51	38	90	50	48	32
24	1	38	54	0.30884	7.06048	51	38	90	50	48	32
24	2	90	44	0.33367	7.61402	51	38	90	50	48	32
24	3	50	52	0.31500	7.95548	51	38	90	50	48	32
24	4	48	52	0.31677	7.13006	51	38	90	50	48	32
24	5	32	55	0.33054	7.78729	51	38	90	50	48	32
25	0	55	67	0.30800	8.01654	55	85	70	50	81	50
25	1	85	61	0.26600	7.32648	55	85	70	50	81	50
25	2	70	64	0.28700	7.90102	55	85	70	50	81	50
25	3	50	68	0.31500	8.27048	55	85	70	50	81	50
25	4	81	62	0.22748	7.35754	55	85	70	50	81	50
25	5	50	68	0.31500	8.10229	55	85	70	50	81	50
26	0	43	46	0.30569	8.32223	43	52	87	11	50	28
26	1	52	44	0.31771	7.64419	43	52	87	11	50	28
26	2	87	37	0.36507	8.26609	43	52	87	11	50	28
26	3	11	52	0.31591	8.58639	43	52	87	11	50	28
26	4	50	44	0.31500	7.67254	43	52	87	11	50	28
26	5	28	49	0.31654	8.41883	43	52	87	11	50	28
27	0	89	56	0.27951	8.60174	89	55	100	59	50	15
27	1	55	63	0.31033	7.95452	89	55	100	59	50	15
27	2	100	54	0.26833	8.53442	89	55	100	59	50	15
27	3	59	62	0.29421	8.88060	89	55	100	59	50	15
27	4	50	64	0.31500	7.98754	89	55	100	59	50	15
27	5	15	71	0.39667	8.81550	89	55	100	59	50	15
28	0	45	41	0.30567	8.90741	45	59	80	50	5	11
28	1	59	38	0.33201	8.28653	45	59	80	50	5	11
28	2	80	34	0.37100	8.90542	45	59	80	50	5	11
28	3	50	40	0.31500	9.19560	45	59	80	50	5	11
28	4	5	49	0.29400	8.28154	45	59	80	50	5	11
28	5	11	48	0.29771	9.11321	45	59	80	50	5	11
29	0	45	40	0.30508	9.21249	45	40	70	65	6	17
29	1	40	41	0.29517	8.58170	45	40	70	65	6	17
29	2	70	35	0.35467	9.26009	45	40	70	65	6	17
29	3	65	36	0.32375	9.51935	45	40	70	65	6	17
29	4	6	47	0.28523	8.56676	45	40	70	65	6	17
29	5	17	45	0.29344	9.40665	45	40	70	65	6	17
30	0	45	58	0.31558	9.52807	45	95	70	40	60	27
30	1	95	48	0.30975	8.89145	45	95	70	40	60	27
30	2	70	53	0.31267	9.57276	45	95	70	40	60	27
30	3	40	59	0.33017	9.84951	45	95	70	40	60	27
30	4	60	55	0.29983	8.86660	45	95	70	40	60	27
30	5	27	62	0.35096	9.75760	45	95	70	40	60	27
31	0	49	26	0.31148	9.83955	49	1	40	18	50	23
31	1	1	36	0.14464	9.03609	49	1	40	18	50	23
31	2	40	28	0.28000	9.85276	49	1	40	18	50	23
31	3	18	33	0.25004	10.09955	49	1	40	18	50	23
31	4	50	26	0.31500	9.18160	49	1	40	18	50	23
31	5	23	32	0.26019	10.01779	49	1	40	18	50	23
32	0	51	40	0.31684	10.15639	51	42	40	46	50	24
32	1	42	42	0.30044	9.33653	51	42	40	46	50	24

Table LVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
32	2	40	43	0.29750	10.15026	51	42	40	46	50	24
32	3	46	41	0.31323	10.41278	51	42	40	46	50	24
32	4	50	41	0.31500	9.49660	51	42	40	46	50	24
32	5	24	46	0.30529	10.32309	51	42	40	46	50	24
33	0	52	66	0.31257	10.46897	52	96	90	70	45	28
33	1	96	57	0.26026	9.59679	52	96	90	70	45	28
33	2	90	58	0.26833	10.41859	52	96	90	70	45	28
33	3	70	62	0.26367	10.67645	52	96	90	70	45	28
33	4	45	67	0.32783	9.82443	52	96	90	70	45	28
33	5	28	71	0.37301	10.69609	52	96	90	70	45	28
34	0	43	60	0.31712	10.78609	43	65	80	25	57	71
34	1	65	55	0.31150	9.90829	43	65	80	25	57	71
34	2	80	52	0.30800	10.72659	43	65	80	25	57	71
34	3	25	63	0.35583	11.03228	43	65	80	25	57	71
34	4	57	57	0.30324	10.12767	43	65	80	25	57	71
34	5	71	54	0.28021	10.97630	43	65	80	25	57	71
35	0	50	53	0.31500	11.10109	50	8	100	40	90	28
35	1	8	62	0.30324	10.21153	50	8	100	40	90	28
35	2	100	43	0.33250	11.05909	50	8	100	40	90	28
35	3	40	55	0.32550	11.35778	50	8	100	40	90	28
35	4	90	45	0.27300	10.40067	50	8	100	40	90	28
35	5	28	58	0.33964	11.31594	50	8	100	40	90	28
36	0	60	55	0.31383	11.41492	60	63	100	48	45	18
36	1	63	54	0.31409	10.52562	60	63	100	48	45	18
36	2	100	47	0.30917	11.36826	60	63	100	48	45	18
36	3	48	57	0.31794	11.67572	60	63	100	48	45	18
36	4	45	58	0.32258	10.72325	60	63	100	48	45	18
36	5	18	63	0.36204	11.67798	60	63	100	48	45	18
37	0	55	64	0.30975	11.72467	55	92	100	3	40	85
37	1	92	57	0.26894	10.79456	55	92	100	3	40	85
37	2	100	55	0.26250	11.63076	55	92	100	3	40	85
37	3	3	74	0.42796	12.10368	55	92	100	3	40	85
37	4	40	67	0.33950	11.06275	55	92	100	3	40	85
37	5	85	58	0.22925	11.90723	55	92	100	3	40	85
38	0	43	58	0.31549	12.04016	43	67	70	70	45	39
38	1	67	53	0.31421	11.10877	43	67	70	70	45	39
38	2	70	53	0.31267	11.94342	43	67	70	70	45	39
38	3	70	53	0.28467	12.38834	43	67	70	70	45	39
38	4	45	58	0.32258	11.38534	43	67	70	70	45	39
38	5	39	59	0.33143	12.23866	43	67	70	70	45	39
39	0	49	41	0.31323	12.35339	49	54	60	20	40	29
39	1	54	40	0.32209	11.43086	49	54	60	20	40	29
39	2	60	38	0.33367	12.27709	49	54	60	20	40	29
39	3	20	46	0.30100	12.68934	49	54	60	20	40	29
39	4	40	42	0.31033	11.69567	49	54	60	20	40	29
39	5	29	45	0.30716	12.54582	49	54	60	20	40	29
