GRAMSCI, THEORY, AND MODERNITY:
A HISTORICAL-CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO ANTONIO GRAMSCI’S
CONCEPTION OF RACE, SEX, CULTURE, AND POLITICS

A Dissertation

by

ROBERT F. CARLEY

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2012

Major Subject: Sociology
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Approved by:

Chair of Committee, Joseph O. Jewell
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ABSTRACT

Gramsci, Theory, and Modernity:

A Historical-Contextual Approach to Antonio Gramsci’s Conception of Race, Sex, Culture, and Politics. (May 2012)

Robert Carley, B.A., Rutgers University;
M.A.I.S., George Mason University

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Joseph O. Jewell

The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact that historical (and cultural) contexts have on the production of theories and concepts. In specific, I am interested in the relationship between historical and cultural contexts and the production of theoretical knowledge. I define historical periods in theory as modernist and an “after-modern” context, which comprises poststructuralism, postmodernism and post-Marxism. My case is the life and work of Antonio Gramsci; a “classical theorist” whose work remains salient across the social sciences and humanities. I hypothesize that in order to understand the historiography of knowledge in the social sciences, from the classical period to the present, significant points of “departure” in theory (e.g. Gramsci, Marxism, psychoanalysis, feminism) need to be viewed contextually. By extension, a better way to fully understand Gramsci’s insights, and their endurance, for the study of race, sexuality, culture and politics is to situate his methodology, theories, and concepts historically. In the dissertation propose two ways to test this hypothesis:

1. I provide an historically grounded interpretation of Gramsci’s political thinking (a orienting place for much of Gramsci’s thought) which includes, for example, changes
in his perspective about the strategic role of specific political groups, e.g. social
movement organizations, in achieving political goals;

2. I embed his theoretical and conceptual framework within the theoretical discourses
prevalent during his time, which would include, for example, the rise and
predominance of Italian positivist criminology as a racial discourse.

I also hypothesize that in this case, such an interpretation is necessary to fully and
accurately understand the potential contribution of Gramsci’s theoretical framework to
contemporary theoretical discourses in both the social sciences and humanities-based
disciplines.

This dissertation is organized around the following sets of questions. My originating
question, which establishes the analytical framework for the dissertation, is:
What impact does historical (and cultural) contexts have on the production of theories and
concepts? As it pertains to my specific case, the life and work of Antonio Gramsci, I sharpen
the point by asking: In the context of the originating research question, In what ways have
the historical (and cultural) contexts effected the production of theories and concepts in
Gramsci’s work?

This dissertation represents a contribution to the sociology of ideas as well as to
classical theory by providing a new lens through which to look at the early contributions of
sociological knowledge. Further, each individual section—which represents explorations of
specific theoretical rubrics—may lead to contributions within these distinct areas.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to two people:

My daughter, Ayira, who came into my and my partner Shona’s life at the conclusion of the first draft of this dissertation and who will no doubt be the subject of many more dedications of all kinds.

John J. McDermott who made a home for me within the space of an institution (not an easy thing to do) and carried that home with him, wherever he went, in case he bumped into me.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I want to thank Dr. Joseph O. Jewell, my committee chair, who was generous with his time, intellect, and spirit and to whom I owe an enormous debt of gratitude. I also want to thank my dissertation committee: Dr. Sarah N. Gatson, Dr. Robert Mackin and Dr. John J. McDermott who not only provided valuable criticism to me during the course of writing my dissertation and in my dissertation defense but who were also supportive, sensitive, and extremely considerate.

Many other people have looked at earlier drafts of these sections, some so early that they could not be taken for the sections that appear here, but I want to thank the following people in particular: Roger Lancaster (George Mason University), Pablo Castagno (Universidad Nacional de La Matanza, Argentina), Paul Almeida (Texas A&M University/University of California, Merced), Bob Griffin (Texas A&M University). I also want to thank participants in the National Communication Association Pre-conference seminar, “Revolutionary Voices: Marxism, Communication and Social Change,” specifically, Steven Macek, Dan Berger, Marco Briziarelli, and Andreas Ytterstad for their comments on sections of my last section and support for my work.

Finally, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my colleague and close friend Christopher Michael Sutch, who proofread the entire dissertation and who absolutely let me know when there were problems but also was extraordinarily supportive and let me know when there were important insights. Chris, I can’t thank you enough.

Lastly, I want to thank my loving partner, Shona Jackson, who is a saint for putting up with me, stubborn and deeply imperfect person that I am.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact that historical (and cultural) contexts have on the production of theories and concepts. In specific, I am interested in the relationship between historical and cultural contexts and the production of theoretical knowledge. I define historical periods in theory as modernist and an “after-modern” context, which comprises poststructuralism, postmodernism and post-Marxism. My case is the life and work of Antonio Gramsci; a “classical theorist” whose work remains salient across the social sciences and humanities. I hypothesize that in order to understand the historiography of knowledge in the social sciences, from the classical period to the present, significant points of “departure” in theory (e.g. Gramsci, Marxism, psychoanalysis, feminism) need to be viewed contextually. By extension, a better way to fully understand Gramsci’s insights, and their endurance, for the study of race, sexuality, culture and politics is to situate his methodology, theories, and concepts historically. In the dissertation propose two ways to test this hypothesis:

1. I provide an historically grounded interpretation of Gramci’s political thinking (a orienting place for much of Gramsci’s thought) which includes, for example, changes in his perspective about the strategic role of specific political groups, e.g. social movement organizations, in achieving political goals;

2. I embed his theoretical and conceptual framework within the theoretical discourses prevalent during his time, which would include, for example, the rise and predominance of Italian positivist criminology as a racial discourse.

This dissertation follows the style of Sociological Theory.
I also hypothesize that in this case, such an interpretation is necessary to fully and accurately understand the potential contribution of Gramsci’s theoretical framework to contemporary theoretical discourses in both the social sciences and humanities-based disciplines. For instance, it is impossible to understand Gramsci’s perspective on race without understanding the intellectual historiography of racial concepts during the time that he wrote. Although I am not the first person to claim that Gramsci’s intellectual production, including his methodology, requires a deeper historical investigation my original research investigates this claim in relation to the rubrics of race, sexuality, culture and agency, and politics—specifically with regard to power, ideology, and the role of intellectuals (regarding the problem of grounding, historically, theoretical and methodological interpretations of Gramsci’s work including historiography, political theory, hegemony, and global capitalism see: Femia 1981; Buttigeig 1990; Morera 1990; Bellamy and Darrow 1993; Morera 2000; Ghosh 2001; Morton 2007; McNally 2008). Each of these rubrics, to which Gramsci has contributed, have either not been explored or are underexplored.

1.1 Research Questions

The dissertation will contain six sections in all, including this introduction. Each section will contain an interdependent focusing question. I will present the focusing questions by section. In the second section of the dissertation, my argument will represent a response to the following set of focusing questions: Where do we situate Gramsci’s work (in the historical, cultural, and national or regional context) with regard to theoretical discourses on race in the social sciences? In what ways does Gramsci’s historical materialist or Marxist perspective limit or expand his conceptual framework into postmodern contexts?
In the third section of the dissertation, my argument will represent a response to the following set of focusing questions: Where do we situate Gramsci’s work (in the historical, cultural, and national or regional context) with regard to theoretical discourses on gender and sexuality in the social sciences? In what ways does Gramsci’s historical materialist or Marxist perspective, specifically with regard to labor rationalization and the organization of economic production limit or expand his conceptual framework into postmodern contexts?

In the fourth section of the dissertation, my argument will represent a response to the following set of focusing questions: Where do we situate Gramsci’s work within the classical philosophical and sociological tradition as it pertains to habits/habitus, perception, apperception, and the category of ontology?

In the fifth section of the dissertation, my argument will represent a response to the following set of focusing questions: How do the theoretical presumptions that inform the study of social movements enable or limit the relationship to classical sociological theories in Gramsci’s case: factory councils, political parties, and revolutionary movements?

In the sixth and final section of the dissertation, my argument will represent a response to the following set of focusing questions (Building off of section 5) What aspects of Gramsci’s work are applicable to/offer insights not explored in the contemporary analysis of social movements? How can Gramsci’s ideas regarding ideology and intellectuals effect or transform theoretical presumptions inherent to the contemporary study of social movements?

This dissertation represents a contribution to the sociology of ideas as well as to classical theory by providing a new lens through which to look at the early contributions of sociological knowledge. Further, each individual section—which represents explorations of specific theoretical rubrics—may lead to contributions within these distinct areas.
1.2 Methods and Data

My methodological approach is contextualism. A contextualist working within the new sociology of ideas and analyzing theoretical discourse both historically and culturally neither assumes that theoretical perspectives come without baggage nor that theoretical perspectives are inherently useful because they explain empirical effects: According to Jones (1986), Camic (1995), Strenski (1997) Abbot (1999) and Camic and Gross (2001) one of the central assumptions of the new sociology of ideas is the importance of contextual methodologies:

… the proper way to read an historical text is as an historical product in which the actual intentions of the author should be our principal guide as to why the text took the particular form it did. To understand these intentions, contextualists argue further that texts must be situated in the immediate contexts where they were produced…(Camic and Gross 2001: 246).

I hope to demonstrate in the following dissertation that by understanding context as both limitation and potential, the contribution to the discipline goes beyond the historiography of the study itself; it allows a researcher to perceive new areas where a theory, concept, or analytical framework may be updated and reinserted into rubric to explain persistently problematic empirical effects.

In my dissertation I do not make the following four assumptions about knowledge (what follows would be in line with a contextualist approach):

1. A theory, concept, or a set of analytical guidelines is useful simply because it fits (explains) the data;
2. A theory, concept, or a set of analytical guidelines should be used because it is predominant within the discourse of a specific rubric;

3. Sociological knowledge only develops in one way: data collection, data analysis, findings and conclusions;

4. Reflection on the historiography of the discipline’s influences in unimportant or of secondary importance to locating and studying new social phenomena or revisiting contemporary phenomena.

In order to demonstrate the importance of context (and to establish a thick historical and context) I rely on data from the following sources: Gramsci’s *prison notebooks* in the context of his *personal correspondences; biographies* of Gramsci’s life as well as the Italian Communist Party; *historical studies* of the context in which Gramsci wrote; *interlocutors* in contemporaneous theoretical discourses.

Regarding my case and my claim above that there are potential theoretical contributions to areas within the social sciences in each of these sections, this research is important because Gramsci’s theoretical insights, with regard to ideology, power, and culture are distinctive and remain under discussion today across many rubrics and disciplines (Buttigeig 2007). In other words, Gramsci’s relevance to the social sciences and humanistic disciplines remains strong and is also extensive, i.e. trans-disciplinary. So as this dissertation project is intended to engage with the new sociology of ideas it also, necessarily, engages with a persistent scholarship on Gramsci.

1.3 Review of Literature

Most recently, Gramsci’s insights into culture and language have been the subject of readers and single-authored books (Ives 2004; Ives and Lacorte 2010; Mayo 2010).
Gramsci’s insights about the hegemony and the balance of power, through his conception of hegemony and the dialectical relationship between coercion and consent, have influenced studies in globalization and international political economy (IPE) (Morton 2007; Jessop 2007). In this vein, Gramsci’s work has inspired an entire “school” of studies in international relations dubbed the “Italian School” which paved the way for the later work in IPE and globalization studies (Cox 1987; Augelli and Murphy 1988; Gill 1990; Rapkin 1990; Burnham 1991; Gill 1993; Murphy 1994; Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Rupert 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Robinson 1996).

In the 1980s and 1990s Gramsci’s work was central to cultural studies and the political platform of the “new left” in Europe. It was brought to prominence primarily through the work of Stuart Hall (1982, 1986, 1992, see also Hall, Lumley and McLennan 1977) who, prior to and during the 80s, maintained his role as an intellectual central to the British new-left a group that was also instrumental in interpreting Gramsci’s work in light of the phenomenon of Eurocommunism (Anderson 1976; Carrillo 1978; Nairn 1980a, 1980b; Boggs 1984). Hall also contributed to post-Marxist theoretical discourses to which Gramsci’s work was also central (Hall, Lumley and McLennan 1977; Mouffe 1979a, 1979b; Laclau and Mouffe 1985 Holub 1992). After the appearance of Quentin Hoare and Jeffrey Nowell Smith’s abridged edition of Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks* (1971) and Valentino Gerratana’s unabridged critical Italian edition (1975) several important books, both single authored and edited volumes, were published to explicate Gramsci’s contribution to the political and social sciences (Buci-Glucksmann 1978; Mouffe 1979b; Adamson 1980; Femia 1981; Sassoon 1981).

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1 In reflecting on the early and middle years of cultural studies in Britain, Europe, and the U.S. Hall stated that Gramsci’s work had, “radically displaced some of the inheritances of Marxism in cultural studies” (Hall 1992: 281). See, also, Chris Rojek’s claim that, “Antonio Gramsci is the principal intellectual influence on Stuart Hall's thought and approach to cultural analysis.” (2003: 108).
1982; Sassoon 1984; Morera 1990; Bellamy and Darrow 1993; Crehan 2002). John Cammett’s *Bibliografia Gramsciana*, currently contains approximately 14,500 entries published in 33 languages between 1922-2001. There is a solid and growing body of literature surrounding Gramsci’s work. The interpretation of, debates around, and uses of Gramsci’s work represents an ongoing project in social-science and humanistic-based disciplines today with sources and citations being added to the *Bibliografia Gramsciana* on a regular basis.

In conclusion, each section of the dissertation represents an exploration of concepts within Gramsci’s work that have been traditionally under or unexplored. Each section seeks to ground Gramsci’s political perspectives (i.e. theoretical presumptions) and his theoretical discourse within history. Hence, each section represents an exploratory study of concepts and is intended as an individual contribution to the respective fields with which it engages. The contributions of this dissertation are intended to be theoretical. The last section represents an attempt to develop an explicit model for political theory, grounded in Gramsci’s conceptual framework that can be tested and which I intend to test in another study. But such a study falls beyond the scope of this dissertation.
2. CONJUNCTURE AS A CONCEPTUAL MEDIATION IN STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL THEORIES OF RACE: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF GRAMSCI'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO RACE AND ETHNICITY

The goal of this section is to investigate why Gramsci’s theories and concepts have a discrete relevance to the study of race and ethnicity in contemporary contexts. My hypothesis is that, during the time that he lived, Gramsci did not enter into the positivist and modernist discursive framework on race (and nationalism) that looked to biological features for evidence to explain and interpret the cultural and sociological expressions of racial difference. Since this is the case, race and difference for Gramsci can and should be linked to a modified historical materialist framework. As a result, Gramsci understood race and difference as imbedded in questions concerning the historical and political transformations that inform praxis (mobilization). Consequently, race and difference do inform Gramsci’s theoretical perspective. Evidence of this is rooted in his transformation from a “southernist” perspective to a constructivist and culturalist perspective and, furthermore, is linked to his transformation from a scholar to an activist and from a socialist to a communist. The latter shift, from socialist to communist, forced Gramsci to consider the role of racial difference in cultural and political contexts.

In specific, Gramsci’s questions concerning the application of historical materialism to political action result in his criticism and disavowal of modernist and positivist biological perspectives on race. More specifically, the link between race and nationalism, which were instrumental in configuring fascist and modernist Italian discourses on race, criminality, and nationalism, as well as similar European and American discourses, presented a singular problem for Gramsci’s politics. Gramsci understood how both race and difference are
configured at the national and political level as instrumental to the state determining national belonging. As Stuart Hall points out, Gramsci resists all homogenizing tendencies in theoretical discourses on race. He is more interested in explaining how the configurations of racial and ethnic difference and how the (scientific) justifications for these differences affect class formations (Hall 1986). This is because Gramsci sought to analyze class as a fact, as empirical his primary interest is to understand and develop a process through which workers and peasants from different regions in Italy can be unified and mobilized to, in part, combat “scientific” justifications for racial ideologies (Verdicchio 1995). By investigating fragments of Gramsci’s writing on race—in his letters and occasional essays—I hope to demonstrate why Gramsci’s discourse on race challenges and exceeds the biologically-based paradigm prevalent (not just in Italy but in modern industrial Western countries) in modernist and positivist discourses on race and nation in the early part of the 20th century. In summary, I am interested in why (and not how, as in the case of Stuart Hall) it is that Gramsci’s work informs contemporary analyses of race, given that during the period in which he wrote most scholarly conceptions of race (with the possible exception of certain anthropological conceptions [McKee 1993]) were rooted in biological, socio-biological, and criminological approaches.

As stated in my introductory first section, the goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact that historical (and cultural) contexts have on the production of theories and concepts. In specific, I am interested in the relationship between historical and cultural contexts and the production of theoretical knowledge. In this case, I seek to demonstrate how the relationship between “scientific” theories of race and Gramsci’s empiricism—which is focused on issues of political mobilization and class formations—are not a mere reflection of
(Marxist) class analysis but, rather, are a negotiation of a complex historical and cultural-national context and, moreover, that this negotiation produced a discourse that can account for significant variation within social, political, and cultural formations.

In this section I make a series of methodological assumptions that are in-line with historical contextualism in my approach to the analysis of data from Gramsci’s personal correspondences (Jones 1986; Camic 1995; Strenski 1997; Abbot 1999; Camic and Gross 2001).

1. Historical texts are historical products;
2. The actual intentions of the author (to the extent that we can explain and interpret them) should be our principal guide as to why the text took the particular form it did;
3. The imminent contexts in which these text were produced must be analyzed it is around this analysis that a theoretical framework may be constructed.

This section will be broken into sub-sections. In the first sub-section, I will introduce Stuart Hall’s description of how Gramsci’s theories and concepts are relevant to the study of race and ethnicity. I will then link Hall’s description—through an investigation of Hall’s research and writing on race (1978; 1980; 1986; 2009)—to an exploration of the specific concepts in Gramsci’s work that contribute to Hall’s assumptions. In the second sub-section, I will investigate why Gramsci’s concepts are relevant through a discursive and textual analysis of specific contributions made by Gramsci. The importance of conducting such an analysis is twofold. First, an analysis of Gramsci’s theories will enable me to specify the extent and the limitations of Gramsci’s contribution to analyses of race and ethnicity. Second, by contextualizing Gramsci’s work both epistemologically and historically, I will be able to demonstrate the sui generis nature of Gramsci’s claims regarding race and ethnicity.
during the time that he wrote. In the third and final sub-section I will conclude by discussing the ramifications of my investigation for theories of race in the context of the social sciences and humanities.

2.1. How Gramsci is Relevant to the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Contextualizing Stuart Hall, the Politics of Race, Racism, and Racialization, and the Problem of Cultural and Structural Analyses

In “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity” (1986) Stuart Hall discusses a specific theoretical problem that is central to his studies of race and racism. The problem is: how can one link structural (economic-based) theories of racism to cultural theories of racism? This problem is not unique to Hall, however it has been central from his earliest studies of national racial formations in *Policing the Crisis* (1978) through to his reflections upon the role that culture, representation, and identification play in the politics of structural transformation (Hall and Back 2009). “Gramsci’s Relevance” is a significant paper precisely because it introduces avenues through which to explore the connections between structural and cultural explanations of racism. These avenues had been explored in previous studies by Hall (1978; 1980), using Gramsci’s work as a theoretical and methodological guideline. So, as the title suggests, “Gramsci’s Relevance” poses a meta-theoretical question, requiring a separate consideration, which arises from Hall’s prior work. The question is: how is Gramsci’s work relevant to the study of race and ethnicity? Again, this question emerges after Hall had already effectively used aspects of Gramsci’s work, but in this specific paper Hall seeks to move between both structural and cultural models of race theory without allowing one model to supersede the other. “Gramsci’s Relevance” then is an attempt to
“sketch,” as Hall states, the ways in which Gramsci allows for these multiple approaches to race within a single framework.

What, however, is the problem as Hall sees it? In a study of race and labor in South Africa, Hall introduces the nature of the problem:

If the first tendency (structural) is broadly correct, then what is often experienced and analyzed as ethnic or racial conflicts are really manifestations of deeper, economic contradictions. It is, therefore, to the latter that the politics of transformations must essentially be addressed. The second tendency (cultural) draws attention to the actual forms and dynamic of political conflict and social tension in such societies—which frequently assume a racial or ethnic character. It points to the empirical difficulty of subsuming these directly into more classical economic conflicts. But if ethnic relations are not reducible to economic relations, then the former will not necessarily change if and when the latter do (Hall 1980: 18-19).

Subsequent to this passage, Hall makes the point that the nature of this problem is strategic more than it is theoretical. One could also argue that the problem is inherently theoretical. The potential point of contact between structural theories of race and cultural theories of race is inherently distant due, primarily, to how one conceives of the empirical basis for each of the theories. Although both theories look at forms of racial and ethnic conflict the scope of each—the structural and the cultural—cannot be joined at the conceptual level without compromising analysis and explanation of either one. As Hall states, because reducing

\[\text{2 Put succinctly: one may believe that racial discrimination can best be understood as a result of socio economic status, education, occupational compartmentalization, structural mobility, geographical segregation, and a host of other variables. Or, one may believe that racial discrimination is best understood by interviewing people about their experiences with racism. The object of both analyses is race; the presumptions and data that inform these studies are inherently different. More to the point, this problem is endemic in the social sciences. For an interesting discussion of the history of the politics of race and class, caste and economics in sociological analysis see McKee 1993, especially chapter 4.}\]
cultural theories of race into more classical economic frameworks begs the question of why it
is necessary to analyze the cultural aspects of racial and ethnic conflict (since the
presumption of this approach is that the ultimate determinant lies within the economic
structure), and because the economic structure tells us nothing about the content of these
racial and ethnic conflicts (since it requires recourse to another logic of conflict altogether),
the problem remains strategic. Which is to say that one must choose between either the
structural or the cultural approach and that choice is based on a belief (presumption) that the
seat of these conflicts (relations) is best explored through culture, rather than structure, or
vice versa.

In “Gramsci’s Relevance,” Hall finds a partial solution to bridge the theoretical and
conceptual distance between structural and cultural approaches to the analysis of race. This,
in no small part, is how Gramsci’s theories and concepts are relevant to the analysis of race
and ethnicity. In the final section of “Gramsci’s Relevance” Hall describes eight specific
ways that Gramsci can make a solid contribution to the analysis of race and ethnicity. These
eight points offer what Hall describes, earlier in the essay, as theoretically sophisticated ways
to mediate the conceptual distance between structure and culture. The eight points address
the following (in order): 1. Historical specificity; 2. National characteristics; 3. The
interrelationship between class and race; 4. The “class subject;” 5. The (lack) of
correspondence between structure, and class, political, and ideological dimensions; 6. The
state; 7. Culture; 8. Ideology. In each of these sections, Hall describes Gramsci’s theoretical
sophistication; it arises from out of Gramsci’s attention to empirical details. So, a large part
of what Hall means by sophistication refers to Gramsci’s ability to describe historical detail
and political impacts in relationship to the flexibility of his theoretical approach. According
to Hall, this flexibility is rooted within a Marxist framework (Hall 2003[1974]). In his 2009 interview with Les Black, Hall links the methodological framework explored in Karl Marx’s *Grundrisse* (1973[1857]) to Gramsci’s ability to discern and interpret events within a broad theoretical approach. Hall refers to Gramsci’s ability to analyze discrete events as “conjunctural understanding” (Hall and Black 2009: 664).

