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dc.contributor.advisorSarin, Rajiven_US
dc.creatorRentschler, Lucas Aarenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T22:02:51Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-22T07:10:44Z
dc.date.available2011-10-21T22:02:51Zen_US
dc.date.available2011-10-22T07:10:44Z
dc.date.created2010-08en_US
dc.date.issued2011-10-21en_US
dc.date.submittedAugust 2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2010-08-8270en_US
dc.description.abstractIn common-value auctions and contests economic agents often have varying levels of information regarding the value of the good to be allocated. Using theoretical and experimental analysis, I examine the effect of such information asymmetry on behavior. Chapter II considers a model in which players compete in two sequential contests. The winner of the first contest (the incumbent) privately observes the value of the prize, which provides private information if the prizes are related. Relative to the case where the prizes are independent, the incumbent is strictly better off, and the other contestants (the challengers) are strictly worse off. This increases the incentive to win the first contest such that the sum of expected effort over both contests increases relative to the case of independent prizes. Chapter III experimentally considers the role of asymmetric information in first-price, sealed-bid, common-value auctions. Bidders who observe a private signal tend to overbid relative to Nash equilibrium predictions. Uninformed bidders, however, tend to underbid relative to the Nash equilibrium. Chapter IV examines asymmetric information in one-shot common-value all-pay auctions and lottery contests from both experimental and theoretical perspectives As predicted by theory, asymmetric information yields information rents for the informed bidder in both all-pay auctions and lottery contests.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectAuctionsen_US
dc.subjectAsymmetric Informationen_US
dc.subjectContestsen_US
dc.titleAsymmetric Information in Common-Value Auctions and Contests: Theory and Experimentsen_US
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.departmentEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.grantorTexas A&M Universityen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberGrosskopf, Briten_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberGronberg, Timothyen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberWoodward, Richarden_US
dc.type.genrethesisen_US
dc.type.materialtexten_US


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