40	0	48	45	0.31234	12.66573	48	16	87	30	45	47
40	1	16	51	0.26819	11.69905	48	16	87	30	45	47
40	2	87	37	0.36507	12.64216	48	16	87	30	45	47
40	3	30	49	0.31733	13.00668	48	16	87	30	45	47
40	4	45	46	0.31558	12.01125	48	16	87	30	45	47
40	5	47	45	0.31514	12.86096	48	16	87	30	45	47
41	0	50	53	0.31500	12.98073	50	34	90	40	45	55
41	1	34	56	0.30903	12.00808	50	34	90	40	45	55
41	2	90	45	0.32900	12.97116	50	34	90	40	45	55
41	3	40	55	0.32550	13.33218	50	34	90	40	45	55
41	4	45	54	0.32025	12.33150	50	34	90	40	45	55
41	5	55	52	0.30975	13.17071	50	34	90	40	45	55
42	0	50	54	0.31500	13.29573	50	56	70	54	40	48
42	1	56	52	0.31696	12.32504	50	56	70	54	40	48
42	2	70	50	0.31967	13.29083	50	56	70	54	40	48
42	3	54	53	0.31043	13.64260	50	56	70	54	40	48
42	4	40	56	0.32667	12.65817	50	56	70	54	40	48
42	5	48	54	0.31724	13.48795	50	56	70	54	40	48
43	0	50	41	0.31500	13.61073	50	65	40	31	43	25
43	1	65	38	0.34125	12.66629	50	65	40	31	43	25
43	2	40	43	0.29750	13.58833	50	65	40	31	43	25
43	3	31	45	0.30879	13.95140	50	65	40	31	43	25
43	4	43	42	0.31222	12.97039	50	65	40	31	43	25
43	5	25	46	0.30625	13.79420	50	65	40	31	43	25
44	0	50	54	0.31500	13.92573	50	70	89	50	35	28
44	1	70	50	0.31967	12.98596	50	70	89	50	35	28
44	2	89	47	0.32046	13.90879	50	70	89	50	35	28
44	3	50	54	0.31500	14.26640	50	70	89	50	35	28
44	4	35	57	0.33250	13.30289	50	70	89	50	35	28
44	5	28	59	0.34221	14.13641	50	70	89	50	35	28
45	0	50	34	0.31500	14.24073	50	52	81	4	30	4
45	1	52	34	0.32004	13.30600	50	52	81	4	30	4
45	2	81	28	0.39384	14.30263	50	52	81	4	30	4
45	3	4	43	0.26026	14.52666	50	52	81	4	30	4
45	4	30	38	0.29167	13.59456	50	52	81	4	30	4
45	5	4	43	0.26026	14.39667	50	52	81	4	30	4
46	0	50	55	0.31500	14.55573	50	58	100	58	50	11
46	1	58	54	0.31537	13.62137	50	58	100	58	50	11
46	2	100	45	0.32083	14.62347	50	58	100	58	50	11

Table LVIII.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
46	3	58	54	0.30417	14.83083	50	58	100	58	50	11
46	4	50	55	0.31500	13.90956	50	58	100	58	50	11
46	5	11	63	0.36596	14.76263	50	58	100	58	50	11
47	0	50	55	0.31500	14.87073	50	43	90	40	40	60
47	1	43	56	0.31386	13.93523	50	43	90	40	40	60
47	2	90	47	0.31967	14.94313	50	43	90	40	40	60
47	3	40	57	0.32783	15.15866	50	43	90	40	40	60
47	4	40	57	0.32783	14.23739	50	43	90	40	40	60
47	5	60	53	0.30217	15.06479	50	43	90	40	40	60
48	0	50	49	0.31500	15.18573	50	51	70	36	40	48
48	1	51	49	0.31579	14.25102	50	51	70	36	40	48
48	2	70	45	0.33133	15.27447	50	51	70	36	40	48
48	3	36	52	0.32349	15.48216	50	51	70	36	40	48
48	4	40	51	0.32083	14.55823	50	51	70	36	40	48
48	5	48	49	0.31607	15.38087	50	51	70	36	40	48
49	0	50	43	0.31500	15.50073	50	36	80	47	35	16
49	1	36	46	0.29409	14.54511	50	36	80	47	35	16
49	2	80	37	0.36050	15.63497	50	36	80	47	35	16
49	3	47	43	0.31444	15.79660	50	36	80	47	35	16
49	4	35	46	0.31325	14.87148	50	36	80	47	35	16
49	5	16	50	0.31183	15.69269	50	36	80	47	35	16

Table LIX.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 4 (Players 0-2 - Home to Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	83	60	0.27419	0.27419	83	67	39	45	48	100
0	1	67	63	0.29437	0.29437	83	67	39	45	48	100
0	2	39	69	0.32886	0.32886	83	67	39	45	48	100
0	3	45	67	0.32783	0.32783	83	67	39	45	48	100
0	4	48	67	0.32027	0.32027	83	67	39	45	48	100
0	5	100	56	0.18667	0.18667	83	67	39	45	48	100
1	0	75	36	0.35875	0.63294	75	70	52	40	9	9
1	1	70	37	0.35000	0.64437	75	70	52	40	9	9
1	2	52	41	0.31841	0.64727	75	70	52	40	9	9
1	3	40	43	0.31150	0.63933	75	70	52	40	9	9
1	4	9	49	0.29969	0.61997	75	70	52	40	9	9
1	5	9	49	0.29969	0.48636	75	70	52	40	9	9
2	0	77	49	0.32004	0.95298	77	40	74	43	50	40
2	1	40	57	0.31383	0.95821	77	40	74	43	50	40
2	2	74	50	0.31836	0.96563	77	40	74	43	50	40
2	3	43	56	0.32366	0.96299	77	40	74	43	50	40
2	4	50	55	0.31500	0.93497	77	40	74	43	50	40
2	5	40	57	0.32783	0.81419	77	40	74	43	50	40
3	0	80	50	0.31500	1.26798	80	69	75	40	31	35
3	1	69	52	0.31544	1.27365	80	69	75	40	31	35
3	2	75	51	0.31500	1.28063	80	69	75	40	31	35
3	3	40	58	0.32900	1.29199	80	69	75	40	31	35
3	4	31	60	0.34204	1.27701	80	69	75	40	31	35
3	5	35	59	0.33600	1.15019	80	69	75	40	31	35
4	0	94	49	0.30576	1.57374	94	60	62	45	32	47
4	1	60	56	0.31267	1.58632	94	60	62	45	32	47
4	2	62	56	0.31164	1.59227	94	60	62	45	32	47
4	3	45	59	0.32317	1.61516	94	60	62	45	32	47
4	4	32	62	0.34524	1.62225	94	60	62	45	32	47
4	5	47	59	0.32004	1.47023	94	60	62	45	32	47
5	0	47	46	0.31129	1.88503	47	56	62	35	30	46
5	1	56	44	0.32256	1.90888	47	56	62	35	30	46