The power of Gramsci’s analysis, for Hall, is rooted in the modifications that Gramsci makes to a general “historical materialist” approach. These modifications are necessary to explain transformations in both Italian history and Italian politics: Gramsci’s object of analysis. Hall’s overarching argument is that a historical materialist framework, upon closer inspection and taking account of its theoretical and methodological goals (as laid out in the *Grundrisse*) must be fundamentally open to transformation in ways that differentiate it from classical philosophical and social science modes of analysis. Regarding the Marxist method and its epistemological foundations as a departure from both philosophical and social scientific approaches, Hall states that,

> It remains an “open” epistemology, not a self-generating or self-sufficient one, because its “scientificity” is guaranteed only by that “fit” between thought and reality – each in its own mode – which produces a knowledge which “appropriates” reality in the only way that it can (in the head): and yet delivers a critical method capable of penetrating behind the phenomenal forms of society to the hidden movements, the deep-structure “real relations” which lie behind them. This “scientific” appropriation of the laws and tendencies of the structure of a social formation is, then, *also* the law and tendency of its “passing away”: the possibility, not of the proof, but of the *realization* of knowledge in practice, in its practical resolution – and thus, the self-
conscious overthrow of those relations in a class struggle which moves along the axis of society’s contradictory tendencies, and which is something more than “merely speculative”, more than a theoretical speculation. Here, as Colletti has remarked, we are no longer dealing with “the relationship ‘thought-being’ within thought, but rather with the relation between thought and reality” (42) (Hall 2003[1974]: 137).

On the one hand, unlike certain aspects of idealism and moralism (Kant) or historicism (Hegel) with regard to philosophical justifications and imperatives regarding reality, for Hall an historical materialist framework is open to transformations in reality so that it can generate knowledge. This does not mean that those other approaches are not valuable. However, philosophical systems, when geared toward explaining events, cannot be self-sufficient or they risk replacing analysis with platitudes.

On the other hand, where social science focuses upon proving and explaining either the existence or function of specific types of relations in a societal context, the scientific and empirical aspects of a historical materialist approach offer recourse to a deeper and more differentiated form of empiricism. One could argue that historical materialism is not a “science” in the sense that it’s very raison d’etre is based in a value judgment with regard to class and, more broadly, with regard to oppression, exploitation, equality and freedom. However, social sciences, which both precede and follow this form of analysis and explanation, presume these values, although it is often the case that they remain both hidden in and inherent to the overall reason for constituting a research question. However, it is precisely because inferences about the current state of society are disconnected from method (if not rendered entirely invisible) in the genesis of questions and subsequently theories and methods that—during the time in which Gramsci lived—positivism contributed to scientific
justifications for racism and fascism whether we are referring to Lombroso or Ferri (with regard to criminology and racism), Mosca or Pareto (with regard to fascism and the social sciences).

Hall demonstrates that the impetus for historical materialism is an analysis of class relations as well as all facets of social organization that contribute to a full understanding of class. This is because the principle of societal organization and differentiation that is central to the current historical formation, according to historical materialism, is class (Hall 2003[1974]; Hall 2009). By analyzing the key contradictions that produce the central dissonance between what a society purports to be and what it is (i.e. “penetrating behind the phenomenal forms of society to the hidden movements, the deep-structure ‘real relations’ which lie behind them”) historical materialism represents the path often not taken or the hard road between theory and empiricism (Therborn 1985; Burawoy 1989). In short, this route represents the ability of theory to mediate between historical, cultural, and political events and the structural contexts, which both make these events possible and constrain the ability of other events to occur. This brings us back to the problem of explaining the significance of racism and the structures that facilitate racial oppression.

It is precisely because Hall takes this approach seriously that he refuses to consign it to an eschatological and teleological determinism (popular criticisms from its opponents), but, rather, seeks to include another category that introduces central societal contradictions: race. Central to Gramsci’s insights, according to Hall, is his attention to transformations at both the cultural and historical levels. Transformation is thematic to the eight points that, Hall states, emerge from the work of Antonio Gramsci. There are multiple points of transformation that, Hall argues, are enabled through Gramsci’s analysis. Gramsci connects
historical and cultural frameworks to structural transformations by analyzing discrete events
that he refers to as conjunctures (Gramsci 1971: 177; Hall 2009). At the level of the
conjuncture, both cultural (including political and historical) and structural transformations
can be analyzed and explained in relationship to one another. In other words, Gramsci is able
to breach the structural and cultural divide by developing a concept that provides a
methodological guideline for placing structural and cultural analysis in relationship to one
another.3

In brief, the conjuncture is a concept that pinpoints the historical, social, cultural, and
economic forces—at a given moment in time—which give expression to what may be
perceived as an anomaly or, as Gramsci puts it, “movements… which appear as occasional,
immediate, almost accidental” (1971: 177). The conjuncture is the locus of potential
transformation. The transformation is potential, because “the political forces which are
struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure
them, within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts (since no social
formation will ever admit that it has been superseded) form the terrain of the ‘conjunctural,’ and it is upon this
terrain that the forces of opposition organize. These forces seek to demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient
conditions already exist to make possible, and hence imperative, the accomplishment of certain historical tasks
(imperative, because any falling short before an historical duty increases the necessary disorder, and prepares
more serious catastrophes). (The demonstration in the last analysis only succeeds and is ‘true’ if it becomes a
new reality, if the forces of opposition triumph; in the immediate, it is developed in a series of ideological,
religious, philosophical, political, and juridical polemics, whose concreteness can be estimated by the extent to
which they are convincing, and shift the previously existing disposition of social forces)” (1971: 178). As it
relates to structure, “The conjuncture can be defined as the set of circumstances which determine the market in
a given phase, provided that these are conceived of as being in movement, i.e. as constituting a process of ever-
changing combinations, a process which is the economic cycle... In Italian the meaning of ‘favorable or
unfavorable economic situation (occasione)’ remains attached to the word ‘conjuncture.’... the conjuncture is
the set of immediate and ephemeral characteristics of the economic situation... Study of the conjuncture is thus
more closely linked to immediate politics, to ‘tactics’ and agitation...” (1971: 177).

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3 According to Gramsci, “in studying a structure, it is necessary to distinguish organic movements (relatively
permanent) from movements which may be termed ‘conjunctural’ (and which appear as occasional, immediate,
almost accidental)” (1971: 177). The importance of this distinction, for analysis, is as follows: “the political
forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure
them, within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts (since no social
formation will ever admit that it has been superseded) form the terrain of the ‘conjunctural,’ and it is upon this
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persistent efforts [since no social formation will ever admit that it has been superseded] form the terrain of the ‘conjunctural,’ and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organize…” [1971: 178]). The continuity sought by those who are in power, whose interest is in maintaining the extant political forces, i.e. the *status quo*, leads to a “modification” in the social forces that, in the conjuncture, disrupt—but are necessary to maintain—continuity. This leads Hall to specify how structure can be placed in a relationship to culture in such a way that both can be understood as linked, not causally, but asymmetrically since the conjuncture results in either continuity (in the form of modifications of social forces) or change.

In “Gramsci’s Relevance” Hall demonstrates how Gramsci’s insights change the way that we understand the relationship between structures that maintain racism through power but allow for modifications to racism. The issue is the specificity of analyses and what analyses tell us about social change and power. In the context of history, Hall explains that … these general features [of racism] are modified and transformed by the historical specificity of the contexts and environments in which they become active…. we would do well to operate at a more concrete, historicized level of abstraction (i.e., not racism in general but racisms)…. It is often little more than a gestural stance which persuades us to the misleading view that, because racism is everywhere a deeply anti-human and anti-social practice, that therefore it is everywhere the same—either in its forms, its relations to other structures and processes, or its effects. Gramsci does, I believe, help us to interrupt decisively this homogenization (Hall 1986: 23).

Most anti-racist theories of race, whether philosophical and phenomenological (e.g. Franz Fanon, Charles Mills, or Cornel West) or socio-structural (e.g. Joe Feagin), link the impetus
or cause to a singular historical event or a chain of events as in, for example, the emergence of “civilization” in Europe and its many forms of cultural contact or to a cognitive imperative as in, for example, the deep structure of consciousness as negation or violence (e.g. “othering”). Racialization and racism, in this discursive context, is rooted in asymmetries of power relations and expressions of racial power become rooted and stolid. This is not an incorrect perspective; however, it does not explain the transformations in the way that racism persistently reframes itself and the mechanics for this reframing. Moreover, it fails to perceive the structure as, itself, changing to maintain some continuity with power. The continuity with power is taken for granted: in this context, racism is racism. What is useful in Gramsci’s perspective is that while he acknowledges the anti-human and anti-social basis for racism (see especially his correspondences on Judaism [Gramsci 1975: 212-217]) he is able to analyze and explain the specific determinants and modification to racist practices with a greater acuity than both structural and phenomenological approaches that seek a root impetus or, in some cases, cause.

At this point, “Gramsci’s Relevance” shifts to a focus on the relationship between race and class: the root of Hall’s problematic raised in his study of labor rationalization in South Africa in “Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance” (1980). Hall focuses, specifically, on the conceptual distance between class and race (based in the divide between structural and cultural approaches), racial differentiations within the category of class and, lastly, on the problem of theoretical correspondence in analyzing both class and race. This is the centrality of Gramsci’s relevance to the analysis of race. As I have demonstrated, this is the central problematic for Hall: he reminds us that “the inter-relationship between class and race… has proved to be one of the most complex and difficult
theoretical problems to address, and it has frequently led to the adoption of one or another extreme positions” (1985: 24) he also restates the nature of the relationship between structural and cultural analysis more succinctly when he states that

… either one “privileges” the underlying class relationships, emphasizing that all ethnically and racially differentiated labor forces are subject to the same exploitative relationships within capital; or one emphasizes the centrality of ethnic and racial categories and divisions at the expense of the fundamental class structuring of society. Though these two extremes appear to be the polar opposites of one another, in fact, they are inverse, mirror-images of each other, in the sense that both feel required to produce a single and exclusive determining principle of articulation—class or race even if they disagree as to which should be accorded the privileged sign. I believe the fact that Gramsci adopts a non-reductive approach to questions of class, coupled with his understanding of the profoundly historical shaping to any specific social formation, does help to point the way towards a non-reductionist approach to the race/class question. (Hall 1986: 24)

In “Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance” (1980) Hall analyzes labor rationalization in South Africa. His findings raise significant issues in relation to this specific problem. He finds that though South Africa meets the conditions of an advanced capitalist society the forms of labor rationalization it depends upon require the presence of “unfree” or “forced” labor in combination with “free” labor. The assumption, of course, is that the fundamental requirement of capitalism and its juridical forms is that labor is “free” so that the laborer can alienate his or her labor power, i.e. is free to sell it as a commodity. This is not only the basis for most Marxist perspectives but, also, the juridical issue regarding
the transformation of labor into the commodity form marks the beginnings of theories of the state (for support of this claim see John Holloway and Sol Picciotto’s *State and Capital: A Marxist Debate* [1978]; for the original source see Evgeny Pashukanis’s *The General Theory of Law and Marxism* [1924]). Hall states that “whatever is the specific legal form with which capitalist development ‘corresponds,’ it must be one in which the concept of the juridical ‘contract’ between ‘free persons’ appears, which can legally regulate the forms of contract which ‘free labor’ require” (Hall 1980: 44). The persistence of unfree labor, despite the enormous disadvantages to capital accumulation in South Africa, is based in a racial economy whereby race is the central determinant for social organization in an advanced capitalist society and not class. Hall says that although there is proof that this affects the economy within South Africa negatively he also points out that this case introduces a sociological question that requires more concerted theorization. More importantly, he indicates that the dissolution of Western colonial enterprises and the long duration of revolutions and declarations of post colonial, national independence are producing formations of racially differentiated labor across the globe that are the rule and not the exception. As a result, the materialist premise regarding the indispensability of free labor to a fully functioning capitalist economy is not wrong; however Hall explains further that

… this does not mean that the tendency to combine capitalism with “free labor” cannot, under specific historical conditions be cross-cut or countermanded by a counteracting tendency: namely, the possibility of certain of the conditions of existence of capitalism being effectively secured by combining “free labor” with certain forms of “unfree” or “forced” labor. Once we move away from European to post-Conquest or post-colonial societies, this combination—free and “unfree” labor,
on the basis of a combination of different modes of production—becomes more and more the paradigm case. (Hall 1980: 331).

Hall is fundamentally in agreement with the Marxist materialist premise that *the conditions most favorable to* the accumulation of capital, realized by increasing its capacity for concentration and centralization with the aid of the nation state, remain unchanged. However, also central to the materialist premise is the commodification of all goods and services including labor power. However, in this case, securing the conditions for capital accumulation relies on an uneven combination of “free” and “unfree” or “forced” labor. In short the level of highest abstraction in Marx’s economic theory enters a “conjuncture” where a counteracting historical tendency (the introduction of forms of labor that do not benefit capital accumulation—in theory) are necessary to ensure the continuity of capital accumulation at the nation-state level. More to the point, “unfree” and “forced” labor is precisely the labor of groups, within the modern nation-state, that have been racialized within changing national-social formations. The challenge that is posed here has to do with the uniformity (free labor) of labor power as a condition necessary to the general law of value within Marxist frameworks.

This raises issues of the correspondence between theory and reality as well as the explanation of historical contingencies that do not fit neatly within theoretical frameworks (Marxism) that retain explanatory power despite the seeming anomaly of “unfree” or “forced” labor. Contingency, of course, is designed to address these anomalies. Specifically regarding the composition of classes within modern capitalist frameworks, the interrelation between race and class, and the correspondence between theory and reality Hall finds affinity with Gramsci’s perspective.
He never makes the mistake of believing, that, because the general law of value has the tendency to homogenize labor power across the capitalist epoch, that therefore, in any concrete society, this homogenization can be assumed to exist. Indeed, I believe Gramsci’s whole approach leads us to question the validity of this general law in its traditional form, since, precisely, it has encouraged us to neglect the ways in which the law of value, operating on a global as opposed to a merely domestic scale, operates through and because of the culturally specific character of labor power, rather than—as the classical theory would have us believe—by systematically eroding those distinctions as an inevitable part of a world-wide, epochal historical tendency…. Capital can preserve, adapt to its fundamental trajectory, harness and exploit these particularistic qualities of labor power, building them into its regimes. The ethnic and racial structuration of the labor force, like its gendered composition, may provide an inhibition to the rationalistically-conceived “global” tendencies of capitalist development. And yet, these distinctions have been maintained, and indeed developed and refined, in the global expansion of the capitalist mode. (Hall 1986: 24)

In the context of Hall’s subsequent study, “Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance” (1980) the problem of classes representing units of analysis linked to the value form as free labor—as commodities—is disrupted by the reality of what Hall refers to, above, as labor rendered through culturally specific forms (which include race, class, and nationalism). In these instances it is the forces of capital accumulation that adjust the social structure to exploit these cultural differences. These differences differentiate labor power in the interest of exploitation. This maintains the Marxist materialist premise—with regard to the law of value and the rate of exploitation in specific; however, these modifications to
regimes of accumulations signal a conjuncture. The conjuncture is analyzed by Hall on the national level, but Hall is able to raise this example to a greater level of abstraction in a postcolonial and emergent global context where the racialization of labor and cultural differences become the *sine qua non* of historical transformations with regard to the maintenance of power and social structure in the context of modern capitalist states. The issue of empiricism in relationship to abstract levels of theory is addressed, through Gramsci’s work, by conceptualizing this “conjuncture” as an attempt to modify transformations in the global landscape of capital accumulation in the context of postcolonial and (in the context of modernization and development in Latin America) postimperial nation states.

Finally, understanding transformations within labor rationalization and regimes of accumulation in an emergent global context depend upon differentiating the correctness of the materialist perspective from the structural fact of the differentiation of forms of labor. Hall finds that it is through Gramsci’s conceptualization of conjunctures as both seemingly anomalous but as producing structural stabilization and continuity that we can understand the interrelation of culture, race, and structure in new and important ways. These conjunctures or moments, unrecognized by structural and cultural frameworks, actually form a perspective that enables theorists to understand the importance of cultural and racial differentiation to the modifications and transformations within structures that enable the continuity of national power. Hall reminds us that Gramsci’s original conception of hegemony is not about the solidity and endurance of power through the formation of stolid structures, but, rather, that it is about placing cultural difference and cultural meaning and mobilization into a relationship with power and justifications for the continuity of power. Hall writes that
Even the “hegemonic” moment is no longer conceptualized as a moment of simple unity, but as a process of unification (never totally achieved), founded on strategic alliances between different sectors, not on their pre-given identity…. [T]here is no automatic identity or correspondence between economic, political and ideological practices. This begins to explain how ethnic and racial difference can be constructed as a set of economic, political or ideological antagonisms, within a class which is subject to roughly similar forms of exploitation with respect to ownership of and expropriation from the “means of production” (Hall 1986: 25)

To conclude, it is this fundamental instability—which is rooted in the empirical instances of class formations as inherently non-homogenous—that Gramsci attempts to explain while remaining within the highest levels of abstraction afforded through a historical materialist standpoint. By developing a way to mediate between the centrality of racial and cultural difference within a structural framework Gramsci provides, for Hall, an enduring relevance especially since race and cultural non-homogeneity seems to be the rule, and not the exception, introduced as the forces of capital accumulation become more global in character. These same forces, that find the hallmark for this modification in the structure of capitalism in the name of globalism or globalization, are actually operating in a paradigm where the shift from colonial and imperialist frameworks to a brief period of independence, postcolonialism, and postimperialism and, finally, to postindependence, neoliberalism and neoimperialism can be leapt over willy-nilly. Each represents discrete modifications to structure and power in the form of necessary racializations or forms of re-identification that never maintain themselves for very long. By understanding these modifications as a conjuncture within a stream of structural modifications to capitalism Hall builds a new
relationship between culture and structure that is rooted in Gramsci’s theories and concepts, necessary modifications that are put in place to account for the analysis of events located at the empirical level. What remains to be explained, however, is why Gramsci has anything relevant to offer to an analysis of race? In the following section I want to explore Gramsci’s perspective on race, racism, and racialization. Hall, with the exception of Verdicchio (1995), is the only theorist to write about Gramsci and race in any detail. However, the question as to why, in a context where race is primarily understood as the racialization of people and cultures due to appearances, Gramsci could provide a way to understand racial differences as cultural, national, ideological and discursive constructs—as well as race and culture as sites of identity that endure through transformations in both meanings and traditions—remains an open one.

2.2. Why Gramsci is Relevant to the Study of Race and Ethnicity: A Discursive and Historical Analysis

The second sub-section of this section demonstrates how Gramsci’s discourse on race represents a departure from the predominant positivist perspective that influenced Italian discourses on race and criminality. Where the first sub-section of the section demonstrates a contemporary theoretical problem that is addressed through the work of Antonio Gramsci, as interpreted and deployed by Stuart Hall, the second sub-section of this section asks a historical and contextual question. What contributed to Gramsci’s perspective on race, and why? To help address this question I rely on historical data. Data is derived from Gramsci’s personal correspondences as well as from essays that explicitly discuss both race and difference. Secondary sources on racial and criminological discourses issuing from the positivist school in Italy provide needed historical context to establish the extent to which
Gramsci’s contemporaneous claims regarding race are both counter-discursive and a precursor to cultural and constructivist perspectives on race and difference. I have already described how the richness of Gramsci’s perspective on race makes it possible for other aspects of Gramsci’s more systematic theoretical framework to be adopted by Stuart Hall to establish a cultural basis for thinking about race in post-Marxist and postcolonial frameworks, especially in relationship to the separation of cultural and structural approaches. Hall in “Race Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance” (1980) and “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity” (1985) demonstrates that Gramsci’s work is central to contemporary cultural and structural approaches (both analytical and theoretical, respectively) to race.

Here, I wish to restate my hypotheses as they pertain to this sub-section of the section. I hypothesize that Gramsci’s centrality to contemporary cultural and structural approaches to race is due to his resistance to racist discourses of criminality issuing from social scientists during the time that he wrote. This can and should be interpreted as a significant, and not merely contingent, part of his larger perspective on culture, power, and politics. Hall’s work is used to demonstrate this significance within contemporary theoretical discourse. On this basis, I further hypothesize that it is possible to weld aspects of Gramsci’s perspective on race into a counter discourse that offers an alternative to modernist-positivistic based “scientific” discourses of race—discourses that inform biologically-based racist perspectives that contemporary cultural theories of race have worked to debunk. Hall derives the coordinates of this discourse not from Gramsci’s letters, as I do in this section, but, rather, from Gramsci’s sensitivity to history, class, race, culture and ideology. The goal of this section is to link Gramsci’s perspective on race—derived largely from his correspondences,
the few excerpts from his prison notebooks where Gramsci directly addresses the issue of race and biological interpretations, and “occasional” essays: “The Southern Question,” “The Revolution Against ‘Capital’”—to contemporary cultural perspectives on race and to demonstrate the ways in which this linkage is possible both historically and conceptually.

In what follows, I will analyze the discourse and contexts surrounding the texts mentioned above. The method of selection required an investigation of Gramsci’s published essays and personal correspondences (Gramsci 1971; 1975a; 1977; 1985; 1995a; 1995b; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). I selected excerpts that help illuminate the relationship between the first and second sub-sections of this section. There are, without a doubt, other linkages that can be drawn depending on the question posed. By way of an example one could link Franz Fanon’s work on race, colonialism, and national culture (“On National Culture”) in The Wretched of the Earth (1961) to the section “The Intellectuals: The Formation of the Intellectuals” in Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971). A comparative analysis of these texts could result in a richer theory of the relationship between the formation of intellectuals in the context of shifting social forces (expressly the shift from industrialization to modernization in the “third” or “underdeveloped” world) across the early part of the 20th century. This, however, exceeds the scope of this section.

The following excerpts come from letters written to Gramsci’s sister-in-law during the first year of his incarceration as the Italian authorities, in anticipation of his trial, repeatedly relocated him. In what follows, I will provide historical context for these quotations and an interpretation of the racial determinants within the discourse.

I want to mention that Gramsci uses a phrase in discussing his translation of Karl Marx’s “The Jewish Question” with his sister-in-law, Tania, which provides a framework
within which to view race as a contentious term that occupies a conceptual space between culture and biology, or nature. What is interesting about this phrase is that he places the word nature in scare quotes. The phrase is “refashion[ing] a new ‘nature.’” He states “the racial question has no interest for me outside of anthropology and the study of prehistoric civilizations” (Gramsci 1975: 217). The correspondence continues: He asks Tania, “What does ‘race’ mean then? Evidently, you have in mind a new modern community that… is able to refashion a new ‘nature’ for itself to fit into a changed social situation” (Gramsci 1975: 217). Bound in by discourses of science, biology and nature, the potential cultural transformations that are based within discourses of differences must be able to challenge not only a biological imperative towards difference as truth but also the continuity of power that persistently redraws the lines that define, for others, oppression, exploitation, and difference. This is the hallmark of discourse and any useful analysis must be able to sort these relations out, relations that produce what Gramsci refers to, above, as “changed social situations.”

These excerpts of Gramsci’s correspondence are with his sister-in-law, Tania. They are “snapshots” of his encounters with prisoners.

