An alternative to constant rate link padding for the prevention of traffic analysis

Abstract

As encryption becomes more prevalent across the internet, techniques that can give an attacker information without needing to overcome encryption will become more important. One such technique, traffic analysis, is already a well researched field. As far back as WWII, technicians could determine a great deal of information about a target without using the content of the message. Given traffic analysis' power, the prevention of traffic analysis is an increasingly important field. The traditional approach to prevent traffic analysis has always been constant rate link padding. However, the effectiveness of this method when an adversary has access to advanced monitoring equipment and knowledge of statistical analysis has not been addressed. This thesis addresses that issue and provides an alternative means for preventing traffic analysis. It begins by discussing the motivation for preventing traffic analysis, then discusses existing work in the field, then summarizes experiments that prove that constant rate link padding is vulnerable to attack. Finally, it describes an alternative to constant rate link padding and explains why this alternative is not vulnerable to the same attacks.