5	2	62	43	0.32984	1.92211	47	56	62	35	30	46
5	3	35	48	0.31675	1.93191	47	56	62	35	30	46
5	4	30	49	0.31733	1.93958	47	56	62	35	30	46
5	5	46	46	0.31556	1.78579	47	56	62	35	30	46
6	0	80	54	0.30100	2.18603	80	79	70	35	35	51
6	1	79	54	0.30214	2.21102	80	79	70	35	35	51
6	2	70	56	0.30567	2.22777	80	79	70	35	35	51
6	3	35	63	0.34300	2.27491	80	79	70	35	35	51
6	4	35	63	0.34300	2.28258	80	79	70	35	35	51
6	5	51	60	0.31311	2.09890	80	79	70	35	35	51
7	0	35	43	0.28700	2.47303	35	68	57	30	10	50
7	1	68	36	0.34944	2.56046	35	68	57	30	10	50
7	2	57	39	0.32774	2.55551	35	68	57	30	10	50
7	3	30	44	0.30567	2.58057	35	68	57	30	10	50
7	4	10	48	0.29633	2.57892	35	68	57	30	10	50
7	5	50	40	0.31500	2.41390	35	68	57	30	10	50
8	0	66	44	0.33143	2.80446	66	96	37	25	9	51

Table LIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
8	1	96	38	0.36223	2.92269	66	96	37	25	9	51
8	2	37	49	0.30044	2.85595	66	96	37	25	9	51
8	3	25	52	0.32375	2.90432	66	96	37	25	9	51
8	4	9	55	0.32839	2.90731	66	96	37	25	9	51
8	5	51	47	0.31463	2.72853	66	96	37	25	9	51
9	0	63	50	0.32016	3.12461	63	88	62	20	32	50
9	1	88	45	0.33007	3.25276	63	88	62	20	32	50
9	2	62	51	0.31864	3.17459	63	88	62	20	32	50
9	3	20	59	0.34650	3.25082	63	88	62	20	32	50
9	4	32	57	0.33474	3.24205	63	88	62	20	32	50
9	5	50	53	0.31500	3.04353	63	88	62	20	32	50
10	0	67	42	0.33602	3.46064	67	82	40	20	24	46
10	1	82	39	0.35457	3.60733	67	82	40	20	24	46
10	2	40	48	0.30333	3.47793	67	82	40	20	24	46
10	3	20	52	0.32200	3.57282	67	82	40	20	24	46
10	4	24	51	0.32046	3.56251	67	82	40	20	24	46
10	5	46	47	0.31603	3.35956	67	82	40	20	24	46
11	0	76	45	0.33259	3.79323	76	93	24	20	50	40
11	1	93	42	0.34209	3.94942	76	93	24	20	50	40
11	2	24	56	0.29923	3.77715	76	93	24	20	50	40
11	3	20	57	0.33950	3.91232	76	93	24	20	50	40
11	4	50	51	0.31500	3.87751	76	93	24	20	50	40
11	5	40	53	0.32317	3.68272	76	93	24	20	50	40
12	0	67	59	0.30231	4.09554	67	97	72	40	40	45
12	1	97	53	0.27991	4.22933	67	97	72	40	40	45
12	2	72	58	0.29857	4.07573	67	97	72	40	40	45
12	3	40	64	0.33600	4.24832	67	97	72	40	40	45
12	4	40	64	0.33600	4.21351	67	97	72	40	40	45
12	5	45	63	0.32550	4.00822	67	97	72	40	40	45
13	0	95	34	0.38325	4.47879	95	60	54	50	0	8
13	1	60	41	0.33017	4.55950	95	60	54	50	0	8
13	2	54	43	0.32069	4.39642	95	60	54	50	0	8
13	3	50	43	0.31500	4.56332	95	60	54	50	0	8
13	4	0	53	0.30917	4.52268	95	60	54	50	0	8
13	5	8	52	0.31304	4.32126	95	60	54	50	0	8
14	0	66	40	0.33889	4.81768	66	69	23	40	20	50
14	1	69	40	0.34204	4.90154	66	69	23	40	20	50
14	2	23	49	0.27594	4.67236	66	69	23	40	20	50
14	3	40	46	0.31500	4.87832	66	69	23	40	20	50
14	4	20	50	0.31500	4.83768	66	69	23	40	20	50
14	5	50	44	0.31500	4.63626	66	69	23	40	20	50
15	0	68	55	0.30954	5.12722	68	75	87	35	30	50
15	1	75	54	0.30625	5.20779	68	75	87	35	30	50
15	2	87	52	0.30032	4.97268	68	75	87	35	30	50
15	3	35	62	0.34125	5.21957	68	75	87	35	30	50
15	4	30	63	0.35000	5.18768	68	75	87	35	30	50
15	5	50	59	0.31500	4.95126	68	75	87	35	30	50
16	0	86	54	0.29316	5.42038	86	64	77	50	30	50
16	1	64	59	0.30553	5.51332	86	64	77	50	30	50
16	2	77	56	0.29799	5.27067	86	64	77	50	30	50
16	3	50	61	0.31500	5.53457	86	64	77	50	30	50
16	4	30	65	0.35467	5.54234	86	64	77	50	30	50
16	5	50	61	0.31500	5.26626	86	64	77	50	30	50
17	0	27	41	0.26241	5.68279	27	42	40	45	28	50
17	1	42	38	0.29671	5.81002	27	42	40	45	28	50
17	2	40	38	0.29167	5.56234	27	42	40	45	28	50
17	3	45	37	0.31033	5.84491	27	42	40	45	28	50
17	4	28	41	0.29601	5.83835	27	42	40	45	28	50
17	5	50	36	0.31500	5.58126	27	42	40	45	28	50
18	0	71	53	0.31206	5.99485	71	69	48	40	35	75
18	1	69	54	0.31101	6.12103	71	69	48	40	35	75
18	2	48	58	0.31537	5.87771	71	69	48	40	35	75
18	3	40	60	0.33133	6.17624	71	69	48	40	35	75
18	4	35	61	0.33950	6.17785	71	69	48	40	35	75
18	5	75	53	0.27417	5.85543	71	69	48	40	35	75
19	0	62	44	0.32844	6.32329	62	72	27	45	28	50
19	1	72	42	0.33964	6.46067	62	72	27	45	28	50
19	2	27	51	0.28924	6.16695	62	72	27	45	28	50
19	3	45	48	0.31675	6.49299	62	72	27	45	28	50
19	4	28	51	0.32167	6.49952	62	72	27	45	28	50
19	5	50	47	0.31500	6.17043	62	72	27	45	28	50
20	0	71	47	0.32676	6.65005	71	80	35	40	32	50
20	1	80	46	0.32900	6.78967	71	80	35	40	32	50
20	2	35	55	0.30800	6.47495	71	80	35	40	32	50
20	3	40	54	0.32433	6.81732	71	80	35	40	32	50
20	4	32	55	0.33054	6.83006	71	80	35	40	32	50
20	5	50	52	0.31500	6.48543	71	80	35	40	32	50
21	0	57	48	0.32039	6.97044	57	63	58	35	32	50
21	1	63	46	0.32622	7.11590	57	63	58	35	32	50
21	2	58	47	0.32191	6.79686	57	63	58	35	32	50