I realized how difficult it is to understand the true nature of men from outward signs. At Ancona…a kind old man who seemed to be of humble, provincial origin asked me to let him have some soup….I gave it to him…taken with the serenity in his eyes and his modest gestures. Immediately afterward, I learned that this repellent beast had raped his own daughter. (Antonio Gramsci, corresponding with Tania Schucht, February 12, 1927.)
Naples: I began to recognize a series of highly interesting types, whereas before the only southerns I had known at close quarters were Sardinians. (Antonio Gramsci, corresponding with Tania Schucht, April 11, 1927.)

At first glance, the first two quotations are anecdotal; they describe encounters Gramsci had with other prisoners as he traveled between the Regina Coeli prison in Rome, the Carmine prison in Naples, a penal institution in Palermo, then to a prison on the island of Ustica. Subsequent to his stay on Ustica he made several other stops to prisons in Cajanello, Isernia, Sulmona, Castellammare, Adriatico, Ancona, and Bologna. He then arrived at the prison of San Vittore in Milan where he would stay until right before his trial. In May of 1928 Gramsci returned to the Regina Coeli prison in Rome, to be in the city where his trial would take place. As is well known, Gramsci’s final stop on this extensive tour of Italy’s penal institutions—which contributed to ill health that plagued him throughout the course of his twenty-plus year sentence—is to the prison at Turi the location where he writes his “prison notebooks.” The quotations above record encounters that he had with other prisoners, mostly Southern Italians, as he traveled the circuitous route between Regina Coeli in Rome and San Vittore in Milan between November 1926 and February 1927 (Buttigeig 2010). They also demonstrate the pervasiveness of racial discourse in Italy as it pertained to Southern Italians (since each of these quotations are literally speaking both within and against it) and that race was “on Gramsci’s mind.” In short, these brief quotations are inextricably embedded in racial discourse since this was the means and measure through which Southern Italy had been constructed by Italian criminologists of the positivist school like Lombroso, Ferri, Sergi, Niceforo, and Orano.

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4 “Gramsci was charged under article 184 of the newly enacted Single Text of Laws on Public Security, and he was sentenced to five years of internment” (Buttigeig 2010: 86).
Gramsci was not in agreement with the positivists and the first two quotations demonstrate that. Niceforo’s famous claim from *Crime in Sardinia* (1897) that criminal intent can be discerned, or read, from physical deformities or “atavisms” (i.e. outward signs) is the subject of the first quotation. The man with whom Gramsci shares his soup exhibits only kindness and humility despite the nature of his crime; a refutation of Niceforo’s claim regarding his study of southerners specifically, Sardinians—the population which Niceforo studied and the island where Gramsci and his family were from. The second quotation represents an attempt to separate the category of “southerner” into groups that exhibit differences: his reference to his own southern Sardinian origins imports him into the discourse both directly and as a bearer of a distinctive regional culture; it can be surmised that these differences refer to cultural distinctions or types and not, obviously, to biological types.\

In these instances, Gramsci’s correspondences can be seen as countermanding the predominant discourse on race (and especially criminality—these are his letters about his encounters with prisoners) in Italy during the time that he lived. Quite literally, Gramsci is pointing out that the theoretical premises for criminology—rooted in a “biologicalization” (i.e. the ability to read race from off of the surface of the body and from behaviors)—are factually incorrect. I want to discuss how some epistemological issues that Gramsci raises in his studies in the early 1930s expose a constructivist and cultural orientation toward understanding race. In other words, they help corroborate the discursive analysis in the immediately preceding paragraphs. Of all of the instances of discourses on race from Gramsci’s writing, these are the most explicitly theoretical. They require the “working out’’

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5 In his correspondences with Tania, Gramsci refers to himself as of Albanian origin. To him, there is a discrete national-cultural mapping exceeding the Italian discourse of race and criminology.
of categories as they pertain to conceptions of humanism within the transformations introduced through modernity.

Gramsci begins by analyzing the Catholic (religious) person. He notes, “[N]obody attaches himself to Catholicism as a norm of life…. [O]ne…who applied the Catholic norms in everyday life would seem a monster” (Gramsci 1971: 351). If Catholicism is to be understood as a set of prescriptive principles by which one should live their life—dogmatically, i.e. absent contemplation and reflection—it is, at its basis, empirically similar to Gramsci’s reflection on the differences between historical materialism at the highest level of abstraction and class empiricism (how people really behave in the context of their class position). In principle, Gramsci actually sees Catholicism as actively and destructively affecting Others’ lives because it makes people (i.e. its humanistic conception) out to be (essentially) evil. In practice Gramsci’s notion of human, then, becomes a process. Human is conceptualized as empirically fashioned from a series of historically and culturally embedded relationships that are composed of “1. The individual; 2. others; 3. an historical (i.e. ideological) conception of the natural world” (Gramsci 1971: 351). These categories form the basis of a three-part dialectic of culture and also inform his conception of race.

Gramsci describes the root of these relationships as “organic,” and “active and conscious.” He states, “The individual does not enter into relations with other men by juxtaposition, but organically, in as much, that is, as he belongs to organic entities which range from the simplest to the most complex. Thus Man does not enter into relations with the natural world just by being himself part of the natural world, but actively, by means of work and technique.” (Gramsci 1971: 351). Gramsci’s category of nature is linked to Marx’s conception of species being, i.e. to “homo faber.” A person relates to others and to the world,
and through these relations produces “life,” an individual life, in process, always composed of these three elements: self, nature, other.

However, these relationships are shot through with consciousness: an interpretive framework through which people reflect on and attempt to understand themselves as human. They do so in a framework that, in its most general conception, is an ideological and historically contingent perspective on nature. In reality, nature is always conceived of and justified through the “organic” (cultural and traditional) rootedness that anchors the discourse of nature. By stating that these relations are “active and conscious” means that they cannot be habitual, mechanical, or pure principle. The process must be active because it is reciprocal: building relationships with nature and others enables one to alter their “species-life” i.e. their own life and their social world. Or, on the other hand, these relations can serve the opposite function when cast in a parochial light. The potential for people to transform themselves has to do with how they come to conceive of the environment in which they are rooted as connected to these relations and not to a perspective that is conceived of as persistently “naturalizing” social relations. If it is the case that people believe that things are the way that they ought to be then one can merely reaffirm the ideological platitudes since this, in short, is the goal of ideology: to make the world seem as though it can only be as it is and no alternative vision of the world is possible. Gramsci explains, however, that the more one comes to understand the groups of relations in their momentary and changing existence, the easier time one will have determining a species-life.

These three elements form the root of a tripartite dialectic. Gramsci’s conception of nature is mediated, primarily, through a self. However, any self is part of an ensemble of social relations—relations with others: a direct product of culture (i.e. language, kin and kith,
and, more abstractly, local common sense). Common sense is the basic building block upon which conceptions of nature, and therefore race, are fashioned and refashioned. However, common sense risks becoming the immutable epistemological ground upon which cultures reproduce knowledge and norms based within inherent parochialisms as truths. There is always the danger that common sense either arrests or severs the connection to the “other” term in the dialectic. Where Gramsci defines common sense as the “diffuse, uncoordinated features of a generic form of thought common to a particular period and a particular popular environment,” it becomes the conceptual terrain that can be coordinated, fused either instrumentally or internally (Gramsci 1971: 330). Common sense is the condition of possibility (for either cultural transformation or stagnation) available throughout all of culture, but it is only available to the individual if he or she attempts to become conscious of their connection to an historical and cultural context. It is not thought of, rather it is thinking, an activity that is a commonplace for Gramsci and is conceptualized as necessary like eating. Thinking leads to interpretation and the basis for cultural interpretation is the terms within Gramsci’s tripartite dialectic. It is the history that encrusts thought (e.g. Marx’s, “The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” [1963: 15]) and, in turn, it is the active thinking-acting process that creates history. Race, as Gramsci explains in these fragments from the early 1930s, is a component in this three-way dialectical tug of war between the self, the other, and nature.

Gramsci says, of race, “the differences in man which count in history are not the biological—race, shape of the cranium, colour [sic] of skin, etc. (For it is to these that the affirmation ‘man is what he eats’ can be reduced…)” (Gramsci 1971: 355). The context Gramsci is worried about is that diet depends on region, (Asia, rice) and as a result, “man is
what he eats” means, Asians are Asian because they eat rice, and, therefore, rice eaters are Asian. Race becomes nothing more than a tautology based in an empirical oversimplification: the discreteness of racial groupings can be linked directly to nature (this is also the basis for positivistic and criminological investigations of race). In order for this discourse on race to persist relations to others (i.e. to those who have different racial or ethnic characteristics—who have been “racialized” through specific discursive perspectives) are rendered out of the picture. Gramsci’s aleatory philosophy, borrowed from Feuerbach’s (through the early Marx’s) “man is what he eats” suggests that one “consumes” but is not simply produced by the objects taken in by the body. The nature of these objects is cultural. They are always necessarily refashioned (by subjects, “ingesting,” “digesting” and ultimately producing culture); evidence of culture and social life and not of nature. If, then, race is a term that is considered anchored in biology, and hence nature, then within Gramsci’s discourse its status as biological or ‘natural’ is meaningless.

To sharpen the point, Gramsci makes two very significant statements regarding the relationship between race and nature: “It is not ‘thought’ but what people really think that unites or differentiates mankind,” and “nor has ‘biological unity’ ever counted for very much in history: man is the animal which has eaten himself precisely when he was nearest to the ‘state of nature’ and when he could not artificially multiply the production of natural goods. Nor yet have the ‘faculty of reason’ or ‘the mind’ created unity….” (Gramsci 1971: 355). So, for Gramsci, we can neither stand on “unrefined nature” since it does not exist, and we certainly cannot rely on cultural mores, especially when they are anchored to a fragmented historical “consciousness” and a parochial or regional framework that constructs others as a persistently liminal group. In the schema, “race” skirts the liminal space between refashioned
nature and the “real political action” of oppositional cultures. The unity born out of difference or otherness, especially racial otherness, finds its fomentation in political action—as in the Turin strike—where new points of unity emerge in new ensembles of relations. The interests of a regionally and a national racially differentiated workforce found a new unity in a new context dependent upon the actors in the struggle. All of the variables that produce differentiation, history, culture, and language, become inverted in an articulation of modernity where class becomes the basis of common interests and a departure point for a new liminal group, the national capitalist class. They do not become inverted in principle, or in theory, but in practice.

Both Gramsci’s discussion of race in the fragments from his notebooks as well as his perspectives on his encounters with prisoners find their basis in experiences that he had, and attempted to explain, during the heyday of his activism (as a socialist during the “two red years” biennio rosso), when workers participated in a general strike in Turin (Torino) at Fiat. In what follows I want to connect Gramsci’s later correspondences and fragments from his notebooks to his earlier political commitments where we can see evidence of his tarrying with the racial discourse in Italy. What will become evident is that Gramsci actually develops his perspective on race in coming to terms with ideological differences and unities witnessed through his participation during the biennio rosso. These perspectives on race become a substantial aspect of his polemical work between 1917 and 1926. More to the point, I will demonstrate they are integral to his transformation from a socialist to a communist. It is from the standpoint of communism—and a more theoretical embrace of historical materialism—that there is an explicit linkage between racial difference and real political action, a linkage that Hall is able to perceive and that, I believe, allows for Gramsci’s work to fit both the
spirit and the letter of Hall’s perspective on Gramsci’s theoretical importance for the study of race and ethnicity.

Although it has not been discussed in great detail up to this point, we know that Gramsci was aware of the “scientific” discourse of the positivist school, a self-identified group of “criminal anthropologists” who fueled the cultural ground for the “southern question.” In turn, “the school” provided scientific support for the continued administrative domination of the southern regions; in fact their information made Sardinia out to be an island of “barbarians” to rival Sicily (Gramsci 1995; Gibson 1998). Further, Gramsci, early in his life and before the general strike in Turin in August of 1917, held a “southernist” position that was common to socialist perspectives during that time and that he describes, in reflection (in 1926), as follows: “…the South is the ball and chain that prevents a more rapid progress in the civil development of Italy; Southerners are biologically inferior beings, either semi-barbarians, or full out barbarians, by natural destiny….The Socialist Party was in great part the vehicle of this bourgeois ideology…” (Gramsci 1995: 20). This passage from “The Southern Question” is significant for two reasons. First, because this question, Gramsci argues, should be of central importance to the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The polemical import of this essay, then, is to distinguish the PCI’s position from that of the Italian Socialist

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6 “…The Socialist Party gave its blessing to all the ‘southernist’ literature of the clique of writers [check original source; there ought to be a comma or semicolon here] the so-called positivist school, such as Ferri, Sergi, Niceforo, Orano…” Gramsci, Antonio. 1995. The Southern Question. Trans. Pasquale Verdicchio. West Lafayette, IN: Bordighera Incorporated. (20-21). It was very possible that Gramsci was all too aware. Alfredo Niceforo, student of Enrico Ferri, wrote a book, Crime in Sardinia, which was published when Gramsci was six years old. It refuted an older study in which Cesare Lombroso, the prolific leader of this school of thought, stated that Sardinia was the only part of the South free of violent crime. Niceforo stated that Sardinia was the most violent and he listed statistical evidence. What is worse, this school popularly believed that a (male) criminal was arrested in his evolutionary development. The outward signs of this took the form of “atavisms” or physical deformities, dark skin being an “atavism” of sorts. It goes without saying that Gramsci was a dark-skinned (he speaks of his complexion in his letters) Sardinian, dwarfish and with a hunched-back.

Party (Pozzolini 1970; Sassoon 1980; Hall 1985; Gramsci 1995). Second, Gramsci describes a tripartite linkage between criminological discourse, discourses of development—which were of central concerns to both bourgeois and socialist ideology alike, and national racial ideology. Given the oppositional politics of the socialists and the political fractions of the bourgeois classes Gramsci demonstrates that, at least in the first decade of the 20th century in Italy, this discourse was near universal within a national context. However, Gramsci’s experiences with workers from across Italy, well before his incarceration, demonstrate the means through which he distanced himself from a “southernist” stance. This, in no large part, was the impetus for his essay, “The Southern Question.” In an affirmative sense, this essay introduced a polemic of unity which would form the groundwork for coalition building for the PCI.

The first theoretical statement regarding the importance of coalition building precedes “The Southern Question” by almost a decade. Following the Fiat strike of August 1917, in which Gramsci was a participant in December of that same year, he published “The Revolution Against Capital,” where he stated that “the Bolshevik revolution had triumphed in Russia against all the Marxian schemas,” and that “The Revolution had been victorious by contradicting Marx’s *Capital* or, rather, the Marxian Theory of socialism as something that can be brought about only by, and in, an advanced industrial society. Instead, the Revolution had won in a backward country composed predominantly of illiterate masses of peasants of hardly any political experience; it had won because of Lenin’s anti-positivist, non-evolutionist doctrines…” (Pozzolini 1970: 29). Pozzolini explains that this article, as well as Gramsci’s other work from this period, caused great controversy amongst the Italian Socialists, and as a result of its publication Gramsci was accused of “voluntarism” for

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8 See also Gramsci 1975: 22-23.
deviating from the principles of (the Italian socialists’ rather mechanical interpretation of) historical materialism (Pozzolini 1970; Gramsci 1995).

However, Gramsci’s initial experiences with militant protest actions, strategies, and tactics enabled him to conceive of the role of the party vanguard and party intellectual in a way that is distinct from other Marxist perspectives, especially those of Marx and Lenin. Although the category of the intellectual in Gramsci’s work is of signal importance to the dialectical movement of history, to his conception of praxis and, later, to his detailed discussion of the state and civil society in the Notebooks, it does not exclude rank and file trade unionists, political radicals, and others on any basis, including race. Further, this is Gramsci’s direct experience of participation in a protest action with laborers from “social worlds” beyond northern industrialized Italy. In the position of organizer and as a leading intellectual in a strike in Northern Italy, Gramsci changed his position regarding the South, or southerners of Italy after this strike. The effects of this protest action mark the beginning of a contravention in the positivist discussion of the concept of race that was predominant at the time.

As Gramsci recollects the Turin movement there is evidence of a shift in perspective. He writes that the movement

was accused at the same time of being “spontaneist” and “voluntarist”…. Once the contradictory accusation is analyzed it shows instead the fruitfulness and the justness of the leadership given to that movement. The leadership was not “abstract.” It did not consist in mechanically repeating some scientific or theoretical formula; it did not confuse politics, the real action, with theoretical dissertations. It applied itself to real men, who had been formed in particular historical relations, with particular feelings,
ways of looking at things and fragments of conceptions of the world, etc. which were the result of the “spontaneous” combinations of a given environment of material production, with the “accidental” agglomeration in it of disparate social elements. This element of “spontaneity” was not neglected and even less despised…. This unity of “spontaneity” and of “conscious direction,” that is of “discipline,” is precisely the real political action of the subordinated classes....” (Gramsci 1971: 198 [my italics])

At the heart of this statement is difference. Placed in historical context, the members of the movement that contributed to the strike were attached to cultural and historical forces within and beyond Italy. Southerners and islanders—attached, generationally, to peasant communities and regional and oral dialects (often not literate)—were linguistically, culturally, and historically differentiated from both the northerners as well as one another. Also, northerners: members of the urban proletariat; some more attached to Europeans from the Northern Alpine region, others who descended from urban artisans, and still others who had gone to the north from the south generations before. Italy’s involvement in World War I, specifically the battles fought for Trieste and the Trentino, as well as the rapid rise of the industrial North, provided a new context for the participants in these waves of strikes and protests beginning in 1916 and culminating in 1920 (for data on the regional, ethnic, and racial composition of the strikers and a history of the strike see Spriano 1975; 1979; Procacci 1988; Corner and Procacci 1997).

It is within this context that Gramsci was first able to analyze the effect of cultural, linguistic, and traditional (or formative) historical differences on class-based forms of protest. This period of Gramsci’s thought has been described as his “idealist” period but, also, the period within which he formed his concept of “factory councils” (influenced by the
Soviet example) as the basis for a worker’s democracy (Hall 1982; Boggs 1984; Sassoon 1987). Others have indicated that the tactical flaws inherent in Gramsci’s position were abandoned, later, due to historical changes (Felice 1982). Finally, some see Gramsci’s experience with the factory councils as enabling a more intensive consideration—in Gramsci’s work after 1930—of the conceptual connection between “organic” and “conjuncture” (Caceres 1986). In short, in the period of Gramsci’s political journalism, race, racialization, and difference was central to his understanding of protest, antagonism, and the potential for a political unity that gave the lie to the predominant discourses of racialization in Italy during the time that he lived. I have tried to analyze, historically, the determinants of racial discourse in the context of the early 20th century in Italy and Gramsci’s position within this discourse (as counter-discourse and not as an explicit systematic theoretical stance on race, racialization, and racism) to demonstrate why it is that Gramsci is relevant to contemporary theories and analyses of race and ethnicity. In my concluding remarks, I will discuss the findings of this study as well as the effect that these findings can have on the way the social scientists and humanistic scholars have on the analysis of race. I want to also point out that it is in the work of Antonio Gramsci that we can begin to perceive a counter-discourse on racialization and modernization that finds its roots in analyses and that modifies (through empirical and analytical specification) classical conceptions of historical materialism.

2.3 Findings and Conclusion

The findings in this study (a historical and contextual analysis of racial discourse in the work of Gramsci) demonstrate that there is a conceptual basis upon which Stuart Hall can base Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity. More to the point, these
findings demonstrate that Gramsci’s analysis of conjunctures in Italy, which lead to mass movements, took race as a salient determinant in movement mobilization. I also find that Gramsci wrote about and discussed race on several occasions between 1917 and 1930. In other words, race emerges as a discussion point throughout his long career as an intellectual, activist, socialist, and communist. Finally, I have attempted to demonstrate, in this study, that Gramsci’s discourse on race countermands the predominant discourses of racialization and criminality in Italy (and arguably, by extension, Europe and the U.S.). His perspective, I believe, is what enables aspects of Gramsci’s theoretical framework to make their way into contemporary theories of culture, race, and power as exhibited in the work of Stuart Hall, a pioneer in the field of cultural theories of race and also under discussion in contemporary Gramsci scholarship, in particular, the work of Adam Morton (2007) (who indicates that it is possible to maintain Gramsci’s Marxist approach while considering other variables, like race, as independent) and Peter D. Thomas (2009) (who has produced the best cultural and political historiography of Gramsci in the context of cultural studies, structural Marxism and postmarxism.

Gramsci’s concept of the conjuncture represents a nexus that connects the theoretical impasse between structural and cultural theories of race. The notion of political and structural modifications to discourses of racialization is, really, a new perspective—one that Hall deploys, especially in work subsequent to “Gramsci’s Relevance” (see Hall 1987; 1990; 1990a 1992)—but which has not been worked out in any great detail, in this context, until now. It is my hope that by providing the conceptual and epistemological basis to Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity and, also, by demonstrating the context through which this relevance is, or becomes, possible a challenge can be issued to the epistemological
limitations placed on modernist perspectives on race and racialization especially in, or against, the framework of historical materialism, which, often, is viewed as deterministic and inattentive to race, ethnicity, and culture. Gramsci demonstrates that it is not only possible to transcend these theoretical and conceptual categories and periodizations but, more to the point, that doing so helps to link theoretical approaches that have been thought of as incommensurable.
Antonio Gramsci’s ideas about Fordism in America contain an accuracy as well as a postmodernist sensibility that are remarkable considering their “original home” in a prison in Rome, Italy circa 1930. Even more remarkable is Gramsci’s attention to concepts like nature, culture, sex and race. Concerning the study of “culture” in contemporary intellectual circles there was somewhat of a sea-change with the introduction of semiotics as a body of knowledge used (by critics) to critique cultural meaning and its production (developed, most fully with post-structuralism, and Roland Barthes in the late 1950s). However, before this time models of production were tied to society through economy, perhaps more so than culture (expressly for Max Weber, Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, Thorsten Velben, and Emile Durkheim to name a few). This section is an exploratory study of concepts of production. It will consider some models and ideas of and about production as they are explained through culture, sex, economy and society in the work of Antonio Gramsci, Herbert Marcuse (and Wilhelm Reich) and Sigmund Freud. It will provide a critique of the models propounded at the time for a better understanding of society through economy and culture. This paper will critique these models’ ethical positioning in contemporary society, their conceptual categories and, finally, their endurance (in part and whole) in contemporary critical approaches to culture. It will, ultimately, focus on Gramsci’s work, specifically the place of “culture” and sex in his understanding of economy; it will speculate as to why his thought regarding western planned economies worked as (well as) it did; and it will interrogate the endurance of his method and his concepts in the study of contemporary culture.
As stated in my introductory first section, the goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact that historical (and cultural) contexts have on the production of theories and concepts. In specific, I am interested in the relationship between historical and cultural contexts and the production of theoretical knowledge. In this case, I seek to demonstrate how the relationship between theories of sexuality and social organization, contemporaneous to Gramsci’s time, and Gramsci’s empiricism—which, in this case, is based on the perspective that different forms of planning within capitalist economies (labor organization and rationalization within and beyond the factory and the introduction of new technologies, for example)—are not a mere reflection of (Marxist) class analysis but, rather, are a negotiation of a complex historical and cultural-national context (in this case, the United States) and, moreover, that this negotiation produced a discourse that can account for significant variation within social, political, and cultural formations influencing the work of Rosemary Hennessey and Roger Lancaster.

