THE TRUTH ABOUT TEXAS: A NATURALISTIC STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF HERITAGE

Volume II

A Dissertation

by

KEITH HOLLINSHEAD

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 1993

Major Subject: Recreation and Resources Development

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2.2.8 Related Data Analysis

Here in this short subsection, a short coverage will be given of the approaches / avenues / aspects to data gathering as utilized by the philosophers being examined. Their data approaches are inspected in relation to the study problem in hand.

Table 2.2.8./1 highlights some of the problematics concerning rational choice and action that philosophers inquire into. A number of important points are in evidence within it!

Philosophy used to be seen as the longstanding disciplinary protector of mankind's "'emphatic concepts of truth', the ideas of reason, freedom, goodness and justice" (McCarthy 1978:105). But philosophers nowadays are less committed to the task of *the mapping of the absolute*. Conceptualizations about or of truth are no longer axiomatically tied to an idea of certainty. Truth is more commonly reckoned to be social, situational and / or contextual.

Hence philosophers have begun to recognize that there ought to be no substantive or conceptual gulf between a 'proud' or 'privileged' philosophy and other more 'mundane' fields of inquiry. It is not sensible to slice understanding up into pockets of contained knowledge. Philosophy has been found to be just as much a matter of culture, social relations and politics as it is about certainty. And philosophy's heartache over certainty, has forced the admission that "epistemology is not a closed and aprioristic discipline floating *above* the sciences. It is rather itself a realm of scientific knowledge, a field in which all other sciences may legitimately interfere" (Albert 1987:82). Only limited sorts of understanding are possible then, when "natural history becomes [merely] biology, when the analysis of wealth becomes [only] economics" (Foucault 1970:312), or when only philosophy in isolation is supposed to ponder 'truth' and 'rationality'. Reduced explanations constrain: interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary explanations, though, tend to enrich the perspective.

One problem that is encountered in learning from philosophy is that the data gathering techniques favored in philosophy are largely neither objective nor verifiable. Researchers in other fields must be fully grounded in 'alternative' / 'non-positivist' forms of understanding to take large benefit from philosophical insight. The theses of philosophy "can neither have nor act as guarantees" (Macdonell 1986:78) in the kinds of 'sure' forms of 'knowledge' that many academicians only ever *do* or *want* to deal with. Philosophy cannot offer the safety net of nullity, and since it no longer pretends to deal in absolute truths, it cannot claim to offer the benefit of a neutral knowledge (80).

Philosophical insight tends *not* to be, then, *readily-packaged intelligence*: it is no 'takeaway judgement' for easy application. As Althusser (1976:58) discloses, philosophy lends assistance to problem-solvers in other ways, **"by modifying the position of the problems"**. Consonantly, the value of the insight from philosophical data is that it helps orientate the investigator to new and pertinent discourse, to unsuspected methods of analysis and to the existence of auxiliary 'foreign' perspectives.

In generally exploring questions of truth and rationality --- or, as in this instance, in specifically inquiry into truths of dominance and subjugation in cultural production --- researchers may frequently be found condemning philosophy's lack of testability. Indeed, even Habermas (1973:6-7) bemoans the

TABLE 2.2.8./1

SELECTED AREAS OF DATA ANALYSIS FROM THE PHILOSOPHY LITERATURE WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON MATTERS OF DOMINANCE AND SUBJUGATION IN CULTURE AND HERITAGE

BROAD AREA OF CONTEMPORARY INVESTIGATION	DATA QUEST
● Research into the Human Endeavor to be Rational	What is rationality? Can an absolute standard of rationality exist or be reached? How is rationality molded or affected by moral, political, religious and other considerations (1>1)?
● Research into Complete and/or Universal Rationality	Is there such a thing as full or complete rationalism (2>1)? Can complete and/or rationality be attained? Is rationality principally a matter of exactification? Can rationality be 'partial' and yet still 'decent'? Must rationality be *tout court* or can it be bounded (2>2)?
● Research into the Apparatus Of/For Knowing Rationality	Is rationality a matter of *is* or a matter of *ought* (3>1); is it requisite of philosophers to be descriptive or prescriptive or both? Can the *is* be readily separated from the *ought*? Is truth thereby a quest for truth for truth's sake alone? Are questions of methodology (to explore how people/groups learn and act 'rationally') more critical than questions of epistemology (to explore what people/groups hold as rational knowledge) (3>2)?
● Research into the Philosophy of Individualism	How important in a given society is the need to investigate those occurrences where only *individuals* have the power to decide upon rationality / truth / future actions (4>1)? Are there many critical instances in that particular society where only individuals can be said to have aims and interests (4>2)?
● Research into the Philosophy of Psychologism	How important in a given society is the need to investigate *the psychological explanation* of activity (5>1)? Is every social behavior reducible to psychology? Can every social explanation be fully explained? In the particular society, are individuals the primary social entity (5>2)?
● Research into the Philosophy of Collectivism	How important in a given society is the need to investigate the degree to which individual decisions are manufactured or inspired by *social forces* (6>1)? Are individual ends largely constrained by the *summum bonum* of the particular society? Is that society 'whole' more than the sum of its parts (6>2)?

TABLE 2.2.8./1 (Continued)

BROAD AREA OF CONTEMPORARY INVESTIGATION	DATA QUEST
● Research into the Philosophy of Institutionalism	How important in a given society is the need to investigate the distinct autonomous rationality of institutions, customs, traditions, societies, et cetera (7>1)? In the particular society is society, itself, the primary social entity (7>2)? How critical is an individual's duty to his/her society?
● Research into the Philosophy of the Origin of Ideas	Was Hume correct: are the majority of our ideas wilfully composed (8>1)? Do factual errors predominantly result from the fact that individuals wish to deceive themselves or others? Or do ideas largely arise out of experience and from a person's sensations (8>2)?
● Research into the Philosophy of Scientific Tradition	Is the rationality employed in science institutional and collectivist? Do scientists tend to be over-immersed in their own 'group' / 'scientific community traditions' (9>1)? Has the particular scientist examined the fundamental rationalities and baseline presuppositions by which he/she is working (9>2)?
● Research into the Philosophy of Power Use	Are the material operators of power within the given society diffuse or contained? Does a limited range of individuals/groups have a solid/persistent hold over the sovereign rationalities of the state (10>1)? Are the ideologies and rationalities of 'education', 'monarchy', 'democracy', 'law', et cetera, are produced under similar circumstances of dominance and subjection (10>2)?

TABLE 2.2.8./1 (Continued)

KEY

1>1	Kekes 1987:275
2>1	Bunge 1987:9
2>2	Bunge 1987:12
3>1	Agassi 1987:250
3>2	Agassi 1987:253
4>1	Agassi 1987:119
4>2	Agassi 1987:121
5>1	Agassi 1987:119
5>2	Agassi 1987:124
6>1	Agassi 1987:119
6>2	Agassi 1987:121
7>1	Agassi 1987:119
7>2	Agassi 1987:124
8>1	Watkins 1987:159
8>2	Watkins 1987:161
9>1	Hattiangadi 1987:87
9>2	Hattiangadi 1987:87 and Kuhn 1970
10>1	Foucault 1980:102
10>2	Foucault 1980:102

absence of sufficiently precise hypotheses to *solve* issues of legitimacy and domination. But all of that tends to ignore the functional value of philosophy. Philosophy's merit is that it opens up proprioception to the truth --- that is, to the possibilities of different truths. Its value is that it teaches (or can teach!) researchers to be much more suspect about the technical value of their methods and the nested significances of their data gathering techniques. As Alexandre Koyré pointedly expressed it, **the technical goodness of a theory --- i.e., its explanatory power --- is not always the or an *open sesame* to scientific understanding** (see Zambelli in Koyré 1967:37ff).

Those who may doubt the value of Koyré's insight may prefer to stay with data from the 'normal' philosophy of the English speaking world. Anglo-Saxon philosophy has tended to be academic in style and analytic in method (Merquior 1985:11). But other avenues to understanding are possible, and French litero-philosophy in particular, supplies them through the theses of Bergson, of Satre, of Bachelard, of Derrida, of Barthes, of Foucault and of others (11-13). Their philosophical work may be, individually and collectively, "wantonly free of [traditional positivist] analytic discipline" (12) --- but they have each taken us to vast new provinces of intellect and wisdom. Their mixed genre philosophies have given (to all social and human fields of inquiry) what is fundamentally needed: more 'savvy'. They have constructed richer veins of cognition about what truth, meaning and action are and can be.

2.2.9 Cross-Evaluation with Postmodernity

One could argue that postmodernity began with the philosophy of Nietzsche. One could state that with the humanism of Nietzsche, modernity "loses its singular status" (Habermas 1987:87). Philosophers, thinkers, social scientists begin to recognize that enlightenment is not 'right' and that the modern age is not necessarily 'better'. With Nietzsche the philosophical foundations of entelechy are undercut, and the progressivist merit of the 'advanced' age of mankind is called to question.

With Nietzsche, modernity is not triumphalized as a glorious techno-scientific age where its people are suddenly able to free themselves from the strictures of religion, it is instead shown up to be a sadly and growingly mythless age for humanity. To Nietzsche, the ascendancy of reason plainly afforded further progress in technical matters, but yielded much diremption in the quality of human existence. The dialectic of enlightenment had to be abandoned: it was principally creating a world of distortions. Enlightenment reason and modernist will-to-power were drawing up their own meanings, and inventing their own universal ways of knowing and acting morally (95). Life was slowly being masked, and made simple and superficial, geared incidentally and predominantly to suit the interests of those 'wielding' **technicist logic** whether or not they were aware of the *will-to-illusion* that they utilize to propel their rationalities. The essential problem that Nietzsche uncovered was that the new, powerful modernist critique of reason was setting itself up "outside the horizon of reason" (96).

So, in unmasking the corruptions and falsifications of modernity's will-to-power, the philosophy of Nietzsche gave impetus to the challenge against **subject-centered reason**, and ultimately encouraged

a liberality of thinking on reason, truth and life through his free-spirited successors such as Bataille, Lacan and Foucault (97).

The resultant interface between philosophy and postmodernity is no neat and orderly beach-head, however. For some social-philosophers, postmodernity is --- as was identified in subsection 1.2 --- an age of *historical amnesia*. It is, by such accounts, an age in which people and institutions have lost their sense of history, and --- living in *a perpetual present* --- they live by their own realities and rationalities (Jameson 1985:125). The logics and interpretations of the past are seen to be resisted much more commonly than ever before.

Other social-philosophers take a rather different stand on the nature of the reason that drives postmodernity. They, instead, would prefer to see postmodernity as a set of social, cultural and other forces which replicate --- at an untrammelled velocity --- the logic of consumer capitalism (125). By this regard, postmodernity reproduces many of the key circumstances by which modernist reasoning can continue to succeed. Consequently, with a phenomenon as complex as postmodernity, philosophers have to be most discerning in what they accept or reject. They must put close scrutiny into what Dewey deemed to be 'the meaning of the daily detail' of fellow theorists.

To that end, the philosophical writings of Foucault and Habermas will now be briefly critiqued in relation to postmodernity.

Foucault, of course, was adamant that *he* was *not* a postmodernist, whatever one was. He saw himself as *a scientist of discourse* and a student of power --- or rather of **the Nietzschean fusion of reason and power**. But Foucault did not see himself as a structuralist theoretician, nor indeed as any sort of theoretician. Foucault claimed merely to be a commentator on the plurality of power strategies that exist (and have existed) amongst people, within institutions and in life. He claimed to be a critic of history (i.e., past ages) rather than an analyst of postmodernity, ipso facto, (i.e., the contemporary age).

But Foucault's philosophical oeuvre is so frequently applied by others to the postmodern debate. Foucault (1988:103) had asked historically: *who had power over whom, when and by what reason and instrument*. Postmodern thinkers now tend to ask similar questions, and like Foucault, tend to uncover power systems (acting in and through Western society) which do not coincide with each other, but which do interfeed. In this respect Foucault's (1980:72) studies of dominance are *not* Marxist; neither, then, are those of succeeding postmodern theorists who take a similarly plural view of power.

If Foucault is not necessarily a postmodernist, it may be easier to describe him as an **antimodernist**. Foucault did not identify with one supreme or universal truth, he saw many different truths emerge through civilization, through the peculiar and irregular connections of discourse to practice. To him the modernist consciousness of time was much too **presentist** (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:249). Modernist understanding was too heavily anthropocentric (261) based overly on self-thematized knowledge (261). He saw modernist scientists as being utopian in their vision, but *enslaved by their own self-reflected concepts of liberations* (264), and *trapped within their own theoretical language*

games (282-3). Thus, if Foucault is not a postmodernist thinker, he conceivably is a **dissident philosopher** who resists the disciplinary and the disciplining power of modernist thought.

Habermas can never be so steadfastly positioned *against* modernity. To Habermas, modernity does have redeeming value (Seidman 1989:2): his philosophical analyses find an emancipatory potential within the rationality of modernity --- modernity does reasonably offer an utopian potential (Habermas 1981; 1987). Thus Habermas targets his suspicious against the crippling reasoning of the Enlightenment, but endorses modernity itself as an age with significant accomplishments in the expansion of legal sensitivity, in the spread of democratic principles and in the empowerment of cultural pluralism (Seidman 1989:6). His philosophy speaks not so much towards a Nietzschean **counter-reckoning** against modernity, but to a **counter-discourse** within a new extension of the emancipatory elements of modernity (McCarthy 1987:xv).

The philosophy of Habermas runs at odds with that of the anti-modernist or post-modern followers of Nietzsche. Habermas could *not* accept **the complete incredulity towards metanarratives** that staunch postmodernists demanded. To him the constant unmasking of metanarratives only is worthwhile if society is able "to preserve at least one standard for [the] explanation of the corruption of *all* reasonable standards" (Habermas 1982/B:28). Such statements show that *Habermas was keen to retain an universalistic philosophy*. To him, universalism *can* support liberal politics despite its difficulties conceptualizing reality (Rorty 1985:162). And progress ought to be sought by liberal thinkers and activists by finding the merit in modernist forces and in apparently oppositional institutions, not by avoiding them: "social purposes are served ... by finding beautiful ways of harmonizing interests, rather than sublime ways of detaching oneself from others' interests" (174).

By Habermas's judgement, liberal or postmodern philosophers such as Foucault, Deleuze and Lyotard were themselves merely **neo-conservative**, and were unable to offer a theoretical basis for mobilizing society in one way rather than any other (Bernstein 1985:30). Foucault's reasoning was adjudged by him to be *unconnected with contemporary society* (Rorty 1985:171) --- viz., 'dry' work with no commitment to real people (172).

In contrast, French postmodern social-philosophers were inclined to identify the Habermas view of modern / anti-modern rationalities as "one more pointless variation on a theme which has been heard too often" (172). The Habermas consensus view of reality was felt to a metanarrative in itself. For Lyotard (1984:65-66) such consensus views should be a *part* of the debate, not the *goal* of the debate. Paralogy was a much more meaningful end for philosophical debates on modernity / postmodernity. To Lyotard, then, the philosophy of Habermas relied upon the contained reasoning of circular interpretation and re-interpretation. It was insufficient to bring about the kind of permanent revolution in social thinking and societal circumstances that is demanded (Rorty [on Lyotard] 1985:163). The Habermasian reliance on the self-correction of data was an effort to scratch where there was no itch (i.e., to constantly test for legitimacy when legitimacy no longer counted for so much) (164).

To sum up, neither Habermas or Foucault are commonly deemed to be postmodern philosophers. yet, their thoughts offer much substance for the postmodern debate on truth and rationality. From the literature of Habermas, one can find the hope that the benefits of modernity can in fact be harmonized with the fresher insights of the later age --- provided that decent and overall standards of science and society are sustained. Truths must prevail, and need to be known and decidable.

From the literature of Foucault (and Lyotard), however, comes a stronger insistence that the new world order must be anti-modern and plural. Consequently, under these views, science and society has to learn to live with undecidables and to accommodate a whole range of social, cultural and other paradoxes. And the truths utilized anywhere within society must be grounded, locally. Universal truths are not possible under French anti-modern, litero-philosophy.

2.2.10 Summary

This part of the literature has examined the literature in philosophy that has addressed the subject of the use of power and truth by states and institutions in our contemporary period. Taking its lead from the refreshing observations of Nietzsche as the century opened it has largely been orientated to the critical theory on domination / subjugation of Habermas and the pseudo-critical-theory of Foucault. Hence the material covered has largely been a liberal mold of socio-philosophy.

Nietzsche had been the first philosopher to capture *the anonymous nature of the processes of subjugation* (Habermas 1987:95). Foucault, perhaps more so than any other philosopher, had inherited Nietzsche's recognition of the need to explore the quiet and non-sovereign ways that groups exert their will on others. Foucault's analysis of the will-to-power at work showed that civil dominations were particularly virulent when discourse was able to reinforce and be reinforced by praxis.

But such dominance, and such reinforcements rarely seemed, to Foucault, have been established 'overnight'. Like Habermas, he saw that the power to subject usually built up slowly from a multiplicity of minor, scattered sources (Rabinow 1984:182). And frequently, in the modern state, they came through *the regulation of small detail.* Acting in toto, these little processes could "overlap, repeat or imitate one other" to a large, converging effect (182). In medicine and welfare, Foucault saw 'bodies' **made docile** by such aggregate influence, and in broader society he saw individuals similarly tamed.

The 'power' which Nietzsche and Foucault had unearthed, was announced as a new *matter of domination, not a matter of capacity.* It was styled as a network of *power over people* not a stipulated *power over things* (Merquior 1985:109). Hence, the power was deemed to be one of asymmetric influence within given societies --- a pancreatic source of dominance which was most strong in closed institutions where its formation could prove unassailable (Habermas [on Foucault] 1987:283). In such institutions, praxis and discourse combined to form **technologies of subjugation,** incessantly building upon the privileged or preferred truth(s) held there (274).

And to the philosophy of Foucault, an important turnaround had occurred. As power had become dependent upon truth, it had become subjectless: it was no longer governed by the human competency of involved actors / players --- **"power's truth-dependency [had turned] into the power dependency of truth"** (274).

Foucault had thus seen truth and rational action *sedimented* within groups and institutions. Habermas concurred. His own analyses of power and discourse had taught him that under modernity, the formation of capital had richly and mutually reinforced other sedimenting and subjugating forces (2). Like Foucault, he saw the resultant docility of individuals and groups to be a form of permanent coercion.

In a sense, the socio-philosophy of both Foucault and Habermas is Durkheimian: they speak of the cumulative effect of small actions and ongoing processes *as if social wholes are observable.* And to illustrate that sort of collectivist or holist perspective, Foucault claims that **a new vulnerability** had arisen in broad Western society, where there was an increased tendency for things / institutions / practices / discourses to reveal inhibitions: he notices "a certain fragility ... in the very bedrock of existence [there]" (Foucault 1980:80).

As the subsection has indicated, there has been a good deal of criticism of the lack of empiricism behind Foucault's observations and of the obscure and protracted nature of Habermas's writings. Bernstein (1985:19), however, warns of the danger inherent in paying too much respect to the validity base of such "theories": it is the overall vision that matters in such atheoretical commentary. The contribution of Foucault and Habermas (and of Lyotard, Derrida, Barthes, et al) to socio-philosophy is that they help break philosophy's traditionally restive view of truth: they help break the equation of 'truth' with 'certainty'. Though Habermas might prefer to retain some concept of an "absolute" or "better" truth, the inevitable consequence of his insights into institutional communication and of Foucault's into praxis-discourse (allied to the work of others, of course) is that *truth is now seen to be context-dependent.* What counts now, after a dubious Habermas but a confident Foucault, is that **"the better truth / the absolute argument"** is now less serviceable in social analysis than **"the argument which convinces a given audience at a given time"** (Rorty 1985:162).