21	3	35	52	0.32375	7.14107	57	63	58	35	32	50
21	4	32	53	0.32634	7.15640	57	63	58	35	32	50
21	5	50	49	0.31500	6.80043	57	63	58	35	32	50
22	0	66	48	0.32396	7.29440	66	67	58	35	32	50
22	1	67	48	0.32412	7.44002	66	67	58	35	32	50

Table LIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
22	2	58	50	0.31911	7.11597	66	67	58	35	32	50
22	3	35	55	0.32900	7.47007	66	67	58	35	32	50
22	4	32	55	0.33054	7.48694	66	67	58	35	32	50
22	5	50	52	0.31500	7.11543	66	67	58	35	32	50
23	0	66	47	0.32583	7.62022	66	68	60	30	32	44
23	1	68	46	0.32844	7.76846	66	68	60	30	32	44
23	2	60	48	0.32200	7.43797	66	68	60	30	32	44
23	3	30	54	0.32900	7.79907	66	68	60	30	32	44
23	4	32	54	0.32844	7.81538	66	68	60	30	32	44
23	5	44	51	0.31906	7.43449	66	68	60	30	32	44
24	0	70	46	0.32900	7.94922	70	78	50	25	32	43
24	1	78	44	0.33591	8.10437	70	78	50	25	32	43
24	2	50	50	0.31500	7.75297	70	78	50	25	32	43
24	3	25	55	0.33250	8.13157	70	78	50	25	32	43
24	4	32	53	0.32634	8.14172	70	78	50	25	32	43
24	5	43	51	0.31957	7.75406	70	78	50	25	32	43
25	0	94	42	0.34169	8.29092	94	71	50	20	32	38
25	1	71	47	0.32676	8.43113	94	71	50	20	32	38
25	2	50	51	0.31500	8.06797	94	71	50	20	32	38
25	3	20	57	0.33950	8.47107	94	71	50	20	32	38
25	4	32	55	0.33054	8.47226	94	71	50	20	32	38
25	5	38	53	0.32424	8.07830	94	71	50	20	32	38
26	0	48	36	0.31024	8.60116	48	55	53	10	25	38
26	1	55	35	0.32667	8.75779	48	55	53	10	25	38
26	2	53	35	0.32214	8.39011	48	55	53	10	25	38
26	3	10	44	0.27767	8.74874	48	55	53	10	25	38
26	4	25	41	0.29167	8.76393	48	55	53	10	25	38
26	5	38	38	0.30324	8.38154	48	55	53	10	25	38
27	0	94	40	0.35196	8.95312	94	76	45	0	32	49
27	1	76	44	0.33563	9.09342	94	76	45	0	32	49
27	2	45	50	0.31092	8.70102	94	76	45	0	32	49
27	3	0	59	0.34417	9.09291	94	76	45	0	32	49
27	4	32	53	0.32634	9.09027	94	76	45	0	32	49
27	5	49	49	0.31556	8.69710	94	76	45	0	32	49
28	0	80	46	0.32900	9.28212	80	81	57	10	32	50
28	1	81	46	0.32874	9.42216	80	81	57	10	32	50
28	2	57	51	0.31794	9.01896	80	81	57	10	32	50
28	3	10	60	0.35233	9.44524	80	81	57	10	32	50
28	4	32	56	0.33264	9.42291	80	81	57	10	32	50
28	5	50	52	0.31500	9.01210	80	81	57	10	32	50
29	0	75	46	0.32958	9.61170	75	33	89	15	32	60
29	1	33	54	0.30429	9.72645	75	33	89	15	32	60
29	2	89	43	0.33866	9.35762	75	33	89	15	32	60
29	3	15	58	0.34358	9.78882	75	33	89	15	32	60
29	4	32	54	0.32844	9.75135	75	33	89	15	32	60
29	5	60	49	0.30683	9.31894	75	33	89	15	32	60
30	0	75	52	0.31208	9.92378	75	65	100	20	32	42
30	1	65	54	0.31325	10.03970	75	65	100	20	32	42
30	2	100	47	0.30917	9.66679	75	65	100	20	32	42
30	3	20	63	0.36050	10.14932	75	65	100	20	32	42
30	4	32	60	0.34104	10.09239	75	65	100	20	32	42
30	5	42	58	0.32657	9.64551	75	65	100	20	32	42
31	0	46	35	0.30483	10.22861	46	44	60	20	32	20
31	1	44	36	0.30016	10.33986	46	44	60	20	32	20
31	2	60	32	0.34067	10.00746	46	44	60	20	32	20
31	3	20	40	0.28000	10.42932	46	44	60	20	32	20
31	4	32	38	0.29484	10.38723	46	44	60	20	32	20
31	5	20	40	0.28000	9.92551	46	44	60	20	32	20
32	0	81	32	0.37938	10.60799	81	74	34	0	31	22
32	1	74	34	0.36316	10.70302	81	74	34	0	31	22
32	2	34	42	0.28289	10.29035	81	74	34	0	31	22
32	3	0	48	0.28000	10.70932	81	74	34	0	31	22
32	4	31	42	0.30214	10.68937	81	74	34	0	31	22
32	5	22	44	0.29671	10.22222	81	74	34	0	31	22
33	0	92	58	0.26404	10.87203	92	82	87	5	67	50
33	1	82	60	0.27617	10.97920	92	82	87	5	67	50
33	2	87	59	0.27011	10.56046	92	82	87	5	67	50
33	3	5	76	0.43575	11.14507	92	82	87	5	67	50
33	4	67	63	0.27057	10.95995	92	82	87	5	67	50
33	5	50	67	0.31500	10.53722	92	82	87	5	67	50
34	0	68	58	0.30324	11.17527	68	64	75	70	32	47
34	1	64	58	0.30716	11.28636	68	64	75	70	32	47
34	2	75	56	0.30042	10.86087	68	64	75	70	32	47
34	3	70	57	0.27533	11.42041	68	64	75	70	32	47
34	4	32	65	0.35154	11.31149	68	64	75	70	32	47
34	5	47	62	0.32109	10.85831	68	64	75	70	32	47
35	0	45	49	0.31033	11.48560	45	66	65	50	32	30
35	1	66	44	0.33143	11.61778	45	66	65	50	32	30
35	2	65	45	0.32900	11.18987	45	66	65	50	32	30
35	3	50	48	0.31500	11.73541	45	66	65	50	32	30
35	4	32	51	0.32214	11.63363	45	66	65	50	32	30
35	5	30	52	0.32433	11.18264	45	66	65	50	32	30
36	0	50	50	0.31500	11.80060	50	69	56	50	32	43
36	1	69	46	0.32874	11.94653	50	69	56	50	32	43
36	2	56	49	0.31906	11.50893	50	69	56	50	32	43

Table LIX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
36	3	50	50	0.31500	12.05041	50	69	56	50	32	43
36	4	32	54	0.32844	11.96207	50	69	56	50	32	43
36	5	43	51	0.31957	11.50221	50	69	56	50	32	43
37	0	85	50	0.31092	12.11152	85	63	80	40	32	35
37	1	63	54	0.31409	12.26062	85	63	80	40	32	35