In this section I make a series of methodological assumptions that are in-line with historical contextualism in my approach to the analysis of data from Gramsci’s personal correspondences (Jones 1986; Camic 1995; Strenski 1997; Abbot 1999; Camic and Gross 2001).

1. Historical texts are historical products;

2. The actual intentions of the author (to the extent that we can explain and interpret them) should be our principal guide as to why the text took the particular form it did;

3. The imminent contexts in which these text were produced (which, in this case influenced the questions informing the investigation as well as were influenced by the
availability of data) must be analyzed it is around this analysis that a theoretical framework may be constructed.

Specific to Gramsci’s analysis of “Americanism and Fordism” is the question of sex. His contemporaries, with respect to this question, are manifold. However, Herbert Marcuse (not quite “contemporary” with Gramsci), Wilhelm Reich and Sigmund Freud are the most interesting of the lot and their theories of sex and capital will be considered with Gramsci’s question of sex and rationalized economies by way of a detour. Marcuse and Reich are interested in the same question whereas Freud’s considerations of “civilization,” though mostly removed from the category of capital, illustrate certain points of discussion advanced by both Reich and Marcuse on the subject.

The final sub-sections of this section will discuss Gramsci’s concepts of economy and society against Marcuse’s and Freud’s concepts. It will point up the more salient features of Gramsci’s work and closely examine the relationship of Gramsci’s work to contemporary cultural criticism, specifically Roger Lancaster’s discussion of “connectivity” in his work on contemporary popular culture and nature. Next, and with the help of David Horn’s book on Italian modernity, I will place some of the concerns discussed in “Americanism and Fordism” alongside an Italian context and speculate on the relationship of Gramsci’s thought on America to events and ideas which lead to the fascist organization of contemporary Italian society. This section is ultimately an exploration of Gramsci’s method, thought and concepts as they pertain to the interaction amongst the categories of political economy, culture and sex and as they pertain to his specific historical and cultural position. Gramsci’s attachment to economic analysis is always held in contact with culture (it can be represented as a kind of invisible framing technology, to borrow a concept from contemporary analysis of film and
media), and although key concepts like “hegemony” are not central to my investigation, Gramsci’s approach to culture is always “haunted” by “hegemony” and “economy”—just as it is “haunted” by critiques of positivism and, of course, its particular historical context. It is this schema that enables Gramsci to “see” the force of overdetermination in culture (as I will show), to answer _economic_ questions through vigorous “observations” of contemporary culture and history, and, finally, to “act” (praxis) in the vicissitudes of society, modes of political, institutional and cultural power. The combination of political economy, history (and historiography), philosophy and a concept of “human (inter)action” and the way in which this combination is exacted on culture, critically, sets Gramsci’s work apart as a model for the critical analysis and study of culture.

3.1 Gramsci’s Method, Buttigeig’s Caveat

The _Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci_, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffery Nowell Smith, represent Antonio Gramsci’s work as organized topically under a singular category (e.g. everything having to do with the topic “Americanism and Fordism” has been written and contained under this heading). However, as Joseph Buttigeig has pointed out, the organization of the notebooks, thematically, is not an actual expression of Antonio Gramsci’s work, or rather his method:

Fragmentation is taken to be an unfortunate obstacle that stands in the way of understanding what Gramsci meant to say…. Hence, efforts to “organize” the notebooks, to collect the fragments around certain themes or under certain rubrics…. [And later about trying to assemble the fragments:] One would have to place each piece in a necessary and fixed relation to other pieces in such a way as to produce a total structure which one could contemplate in its wholeness. _But history is presented_
in the notebooks as “experience” not as contemplation and the “experience upon which the philosophy of praxis is based cannot be schematized.” (Buttigeig 1990: 80-81, italics mine)

This quote from Buttigeig’s essay congeals many salient points that must be met for anyone interested in understanding Gramsci’s method in his Prison Notebooks. First, the edition of Gramsci’s notebooks used most widely, and used here in this paper, organize not only various titled subsections under a single section (e.g. “Supercity and Supercountry” under “Americanism and Fordism”) they also organize the subsections from disparate points made by Gramsci in his notebooks. As Buttigeig points out, notes on “Achille Loria,” “Cuvier’s little bone,” and “Aftereffects of low romanticism” are linked around Gramsci’s cultural concept of the intellectual. However, in American and British versions of Selections of the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (1971—British Edition) and Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Cultural Writings (1985—American edition with British translation copyright) these “notes” are grouped under headings pertaining to other “themes” generated by the editors or they are eliminated altogether. For example, in the Cultural Writings, Cuvier does not appear at all; in the Selections from the Prison Notebooks Cuvier appears in “Problems of Philosophy,” subsection: “History and Anti-history.” Further, the original note that Buttigeig refers to is omitted from both texts. In other words, the “ideas” we are reading are either “re-linked” to new and more complete “notes” (the original links are broken) or, the “formative stage” of the idea is edited out of the text entirely. The formation of these notes and their links to other notes embody both Gramsci’s particular cultural and historical concerns around, in this example, the formation of intellectual groups. Placing bits of text side-by-side in the edited editions removes us from the historical reasons that Gramsci put a
note on Cuvier next to a note on an obscure Italian intellectual next to a note on aftereffects of low romanticism. This sufficiently complicates any readers’ views of the historicity of Gramsci’s method.

The italicized portion of the quote which begins, “but history is presented…as experience…” introduces the concept of “praxis” into Gramsci’s method. This quote is a testament to the impossibility of “distilling” praxis as a method. A “praxiological” approach to culture and history is a “battle” with history as an objective and, in some respect, a “naturalistic” account of events. This approach necessarily is critical of historical events and its purpose is to reconfigure the “cultural and social group” (e.g. nationalistic) signification of historico-cultural contexts towards its own group (e.g. Communist party). In Gramsci’s case “praxis” introduces an opportunity to present not simply an “alternate understanding of events” but as many possibilities as can be located in history in any one (cultural) moment. In this way, Gramsci is explicitly and in full answering Marx’s charge in his “Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach.” For Buttigeig, any piece of work which is so steeped in the immediacy of its own culture is difficult to read and understand in its concept unless the instance which engendered the concept is present in what the reader brings to the text. Buttigeig states, “[T]o avoid making such blunders…is to remain true to the methods of criticism and philology…. The theory and practice of philological criticism found in the notebooks constitute in themselves a most important contribution to…philosophy of praxis” (1990: 81). Buttigeig, of course, means that like Gramsci, one, in reading the notebooks, should be aware of the

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9 It is difficult to locate a definition of praxis. Its position is best exemplified in Karl Marx’s 11th thesis on the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” For Gramsci, everyone was an intellectual, everyone had, at least, common sense and used this sense to interpret the world. The idea was for everyone, in developing a concept of culture and nature, not to confront ideas with mere ideas but also with social action which, in a relation to ideas, would produce, for instance, a political party: a culture based on social action and thought (and ideally communist liberation from capitalism.)
variances which comprise the content of culture in history and, further one must employ a critical lens on the historical variances which may make a concept (about culture) possible. Something else interesting happens in this passage. Buttigeig suggests that praxis is connected to philology after the work of Gramsci. In fact, he sees the link as necessary to the theory. “[T]hese methods…function simultaneously as a weapon and a shield against all forms of dogmatism and mystification” (1990: 81). In other words, it is more difficult for Gramsci to “get it wrong” (I suppose as compared to Lenin and Trotsky) due to the wealth of historical material Gramsci employs to interrogate a “happening” in culture. This, further, is the answer to parsing out critical problems posed by overdetermination in culture. Through Buttigeig’s essay critical points are made relating to Gramsci’s method and the use of his ideas in contemporary analyses of culture.

3.2 “Societas rerum and the societas hominum”

Keeping Gramsci’s methodology “in mind,” I wish to turn to the section of the Hoare and Smith edition of the *Prison Notebooks* (hereafter referred to as *The Notebooks*) entitled “Americanism and Fordism.” In the first paragraphs of this section, which represent Gramsci’s first fragments leading toward a consideration of the subject, Gramsci notes of his subject “that the solutions to these problems must necessarily be put forward within the contradictory conditions of modern society, which create complications, absurd positions and moral and economic crises often tending toward catastrophe” (Gramsci 1971: 288). Further, Gramsci claims that the primary social action that leads to these complications from the previous quote is the attempt to achieve a planned economy: “problems arise from the various forms of resistance to this evolution encountered by the process of development, the
source of the problems being difficulties inherent in both the societas rerum and the societas hominum (society of things and the society of man)” (Gramsci 1971: 288).

Early in the development of a question, or set of questions, around the heading “Americanism and Fordism,” Gramsci lays out the groundwork by pointing to two opposed tendencies in modern society. First, he indicates that the organization of a planned economy signals the disorganization of a political and economic culture that, in many respects, will not and cannot disappear completely. There will be “residues” from economies (both formal and informal) that are contingent to capital as it develops and the cultural groupings which are unwilling to disband their “parasitic” and/or dis-organized practices of acquiring wealth (e.g. landed petit-bourgeois, clergy, state employees w/pensions, etc.). Second, Gramsci notes that there are mass rationalizations of society. Gramsci points here, in the opening paragraphs of Selections from the Prison Notebooks, to the organization of the economy and its institutions; however, the “problems” he discusses (as a catalogue of features related to the original “heading”) seem to be by-products of a rationalized society and planned economy. They seem rather than are because Gramsci’s political economic investigations are linked to contemporaneous categories represented by new social movements and in intellectual and academic endeavors such as cultural studies, various area studies and other political and social theories interested in active historical subjects navigating a changing and “context-troubled” socio-economic sphere. In other words, culture is as central to the argument as economy. Also, so that Gramsci may discuss the future of capital he forecasts many of the cultural categories that seem or are similar to categories we see in today’s post-industrial society. These categories are congealed and unelaborated in the statement “societas rerum and the societas hominum.”
As identity politics, activism and “situated knowledges” become areas of mobilization for contemporary intellectuals involved in the study of culture these same “actors” must not turn a blind eye to Gramsci’s approach for acting in culture. Gramsci’s intellectual approach is wedded, seamlessly, to his acting in the world (I do not think, dualistically, that thinking is separate from acting; Gramsci’s materialism depends on both thought and action: for Gramsci everyone is an intellectual). Praxis is and must remain, a method that is not a method, it is neither simply for one type of intellectual nor is it intended to be only philosophical and critical; it sees history as experience and it seeks active control in the production of culture (i.e. material and symbolic aspects of culture). This, again, is why economy, and material forms of production remain central to Gramsci’s thought.

Gramsci’s interest in the variegated forms of social practice that inhabit the formation of “culture” or institutions or what is currently known as “social worlds” in disciplines like sociology and anthropology—through a “praxiological epistemology” and an historical and philological methodology—place the contemporary scholar of culture in some very particular positions in any attempt to recuperate Gramsci’s work to better understand, for instance, modern history and contemporary culture. (If, at least, for the reason that these are different times.) Further it must be said that the notion of “the society of things and the society of man” belies a particular rigor to Gramsci’s consideration of culture; it never excludes a concept of “nature” or an understanding of human relationship with nature. In fact, in an obvious expository turn one could argue that Gramsci differs from Freud, for example, based on the position of nature (and history) in their theories of culture. Others, like Freud, have attempted to look at “modern” (and “postmodern”) social, cultural and economic phenomena through lenses that, though less historical, have none the less initiated enduring discourses of
production and reproduction in society and culture. Here, I concentrate on Herbert Marcuse’s (and Freud’s) theories of production and reproduction of culture and society in both (western) “modern” and “postmodern” milieus. These theories, I contend, are a “touchstone” in a genealogy that involves the work of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guittari in important and perhaps not-so-obvious ways. Further, I read Marcuse and Freud against a modern critique of materialist and idealist theories of sex advanced by Rosemary Hennessey. Her critique will lead us into a further discussion of Gramsci’s “Americanism and Fordism.”

3.3 Sexological Interlude

Rosemary Hennessey’s book Profit in Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism (2000) offers, early on, a chapter devoted to the critique of “materialist” theories of sex appropriately entitled: “The Material of Sex.” She devotes a small section of this chapter to Sigmund Freud, Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse. Of all three, she focuses most intensely on the work of Herbert Marcuse, specifically his 1955 book, Eros and Civilization. Hennessey’s critique is a good introduction to the question of sexuality or the positioning of sex as the modality through which capital is understood for, on the one hand, what it takes as its object of critique and, on the other, what it leaves out.

Hennessey rightly notes that Marcuse recognizes “that changes in the organization of sexuality and libidinal pleasure are tied to changes in the division of labor and his [Marcuse’s] contention that the reification of the body and of pleasure under capitalism are alienating violations of human capacities” (Hennessey 2000: 43). She then states, “[H]e argues that advanced capitalist societies have made sex a commodity and that commodified sexuality closes down…a true sexual revolution” (2000: 43-44). However, Marcuse neither focuses on sex as a commodity any more than he attempts to integrate “guilt” or schuld into
the fabric of capitalist progress, nor does he focus on the function of instincts and their containment by various civil and social institutions, or other examples that I will refrain from noting here.\textsuperscript{10} Yet this is not an interesting critique of Hennessey’s argument, and leans rather towards the uncritical; further, it does not do justice to Hennessey’s well wrought and concise chapter. After Hennessey accuses Marcuse of mythologizing the relationship of sex to capital by placing Eros “prior to or outside of social life” she then correctly surmises, further down the page, that,

much like Eros, sexuality becomes an autonomous principle governing the organism. Once societal authority is absorbed by the individual, his erotic performance is brought in line with and repressed by his societal performance. Under the rule of capitalism’s performance principle, body and mind are made into instruments of alienated labor. The performance principle operates to unify the various objects of the instincts into one libidinal object of the “opposite sex” and to establish genital supremacy (Hennessey 2000: 44).

This is the mechanism by which society, in \textit{Eros and Civilization} (1955), regulates the laboring body and, by extension, labor power. This model, espoused by Marcuse in 1955 is no longer relegated to industrial forms of production, which is to say that both the “office worker” and the residues of Fordist discipline contribute to Marcuse’s model simultaneously. Having noted that, Hennessey then states a major objection to Marcuse’s theory: “under capitalism the libido is drained and used up by work, and sexuality/eros is relegated to leisure time and genital sex” (Hennessey 2000: 44). This is both, according to Hennessey, an oversimplification of sexuality in capital and, in that same vein, it misses the “historically variable ways” sex is \textit{in} the workplace as well as capital’s attempt to make a return on

\textsuperscript{10} See footnote 12, in this section, with regards to the German term \textit{Schuld}
“certain forms of sexual identity”—though she does not elaborate what forms of identity she is referring to here.

It is here that I intend to make my two caveats to Hennessey’s all too easy dismissal of *Eros and Civilization* and lead us into a comparative consideration of Marcuse and Gramsci. First caveat: Hennessey, very interestingly omits any reference to the specific, “the investment of monopoly capital in certain forms of sexual identity” (Hennessey 2000: 44). Further, she fails to state whether or how that claim is connected to her previous claim that “sexuality [in historically variant forms] pervades the workplace” (2000: 44). We must note that the year is 1955; from about 1941 to 1945, the industrial workplace was replete with female labor power—constructing bomb casings, riveting fuselages for B-29 Superfortresses and other warplanes, and armor plating for naval vessels, etc.—as there were various jobs requiring administrative and support office labor, known, at the time as “pink collar” jobs. Is this what Hennessey is referring to, and if it is, how did monopoly capital invest in sexual identities in this way; in both identities simultaneously? In other words, do variant forms of identity coincide or are they sequential? What is the specific nature of these forms of identity in relation to political economy?

We know from studies of Fordism and post-Fordist forms of economic discipline (Harvey, “The political-economic transformation of late twentieth-century capital” in *The Condition of Postmodernity* as well as Gramsci’s “Americanism and Fordism”) that the focus on “the family man” was buttressed by high wages and in some cases planned communities. In other words, the image was *made* a reality along with the by-products of American (U.S.) male virility (families could grow in proportion to wages, etc.) and the “guaranty,” for producers, of a stable work force. Of course, due to the development of capitalist modes of
production, in the present, in the direction of finance capital and finance instruments as well as the search for cheaper labor abroad, very often the market for, for instance, low skilled assembly line labor—in the automotive industry—simply wasn’t there as it had been in the 1970s. Is this what Hennessey is referring to? She does state, immediately following her complaint (quoted previously) that both Reich and Marcuse ignore the relation between gender and sexuality as well as the gendered division of labor. However, she, in this context makes the same move. I here have offered only two versions of the historical variance she mentions and I do not think (rather I know) that I have said little on the matter at hand. Moreover, it is impossible to know specifically what Marcuse is referring to. However, Marcuse, by not discussing the gendered division of labor, is able to generalize his theory as liberatory for all forms of sexuality—Hennessey admits that Marcuse’s liberated subject is polymorphously perverse (see his chapter 2 and page 203)—and whatever continuum of gender is imagined.

My second and more important caveat regards her objections to Marcuse’s text. I believe that at certain points Hennessey oversimplifies Marcuse’s argument, specifically the economy of “sex” as it works through his text. She notes that “a thoroughly administered society that absorbs and confines the individual and sexuality into alienated social arrangements dominated by repressive institutions like the media leaves little or no room for the possibility of social change” (44). And this is where the critique of Marcuse (and Reich) ends and segues (in her text) into gay liberation theories of the 1970s. This is precisely the point where Hennessey fails to discuss the dialectical formation Marcuse assigns to the operations of instincts so that it might overcome Freudian “guilt.”

11 Very interestingly, Hennessey never mentions the function of what could be called the guilt-rebellion dialectic in Eros and Civilization. This is, in so many ways, central to the “transformation” of the instincts and
In order to think Marcuse’s dialectic one should set two terms apart, from his text, as poles in the social struggle for the liberation or, to use his word, “transformation” of the instincts and of the institutional framework that contains them. These terms are “guilt” and “rebellion.” Marcuse notes, “[I]n every revolution, there seems to have been a historical moment when the struggle against domination might have been victorious—but the moment passed. An element of self-defeat seems to be involved in this dynamic” (Marcuse 1955: 90-91). At this point, he does not detail what it is that betrays revolution. In the next paragraph, discussing Freud, he notes that for Freud guilt feelings “explain the ‘identification’ of those who revolt with the power against which they revolt.” And, “The economic and political incorporation of the individuals into the hierarchical system of labor is accompanied by an instinctual process in which the human objects of domination reproduce their own repression” (Marcuse 1955: 91). It must be said, here, that Marcuse is introducing Freud’s notion of civilization as generating guilt through its “archaic heritage.” Marcuse explains:

[L]ife was organized by domination. And the man who succeeded in dominating the others was the father—that is to say the man who possessed the desired women and who had, with them, produced and kept alive the sons and daughters. The father monopolized…([the supreme pleasure) and subjugated the other members…. The monopolization of pleasure meant an unequal distribution of pain…. The burden of whatever work had to be done in the primal horde would have been placed on the sons who...had now become “free” for the channeling of instinctual energy into

of social institutions for Marcuse in both his earlier and later chapters. It is safe to say that she misses how, in chapter four, “The Dialectic of Civilization” functions. I say this because it is here that Marcuse states, plainly, “[N]ot all work involves desexualization, and not all work is unpleasurable” (Marcuse 1995: 83). Contradicting the claim that “eros and sexuality is relegated to leisure time and genital sex” (Hennessey 2000: 45). (I argue this point at the end of this section.
unpleasurable but necessary activities…, [This] created the mental preconditions for the continued functioning of domination. (Marcuse 1955: 61-62).

The primal father sets the terms of the economy and society—centered around pleasure. The brothers then re-enact the Oedipal scene by slaying the father to lift the direct repression of pleasure. What is significant here is that once the brothers set up a “clan” they realize the import of the father’s despotic pose and “guilt feeling” is instilled and takes the social form of a “prohibition” or “taboo.”¹² In other words, the guilt is represented in the form of taboos that mimic the father’s despotism, only there is no figure to embody the despotism, only the communally known taboo. This taboo becomes social morality, which, then, becomes law.

“Civilization—presupposes guilt feeling: it introjects into the individuals and thus sustains the principal prohibitions, constraints and delays in gratification on which civilization depends” (Marcuse 1955: 63). And, “The despot-patriarch has succeeded in implanting his reality principle in the rebellious sons. Their revolt has, for a short span of time, broken the chain of domination” then the new freedom is again suppressed—this time by their own authority and action. Must not their sense of guilt include guilt about the betrayal and denial of their deed” (Marcuse 1955: 66-67)? The reality principle, which is represented through the generation of taboos in society, then imbeds itself in the individual at the level of instincts. The proper use of the instincts is, as “civilization” develops, guided via institutions (and the performance principle); in other words, institutions exact the proper amount of

¹² Guilt or Schuld, in the German—which means both “guilt” and “debt” has another manifestation which becomes, for Freud, present in the superego. The “clan” realizes that it owes a debt to the Father (for “the gift of” morality and society) whom it has killed. Guilt takes the form of a debt which can never be repaid. It passes from its realization in the ego to the superego and regulates morality in the figure of the despotic father. This role then falls upon the functioning of institutions.
repression to enable society and economy to function, maximally (Marcuse’s “surplus repression” is the theory that elaborates this concept fully).13

This model is not too far off the mark when one considers the enduring strength of the Oedipal myth and its interlocutors in contemporary social theory (Anti-Oedipus [and part two: Mille Plateau], by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari), and, in terms of the function of institutions after “successful” revolutions see Michel Foucault’s “On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists” in Power/Knowledge (1980).14 Even if the forms of “identification” are institutional/administrative, that is to say, structural, it is precisely this notion of the primal and despotic father embedded in the social body that Marcuse’s theory supports via his reading of Freud. In other words, the notion of something haunting the social body and forcing a repetition of culture, society and governmentality is neither outrageous nor old-hat.

Now, through the elaboration of this model, one sees how the act of rebellion is actually a *reenactment* of the primal scene of rebellion, since the residues of the primal father are imbedded in society and reified through the presence of institutions such as juridical

14 Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*. Colin Gordon ed. New York: Pantheon, Pg. 29. The quick and dirty version of Foucault’s 1971 discussion with French Maoists: Foucault is trying to make the argument that juridical institutions, whether they are “revolutionized” via stages or not, contain all of the postures and disciplines, all of the effects, of the pre-Revolutionary society. The point of comparison between Marcuse and Foucault occurs at the level of a culture possessing a residue or kernel of something which functions in an organizational capacity (be it guilt or discipline). Foucault’s thoughts on the matter come closest to Marcuse’s in the following passage, “…the court, with its triple division into two disputing parties and the neutral institution, which comes to decisions on the basis of some concept of justice *which exists in and for itself*, seems to me a particularly disastrous model” (29). The concept of justice, which exists “in and for itself” unexamined, possesses the same residue of guilt—in fact, if one were to read Freud into Foucault’s statement (although this would not necessarily be theoretically cogent) one could link the concept of justice-for-itself to the taboo, and ultimately to the primal father.