Perhaps Nietzsche, Foucault and Habermas may be taken as representative of the broader oxygenation that has come to philosophy during the twentieth century. Philosophical argumentation used to be, principally, a profound and pre-eminent search for human rationality. But the debate on reason has spread ubiquitously during the century --- and no absolutist or consensual view on the meaning of either 'truth' or 'reason' is now likely. Too many important desiderata have emerged: the quest for a full or global rationality, in the social sciences at least, now borders on the naive. What is becoming important is the competency of researchers in knowing how to construct distinct institutional or inter-subjective rationalities. Reason, like truth, is now regarded as an entity which must, necessarily, be grounded. The key is now to discern which aspects of rationality (of, for instance, Burge's (1987:8) 'conceptual', 'logical', 'ortological', 'practical' and other types) are desirable or attainable for *the particular context.*

And in examining science, philosophers have inevitably learnt lessons about their own inclinations. Kuhn (1970) had found that scientists do not implicitly challenge their own working or structuring ideologies: they largely begin with a tradition and stay within it, so that "even within the exalted halls of science most [investigators] are content *to simply apply what they have taken on faith*" (Haltiangadi 1987:88; emphasis added). Scientific theories are fundamentally 'collective' in their reasoning. And, thereby, they are both social and political, too.

And if science is a matter of social and political productivity, so too is philosophy. Ideas tend to be wilfully composed: ideas tend to be wilfully neglected. Euistemology in science is now deemed not to be independent of political action: epistemology in philosophy is now recognized to be redolent with politics. No philosophy can be *pure contemplation* or *disinterested speculation* as tended to be formerly assumed (Althusser 1976/B:57). **It is not possible for philosophy to be neutral** (Macdonnell 1986:75). In this fashion, under the postmodern thought of Rorty and Lyotard:

> Philosophy with a capital 'P' is no longer a viable or credible enterprise. ... [And] philosophy, and by extension, theory [has to be] grounded [in] politics and social criticism. With the demise of foundationalism comes the demise of the view that casts philosophy in the role of founding discourse... . Thus the term philosophy undergoes an explicit devaluation; it is cut down to size. ... In the new postmodern equation, then, *philosophy* is [now] the **independent variable**, while *social criticism* and *political practice* are **dependent variables** (Fraser and Nicholson 1988:85).

Philosophy, it seems is no longer a meta-narrative. In exploring legitimacy and truth it has lost its own legitimacy and privileged truth. Its status as privileged discourse is now replaced by its status on a participant within interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary discourse.

2.3 THE ANTHROPOLOGY LITERATURE: THE DISCOURSE ON POWER AND TRUTH

2.3.1 Introduction

One of the oddest turns of twentieth century social science has seen what had been regarded in so many quarters as the relatively backward and *casual* scientific methodologies of anthropology suddenly has become quite commonly praised as *painstaking and forward-thinking scientific work* from which all other social sciences *ought* to inspect to gain much refreshing insight. Anthropology is now being less frequently tabbed as a quixotic *art*, and more frequently recognized as a bona fide, an appropriate *scientific discipline*. "Anthropology, once read mostly for amusement, curiosity, or moral broadening ... has [itself] become a primary arena of speculative debate. ... 'The way we think now' [has] been joined in terms of *anthropological* material, *anthropological* methods, and *anthropological* ideas" (Geertz 1983:4-5). The quasi-science of old (Kaplan and Manners 1972:ix) is no longer so repeatedly condemned as being 'quasi'.

At first look, the platform concerns that anthropology deals in, amy not appear to be over-complex. During the nineteenth century the work of anthropologists principally came to be understood to amount to, firstly, the examination of the way particular cultural systems work, and secondly, the study of the way these cultural systems have developed to be as they are (2). Thus, superficially, anthropologists look for cultural differences and identify cultural similarities.

Sterner inspection, however, reveals that anthropologists face an immense field of inquiry, spread across "kinship and social organization, politics, technology, economics, religion, language, art, and mythology" (1) --- to list only some of the more immediate issue areas befacing anthropologists. The breadth of this coverage undoubtedly renders it difficult for strong unities of interest and approach to build up amongst anthropologists. In the 1970s, for instance, Kaplan and Manners "were impressed repeatedly by the relative lack in anthropology, as compared with some of the more developed scientific disciplines, of an accepted or common theoretical language or corpus of theoretical terms" (ix). If Kaplan and Manners were right --- or are still right --- anthropology is a field housing a welter of perspectives, avenues of approach and mix of conceptualizations in contrast to other disciplines which do not have to deal so expansively with human representativity and human collectivity.

Amongst the definitional debates and the intellectual interchanges that have characterized anthropology during its development, perhaps, the deepest and most pervasive 'tension in cognition' has been that between **enlightenment** and **romanticist** anthropologists (Shweder 1984:28). Shweder considers that this disaffinity within the discipline is a late round in "the ancient fugue" (30) of the social and cultural sciences. In anthropology it emanates from the founding enlightenment figures of E.B. Tylor (1871) and J.G. Frazer (1890), and from Levy-Bruhl (1910).

To Shweder (28) "*from the enlightenment view flows a desire to discover universals: the idea of natural laws, the concept of deep structure, the notion of progress or development, and the image of the history of ideas as a struggle between reason [and] and unreason, science and superstition*". And to the same anthropological theorist comes the perspective that "*ideas and practices have their foundation in neither logic nor empirical science, that ideas and practices fall beyond the scope of deductive and inductive reason, that ideas and practices are neither rational nor irrational but rather* **non***rational*" (28). Taken together, Tables 2.3.1./1 and 2.3.1./2 now contrast the enlightenment and the romanticist orientations of anthropology. Table 2.3.1./1 illustrates the quest for universal reason across societies that characterizes enlightenment anthropology, while Table 2.3.1./2 illustrates the quest for the cultural and subcultural reasonings within made society that typifies romanticist anthropology.

Table 2.3.1./1 might appear to suggest that all enlightenment anthropologists uphold the view that "the dictates of reason and evidence are the same for all [peoples]". This is *not* in fact, the case. Some enlightenment anthropologists are indeed UNIVERSALISTS, and they uphold the view, for instance, that morals are universally *obvious* to reasons --- i.e., to everybody's reason, even to those of young children (31). But other enlightenment anthropologists are DEVELOPMENTALISTS, and refuse to support

TABLE 2.3.1./1

THE ENLIGHTENMENT PERSPECTIVE IN ANTHROPOLOGY: THE SEARCH FOR THE ANALYTICAL ACTOR AND THE RATIONAL SOCIETY

■ **Basic View of Enlightenment Anthropologists**: *All people are intentionally rational and scientific: all people guide their lives by reason and evidence.*

■ **Common Enlightenment Perspectives**:

- The beliefs and practices of people bow down before reason and evidence;
- What reason and evidence dictate is the same for all --- there are universal/natural laws;
- Reason is felt to be heavily 'scientific' and consists of
  - canons of deductive logic;
  - patterns of hypothetical reasoning;
  - thought guided by principles of statistical inference or experimental logic;
- Evidence consists of
  - sense perception;
  - the observation of regular connections between things;
- Some peoples are better than others at 'receiving' rational/scientific insight (with a heavy implication that certain 'alien,' 'other,' 'primitive' peoples are particularly deficient in their capacity to 'read and receive.'

■ **Exemplary Agendas of Investigation**:

- e.g., the universal processes of lexicalization which exist within mundane descriptive categories;
- e.g., the practices of reason involved in (for instance) rational, irrational and nonrational 'agreement.'

SOURCE: Adapted from Shweder 1984:27-37.

the notion that there are universally valid commands of reason and / or evidence that are equally available to all populations (31). Developmentalists thereby argue that some rules / principles / norms are uncovered / reached / worked out only by a few 'civilized' populations.

Table 2.3.1./2 suggests that romanticist anthropologists do not support conceptualizations of reality which are strongly *coherent* or strongly unified. Whorf (1956:55, 214-15, 252) offers a quintessential romanticist account. He finds that in the world there is "no ideal or unitary pattern of relative likeness and difference frozen into reality waiting to be discovered" (Shweder on Whorf 1984:44). Objects are formless, changeable and kaleidoscopic. It is the human mind which imposes classification upon them. Watanabe's (1969:376-9) view approximates to Whorf when he states that "there exists no such thing as a class of similar objects in the world", and Goodman (1968) is a romanticist who sees culture as that 'framed' mass of an arbitrary taxonomy of the world that is passed on from age to age --- indeed, he sees culture as a nonrational, and extralogical.

Certainly to romanticist anthropologists, culture is an arbitrary code (D'Andrade and Romney 1964). Many romanticists press for an anthropology which is symbolic --- i.e., an anthropology which principally revolves around the study of verbal and non-verbal modes of communication. Thus the arbitrary or expressive codes that romanticists examine are the 'non-rational ideas' which are enwrapped within cultural definitions and cultural presuppositions --- expressions which may take the form of *actions* just as much as of *oral communication*, so long as they can be interpreted as speaking for the group / societal construction of reality. And such codes are inevitably taken to be anti-normative: there are no standards [of expression or symbols-in-common] worthy of universal respect dictating what to think or how to act" (Shweder 1984:47).

The debate in anthropology between enlightenment and romanticist theorists concerns the nature of culture. One could summize that to the former, anthropology is **an experimental science** (as most sciences are perhaps conceivably regarded) out to find and formulate *laws*, while to the latter, anthropology is **an interpretive science** in pursuit of variation in *meaning*. Thus the tendency may be for enlightenment anthropologists to see the cultures of mankind as 'a' or 'the' culture --- "a self-contained 'super-organic' reality with forces and purposes of its own; that is, [a reified entity]" (Geertz 1973:11). And the counterpoint tendency may be to see culture as Ward Goodenough did, as that which is located in the minds and hearts of the people in a given society --- "[consisting of] whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members" (Goodenough [in Geertz: 1973]11).

Thus, anthropology as a science has recently been subject to considerable disaccord. Shweder 1984:51-57) illustrates this tension by highlighting the manner in which relatively established Tylorian-cum-Frazerian views of rational and scientific societies have been undermined by romanticist thoughtlines. As Table 2.3.1./3 portrays, romanticist thinking has 'questioned' or 'inverted' a number of what were somewhat stable perspectives.

TABLE 2.3.1./2

THE ROMANTICIST PERSPECTIVE IN ANTHROPOLOGY: THE SEARCH FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTOR AND THE BUILT SOCIETY

■ **Basic View of Romanticist Anthropologists**: *Each people live in a distinct 'cultural'; each people have a self-contained 'social order' (i.e., framework) from comprehending experience.*

■ **Common Enlightenment Perspectives**:

- Distinguishable populations/communities have their own self-sufficient 'designs-for-living';
- These separate 'designs-for-living' are not easily or comfortably comparable in terms of normative evaluation;
- Science --- particularly social science --- is felt to be predominantly a matter of ideology, as is 'reason';
- Tradition, religion and ritual are indispensable components of human thought and practice;
- 'Other', 'alien', 'different' peoples ought not to be designated in relation to a standard emergent from any particular culture.

■ **Exemplary Agendas of Investigation**:

- e.g., The content of group/societal thought: communicated values and presuppositions;
- e.g., The acquisition of ideas: tacit or explicit.

SOURCE: Adapted from Shweder 1984:27-48.

Table 2.3.1./3 explains some of the tension between enlightenment and romanticist views of --- in this instance --- cognitive anthropology. Enlightenment anthropology has been experimentalist in this field, notably through the adaption of the ideas of the cognitive psychologist, Piaget. To Piaget and his followers knowledge is invented by individuals who respond to the *practical* exigencies of reality. Romanticist thinkers, however, do not necessarily think that Piaget is wrong in nominating the significance of logico-scientific reasoning for the individual, but they do believe his views are dangerously incomplete. They suggest that an individual's understanding is also critically influenced (as the table indicates) by the social-learning inherent or implicit in nonrational behavior and in expressive communication. Such social theorists suggest that in order to comprehend the understanding held by groups and societies, researchers should explore not just its **inferential reasoning** (as Piaget did) but also its **language games** (as Habermas, Foucault and others have proposed elsewhere).

Hence, as Table 2.3.1./3 implies, romanticist anthropologists are insisting that the concepts of culture that various societies have should not just be examined in terms of *the reasonings* behind it, but also for *the meanings* it imparts. To Geertz (1973:230-231) anthropology can be scientific, in terms of the disinterested endeavor of the researcher to critically and diagnostically examine given cultural traits and practices. But to Geertz, anthropology can also be ideological, in terms of the necessarily interested and involved endeavor of the investigator 'to establish and defend' patterns of belief and value. To Geertz the lines of work are different: the *scientific* approach is intensively differentiative, and the *ideological* approach is justificatory and apologetic (231). And to Geertz, a scientific understanding that is not tempered by or with ideological insight is unreliable intelligence. Indeed, the gain of ideological insight should conceivably precede the effort to win scientific knowledge: "the so-called function of science vis-a-vis ideologies is first to understand them --- what they are, now they work, what gives rise to them --- and second to criticize them, to force them to come to terms with (but not necessarily to surrender to) reality" (232).

Romanticists in anthropology, like Geertz, seek to examine not only "the deep structures or hypothesized processes underlying their thoughts [but also and rather] by the surface content of what they say and do to each other in the here and now. [They maintain that] the more anthropologists attend to surface content, *the less common is the culture of [peoples]*" (Shweder 1984:48; emphasis added).

The sustained debate between enlightenment and romanticist anthropologists ironically mirrors many of the wider contentions of contemporary social science. In the past, there had been a tendency to regard the work of anthropologists as "a snug and insular enterprise" (Geertz 1983:3). But as the broader human and social sciences have been infused with the refreshing twentieth century insights of Wittgenstein, Gadamer and Ricoeur, such analysts as Jameson and Fish, and such **all-purpose subversives** as Foucault, Habermas, Barthes and Kuhn so "any simple return to [a fundamentally scientific-] technological conception of those sciences is highly improbable" (4). The wider field of social science has been swept to where insular romanticist anthropology has long been pitched. The modern,

TABLE 2.3.1./3

ANTHROPOLOGY'S ROMANTIC REBELLION AGAINST EXPERIMENTALISM

... where anthropological understanding is also based upon the mapping of variable forms of tacit communication rather than just upon fixed canons of developmental research

SAMPLE EXPERIMENTALIST IDEAS **The 'older'/'established' enlightenment perspective** *based upon Piaget's original cognitive psychological work on the image of actors as intendedly rational actors, and applied to anthropology*		**SAMPLE ROMANTICIST IDEAS** **The 'newer'/'alternative' romanticist perspective** *based on late images of actors-in-society as inevitably nonrational actors*
● SELF CONSTRUCTED KNOWLEDGE - where exigencies are faced by **individuals** who invent their own solutions as 'knowledge'	*inverted to*	OTHER-DEPENDENT LEARNING - where what is known is largely **learned** from other people, formally or (and more usually) **informally**.
● RATIONAL MAN - where people are assumed to be intendedly rational, that is **thinking straight** and inducing correctly	*inverted to*	NONRATIONAL MAN - where people are assumed to also rely upon **distinctive constitutive presuppositions**, customs, traditions, expressive rituals and arbitrary classification as well as the rational.
● PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT - where early (deficient) forms of understanding are replaced by newer and **improved forms of insight** as the youngster advances to adulthood	*inverted to*	FRAME SWITCHING - where it is recognized that some nonrational forms of understanding have no universally valid standard for judging the quality of ideas --- and where the need to utilize **different 'frames' of adequacy** is recognized.
● PERSONAL CONSTRAINT - where the individual (on his or her **own**) seeks **consistencies of meaning** and integration amongst ideas	*inverted to*	INTERPERSONAL CONSTRAINT - where the imperatives to develop a consistent, integrated, and generalized worldview appear to be linked to various **social** or **intersubjective communication processes**.
● PERSONAL INVENTION - where emphasis in knowledge creation is placed upon individual cognitive functioning and **logico-scientific reasoning**	*inverted to*	COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS - where it is recognized that a good deal of an individual's ideas are transmitted to him or her in **social discourse** --- viz., messages about what to value, what to feel, how to act. These are collective representations of the world and they may or may not have undergone longterm collective development.

SOURCE: Adapted from Shweder 1984:49-57.

pluralistic and localized frameworks of other social sciences now parallel the engaged approaches of romanticist cultural anthropologists:

> Long one of the most homespun of disciplines, hostile to anything smacking of intellectual pretension and unnaturally proud of an outdoorsman image, [romanticist cultural] anthropology has turned out, oddly enough, to have been preadapted to some of the most advanced varieties of modern opinion. The contextualist, antiformalist, relativizing tendencies of the bulk of that opinion --- depicted, charted, represented --- rather than the way it intrinsically is, have been rather easily absorbed by adventurous scholars used to dealing with strange perceptions and stronger stories. [Romanticist cultural anthropologists] have, wonder of wonders, been speaking Wittgenstein all along (4).

Thus the broader realm of social sciences now moves to also accommodate hermeneutic and local understanding. Anthropological formulations of meaning, symbol and text are now under close and particular examination elsewhere. Symbolic-culture has now surfaced rather ubiquitously across the human and social sciences.

2.3.2 Outlook on Power and Truth

Enlightenment views on or of power and truth differ quite considerably from romanticist views in anthropology, as one might expect.

Enlightenment perspectives were seen in subsection 2.3.1. to be universalist or developmentalist. Universalist perspectives tend to examine different societies in order to induce the common ways across those societies in which they have rationalized the use of power or have 'reasoned' an appropriate history for themselves.

Such common practices are not of such prime interest to development anthropologists, however. Developmentalist anthropologists are more alert to the directives on power and history that are issued by virtuosos or experts within the particular community or society. Developmentalists assume that such truth-holders have added levels of awareness about the appropriate need for propitiously applied power (in order to sustain that community in its natural environment and geography) or about the pre-requisite need for a 'decent' history (which teaches the population how they came to live where they live and conceivably how they should continue to live in the light of that past set of experiences).

The above is a purist explanation of universalist and developmentalist enlightenment. In practice in anthropology, both the universalist and developmentalist view have emerged within the field of ethnoscience, which has explored different societies folk knowledges (e.g., Agar 1973), everyday systems of classification (e.g., Levi-Strauss 1966) and commonplace processes of inference (e.g., Hutchins 1980; Shweder 1984:32). Recent ethnoscience has recaste the Tyler / Frazer view of 'other' / 'alien' peoples as 'primitive' or 'deficient' thinkers by attempting to present unified accounts of different thought systems about the world. Such contemporary ethnoscience attempts to account for the seeming 'scientific' or 'logical' deficiencies of the reasoning of such people by revealing 'the closed intellectual predicament' in

which they live. Such peoples have a lack of information regarding alternative approaches to understanding. Consequently neo-Tylorian and neo-Frazerian research in ethnoscience now seeks to develop more robust concepts on the rationalities within traditional societies --- that is, by adapting richer and more discerning schemas of *irrationality* and *nonrationality* along with *rationality* (37-38).

In terms of romanticist theory, perhaps the most relevant work for our understanding of power and truth has come in cognitive anthropology with the definitional work of *culture as an arbitrary code* (D'Andrade and Romney 1964). In cognitive anthropology, enlightenment researchers tend to emphasize the rational, scientific and quasi-scientific knowledge structures that underpin a societies thoughtlines and approved forms of behavior. But in the same field, it is romanticist researchers who have conceivably made longer and larger leaps of understanding by exploring the surface and arbitrary representations of culture. Hence religion can be interpreted as an expressive or arbitrary 'integrative system', as an 'ideology', and conceivably also as a 'power' or 'truth'. Each of these interpreted 'systems' may be interpreted via nonrational ideas and by verbal or nonverbal modes of communication. Hence Geertz (1973) has looked at 'Religion as a Cultural System', and Sahlins (1976) has delved similarly into the integrative yet expressive and arbitrary 'meaning' of 'Practical Reason'.

In the purist sense, romanticist anthropologists work in the area of symbolic anthropology, where 'expressive symbols' constitute any item or concept that speaks for a different thing. An expressive symbol can be a person, an object, an insignia --- and clearly, such expressive or symbolic items can be redolent with meaning in regard to the exercise of power or of the maintenance of historical truths. Expressive symbols can 'stand for' authority, can 'convey' legitimacy, and can 'identify' a sought authenticity.

To Peirce (1955) there are three chief types of expressive 'representations':

- *symbols* --- which have no intrinsic or causal relationship with their referents;
- *icons* --- which resemble their referent in some important characteristic; and,
- *indexes* --- which are assumed to be the reason for, the result of, or a co-recurrent feature in association with the referent.

