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dc.creatorHouston, Christy Michelleen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07T23:14:48Z
dc.date.available2012-06-07T23:14:48Z
dc.date.created2002en_US
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2002-THESIS-H675en_US
dc.descriptionDue to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaf 104).en_US
dc.descriptionIssued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe agricultural economy in recent years has been in a steady decline and has shown an express need for reform of government policy pertaining to it. Particularly, the rice industry has been plagued with not only steadily decreasing prices but also increased costs of production. The primary objective of this research is to assess the farm level economic implications of the House of Representatives and the Senate farm bill proposals on representative rice farms from six different rice-producing states for the years 2001-2010. A whole farm computer simulator (FLIPSIM) was used to simulate the economic activity of 17 representative rice farms from six different rice-producing states operating under two farm bill proposals, H.R. 2646 and S. 1731. The two scenarios were ranked as to the preference of each farm's manager using three methods for ranking risky scenarios: averages of key output variables, CDFs of average annual net cash farm income and certainty equivalents. The results as to preference between the two bills are inconclusive using the first two methods. However, preference can be determined for each farm whether the farm manager is risk loving, neutral or risk averse, using certainty equivalents to rank risky scenario ranking. Using this method it was determined that if the farm managers were risk loving, 12 of the 17 farm managers would prefer farming under H.R. 2646 over farming under S. 1731. The smaller farm managers would choose to farm under the Senate bill as opposed to the House bill if the farm managers were risk loving. Seven farm managers would prefer a risk free investment over farming under either of the farm policies if the farm manager was risk averse. Eight of the 17 risk averse farm managers would chose to farm under H.R. 2646 over either a risk free investment or farming under the Senate bill. Only two risk averse rice farm managers would prefer to operate under S. 1731 over a risk free investment and farming under H.R. 2646.en_US
dc.format.mediumelectronicen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherTexas A&M Universityen_US
dc.rightsThis thesis was part of a retrospective digitization project authorized by the Texas A&M University Libraries in 2008. Copyright remains vested with the author(s). It is the user's responsibility to secure permission from the copyright holder(s) for re-use of the work beyond the provision of Fair Use.en_US
dc.subjectagricultural economics.en_US
dc.subjectMajor agricultural economics.en_US
dc.titleFarm-level economic impacts of the House of Representatives Farm Bill Proposal, H.R. 2646, and the Senate Farm Bill Proposal, S. 1731, for representative rice farmsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineagricultural economicsen_US
thesis.degree.nameM.S.en_US
thesis.degree.levelMastersen_US
dc.type.genrethesis
dc.type.materialtexten_US
dc.format.digitalOriginreformatted digitalen_US


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