37	2	80	51	0.31150	11.82043	85	63	80	40	32	35
37	3	40	59	0.33017	12.38057	85	63	80	40	32	35
37	4	32	61	0.34314	12.30521	85	63	80	40	32	35
37	5	35	60	0.33775	11.83996	85	63	80	40	32	35
38	0	85	46	0.32725	12.43877	85	59	81	39	32	21
38	1	59	52	0.31731	12.57793	85	59	81	39	32	21
38	2	81	47	0.32513	12.14556	85	59	81	39	32	21
38	3	39	56	0.32758	12.70815	85	59	81	39	32	21
38	4	32	57	0.33474	12.63995	85	59	81	39	32	21
38	5	21	59	0.34613	12.18609	85	59	81	39	32	21
39	0	87	49	0.31327	12.75204	87	65	51	55	32	43
39	1	65	54	0.31325	12.89118	87	65	51	55	32	43
39	2	51	56	0.31498	12.46054	87	65	51	55	32	43
39	3	55	56	0.30742	13.01557	87	65	51	55	32	43
39	4	32	60	0.34104	12.98099	87	65	51	55	32	43
39	5	43	58	0.32529	12.51138	87	65	51	55	32	43
40	0	77	43	0.33894	13.09098	77	66	47	35	32	33
40	1	66	45	0.32956	13.22074	77	66	47	35	32	33
40	2	47	49	0.31234	12.77288	77	66	47	35	32	33
40	3	35	51	0.32200	13.33757	77	66	47	35	32	33
40	4	32	52	0.32424	13.30523	77	66	47	35	32	33
40	5	33	51	0.32214	12.83352	77	66	47	35	32	33
41	0	77	47	0.32634	13.41732	77	75	57	30	32	41
41	1	75	47	0.32667	13.54740	77	75	57	30	32	41
41	2	57	51	0.31794	13.09082	77	75	57	30	32	41
41	3	30	56	0.33367	13.67123	77	75	57	30	32	41
41	4	32	56	0.33264	13.63787	77	75	57	30	32	41
41	5	41	54	0.32361	13.15713	77	75	57	30	32	41
42	0	62	47	0.32424	13.74156	62	70	64	25	32	42
42	1	70	45	0.33133	13.87874	62	70	64	25	32	42
42	2	64	46	0.32676	13.41758	62	70	64	25	32	42
42	3	25	54	0.32958	14.00082	62	70	64	25	32	42
42	4	32	53	0.32634	13.96421	62	70	64	25	32	42
42	5	42	51	0.32004	13.47717	62	70	64	25	32	42
43	0	68	52	0.31584	14.05740	68	73	92	20	32	42
43	1	73	51	0.31607	14.19481	68	73	92	20	32	42
43	2	92	47	0.31794	13.73552	68	73	92	20	32	42
43	3	20	61	0.35350	14.35432	68	73	92	20	32	42
43	4	32	59	0.33894	14.30315	68	73	92	20	32	42
43	5	42	57	0.32564	13.80281	68	73	92	20	32	42
44	0	51	49	0.31579	14.37319	51	66	55	50	32	43
44	1	66	46	0.32769	14.52250	51	66	55	50	32	43
44	2	55	48	0.31908	14.05460	51	66	55	50	32	43
44	3	50	49	0.31500	14.66932	51	66	55	50	32	43
44	4	32	53	0.32634	14.62949	51	66	55	50	32	43
44	5	43	51	0.31957	14.12238	51	66	55	50	32	43
45	0	88	45	0.33007	14.70327	88	77	45	40	32	33
45	1	77	48	0.32319	14.84569	88	77	45	40	32	33
45	2	45	54	0.31325	14.36785	88	77	45	40	32	33
45	3	40	55	0.32550	14.99482	88	77	45	40	32	33
45	4	32	57	0.33474	14.96423	88	77	45	40	32	33
45	5	33	56	0.33206	14.45444	88	77	45	40	32	33
46	0	85	31	0.38850	15.09177	85	69	7	30	32	19
46	1	69	35	0.35313	15.19882	85	69	7	30	32	19
46	2	7	47	0.22671	14.59456	85	69	7	30	32	19
46	3	30	42	0.30100	15.29582	85	69	7	30	32	19
46	4	32	42	0.30324	15.26747	85	69	7	30	32	19
46	5	19	45	0.29619	14.75063	85	69	7	30	32	19
47	0	87	45	0.33054	15.42231	87	80	53	10	32	50
47	1	80	46	0.32900	15.52782	87	80	53	10	32	50
47	2	53	52	0.31619	14.91075	87	80	53	10	32	50
47	3	10	60	0.35233	15.64815	87	80	53	10	32	50
47	4	32	56	0.33264	15.60011	87	80	53	10	32	50
47	5	50	52	0.31500	15.06563	87	80	53	10	32	50
48	0	65	47	0.32550	15.74781	65	70	60	50	32	25
48	1	70	46	0.32900	15.85682	65	70	60	50	32	25
48	2	60	48	0.32200	15.23275	65	70	60	50	32	25
48	3	50	50	0.31500	15.96315	65	70	60	50	32	25
48	4	32	54	0.32844	15.92855	65	70	60	50	32	25
48	5	25	55	0.33250	15.39813	65	70	60	50	32	25
49	0	70	42	0.33833	16.08614	70	78	61	40	32	0
49	1	78	41	0.34571	16.20253	70	78	61	40	32	0
49	2	61	44	0.32758	15.56032	70	78	61	40	32	0
49	3	40	48	0.31733	16.28048	70	78	61	40	32	0
49	4	32	50	0.32004	16.24859	70	78	61	40	32	0
49	5	0	56	0.32667	15.72480	70	78	61	40	32	0

Table LX.: Data from experiments: 6 small suppliers - with transport costs - Cohort 5 (Players 0-2 - Home to Market A; Players 3-5 - Home to Market B)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
0	0	94	58	0.25956	0.25956	94	76	80	42	44	50
0	1	76	62	0.28103	0.28103	94	76	80	42	44	50
0	2	80	61	0.27650	0.27650	94	76	80	42	44	50
0	3	42	69	0.33684	0.33684	94	76	80	42	44	50
0	4	44	68	0.33096	0.33096	94	76	80	42	44	50
0	5	50	67	0.31500	0.31500	94	76	80	42	44	50
1	0	85	56	0.28642	0.54598	85	66	82	44	37	50
1	1	66	60	0.30156	0.58259	85	66	82	44	37	50
1	2	82	56	0.29111	0.56761	85	66	82	44	37	50
1	3	44	64	0.32816	0.66500	85	66	82	44	37	50
1	4	37	65	0.34291	0.67387	85	66	82	44	37	50
1	5	50	63	0.31500	0.63000	85	66	82	44	37	50
2	0	63	55	0.31257	0.85855	63	62	86	45	33	50
2	1	62	55	0.31304	0.89563	63	62	86	45	33	50
2	2	86	51	0.30576	0.87337	63	62	86	45	33	50