Thus romanticist anthropologists would tend to investigate the salient symbols of power and historical truth in a particular society. Just as so many of the conventions of a group or community from dining grace (Elias 1978) to norms of fashion (Sahlins 1976) are arenas for such symbolic representativity, so there will inevitably be arenas for symbolic expression within 'power' and 'historical truth'. For instance, national emblems may apply to both. In matters of 'power', a musical anthem may represent 'the supreme power of the state'; in matters of history, a designated date may speak for 'the glorious activities of select antecedents'.

Romanticist anthropologists then would tend to explore the *expressive* and *arbitrary* background to the exercise of power and to the projection of historical truth. Thereby they would largely be investigating the existential 'face' or 'character' of the society --- matters which the logics and the scientific

analyses of enlightenment approaches are not yet very good at making intelligible. Romanticists thus would tend to look towards those things which reflect the capricious display of power or the discretionary exhibition of particular historical truths in order to find the important meanings and values of the social order under review. And such romanticist perspectives would be *anti-narrative*: the romanticist anthropologist would not be expecting to find any notions or conceptualizations about 'power' and 'historical truth' which would determine thought and / or behavior for a whole mix or range of societies. Romanticist anthropology would tend to champion "the coequality of fundamentally different 'frames' of understanding" (Shweder 1984:48) for the power within a social order, as it would for truth.

The remainder of this introduction to anthropology's contemporary outlook on *power* and *historical truth* now picks its way through some of recent romanticist literature on these twinned Foucauldian subjects of power and truth.

In investigating different societies, Geertz considers that anthropologists principally are concerned with **the study of thought** in cultures. To him, "human thought is basically both social and public" (Geertz 1973:45) **in lieu of being that which happens in the head**. Hence thinking can be seen as "a traffic in ... significant symbols ... anything, in fact, that is disengaged from its mere actuality and [is] used to impose meaning upon experience" (45). Thus, to Geertz, culture ought not to be seen so much as a feet of "concrete behavior patterns --- customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters --- as has, by and large, been the case" (44), but as *a mix of rules and recipes of control* which govern the behavior of the community.

In this respect, Geertz views anthropology almost as Durkheim views sociology. What to Geertz (in anthropology) are devices and programs of control, approximate to the disciplinary forces of Durkhemian sociology. Both focus on what Geertz deems to be "the extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms ... for ordering behavior" (44), though anthropologists have tended historically to search for them in exotic / removed / unknown societies and sociologists in relatively immediate / at hand / urban-industrial communities. In their respective disciplines, moreover, Geertzian anthropologists and Durkhemian sociologists study *the expressive and arbitrary way in which populations create themselves.*

In recent years romanticist anthropologists have found the study of 'celebration' within societies to be a notably rich area for the investigation of *outside-the-skin control mechanisms.* All societies celebrate the precious things and events which they consider renders them a 'special' or 'proud' people. And celebrations such as festivals and rituals say much about a population's regimes of power and its orientation to historical truth.

Turner has been notably active in researching the historical situation and the symbolic universe of celebrants within different societies (Rinzel and Seitel 1982:8). He has theorized about the meanings behind 'peak experiences', 'culturally shared events', and 'sacra' (holy things) (Turner 1982:11-13). In calculating the evocative powers of celebratory powers for a given people, he has found some symbols

to be *multivocal* (for those which represent many things simultaneously), some to be *multivalent* (for those with various meanings or values), and some to be *polysemous* (for those open to several meanings).

To Babcock (1978) celebrations are frames in which communities or settlements can observe, analyze and savor themselves through the staged construction and / or deconstruction of 'real' or 'idealistic' representations of themselves. Where the comradeship, communion or flow is strong, 'lineaments of fear and glory' and 'communitas' itself are reinforced (Turner 1982:29). Where the celebration involves the imparting of esoteric knowledge or 'real' truths (the final gnosis), all previous interpretations of truth for that subject / object are supposed to be annulled (19).

And, by extension, romanticist anthropologists recognize that celebrations and commensurations can bind a given population firmly together in the ritualized recreation of a legendary past (Dorson 1982:55). Nationalists within given societies tend to select symbols and events which express ideas that evoke the distant origins of 'the nation' (Kapferer 1989:189). On such occasions nationalist rituals and celebrations can become presentations of extreme cultural self-consciousness (193). **Identity** and **historical truths** become acutely reciprocal.

Romanticist anthropologists are drawn then --- in looking at historical truth --- to investigate the systems of meaning that a given population invests in its *evocative* social forms. And the work of such anthropologists is quite distinct to that of historians:

> Seen through [romanticist] anthropologists' eyes, myth, ritual, and symbol are no longer historical trivia, decorative elements that can be tacked onto the serious subjects of analysis when they do not obscure these altogether; they become vital clues, interwoven with and revealing the very issues considered the real stuff of history (Appadurai 1986:x).

Borrowing from Durkheim (1976; original publication date of 1912), romanticist anthropologists are inclined to acknowledge that all societies need to preserve distinct parts of their heritage and environment as 'sacred'. Within the culture of each society, certain things remain *unambiguously singular* --- resistant to commoditization and / or protected from common everyday use (Kopytoff 1986:73). And romanticist anthropologists are particularly keen to know who (or which institutions) in the society in question has **the right to singularize objects** --- that is the right to sacralize or monopolize particular things, places or events (73). Consonantly, they recognize that sacralized things, places and events have a quite different sense of ownership, space and time from the other 'social things' of the everyday world (Abrahams 1982:167).

Romanticist anthropologists are critically interested in celebratory behavior as pointedly 'framed' behavior, and as 'supreme acts of sociation' (Turner 1982:28). With celebratory events, anthropologists can explore in stark and concentrated fashion the *powers* behind sociation, and the preferred *truths*. Celebratory historical happenings are highly **visible** demonstrations of **political** as well as **civic** power. At times of ritual and festival, romanticist anthropologists can find simple symbolic features such as flags to be "[highly] redolent of [that community's] message of endurance" (Abraham 1982:172). To restate

Appadurai (1986:4), so many commodities, persons and places have 'social' and 'cultural' lives. Such are the meaning-laden powerplays of truth and the politics of value as are currently cropping up in the literature of romanticist anthropologists.

2.3.3 Similar Investigations

The goal of anthropology --- as of most disciplines --- lies in the gaining of communication of cognitive knowledge. More specifically, the aim of anthropological inquiry is the winning of what Kaplan and Manning (1972:28) style as **public reliable knowledge about sociocultural affairs**. In a nutshell this means the improvement in our understanding of two broad questions:

- *How do cultural systems work?* and,
- *How have they come to be as they are?* (35 and 54).

Clearly, enlightenment anthropologists will tend to focus upon the *rationalities* inherent in *the working design* of human societies (and in the actions of social members) while *romanticist* anthropologists will largely prefer to work with *the contents of thought* in currency in a society --- viz., the values and presuppositions rather than the rationalities --- and will concentrate primarily upon how different specific groups of people within a society classify and communicate (Shweder 1984:48).

In order to weigh up how the current literature suggests that anthropologists investigate 'power' and 'truth', it is first necessary to observe the literature suggests that anthropologists look at all cultural questions. And in the investigation of cultural matters, it should be realized that anthropologists face a major difficulty in data gathering: "not only does the anthropologist operate within his own conceptual framework, but the people he [or she] studies operate within their own conceptual framework or frameworks" (22). Thus, these frameworks can clash in terms of the clash between what Pike (1967) nominated as **emic** versus **etic** (Harris 1979:32-35) objectivity. Hence the anthropologist has to resolve how to evaluate the quality of a given informants descriptions on accounts: shall *real / meaningful / adequate* 'native' *emic* judgements apply, or shall the more 'scientifically productive' *etic* standards of differences and similarities apply (32).

In the last two decades, considerable controversy has arisen over the emic / etic debate. Pike is, according to Harris (35) a cultural idealist and he (Pike) favors the use of emic standards of analysis because he believes that the aim of social science is to analyze emic systems. Thus cultural idealists favor the winning of an *insider* view of societies.

But insider views of groups / communities / states can be exceedingly deceptive. When questioned, insiders tend to interpret things "as they ought to be", and load their observations consciously and subconsciously with their own petty and / or substantive rationalizations (Pitt-Rivers 1967:31-32). Insiders tend to have incomplete "knowledge of the total outline of [each or any] of their social structures" (Malinowski 1961:25 and 83). And there can be no constant / infallible way of gaining **verstehen** (i.e.,

empathizing) with or capturing an emic viewpoint: emic viewpoints are inescapably "translated" *whenever* an outside observer is involved --- "one [researcher's or person's] *verstehen* differs from the next" (Kapland and Manners 1972:27).

Yet there are further crucial reasons why an anthropologists' objectivity towards culture, ipso facto, can be limited. Kaplan and Manners (28-31) present four of them in comparison to the manner in which knowledge is gained in the natural and physical sciences:

- *Historicity*:

  Natural / physical scientists can largely assume that they are dealing with relatively stable structures, but societies can change rapidly and comprehensively (29): " ... a society may change from one type to another, sometimes with great suddenness and violence" (Evans-Pritchard 1962:55).

- *Open Nature of Socio-Cultural Systems*

  Anthropologists tend to have to deal with *highly open systems*, tend to have to consider large numbers of variables and are usually unable to exert control over the variables they deem to be critical (Kaplan and Manners 1972:29).

- *Social Reactivity*

  Anthropologists tend to have a duty to respond to problems / issues / concerns that are highly visible and which are generated out-wide in society. They are not so free as natural / physical scientists to follow research agendas generated by the internal progress of the science. Thus, anthropologists are drawn into the endeavor to solve grand problems that are largely 'unsolvable', while natural / physical scientists can work much more frequently hidden from larger society --- albeit an often indifferent larger society (Brodbeck 1954:146-47).

- *Ideology*

  Anthropologists deal, like a number of other disciplines, in the highly nebulous matter of ideology: they have to theorize about theories in society! They may not at all be aware of the degree to which they themselves filter the ideologies of host communities on logical, moral or other extrascientific criteria.

Such are some of the limitations which constrain the degree to which, operationally, anthropologists can gain error-free, public reliable knowledge about culture. Now attention will be put to the limitations that affect the capacity of anthropologists to build up organizing theories about culture --- and thereby about 'power' and 'truth'.

Since its origins as a science, anthropology has approached the study of culture from four main orientations. These are "evolutionism", "functionalism", "history" and "cultural ecology", and they are deconstructed in Table 2.3.3./1 in terms of the strengths of their organizing viewpoint on culture and in terms of the outlook they offer for the study of 'power' and 'truth'. Generally, the twentieth century has seen the ascendancy of relativistic-functionalist approaches over the formerly predominant evolutionary,

developmentalist or 'social Darwinist' standpoints (Kaplan and Manners 1972:36-7). This has lead to the understanding that nineteenth century principles in anthropology were inclined to be highly ethnocentric, and were inclined to see the development of societies and culture or unilineal, supposedly culminating in the moral and intellectually superiorities of the Western civilization / civilizations.

Of the orientations accounted for in Table 2.3.3./1, *evolutionism is* presented in contemporary form as distinct from its highly ethnocentric nineteenth century precursor perspective (38), and *functionalism* is offered as the dominant orientation with regard to frequency and depth of support during the twentieth century --- indeed, Davis (1959:752-72) had recognized that in certain social science circles, functionalism is synonymous with anthropological and / or sociological analysis. Then, to complete the coverage of lead perspectives, *historical explanation is* presented as a form of constructivist enterprise (pertinent to the thinking of relevant populations active in the reconstruction / deconstruction of their ethnographic heritage) and *cultural evolution* is offered as perhaps that which (of the four) has most fed contemporary anthropology.

A number of further points warrant clarification about the table.

Firstly, the table presents only idealized accounts of each of the orientations. In application, each theoretical orientation is inclined to be used much more approximately, and possibly in combination with another orientation.

Secondly, the four orientations do not share a constant conceptualization of **culture** --- as their principal point of investigation --- nor indeed do they, for **'power'** or **'truth'**. For instance, under *functionalism*, *culture* is generally deemed to be 'a system', whereas under Boasianism (as a representative school favoring *historically-explanative* theories) *culture* at times becomes an haphazard admixture of distinct components (72), and under some *ecological* perspectives, *culture* ceases to be the pivotal point of inquiry, being replaced by "populations of organisms as the basic unit of analysis" (86).

Thirdly, the orientations tend to reify the existence of societies as distinct 'cultures' and as stable acculurating societies. Yet across the world, many societies are **forced societies**, formed by an act of will rather than through tradition --- the U.S.A., amongst them (Washburn 1982:298). In such places, the culture may be *mass, individualized* and *short-of-communitas*, rather than stable and singularly 'tribal' (298). In the U.S.A., furthermore one might suspect that polyglot Americanization is not something done as a matter of course to newly arriving immigrants *by the culture*, it is also just done at scale by newly arriving immigrants *to the culture*.

Fourthly, the concept of 'the environment' tends to change significantly across the orientations. Under evolutionism and fundamentalism, the environment is inclined to be regarded as a set of external influences. But under historical exploration and cultural ecology an important distinction is made between 'the environment', ipso factor, and 'the effective (or realized) environment' --- viz., that which is conceptualized, manufactured or identified-as-significant by the given culture-holders. In this sense, and importantly, "the environment [ceases to be] a natural thing: [it becomes] a set of interrelated precepts,

a product of culture" (Leach 1965:25, 37-38; Frake 1962:53-59). If the environment can be faithfully conceptualized as 'a cultural product', there seems to be little resistance to acknowledging that *anything* or *everything* is (or can be) a cultural product. **The world suddenly becomes so much more ambiguous**, and the need to proceed with extreme vigilence on the identification of meaning is all the more crucial.

None of the platform orientations given in Table 2.3.3./1 are therefore offered as all-powerful or robust perspectives. They each offer a clarity of vision on 'culture', 'power' and 'truth', but each has its contrarieties and its irresolutions.

With regard to the strength of insight that is gatherable whatever the theoretical orientation, it needs to be emphasized that anthropologists (so frequently working independently and poorly resourced within isolated locales) have tended to build up for their discipline a breadth of coverage, but a relatively poor depth of analysis (Kaplan and Manners 1972:25). The sustained fear was that this practice was inclined to place the resultant / emergent objectivity upon the work of *individual anthropologists* and not upon *the discipline as a whole* --- a worry that has since begun to dissipate with the 1980s advances on the design of approaches such as naturalistic inquiry (and its consonant development of the Lincoln and Guba (1985:292) trustworthiness criteria to replace 'objective' considerations) as given under subsection 1.3.5.

Table 2.3.3./1 says much, moreover, about the a priori nature of these main four anthropological outlooks on science. When 'power' or 'truth' are being questioned, the investigator / operator under each of the four orientations already is inclined to have preformed notions on how 'power' or 'truth' work (i.e., contribute to society). For the *evolutionist*, 'power' and 'truth' are *matters of quality*, for the *functionalist* they are *matters of performance*, for the *historian* they are *matters of inheritance* and for the *ecologist*, they are *matters of adaptation*. It seems that while "even the most intelligent 'native' or 'local respondent' may be unaware of the way in which system and structure [read 'power' or 'truth'] impinge upon his [sic!] day-to-day behavior" (Kaplan and Manners 1972:24), the inquiring ethnographer has already made his / her mind up. And that very judgement, moreover, may be qualified through an odd double-standard:

> When the members of tribe 'X' exhibit cruel and sadistic behavior toward others --- for example, head hunting --- their behavior is not fit to be condemned but understood, the relativist [anthropologist] would say, in terms of the way in which the act fits into the broader cultural pattern of that society. But let a Northern or Southern racist [in the U.S.A.] in our own society act out his fears by barring the school enhance to a Negro [sic!] child and his behavior is sure to be condemned by the same relativist (42).

In the first instance, seemingly objective insight is further qualified by a relativistic-paternalism, and in the latter by a nonrelativistic evolution. Such perspectival difficulties only wash out when the investigated events are comprehensively presented in terms of grounded / situated / contextualized knowledge. In ethnography, it is hard to escape this need for thick description.

TABLE 2.3.3./1

THE LEAD THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS IN ANTHROPOLOGY: FOUR IDEAL APPROACHES TOWARDS POWER AND TRUTH

Theoretical Orientation	**Contemporary Evolutionism**	**Functionalism**	**Historical Explanation**	**Cultural Ecology**
Basic View of Orientation	**Cultures evolve progressively; the experiences of societies are collective and cumulative.**	**The institutions and structures of a society are inter-connected to form a fully functional system.**	**The past-histories of peoples are really contemporary histories; the origins of people are largely concocted.**	**Cultures adapt to the environment around them; and societies adapt to other societies about them.**
Strength of Orientation	Able to consider culture writ large; its 'belief' has high credibility (similar to biological evolution).	Explains how cultural phenomenon interrelate; its 'belief' has high credibility (society is a stable organism).	Accommodates historical and environmental and psychological factors to explain the past of a people; works better than 'evolutionism' and 'functionalism' at the micro / local level.	Takes a long-range view of a society or rather of humanity; provides for an active role for people (responsive yet proactive).
Weakness of Orientation	Assumes unlinearity of development, which (historically) many frozen, non-advancing societies refute. Ignores fact that cultural systems can become specialized absolutely, but only in regard to something.	Assumes that the boundaries of a group / society are fixed and easy to trace. It cannot readily account for structural changes, and assumes that activities take place *in order* to create / cause / occasion important 'unique' distinguishable events.	Assumes that specific cultures are concrete systems located in time and space. Produces a nonfunctional, fragmented 'shreds-and-patches' view of culture.	Assumes that people can use the climate and the environment mechanistically. It cannot readily explain what 'an environmental opportunity' or 'an environmental limitation' is in absolute terms. Inclined towards simplistic environmental determinism. Fails to see that what is seen as 'the environment' is a product of a culture.

TABLE 2.3.3./1 (Continued)

Theoretical Orientation	**Contemporary Evolutionism**	**Functionalism**	**Historical Explanation**	**Cultural Ecology**
Exemplary Regard for/over power	Tends to look for cultural regularities overtime, e.g., the way core institutions adapt to and exploit their environment.	Tends to look for post hoc explanations --- i.e., ascriptions of functions of power to institutions. Tends to appear 'reasonable'.	Tends to view accumulations of power as 'accidental' rather to continuous and recurrent.	Tends to look for environmental possibilism, where harmony with / control over the environment produces economic and political power.
Possible Claim Over Power in Texas Heritage	*The 'state' / 'national' institutions of Texas evolved naturally; rival institutions were / are predestined to fail.*	*The 'state' / 'national' institutions of Texas have a proper role to play in the stewardship and care of heritage.*	*The past is selectively inspected, and the original storylines adopted accentuate the reflected past of those Texans alive / notable today.*	*Certain significant Texans became powerful because of the way they were able to manipulate the ecosystem.*
Exemplary Regard for/over Truth	Tends to see culture change as inevitable / natural; truth / knowledge becomes better (i.e., more scientific and rational).	Tends to see truths as shared cognitive orientations, where, as such, their existence is a prerequisite for each and every successful society.	Tends to see the past / origins / antecedence of people as relativistic; that particularizes populations today.	Tends to look for truths which reflect the reciprocity of environment on culture and culture on environment.
Possible Claim over the Truths about Texas Heritage	*The proper 'truths' are those that explain a 'specific' or (better still) a 'general' evolution for the people of Texas.*	*The proper 'truths' in Texas are those that unify a population or integrate a mix of people; truths must integrate Texans.*	*No proper 'truths' exist for Texas; all Texan storylines are constructions, and many, many are valid.*	*Proper or ultimate 'truths' are those where the Texan people are seen as part of the full ecosystem or overall biotic community in 'geophysical Texas'.*

In this way, relativism, "long an important message of ethnography abroad, has now become a commonplace of liberal discourse at home [in the West]" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:135). Perhaps this is *the* contribution of recent anthropological work to our comprehension of power, truth, and culture: relativism ought to start at home!