Further, one must not forget that, with respect to guilt, Foucault locates “discourse” at the site of the Christian confessional. As a result, classification, visibility, intelligibility, knowledge and its partner, power are all haunted by guilt since the impetus to confess is either to avoid or accept punishment and the impetus to avoid or accept punishment is based on guilt.
institutions. As long as civility is maintained, the primal father haunts society through the very apparatuses which constitute it as such. For Marcuse, Freud’s dialectic is a “shallow” dialectic of “domination-rebellion-domination” with the primal father maintaining the repetition or rhythm of this dialectic indefinitely. However Marcuse wishes to posit that “the repressive force of the reality principle seems no longer renewed and rejuvenated by the repressed individuals. The less they function as the agents and victims of their own life, the less is the reality principle strengthened through ‘creative’ identifications and sublimations…” (Marcuse 1955: 104). Human potentialities are freed to develop inversely with the mass administration and development of society. In other words the monolithic institutions that Hennessey cannot see her way around, “repressive institutions like the media leave little or no room for the possibility of social change” (Hennessey 2000: 45), become the site where resistance is generated. For Marcuse, “the human energies which sustained the performance principle are becoming increasingly dispensable…dislodged from its instinctual as well as rational ground…. The elimination of human potentialities from the world of (alienated) labor creates the preconditions for the elimination of labor from the world of human potentialities” (Marcuse 1955: 105).

This process, as the last sentence of the quote would suggest, is a dialectical struggle not unlike what has been proposed by Marx, in *The Communist Manifesto, The German Ideology* and *The 1844 Manuscripts*; however, such a struggle in the contemporary context of manufacturing appearing in emerging economies (replaced by service labor in, for instance the U.S.) would depend upon the contemporary historical context through which the reality principle begins to exhibit the tendencies of its own dismantling. Further, resistance from the inside is possible, since Marcuse believes that pleasure can be experienced in certain
occupations and in certain interstitial moments; however revolution is recommended. (One must take into account that Foucault and the notion of “resistance from the inside”—or even Roland Barthes’ position at the end of *Mythologies* (1957), was not at all attractive to social theorists working at this time, certainly not Marxists.\(^{15}\) Finally, it is rather ineffective and uncritical in the terms of any critique to dismiss Marxist social theory before around 1960 on this basis.)

3.4 Gramsci’s Sexology or “Civil” Wars of Position: Societas Rerum vs. Societas Hominum vs. Societas Rerum

Antonio Gramsci, as opposed to Marcuse, pinpoints several strategic instances in the organization and rationalization of economies, where resistance through tactical means would be possible. However, the crux of Gramsci’s question of sex in the administration of planned economies does not focus on an answer that is concerned with how to resist. To attempt to tear this from out of Gramsci’s work is a reduction of Gramsci’s project. I would argue that to interpret Gramsci’s writing on labor discipline and sex as a question of how to resist the imposition of planning would make his project seem akin to a Foucaultian paradigm (instead of broadly responsible to an economic or Marxist paradigm). Rather, the section called “Americanism and Fordism” (Hoare and Smith) “showcases” Gramsci’s thought regarding the administration of both fascist political economy in Italy and, of course, capitalist economy in America (US) after World War One. This section will demonstrate that any attempt to pick up the thread of the question of sex still leads one towards the core of Gramsci’s preoccupation with modern forms of culture.

As I consider the question of sex in this body of work, I will point up particular concepts Gramsci imbedded in these concerns and I will discuss why they are important to both his work and contemporary critical cultural theory. Also, I will discuss the different effect Gramsci and Marcuse’s concepts have on considerations of culture and economy. Lastly, I will include anthropologist-historian David Horn and anthropologist and cultural critic Roger Lancaster in the discussion around Gramsci’s work. Horn has written on Gramsci’s Italy with regard to administrative technologies that were exacted on the bodies of most Italians. Lancaster, working through questions of “nature” in contemporary popular culture, has recuperated Gramsci’s work, appropriately the sections on “Americanism and Fordism.” Lancaster’s approach is through contemporary cultural (studies) criticism and queer theory; also it is diacritical and it laterally engages contemporary debates on sexual identity politics. Both Lancaster and Horn complement my discussion of Gramsci and, further, “direct” my questions in a tripartite (anthropological, historical and contemporary cultural-critical) fold.

If Buttigeig’s paper “Gramsci’s Method” functions as my barometer of interpretative integrity with regard to Gramsci’s thought, then I wish to indicate the position of particular concepts (and the importance of the concept) in Gramsci’s thought as it pertains to sex and planned economies. Gramsci does speculate on “archaic” social forms and their connection to contemporary society, further, he gives a nod to psychoanalysis but he never adopts guilt as a modality through which the current situation of culture and economy can and should be explained. Gramsci’s position on psychoanalysis, oddly enough, prefigures Reich’s capitulation as a social critic of moral proportions: he views “psychoanalysis and its enormous diffusion since the war as the expression of […] increased moral coercion” (1974:
Reich, in *The Sexual Revolution* (1972) and *Sex Pol* (1974) is concerned with generating a new “moral fabric” based on theories of sexuality and sex practices that are healthy to the individual and reflected in social mores and institutions. As culturally and sexually libertarian as Reich’s position may have been for its time, it was a form of social coercion that left institutions in place to regulate sexuality differently. This however would not have been amenable to Gramsci.

When Gramsci lays out the problem of Fordism, initially, he first asks the question of whether its impact signifies what might be considered an epoch in the narrative of the vicissitudes of capitalist modes of production and, second, he “dons his political economist hat” when he asks if it is “the ultimate stage in the process of progressive attempts by industry to overcome the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall” (Gramsci 1971: 280). I cannot be certain if these notes were made in an earlier notebook and elaborated in a later one or if, perhaps, the sections unified beneath the heading “American and Fordism” in the Hoare and Smith edition of *The Notebooks* (1971) were actually as “adjacent” to one another as this edition would have one believe. However, I can and do claim that Gramsci, in all of his considerations of planned economies was concerned with the composition of organic capital and with the price of labor—the two elements which comprise “the law of tendency” in Marxist economics. In other words, the thoughts in this section, the questions of culture and sex, are organized under the question of Fordism, which, in an important sense, is the question of the cost of organic capital (capital expressed as materials, use of machinery—but also the cost of the reproduction of labor) against the rate of exploitation (of value—extraction of surplus value). This contradiction is especially pertinent to Gramsci since

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16 The logic of this metaphor is obviously mixed since I contend that Gramsci is not only always wearing his political economist hat, he is always wearing many hats at once.
Fordist economies pay their workers such “high wages.” This problem, in its entirety, contains the seeds of culture and its function. Gramsci’s posing of the problem at first, in economic terms, does not force him to reduce the role of culture. He is simply setting up a contradiction.

I am not “versioning” Gramsci as “vulgar” or “Marxist” economist, here, but, what I am suggesting is that rather than focus on an “anthropological” or mythic concept like the primal father or a concept as abstract and “theocratic” as guilt (Marcuse and Freud); Gramsci is noting the specific intellectual problem that this poses to “economy.” Further, this technique, which is a kind of epistemological framing technique (as I state earlier) enables Gramsci to know particular effects of economy and culture: particularly the difference between a true effect and the agglomeration of indecipherable effects which overdetermine a cultural context. Gramsci’s commitment to (political) economy and culture simultaneously, his interest in complicating his concepts through cultural (class) practices across cultural and national boundaries (e.g. various historical examples from Italy and America) is described by Roger Lancaster as “connectivity.” Lancaster states (in a footnote),

Everything Gramsci writes about, from theories of ideological hegemony to strategies of class alliance turns on connectivity…. [I]t seems to me that Gramsci’s text could be used in more than one way, or, at any rate, that theories of hegemony ought to attend more rigorously to how an institutional nexus articulates with and reproduces (or fails to reproduce) a given regime of accumulation. (Lancaster 2003: 310).

I intend to illustrate Lancaster’s passage by way of an example. Gramsci’s “Law (or Theorem) of Fixed Proportions” (borrowed from Maffeo Pantaleoni, Principi di Economica Pura) is, according to Gramsci, inextricably connected to “the science of organizations (the
study of the administrative apparatus of demographic composition) and general politics (situations of relations of force, in the problem of the intellectuals, etc.)” (Gramsci 1971: 190).

The substance of the theorem is, in sum, that if a certain element of some variable is present, as in chemistry and the formation of compounds, the proper amount of each element must be present to form a greater substance. Now, if less of the element that is needed to form a compound is present, it can only work if it suffices in the overall composition. Further, what is excessive to the formation remains free. Now, considering “connectivity” (Lancaster), of admittedly looser comportment than Butigeig might like, this theorem—plugged into the question of sex via “the study of the administrative apparatus of demographic composition” (Gramsci)—is able to monitor, in culture, the truth of the various cultural representations of social groups via the effects of administrative apparatuses on the practices of the group and, in turn, the effect (or lack) of the group’s practices on accumulation and the effect (or lack of) back on the administrative apparatus. This is because for Gramsci, and through the nexus of concepts that get at the production of culture economics is held in a constellation with culture and history and each of these concepts point to production. Therefore, at every point, economy undergirds culture in interesting ways. The production of cultural and its meanings is economic, further it is mediated by history and, moreover, the unfolding of history through contemporary culture is the location of Gramsci’s analysis in passages like “Americanism and Fordism.”

In other words, this theorem occupies a position similar to “guilt” or “the primal father,” but, unlike Freud and Marcuse’s concepts, it is neither a foundation for the study (be it myth, anthropology of archaic cultures, etc.) nor the arch-myth behind all western
civilization. Instead, it is related to the administrative and nationalistic _desires_ represented through the _logic_ of contemporary forms of economy and society. Marcuse’s “surplus-repression” is a concept that depends upon the myth of the primal father and that claims to know “the differential between (phylogenetically necessary) repression and surplus-repression…. Within the total structure of the repressed personality, surplus-repression is that portion which is the result of specific societal conditions sustained in the specific interest of domination (Marcuse: 1955: 88). Marcuse explains that since “surplus-repression” is the result of specific social conditions: “The extent of this surplus-repression provides the standard of measurement: the smaller it is, the less repressive is the stage of civilization” (Marcuse 1955: 88). In order to determine the extent and functioning of “surplus-repression” you start with a group or an individual: this is not clear. According to Marcuse there is no necessary differential amongst individuals in the group based on location, race, (even) gender—or perhaps the group, in true sociological fashion, determines the range of variables present; this, also, is not clear. One then discerns (I suppose if it is a group as object of the study somehow an “average” or “mean” is derived) how much[?] repression the group is experiencing is phylogenetically necessary to that group in society and how much is “extra.” Finally, that result determines the extent to which a civilization is specifically repressive.

One wonders first, how it is possible to imagine what quantity of repression is phylogenetically necessary and what is “extra.” It would require one to have complete knowledge of the function of society and the full extent of the interrelationships it engenders. Then, how does one discern between different forms of repression as surplus to existing repression? In other words, how are different administrative expressions of repression differentiated and, all the same, understood as extracting a surplus—do the differences matter
at all? Even if I am being unfair to Marcuse, he would require either the interrogative subject or his concept to know things that cannot really be known—things that comprise the crux of the question of repression.

Gramsci’s theorem does not claim to know anything, it is contemporary to political economy, it is rigorous in its analysis and it is consistently tested in the crucible of contemporary economy and society. Dislodge “surplus repression” and Marcuse’s work is dismantled. Dislodging the Law of Fixed Proportions requires an investigation of each socio-cultural example to which Gramsci attaches it (it may not be a principle that is generalizable across all examples, but it may work quite well in certain situations). It requires one to “attend,” precisely “more rigorously to how an institutional nexus articulates with and reproduces (or fails to reproduce) a given regime of accumulation” (Lancaster 2003: 310). It does not attempt to congeal or unify and then explain culture through a series of concepts that contain a polemic, an implicit ethical position as to what culture ought to resemble or become. The example of this “theorem” is complementary to Gramsci’s method, which is philological and critical; it is, also, illustrative of the “connectivity” that Lancaster rightly indicates is the force behind Gramsci’s critique of capitalism and culture.

3.5 Demography and Sex

David Horn, like Roger Lancaster, adds a dimension to Gramsci’s work that has not otherwise been noted in contemporary critical studies of culture. However, Horn has no necessary commitment to Gramsci’s work. Rather, Horn gives us an idea of how Italy, at the time Gramsci was in prison, vigorously regulated sex to benefit the development of fascist economy. Horn also sheds some light on the categories Gramsci employs in his discussion of the sex question, particularly the interest in “the demographic composition of Europe.” My
discussion of Horn will attempt to “flesh out” the context in which Gramsci’s ideas on Americanism and Fordism developed. It will suggest that his “sense” of America depends greatly on his understanding of Italian Fascism and its administration of the population, specifically through the technologies of demography.

David Horn’s book, *Social Bodies: Science, Reproduction and Italian Modernity* (1994), incorporates a tremendous amount of material in the form of scientific and state documents (and other materials) from fascist Italy to discuss how invasive social technologies were developed to produce self-managing socialized bodies as naturally fertile bodies. In a chapter entitled “Social Bodies,” Horn discusses a concept, the “new organicism,” which was considered *good objective science by everyone*. Corrado Gini coined the phrase and was the motivating intellectual behind Italy’s Central Institute of Statistics from 1926-1932. This is the period of time that Gramsci was first imprisoned until five years prior to when he was released. Although I have no evidence that Gramsci was speaking back to Gini, it is most certainly the case that Gini, “a professional demographer, statistician and sometime eugenicist,” was “hegemonic” in the field of demographic work in Italy. Since Gramsci was prolific during this time and had daily access to information about contemporary Italy, it can be easily assumed that by dint of his concerns with demography he was either speaking indirectly to Gini or to his students. Further, it is most certainly the case that Gini was encamped with the “positivists” that Gramsci spends so much time critiquing.

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17 “The exclusive property of neither the political left nor the right, and central to projects as diverse as Durkheimian sociology and German racial sciences, the “new organicism […] marked a new way of conceiving and a program for adjusting the relations between the whole of society and its parts and helped to construct a new nosology of social pathologies” (Horn 1994: 20).
(as “Lorains”) for their misguided attempts at scientific sociology and their allegiance to an “ideological” socialism that easily converts into fascism for so many (Mussolini for one).  

Gini’s methodology for the administration of sex and reproduction was a direct refutation of Marx. That societies exhibit similar (even identical) regularities had, in Gini’s view, been established by demography, political economy and the social sciences. For Gini, the earliest statistical studies…had demonstrated (in a “refutation” of Marx) that societies, like organisms, are in dynamic equilibrium…. Political economy had brought to light mechanisms of auto-regulation and compensation…. Sociology had discovered internal regularities of society, what Durkheim had called “social facts comparable to those discovered in physiology”[?]. … [F]inally statistics made it possible to distinguish scientifically various stages in the evolution of nations, corresponding to the stages of growth of the individual organism (Horn 1994: 22). 

Further, Gini’s science was certainly more exacting than Taylor’s in that it was to be used on Southerners in Italy specifically for the purposes of filling in the vast empty spaces of the rural south and, ultimately, producing a healthy and ample workforce. The case could be made (although I don’t believe I possess enough evidence) that Gramsci was speaking about America, Fordism and on occasion Taylorism through Gini’s demography and fascist Italy. 

This paper has been an attempt to consider notes Gramsci made on planned economies from the vista of Gramsci’s own method, his historical context and against other theories of production which endure as critical discourses of production. It places “sex” as central to the consideration of economies’ effects in culture. Specific “regimes of accumulation” effect sex through socio-cultural avenues and sex, further, gets in the way of society through culture and, by connection, economy. I don’t mean, through this work, to

18 I mention Rocco and Lombroso in the previous section. See also Schneider 1998, pp. 99-115.
minimize the force of “guilt” as a powerful operator in the “secular” Christian cultures of America and Europe (in fact, Walter Benjamin’s little essay and annotated bibliography “Capitalism as Religion” states that capitalism is the highest and most destructive manifestation of guilt). However, Antonio Gramsci’s work relies on culture, entirely. He could never claim what he does about economy unless it is through culture. Culture or for that matter social institutions are not explained away through their relationship to an unrecorded past which represents, ahistorically, a society’s formative stages. This is why Marcuse’s attempts to deal with Marx and Freud together were most admirable but they left a lot to be desired. Though I know many would disagree, cultural critics cannot assume the role of psychoanalyst to the world-as-analysand. Although this discourse for understanding cultural meaning is still very productive, and seems to be present in all critical modes under some other name (e.g. “trauma theories” in Caribbean studies); it will never be able to engage cultural objects on its own. Culture as an object is large and the route through culture is more than sex and the institutions that regulate it. It is when sex can be imagined historically and economically, when it can unlock itself from the primal scene and, further, the refuge that this scene provides through psychoanalytical discourse that other imaginaries will become possible.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19} I think that Foucault is someone who provides cultural critics with a “new” way to think about sex as disengaged, though not entirely, from the Freudian economy of sex. See also Foucault’s modified position, in light of a greater understanding of historical contextuality, in Volumes 2 & 3.
4. GRAMSCI, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE, AND AGENCY: 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASSICAL AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY AND CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT

The raison d'être for sociological thinking is to develop an approach for thinking about society and all that it entails: states, social institutions, politics, cultures, communities, etc. As such, society taking center stage, structure tends to produce social subjects despite the tradition in classical sociological thinking that spends a great deal of time discussing and describing the formation of selves (especially in the work of George Herbert Mead) and the relationship between experience, ideology, history, and the development of socio-historical “epochs” (in the work of Karl Marx). Classical American philosophy, which emerges at around the same time and, in some cases is peopled by the same figures, especially Mead and in a less pronounced and more problematic matter, genealogically speaking, Dewey and Bergson, addresses directly the question of human experience through the categories of consciousness, empiricism, perception, and will—to name but a few. I will consider a limited form of the relationship that certain tenets of sociological thought share with classical American philosophy, specifically regarding the relationship between social structures and social institutions, on the one hand, and the varied ways that “social individuals” experience the world through preexistent social categories as well as through the unique perceptual, tactile, embodied and experiential qualities that may at times “exceed” their societal use values even if they are organized back into social, political, and cultural meanings. I think that it is possible for individuals and communities to assert and claim priority for their experiences of the world, but this, I contend, requires a way to actively engage in the social
and structural terrain that organizes, legitimates, and validates certain experiences of the world over and against others.

My analysis will first consider the similarities between certain aspects of sociological structural theories and theories of consciousness and cognition in classical American philosophy. I will explain how William James’s concept of “habit” actually provides room for imagining labor as, simultaneously, an ontological and social category. The problem, then, is how one is able to give significance to the ontological and experiential qualities that emerge from different forms of sensuous activity in the world. I will consider how the discussion of “percepts” in classical American thought paves the way for conceiving of the simultaneous existence of multiple social realities within a “singular” societal context. I will end the essay by bringing classical American philosophical work in alignment with classical sociological thought, specifically—with regard to the latter—the work of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Marx. I will contend that different ways of experiencing the social world have to be given a polemical form while the intellectual, sensuous and somatic content is excavated pedagogically. I will conclude with some remarks on the relationship between structures and selves by bringing Gramsci and Marx into a conversation with the latest work of György Lukács, who revisited his discussion of labor, praxis, and ontology that he began in the early-middle part of his life and career.

As stated in my introductory first section, the goal of this dissertation is to investigate the impact that historical (and cultural) contexts have on the production of theories and concepts. In specific, I am interested in the relationship between historical and cultural contexts and the production of theoretical knowledge. In this case, I seek to demonstrate that within the classical philosophical and sociological tradition Gramsci’s work contains
conceptual categories that enable it to dovetail with classical (American) philosophical concepts as well as contemporary concepts in cultural theory, for instance, habits/habitus, perception, apperception, and the category of ontology. Gramsci’s discussion of these concepts are not a mere reflection of (Marxist) class analysis but, rather, are a negotiation of a complex historical and cultural-national context and, moreover, that this negotiation produced a discourse that can account for significant variation within social, political, and cultural formations. Lastly, although this section is more loosely structured with regard to historical data—instead advancing a theoretical argument—it does represent an attempt to connect the categories of culture and class across modern and postmodern periods. I also want to point out that Gramsci’s rather clear perspective on classical American philosophy or “Pragmatism: in “Pragmatism and Politics” (Gramsci 1971: 372-373) in the notebooks, though an indictment of the political project of “American Pragmatism” is limited in its scope and analysis as are some topics Gramsci wrote on given his access to sources in prison. Further, Gramsci could not have anticipated the different “political” careers of, for example, William James and John Dewey. This raises problems for the methodological category of intention; one of the most problematic methodological guidelines, I believe, in the contextualist approach.

Regardless, in this section, I make a series of methodological assumptions that are in-line with historical contextualism in my approach to the analysis of data from Gramsci’s personal correspondences (Jones 1986; Camic 1995; Strenski 1997; Abbot 1999; Camic and Gross 2001).

1. Historical texts are historical products;
2. The actual intentions of the author (to the extent that we can explain and interpret them) should be our principal guide as to why the text took the particular form it did;

3. The imminent contexts in which these text were produced must be analyzed it is around this analysis that a theoretical framework may be constructed.

4.1 Habit, Habitus and Practice, or Society, Bodies, and Experience

There is a significant relationship between William James’s section on “Habit” from his *Psychology: Briefer Course*, and the concept “habitus” from the structural theories of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The relationship, and my thesis, is that James’s empirical basis for the construction of his conception of habit, neurology, is analogous—in logical terms—to Bourdieu’s conception of the social structure. Both neurology and social structure undergird the conceptual efficacy of habit and habitus. In what follows, I will draw out that relationship and come to some conclusions about the specific significance of the relationship.

James’s empiricism, which is rooted in the contemporary scientific field that describes the neurological functioning of the brain, provides an architecture for his conception of habit. James states that “an acquired habit…is nothing but a new pathway of discharge formed in the brain, by which certain incoming currents ever after tend to escape” (James 1977: 9). These neurological-material pathways, cleaved out by the acquisitions of habits, are—James notes—“plastic” enough that they yield to the sensations and experiences of the world through the generation of neurological substructures within the brain. These substructures then are present, neurologically, and organize pathways for nerve centers (James 1977: 11). According to James then, given the “plastic” nature of the brain these well tread paths become the organizational structures for the nerve centers producing habitual
actions. This structural aspect of James’s conception of “habit” has its logical analog in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, specifically regarding his conception of habitus.

Habitus, a concept that Bourdieu locates in the work of the anthropologist Marcel Mauss, has been described, generally, in *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture*, as “a socialized subjectivity.” In his book *Logic of Practice* (1990) and in a 1987 essay, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” Bourdieu states that habitus is a “structuring structure” that is fundamentally “a cognitive structure with a social genesis.” For Bourdieu, habitus is linked to his conception of doxa, which are essential beliefs taken as self-evident and universal. Doxa inform the practices of individuals; furthermore doxa favor the always-already extant social structure, thereby recognizing (one’s own position of) dominance as self-evident and universally favorable or justifiable.

James, toward the end of his brief piece on “Habit” explains how through the development of character one can subject habits—the function of the nervous system—to a kind of “second order” of actions and liberate other conscious aspects of practice to do higher orders of work. He states, “[T]he more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work” (1977: 17). I would argue that for those mired in labor and poverty, the faculties that structure the capacity and opportunity for higher-order “proper work” are hopelessly lost to the strata people who do not, that cannot, engage the societal potential afforded through, for instance, a formal education.

