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dc.contributor.advisorGan, Li
dc.contributor.advisorBrown, Alex
dc.creatorCastillo Garcia, Jose Gabriel
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-29T19:43:53Z
dc.date.available2017-08-01T05:37:40Z
dc.date.created2015-08
dc.date.issued2015-07-28
dc.date.submittedAugust 2015
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155533
dc.description.abstractThe three essays in this thesis foster the identification of unexpected influences of different institutional arrangements on economic outcomes. The first two essays, experimental in nature, analyze the impact of two different contexts within Public Goods Games (PGG) environments. The first essay documents exact replications of four classic experiments in PGG and cast unexpected results in contribution behavior. First, it shows how the attenuation effect in replication studies, well documented in other disciplines, is also pervasive in experimental economics. Not all previous findings replicate, and effects found in successful replications are much smaller. Second, it shows that experimental context matters; experimental subjects in Texas tend to contribute more and free ride less, across different experiments. The second essay analyzes whether democratic institutions have any impact on agency problems where group members face a centralized arrangement of sanctioning power. It offers novel evidence, although a weak effect, of the intrinsic incentives for pro-social behavior attached to legitimacy in democratic institutions to promote collective action and higher economic efficiency. Finally, the last essay offers an empirical alternative to unravel heterogeneous unobserved traits on credit market customers. Through the use of mixture density estimation methods and rich administrative data, it identifies different quality-types of clients for credit demand and default decisions. Credit customers differ in their individual preferences, as well as levels of foresight, strategic behavior; all unobserved by the principal (lender). Accounting for these unobserved traits improves the forecast of potential clients' behavior and offers alternatives for different contracts and risk-pricing strategies to reduce credit rationing.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectPublic goodsen
dc.subjectreplicationen
dc.subjectlab experimentsen
dc.subjectdemocratic institutionsen
dc.subjectunobserved preferencesen
dc.subjectcredit rationingen
dc.subjectcredit scoring.en
dc.titleUncovering Economic Behavior in Heterogeneous Institutional Environments: Three Essays in Applied and Experimental Economicsen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.departmentEconomicsen
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen
thesis.degree.grantorTexas A & M Universityen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberEckel, Catherine
dc.contributor.committeeMemberVedenov, Dmitry
dc.type.materialtexten
dc.date.updated2015-10-29T19:43:53Z
local.embargo.terms2017-08-01
local.etdauthor.orcid0000-0002-1143-3878


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