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dc.creatorHickenbottom, Richard Scott
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07T22:40:50Z
dc.date.available2012-06-07T22:40:50Z
dc.date.created1995
dc.date.issued1995
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1995-THESIS-H53
dc.descriptionDue to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.en
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en
dc.descriptionIssued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.en
dc.description.abstractThe first large-scale use of American paratroopers in combat occurred during the invasion of Sicily, code-named Operation HUSKY, in July 1943, when poor navigation by troop-carrier pilots caused the 505th Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team to be scattered across a sixty-five mile area during the initial jump. The terrible dispersion of that force, along with a friendly-fire incident a few days later, led to changes in U.S. airborne doctrine, planning, organization, and procedures. It also led to the development of pathfinder units to guide airborne formations to drop and landing zones more accurately through the use of radar and homing equipment first developed by the British. From that point forward, American pathfinders, which included selected C-47 crews from the IX Troop Carrier Command and teams of paratroopers from the airborne divisions, flew in ahead of the airborne assaults in Salerno, Italy, Normandy, France, and Holland. The specially-trained paratroopers descended to set up homing equipment and visual aids for the rest of the airborne armada that followed, and their efforts led to considerable improvements in accuracy. Ironically, the British had developed a pathfinder organization of their own nearly a year before the disaster in Sicily, while an American airborne battalion and a troop-carrier wing were exposed to British pathfinder techniques and equipment before undertaking small-scale airborne operations in North Africa in November 1942. This study examines the development of U.S. Army pathfinders between 1943 and the end of the war in an attempt to explain why the U.S. failed to develop this pathfinder technology earlier and why British pathfinder technology was not transferred to the Americans in time for HUSKY. At the same time, it explores American pathfinders' contributions to airborne operations and the Allied war effort. In doing so, it provides insights into the complex interplay of bureaucracies, personalities, technology, doctrine, strategy, and military organization in the evolution of new forms of warfare and their role as inhibitors or facilitators of technology transfer.en
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherTexas A&M University
dc.rightsThis thesis was part of a retrospective digitization project authorized by the Texas A&M University Libraries in 2008. Copyright remains vested with the author(s). It is the user's responsibility to secure permission from the copyright holder(s) for re-use of the work beyond the provision of Fair Use.en
dc.subjecthistory.en
dc.subjectMajor history.en
dc.titleU.S. Army pathfinders in World War II: the Mediterranean and Europeen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.disciplinehistoryen
thesis.degree.nameM.A.en
thesis.degree.levelMastersen
dc.type.genrethesisen
dc.type.materialtexten
dc.format.digitalOriginreformatted digitalen


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