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dc.creatorBacon, Peter Kirk
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07T22:51:35Z
dc.date.available2012-06-07T22:51:35Z
dc.date.created1998
dc.date.issued1998
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1998-THESIS-B33
dc.descriptionDue to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.en
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references: 68-74.en
dc.descriptionIssued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.en
dc.description.abstractByzantine military strategy has been a neglected subject within the discipline of military history. For many years, examination of the military writings and the abilities of Byzantine commanders has been hampered by the determination of earlier scholars that Byzantine generals relied more on deception and trickery than skill and planning to win battles. Because of these early statements, modern scholars have neglected to study the strategy and tactics embodied in the military treatises written after the fall of the western half of the Roman Empire. An in-depth study of these treatises, however, reveals that the Byzantines placed great emphasis on the preparation of the army for war, and on the tactics associated with battle. Byzantine military treatises, in fact, dwell far more on the preparation for and conduct of battle than they do on the use of stratagem. Deception and trickery, while not unknown to the Byzantine commander, were only tools that he might use to aid him in battle, rather than a crutch on which he was overly dependent. This thesis contradicts the findings of Edward Gibbon, George Finlay, Lynn Montross, and other scholars who demean the abilities of Byzantine tacticians and who relegate the victories of the Byzantine Army to the fruits of deception and deceit. This study of the extant military literature of the period demonstrates that the Byzantine military leaders were able strategists and tacticians and that stratagem was a minor component of the general's arsenal.en
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherTexas A&M University
dc.rightsThis thesis was part of a retrospective digitization project authorized by the Texas A&M University Libraries in 2008. Copyright remains vested with the author(s). It is the user's responsibility to secure permission from the copyright holder(s) for re-use of the work beyond the provision of Fair Use.en
dc.subjecthistory.en
dc.subjectMajor history.en
dc.titleA critical appraisal of Byzantine military strategy, 400 - 1000 A.D.en
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.disciplinehistoryen
thesis.degree.nameM.A.en
thesis.degree.levelMastersen
dc.type.genrethesisen
dc.type.materialtexten
dc.format.digitalOriginreformatted digitalen


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