Bourdieu’s “habitus” is a concept designed to engage particularly this problematic. However, despite the sociological logic of his conceptual underpinning (as opposed to a biological logic) he does not offer the kind of subjective or individual potential that James
does in discussing the relationship between individuals and fundamental “structuring structures:” those that are “felt” but not perceived. If, for instance, proper work has its societal genesis in the institutions that provide the credentials so that certain folks can do work proper to their position on the flywheel of society, proper work exists only for those who have had the advantage of developing a proper relationship to their work—a relationship proper to their position within the society. But, as I mention above, James does give an example that, perhaps, may transcend class.

If, for the working class, experiencing a relationship to labor forms the schoolhouse that delimits the relationships available to do proper work, we can see a creativity that attempts, at any and all points, to transcend the rationalization of labor that began with Fredrick Taylor in 1911 and remains a societal control measure available to any and all capitalists today. I am thinking particularly of a book of essays written by a former Longshoreman, Reg Theriault entitled The Unmaking of the American Working Class (2003). In an essay which describes how the intellectual, sentimental, somatic, and creative ability of workers was inextricably lost to labor rationalization, to automation and to history, Theriault recounts how he watched two teamsters load a shipping container with 500lb. oil drums using a ramp and a beveled two-by-four. The one man would line up and roll a drum down a steep hill toward the other who stood inside the container with the piece of wood braced only by his hands and a knee forming a short and steep makeshift incline. As the drum sped toward the man standing in the container he would line the wood up with the end of the drum furthest from the drum that was upright in the container—the place where the coming drum would assume its new upright position as packed next to all the other drums. The speeding 500lb barrel of oil would then roll up the two-by-four, on its edge, and pivot to an upright
position right next to the previously loaded drum: both maximizing the space in the container and creating a perfectly ordered array of drums. This talent was erased by automated loading methods only years later.

The point however remains: it is possible—given the logic of James’s argument regarding habit—to imagine that the abstraction or looseness of the phrase “proper work” can be grounded back into the discussion of habit such that the intellectual and sensuous abilities described transcend institutional or “credentialized legitimations” of work. However, it does not get around the value and indispensability (or dispensability) placed, socially and economically, on certain types of work. What is at stake, here, is how the range of talent and of experience that anyone is capable of can be lost to the crushing weight of society and institutional structure which can, and often does, rob the most remarkable experiences from an experiential and experienced “vocabulary” of the world.

The term “novelty” which has some significant “truck” with classical American philosophy represents a conceptual place such that “bare continuity cannot be experienced. There is a tang of novelty in each moment of experience” (Mead 1981: 350). As far as novelty presents itself to experience the subjective qualities of novelty are, borrowing from and critiquing Kant’s *Mannigfaltigkeit der Empfindungen* or “varied or diverse sensations or impressions” (my translation). Mead states of novelty that it is, for Kant, “an unordered sensuous content which becomes experience when it is placed within the forms of the understanding.”²⁰ Coming to terms with novelty requires a break from the sensuous content of novelty so that it may be situated within the limits of comprehension or an understanding of

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²⁰ It should be mentioned here that in *The Philosophy of the Present* Mead enters into an extensive discussion with regard to the objective qualities of “novelty,” how and where it can be located in nature. His basis for this thinking emerges from the work of Charles Darwin and makes recourse to a series of biological facts as well as biological metaphors. It is too extensive to discuss within the limits of this paper.
the experience of the novel. Mead notes that “without this break within continuity, continuity would be impossible.” And, later, Mead notes that:

Kant’s chasm between the two [content and form of experience] is illusory… as present passes into present there is always some break in the continuity—within the continuity not of the continuity. The break reveals the continuity, while the continuity is the background for the novelty (1981: 350).

In other words, for Mead the break is located not in some categorical or empirical separation of experience into our cognition. Rather, what mediates the experiencing of experience is the very complexity of the individual self. The break in continuity is overshot by an effect of memory, which places a present experience in the context of the self. He states that “the primal break of novelty in passage is gone and the problem of bridging the contingent factors is before the mind…” (1981: 351). Mead notes that the memory of another experience is fundamentally cognitive and unifies the experience that the “I” has into the biography of the “me” such that the memory of the other experience does not contain its novelty—which is imminent—but rather situates the present experience in the self such that it is intelligible. However, novelty reemerges within the construction of the self such that it is an individuated and novel self. Mead states, in his Carus Lectures delivered in 1930 in Berkeley a year before his death and compiled under the title The Philosophy of the Present, that

…our pasts are always mental in the same manner in which the futures that lie in our imaginations ahead of us are mental. They differ, apart from their successive positions, in that the determining conditions of interpretation and conduct are embodied in the past as that is found in
the present, but they are subject to the same test of validity to which
our hypothetical futures are subject. And the novelty of every future
demands a novel past. (Mead 1932: 31).

In other words, the novelty is also situated within the individual selves that cognate and
construct experience through a personal timeline. It is from this point that something of a
vocabulary of the world becomes intelligible. I will pursue this further through a discussion
of the “percept” as it mediates the relationship between structural and individual realities.
This will, further, raise issues regarding experience, perception, structures, and
communicability that I will address in the last section of the paper.

4.2 “Percept” and the Disambiguation of Reality

In the context of classical American philosophy, or pragmatism, Henri Bergson, who
was attached to Mead, James and others in the form of correspondences, used the term
“percept” in his 1896 work, Matter and Memory. However, after Bergson, many interlocutors
including James’s student and contemporary C.S. Peirce sought to distance themselves from
Bergson’s thought and, more specifically, his methods. Peirce writes, “[A] man who seeks to
further science can hardly commit a greater sin than to use the terms of his science without
anxious care to use them with strict accuracy; it is not very gratifying to my feelings to be
classed along with a Bergson who seems to be doing his prettiest to muddle all distinctions”
(Perry 1935: 438). However, in Principia Mathematica, Whitehead and Russell attempted to
assign some “strict accuracy” to the category percept. They describe percept:

The universe consists of objects having various qualities and standing in
various relations. Some of the objects which occur in the universe are
complex. When an object is complex it consists of interrelated parts. Let
us consider a complex object composed of two parts a and b standing to each other in relation R. The complex object “a-in-the-relation-R-to-b” may be capable of being perceived . . . we then judge that a and b stand in the relation R. Such a judgment, being derived from perception by mere attention, may be called a “judgment of perception.” This judgment of perception, considered as an actual occurrence, is a relation of four terms, namely a and b and R and the percipient. The perception, on the contrary, is a relation of two terms, namely “a-in-the relation-R-to-b,” and the percipient. Since an object of perception cannot be nothing, we cannot perceive “a-in-the-relation-R-to-b” unless a is in the relation R to b. Hence a judgment of perception, according to the above definition, must be true. (Whitehead and Russell 1962: 43).

More on this quotation later. In the first sub-section of this section, I followed a genealogical linkage from William James to Pierre Bourdieu and the “matter” of this linkage—what comprised the “chain” was the somewhat isomorphic nature of the concept or concepts habit (James)/habitus (Bourdieu). For both, the distinctive neurological development of individuals and the presence of “doxa,” or self evident beliefs that are the stuff of social structures that comprise the basis for a social form of cognition, respectively, locate their mediation in a process that is fundamentally cognitive but that contains a distinctively different basis. For the former, James, that basis is neurological and for the latter, Bourdieu, that basis is socio-structural. However, for both, irrespective of the “basis,” experience or action reifies these processes. For James, it produces well-worn neurological networks, for Bourdieu, it strengthens the legitimacy of the doxa—expressions and justifications of the present
structure—and is further rooted in social process through the reception of “capital” (social capital, cultural capital, economic capital), which can be described as a kind of recognition and reward from the structure to the individual.

This is where the assertion of “percept” into the discussion troubles all the well established conceptual and processual aspects of habit and habitus. In an attempt to summarize the import of the quotation, above, from *Principia Mathematica*, what Whitehead and Russell are concerned with is *perception* and *judgment* as the basis for the categorization and conceptualization of objects. But, more significantly, they are concerned with both perception and judgment as the basis for reality, more specifically, as the basis for the conception of empiricism. The nature of the percept, then, within this context, is such that it is contestable based entirely on judgment, or the percipient’s perception of the, or their, percept.

Now, enter James and Bourdieu and the social world. If both neurology and social structure undergird the conceptual efficacy of habit and habitus and, with regard to the former, the plasticity of neurological processes includes not only the potentiality for imagining or assigning a role to alternative judgments, the recognition of novelty, and the like, but, also, constitutes variability within the structures of the social world itself (empiricism and reality based upon perception and judgment, both). The key to better understanding the potential inherent in James’s thought is that James’s conception of habit enables the “percipient” to relegate—through reflection—habitual action to second-handedness. Habitus, on the other hand, is really an internalization of the social structure such that the percipient judges that there is really “nothing new under the sun.” If, in the social world, two “percipients” stand next to each other—more or less assuming a similar if
not the same perspective—and are both witness to a phenomenon or event of some kind, a distinctively different if not opposite judgment could result. This resolution may be due to “interpretation” but it may also be due to the actual perception differing thus exploding the empirical or real ground of phenomenon in the world. What do we assign the “illusion” to: mere judgment or interpretation or to the actual event, phenomenon, or object? If the percipients claim that they saw, perceived, distinctly different things does this not consign ambiguity directly to the process of conceiving of what is real? Or, rather, is not reality fundamentally ambiguous not in terms of judgment or interpretation but, more foundationally, in terms of what constitutes reality itself?

Through the communicability (or lack of communicability) between the percipients of the event, phenomenon, or object at hand these phenomena—rooted in the social world—directly challenge the empirical basis of social reality. Or, in other words, the phenomena raise a question regarding the relationship between judgment and reality where perception is what produces the experience of what is real. In sociological terms, specifically political sociology and cultural sociology, this raises fundamental questions regarding the relationship between ideology and society. The former, ideology, is always considered analytically distinctive from the latter, society. This is due to the separation between, on the one hand, interpretations and justifications from, on the other hand, structural process (e.g. the effects of a certain policy or the way in which an economy operates and affects behaviors, etc.). If the interpretations or judgments are based on a misperception that has, as of yet, to be challenged by someone who perceived an event, phenomenon or object as distinctively different, then one thing that we can claim from all of this is that sociology (as well as all other sciences) rely upon the principle of a fundamental “disambiguation” of social reality.
This, perhaps, is why social structures are so solid or stolid and, also, why Bourdieu’s category of “doxa” is a necessary addition to his theory. One might claim that even for Bourdieu the effective strength of his theory comes from reinforcing the uniformity of judgment as opposed to relying on the concreteness of socio-structural concepts.

There has been a thorough-going discussion, especially under the rubric of political theory, regarding the fair and just communicability of different perspectives. This discussion has focused on different aspects of scholarly concern in the social sciences. The texts which treat this problem with the utmost seriousness are John Rawls’s *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (2001), Jurgen Habermas’s *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1981; 2 volumes), and Nancy Frazer’s “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age” (1995). The latter was expanded into a discussion of these issues with the German political theorist Axel Honneth under the title, *Redistribution Or Recognition?: A Political-philosophical Exchange* (2003). At this point, I do not wish to enter into a lengthy discussion about the similarities and differences with regard to these texts. Two things remain significant here, first, each of these texts seek to construct a series of discursive rules (language games) based in forms of rationality (both transparent and instrumental) that make cross cultural or experiential distinctiveness equally “valuable” without falling into a trap of extreme relativism or enable the political terrain or the locus of power isomorphic such that instrumentalism always wins the day (Habermas and Rawls). Secondly, Fraser’s model seeks to level the playing field by including the materialist category of redistribution. For her, certain linguistic requirements cannot be met without the concomitant opportunities being met by a fair and equitable distribution of social needs or social wealth. This, arguably, would be the endpoint of both Rawls’s and Habermas’s construction of communicability.
What I think is absent from this discussion—which relies strongly on the Enlightenment project as well as modernist understandings of the political world—is the recognition of a locus of an experiential language which is “faithful” to radically different percepts. Conceptions of cognition, after all and even somewhat arguably within the vein of modernism and Enlightenment thinking, “… is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me as well” (Giddens 1971: 41). Marx’s passage from the *German Ideology* indicates that all forms of communication are deeply—ideologically—rooted in social structures, such that the distinction between cognition, language, and ideology is hard won if won at all. If this is the case, the presumption of a “democratic” system of communication—based in Enlightenment and modernist thinking—represents a fundamental departure from the question of what experience is and how it emerges, or becomes manifest, or, finally, if it can be recognized and recovered at all. I believe that it can. The question of experience, communication, and self-determination—a question that I address in the first sub-section of this section—requires a detour through the work of Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, and William James. I believe that James’s departure from the series of philosophical clusters that attempt to determine, at the very least to describe, the nature of consciousness through his forays into “radical empiricism” have something in common with Marx’s discussion of “ontology” as well as Antonio Gramsci’s expansion of the “philosophy of praxis.”

4.3 Gramsci, Marx, and James

In subsequent sub-sections of this section I have argued that the “nature” of experience is such that it can be “cut off” through the structural function of a given social formation. This led me to question the “nature” of experience in the context of a reality that
is governed by the particularities of structural potential (a moment in the social formation; see, e.g. Althusser 1968 and, also, the work of Nicos Poulantzas). If reality, as I have argued, can only ever be apprehended through a percept, then the emphasis on structure as conferring the “ultimate” if not “empirically verifiable” meaning of reality requires the disambiguation of what is real through a sociological empiricism that locates the real in what is both present (in a “vulgar” sense) and possible. This, I will argue is insufficient if we consider William James’s position in *The Will to Believe*. In what follows I will argue that James’s position comes very close to Karl Marx’s discussion (or Marxist discussions) regarding the foundational ontological and epistemological qualities of social individuals. Marx’s conception of praxis, which is often downplayed in sociological thought due to the dialectical process through which the concept must be understood, is too often swept up into an eschatological or teleological end-game—such that one might assign the concept to a particular mode of production. Most often, contemporary sociological analysis requires that it be understood in the process of capitalism. But praxis in Marx, like experience in James, depends much more upon historical accident, ambiguity, and process than is often allowed for, especially, for instance, in the sociological literature.

*The Will to Believe* begins by introducing a series of examples to make a general point. James illustrates that one’s will to believe operates when, in any given context, moment, or situation, one is confronted with two different “live” hypotheses that are equally coherent and equally correspond to empirical data: “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds” (James 1977: 723). This quotation is based upon a statement or sentiment, of James’s from “The Sentiment of Rationality,” where
he says that, “Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when we form our philosophical opinions. Intellect, will, taste, and passion co-operate just as they do in practical affairs” (James 1977: 334).

The role of passion is certainly not ignored by those whose investigations into praxis are concerned with the realization of its theoretical tenets. Antonio Gramsci’s interlocutions with regard to the development and deployment of praxis remain unparalleled. Gramsci states,

A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself at the outset in a polemical and critical guise, as superseding the existing mode of thinking and existing concrete thought (the existing cultural world). First of all, therefore, it must be a criticism of “common sense”, basing itself initially, however, on common sense in order to demonstrate that “everyone” is a philosopher and that it is not a question of introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone’s individual life, but of renovating and making “critical” an already existing activity (Gramsci 1971: 330).

At first blush, the political project of praxis, here, appears as just another ideological justification for a specific world view. However, as one reads on, the key—and something that is absent, if only in nuance, from Marx’s work—is to understand what Gramsci means by “common sense” and his claim that everyone is a philosopher.

In Gramsci’s work, common sense represents a suffusion of both passion and intellect. Common sense is lived and, for Gramsci, forms the practical basis for something like a political pedagogy. Gramsci states that common sense “already enjoys, or could enjoy, a certain diffusion, because it is connected to and implicit in practical life” (1971: 330). Its
strength is that it becomes the basis for discovery, for proposition making, for those who are not connected to the credentialized philosophical strata within a given society. So, common sense is a repository of cultural knowledge. It is the knowledge that describes the collective experience of a cultural group. However, it has no sense of itself as knowledge nor does it possess historical continuity. In other words, it endures because it is the basis for communal and individual knowledge such that it becomes the basis for a reality that is defensible because it is experienced communally. It becomes the basis for an opposition to ideology; to a justification for reality as it is because the social structure or social formation makes it so even over and against the interests of some. Praxis, then, could be understood as the basis for the defense and elaboration of communal percepts such that they contain the political and ethical potential for intervening in the picture of reality that is “broadcast” through the socio-structural machinations of the world. This gives us the first key, “common sense.”

However, how does Gramsci’s claim regarding everyone’s status as a philosopher come into the picture? This claim ties Gramsci’s version of praxis most closely to James. James’s *The Will to Believe* was delivered in the form of a lecture to the Philosophical Clubs of Brown and Yale University (James 1971: 717). The significance of this cannot be understated; James knew his audience and this allowed him to propose a particular conception of belief grounded in the rational choice between two distinct propositions with equal empirical and logical weight. Common sense, unless it is the common sense of a philosopher, does not require a language of propositionality, logic, or empiricism. If common sense becomes the ground upon which a scaffolding of praxis is erected, and if praxis is a philosophical elaboration of common sense such “that it becomes a renewed common sense possessing the coherence and the sinew of individual philosophies,” then praxis serves a
pedagogical function. So when Gramsci states, above, that “everyone is a philosopher,” this signifies that trained in such and such a way even an Italian laborer can sit in on the lecture intended for the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities and participate, comprehend, and engage. Being a philosopher of a certain kind is dependent on the meaning a community links to that identity.

Coming full circle, Marx’s epistemological concerns were such that he recognized the fundamentally changeable “nature” of nature itself. Marx’s discussion of sensuous activity required his social individual to persistently involve him or herself in a relationship with the natural world. The dialectical moment that captures this epistemological concern is between labor and nature, mediated by desire, knowledge, passion, every ounce of what Marx understood by ontology. Like James (and Dewey), for Marx it could be argued that “experience itself, taken at large, can grow by its edges” and that the world contains novelty—this drives the persistent search for knowledge through an intensive involvement with the world. Marx, in making one of only a few claims regarding ontology, states:

If man’s feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological phenomena in the (narrower) sense, but truly ontological affirmation of being (of nature), and if they are only really affirmed because their object exists for them as a sensual object, then…they have by no means merely one mode of affirmation… (Marx [the first page of] The Power of Money).

So, for Marx, feeling and passion are at the root of the actions which form the primary mediation for the acquisition of knowledge. For Gramsci, this sense of the world, the basis for praxis, cannot be eradicated, erased, and must not: for this activity is what, precisely, contains the evidence that everyone is, in fact, a philosopher. Finally, with regard to James’s
The Will to Believe, where intellect, will, taste and passion cooperate in the formation of philosophical positions and opinions, both Gramsci and Marx also believe that this is at the basis—ontologically and epistemologically—of cognition and action. But, in line with my prior arguments, conceiving of the role of the percept within a framework of sociological knowledge can now be put under a new light.

4.4  Labor and Ontology Today

I want to conclude this section with some notes on the contemporary connection between ontology and labor. The world is “drunk in” through labor. This is the materialist basis for Marx’ ontology as well as Gramsci’s discussion of praxis—including the recognition that we philosophize constantly if not within a particular tradition or established mode of ideas then nascently, rationally, and reflexively. For Gramsci, everyone is a philosopher, “primordially,” of their own activity. No one has gone as far as taking Marx (and Gramsci, if only in spirit) seriously in this vein as Győrgy Lukács, first in his “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” (1923) and then, later, in a more developed form when he returns to the “spirit” of this early essay in Volume III of his The Ontology of Social Being: Labor (published posthumously, 1980). Lukács’s career provides—literally—our starting point and ending point.

For Marx, and recognized by Lukács, labor is never abstract; it is always social. As such, the techniques, knowledge, technology—in short, the development of the labor process—a manifestation of the development of an ontological relationship between individuals and nature. These preconditions entail a “deliberately made separation between subject and object [as] a necessary product of the labor process, and at the same time

\[21\] Marx’s category of “abstract labor,” by the by, is an economic category which describes the undifferentiated expenditure of human energy. Therefore, it can be found in surplus value and exchange value, but not in use value.
comprise] the basis or the specifically human mode of existence” (Lukács 1980: 24). This initial distinction is fundamental since it marks a point where, first, individuals can reflect on activity, learn from it, and develop their own relationship to nature; and, second, under the organizational strictures of the capitalist mode of production this marks the division between mental and material labor, it becomes the basis for the rationalization of the labor process whereby management seizes the mantle of “mental labor” and deploys “labor power” towards ends that it selects, posits, and monitors in the interest of maximizing profit.

This is how the discussion of structure, ideology, and the percept comes back in. Marx, at the end of his Paris Manuscripts on economic and philosophical categories, and also following the passage cited above, states—regarding his thinking on ontology—that with the rise of industrialization and mass production or, with the emergence of a totally new “world picture” to borrow from Heidegger,

Only through developed industry — i.e., through the medium of private property — does the ontological essence of human passion come into being, in its totality as well as in its humanity; the science of man is therefore itself a product of man’s own practical activity…. The meaning of private property — apart from its estrangement — is the existence of essential objects for man, both as objects of enjoyment and as objects of activity.

Science, and its economic product, “technology,” realizes the “ontological essence” of humanity through the preeminence of mass production and industrial capitalism. Simultaneously, giving the nod to Heidegger here, the object does not become experience, ontology, and humanity, but by providing the capacity to generate “existence of essential objects” for everyone the production process takes center stage over the needs of individuals,
since the assumption is that the needs of all individuals can be fulfilled through the economic process. This distinction depends on a social structure that breaks apart the categories of mental and material labor. It does this not only through the economic process, but is reified in the legal sphere (private property which creates the preconditions for the ownership of labor power) as well as the political sphere (through ideologies of “personal freedom” which are based entirely on the legal category of private property: e.g. George W. Bush’s “ownership society”).