2	3	45	59	0.32317	0.98817	63	62	86	45	33	50
2	4	33	61	0.34197	1.01584	63	62	86	45	33	50
2	5	50	58	0.31500	0.94500	63	62	86	45	33	50
3	0	22	52	0.28364	1.14219	22	50	94	42	25	47
3	1	50	46	0.31500	1.21063	22	50	94	42	25	47
3	2	94	37	0.36736	1.24073	22	50	94	42	25	47
3	3	42	48	0.31724	1.30541	22	50	94	42	25	47
3	4	25	51	0.32083	1.33667	22	50	94	42	25	47
3	5	47	47	0.31584	1.26084	22	50	94	42	25	47
4	0	7	59	0.28691	1.42910	7	57	94	54	41	49
4	1	57	49	0.31957	1.53020	7	57	94	54	41	49
4	2	94	42	0.34169	1.58242	7	57	94	54	41	49
4	3	54	50	0.31183	1.61723	7	57	94	54	41	49
4	4	41	52	0.32151	1.65818	7	57	94	54	41	49
4	5	49	51	0.31579	1.57663	7	57	94	54	41	49
5	0	49	60	0.31544	1.74454	49	47	95	46	60	50
5	1	47	60	0.31619	1.84639	49	47	95	46	60	50
5	2	95	50	0.29925	1.88167	49	47	95	46	60	50
5	3	46	60	0.32209	1.93933	49	47	95	46	60	50
5	4	60	57	0.29750	1.95568	49	47	95	46	60	50
5	5	50	59	0.31500	1.89163	49	47	95	46	60	50
6	0	75	54	0.30625	2.05079	75	57	85	46	37	45
6	1	57	58	0.31222	2.15861	75	57	85	46	37	45
6	2	85	52	0.30275	2.18442	75	57	85	46	37	45
6	3	46	60	0.32209	2.26142	75	57	85	46	37	45
6	4	37	62	0.33836	2.29404	75	57	85	46	37	45
6	5	45	60	0.32375	2.21538	75	57	85	46	37	45
7	0	93	54	0.28189	2.33268	93	95	53	43	35	45
7	1	95	54	0.27825	2.43686	93	95	53	43	35	45
7	2	53	62	0.31269	2.49711	93	95	53	43	35	45
7	3	43	64	0.33019	2.59161	93	95	53	43	35	45
7	4	35	66	0.34825	2.64229	93	95	53	43	35	45
7	5	45	64	0.32608	2.54147	93	95	53	43	35	45
8	0	86	37	0.36456	2.69724	86	23	51	41	30	39
8	1	23	49	0.27594	2.71280	86	23	51	41	30	39
8	2	51	44	0.31638	2.81349	86	23	51	41	30	39
8	3	41	46	0.31521	2.90682	86	23	51	41	30	39
8	4	30	48	0.31500	2.95729	86	23	51	41	30	39
8	5	39	46	0.31474	2.85621	86	23	51	41	30	39
9	0	68	49	0.32214	3.01938	68	40	80	36	37	50
9	1	40	54	0.31033	3.02314	68	40	80	36	37	50
9	2	80	46	0.32900	3.14249	68	40	80	36	37	50
9	3	36	55	0.32839	3.23521	68	40	80	36	37	50
9	4	37	55	0.32774	3.28503	68	40	80	36	37	50
9	5	50	52	0.31500	3.17121	68	40	80	36	37	50
10	0	40	47	0.30217	3.32155	40	40	84	28	34	48
10	1	40	47	0.30217	3.32530	40	40	84	28	34	48
10	2	84	38	0.35943	3.50191	40	40	84	28	34	48
10	3	28	49	0.31654	3.55175	40	40	84	28	34	48
10	4	34	48	0.31649	3.60152	40	40	84	28	34	48
10	5	48	45	0.31514	3.48635	40	40	84	28	34	48
11	0	22	59	0.30651	3.62805	22	57	91	38	62	47
11	1	57	52	0.31712	3.64243	22	57	91	38	62	47
11	2	91	45	0.32839	3.83031	22	57	91	38	62	47
11	3	38	56	0.32844	3.88019	22	57	91	38	62	47
11	4	62	51	0.30184	3.90336	22	57	91	38	62	47
11	5	47	54	0.31829	3.80464	22	57	91	38	62	47
12	0	4	51	0.23879	3.86685	4	44	92	36	36	47
12	1	44	43	0.30506	3.94749	4	44	92	36	36	47
12	2	92	33	0.38654	4.21685	4	44	92	36	36	47
12	3	36	45	0.31206	4.19225	4	44	92	36	36	47
12	4	36	45	0.31206	4.21542	4	44	92	36	36	47
12	5	47	42	0.31409	4.11873	4	44	92	36	36	47
13	0	19	64	0.32151	4.18836	19	88	100	25	55	50
13	1	88	50	0.30791	4.25539	19	88	100	25	55	50
13	2	100	47	0.30917	4.52601	19	88	100	25	55	50
13	3	25	62	0.35292	4.54517	19	88	100	25	55	50
13	4	55	56	0.30742	4.52284	19	88	100	25	55	50
13	5	50	57	0.31500	4.43373	19	88	100	25	55	50

Table LX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
14	0	47	58	0.31549	4.50385	47	64	92	42	40	50
14	1	64	54	0.31369	4.56909	47	64	92	42	40	50
14	2	92	49	0.30814	4.83415	47	64	92	42	40	50
14	3	42	59	0.32751	4.87268	47	64	92	42	40	50
14	4	40	59	0.33017	4.85301	47	64	92	42	40	50
14	5	50	57	0.31500	4.74873	47	64	92	42	40	50
15	0	27	54	0.29729	4.80114	27	63	68	50	36	52
15	1	63	47	0.32471	4.89379	27	63	68	50	36	52
15	2	68	46	0.32844	5.16259	27	63	68	50	36	52
15	3	50	49	0.31500	5.18768	27	63	68	50	36	52
15	4	36	52	0.32349	5.17650	27	63	68	50	36	52
15	5	52	49	0.31374	5.06247	27	63	68	50	36	52
16	0	6	50	0.23903	5.04016	6	67	81	17	33	50
16	1	67	37	0.34594	5.23973	6	67	81	17	33	50
16	2	81	35	0.36853	5.53112	6	67	81	17	33	50
16	3	17	47	0.30114	5.48882	6	67	81	17	33	50
16	4	33	44	0.30826	5.48476	6	67	81	17	33	50
16	5	50	41	0.31500	5.37747	6	67	81	17	33	50
17	0	87	58	0.27442	5.31459	87	70	93	14	62	50
17	1	70	61	0.29400	5.53373	87	70	93	14	62	50
17	2	93	57	0.26684	5.79796	87	70	93	14	62	50
17	3	14	72	0.40236	5.89118	87	70	93	14	62	50
17	4	62	63	0.28504	5.76980	87	70	93	14	62	50
17	5	50	65	0.31500	5.69247	87	70	93	14	62	50
18	0	69	42	0.33761	5.65220	69	30	54	33	41	50
18	1	30	49	0.28933	5.82307	69	30	54	33	41	50
18	2	54	45	0.31976	6.11772	69	30	54	33	41	50
18	3	33	49	0.31817	6.20935	69	30	54	33	41	50
18	4	41	47	0.31626	6.08606	69	30	54	33	41	50