2.3.4 Related Inquiries

In anthropology the emergent field of **applied anthropology** is gradually assuming the or a right to handle research into matters of state that have a bearing on heritage. This subsection (2.3.4) will consider the insights that are being experimented with as is revealed in the literature of this growing area of social intervention approaches. While few of the techniques covered relate precisely or exclusively with heritage stewardship and / or management, per se, there is considerable cognizance to be gained from the neighboring areas of social anthropology and policy development that applied anthropologists are is increasingly venturing into.

Applied anthropology is pragmatic research applied by *practicing anthropologists* to solve an endless variety of human problems. It embraces many different styles of practice, including advocacy anthropology, action anthropology and development anthropology. Applied anthropology places a heavy emphasis on the endeavor to get research findings *used*. It seeks to make particular sorts of data or insight accessible --- as pointedly as is possible --- for or to those decision makers in government (or in otherwise significant positions) who can adopt it in the enactment of their duties and responsibilities.

'Applied anthropology' is anthropology's attempt to influence human affairs (Rappaport 1986:1). it is the attempt to translate the theories and the findings of anthropological investigations directly to the amelioration of social problems. It is that set of efforts to build "a stronger anthropological voice in the public ear" (Gilbert 1989:71). Based on the ideology of the facilitation of **self-determination** by communities, groups and individuals, it is now applied in many fields such as health, mental health, welfare, urban development and rural sociology (Cohen 1989:306). And while direct and singular applications to historical truth and heritage matters may be as yet rare in the literature, much valuable insight can be translated from these parallel 'social problems' to the social problem of heritage.

Whatever the human affairs area of interest, applied anthropology is conducted with a strong value orientation: it is pragmatic, it is democratic (van Willigen 1986:xiii). "It is not about getting people to change against their will, it is about *helping people* [to] *express their will*" (xiii). It is the attempt to apply sound anthropological theory to everyday public affairs --- the attempt to identify the appropriate variables which can and ought be acted upon. But it is work founded on the ethical principles of informed consent and voluntary participation of the communities, groups and / or individuals involved.

Generally, applied anthropological approaches seek to help a community towards developmental change, i.e., towards its long-term adaptability. It is research-in-practice, undertaken for, with or on behalf of groups in conflict with or misunderstood by government or by "more powerful political forces" (xvi). Its

goal is more effective inter-group understanding and, hence, *the smoothing of culture contact.* In attempting to solve such practical problems, the applied anthropologist is not just a purist researcher in the specialist sense. He / she can or must adopt from a multiplicity of available research related roles -- as depicted in Table 2.3.4./1.

The table suggests that there is a considerable range of styles of work which falls under the orbit of applied anthropology. Most of the fourteen roles outlined are 'responsive' work styles: the form of the work done or services provided tends to be defined more substantively by the nature of the public problem in question and not so much the strictures of the discipline. Hence the fourteen roles are potential techniques by which the experienced anthropologist can **mix his grounded research with situated action**. The aim of this 'research-plus' activity is the facilitation of "[appropriate] changes in human behavior [which are believed to be able to solve or lessen] contemporary social, economic, and technical problems, *rather than developing social and cultural theory [ipso facto]*" (Foster 1969:54; emphasis added). Thus, the fourteen roles constitute a complex set of related research-based instruments which are used to initiate direct action and help formulate ameliatory public policy (van Willigen 1986:8). In application, they are research styles which feed off raw data, which target relevant policy areas, but which are engineered towards interventionist action. And they are usable particularly in those situations where a society or community has meaningful and sustained authority over the individuals within it.

The gain of insight from the parallel deployment of applied anthropological techniques is not a straightforward matter. Applied anthropologists are not inclined to publish their work in conventional locales or in orthodox formats, and the literature that survives is "fugitive" (Clark and van Willigen 1981). Furthermore, few academic journals are equipped to cover submissions which are primarily applied pieces. Consequently the existing impact and potential impression of applied anthropology upon supposedly 'theoretical' anthropology is prone to being heavily obscured.

Despite that masked effect, van Willigen (1986) has been able to trace the increased attending of cultural affairs research to applied anthropology. He has noted how:

- the rate of published applied anthropology documentation has slowly increased (20);
- the use of value-stated approaches has proliferated (21; 29);
- experimentation in a wider range of problem area and political contexts has multiplied (23):
- the absorption of applied methods into interactive planning schemes has enlargened (29); and how,
- the targeted emphasis of applied anthropology upon policy formulation has intensified (33-4).

As use of applied anthropology is tempered, a high proportion of the client groups and communities benefitting from it have become more politically sophisticated. In many regards, it is the extended pressures of these outside parties that have considerably boosted the appeal of and need for

TABLE 2.3.4./1

RESEARCH ROLES IN APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY: AS APPLIED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN GENERAL AND TO HERITAGE AFFAIRS IN PARTICULAR

COMMON ROLES IN APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY	COMMON ILLUSTRATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF HUMAN POLICY PROBLEMS	PERTINENCE FOR HISTORICAL STEWARDSHIP PROBLEMS
1 **POLICY RESEARCHER** The gathering on relevant information upon which to base policy decisions.	e.g., The use of traditional ethnographic research or other specialized research techniques to determine baseline facts.	e.g., The identification of the historical truths and myths that apply to a particular people or area.
2 **EVALUATOR** The determination as to whether a project, program or policy is working effectively; a commonplace role.	e.g., The determination as to whether a given health or welfare program had successful outcomes.	e.g., The determination as to whom existing heritage policies actually do serve.
3 **IMPACT ASSESSOR** The specialized prediction of the effects of a project, program or policy.	e.g., The assessment of the impacts of a substantial land-use development on local communities in order to influence ongoing design.	e.g., The identification of the impacts of a large development upon significant / sacred sites and historical features.
4 **NEEDS ASSESSOR** The gathering of data on public program needs in anticipation of future program formulation.	e.g., The assessment of social / health / education / other needs in order to justify attention to them in future programs.	e.g., The collection of opinions and/or preferences on recognized or unrecognized historical assets.
5 **PLANNER** The participation in the design of future programs, projects and policies.	e.g., The collection of data in relation to specific local aspects of a new larger / regional / statewide plan.	e.g., The identification of in-site significances (on the ground) at a sacred or important historical 'theater'.
6 **RESEARCH ANALYST** The interpretation of research results for decision makers.	e.g., The provision of support / auxiliary / translative aid for government policy makers and/or planners.	e.g., The interpretation of the contemporary community significance of inherited myths and tales.
7 **ADVOCATE** The empathetic support of community groups in order to direct / coax political action appropriate for their professed goals.	e.g., The mediatory role in helping local groups express their opinions and act upon them.	e.g., The clarification for / with / on behalf of a community as to its preferred operational course(s) of action regarding heritage care.

TABLE 2.3.4./1 (Continued)

COMMON ROLES IN APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY	COMMON ILLUSTRATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF HUMAN POLICY PROBLEMS	PERTINENCE FOR HISTORICAL STEWARDSHIP PROBLEMS
8 **TRAINER** The development and use of training approaches / materials for local groups on particular areas of need.	e.g., The guidance of specialist technicians / experts in 'how to perform' in local syntax and situations.	e.g., The training of natural-historic interpreters in the nuances of local / host storylines.
9 **CULTURE BROKER** The two-way linkage work involved in translating programs to ethnic communities.	e.g., The explanation of health services to a local group and the explanation of local health practices to government.	e.g., The explanation of a new (externally initiated) cultural-tourism program to a local group and a conveyance back of group concerns.
10 **EXPERT WITNESS** The presentation and elucidation of ethnic views at legal or jurisdictional proceedings.	e.g., The provision of direct testimony at a land use / ownership hearing.	e.g., The provision of testimony on matters of proprietary ownership for a traditional clan or group.
11 **PUBLIC PARTICIPATION SPECIALIST** The occasional gatherings and communication of group views on external projects.	e.g., The involvement or even management of public meetings on health / welfare / social matters on a case by case basis.	e.g., The preparation of public opinion on a traditional or heritage matter for wide media use.
12 **ADMINISTRATOR/MANAGER** The direct administration of critical public affairs programs / projects.	e.g., The direct management of an external program in a community in order to keep out other entrusted 'managers'.	e.g., The management of a pilot 'special events' program of historical activities provided for visitors.
13 **CHANGE AGENT** The work with community leaders to stimulate changes in behavior on a critical social issue or welfare activity.	e.g., The encouragement of a group / community to take advantage of a new economic / technological / business possibility in agriculture which fits in with known group interests.	e.g., The encouragement of a group / community to project its heritage for reasons of sought economic / identity / territorial / other gains.
14 **THERAPIST** The deployment of 'talk' therapy to treat individuals with particular social problems which impact the wider group.	e.g., The work of 'clinical' anthropologists in health / welfare care in outreach situations.	e.g., The use of 'talk' therapy to resolve within-the-group disputes on longstanding totemic / ownership / heritage matters which constrain the community stewardship of heritage.

SOURCE: Adapted from van Willigen 1986:3-6.

applied anthropological research --- not just an inherent or internal advance in disciplinary prowess by field anthropologists.

Postwar, applied anthropology has been utilized in a widening pool of public affairs areas with Stewart's (1961) study being a noted examination of its use in ethnohistory. Conceivably, its use will continue to reproduce in areas of public affairs where institutions or dominant groups have advantaged singular aspects of culture and ways-of-living at the expense of others. And for the case at hand --- involving the possibility that a state government (or that dominant sectors working through state government) wittingly and unwittingly subjugate other 'social truths' with their own 'privileged social truths' --- there is much, much scope for the deployment of applied anthropology.

Anderson (1983) has shown the ideology of statist nationalism to be one of the most dominant and aggressive socio-political imperatives of recent world history. Kapferer (1988) notes the 'religious intensity' and proselytizing urgency of many forms of contemporary nationalism. 'Nationalist' imaginations intensify to become *lived realities* which universalize space and time and attempt to synchronize the various individuals and groups of a 'nation' into an *experiential unity* (Anderson 1983). Modern nationalism tends to have a 'flat' and 'horizontal' ideology, much different from the hierarchical and center-dominant forms of statehood from previous centuries (22). Diverse cultural groups and societies have to be tethered in 'competitively', and modern states are inclined to be preciously concerned about their identities and their boundaries. Leaders / elites have tended to force and reinforce concepts of nationhood: misfits have had to fit in! And now all of this is fodder for applied anthropologists charged with identifying subtle societal imbalances and subtle cultural disaffections.

Van Willigen (1986) records five principal interventionist styles of practice in applied anthropology:

- *Action Anthropology*: a highly interactive method in which goals unfold for the given community during its complex processes of interaction with the researcher (77);
- *Research and Development*: a value-explicit, extended-role approach in which the researcher assumes power (where apposite) and then devolves it (79, 91);
- *Community Development*: a progressivist, processual approach which searches for culturally appropriate forms of technical assistance and for opportunities to float local / host initiatives (108-9);
- *Advocacy Anthropology*: a direct relationship, short-term action activity where the researcher acts as an auxiliary to / for community leadership; and,
- *Cultural Brokerage*: a 'go-between', co-cultural effort at mediation in which the researcher works behind the scenes (rather than 'up front' / 'on stage') to improve the cultural appropriateness of provided services and / or the resource base with which the community / ies act (139).

Of the five, the last two (Advocacy Anthropology and Cultural Brokerage are thought to be best suited for the involved living experiences and socio-political entanglements of urban-industrial environments (xvi) --- as per the ongoing catalyst study of culture identification / disidentification in Texas.

In each, however, it is the responsibility of the individual researchers, for the most part, 'to seek and accept' the role of part-time policymaker under the overall strategy of utilizing the products of his / her research (Gilbert 1989:72). And that same single researcher must recognize the necessary cumulative / protracted rather than overnight / immediate profile of his / her deliberations (72). For such public-affairs advocacy, the *sine qua non* of investigative formats is short-term research: but the *sine qua non* for generative success in transforming social reality is commitment to the long-haul program of brokerage and training effort (Cohen 1989:315).

To sum up this subsection on the related inquiries in anthropology into the state administration of heritage, the weight of ethnographic investigation has been placed upon experimentation in **value-explicit** forms of research which are ostensibly (but not exclusively) geared towards **advocacy** and **action**. A great variety --- and a steadily additive mix --- of styles and techniques of applied approaches to the discipline are currently being piloted. They are largely being developed in accordance with the pragmatic - democratic aim to help subdued / suppressed cultures (chiefly) persist, and to encourage a more informed and compatible adaptation to changing times. In each, the researching anthropologist must take pains to determine where convenient and germane community action is possible: He / she is therefore located at both the *productive* and the *utilizing* ends of policy research enterprise (van Willigen 1986:xvii).

The lesson in current work in applied anthropology is that forms of research (where means and ends are independent) can become accepted as bona fide. Such techniques can succeed, notably where there is a pronounced collision of interests within an overarching society, or where there is an imperative to recognize in a given region / state / nation a pluriverse of 'cultures' or 'identities'.

Undoubtedly --- as is so important for the current study of petty and opaque power in Texas --- the 'nationalist' ideology of a state can create or at least accelerate the circumstances in which the disidentifying or equalizing work of applied anthropologists is in demand. As cultures, identities and socio-political affiliations become totalized or remain selective and / or subjugatory, so the need for the countervailing value-stated investigations of applied anthropological research will be called for. 'Nationalism', in its most general sense can be seen not so much "[exploiting the] collective senses of identity or building upon shared meanings ... as creating and generating them" (Kapferer 1989:191). Statist nationalism, administrative nationalism, and constructive nationalism, can each devastate cultural processes where they seek to cultivate extreme forms of cultural and / or socio-political self-consciousness (192-193). And as confident and dominant administrations --- or confident and dominant elites working with or through administrations --- privilege some heritage truths over others, a subsequent critical and corrective role for applied researchers is spawned. Yet "it is clear that the needs, interests, and purposes of culturally and otherwise dominant members of a [state or] community do not exclusively or totally determine which [cultural forms, works and identifications] survive" (Smith 1983:30). One common 'folklore' can out-compete or endure, beyond another: common 'folklores' can shift the

dominance amongst cultures and social practices which ultimately may or will need to be equalized. There are no shortages of the kind of socio-cultural and / or socio-political disharmonies that applied research will now be summoned to investigate and help solve --- and one may expect that such calls will increasingly be issued over heritage matters alone or in concert with other public concerns.

Applied anthropology is thereby leading the way in showing how in-situ research can be used to help solve significant problems in human affairs, where the knowledge created can be geared towards policy-relevant diliberations and grounded action (Weber 1984:216). In such instances, researchers become involved in the participatory exercise of moral and political values (Cohen 1989:305), and *their activities do not cease with the production or conveyance of data* --- they convey *themselves* with the data. In this sense, the literature informs that applied anthropological research --- to become effective --- crucially becomes a daily and an ongoing pursuit (Weber 1984:221). Thus where 'Foucauldian' institutional arrangements exist --- that is, where given administrators work in professionally petty and occupationally opaque, capillary situations, applied anthropologists (and other applied researchers) can it seems work profitably but at length to understand the embedded logic of the situation. Where the gaze of administrators over human affairs in general, or towards heritage affairs in particular, may be expected to be aggregative, the reciprocal / related work of applied researchers (in translating anthropology --- or any social science --- into policy development and into policy implementation) may also be expected to be cumulative (Cohen 1989:315). Administrative decisions gain their weight additively: advocation and brokerage, in research, also influence additively.

2.3.5 Related Researchers

The purpose of this subsection (2.3.5) is to gain insight on lead anthropologists for the current study of social and political discourse on truth concerning historical tourism in Texas. The insight will be gleaned from a study of what certain leading contemporary anthropologists actually do --- not just what they say they do. Hence this subsection will explore the way prominent anthropologists conduct their fieldwork.

In focussing upon fieldwork the subsection will first attempt to relate the contemporary fieldwork practices selected to the intelligence so far gathered (in subsections 2.3.1 to 2.3.4) about anthropological orientations to discourse and truth. Then it will compare the non-positivist working regimes of Clifford Geertz and James Clifford. They are selected because their respective ethnographic careers conceivably best reflect the epistemological and methodological issues currently brewing in and around this adjuvant, and naturalistic study of Texas. Time and space limitations prevent the opportunity of analysis being extended to any other non-positivist anthropologists or culture theorists in ethnography.

First, then, comes the route to the two Cliffords --- Geertz and 'James'.

2.3.5.1 The Principle Styles of Fieldwork in Anthropology

In anthropology there have been three predominant fieldwork practices --- viz., 'British social anthropology', 'the Chicago school', and (latterly) 'the phenomenological-existential mode' (Manning 1987:11). A brief account of each now follows:

- **The British School of Social Anthropology**

The British Anthropological Tradition was significantly influenced by the administrative dictates of empire, and the need for knowledge to be gained "how societies worked". Consequently, British social anthropology was inclined to be *functionalist* in its methodology (Marcus and Fischer 1986:19), often constituting a penetrative but stained inquiry into each conceivable aspect of life. In favoring close description, the British Malinowskian tradition was essentially *sympathetic* in perspective (rather than *empathetic*) (Wax 1972), though Douglas (1976:43) believes that its often isolated anthropologists more commonly identified with the given people than with the discipline, with theories, or with absolute truths.

Manning (1987:12) maintains that it is British social anthropology that has provided the guidelines upon which so much conventional fieldwork in anthropology is based:

- case-based, sympathetic work has become **emic** ethnography (Berreman 1966);
- administrative detail mongering has become (for British social anthropology's most faithful adherents, at any rate) the **close attention to empirical data** --- but the British tradition "has eschewed model building [and] the erection of 'ground theories'" (Manning 1987:14);
- removed, isolated investigation has become **auto-didacticism** (14); and,
- lone-work styles have become fieldwork by self-apprenticeship (**Epstein 1967; Rock 1979:6**).

British social anthropologists have historically *not* been strong comparativists.

- **The Chicago School**

In contrast to the British tradition the tendency within Chicago school research was for anthropologists to be somehow previously *associated* with the groups and communities they studied. They were prone to being investigative reporters, travellers abroad, or casual comparativists (Douglas 1976) --- in short they were likely to be current, partial or former members of the target population. Because of this added degree of immersion in the target group culture, the critical epistemological and methodological problems concerned whether the inquirer --- almost a **sociologist** as an anthropologist --- could stand aside to look 'objectively' at what was 'already known' (Hughes 1971). There was less need 'to reflect' in order to understand an alien worldview or to cope with a removed or exotic environment. Much could already be assumed.

Accordingly, the ongoing research agenda of the Chicago school was narrower than the British school: it was less varied. It was generally reducible to the investigations of a 'marginal', 'empathizing'

but alternative insider --- albeit an insider with binocular vision (Manning 1987:16). But, like the British school, Chicago-style anthropologists had to take considerable time while their 'story' unfolded: they had to experiment with various methods of open / closed entry, and with full discretionary / limited-discretionary inquiry (Wax 1952; Hunter 1960).

Understandably, the possibilities of generalized explanation across research studies in the Chicago tradition was extensive. Overtime, the regularly harnessed conceptual platforms included, according to Manning (1987:16):

- the theory of **social disorganization** (Davis 1975);
- **the ecology — zone theory** and culture differention (Park and Burgess 1969 [1921]);
- the social-psychological theories of **symbolic interactionism** (Blumer 1969); and,
- the theories of **collective behavior** (Becker 1982).

Although the degree of generalization possible in such sociology-inspired anthropological work has been low, the core work of the Chicago school is regarded as having a cultural relativist perspective (Marcus and Fischer 1986:19).

- **Existential-Phenomenology**

In recent decades fieldwork in anthropology has been influenced --- as has that of sociology, psychology and other social study disciplines --- by the existential issues of meaning that pertain to **internal states of being** and knowing (Douglas 1976:35; Alder and Adler 1987). Existential fieldwork in anthropology is not a search for objective truth, as Malinowskian and Chicagoan anthropology have been inclined to be: it considers, instead, 'the transactional relationship' individuals have with things (Thomas 1983) or what Manning (1987:18) reproduces within the queries. 'How does one know?', 'What can be known?', and 'What sorts of Knowing are there?'

