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dc.creatorSvonavec, Stephen Charles
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07T22:38:44Z
dc.date.available2012-06-07T22:38:44Z
dc.date.created1994
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1994-THESIS-S969
dc.descriptionDue to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.en
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en
dc.description.abstractAt the end of World War I, the United States Navy was in the midst of a building program designed to make it a "Navy Second to None." However, the post-war desire to avoid involvement in another international conflict led the United States to retreat from the aggressive naval policy of President Woodrow Wilson. America initiated and supported conferences which led to the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930, both of which limited the maximum strength of the world's naval powers. In addition, throughout the 1920's and early 1930's the United States failed to build up to the levels allowed by the treaties, causing the Navy to slowly age toward obsolescence. This situation changed in the period from 1933 to 1940 as Congressman Carl Vinson of Georgia, chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, drafted and saw to the passage of legislation designed to once again provide the United States with a powerful navy as part of a strong national defense. Vinson obtained passage of naval construction legislation in 1934, 1937, 1938, and 1940, and supported the annual and supplemental appropriation acts which funded the newly authorized construction. In doing so, Vinson overcame opposition from pacifists and isolationists in Congress who feared America would be drawn into another European war. Vinson also had to persuade fiscal conservatives opposed to increasing the budget deficit that funding naval construction was in the nation's best interests. Additionally, Vinson obtained the often reluctant support of President Franklin Roosevelt to insure final approval of his legislation. This study examines Vinson's efforts to provide the Navy the ships with which it eventually fought World War II. it looks at committee hearings, House and Senate debates, and behind the scenes conferences between Vinson and officials of the Navy Department and Roosevelt Administration which helped decide the course of naval expansion. It shows that while many people contributed passing naval construction legislation, Carl Vinson was the driving force behind the expansion of the Navy. Without Vinson's pre-war legislation, the Navy could not have been prepared to effectively fight the Second World War.en
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherTexas A&M University
dc.rightsThis thesis was part of a retrospective digitization project authorized by the Texas A&M University Libraries in 2008. Copyright remains vested with the author(s). It is the user's responsibility to secure permission from the copyright holder(s) for re-use of the work beyond the provision of Fair Use.en
dc.subjecthistory.en
dc.subjectMajor history.en
dc.titleCarl Vinson and pre-war naval legislation 1932-1940en
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.disciplinehistoryen
thesis.degree.nameM.S.en
thesis.degree.levelMastersen
dc.type.genrethesisen
dc.type.materialtexten
dc.format.digitalOriginreformatted digitalen


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