Although labor remains the way that people realize their desires, learn that their body does not end where nature begins but becomes the site of a relationship that is mental, physical, spiritual or, in a word, “embodied,” the discussion of “structure” strung throughout this section is predicated on the ability for economic, institutional, and political “spheres” to separate experience from the majority of time people spend working (living) in the world: no one learns when jobs are “deskilled” in the interest of lowering the costs of variable capital. Life is not felt at work, but is promised to another generation who will, hopefully, do better than their fathers and mothers. The “existence of essential objects” is not located in the mediation between human activity and nature, but on the market where we consume blind to the fact that the ontology Marx and Gramsci detailed is caught in every object on every shelf in every store. What separates us from these objects we are responsible for is not so much the series of social institutions that produce legal and political categories but, rather, a society that is not interested in having us as participants. This not only separates us from what we

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make but, also, what we do and, ultimately, from one another. However, the fetish quality of these objects, what we perceive, is precisely what isn’t there. Imagine for a moment that every commodity required not only a price tag but “credits” like a film, which detailed who was responsible for the primary products that were distributed, and who was responsible for this distribution to a site (e.g. factory) whereby these materials were converted into a sellable product or commodity. The list continues by detailing how the product came to the market and who stocked it. Remarkably, contained in this moment; this object, would be the ontological wealth of history and society.
5. ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT SCHOLARSHIP:
AN INTERVENTION INTO THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS’
THEORETICAL PRESUMPTIONS

Theories that emerge from contemporary social movement scholarship contain a host of presumptions. With regard to the most prominent social movement theories we witness this specifically as it pertains to framing and the relationship between resource mobilization and movement entrepreneurism. However, and in general, the often difficult thing about theoretical presumptions is locating them. Although presumptions fulfill the function but often lack the sufficient status of *a priori* knowledge, what is being presumed by a theory can be located at different levels—the presumption can be rooted in the case, it could be conceptual, analytical, it may be found in the description of the theory—or it could be present across some or all of these levels. Presumption in and of itself is not a problem—theories necessarily contain presumptions; some of the strongest theories begin from a (stated or described) perspective. In a recently written monograph on global capitalism, William I. Robinson points out that approaching a social, political, economic, and cultural phenomenon like globalization requires a strong perspective. By understanding the basic tenets of this perspective, one is able to understand the nature of the syntheses that are instrumental in the formulation of his theory. He states of his position, first, that “theoretical understanding allows us to interpret a wide variety of phenomena and to weave these phenomena together into a ‘big picture’ of social reality in its holistic unity” (Robinson, xv). And, a bit later, that “the global capitalism school believes that globalization can be explained largely by a methodologically prior, materialist theory of capitalism” (Robinson, 2004: 2).
I begin this section on the theoretical presumptions in social movements scholarship with quotations from Robinson’s most recent book-length work not simply because he does a good job of laying out the issues that sociological theorists confront, but because social movements, like globalization, are a prominent and related topic across contemporary sociology. Globalization provides a contemporary salient framework in which social movements locate grievances and mobilize; from which they derive resources; through which they experience oppression and repression—especially in the form of austerity programs—and witness and respond to cleavages in transnational elite or capitalist classes (Almeida and Johnston 2006). And, finally, like Robinson’s affiliation with the “global capitalism school,” much of the presumptions that inform theories in social movement scholarship can be traced back to methodologically prior materialist theories of capitalism (see McAdam, 1982/1999 and Tarrow, 1998 for their explicit linkages of the political process model and the notion of contentious politics to classical materialist sociological theories). However, I will argue in this section that in the case of Antonio Gramsci, who was the cultural, intellectual and political center of a revolutionary social movement, the relationship between social movement scholarship, specifically regarding framing and the role of the social movement entrepreneur, and Gramsci’s prior theories is never explicitly drawn due to the methodological, theoretical, and political presumptions of the latter.

I will explore the ways in which this is manifest (especially in a well-known quotation about Gramsci in this context by Sidney Tarrow); I will briefly discuss the role of epistemology in sociological study; I will then entertain Gramsci’s continued relevance for

23 See Anthony Giddens’s rather prescient comments at the end of the “Postscript” to his monograph, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber*, written in 1970 and compare them to comments made by the current ASA president, Arne L. Kalleberg in his presentation “The Role of Sociology in the 21st Century,” presented at the Southwestern Social Science Association’s 88th Annual Meeting.
social movement scholarship and will end my argument by discussing Gramsci’s importance for only one aspect of social movement scholarship: framing. Lastly, I will conclude my paper by discussing a contemporary question in social movement scholarship namely, in the context of framing: what is the nature of the relationship between the recently revived concept “moral economy” and the imposition of global capitalism? I will discuss how Gramsci’s conception of praxis may represent a well-suited response.

Lastly, with regard to methodological guidelines, in this section I make a series of methodological assumptions that are in-line with historical contextualism in my approach to the analysis of data from Gramsci’s personal correspondences and, especially, his political journalism on social movements (Jones 1986; Camic 1995; Strenski 1997; Abbot 1999; Camic and Gross 2001).

1. Historical texts are historical products;
2. The actual intentions of the author (to the extent that we can explain and interpret them) should be our principal guide as to why the text took the particular form it did;
3. The imminent contexts in which these text were produced must be analyzed it is around this analysis that a theoretical framework may be constructed.

I begin with a discussion of the social movement literatures’ assumptions regarding classical political thinkers’ conception of social movements and place them against Gramsci’s journalism. This will establish the argumentative tension, which I hope to maintain across the remainder of the section.

5.1 Theoretical Presumptions, Regarding Gramsci, as the Impetus for the Study:

Tarrow and Foran and the Classical Sociological Tradition

Specifically, Tarrow’s discussion of Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci in the first chapter of
Power in Movement describes Gramsci’s work as additive to Lenin’s conception of the vanguard (Tarrow, 1998: 14-15). Although Tarrow should be applauded for recognizing, in full, Gramsci’s conception of power, politics, and political economy—connections that are lost in post-Marxist versions of Gramsci’s vision (see especially Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s book, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and Neil Larsen’s excellent criticism of their work [Larsen, 1990: section 12])—Tarrow makes a point that is arguable regarding the work of Antonio Gramsci. He states the following:

Gramsci’s solution to the collective action problem—like Marx and Lenin’s—was indeterminate about the influence of politics. Gramsci did argue that the battle had to be fought within the trenches and fortifications of capitalist society…, but he provided no guide to how that battle should be fought nor did he differentiate between countries in which the opportunities and constraints would be strong or weak (Tarrow, 1998: 15).

I disagree with Tarrow’s supposition that Gramsci provided no guide to how the battle against the bourgeoisie and the structures that they put in place should be fought. In two early essays prior to his editorship of Ordine Nuovo, Gramsci begins to address the question of effective collective action through a discussion of the 1905 revolution in Russia. In the first of these two essays, “The Revolution against ‘Capital’” (1917), Gramsci makes the argument that historical materialism is not an evolutionary conception of history but requires an analysis of the state, the development of strategies, and political action through political organization. Though written when Gramsci’s language was couched in philosophical idealism, this essay directly addresses Russia’s status as a weak state and the
historical contingencies that made the 1905 revolution both possible and necessary (Sassoon 1987). He extends this idea in an article written one year later, “Lenin’s Work” (1918). In this essay Gramsci claims that the results of the revolution in Russia evince an appropriate application and continuation of Marx’s ideas. It is a commentary on how Lenin’s use of Marx’s theories not only represents an extension of Marx’s work but its extension through praxis or collective political action. Gramsci continues to address collective action through the rudiments of an analysis of the state form, trade unionism, and the Jacobin tradition during his editorship of Ordine Nuovo. Each of these rudimentary pieces is elaborated more systematically after 1926 when he begins the Notebooks.

I take Tarrow’s comments as illustrative of how the already well instantiated logic and conceptual vocabulary of social movement theory makes it difficult for social movement scholars to connect contemporary social movement theory to the work of Gramsci. The categories are evident in Gramsci’s work. There is, for instance, his revised but classically Marxist conception of praxis, his case-based conception of the political party, and his theory of hegemony, which, in turn, depends upon a Marxist-influenced set of concepts including “elaboration,” “war of position,” “war of maneuver,” “economic corporate,” “class corporate,” and “hegemonic.” These categories represent detailed stages that are fomented in and emerge from collective action.

Gramsci’s theory is more akin to what Michael Burawoy describes in his discussion of the sociological version of the “research program.” Burawoy claims that by looking at the development and growth of sociological knowledge, he is “explor[ing] the implications for sociology of adopting one of these historically rooted conceptions of science, namely the methodology of scientific research programs proposed by Irme Lakatos, by comparing it with
the standard methodology of induction” (Burawoy, 1989: 759). He introduces us to his thesis by describing how the methodology of the physical sciences is constituted from out of the philosophy of science. He states that “these principles evolved more from philosophical speculation than from careful empirical examination of the ‘hard’ sciences from which they derived their legitimacy” (759). His introduction of Lakatos’s methodological innovations for sociology plays itself out as a comparison between Theda Skocpol’s and Leon Trotsky’s work on revolutions. Though Burawoy contends that both are historically rooted, his discussion explores the way in which they are rooted and what that means for the deployment and development of sociological knowledge. The recognition that some of the most scientific aspects of sociological thought are embedded in philosophical speculation and the type of operation—exploring how theories are historically rooted—is necessary to developing a deeper relationship between “classical sociological theorists” (who often were not sociologists or certainly not sociologists in any contemporary sense) and contemporary sociological studies.

I will then follow this with a review of salient social movement scholarship on framing that deploys concepts and theories which can be compared to concepts and theories in Gramsci’s work in an attempt to further my claim. The totality of Gramsci’s theoretical inventory—removed from his case, the contemporaneous terrain of Italian culture, politics, society, and history—remains relevant to the study of social movements, but the separation of his theoretical framework from his object of investigation limits the strategic and political potential and depth of his thought. We tend, as sociologists, to seek concepts and theories that come to us “proven,” well-worn, or that are, in the least, seemingly generalizable—we can and do often infer this from the descriptive aspects of the theory; in the latter instance we
test them against a case, a social phenomenon or object, etc. However, we tend not to think of Antonio Gramsci as an activist, parliamentarian, communist party secretary, intellectual, and scholar who thoroughly investigated one enormous case (industrializing Italy, n=1) as, at least, a good sociologist and historiographer. But all of these labels serve as nothing but mere equivocations; Gramsci was all of these things and more and it seems to me that he does not have a modern analog in scholarship, activism, or politics. He certainly was not a conventional scholar; in fact, his work was not compiled in a conventional manner, and he certainly did not work under conventional conditions (Buttigieg, 1990; regarding the last point: Fiori, 1971; Spriano, 1979). In order to recognize the breadth and depth of Gramsci’s concepts we must recognize that he, rather uniquely, developed a knowledge and thickness of his case that is methodologically different from contemporary sociological construction and discussion of cases—and that much of the development of his theory and conceptual categories resides within and emerges from his deep historiography of Italy as well as his discussion of the potentials and pitfalls of the intellectual terrain of his contemporaneous Italy. I would contend that to fully excavate Gramsci’s theoretical framework we must read closer and differently than sociologists often are disciplined to read.

It is entirely possible to claim that any ties to the work of Antonio Gramsci, at this stage in the theoretical game of understanding social movements are irrelevant. The field of social movement scholarship has an overflowing arsenal of theories flanked in by an inventory of conceptual categories—which are being added to every quarter that a sociology journal publishes an article or set of articles on some movement in some part of the world.

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24 The best historiographies of Gramsci’s intellectual and political work remain Anne Showstack Sasoon’s Gramsci’s Politics (1987) and Paolo Spriano’s Antonio Gramsci and the Party: The Prison Years (1979). Giuseppe Fiore’s excellent biography of Gramsci, Antonio Gramsci, Life of a Revolutionary (1971) also provides important insights into Gramsci’s life and work.
However, Richard Flacks (2005) in an essay entitled “The Question of Relevance in Social Movement Studies” makes several empirically-based points regarding activists. He notes, first, that “current literature in the sociology of social movements is not high on activists reading lists,” and a page later that “today’s activists continue to wrestle with matters that have been central in academic social theory for at least a century,” and finally that “much foundational work in classical social theory about organization was rooted in the experience of activist intellectuals. That work remains an important resource for today’s activists.” (Flacks, 2005: 13-14; see also Bevington and Dixon, 2005).

Gramsci’s preemption in the work of social movement scholarship and the emergence of “neo-Gramscian” orientations are often related to what is perceived, by some, as problematic to the logic of what can be described as classical western Marxist thought. In an essay on framing and hegemony, William Carroll and Robert Ratner state, about Gramsci’s work, that “[a]mong the ideas called into question is the intellectual legacy left by Antonio Gramsci, who while breaking from the economistic and reductionistic excesses of some versions of Marxism held fast to the critical-modernist project of emancipation as a systemic transformation accomplished through the unified struggle of subaltern groups” (Carroll and Ratner, 1996: 408). Following this statement, Carroll and Ratner rightly identify that the poststructuralist trap, introduced through the work of Foucault, and the postmodern and post-socialist orientation toward Gramsci, spearheaded in the work of Laclau and Mouffe, forecloses or, at the very least, limits the political possibilities of social movements. In an inventory of criticisms Carroll and Ratner cite the following seminal critiques:

Movements that have arisen or been revived since the 1960s have variously been described as practicing a self-limiting radicalism (Cohen, 1985); as contesting
dominant codes and constructing new messages that eschew any alternative vision (Melucci, 1989); as engaged in a cultural politics “to create affirmative identities and communities” (Seidman, 1992: 52; 1991); as committed to a “life politics” that supplants the modernist quest for economic justice with a concern to create “a fulfilling and satisfying life for all, and in respect of which there are no ‘others’” (Giddens, 1990: 156); and as carriers of a radical pluralism that in valorizing difference breaks away from the totalizing logic of “class” identity in which the left has been perennally entrapped (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). (Carroll and Ratner, 1996: 408-9).

The implication that lies beneath these critiques and the claim regarding “the critical-modernist project of emancipation as…systemic transformation” is that the logic of “modernist” theories fundamentally assumes a teleological and unilateral approach and, furthermore, that postmodern and poststructuralist thinking rightly locates this and breaks from it entirely. However, there have been several challenges to the idea that this theoretical approach is teleological, closed-off, and politically foreclosed (Paolucci, 2005; Sutch, 2009). In point of fact—and with tremendous irony—it is Karl Marx himself (in his, regrettably, widely overlooked correspondences) who indicates how the political (and

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25 I want to mention here that Carroll and Ratner are attempting to find a new theoretical strategy that resides between Gramsci and the postmodern, poststructural, and post-socialist theoretical orientation in the NSM literature. Their empirical work in this essay and argument I am largely in agreement with, especially their suggestion at the end of their essay to adopt Carl Boggs’s “Radical Model;” a model that comes from Boggs’s work on social movements leading into his book on Gramsci. I see Boggs’s 1991 book on Gramsci as something of an antidote to Laclau and Mouffe. See also, recently published, Emanuele Saccarelli, 2007. *Gramsci and Trotsky in the Shadow of Stalinism*. New York: Routledge. However, I believe that—in line with the quotation from Flacks—a better level of engagement requires a closer degree of erudition with the classical sociological theorists, especially—given the political prominence of “post” theoretical orientation—those in the materialist tradition, e.g. Marx, Lenin, Lukács, Gramsci—to name a few.
dialectical) foreclosure of history serves both elites and capitalists at the expense of counter-movements within the polity. Marx states:

History would have a very mystical character if “accident” had played no part. These accidents enter of course by themselves as component parts in the general process of development, being outweighed by other accidents. But the acceleration and retardation depend to a considerable degree upon these accidents among which figure the character of people who stand at the head of the movement (Marx, 1871).

There is much that is prescient about this quotation. First, the notion that a Marxist materialism is determinist—in nature—is challenged by Marx, himself, whereby he explains that it can be determinist—in situ. And, secondly, this depends upon the realpolitik; the intellectual, political, and interpretive capacity of social movement leaders. Or, in the language of social movement scholarship, what is at stake in the question of the relationship between the work of classical, materialist, social movement theories and contemporary social movements and social movement scholarship is the nature of how contemporary social, cultural, political, and economic issues are framed by those who “stand at the head of a movement.”

5.2 Gramsci and Framing in Social Movement Scholarship: A Discussion

Framing, like resource mobilization and the political process model, provides central concepts to the study of social movements and, as a result, has become a primary location for the sociological focus of social movement investigations. In an article published in 2000 in the Annual Review of Sociology, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow note that “framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of
social movements” (Benford and Snow, 2000: 612). They back up this claim with simple descriptive statistics (from Sociological Abstracts) that demonstrate the growth of framing literature in the field of social movement scholarship from the early/mid 1980s to the late 90s. The literature on framing is far too vast to review, in its entirety, here. I will, however, discuss concepts, arguments, and examples from across some of the most salient work in the field in consort with the work of Antonio Gramsci, specifically section three of the Hoare and Nowell-Smith edition of Selections from the Prison Notebooks, “The Philosophy of Praxis.”

In Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, Doug McAdam makes it clear, in his critique of the classical tradition of social movements scholarship—specifically in his discussion of strain and individual discontent—that one of the biggest drawbacks of the classical model is that, through it, “social movements are thus viewed as emergent collections of discontented individuals. But to adopt this perspective requires that we ignore the fact that...social movements are a collective phenomena” (McAdam, 1982/1999: 15). And this critique of the classical model—a certain politicization of a psychologism—has been both so common and so enduring that the role of individuals in movements has been absent, almost entirely, from—at the very least—framing literature. Structural terms like “agents,” “members,” “actors,” are common; members and groups are discussed as partaking in the framing process despite the fact that, methodologically, movement activists and leaders are interviewed and their words provide the empirical grist for our empirical mills. Although McAdam includes “leaders” in his discussion of “indigenous organizational strength,” and—in the second edition of Political Process—he

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26 In the quotation by Tarrow, above, the claims he makes about what Gramsci did not do are cited from earlier passages in the same edition. The passages that I will discuss, subsequently, he does not cite.
makes it clear that “the cultural turn in sociology…has had a decidedly salutary effect on the social movements field. It has organized a host of critically important issues back into the study of social movements and collective action. These issues include: collective identity…emotion…and framing.…” A large part of this turn includes discussion of the structure agency dichotomy such that the latter contends with concepts like “subjectivity,” “identity politics,” and “performativity” (McAdam, 1982/1999: xxxii). What I am getting at is, given the overarching structuralist orientation to most of the major theories—including framing, the most microsociological of the lot—who, which of the members, agents, actors, etc. produces the meanings and inspires the mobilizations associated with frames and how do they go about making frames?

The only “agents” or “actors” who achieve categorization in the social movements literature are “social movement entrepreneurs.” This concept, which originates in a paper by McCarthy and Zald from 1973, is taken up by Meyer Zald in a 1992 essay where he states:

Recognizing, as RM theory does, that social movement entrepreneurs have a stake in the rhetoric that they attempt to manipulate and define does not mean that RM theory has any purchase at all on the linguistic-cognitive-emotive conditions of meaning systems for either the long or the short haul. Of course, the issue plagues all instrumental theories, of which RM theory is but one (Zald, 1992: 341).

Present within this quotation is the assumption that “social movement entrepreneurs” are somehow vested in the rhetoric they control. However, it must be asked: Is Zald vested in his own rhetoric here? If he is then he is suggesting that social movement entrepreneurs both deploy their rhetoric in a semi-detached manner and are partially vested in what they say—but we can neither determine to what degree nor do we know if the phrase “manipulate and
define” is a signpost that indicates a continuum within a given context and conjuncture whereby “definition” is somehow of greater ethical and ontological qualification than “manipulation.” Context and conjuncture would play the significant part; however, the choice of “entrepreneur” would seem to connote a more controlling if not mercenary orientation to resource, frame, or structural mobilizations. In more recent work, both Helmut Anheier and Jeffery Cormier describe the role of social movement entrepreneurs in a way that supports my prior claim. Anheier states that, “Like economic entrepreneurs, social movement entrepreneurs combine and coordinate ‘inputs’ for some gain” (Anheier, 2003: 53). And Cormier divests all figurative quality from his description when he states, “The ultimate goal of social movements entrepreneurs actions’ in framing a social movement is to construct a frame that resonates with the social context within which it operates” (Cormier, 2004: 12).

Tarrow briefly criticizes both the language and the orientation of “social movement entrepreneurs” as well as “social movement organization” (Tarrow, 1998: 16). It remains, however, that the question of who is largely responsible for framing remains within the more structural language of discussions of the framing process. Somewhere between strain and deprivation theories in the classical model and Lenin’s vanguard—both obviously problematic for social movement scholarship—lurks a concept that describes what it is that movement members do; a concept that resides somewhere between cultural logic and structural logic. Tarrow, before his criticism I cite above, relies on Gramsci as the sentiment if not the scholarship that inflects framing discussion. He states that

…the cultural aspect of recent social movement studies is resonant of Gramsci. Just as Gramsci added a cultural dimension to Lenin’s concept of class hegemony, many
recent writers have tried to shift the focus of research on social movements from structural factors to the ‘framing’ of collective action. The earliest hint of a paradigm shift came from E.P. Thompson’s enculturation of the concept of class (1966). Thompson did not want to throw class out the window, but only to substitute for the productivist Marxism of his forebears a focus on class self-creation. This took him far from the factory floor—to factors like custom, grain seizures, and consumer mentalities (1971). In a field that had previously been obsessed with class conflict, Thompson also brought to the study of contention a sensitivity to interclass reciprocity, a factor that he labeled the “moral economy” (1971) (Tarrow, 1998: 16-17).

Besides being a good appraisal of the effect of Gramsci’s work on the cultural turn in sociology, the resultant effect on sociological subfields (e.g. social movement scholarship), and the rise of theories and concepts to address structural gaps (e.g. framing), this quotation intimates that in order for Thompson to venture far from the factory floor, there must have been something in Gramsci’s work that enabled this journey. That, in point of fact, the conceptual conjuncture between class and culture must have been addressed or at least mapped in the work of Gramsci. I would contend that this is true and that, moreover, the usefulness of Thompson’s conception of “moral economy” owes more than a small debt to Gramsci.

The relationship between austerity programs and social movement scholarship in Latin America has made good use of Thompson’s notion of “moral economy,” especially in discussions of Argentina and Mexico (Auyero, 2006; Shefner, Pasdirtz and Blad, 2006). Auyero describes moral economy—or in this fold “moral politics”—as referring to “shared
beliefs as to what [is] right and wrong…. [T]he notion of moral politics…has the virtue of calling for simultaneous attention to the content of protesters’ beliefs, to their origin and to their impact…” (Auyero, 2006: 148). Despite Auyero’s emphases in the quotation above, what is interesting to me is the idea that the “location” of moral economy is immediately accessible to the aggrieved and their sense of right and wrong. But what of origin? That—it seems to me—is key; if there is a “moral economy” already available to an aggrieved group—e.g. peasants facing austerity measures handed down by an international lender and imposed through state machinery—it is embedded, developed through autochthonous experience. It is not the result of, nor is it the result of a litany of, clever framing processes. In fact, given the region and its political history, colonial incursions and the political, cultural, and moral process of “decolonialization” could be described as pre-modern attempts to impose European frames upon other cultures to mobilize a mass population for the interests of massive feudal empires.

Gramsci actually gives Thompson the conceptual roots for his notion of “moral economy.” Gramsci’s discussion of “common sense;” his discussion of the role of the intellectual; of philosophy; of the polemical-critical disguise; and of the development—through this—of organic intellectuals is an explicit attempt to connect a complicated political and economic world-view to the moral economy of aggrieved groups. Too often, Gramsci is sold down the river of Marxist orthodoxy—since his endpoint is class struggle the logic and direction of his concepts are subsumed beneath what I think many imagine is a mechanistic and deterministic dialectic. However, in the quotation below, Gramsci is more concerned with the dialectical nature of class-cultural self-determination. Gramsci is interested in the more nascent, and subjective aspects of framing—he is neither interested in extant members’
diagnostic framing (Snow and Benford, 1988); nor is he interested in the timing and
application of framing process (bridging, amplification, extension and transformation) by this
same group (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford, 1986). He recognizes, first, that every
individual who is aggrieved has the intellectual capacity to be actively invested in the
movement; to frame and reframe the movement; to be an intellectual, and, second, that social
movements cannot be guided by entrepreneurs—they must be peopled with a majority cadre
of informed individuals. Gramsci states:

…common sense… is the diffuse, uncoordinated features of a generic form of
thought common to a particular period and a particular popular environment. But
every philosophy has a tendency to become the common sense of a fairly limited
environment (that of all the intellectuals). It is a matter therefore of starting with a
philosophy which already enjoys, or could enjoy, a certain diffusion, because it is
connected to and implicit in practical life, and elaborating it so that it becomes a
renewed common sense possessing the coherence and the sinew of individual
philosophies. But this can only happen if the demands of cultural contact with the
“simple” are continually felt.)