Under existential phenomenology, researchers are not intimidated by close proximity in investigation: they favor intimacy with researched subjects and objects. The maintenance of close, dialectical relationships permits the inquirer not only to identify what people know, but how they know it. Singular and integrated or consensual perspectives are not sought: rather there is a keen interest in the recognition and / or demolition of the false facades which commonly exist around communal truths. Hence "the older [research] rules about secrecy, trust and mutual truth, the protection of one's subjects' worlds, and event to some extent, the editing of field reports to save the face of the researcher and the research subjects, no longer hold" (Manning 1987:19).

Hence, the goals of existential-cum-phenomenalogical fieldwork in anthropology have been nominated as:

- the effort to find new views of **truth and / or human feeling** (19);
- the endeavor to observe everyday life in **natural settings**, using the natural data sources (e.g., diaries, in-depth interviews) of ethnoscience (Agar 1985);

- the attempt to gain insight reflexively into **the way the native sees the world** --- not vicariously but analytically (Gubrium 1988:73-74); and,
- the approach to uncover the **everyday reasoning** of a population --- the talk and the discourse of informants who may be deliberately or purposely selected for their *marginality* as for their *central representativity* (Johnson 1990:27-33).

And in so doing, the fieldwork of 'new' anthropology no longer "locks the observer inside rigid category systems having little or nothing to do with the culture of the researched, but everything to do with [the anthropologists own] research culture" (Van Maanen, Manning and Miller 1990:5) --- as originally quoted early on in section 1.

2.3.5.2 Geertz, Clifford and the Experimental Moment

In the last two decades anthropology has experienced such a range of revisions through its accommodation of existential-phenomenological techniques and through its late and oxygenating proliferation of romanticist perspectives that Rose (1990:55) is able to conclude that *a sea change* has occurred in ethnographic practice. Marcus and Cushman (1982) have coined the term "the experimental moment" for the refreshing and pioneering ways that anthropological fieldwork is now being conducted and written up.

Geertz and Clifford have been at the forefront of this new ethnography --- these vernal field realities, both in the ways they have researched and described parts of the world unknown to others, and in the manners in which they have used new voices / novel hands to present their findings regarding truth in ethnography. Under Geertz, Clifford, and others, ethnography-as-science is becoming refurbished, yet more self-regulated at the some time. And after Geertz and Clifford and others, ethnography-as-art is becoming legitimate. These trends are now shown in brief in Table 2.3.5.2./1.

Table 2.3.5.2./1 is an attempt to contrast the non-positivist ethnographies of Geertz and Clifford. It is based on the work of Pearce and Chen (1989) who have closely examined the way that both Geertz and Clifford reject the possibility of *detached, neutral, unbiased* and *objective* scientific discourse --- that is, knowledge "untouched by human minds" (119). it traces how Geertz and Clifford both see and use ethnography as a sermonic exercise --- a rhetorical activity. The table is designed as an attempt to reflect the characterizations by Pearce and Chen that "Geertz [is] an accomplished novelist whose hard work is deliberately obscured by the grace of the finished product; and [that] Clifford ([is] a [campus-bound but particularly insightful] commentator on the problems of representation in [ethnographic] writing" (123).

Table 2.3.5.2./1 introduces Geertz as a master of hermeneutics --- an interpreter who does not think it possible for cultural analysis to be an experimental science, and who advances by "construing social expressions [out of] their surface enigmatical" (Geertz 1973:45). The table breaks down some of the key features of the Geertzian approach to *the dialetics of experience*, an approach based on the thick

TABLE 2.3.5.2./1

GEERTZ, CLIFFORD AND THE EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT IN ETHNOGRAPHY: THE RHETORIC OF ENLARGED INTERPRETATION VERSUS THE RHETORIC OF COMPLICITOUS PRODUCTION

Area of Anthropological Interest	The Subjectivities of Geertz	The Intersubjectivities of Clifford
Main Ethnographic Approach	**Enlarged Interpretation** - ethnography is *translation*; it is the enlargement of human discourse through the symbolic conceptualization of culture.	**Complicitous Production** - ethnography is an engaged association of ethnographer and natives; it constitutes a long and arduous effort of 'mutual learning'.
Principle Ethnographic Techniques	**Thick Description** - Geertz produces ethnography as a literary form: his 'thick' description consists of fabricating fictions in order to render coherent accounts of exotic cultures.	**Negotiated Vision** - Clifford engages in *interlocution*; the interlocuting ethnographer must give considerable voice to his/her informants.
View Of Objectivity	**Objectivity Is Illusory** - objective representations of other cultures are deceptive and erroneous: looking at other cultures, people should recognize the different social semiotic of those cultures and the 'localness' of their own culture.	**Objectivity Is Illusory** - the intellectual imperialism of one way discourse must be avoided in which ethnographers extract impoverished and unimproved kinds of information about a culture but do not take these interpretations back to the natives.
Perspective On People	**Subjective** - doing ethnography is like reading a manuscript: it is a subjective attempt to read in coherency where there a foreign, faded, *ellipsean* incoherences.	**Intersubjective** - fieldwork has to be dialogical and discursive: it is a process of inventive interpretation of two cultures.
Outlook On Culture	**Culture Is A Text** - it is manifested in people's transient examples of shaped behaviors, social discourse, cultural activities and patterns of symbols.	**Culture Is Not Itself Manifest: Texts Have To Be Produced** - the 'texts' that an ethnographer needs to work with do *not* manifest themselves in symbolic cultural events but are always produced by the natives as the first layer of interpretation.

TABLE 2.3.5.2./1 (Continued)

Area of Anthropological Interest	The Subjectivities of Geertz	The Intersubjectivities of Clifford
View On Thought	**Anthropology Is The Study Of Thinking As A Public Activity** - it is the study of the webs significance that people have spun (i.e., thought up) around themselves.	**Anthropology Must Be The Study Of Native Thinking** - Clifford abhors the tendency of ethnographers to frame their analysis within their own culture's conceptual apparatus and regimes of thought.
Perspective On Meaning	**Meanings Are Discernible In Public Symbols** - Geertz interprets the symbolic activities of natives, then translates them into a comprehensible report in the language of his own society.	**Meanings Are Fabricated By Many-In-Cooperation** - many voices contribute to the final coherent ethnographic account; these voices are frequently hidden in the final assembled articulation of meaning.
Outlook On Accuracy	**Ethnographic Interpretation Need Not Be Literal** - accuracy is less important than sermonic message.	**Ethnographic Must Be Inventive** - ethnography cannot be accurate: it is actively situated *between* powerful systems of meaning: it must necessarily be an intrusive and/or creative activity.
View On Authority For The Data	**The Ethnographer Is The Authority Behind The Interpretation** - Geertz does not disguise his own role but sees through the falsity of the unsophisticated, self-serving, and sentimental Malinowskian methods of rapport.	**The Ethnographer And The Information Are The Joint Authorities** - Clifford follows the teaching of Maurice Leenhardt: data must not be obtained self-reflectedly, but through *mutual* inquiry.
Investigative Stance	**Detached Involvement** - ethnographers, as participant-observers, should continuously tack between inside and outside events.	**Collaborative** - ethnography is ongoing, productive and collaborative work with natives which ought not be dominated by privileged, absolute interpretations.
Data	**The Ethnographer's Construction** - data is really an informed *construction* by the ethnographers of other people's constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to.	**A Two Party - Reconstruction** - data is really an ongoing give-and-take (negotiation of reality) between the ethnographer and the natives; it is a cumulative *reconstruction* between the two.

TABLE 2.3.5.2./1 (Continued)

Area Of Anthropological Interest	The Subjectivities Of Geertz	The Intersubjectivities Of Clifford
Principle Audience	**Broader Than Anthropology** - Geertz addresses himself to a readership of intellectuals: in toto, his work constitutes a sustained sermon about the way Western culture thinks about itself.	**Non-Natives And Natives** - the insight produced in the fieldwork must be accessible for reappropriation by the natives who are often the coauthors.
Overall Rhetorical View Of 'Truth'	*Truth Is Local Vision And Public Thought: It Cannot Be Discovered Formally And Impeccably On A Bodiless Landscape: It Is Only Ever Interpretable, Never Predictable.*	*Truth, As A Norm In Culture Is An Artificial Arrangement, Like 'Beauty' And 'Reality'. It Inescapably Borrows From Other Beliefs And Is Always Contestable.*

SOURCE: Adapted from Pearce and Chen 1989:119-132.

description of 'experience-near' and 'experience far' conceptualizations (Pearce and Chen 1989:121). Yet the table fails if it conveys the impression that the substantive Geertzian detail inherent in *thick description* is merely added or padded text. Geertz was, himself, particularly brusque about the inadequately voluminous ethnography of Malinowski --- whose output, he believed, was "detailed and comprehensive to the point of indiscriminateness" (127).

In contrast to the portrayal of Geertz, the table does not present Clifford as a decoder of textualized behavior, but as an ethnographer who is keen to reveal the necessarily polyphonic character of ethnography. Clifford is a *surrealist* in attitude: he sees culture as something 'constructed artificially' rather than existing transparently. And, as Table 2.3.5./2 also suggests, Clifford is Bakhtinian in his support of the concept of *the heteroglossia*: "languages [and cultures] do not exclude each other, but rather intersect with each other in many different ways" (Clifford 1983). Thus Clifford believes that *it is not an easy matter to ever isolate a distinct society*: cultures are inescapably influenced by the constant availability of other beliefs, values and social arrangements, and the interpretations that are accessible to ethnographers are always contested. Interpretations of reality are only truths "espoused by parties with different situations of power relative to one another" (Marcus and Fischer [on Clifford] 1986:123).

Hence Table 2.3.5.2./1 presents the non-positivist and the existentialist-phenomenological views of Geertz as non-literal carefully translated interpretations of truth, while the non-positivist and the existentialist-phenomenalogical outlook of Clifford is offered as the endeavor to painstakingly capture plurality through sustained indigenous collaboration. And the work of both (as is implicit rather than explicit in the table) is shown to reactive against existing forms of positivist or inadequate non-positivist ethnography which are conceived improperly around ad hoc problem selection and around inconsistent role relationships. Both Geertz and Clifford, in their separate ways, speak rhetorically against the gross counterfactualities and the largely **unsuspected intentionality** of so much other ethnography. They both say much about the persistent ways that ethnographers must be vigilant against *the creep of intellectual imperialism* into their anthropology. They not only "argue that translation / interlocution *are* possible, but that there is a moral imperative why they *should* occur" (Pearce and Chen 1989:128). They therefore offer stern advocacy on the methodological and conceptual reasoning that ought to be part of all sincere attempts to establish felicitous conditions for ethnography --- whatever the parent discipline for that ethnography. Their rhetoric and their praxis is in the van of the experimental moment of all ethnography.

2.3.6 Related Perspectives

This subsection is designed to pull together a number of contemporary perspectives which have risen with the claimed 'change in sea level' in anthropological understanding in the 1970s and 1980s. The ten selected perspectives are drawn variously from their various influences with the increasingly important currents of thought in ethnography that have so far been aired in subsections 2.3.1 to 2.3.5, viz.

- from the rise of *romanticist thought*;
- from the late popularity and operational appeal of *applied anthropology*; and,

- from the effervescence within the discipline that is caught up in the emergence of *existential, phenomenalogical, surrealist* and / or *transactional ethnography* (--- much of which, but not all, may be assumed within the romanticist movement).

The ten perspectives which follow, potentially offer new and catalytic insight for inquiry into the dominance / subjugation issues involved in the manufacture of state heritage. Oncemore, however, it should be noted that there will be some considerable overlap between some or other(s) of these perspectives.

- **Cultural Action as a Mix of Rationalities**

The opening perspective is an important foundational one, and warrants clear restatement. The emergent vision in anthropology is comparative, but the new global aspect within the discipline is "no longer framed by an evolutionary scheme or oriented to the measurement of relative progress toward 'rational' values [alone]" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:23). Anthropology now operates via "a looser set of genre conventions" (23) which are altogether more ethnographically realist (Marcus and Cushman 1982). The contemporary perspective in anthropology is more realist in that "it seeks to represent *the reality of a whole world*" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:23; emphasis added) of rationalities, irrationalities, arationalities and non-rationalities. Anthropology is not just discovering peoples of the world, it is **constantly rediscovering** them.

- **Society as Informal Order**

In the 1990s, *so much* of the cultural analysis that occurred before the 1970s is just not believable anymore. So much of the twentieth century anthropology has been deluded in its **ultra-coherency**: depictions of formal order have been just too 'impeccable' (Geertz 1973:18). Existence has been seen on stainless and indefectible. "Pressure to get to the heart of culture has introduced into the field of anthropology a systematic bias which carries it ever further away from its subject: namely a bias which favors conservative, particularistic versions of culture, and which denies the creative activities that occur on the fringes of all cultures" (MacConnell 1979:149).

Recent perspectives in the discipline of anthropology have become Whorfian (after Whorf 1956): there are no frozen, coherent realities, the object world is a kaleidoscope which must be organized by the minds of researchers (as it is in life, by inhabitants). 'Old' anthropology had been biased toward over-thematization, not so much in the way [anthropologists] thought about cultural materials but rather in the kinds of places anthropologists were willing to move into and stay at for a while (Levy, cited in Shweder 1984:19). "The sample of cultures studied by anthropologists is a very strong sample [which] we have never adequately defined, and it may overrepresent cultures that are tightly organized" (19).

'Old' anthropology had ben platformed too restrictively upon "the Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement and action organized into a distinctive whole" (Geertz 1975:48). And that is increasingly appearing to be "a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures" (48) and even within the particular setting of Western societies, themselves. Californian culture, for

instance, is now being seen as "a zero-point culture [to which] no one belongs [and where] there is no [native culture'" (Manning 1987:17).

Hence the emergent perspectives of the 'new' anthropology (which jostles with surviving 'old' viewpoints) no longer axiomatically support the image of **an unitary world**. 'Innocent eye' classifications (where things are classified because *that is the way they are*) are increasingly rejected (Shweder 1984:45). Reason can no longer be seen to dictate absolutely in the groups and societies encountered by ethnographers. After the sea-change, **formal order** is conjoined by **informal order**: culture has *also* been found to be an extralogical, arbitrary partitioning of the world (45). When formality and rule are now found by a rising proportion of anthropologists, a new healthy tendency is for the investigator to suspect that he / she has evoked Procrustean laws of analysis. Many more ethnographers now doubt **coherency**; as Foucault (1970:xix) recognized elsewhere, cohesion and indivisibility smack of an *a priori* imposition by science on society.

- **Culture as Diversity**

The ever common divisions between older evolutionary / functionalist / cultural materialist perspectives in anthropology and the newer romanticist / existentialist perspectives can also be examined from the point of view of **cultural variability**, as well as that of societal coherence:

> At one pole of opinion are the reductionists --- Marxists, neoclassical economists, cultural materialists, orthodox Freudians, and sociobiologists --- whose basic premises include uniformities of structure and content in human life, culture and motivation at all times and places. They are inclined to minimize cultural variability and to interpret evidence of variations as surface manifestations, concealing the deeper uniformities forecast by their theoretical positions. At the other pole are those cultural phenomenologists who insist on the uniqueness of each culture as the symbolism of a people who share a history and endow each aspect of human life that appears universal with a unique pattern of meanings derived from that history. They tend to reject transcultural categories and even comparative methods as [being] based on superficial similarities in behavior that fail to take account of diversity in the meanings that define culture (Le Vine 1984:80).

Yet as the division persists, the urges and exigencies of 'new' anthropology have reduced the level of support within the discipline for the reductionist argument. What Kroeber formerly called **the centrifugal impulse** of anthropology (Geertz 1984:265) is now slowly being broken down in terms of the regard for cultural diversity.

In response to the ascendent phenomenological viewpoint, reductionists (and a number of other social commentators) argue that developments in the mass media, in the physical sciences and in technology, are or will all lead to the world "becoming a more homogenous, integrated and interdependent place" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:135), where the different, the unusual and the exotic will slowly disappear. But experiential and existential ethnographers strongly challenge that view: "the apparent increasing global integration suggests [to them] not the elimination of cultural diversity, but rather

opportunities for counterpoising diverse alternatives that nonetheless share a common world" (136). The debate continues: the perspectives continue to clash over the extent of homogeneity in culture.

- **Culture as Everything**

The fourth perspective concerns the way in which culture is nowadays found to be 'larger'. Culture is not so much felt to be expanding, it is merely being *seen* by existentialist anthropologists to be even more actopoidal than was suspected before. Learnt or shared cultural constructions --- i.e., those held within one cultural group rather than another --- are being identified in an immense plethora of novel places and situations.

Reading has, for instance, been found to be a socially constructed part of culture, in which "what people actually do, the interpretations they produce, are attached to everything outside themselves, to the whole of their social and material world" (Pratt 1982-3:222).

Similarly, the ontological ground of the ideology of a culture / of a society is being identified on much wider fronts. The articulations of ideological and cultural premises are being uncovered in realms of experience which were previously felt to have just *not been* ideological or cultural matters (Kapferer 1989:191). Thus nationalism --- as a motivational force within ideology and culture --- has for instance been found to not "exploit collective senses of identity or [to] build upon shared meanings so much as [to] create and generate them" (191).

And, in studying cultural ritual, Myeroff (1982:112) has found that cultural rites-of-passage are "often merged with [wider cosmological] messages and [wider social] occasions that go beyond the change of status of an individual or age cohort." Symbolic identification in culture are thus found almost everywhere: *cultural representations integrate and socialize in so many more places, moments and situations than was formerly deemed probable.*

In the light of this expansion of awareness about the force of the presence of cultural imperatives, Bourdieu has found taste to be strongly rhetorical in terms of cultural meaning --- that is, strongly determined by class or group persuasions:

> A cultural product --- an avant-garde picture, a political manifesto, a newspaper --- is **a constituted taste**, a taste that has been raised from the vague semi-existence of half-formulated or unformulated experience, implicit or even unconscious desire, to the full reality of the finished product, by a process of objectification ... . It is consequently charged with the legitimizing, reinforcing capacity which objectification always possesses, especially when, as is the case now, the logic of structural homologies assigns it to the prestigious group so that it functions as a authority which authorizes and reinforces dispositions by giving them a collectively recognized expression (Bourdieu 1984:231).

Hence to Bourdieu, taste is not so much a matter of individual choice, but a matter of valued and conspicuous meaning: it is part of the articulated rhetoric of a group or subculture. Taste is part of socially determined meaning and is held within what Fish (1980:322) called different **interpreting communities** within a society.

- **Culture as Dialect**

Most, if not all, anthropologists do not believe that people move around in a raw universe (Smith 1983:22). Most, if not all, anthropologists --- particularly interpretivists --- believe that the cultures in which people live are interpreted ones rather than being aseptic, untouched inheritances: "Cultures as collective organizations of ideas, symbols and meanings do not ... come internally packaged ... ." (Le Vine 1984:82). The values held by people are not a naked or "an inherent property of objects nor [are they a] self-evident projection of subjects" (Smith 1983:11), they are the outcome of the techno-economic dynamics of the host culture. Anthropologists and culture theorists, today, are not inclined to view culture as a natural structure or entity "in the way that a geological function is natural" it can never *be* authentic" (MacConnell 1979:153).

Anthropologists today are increasingly drawn towards the romantic notion that cultures are arbitrary codes (D'Andrade and Romney 1964), that is cultural logics and dialects which have to be learnt. They are constructions of the world which constantly change, and continually question (and frequently reverse) understandings and meanings overtime. Thus the cultural dialects are *inescapably* dialectical. Individuals living within the particular society have to learn how to interpret them: anthropologists on the outside have to learn how to interpret and reinterpret them. Hence interpretations will always be incomplete in themselves and inconsistent amongst each other, and will always tend "to escape from systematic modes of assessment" (Geertz 1973:24).

- **Identity as Uncertain Self**

The next perspective in anthropology flows on from the last one. Ethnographers are, in the West, critically concerned today with the cultures people *choose to belong to* --- or *choose to experiment with.* As ethnography revitalizes itself, it has to confront the immense sociological boundary changes of late twentieth century life, and (particularly in the U.S.A.) it has to accommodate the new varied cultural and ethnic forms of American pluralism. "For many Americans, questions of group mobility or assimilation are no longer burning issues, or are easily identified" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:155). Old, traditional, compelling group / state / national loyalties may no longer be so obsessive. The basis of new / contemporary / postmodern affinities is increasingly obscure. Cultural belongingness is become deristricted: are the motivations of cultural group membership for a given individual ethnic, emotional or capricious?