18	5	50	45	0.31500	6.00747	69	30	54	33	41	50
19	0	41	49	0.30576	5.95796	41	63	74	19	38	49
19	1	63	44	0.32926	6.15232	41	63	74	19	38	49
19	2	74	42	0.34076	6.45848	41	63	74	19	38	49
19	3	19	53	0.32513	6.53448	41	63	74	19	38	49
19	4	38	49	0.31864	6.40470	41	63	74	19	38	49
19	5	49	47	0.31533	6.32280	41	63	74	19	38	49
20	0	51	49	0.31579	6.27375	51	62	84	15	37	48
20	1	62	47	0.32424	6.47656	51	62	84	15	37	48
20	2	84	43	0.33959	6.79807	51	62	84	15	37	48
20	3	15	56	0.33542	6.86989	51	62	84	15	37	48
20	4	37	52	0.32319	6.72789	51	62	84	15	37	48
20	5	48	50	0.31631	6.63910	51	62	84	15	37	48
21	0	52	51	0.31607	6.58982	52	68	88	17	34	48
21	1	68	48	0.32424	6.80080	52	68	88	17	34	48
21	2	88	44	0.33451	7.13258	52	68	88	17	34	48
21	3	17	58	0.34349	7.21338	52	68	88	17	34	48
21	4	34	55	0.32956	7.05745	52	68	88	17	34	48
21	5	48	52	0.31677	6.95588	52	68	88	17	34	48
22	0	50	50	0.31500	6.90482	50	72	87	15	33	43
22	1	72	46	0.32937	7.13018	50	72	87	15	33	43
22	2	87	43	0.33917	7.47175	50	72	87	15	33	43
22	3	15	57	0.33950	7.55288	50	72	87	15	33	43
22	4	33	53	0.32611	7.38355	50	72	87	15	33	43
22	5	43	51	0.31957	7.27545	50	72	87	15	33	43
23	0	96	49	0.30319	7.20802	96	68	90	15	32	40
23	1	68	55	0.30954	7.43972	96	68	90	15	32	40
23	2	90	50	0.30567	7.77742	96	68	90	15	32	40
23	3	15	65	0.37217	7.92505	96	68	90	15	32	40
23	4	32	62	0.34524	7.72879	96	68	90	15	32	40
23	5	40	60	0.33133	7.60678	96	68	90	15	32	40
24	0	3	46	0.20862	7.41664	3	60	91	10	30	41
24	1	60	35	0.33717	7.77688	3	60	91	10	30	41
24	2	91	29	0.40493	8.18235	3	60	91	10	30	41
24	3	10	45	0.28233	8.20738	3	60	91	10	30	41
24	4	30	41	0.29867	8.02746	3	60	91	10	30	41
24	5	41	39	0.30786	7.91464	3	60	91	10	30	41
25	0	42	52	0.30977	7.72641	42	66	95	17	37	45
25	1	66	47	0.32583	8.10271	42	66	95	17	37	45
25	2	95	41	0.34650	8.52885	42	66	95	17	37	45
25	3	17	57	0.33964	8.54702	42	66	95	17	37	45
25	4	37	53	0.32471	8.35217	42	66	95	17	37	45
25	5	45	51	0.31850	8.23314	42	66	95	17	37	45
26	0	98	51	0.28924	8.01565	98	67	91	16	38	44
26	1	67	57	0.30627	8.40898	98	67	91	16	38	44
26	2	91	53	0.29013	8.81897	98	67	91	16	38	44
26	3	16	68	0.38323	8.93025	98	67	91	16	38	44
26	4	38	63	0.33824	8.69041	98	67	91	16	38	44
26	5	44	62	0.32676	8.55990	98	67	91	16	38	44
27	0	47	56	0.31479	8.33044	47	62	92	17	63	44
27	1	62	53	0.31584	8.72482	47	62	92	17	63	44
27	2	92	47	0.31794	9.13691	47	62	92	17	63	44
27	3	17	62	0.35889	9.28914	47	62	92	17	63	44
27	4	63	52	0.29892	8.98933	47	62	92	17	63	44
27	5	44	56	0.32256	8.88246	47	62	92	17	63	44
28	0	55	54	0.31558	8.64603	55	63	99	25	38	43

Table LX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
28	1	63	52	0.31712	9.04195	55	63	99	25	38	43
28	2	99	45	0.32186	9.45877	55	63	99	25	38	43
28	3	25	60	0.34708	9.63622	55	63	99	25	38	43
28	4	38	57	0.32984	9.31917	55	63	99	25	38	43
28	5	43	56	0.32366	9.20612	55	63	99	25	38	43
29	0	46	48	0.31089	8.95692	46	60	81	20	35	45
29	1	60	45	0.32550	9.36745	46	60	81	20	35	45
29	2	81	41	0.34683	9.80560	46	60	81	20	35	45
29	3	20	53	0.32550	9.96172	46	60	81	20	35	45
29	4	35	50	0.32025	9.63942	46	60	81	20	35	45
29	5	45	48	0.31675	9.52287	46	60	81	20	35	45
30	0	53	49	0.31724	9.27416	53	61	68	34	34	46
30	1	61	47	0.32373	9.69117	53	61	68	34	34	46
30	2	68	46	0.32844	10.13404	53	61	68	34	34	46
30	3	34	52	0.32396	10.28568	53	61	68	34	34	46
30	4	34	52	0.32396	9.96338	53	61	68	34	34	46
30	5	46	50	0.31743	9.84030	53	61	68	34	34	46
31	0	71	44	0.33411	9.60827	71	35	73	32	36	45
31	1	35	51	0.30100	9.99217	71	35	73	32	36	45
31	2	73	44	0.33486	10.46890	71	35	73	32	36	45
31	3	32	52	0.32424	10.60992	71	35	73	32	36	45
31	4	36	51	0.32186	10.28524	71	35	73	32	36	45
31	5	45	49	0.31733	10.15763	71	35	73	32	36	45
32	0	70	50	0.31967	9.92794	70	63	75	33	37	44
32	1	63	52	0.31712	10.30930	70	63	75	33	37	44
32	2	75	49	0.32083	10.78973	70	63	75	33	37	44
32	3	33	58	0.33602	10.94595	70	63	75	33	37	44
32	4	37	57	0.33077	10.61601	70	63	75	33	37	44
32	5	44	56	0.32256	10.48019	70	63	75	33	37	44
33	0	34	53	0.30343	10.23136	34	63	75	46	36	44
33	1	63	47	0.32471	10.63400	34	63	75	46	36	44
33	2	75	45	0.33250	11.12223	34	63	75	46	36	44
33	3	46	50	0.31743	11.26337	34	63	75	46	36	44
33	4	36	52	0.32349	10.93951	34	63	75	46	36	44
33	5	44	51	0.31906	10.79925	34	63	75	46	36	44
34	0	67	56	0.30826	10.53962	67	65	75	55	31	55
34	1	65	57	0.30800	10.94200	67	65	75	55	31	55
34	2	75	55	0.30333	11.42556	67	65	75	55	31	55
34	3	55	59	0.30567	11.56904	67	65	75	55	31	55
