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dc.contributor.advisorDawson, Joseph G.
dc.creatorHawkins, John Michael
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-16T20:06:40Z
dc.date.available2015-08-01T05:48:26Z
dc.date.created2013-08
dc.date.issued2013-07-12
dc.date.submittedAugust 2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151185
dc.description.abstractExcessive unobserved firepower expenditures by Allied forces during the Vietnam War defied the traditional counterinsurgency principle that population protection should be valued more than destruction of the enemy. Many historians have pointed to this discontinuity in their arguments, but none have examined the available firepower records in detail. This study compiles and analyzes available, artillery-related U.S. and Allied archival records to test historical assertions about the balance between conventional and counterinsurgent military strategy as it changed over time. It finds that, between 1965 and 1970, the commanders of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams, shared significant continuity of strategic and tactical thought. Both commanders tolerated U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Allied unobserved firepower at levels inappropriate for counterinsurgency and both reduced Army harassment and interdiction fire (H&I) as a response to increasing budgetary pressure. Before 1968, the Army expended nearly 40 percent of artillery ammunition as H&I – a form of unobserved fire that sought merely to hinder enemy movement and to lower enemy morale, rather than to inflict any appreciable enemy casualties. To save money, Westmoreland reduced H&I, or “interdiction” after a semantic name change in February 1968, to just over 29 percent of ammunition expended in July 1968, the first full month of Abrams’ command. Abrams likewise pursued dollar savings with his “Five-by-Five Plan” of August 1968 that reduced Army artillery interdiction expenditures to nearly ten percent of ammunition by January 1969. Yet Abrams allowed Army interdiction to stabilize near this level until early 1970, when recurring financial pressure prompted him to virtually eliminate the practice. Meanwhile, Marines fired H&I at historically high rates into the final months of 1970 and Australian “Harassing Fire” surpassed Army and Marine Corps totals during the same period. South Vietnamese artillery also fired high rates of H&I, but Filipino and Thai artillery eschewed H&I in quiet areas of operation and Republic of Korea [ROK] forces abandoned H&I in late 1968 as a direct response to MACV’s budgetary pressure. Financial pressure, rather than strategic change, drove MACV’s unobserved firepower reductions during the Vietnam War.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.subject11th marinesen
dc.subject12th marinesen
dc.subjectabramsen
dc.subjectair forceen
dc.subjectallieden
dc.subjectamerican way of waren
dc.subjectammunitionen
dc.subjectarmyen
dc.subjectartilleryen
dc.subjectattritionen
dc.subjectarvnen
dc.subjectaustralianen
dc.subjectb-52en
dc.subjectbirtleen
dc.subjectbudgeten
dc.subjectcapen
dc.subjectceaen
dc.subjectclassicalen
dc.subjectclausewitzen
dc.subjectclifforden
dc.subjectcoled-ven
dc.subjectcollinsen
dc.subjectcommunisten
dc.subjectcongressen
dc.subjectconstraintsen
dc.subjectconventionalen
dc.subjectcounter-batteryen
dc.subjectcounterinsurgencyen
dc.subjectdollaren
dc.subjectexpendituresen
dc.subjectfilipinoen
dc.subjectfinancesen
dc.subjectfire supporten
dc.subjectfirepoweren
dc.subjectfive-by-fiveen
dc.subjectfree world militaryen
dc.subjectfwmafen
dc.subjecth&ien
dc.subjecthainesen
dc.subjectharolden
dc.subjectharrassmenten
dc.subjecthunten
dc.subjecthybriden
dc.subjectinterdictionen
dc.subjectjohnsonen
dc.subjectkalergisen
dc.subjectkomeren
dc.subjectkoreanen
dc.subjectkrepinevichen
dc.subjectlairden
dc.subjectleonard tayloren
dc.subjectlewyen
dc.subjectlyndonen
dc.subjectmacven
dc.subjectmarinesen
dc.subjectmcnamaraen
dc.subjectmekongen
dc.subjectnaglen
dc.subjectnew zealanden
dc.subjectnixonen
dc.subjectnvaen
dc.subjectobserveden
dc.subjectoperationsen
dc.subjectphilippineen
dc.subjectpreemptiveen
dc.subjectpreparatoryen
dc.subjectresoren
dc.subjectrestrainten
dc.subjectriverineen
dc.subjectroken
dc.subjectsavingsen
dc.subjectsensorsen
dc.subjectsorleyen
dc.subjectsouth vietnameseen
dc.subjectstrategyen
dc.subjectsummersen
dc.subjecttacticsen
dc.subjectthaien
dc.subjectthird countryen
dc.subjecttrinityen
dc.subjectunconventionalen
dc.subjectunobserveden
dc.subjectusarven
dc.subjectvan fleeten
dc.subjectviet congen
dc.subjectvietnamen
dc.subjectwestmorelanden
dc.subjectwheeleren
dc.subjectwise menen
dc.titleThe Limits of Fire Support: American Finances and Firepower Restraint during the Vietnam Waren
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.departmentHistoryen
thesis.degree.disciplineHistoryen
thesis.degree.grantorTexas A & M Universityen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberAdams, R.J.Q.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberAnderson, Terry H.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBradford, James C.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberHermann, Charles
dc.type.materialtexten
dc.date.updated2013-12-16T20:06:40Z
local.embargo.terms2015-08-01


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