Sense-of-self is changing in the U.S.A. What Geertz (1973:258) calls the 'gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion and tradition' still remain, but there is a conjoint acceleration of imaginative personship and of quixotic nominalism.

Sense of belonging is variously becoming more diverse, more uncertain and less fixed. To recall Myeroff (1982:298), "American festive occasions are more often, [nowadays], celebrations of an *individuals'* birth, marriage, divorce, or death, rather than *communal recognitions* of the importance of *communitas* ... ." In complex societies, overall, "a person's social identities are [nowadays] not only

numerous but often conflicting, and **there is no clear hierarchy of loyalties that makes one identity dominant over the others"** (Kopytoff 1986:89).

- **Culture as a Mental Act**

To Hanson and Martin (1973:191) the central perspective or philosophical concern of anthropology, is the orientation and necessity to understand the categories of thought of different cultures. Anthropology could be said, then, to be the disciplinary effort to make comprehensible the basic modes of thought and categorical conceptualization of other societies. To Ryle (1949), culture theorists should apply themselves to "the concept of the mind" --- where the mind is not a hidden, inner theater of private contemplation, but a public arena performing overt acts (50-1). To Ryle (and later to Geertz (1973)) **mental activities are open to public view**: mental acts are public thinking --- they are *knowing how* (Ryle 1949:54). And contemporary anthropologists who follow Ryle and Geertz see social thought as an internalized system of public behavior, not a confidential, secluded, yet explicit matter of ratiocination. Culture then may be seen in this style of hermeneutics as a set of mental acts which are largely guided by subconscious levels of reasoning.

- **Culture as Symbolic Meaning**

The insights of Ryle, Geertz, Clifford have shifted the attention in anthropology from 'hard' behavior, ipso facto, to 'soft' mentality --- to symbols and to meaning. The scrutiny has turned from behavior as social structure towards valued expression (Marcus and Fischer 1986:33), and the perfidities of communities of spirit have become more significant to ethnographers than the formal fixities of the known elements and certain compounds of society (Abrahams 1982:163).

Hence to Geertz, (1973:33) the politics of anthropological perception is not a matter of the definition and verification of societies 'physical' structures, it is a matter of how to appropriately frame an analysis of meaning for the given society. It is the quest to understand 'shared flow', 'communitas', 'liminal activity' (Turner 1982:29), not just at moments of celebration, but for ordinary and enduring ways of living, too. It is the effort to comprehend the fluidity rather than the fixity of group belonging and group thought: the identification of the way communities and societies demarcate behavior for *particular* (i.e., limited) times and places (28). And as the romanticist rebellion continues (Shweder 1984:45), it is increasingly targeted upon 'expressive' acts, 'symbolic behaviors', and 'non-verbal' unities.

- **Culture as Local Meaning**

The penultimate of these recap outlooks revolves around the fact that routinely the anthropologist is a novice in the 'new' or 'removed' society he / she is exploring. This is *the* problem of 'other cultures' (Hanson and Martin 1973:205-6). The anthropologists perspective is usually one of the outsider, therefore: his / her perspective is that of the interested observer who wants to gain an 'internal' / 'insider' understanding of the native's viewpoint. Hence romanticist anthropologists are keen "to see things from the actor's point of view" (Geertz 1973:14): to interpret via emic analysis.

The main problem with the emic perspective is that the anthropologist can never be sure he has captured it (Hanson and Martin 1973:193). Harris, (1980) moreover, considers it insufficient to just try and grasp emic understanding --- **for each and every society must also act in etic fashion**. The need to subsist necessitates *an etic behavioral mode of production* (51); the impulse to survive necessitates *an etic behavioral mode of reproduction* (51); and the drive to produce / to manufacture / to engage-in-technical-activity necessitates both *an etic behavioral domestic economy* and *an etic behavioral political economy* (52). Hence it may be more appropriate to detail this perspective as the local / grounded / situational perspective rather than the perhaps constrained 'emic' or 'verstehen' outlook. In toto, it amounts to the comprehensive perspective that has to be gauged, not just the insider's view on insider matters, per se.

- **Anthropology as Reflexivity**

The final summary perspective in anthropology is that of reflexivity. Anthropologists studying 'other cultures' must not forget or overlook the inescapably imperfect nature of their textualization. When Western anthropologists study 'other' cultures, the examination is inevitably conducted within an embedded Western world of values. Too much cross-cultural togetherness can be assumed too early: fieldworkers must remain alert to the almost natural degree to which his / her "shaky control of material" is later replaced and *concealed by authorial writing* (Marcus and Fischer 1986:69). Hence Dwyer (1982) constantly stresses the need for ethnographers to be vigilant to the way their knowledge grows: he urges **recursiveness** from one interview to the next. Accordingly, for Dwyer, "the text is meant to be neither definitive nor a model for others to follow, but rather a way of stressing the **vulnerability** of all participants in the ethnographic project: anthropologist, informant and reader" (Marcus and Fischer [on Dwyer] 1986:70).

2.3.7 Related Concepts

In this subsection clarification will be given for a number of important concepts in anthropology which have a bearing on dominance and subjugation.

- **Culture**

Culture is the cardinal concept of anthropology, though it is an omnibus term and there is a multipolicity of definitions of the subject (Kroeber and Kluckholn 1952). Generally, definitions of culture concern "those phenomena which account for patterns of behaving which cannot be fully explained by psychobiological concepts" (Kaplan and Manners 1972:2). And, for the purposes of this study, that is aptly conveyed by Goodenough's (1964:36) judgement whereby culture consists of "whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept for one of themselves." Thus, to anthropologists culture is routinely regarded as a set of shared social codes and conceptualizations.

- **Texts**

For many anthropologists, the term culture is just too comprehensive in its coverage (Kaplan and Manners 1972:3), and an increasing number of anthropologists prefer to work with particular concepts of **social knowledge** rather than with the blanket and compendious term 'culture' (Douglas 1976). Thus, where structualists in anthropology tended to be more concerned with the relations between the mutually conditioning components of a given cultural code, more recent, interpretive anthropologists have focused more keenly on culture as a range of social knowledges which are principally built around the different meanings held by different populations and / or groups or sections of populations and / or groups (Marcus and Fischer 1986:25). Put another way, structuralist explanations of culture were geared to the encoding of knowledge about singular, special or privileged subjects, i.e., to understanding the way elements of a culture contributed to the working order of the society in question, whereas an interpretive anthropology like Geertzian 'cultural hermeneutics' (Geertz 1983:4) concentrates its attention on meaningful content in its own right: there, no subjects are fixed, given or transcendental.

Interpretive anthropologists regard the meanings that are held by social groups as being multiple and changeable. Since subjects are neither durable nor autonomous, it is therefore deemed necessary to identify the convertible and labile meanings held about them in **texts**, which (as was presented in subsection 2.3.5) has to be appropriately translated and thickly described by the ethnographer, (according to Geertz), and which has to be collaboratively produced by informant and researcher, (according to Clifford).

The interpretive approach of both Geertz and Clifford are semiotic in approach, however. As is so for other interpretive anthropologists, the text is produced as a statement which offers elucidation: it yields '*comments* about' rather than 'strict *codes* for' the understanding being revealed. The semiotic interpretation of texts enables the reader to converse with the people being studied, and it yields insight into the cherished meanings and pliant significances they variously hold.

But again, for Geertz the text is *evident* in a population's transient form of shaped behavior, cultural activities and patterns of symbols while for Clifford the texts are specifically *produced* for the ethnographic event rather than being self-manifest (Pearce and Chen 1989:125).

- **Discourse**

Discursive analysis is that broad branch of social science in which social theorists study "how members [of a given society] interpret behavior and display (supposed) internal states for all to see, [i.e.,] how members make behavior meaningful to one another (Bilmes 1986:4). Although the fields impetus had tended to be loosely sociological rather than strictly anthropological, anthropologists have drawn concepts from a wide socio-scientific literature, notably from:

- Foucault's discursive approach to history;
- Wittgenstein, Austin, Grice on linguistic philosophy;
- Meed, Blumer and Goffman on symbolic interactionism;
- Birdwhistell, Hall and Scheflen on nonverbal communication; and,
- Bateson, Hymes, Labov, Sacks and Schegloff on communication analysis (4-5).

Taken together, the above fifteen discourse analysts (sometimes otherwise styled as linguistic pragmatists) have studied "the relation of utterances to their linguistic and nonlinguistic contexts" (126).

In order to explain how the concept of **discourse** has been applied to anthropology, a brief explanation will be given to Lindstrom's (1990) adaptation of Foucault's genealogical discourse --- an approach in which Lindstrom (15) attempts to translate Foucault's work from heavily textualized aspects of European knowledge to a remote South Pacific society which is largely non-textualizing in its own practices.

Lindstrom suggests that the post-structuralist term 'discourse' has in fact replaced 'culture' in many anthropological arenas (xii). Culture, though a neutral term is deemed to be unable to address the various conditions in which various competing bodies of knowledge are formed. In exploring Tanna (an island of southern Vanuatu --- formerly the New Hebrides), Lindstrom finds that the society under analysis is an island world of discourse (28) where discourse is taken to be "*the complexes of signs and practices which organize social existence and social reproduction*" (Terdiman 1985:54). Consequently, Lindstrom's (1990:xi) recasting of Foucault's theses is an anthropological attempt to penetrate the local discursive order rather than to map the cultural geography or cultural contexts of the island.

In analyzing the domination and the subjectification of 'those who talk', Lindstrom identifies a mix of discursive and non-discursive processes and situations which channel the creation, use and digestion of what he terms **knowledge statements** (or otherwise **truth statements**). In following Foucault's genealogical thinking, Lindstrom suggests that these knowledge / truth statements maintain orders of truth and power within each or the given society (12). To him, "culture is always freighted with interests. Everywhere there is inequality of access to the means of cultural knowledge production [as represented by these knowledge / truth statements]" (12).

Given the continuing existence of these social inequalities, Lindstrom follows Foucault (1981:67) in conceiving discourse as *the violence that people within a society do to things* as they impose their beliefs and rationalities upon them, and also as they repress alternative cultural knowledges. Culture then becomes a view of the world that people learn within groups and sustain in 'the shared talk' that constitutes discourse. And in this regard, it is not only urban-industrial / metropolitan / Western society that may be conceived as 'an information society' --- for Tanna itself is so rich in its articulation of discourse, that it too would qualify for the term. Tanna, it appears, is a worldspace redolent with information production, storage, circulation and consumption of talk (read 'information') (Lindstrom 1990:10).

In this regard may be seen one anthropologist's contempualization of the merit of the Foucauldian theses on knowledge and power for the understanding of social cohesion on an isolated Oceanic island. Yet, Lindstrom does not claim his insight --- in this instance --- to be ethnographic (8), ipso facto, for it lacks transcendental subjects. Such is Lindstrom's own concept of ethnography. The subject will be returned to in greater detail in section 2.6 on communications.

- **Regimes of Value and Truth**

The fourth concept that warrants amplification, is Appadurai's (1986:4) thinking on **regimes of value** --- viz., these particular conditions under which economic objects circulate differentially in space and time. A regime of value exists where an exchange situation, either inter- or intracultural, is typified by a relatively shallow set of shared standards of value (14). When privileged, periodic events take place free from the norms of a society's economic life, a status-bestowing tournament of value is thought to occur (21).

Yet, if Lindstrom's accentuation of Foucault's ideas are supported, neither the concept of regimes-of-value nor tournaments-of-value should be limited to economic matters. Discourse is itself thought to be marketable: knowledge statements / truth statements do not so much have had *use value* or *truth value* in and of themselves --- they have potential *exchange values* (Lindstrom 1990:22). Whether they are written down, or orally produced, knowledge statements / truth statements are exchangeable and consumable.

In this regard discourse may be judged to be *disciplinal* or *doctrinal knowledge*, and groups in society contest against others to gain or to sustain a hegemony over contrary bodies of knowledge, where their favored regime of truth is rendered universal. *Disciplinary knowledge* is that set of rules and procedures which govern knowledge production (Foucault 1981:61; Bourdieu 1977:657). *Doctrinal knowledge* is binding and enunciatory socially distributed knowledge; it tends to be 'strongly political' (Foucault 1981:64; Lindstrom 1990:51), but is only of value if it is "talked about and deployed within the society" (37). For the South Pacific island of Tanna, Lindstrom concluded that knowledge statements / truth statements are not a distinct form of exclusively epistemological way of knowing within society, but are well entwined with all / everyday island discourse (43). On Tanna, knowledge is not so much *uncovered* or *created*: it is *socially revealed*. By Lindstrom's account the value of disciplinary or doctrinal truths on Tanna is *passed down* within social groups, not *made up* by particularly intelligent persons (43). This local theory of knowing --- and thereby this local theory of the value of knowledge on Tanna --- is more a matter of *social* **perception** than of *intellectual* **apperception** (43).

- **Webs of Significance**

Interpretive anthropologists tend to follow Weberian views of society: they believe humans are "suspended in webs of significance that they themselves have spun" (Geertz 1973:5). For Geertz those webs are explicitly the culture that groups uphold and share. For Lindstrom the webs are implicitly the discourse they participate in. But for both Geertz and Lindstrom, the crucial endeavor is to search for the meanings that flow through that identified culture or that identified discourse.

Both culture and discourse are conceived of as *public meaning* in interpretivist / hermeneutic anthropology. Culture (for Geertz) and discourse (for Lindstrom, after Foucault) are interworked modes of communication --- shared and responsive systems of significant and indicative 'signs'. And to understand or map these webs of significance, the interpretive anthropologist must gauge context. In

culture and in discourse, people in a given intersubjective setting, group, or community engage in the traffic of symbolism as they conjointly experience life situations or socially experience things. Webs of significance are thereby the **social and public human thoughts** which are *in circulation* about life and about things.

- **Emics and Etics**

Further comment is warranted on the terms *emic* and *etic* which have occurred with some frequency in section 1 and section 2.3. The two, largely oppositional terms stand as crucial guideposts for ethnographers and other researchers in the humanities who deal in cultures apart from their own: "Many anthropologists, in fact, if not other social scientists, may owe their jobs to their ability to make the distinction between 'emic' and 'etic'" (Headland 1990:17). Unfortunately, many ethnographers and social scientists utilize the two concepts somewhat vaguely in their diverse purposes (18), sometimes loosely equating emic and etic "with verbal versus nonverbal, or as specific versus universal, or as interview versus observation, or as subjective knowledge versus scientific knowledge" (21). Usage remains somewhat problematic in anthropology.

Pike --- who first coined the two terms (see Pike 1967) --- accepts Kant's (1966:70) view that "We can attain to a knowledge of *appearances* only, never to that of the *things in themselves*". Hence Pike is concerned to see how a thing relates to the thought and knowledge of a people. To him an emic unit "is a physical or mental item or system treated by insiders as relevant to their system of behavior" (Pike 1990/A:28). To him emic units are locatable in the patterned cultural-contexts of mental-plus-physical behavior. They may be observed or deduced in implicit or explicit fashion and they cover the territory between 'ideas' and 'things' and / or between 'speech' and 'experience'. And of special importance to Pike, is the tagmeme (30) which is that particular type of emic unit which relates to paradagmatic, the syntagmatic, the pragmatic, and the cohesive routines a group / community / society live and think by.

Harris (1990/A:60), however, is not easily able to accept constructions (or rather, in his eyes, reconstructions) made exclusively from emic components. To him, reconstructions of mental life have necessarily to be etic (not emic) and their correspondence with the supposed emic structures operating (or believed by others like Pike to operate in a society or community) must always remain untestable. In the estimation of Harris (59) the larger the community or social scene, the less it is likely that identified issues can be accounted for by 'emically valid intentions'.

But Harris does not wish to destroy or designate the distinction between emic and etic understanding. He wishes to point out that in his view science cannot progress very far on emic accounts only. To him, etic accounts are needed when prediction or retrodiction is required, or when a study must examine a behavior over a considerable span of time.

Harris recognizes, however, that there are no comfortable alternatives to the emic / etic distinction. **Subjective / objective distinctions** are difficult to use because participants can be both

subjective and objective, as can observers. **Insider / outsider points of view** are difficult to use because outside (researchers) are not necessarily only observers or always outsiders. **Cognized / operational distinctions** are difficult to use (where *the cognized model* of the environment is that conceived by the people who act in it and *the operational model* is that constructed by the anthropologist) are difficult to use because "of the lack of specificity concerning how one knows about the cognized model as conceived by the actor" (Harris 1990/A:51). And **mental / behavioral** differences are difficult to use because of the ambiguities involved in determining whether it is the participant's or the observer's judgement of what the participants think that is being deployed.

The debate on the emic / etic distinction continues in anthropology and in the humanities. Pike (1990/B) maintains etic / outsider / research criteria need not only or predominantly be used in science because natives can always / eventually be taught to use external / etic criteria of analysis once they have been translated to their own language / thought regimes. And Harris continues to believe that emic-only 'closed-hermeneutic circles' of understanding are unproductive because they do not help one understand the way a society has inherently to deal with the environment and nature surrounding it. That, to Harris (1990/B:83), is importantly, largely an empirical matter, not restrictively an epistemological one.

- **The Social Life of Commodities**

Ethnographers conceptualize that there is **an anthropology to things**. Events / things / commodities are held have social lives (Appadurai 1986:3). Within each identifiable social and / or political economy there is **a commodity ecumene** 927) in which happenings / ideas / objectives are accorded a cultural role 935) specific to that group / community / society. Hence the primary value of events / things / commodities is their use as *rhetorical* signs --- otherwise known as *social* or *incarnated* signs (38). 'Trade' occurs in these commodities in mundane everyday situations, or otherwise in the forementioned tournaments of value when the said events / things / commodities are nonroutine.

- **Singularization**

Interpretivist anthropologists do not only take their key concepts from interpretive / Weberian analysis. Some concepts have also been borrowed from established / structuralist analysis. From the traditional functional theory of Durkheim, comes important insights into the understanding of 'religion' in its broadest social and political contexts. Religion helps build social consensus: religion reinforces common values and views. From Durkheim's (1976 [originally 1912]) perspective societies *need* to set apart particular areas of their physical terrain as their notional social-spaces as sacred zones. From interpretivist - anthropological perspectives, societies *do* set aside certain portions of their physical or notional environment. Hence both Durkheimian foundationalists and interpretivist - anthropologists both support the view that groups / communities / cultures seek to ensure that certain precious or esteemed places and things remain singular. This, to Appadurai (1986:73), is the process of singularization --- the process which 'publicly precludes' these spaces and items from being commoditized. In modern states Appadurai believes the right to singularize an object is power-related, and at its extreme levels,

monarchies / elites / leaders can establish a monopoly over a select set of objects (73) to symbolically represent the power, dignity and integrity of that statist or local communality. Hence interpretivist anthropologists put considerable importance on the effort to trace *the cultural biography* of sacred, singularized or non-commodifiable things.

- **Relativism**

The final two concepts for consideration --- relativism and comparison --- are often taken as being diametrical opposites. Relativism has the ideological thesis that "each culture is an unique configuration with its own special flavor, its own style and genius" (Kaplan and Manners 1972:5). Quite frequently this uniqueness is taken by anthropologists to be an article of faith and it is not closely explained. Moreover, that uniqueness is only by degree, for if an object or a society was totally unique, others (and researchers!) would not be able to comprehend it. As Kaplan and Manners reveal, the extreme relativist begins with the assumption that no two cultures are alike [and] that pattern, order and meaning are violated if elements are abstracted for purposes of comparison.

- **Comparativism**

Comparativists are also inclined to believe that societies and cultures are not alike and that the functional integration of societies differs. But comparativists also believe that all of humanity is functionally integrated, and that there is as much sense in demonstrating the ways in which societies are similar / integrated as in the ways in which they are unique. Comparativists therefore tend to view the craft of comparison as methodologically legitimate and scientifically productive (6). The inescable problem that comparativists face, however, is knowing whether the social or cultural phenomena being compared are sufficiently similar in style, shape or structure to justify the comparative effort. That is always both a theoretically and an empirical judgement.