34	4	31	63	0.34869	11.28820	67	65	75	55	31	55
34	5	55	59	0.30567	11.10492	67	65	75	55	31	55
35	0	89	48	0.31591	10.85553	89	69	76	21	29	45
35	1	69	52	0.31544	11.25745	89	69	76	21	29	45
35	2	76	51	0.31439	11.73996	89	69	76	21	29	45
35	3	21	62	0.35628	11.92532	89	69	76	21	29	45
35	4	29	60	0.34391	11.63211	89	69	76	21	29	45
35	5	45	57	0.32200	11.42692	89	69	76	21	29	45
36	0	39	46	0.29934	11.15487	39	67	77	15	26	47
36	1	67	41	0.33801	11.59545	39	67	77	15	26	47
36	2	77	39	0.35154	12.09150	39	67	77	15	26	47
36	3	15	51	0.31500	12.24032	39	67	77	15	26	47
36	4	26	49	0.31556	11.94767	39	67	77	15	26	47
36	5	47	45	0.31514	11.74206	39	67	77	15	26	47
37	0	60	47	0.32317	11.47804	60	78	75	11	27	46
37	1	78	44	0.33591	11.93136	60	78	75	11	27	46
37	2	75	44	0.33542	12.42691	60	78	75	11	27	46
37	3	11	57	0.33866	12.57898	60	78	75	11	27	46
37	4	27	54	0.32949	12.27716	60	78	75	11	27	46
37	5	46	50	0.31743	12.05948	60	78	75	11	27	46
38	0	74	49	0.32116	11.79920	74	69	75	31	25	45
38	1	69	50	0.31988	12.25124	74	69	75	31	25	45
38	2	75	49	0.32083	12.74775	74	69	75	31	25	45
38	3	31	58	0.33761	12.91659	74	69	75	31	25	45
38	4	25	59	0.34417	12.62133	74	69	75	31	25	45
38	5	45	55	0.32083	12.38032	74	69	75	31	25	45
39	0	73	44	0.33486	12.13406	73	58	76	11	28	45
39	1	58	47	0.32191	12.57314	73	58	76	11	28	45
39	2	76	43	0.33866	13.08641	73	58	76	11	28	45
39	3	11	56	0.33411	13.25070	73	58	76	11	28	45
39	4	28	53	0.32681	12.94813	73	58	76	11	28	45
39	5	45	49	0.31733	12.69765	73	58	76	11	28	45
40	0	89	49	0.31136	12.44542	89	60	82	24	35	45
40	1	60	55	0.31383	12.88698	89	60	82	24	35	45
40	2	82	51	0.30977	13.39618	89	60	82	24	35	45
40	3	24	62	0.35383	13.60452	89	60	82	24	35	45
40	4	35	60	0.33775	13.28588	89	60	82	24	35	45
40	5	45	58	0.32258	13.02023	89	60	82	24	35	45
41	0	100	47	0.30917	12.75458	100	61	84	16	27	45
41	1	61	54	0.31474	13.20172	100	61	84	16	27	45
41	2	84	50	0.31183	13.70801	100	61	84	16	27	45
41	3	16	63	0.36339	13.96792	100	61	84	16	27	45
41	4	27	61	0.34827	13.63416	100	61	84	16	27	45
41	5	45	58	0.32258	13.34282	100	61	84	16	27	45
42	0	92	46	0.32284	13.07742	92	62	82	13	26	45
42	1	62	52	0.31724	13.51896	92	62	82	13	26	45

Table LX.: (continued)

Round	Player	OwnMove	MS	Earnings	SubTotal	Player0	Player1	Player2	Player3	Player4	Player5
42	2	82	48	0.32097	14.02898	92	62	82	13	26	45
42	3	13	61	0.35644	14.32436	92	62	82	13	26	45
42	4	26	59	0.34356	13.97772	92	62	82	13	26	45
42	5	45	55	0.32083	13.66365	92	62	82	13	26	45
43	0	88	46	0.32564	13.40306	88	62	80	16	25	45
43	1	62	51	0.31864	13.83760	88	62	80	16	25	45
43	2	80	47	0.32550	14.35448	88	62	80	16	25	45
43	3	16	60	0.35149	14.67585	88	62	80	16	25	45
43	4	25	58	0.34125	14.31897	88	62	80	16	25	45
43	5	45	54	0.32025	13.98390	88	62	80	16	25	45
44	0	83	49	0.31654	13.71960	83	84	81	11	24	45
44	1	84	49	0.31579	14.15339	83	84	81	11	24	45
44	2	81	49	0.31789	14.67237	83	84	81	11	24	45
44	3	11	63	0.36596	15.04181	83	84	81	11	24	45
44	4	24	61	0.35079	14.66976	83	84	81	11	24	45
44	5	45	57	0.32200	14.30590	83	84	81	11	24	45
45	0	92	48	0.31304	14.03264	92	82	81	13	20	45
45	1	82	50	0.31351	14.46690	92	82	81	13	20	45
45	2	81	50	0.31428	14.98665	92	82	81	13	20	45
45	3	13	64	0.36939	15.41120	92	82	81	13	20	45
45	4	20	63	0.36050	15.03026	92	82	81	13	20	45
45	5	45	58	0.32258	14.62848	92	82	81	13	20	45
46	0	97	45	0.32377	14.35642	97	79	74	9	18	45
46	1	79	49	0.31906	14.78596	97	79	74	9	18	45
46	2	74	50	0.31836	15.30501	97	79	74	9	18	45
46	3	9	63	0.36666	15.77786	97	79	74	9	18	45
46	4	18	61	0.35457	15.38483	97	79	74	9	18	45
46	5	45	55	0.32083	14.94932	97	79	74	9	18	45
47	0	100	45	0.32083	14.67725	100	84	70	8	16	47
47	1	84	48	0.31976	15.10572	100	84	70	8	16	47
47	2	70	51	0.31733	15.62234	100	84	70	8	16	47
47	3	8	63	0.36694	16.14480	100	84	70	8	16	47
47	4	16	62	0.35943	15.74426	100	84	70	8	16	47
47	5	47	56	0.31899	15.26831	100	84	70	8	16	47
48	0	96	40	0.35149	15.02874	96	67	64	11	15	45
48	1	67	46	0.32809	15.43381	96	67	64	11	15	45
48	2	64	47	0.32513	15.94747	96	67	64	11	15	45
48	3	11	57	0.33866	16.48346	96	67	64	11	15	45
48	4	15	57	0.33950	16.08376	96	67	64	11	15	45
48	5	45	51	0.31850	15.58681	96	67	64	11	15	45
49	0	93	44	0.33206	15.36080	93	85	66	13	11	46
49	1	85	46	0.32725	15.76106	93	85	66	13	11	46
49	2	66	50	0.32023	16.26770	93	85	66	13	11	46
49	3	13	60	0.35212	16.83558	93	85	66	13	11	46
49	4	11	61	0.35686	16.44062	93	85	66	13	11	46
49	5	46	54	0.31929	15.90610	93	85	66	13	11	46

VITA

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