Goldschmidt (1966) attempted to solve this dilemma by drawing up the framework of *comparative functionalism*. He put forward the view that cultural events and items can be compared (even when explained only in their own / emic terms) if they are presented as social or cultural responses to ongoing questions of survival / existence by the societies being compared. In this way, the comparativist is able to justify how he or she can conceivable overcome Malinowski's (1961 [1922]} criticism that the comparison of behaviors drawn from different behavior sets is fundamentally an exercise in delusion: one cannot compare what (otherwise, in their own right) are incomparables. Thus Goldschmidt's measure of functional comparison is really a measure of *equivalence*, not of comparison.

2.3.8 Related Data Analysis

From the immediately preceding subsections (predominantly 2.3.4. to 2.3.7 inclusive), a number of tendencies are in evidence with regard to what the literature on anthropology reveals about conventional / developing practice in terms of data gathering --- that is, data gathering for the kind of dominance / subjugation issues being covered in the research agenda being developed. The pertinent tendencies are now given in Table 2.3.8./1.

TABLE 2.3.8./1

STATE-OF-THE-ART PRACTICE IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY: DATA GATHERING PROBLEMATICS

	TENDENCY	ONGOING UNCERTAINTIES
• EXPRESSED DATA	Interpretive anthropologists tend to avoid the use of experimental techniques of data gathering, and prefer question-and-answer means of data gathering (which appear to depend considerably for their success upon the anthropologists capacity to develop appropriate interpersonal conditions for verbal expression)(1>1).	Many of the seemingly important things within a culture, such as 'success', 'soul' (or 'culture' itself) have no palpable form. They are difficult to 'test", ipso facto.
• CONTEXTUAL DATA	Interpretive anthropologists tend to prefer to work in 'natural laboratories' where critical parameters are not manipulable (2>1).	In the absence of methodological manipulation, interpretive anthropologists are drawn towards the necessity to fine-comb study or natural situations in order to create the critical elements of 'the context'. Such analyses of context have to contend with difficult matters of circumstantiality (2>2).
• NON-LOGICAL DATA	Interpretive anthropologists tend to support the view that people who act in given societies do not always act in accordance with explicit or Cartesian models of ratiocination; the researcher has to determine if and when formal logical process have been utilized in that society's determination of that behavior and in that individual's conscious awareness of that formal (ratiocinative) reasoning (3>1).	People in given society do not have propositions in their head! Does the researcher's formal propositions correspond with the informal and formal rules, ideas and beliefs. Formal propositions can never completely tally with 'nature'.
• THICK DATA	Interpretive anthropologists (of the Geertzian mould) tend to favor fabricated and thickly described fictions in order to put across an holistic and integrated account of the 'removed' or 'other' societies they investigate (4>1).	Thick descriptions are double constructions: they are an ethnographer's construction of other people's constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to (4>2).
• DISCURSIVE DATA	Interpretive anthropologists tend to rely heavily on analysis of the discourse of natural language to find out what an informant thinks or feels; natural language permits the representative communication of host society symbols and ideas (5>1).	In analyzing the discourse of foreign nomenclature and symbols, the question is whether the anthropologist is able not only to predict which objects will be referred to by which terms, but also to predict what criteria the native speaker will employ in determining the appropriate term to use (5>2).

TABLE 2.3.8./1 (Continued)

	TENDENCY	ONGOING UNCERTAINTIES
• REFLEXIVE DATA	Interpretive anthropologists are increasingly drawn towards reflexive fieldwork styles where the researcher positions himself as a translator-cum-narrator between the native and the reader (6>1).	Hermeneutic anthropologists have become concerned about the effect of their reflexive role in cross-cultural interpretation (6>2). They recognize the impossibility of attaining full internal understanding: being caught in a conceptual knot, the ethnographer can never be certain that the rationale they communicate are indeed those of the informant/informing population.
• VALIDATED DATA	Interpretive anthropologists are drawn towards the production of both emic and etic knowledge: they are not only charged with comprehending the human condition (hence emic insight) but they must also understand and explain cultural variability (etic insight) (7>1).	In many circumstances people in a given society will lose the ability to control their behavior; others will act against their expressed logic. Are both sets of people then acting in an emic fashion, even thought they are not acting in a way prescribed by emic logic? (7>2). Emic knowledge and behavior is validated knowledge and behavior, not just observed behavior of the host individual/population (7>3).
• DISCOVERED DATA UNITS	Interpretive anthropologists are inclined to work in data units which are *discovered* during the study rather than *predicted* before the study (8>1). Phonemic systems can, under normal circumstances of ethnography, only be discovered gradually (8>2).	In transferring institutions across societies it is necessary to establish the conceptual equivalence of emically-identified institutions (8>3). This is no simple task (8>4) because of the routine difficulties of obtaining translation equivalence (8>5).
• IMPOSED DATA CATEGORIES	Interpretive anthropologists are (like all scientists) prone to the unwarranted imposition of their own data categories on host population's thoughts / behaviors (9>1). Such impositions have long produced *apparent* similarities of structure from language to language, from culture to culture.	All scientific methods are prone to suffer from the misplaced and hurried objectivity of researchers. Science, as etic analysis should have no special or privileged status --- being in effect just a particular type emic perspective. All science is fallible, and accordingly each and every scientific statement regarding human thought and behavior should be extremely guarded in its use of 'probabilities' (9>2).
• REDUCED DATA	Interpretive anthropologists have (like all scientists) to take risks in providing their interpretations. In identifying subjects in (emic) speech acts, etic categories in use are inclined to be conservative: etic mental attribution is routinely deliberately reductive (10>1).	It is perhaps a natural inclination of researchers to want to describe those aspects of the expressed mental field [in a host group] that may be most directly correlated with [known] behavioral descriptions (10>2).

SOURCE: Headland, Pike and Harris (1990) and various others.

TABLE 2.3.8./1 (Continued)

KEY

1>1	D'Andrade 1984:108
2>1	Geertz 1973:22
2>2	Geertz 1973:23
3>1	Hanson and Martin 1973:201
4>1	Geertz 1973:6
4>2	Geertz 1973:9
5>1	D'Andrade 1984:108
5>2	Wallace 1965:231
6>1	Manning 1987:21
6>2	Marcus and Fischer 1986:30
7>1	Lett 1990:133-4
7>2	Lett 1990:139-141
7>3	Lett 1990:138
8>1	Pike 1967:37-38
8>2	Pike 1990/B:62-74
8>3	Sears 1961
8>4	Tatje 1970:689
8>5	Berry 1990:89
9>1	Quine 1990:166
9>2	Quine 1990:167
10>1	Reiss 1990:179
10>2	Reiss 1990:179

In summarizing ten inclinations of interpretivist anthropology, Table 2.3.8./1 reveals an equivalent number of uncertainties which hermeneutic scientists / ethnographers ought address before, during and after the conduct of their research. Taken together, these ten problematics suggest that "the problem of [faithfully studying] other cultures is conceptual rather than empirical" (Hanson and Martin 1973:206-7). Two principal conceptual dangers exist. The first is that ethnographers are inclined to view new / other / fresh societies in the ways that they have already been prone to studying earlier / previous societies. The second is that Cartesian imperatives for neatness, order and predictability are inclined to characterize all science --- even interpretivist modes. Hence, it is hard for ethnographers not to be drawn towards a priori conceptualizations as to how a new society will function in order to match how known societies are *thought to function* by the established communities of scientists.

The ten problematics of Table 2.3.8./1 do, however, suggest that interpretivist anthropologists are indeed losing 'their innocent eye', and are coming to terms with the myriad of ways in which their own seemingly innocent presence, innocent questioning and innocent expectations are in fact heavily loaded, heavily weighted and heavily biased. Consonantly, when Spiro (1984:343) (and also originally, Shweder) suggests that in the conduct of ethnography, there is more to thinking than reason and evidence, it is clear that the *nonrationalities* that are being newly observed belong to the thought and actions of researchers as much as to the thought and actions of the researched. Table 2.3.8./1 implies that data gathering in ethnography is no longer just being recognized as a matter of the careful observation and systematic documentation of what people say and do --- nor is it "just a matter of the mechanics of recording speech and activity" (Gubrium 1988:74).

Instead, interpretivist anthropologists are acknowledging that though ethnographic fieldwork involves the analytical participation of the researcher in and amongst the dynamism of the host population's everyday activities, and in the dynamism of the researcher's own productive role in the manufacture of scientific data. Hence, social science is now known to be not only grossly *fabricated*, but grossly *pre-fabricative*, too.

2.3.9 Cross-Evaluation with Postmodernity

Since anthropology is an exceedingly wide-ranging discipline it will not be possible in the space available within this subsection (2.3.9) to offer anything approaching a comprehensive review of the ways that theory in anthropology can or does have interface with ideas on postmodernity. Accordingly, a representative review will be given of the way in which approaches to *applied anthropology* have or can cross-fertilize with postmodernity.

And these loosely representative comments will largely follow the observations of Johannsen (1992) who explored the relationship between applied anthropology and interpretive ethnography, and who saw **interpretive ethnography as equivalent to postmodernist ethnography**. That assumption of equivalence is undoubtedly a matter of some argument in its own right, yet it is in fact taken as an article of faith by Johannsen without being accounted for in the 1992 paper: her keywords merely and blandly

list "interpretive or post-modernist (sic!) ethnography" together. There is no overt explication of their fit in her text, nor is their reference to other literature where this symmetry is accounted for.

Where Johannsen is *not* explicit on the matching profile of 'interpretive' and 'postmodern' ethnography, she is perspicuous on the mutualities between applied anthropology and interpretive (or postmodern) ethnography. She finds the view that seeming incompatibilities exist between *praxis oriented, theoretically unsophisticated* and *ethnically problematic* work of applied anthropology and the *theoretically rich, contemplative* work of interpretive / postmodern ethnography to be a gross exaggeration of circumstance. To her, the practical inclinations of applied anthropology can be improved considerably and reciprocally through cross-tilling with the lucubration of what she styles as interpretive / postmodern study.

Principally, Johannsen finds that applied anthropologists have common ground with interpretive / postmodern ethnographers in the interventionist nature of their work. Where applied anthropologists seek the closest of involvement in order to affect change, interpretive / postmodern ethnographers seek the fullest of contact in order to locate the richest of insights into value and meaning. Both applied anthropologists and interpretive ethnographers therefore have to face substantial ethnical matters. While outside observers may question the propriety of the commitment of applied anthropologists to planned, intended intervention (73), other external judges may question the degree to which interpretive / postmodern ethnographers can ever 'disappear from the texts' they construct about a host population (76).

Assuming those ethical dilemmas can be overcome, Johannsen believes that applied anthropologists have a good deal to teach or remind interpretive / postmodern ethnographers. Such 'instruction' predominantly surrounds the need for anthropological / ethnographic intervention to be holist. Consequently it is generally unwise for change / advocacy / developmental intervention to be conducted by the applied anthropologist / postmodern ethnographer alone: many critical roles in strategic intervention are better dealt with by other experts, other professions, and / or those from other disciplines working in concert with the anthropologist / ethnographer (Peterson 1974:315).

Overall, however, Johannsen appears to consider that interpretive / postmodern ethnography has more to offer in terms of seeding or instructional value than vice versa. She finds interpretive-postmodern ethnography to be much more than "the vapid form of literary criticism" that certain 'nonzealots' deem it to be (Johannsen 1992:71). To her, the extremely self-critical orientation of interpretive / postmodern insight can draw theoretical ethnographers and pragmatic anthropologist alike into the identification of, and the sustained dialogue with, many different groups within the society under analysis. She appears to proffer that *interpretive-postmodern approaches enlarge the possibilities of investigation into heterogenous society.* In this respect, Johannsen echoes Rickman (1979:58-73): since interpretivist / postmodern inquiry in ethnography is distinctly and powerfully concerned with the implicit meanings that events and behaviors have for the actors themselves, it promotes a manifestly **human** study of society. The unities that ethnographers and anthropologists are drawn towards finding within the societies they investigate are

no longer so predominantly driven by 'politics' and / or by 'economics' --- the uncovered unities are increasingly found to be 'human' or 'symbolic' in their characteristics.

Johannsen considers that the fastidious, self-critical recording methods of interpretive / postmodern methods of symbolic and societal representation can offer considerable insight for applied anthropologists. Their focus on the problematics of cultural delineation has in her view, lead interpretive / postmodern ethnographers to refreshing ways in which the authority of texts has been negotiated between researchers and their hosts: that liberalization of authority has not only encouraged the identification of a wider range of "voices" within the society --- but has yielded the production of more *concrete* representative texts (74). That critical self-reflection has also helped develop the need for effective communication between ethnographers and their readerships (Marcus and Cushman 1982:52) --- and ultimately to the more commonplace development of different rhetorical styles for different clients and audiences. Thus, at each end of the ethnographic process there has been some degree of oxygenation: a wider range of local voices and storylines to listen to AND a wider repertoire of broadcasting styles to re-narrate those storylines by.

Johannsen (1992:77) considers that interpretive / postmodern ethnography can and has been a tonic for applied anthropology in other ways. Its destablization of orthodox standards of science has encouraged the acceptance of new basic values and truths. Its intensive use of iterative and reflexive research styles has shown how members of host populations can learn about themselves through the careful 'enactment' of social science and the deliberate 're-enactment' of social science (78). In these fashions, interpretive / postmodern ethnography has helped derive sorts of anthropology which are conceivably *more complete, (i.e., more exhaustive) more enlightened* and *more accessible* (79).

Yet, it has to be acknowledged that the value of interpretive / postmodern approaches for applied anthropology (and for other areas of social science) is not entirely and obviously positive. Rabinow (1985:7) considers that the postmodern ethnography is as yet an unclear and an emergent genre. Dwyer (1977) advises that as yet the relationships developed between ethnographers and even their principal informants are rarely anything other than thin and unreciprocal. Johannsen (1992:78) recognizes that even interpretive / postmodern ethnography has achieved only small success in the manner in which it has given host populations reasonable levels of control over the devised and reconstituted representations made of them. More high-priority collaborative work is required to permit 'locals' to speak for themselves (78;79).

The anthropology literature is nowadays beginning to suggest that applied anthropology does, in fact, share points of significant convergence with 'postmodern' anthropology. The ethnographic encounter is being increasingly found to be an open-ended, constantly changing experience (Marcus and Cushman 1982:45), and reflexive, discursive interpretive styles are proving to be of relevance in wider panorama of applied situations, such as in nations / states / regions which have syncretic (i.e., multi-tradition) populations (Turner 1982:313-4), in contemporary Western / North American society where mass participatory cultural forms exist (298), and where new significant events or meaningful moments are

identified in the lifespace of a society (as perhaps is represented by the tour / the vacation / the holiday itself (174-5)).

As yet, however, the interpretive styles of postmodern ethnography (that applied anthropologists can borrow from) are still adolescent. While Geertz (1972) acknowledges that the rituals and symbols people offer of and about themselves belong more in the realm of art than of objective reality, he also acknowledges that the reproductive work of interpreting ethnographers also ought more definitively be described as 'art' rather than 'reality'. To some observers, postmodern forms of interpretation have prospered in ethnography because anthropology was and is not decently meeting its aims of cultural representation (Marcus and Fischer 1986:33). Postmodern ethnography must continue to improve its capacity to depict lifeworlds faithfully. And to that end, it must continue to divest authority: if postmodern / interpretive approaches are to influence anthropology on a wide front, its ethnographers must continue to find appropriate methods *to give up textual dominance* in their writing --- however impossible that currently appears to be (Watson 1989).

As yet, what Johannsen deems to be postmodern ethnography "has focussed too egocentrically on the native's dialogue with [ethnographers] and too little on their dialogue with one another" (Barth 1989:134). Let the postmodern laboratory be enlarged still wider, for further advances in an extensive mix of interpretive-theoretical modes and in practical-collaborative approaches. Postmodernity is yet raw in its ethnography.

2.3.10 Summary

Subsection 2.3 has covered some of the leading imperatives that drive contemporary ethnographic insight into power and truth. The anthropology literature has been reviewed to reveal the rise of **romanticist, arbitrary, symbolic** and **expressive** accounts of culture vis-a-vis traditionally established enlightenment and rational accounts of lifeworlds. To that end, the steady but uncertain spread of **insider / subjective / emic** storylines to rank alongside and ahead of outsider / objective / etic accounts of populations has also been acknowledged. And the critical endeavor of anthropology has been found to be that of uncovering human beliefs: who shares which **public meanings** with whom, when and where. Culture has thereby no longer been seen to be a thing (or set-of-things) acting in its own right --- but to be those more fluid and evanescent **thoughts** that people participate in contextually and inter-subjectively. The anthropological literature therefore indicates that culture now equates to 'the constructed thought' of associating populations in various *fixities* and *unfixities* of time and space.

In uncovering the way in which anthropologists increasingly acknowledge the contextual nature of culture, the subsection has explicated a number of Shweder's (1984:51-56) inverted findings about culture. In the present context they may be re-caste as follows:

(i) *from self-constructed knowledge to other-dependent learning*: truths have been found to be largely social and contestable, existing 'communally' within certain people's heads rather than out-there, in reality;

(ii) *from rational to nonrational man*: power is not only utilized by people and institutions decidedly, but also unintentionally;

(iii) *from progressive development to frame-switching*: truths cannot be ranked in terms of quality or adequacy;

(iv) *from personal constraint to interpersonal constraint*: consistent worldviews perhaps more commonly belong to groups and societies than to individuals; and,

(v) *from personal invention to collective representations*: so many of a group's or society's truths are inherited from other and transmitted to them rather than being freshly imagined or cognitively reasoned within the given population.

Taken together the five above inversions suggest that *there is no unitary reality* in which all groups and societies do or should participate. Romanticist anthropologists seek to find reality manufactured in each of its interpersonal locales. Increasingly in plural society, ethnographers are finding it important to map the obscure, but deeply emotional, ties people have variously within the society towards ethnic identifications and inherited truths. When anthropologists search for individual consciousness they accentuate such embedded forms of group consciousness. And that consciousness increasingly emerges within --- or is recognized within --- macro-level institutional and group practices, as much as it does in micro-level individual behaviors. Hence group / societal / statist solidarities are now seen to not only exploit the collective identities of individuals, but also to re-create and re-generate them.

Under the rise of romanticist viewpoints, then, ethnographers have come to support the comprehension that culture ought not to be weighed up as a natural entity in its own proactive or reified right, but as an expressive yet changeable set of forces which vanish and reform the moment they are 'found'. Hence anthropologists are tending to find 'the problem of culture' not so much to be **empirical** as **conceptual**. They do not so much nowadays seek to cultivate a method that can locate and isolate culture-as-entity, as they seek to cultivate a set of imaginative and symbolic codes which can trace culture-as-ephemeral-influence. Since culture is thereby increasingly seen to be dynamic and dissolving, ethnographers are tending to prefer to investigate statements about it, rather than to search for the thing itself --- that which melts. Consonantly, 'culture' becomes operationalized as **accepted common knowledge** --- or for some, 'discourse', for short.

In this sense, anthropologists like Lindstrom lie neatly within the Foucauldian mold. They see the ascendancy, in research, of discourse over culture, and find *the discursive order* to be a valid substitute for the various levels of group / society / state. To Lindstrom, *that* inevitably *lies within*

discourse, and in the institutional practices of each discursive order. It is discourse that carries power: it is discourse which dominates and violates.

2.4 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE: THE DISCOURSE ON POWER AND TRUTH

2.4.1 A General Introduction to the Discipline's Contemporary Outlooks

This review of the political science literature starts from the premise that political scientists are very much concerned with what Freud (1955) called ***the tragic paradox*** of the human story. Freud's tragic paradox constitutes the view that in order to be 'integrated' and 'successful', each complex or civilized / civilizing society necessitates *the suppression of instinctual life*: "Civilized man [sic!] has exchanged some part of his chances for happiness for a measure of security" (92). Civilized / civilizing societies repress individuals instinct to be free: that is the tragic cost of civilization. And political scientists study how various groups and interests in society compete and contest to take control of those inevitable repressive forces. They investigate how groups and interests seek to restructure society in line with their own preferences, materialities and internal logics as they deny the instincts and preferences of others that are not compatible with their own lived world.

In working inherently in, on and about Freud's tragic paradox, political scientists seek to uncover *the uniformities of collective actions*, that is the consistencies by which groups and interests endeavor to stamp their preferences on the broader society of which they are part. In order to trace these uniformities, political scientists attempt to trace the intentions of the various groups and interests --- they attempt to trace **intentionality**. Thus, political scientists seek to reveal the **policies** of those parties and communalities of perspective, where the term policy is an expansive one "embracing both *what is intended* and *what occurs* as a result of the intention" (Heclo 1972:84-85). And those policies include decisions *not* to intervene or *not* to take action, just as do for conscious decisions to intervene on any issue (Freeman 1974:4). In its fullest sense, then, the intentionalities and nonintentionalities (that political scientists investigate) are highly dynamic: they are the identified *behavioral consistencies and repetitivities* (Eulau and Prewitt 1973:464-88).

In exploring policy, intentionality and the play of the tragic paradox political scientists can work from a considerable range of approaches to knowledge within the discipline. The same societal phenomena can be serviced in terms of numerous competing explanations. It is most rare for questions in political science to form around a single agreed-upon judgement on primary intentionality. In political science, there therefore tends to be a pandamenia of different perspectives, *under normal circumstances*. There are, as for other human and cultural sciences, no all-purpose empirical tests in political science by which each account of policy warfare and every version of the facts about a political encounter can be examined. And, moreover, political science is a discipline which heavily borrows concepts, theories and methods from other social sciences, as will now be revealed.

In order to introduce the commonplace perspectives that are utilized in political science, this section will adopt the judgement of Zuckerman (1991) who classifies five principal research schools within political science: viz.,

- *Rational choice theory*;
- *Psycho-political perspectives* [known as Political Attitudes and Behavior (in original)];
- *Anthro-political perspectives* [known as Approaches from Anthropology (in original)];
- *Critical / conflict theory* [listed as Marx's theory (in original)]; and,
- *Weberian socio-political perspectives* [known as Weber's social science (in original)].

Table 2.4.1./1 now provides an elementary introduction to the premises and methods upon which these five perspectives are based.

Zuckerman (80-81) draws a number of substantial conclusions about the characteristics of the five political science approaches. They are reduced here:

(a) *Level of analysis*

Some perspectives emphasize analysis at the level of the *individual* (e.g., rational action theory and psycho-political perspectives), others place the individual in an *enveloping social structure* (e.g., critical / conflict theory and anthro-political perspectives), while Weberian views stress the interdependence of each level of analysis.

(b) *Rationalities*

Rational choice theorists consider each individual to be *a rational maximizer* of their subjective utilities, anthro-political scientists search for *motives*, and Weberian investigators hunt for *styles of orientation* to action.

(c) *Structural forms*

Conflict theorists tend to recognize the mode of production as the principal component of the social structure, anthro-political scientists seek to explore the interactions between the key identified components of the given society, while Weber presents a typology of idealized structures.

(d) *Evidence*

Many conflict theorists (particularly Marxists) and rational action theorists deduce their theories from axioms; anthro-political scientists are drawn towards thickly described explanations, while conflict theorists, Weberians and rational choice theorists, but particularly psycho-political scientists, depend heavily on sample surveys of populations.

Clearly, none of the five (or any other political science approach) is able to territorialize the discipline: each of the avenues to knowledge of policy and intentionality are attempts to privilege a certain observation of the world. And as Zuckerman (81) concludes, the models invariably talk past each other in a number of instances.

TABLE 2.4.1./1

PRINCIPAL RESEARCH SCHOOLS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: FIVE CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO KNOWLEDGE

	Rational Choice Theory	**Psycho-Political Perspectives**	**Anthro-Political Perspectives**	**Critical/Conflict Theory**	**Weberian Socio-Political Perspectives**
Fundamentals of the Approach	The radical, simplificatory approach which uses formal mathematical models to explain political actions. The political world is seen to be composed principally of informed and calculating individuals who do wish to improve their economic well-being.	The view that political **behavior** stems from variations in **attitudes**, motives and other psychological characteristics.	The approach organizes research **at the group or structural level**, utilizing defined settings like villages, legislatives, political parties. It studies the ways that those 'members' of the said community perceive and interact.	Critical theories (like anthro-political theories) concentrate upon the structural level, emphasizing the way particular components of a society inter-relate. Considerable attention is given to the way in which the economic order influences other structures.	The view that insight into politics comes in shifts of light (i.e., criticisms, political-philosophy, scientific methodologies) rather than from singular and complex theories on politics. Each effort to view the political world is necessarily *specialized* and thereby *limited/partial.*
Preferred Level of Focus	Focuses on the individual; assumes all people are rational maximizers of **self-interest**, and assumes all people calculate the value of alternative goals.	Focuses on the purposeful action of individuals --- as predominantly drawn from *the measurement of attitudes* based on direct personal experience.	Focuses on the ways in which individuals act *collectively, culturally* processing information and action. The aim is to draw large conclusions for *densely textured facts.*	Focuses upon collective problems, and contends through contention and disputation **to force awareness** of these class / commural / societal ills to the attention of those felt to be in a position to solve them.	Focuses on the judgement that politics is an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistingly emerging and disappearing events both *within* and *outside* of individuals. Weberian analysis relates individual levels of analysis to group levels of analysis via typologies of social action and of political structures (see below).

TABLE 2.4.1./1 (Continued)

	Rational Choice Theory	**Psycho-Political Perspectives**	**Anthro-Political Perspectives**	**Critical/Conflict Theory**	**Weberian Socio-Political Perspectives**
Preferred Mode of Evidence	Seeks insight into the assumed motivations of individuals; does not necessarily need evidence on the political culture or on political events.	Relies heavily on sample surveys of populations and public opinion polls. Heavy use of multiple regression and sophisticated statistics.	Assumes communities exist as a set of social relationships; seeks evidence on the existence of systems of *social relations.* Seeks 'plausible readings' not explanation.	Seeks insight into *political* and *social problems* AND seeks actions which can help resolve them. Assumes that the causes of these problems lie within social and political institutions.	Recognizes that description and explanation will always be *incomplete*, with for instance Marxist "class" being no more than '*an ideal type*'. Weber considered it critical to examine the **meanings** that surround human and social action, viz., the subjective understandings which apply and the *webs-of-significance* people spin around themselves. Evidence or judgement must be obtained at both individual and structural levels of analysis.
Preference Regarding Comparative Analysis	Assumes all people *act rationally* to maximize their self-interest.	Attitudes are arranged into clusters of beliefs in order to uncover (comparatively) underlying principles and preferences.	Seeks to understand the meaning of actions within communities normally on an in-depth / particular (Geertzian) basis; many researchers deny the ability to generalize: each community is held to be unique.	Attempts to gather information **critically** upon the actions of everyday institutions within a given social order/state/nation. But assumes there are universal principles of social, economic and political life.	Weberian analysis emphasizes verstehen understanding --- i.e., empathetic understanding of individuals in the context of their own society instead of being compared to individuals elsewhere.

TABLE 2.4.1./1 (Continued)

	Rational Choice Theory	**Psycho-Political Perspectives**	**Anthro-Political Perspectives**	**Critical/Conflict Theory**	**Weberian Socio-Political Perspectives**
Preference Regarding Theoretical Integration	Rational theories are models of how politics would be if the model's assumptions were true.	Psytho-political approaches are models which seek to link attitudes to behaviors.	Anthro-political perspectives constitute distinctive methodologies rather than integrated theories; they have *few general concepts* or hypotheses.	Critical/conflict theory melts the distinction (deliberately) between descriptive and normative theory. It integrates its action (rather than its theory) around *change* and *disequilibrium*.	Weberian explanations depend on the attribution of adequate/appropriate **motives**. These motives are placed within a four-cell typology of *traditional, emotional, absolute value rational,* and *instrumental value rational* actions. For instance capitalist democratic society is characterized by the spread of instrumental rational orientations to action and rational legal authority structures.

TABLE 2.4.1./1 (Continued)

	Rational Choice Theory	**Psycho-Political Perspectives**	**Anthro-Political Perspectives**	**Critical/Conflict Theory**	**Weberian Socio-Political Perspectives**
Preference Regarding Empirical Knowledge	The empirical accuracy of assumptions in not particularly important; *deductive logic* is emphasized instead.	These studies of motives and dispositions tend to be *heavily quantitative*; evidence replaces deductive logic.	Relies on the *interpretation* of observed behaviors as gathered ethnographically --- predominantly by the gathering of a multiplicity of facts to permit 'think description.' Some anthro-political scientists believe that it is proper and reasonable to generalize from ethnographic data --- by using the techniques of multivariate analysis upon measures of abstract variables.	Seeks insight on the patterns of interacting structures (e.g., as seen through *class*) in order to *explain, predict,* and then *establish* the necessary conditions to *transfer society* in a better(?) / more just(?) / equal world(?) Each critical / conflict theory model (e.g., Marxism) tends to have its own distinct concepts, variables, hypotheses.	Weberian analysis can be conducted via psychological tests but is more commonly obtained via the comparative study of large numbers of cases.

SOURCE: Predominantly Zuckerman (1991) and Herson (1984).

In analyzing the intentionality of political actors, contemporary political scientists are prone, like Foucault, to finding evidence of its play and engagement in all corners of society (Harland 1987:161): Politics is no longer regarded, if it ever properly was, as that which 'politicians' or 'political parties' engage in. "Politics is no longer restricted to the level of general class relations, but percolates down into domestic relations, schooling relations, parent-child relations, and of course sexual relations" (161). Political scientists unearth mechanisms of 'power', and incident of 'policy' formation ubiquitously --- as did Foucault: 'politics is over and above the individual" (162) even for those approaches which assume political events to be inspired by individual actions / initiatives.

For the current development of the research agenda into truthmaking, however, emphasis will be given to the literature that attempts to account for those competitive struggles whereby groups struggle for power and authority. It will tend to pivot upon those interest-group theories and those investigations of interest-group claims and challenges upon **legitimacy**. But that does not mean that the political science surveyed will be candid and prosaic. Political scientists do not have the plain and simple task of analyzing the essentially *political* role of politicians vis-a-vis, for example, fundamentally *technical* role of civil servants: "the definition of what is political and what is technical ... is anything but straight-forward (Baumgartner 1989:5). Undoubtedly, a number of trite and stereotypical assessments of political action and of policy science still abound. The turn-of-the-century words of Arthur Bentley (1908) are still appropriate today: time is ripe for the outlawing from political analysis of those sorts of 'metaphysical ghosts' that portray politico-legislative action as fundamentally the work of legislators striving earnestly for the public welfare. Intentionality in legislation and, intentionality in politics is routinely much more clever circuitous, and cloaked than that.

2.4.2 A Specific Introduction to the Discipline's Contemporary Outlook on Power and Historical Truth

Few, if any, political scientists --- whether they would be Weberian commentators, political behaviorists or even rational choice theorists --- would subscribe to the view that there is a single, simple truth 'out there' calling attention to itself (Zuckerman 1991:163). Both players and actors in politics, and political scientists tend to recognize that 'truths' in politics are highly dynamic. The truths that are current on any issue, in any arena, or within any institution in politics are prone to changing, to evolving, and to being the subject of new / vogue / recast interpretations: "The content of [an issue / a conflict encounter / a policy] has only a minor impact on how many different actors actually [view / relate / decide] it" (Baumgartner 1989:213).

In order to explain the way this dynamism is mapped and modelled in the contemporary political science literature, this subsection will consider the way truth and power are seen to work in and through government. The subsection will pivot on C.O. Jone's (1977) analysis of political action from a policy process front. Historical truths will be deemed to be no different than any other truths in politics --- i.e., malleable products which are accepted, re-shaped or denied, depending upon the broader preferences

and missions of each set of interests involved. And power will be viewed as that sum of forces / influences / authorities any of those interests can bring to bear upon 'truth' (i.e., each or any of those historical truths) during the policy process.

During the analysis, the following critical considerations will apply:

- policy conflicts are deemed by political scientists to be clashes of *different values* (i.e., confrontations of perspectives on 'truth') and policy decisions are those settlements which are drawn up by those parties in disagreement (Eyestone 1972:80);
- the *problems* and the *environments* which policies and intentionalities address are *extremely difficult to hold constant* (Jones 1977:212);
- different players in the game rarely accept the same given problem (Wildavsky 1979:404-5);
- the policies that individuals / interests / institutions form are highly dependent upon the knowledge that they hold and receive (Jones 1977:218);
- the policies that individuals / interests / institutions derive are produced "in a big pot in which many stir" (Meltsner 1975:116-117); and,
- all of the players in the political process or in the business of policy formation have *imperfect knowledge*: none knows 'the whole truth' (Schattschneider 1969:53).

The six above considerations are some of the major premises upon which the Jones policy process approach is based. In his view, policies that are current in any political situation are almost always based upon **ambiguous and contestable data**. And they themselves are ambiguous, having to be 'inferred' rather than clearly and overtly read. Accordingly, Jones (1977:8) codifies his framework of the analysis of the dynamics of policy development around nineteen orienting propositions. They are now listed in Table 2.4.2./1.

In devising his set of nineteen propositions, Jones (1977:15) attempts to show how from a political science perspective "one person's problem may be another person's profit". He suggests that where problems between players can be sorted out without producing demands upon others who are not directly involved, the problem remains *private* in nature. But when the problem escalates it can become public: "when the consequences are *perceived* by others and considered to be significant enough to be controlled, a **public** is born (16; bold emphasis added). Jones quotes Dewey (1927:15-16) in this regard: "the public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for". Hence, by implication, Jones writes in and around **the tragic paradox**. The nineteen orientating propositions of Table 2.4.2./1 revolve around the ways in which *private groups seek the platform of government in order to control the behaviors of other private groups*. The Jones characterizations of public policy draw attention to the way private interests of all sorts can incrementally dress their programs, projects and

TABLE 2.4.2./1

JONES'S GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: NINETEEN ORIENTING PROPOSITIONS ON POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

THE NINETEEN PROPOSITIONS	HISTORICAL TRUTH SCENARIO
1. Events in society are interpreted in different ways by different people at different times.	e.g., President Kennedy died in 1963 yet views of his strengths and qualities have risen and fallen variously in the three decades since then;
2. Many problems may result from the same event.	e.g., Civil War erupts in Yugoslavia: neighboring nations/states/ethnic groups across a wide expanse of Eastern and Western Europe realign variously; many old historical truths are rekindled in countries distant from Yugoslavia;
3. People have varying degrees of access to the policy process in government.	e.g., Some populations/ethnic groups/subcultures may be able to exert force on a Washington, a Canberra or a Madrid because they are geographically situated close to it, and able to concertedly lobby on behalf of their culture, their past, their identity with relative ease;
4. Not all public problems are acted on in government.	e.g., Some populations/ethnic groups/subcultures do not understand the given federal/state/local system of governance; the necessity to or experience in explaining their cosmic worldview/their inheritances/their traditions via 'specialized'; 'professional'; or 'fulltime' politicians may be alien to them;
5. Many private problems are acted on in government.	e.g., Economic elites who hold particular historical truths may be able to buy lobbying presence or to influence political decisions well beyond the numbers of people who hold to those truths --- or well beyond the inherent virtue of these truths (if there is such a thing!);
6. Many private problems are acted on in government as though they were public problems.	e.g., Owners of historic houses, historic estates or historic ruins successfully convince or influence government into taking over financial/maintenance/administrative responsibility for their sites --- they are able to persuade government decision-makers that those houses/estates/ruins are decently or fully representative of the state;

TABLE 2.4.2./1 (Continued)

THE NINETEEN PROPOSITIONS	HISTORICAL TRUTH SCENARIO
7. Most problems aren't solved by government though many are acted on there.	e.g., Certain marginal groups claim to the government state 'official' or 'common' histories of the state under-represent marginal groups; government acts upon the problem, but cannot solve it. When encouragement is given to the re-writing of history to accommodate those marginal groups, other new marginal groups emerge to state their case --- and *new ways* of being under-represented become identified for both the old set of marginal populations, and the new set of claimants;
8. Policy makers are not faced with a given problem.	e.g., Some claim 'the given problem' in a certain state to be the absence of historical record; some claim it to be 'the absence of bona fide historical record', some claim it to be 'the inadequacy of the interpretation of the historical record', some claim it to be 'an absence of appreciation today of the mores of the particular past; and others ... et cetera.
9. Most decision making is based on little information and poor communication.	e.g., The state-in-question under-represents the indigenous or ethnic history and culture within its territory because it has no bureaucrats who are trained anthropologically, or humanistically, to understand the cultural logic of those groups --- its historical committees do have fully qualified historians but do not have professional anthropologists;
10. Programs often reflect an attainable consensus rather than a substantive conviction.	e.g., The given state has officials and/or officers who genuinely want to develop a more equitable/representative state history, but much of that would involve the recognition of land rights to indigenous/marginalized populations; the state leadership cannot grant those land rights for fear of offending the mineral industry who are keen to retain access to those lands during a period of sustained recession. The result is rhetorical appeasement for land rights but continued economic empowerment for the mineral lobby;
11. Problems and demands are constantly being defined and redefined in the policy process.	e.g., History and heritage for the given state used to be the responsibility of the Department of Environment and Lands before it was remodelled to become the Department of Heritage and Lands, before historical/heritage matters were shifted to the Department of Arts, Culture and Humanities, which itself was remodelled to become the Department of Tourism, Arts and Culture...!!
12. Policy makers sometimes define problems for people who have not defined problems for themselves.	e.g., The marginalized population within the large nation consists of people whose internal rationalities are communal --- they have few individuals who are keen or able to articulate their worldview(s) or advance their history(ies) via the strong individualized work-styles of legislators in the mainstream society. Consequently the mainstream government in power relies on 'trusted' academic or 'handy' secondary accounts of that population's will rather than from a regular diet of direct and immediate views;

TABLE 2.4.2./1 (Continued)

THE NINETEEN PROPOSITIONS	HISTORICAL TRUTH SCENARIO
13. Many programs are developed and implemented without the problems ever having been clearly defined.	e.g., Several states get together to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the landing of/birth of/nomination of XYZ. But by some accounts, XYZ shines as a bright/proud light over the region, whereas by others XYZ is surrounded in notoriety and infamy. Bureaucrats working for the state assume the only necessary or important history is the roseate one. No sustained research is mounted on historical or political representativities --- the Big Roseate / Wonderful Event is funded and mounted axiomatically;
14. Most people do not maintain interest in other people's problems	e.g., The aggregate history of the state's politically selected Board-of-Heritage becomes the official history for the Whole State. Those Board members are ultra-knowledgeable about their own antecedents and ultra-keen about their own inheritance --- but they remain deaf to the alternative histories of that region that paralleled those of their foreparents;
15. Most people do not prefer large change.	e.g., The population of the given state cherishes its folk-heroes and meta-narratives: many, many individuals taken their identity from them and many, many live by them. Such people do not like these legends and these mythical figures to be 'corrected' or 're-evaluated' --- at least not in terms of the precious and hallowed storylines they learnt in their childhood.
16. Most people cannot identify a public policy.	e.g., Most of the population of the given state cannot closely identify any of the principal aims or objectives of the policy of the state's agency responsible for the conservation of history and the preservation of heritage;
17. All policy systems have a bias.	e.g., The City council's policy towards historical presentation and interpretation is heavily weighted towards 'white', 'European', 'male', 'militaristic', and 'progressivist' storylines --- as evidence from a content analysis and textural discontruction of its museum exhibits.
18. No ideal policy system exists apart from the preferences of the architect of that system.	e.g., In 1993 the state conducts an internal review of its historical conservation services and its heritage interpretation program. Whilst most of its staff and members preferred little major change to existing policy, there were sharp divisions on the kind of 'additional' services and programs they would each like to see. The following findings were recorded: more advocacy services (61%); more outreach programs (47%); more joint-provision/dual use/facilitator role work (32%); more direct provision (26%); more cafeteria-style services and programs (18%). Altogether, an exceedingly broad range of new/potential policy and operational improvements were suggested;