A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself at the outset in a polemical and
critical guise, as superseding the existing mode of thinking and existing concrete
thought (the existing cultural world). First of all, therefore, it must be a criticism of
“common sense”, basing itself initially, however, on common sense in order to
demonstrate that “everyone” is a philosopher and that it is not a question of
introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone’s individual life,
but of renovating and making “critical” an already existing activity (Gramsci, 1971: 330-31).

In brief, Gramsci gives us a cultural variable concept “common sense”—deeply derived from his intellectual historiography of Italy—from which a kind of framing is derived. It originates with the moral sentiment and practical and intellectual sense-making of the aggrieved group. These people, through a dialectical process, become the “entrepreneurs” of their own movement. However, more than a mere choice of language, these strategists and tacticians are not “accountants” of their political, social, and cultural issues—weighing debit against credit columns considering inputs and gains—but are actively involved in the intellectual life of their social movement. The language of this passage signals a process: one that has the capacity to connect the notion of moral economy to the complicated top-down macro social, political, and economic process of global capitalism by re-theorizing the “role” of movement agents, or actors, or members.

5.3 Bridging Moral Economy with Globalization

There is a significant difference in Gramsci’s orientation toward social movements, framing grievances, participation, mobilization, etc. than is discussed in the framing literature. However, the focus on relying upon common sense—which is the root of Thompson’s, and notably James Scott’s, notion of “moral economy”—makes it possible, conceptually and theoretically, to connect the global realpolitik to the daily life of workers, peasants, the un-propertied, dispossessed, etc. As Almeida and Johnston point out, “Since the 1980s, an anti-globalization master frame has become a powerful lens through which to view local grievances. It incorporates the local moral economy of aggrieved populations within a larger and sophisticated schema of understanding about the global economy” (Almieda and
Johnston, 2006: 7). But the master frame does not incorporate anything. The connection between local grievances and the globalization master frame has been the result of very public challenges. Is it the master frame that enabled Rigoberta Menchu to declare, simultaneously, her subject-hood and subjection and enabled Hebe de Bona Fini, a representative of Argentina's Madres de la Plaza de Mayo to stand up to, debate, and ultimately shame and silence George Soros in 2001 at the World Economic Forum in Porto Allegre or are these actions productive of a master frame? It is in these examples from Gramsci’s work that, I think, the nature of the connection between the moral economies and globalization is made explicit. If framing is oriented toward explaining the relationship between “moral economies” and larger contexts, but remains within the logic of structural theories microsociological phenomena, like significant “symbolic” and “real” events, will become so much grist for the structuralist’s mill. However, Gramsci’s discussion of the organic intellectual and the process of bringing common sense up to the level of complex political participation entreats sociology, in the least, to reconsider Gramsci’s relevance for contemporary social movement scholarship.
6. GRAMSCI AND THE AFTERLIVES OF POLITICS:
IDEOLOGY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

6.1 A Gramscian Approach to Ideological Analysis:

The Centrality of Organic and Traditional Intellectuals

It has been claimed that Gramsci’s understanding of ideology within the Marxist literature is unique and marks a distinctive break from the concept (Larrain 1979; Said 1983; Sassoon 1987; Murphy and Augelli 1988; Morera 1990; Barrett 1994 Sassoon 2000). This is also demonstrated across Gramsci’s own work (Gramsci 1971, 1995). In brief, Gramsci builds on the existing definition of ideology within Marxist (and other) literatures. He, however, offers an affirmative (as opposed to the more popular, pejorative) definition of the concept; one that demonstrates how ideology can be used to analyze the way in which groups organize themselves both internally and against external political forces. This definition of ideology is connected to Gramsci’s concept of intellectuals, civil society, hegemony, and the historical bloc (a concept unique to his theories on politics which I will discuss in detail below).

In the following section I will offer a theoretical model, the “ideological contention model,” which is based on Gramsci’s work. This theory of ideology can be used to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of social movement political and organizational strategies as they pertain to the internal structure of social movements as well as movement struggles (against external political actors) within a specific political context. In what follows, I will discuss how Gramsci describes ideology and how it is different from preexisting conceptions in Marxism and other political theories. I will, then, discuss associated concepts (e.g. organic and traditional intellectuals, civil society, and Gramsci’s conception of history) in relation to
Gramsci’s concept of ideology to demonstrate that it is an essentially contentious process and that this is a more empirically accurate model for understanding issues of interpretation and mobilization within the field of politics. I will conclude by describing how Gramsci’s work makes it necessary to conceive of ideology as central to understanding social movement organizational forms, strategic endeavors, and how it addresses a significant conceptual and empirical gap in existing theories within social movement scholarship, specifically theories of social movement framing.

This model depends upon and is developed through a intensive investigation of Gramsci’s work including categories that have not been discussed in social sciences literature (or have been eclipsed by other concepts like hegemony). In order to construct this theory, in this section, I make a series of methodological assumptions that are in-line with historical contextualism in my approach to the analysis of data from Gramsci’s marginalia, concordance tables (which provide detail on what fragments were generated in the notebooks and when), as well as fragments not included in the popular English language edition of the notebooks (Jones 1986; Camic 1995; Strenski 1997; Abbot 1999; Camic and Gross 2001).

The following are the methodological guidelines the comprise a contextualist approach:

1. Historical texts are historical products;
2. The actual intentions of the author (to the extent that we can explain and interpret them) should be our principal guide as to why the text took the particular form it did;
3. The imminent contexts in which these text were produced must be analyzed it is around this analysis that a theoretical framework may be constructed.
One of the challenges of posing this theory is testing it on contemporary movements to see if it applies to all movements. Though I do include empirical examples to support my argument testing this theory extensively will provide the basis for future research.

6.2 Gramsci and Ideology: A Definition of “Historically Organic Ideology”

In a section entitled “The Concept of ‘Ideology’” from *The Prison Notebooks* (1971), Gramsci makes a distinction between the concept of ideology proper and what he describes as “historically organic ideologies.” He defines historically organic ideologies as:

…those…which are necessary to a given structure…. To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is “psychological;” they “organize” human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc (Gramsci 1971: 376-377).

According to Gramsci, the concept of ideology, against which he poses his conception of “historically organic ideologies,” lacks analytical and historical validity. In a review of the historiography of the term “ideology,” Gramsci describes prior thinking on ideology as a value judgment (leveled upon the term by others) whereby ideology stands in for “bad sense.” According to Gramsci, ideology—up to the point where he introduces his own conception—is understood as follows:

1. Ideology is identified as distinct from the structure, and it is asserted that it is not ideology that changes the structures but vice versa;

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27 For the purposes of this section (and in the dissertation) I am using the 1971 edition of Selections from the *Prison Notebooks*, which is not a critical edition and compiles Gramsci’s writing thematically and not chronologically. This is the first and most widely used English language edition. It is worth noting that, according to later critical editions, the original entry, entitled “Ideologies,” appears as entry number 19 in Gramsci’s 7th notebook composed between 1930 and 1931 (see Gramsci 1995; 2010c). My research shows that the most substantive writing on ideology occurs between 1930 and 1933 (Gramsci’s writing slows down after December, 1933 whereupon Gramsci is admitted to the Cusumano Clinic in Formia—but remains under strict police surveillance—due to poor health. He remains there until August, 1935).
2. it is asserted that a given political solution is “ideological”—i.e. that it is not sufficient to change the structure, although it thinks that it can do so; it is asserted that it is useless, stupid, etc.;

3. one then passes to the assertion that every ideology is “pure” appearance, useless, stupid, etc. (Gramsci 1971: 376).

Gramsci goes on to claim that “to the extent that they [ideologies] are arbitrary they only create individual ‘movements,’ polemics and so on (…these [definitions] are not completely useless, since they function like an error which by contrasting with truth, demonstrates it)” (Gramsci 1971: 377). In other words, even though the term describes a phenomenon that is outside of the structural facts of social organization (item 1), is utopian, idealistic, and erroneous (item 2), and is pure representation uncoupled from practical political action (item 3), Gramsci points out that this implies, at every step in the definition, an opposite conception of ideology. There is, then, an approach to political ideas, representations, and the like that is part of the social structure; that offers real political solutions; that is connected to reality; and that is a part of what one understands by “ideology.” He describes this approach as “historically organic ideology.” Gramsci finds precedents for this definition within Marx’s work before The German Ideology (1845-1846), specifically in “Toward the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: An Introduction” (1843) (as opposed to Engels—see Lenin’s (1929) discussion of ideology and social movements see, also, Larrain’s discussion of Lenin and Gramsci 1979: 82). Gramsci does this to indicate that although these fragments from

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28 This introduces a question with regard to Marx and his intellectual historiography (one that, to my knowledge, has not been explored by Gramsci scholars). Gramsci makes the claim, of Marx, that “[w]hat he says more or less is ‘when this way of conceiving things has the force of popular beliefs,’ etc. Another proposition of Marx is that a popular conviction often has the same energy as a material force or something of the kind, which is extremely significant” (Gramsci 1971: 377). The claim that “ideology has the same energy as a material force” is central to Gramsci’s perspective on ideology. (Gramsci 1971: 376) I investigated where this or some similar claim was made by Marx. I can find two places or times where a claim like this is made: 1. In
Marx are not cited alongside of *The German Ideology*, they do provide a precedent to establish an alternative, and affirmative, definition of the term.

6.3 Contention, Ideology, and Intellectuals: Organic and Traditional

6.3.1 Organic Intellectuals

Gramsci’s concept of intellectuals, and their social role, gives ideology a specific dynamism. It is in this context that the term “organic” must be understood in relation to ideology. By focusing on the meaning of the word “organic” in relation to the category “intellectuals,” the relationship between ideology and history will become clearer.

In a section of Gramsci’s notebooks entitled “The Intellectuals: The Formation of the Intellectuals” he poses a specific research question. He asks, “[A]re intellectuals an autonomous and independent social group, or does every social group have its own particular specialized category of intellectuals” (Gramsci 1971: 5)? In short, Gramsci finds that intellectuals (that appear to be) autonomous occupy one category. Largely, however, all intellectuals have, or have at one time had, a specific function and a social role and they are “specialized.” But, intellectuals necessarily go beyond their specialized function, and must do so, in order to produce ideology. As I will demonstrate below, the production of ideology is central to the role of the intellectual.

Gramsci is able to discern two specific categories of intellectuals: organic and traditional. Although, at a given moment in time, all intellectuals are “organic;” they do not remain so. The progression of history and the changes to a society—upon the terrain of

“The Jewish Question” where Marx is criticizing Rousseau’s discussion of individuality and the associated (natural and political) rights and powers regarding civil society and the state. 2. “Toward the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: An Introduction” where Marx claims, “Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses” (Marx 1997: 257). Both texts precede *The German Ideology* and the latter quotation is closer to Gramsci’s discussion of Marx whereby ideas and ideologies are like material forces.
economics and politics—change the intellectual’s function (Morton 2007). In short: to the extent that an intellectual is involved in the development of society he or she is organic. However, if an intellectual is not directly involved, but allied with the process of societal development, he or she is traditional. Gramsci, then, conceives of the intellectual as forming an empirical link to specific fractions of society. An intellectual is organic to the extent that:

Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields (Gramsci 1971: 5).

Whether this social group is a political group (not, however, a political party), a part of a private organization, or a part of the state bureaucracy makes no difference. The category of intellectual contains a specific conceptualization of the function that an intellectual fulfills. For example, when speaking of a specific type of intellectual and their role, say the role that an entrepreneur plays in civil society, Gramsci states that:

It should be noted that the entrepreneur himself represents a higher level of social elaboration, already characterized by a certain directive [dirigente] and technical (i.e. intellectual) capacity: he must have a certain technical capacity, not only in the limited sphere of his activity and initiative but in other spheres as well, at least in those which are closest to economic production. He must be an organizer of masses of men; he must be an organizer of the “confidence” of investors in his business, of the customers for his product, etc…. It can be observed that the “organic” intellectuals, which every new class creates alongside itself and elaborates in the
course of its development, are for the most part “specializations” of partial aspects of
the primitive activity of the new social type which the new class has brought into
prominence (Gramsci 1971: 5-6).

The intellectual as the bearer of a specific kind of technical knowledge, seeks to achieve—
within the existing society—an end for the class or the group to which he or she is attached.
The intellectual can only achieve this end by organizing and directing others: in other words,
by becoming involved in politics.

An intellectual’s social position is not only determined by their relationship to a class
but to the political elaboration (i.e. the ideological elaboration) of the role that class plays
through specific institutions. In the case of the entrepreneur, specific forms of private
enterprise become the ground upon which his or her institutional function is tethered.
However, for Gramsci, the role of the political party (i.e. political direction and leadership) is
paramount. In short, the political party, as an institution, gives the intellectual a broader reach
(e.g. beyond a private institution across civil society). This is the case regardless of the class
to which the intellectual is attached. In a section of his notebooks entitled “The Different
Position of Urban and Rural-Type Intellectuals,” Gramsci states:

The political party, for all groups, is precisely the mechanism which carries out in
civil society the same function as the State carries out, more synthetically and over a
larger scale, in political society. In other words it is responsible for welding together
the organic intellectuals of a given group—the dominant one—and the traditional
intellectuals. The party carries out this function in strict dependence on its basic
function, which is that of elaborating its own component parts—those elements of a
social group which has been born and developed as an “economic” group—and of
turning them into qualified political intellectuals, leaders \textit{[dirigenti]} and organizers of all the activities and functions inherent in the organic development of an integral society, both civil and political (Gramsci 1971: 15-16).

In this quotation, Gramsci’s analytical focus is on the role that the political party plays in extending the organic function of intellectual development to the groups of intellectuals that he categorizes as “traditional intellectuals” through political practice. The purpose of combining organic and traditional intellectuals is necessary to the stability of the dominant group and that stability is dependent upon the formation of ideology.

Two significant theoretical points emerge from this passage. The first is that an intellectual’s political function is to develop and refine the ideological position of a specific social group. Intellectuals that are organic to the dominant class in society, whatever their specific function within that class, are responsible for disseminating ideology and organizing the other, traditional, intellectuals. These are the “other spheres” of intellectual activity that Gramsci describes when discussing the example of the entrepreneur. An intellectual exceeds the mere role of technician or expert; he or she is also an organizer, and the medium through which organization is possible is ideology.

The second theoretical point is that ideology is a process of elaboration through contention. In the context of politics ideology represents a battleground—it is not seamless; it does not (and cannot) merely frame political issues, interpret events, and mobilize existing and potential adherents, but, rather, it is a battleground of ideas and political strategies. That battleground is the terrain upon which intellectuals struggle for political and economic power. This ideological process is potentially productive for the dominant group (it may backfire and produce further contention, the fractionalization of its own group, and or
enemies) if it mobilized the intellectuals, or the leaders of other groups. Regardless, ideology is essential to politics. How the process works is an empirical question; it requires a scope and an analysis. Theoretically though, ideology describes the process through which a group integrates and mobilizes others by offering an interpretation, or perspective, through its own, organic, intellectuals. Gramsci states:

One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals (Gramsci 1971: 10).

Who are the “traditional intellectuals” and why do they require “assimilation” and, in some cases, “conquest?”

6.3.2 Traditional Intellectuals

The category, “traditional intellectuals” describes intellectuals who, in the past, were organic to a social group, but understand their ideological presumptions, in contemporary contexts, to be universal and their role in society to be autonomous (hence, Gramsci’s initial question about the social role of the intellectual). Traditional intellectuals are remnants of another group that, often, did occupy a position of power and now enjoys a symbolic form of power in the current social structure. They understand themselves (and are understood, generally) to be autonomous precisely because their function is no longer organic to the contemporary development of society, but, rather, the institutions that they are affiliated with have some direct, or indirect, continuity in the existing social structure. They presume that their ideology is universal because, to the extent that they were attached to groups who
achieved successes in civil and political society (or directly through the state), it was the dominant justification for their success and, to some extent, is still connected to the existing society. (Society, at different levels and through specific institutions, is constantly undergoing transformations by organic intellectuals who fulfill a specific technical function that traditional intellectuals no longer fulfill.) Gramsci states that:

> every “essential” social group which emerges into history out of the preceding economic structure, and as an expression of a development of this structure, has found (at least in all of history up to the present) categories of intellectuals already in existence and which seemed indeed to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms…. The most typical of these categories of intellectuals is that of the ecclesiastics, who for a long time (for a whole phase of history, which is partly characterized by this very monopoly) held a monopoly of a number of important services…. Since these various categories of traditional intellectuals experience through an “esprit de corps” their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification, they thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group (Gramsci 1971: 6-7).

Traditional intellectuals fulfill a function in the developing society. If won over, they have the capacity to legitimate the ideology of the current dominant group as they speak for it: as they become bearers of the current, dominant, ideological presumptions these presumptions appear as their own. In doing so, traditional intellectuals not only legitimate the dominant position of the ruling group, but (since they already enjoy an autonomous status) they render the dominant group’s ideology universal and give it an air of autonomy.
The specific function of the traditional intellectual in the realm of politics is such that they are able to render ideology as a special domain within “high culture.” Through the writings, speeches, in short the discourse of traditional intellectuals, the ideology of the dominant group becomes intertwined with “great works” of philosophy, literature, art, etc., which—when discussed in nationalist terms—legitimates the position of the ruling group both morally and historically (Gramsci’s main example for this is his discussion of Benedetto Croce’s political role which was possible because of his international recognition as an important Italian intellectual). The traditional intellectuals provide (by constructing) a seemingly essential continuity amongst the political groups who rule and have ruled.

Politics and ideology are capacity building endeavors for intellectuals. Intellectuals, both organic and traditional, play a specific role in the development of a social group’s ideology. Organic intellectuals have a specific function within the group. If they are an entrepreneur, as Gramsci notes, they must organize workers, investors, and customers to the extent that their institutional means allow for it. Gramsci also points out that the entrepreneur’s role as an intellectual exceeds the sphere of private industry; it intersects with other spheres that are closest to the role that economic production fulfills within a society. As the entrepreneur becomes better at organizing groups of people and winning their confidences he or she develops an ideological and political standpoint.

In summary, Gramsci conceptualizes all ideology as containing a historical dimension. Intellectuals, by necessity and not by choice, elaborate their function and direction—as well as the function and direction of the institutions to which they are linked—through ideology. The statement: the predominant ideas at any given time are the ideas of the ruling class, paraphrases of the classical Marxist definition of ideology. Gramsci’s would
restate this; for him, the ideas that have institutional solidity are the ideas that are espoused by traditional intellectuals. These intellectuals were organic to the rise or transformation of institutions that were central to a specific social formation, or a historical moment where the balance of power favored an arrangement of public and private institutions. Once in a position of power through their institutional affiliations, these intellectuals became representative of an historical moment and their “victory” was triumphialized and, later, memorialized. This lends credence to the classical Marxist definition of ideology. However, we can see a process through Gramsci’s work.

These prior sections set up Gramsci’s perspective. In what follows, I will give an overview of my analysis. In the previous section I established the following: Gramsci’s concepts (language) do not provide an easy integration into existing social movement theoretical frameworks; the language of “entrepreneurialism” in resource mobilization theory is both reductive—in terms of the function of social movement actors—and disingenuous; the conceptual language surrounding framing in the social movement literature introduces problems regarding the agency of social movement actors.

It is my claim that social movement agency can be understood in relationship to Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals (as agents and actors within social movement frameworks) as well as to Gramsci’s conception of ideology as a transformative terrain driven by contests amongst intellectuals. This “ideological contention” drives social movement mobilization, participation, strategies, tactics and action.

In the following section, I will challenge the social movement framing perspective. I will introduce ideology as conceived within contemporary social movement studies. The two prevalent models are ideologically structured behavior and ideological salience. These
models demonstrate that ideology has the capacity to introduce a dynamic into social movement studies that is absent in the framing perspective. I will then describe the ways in which ideology has been defined across the social sciences with the goal of providing the conceptual context to introduce Gramsci’s perspective on ideology into social movement studies as a viable alternative to the frame perspective. Lastly, I will explain how Gramsci’s definition of ideology and the role of intellectuals, reconfigures the frame perspective as a dynamic and conflict-based model as opposed to the less dynamic concept of framing. The justification for Gramsci’s perspective will be demonstrated through his own analyses as well as through the social movement theoretical models that call for more acute attention to ideology as a viable perspective upon which to base analyses of social movement agency.

6.4 Gramsci, Social Movements, Frame Processes, and Ideology

In social movement studies proponents of frame theory hold the view, articulated most strongly by Robert Benford and David A. Snow and others (Snow, Rochford, Jr., Worden and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow and Benford 1992; Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Benford and Snow 2000a; Snow and Benford. 2000b; Snow and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Snow and Byrd 2007; Snow 2004, 2008), that frame processes are dynamic and ideology is best conceived of as a static repository of cultural resources (in the form of symbols, narratives, ideas, etc.) from which frames derive symbolic meaning. As inquiry into the relationship between framing and ideology developed across the sociological literature (Platt and Williams 1999; Williams 1999; Oliver and Johnston 2000a; 2000b; Zald 2000; Platt and Williams 2002), proponents of the frame perspective claim that ideology is largely static; it cannot form a strong empirical relationship to data because it fails to explain (or explains less well than the framing perspective) how ideas are mobilized politically
(Westby 2002; Snow 2004; Snow and Byrd 2007). A review of the literature on frame processes that describe or deploy the concept of ideology demonstrates that the conceptual definition of ideology as a cultural phenomenon and as static (in relation to framing which is dynamic) drives analytic intent. This definition seems to be exclusive to the framing literature in social movement studies and, as a result, leads to some circularity with regard to concept and analysis. Regardless, for advocates of the frame perspective, the concept of framing provides the strongest mediation between theory and data, stronger than other similar concepts like ideology.

Even though the concept of ideology has not been expanded beyond its cultural definition, with some notable exceptions (Williams and Blackburn 1996; Zald 2000a, 2000b; Westby 2002), challenges issued from within the framing literature theorize that ideology explains certain empirical effects better than the frame perspective regarding, for instance, the relationship between culture and political organization (Freeman 1972; Williams and Blackburn 1996; Freeman 1997; Platt and Williams 1999; Williams 1999 Zald 2000a, 2000b; Platt and Williams 2002); the interrelation of ideas, beliefs, and values (Oliver and Johnston 2000a; 2000b); and the elaboration of movement strategies (Westby 2002). For example, Westby cites studies that demonstrate how ideology, within a single movement, provides singular or multiple standpoints that have different empirical effects on movement messages, strategies, and organization (e.g. Mooney and Hunt 1994; Johnston 1995; Mooney 1995; Carroll and Ratner 1997; Noonan 1997; Westby 2002). The scope of ideology, in this literature, encompasses a social movement or a single social movement organization. It explains how the process of establishing a frame (e.g. frame cohesion and frame alignment) may be enriched by considering that ideological disputes within a social movement
contribute to the successes and failures of frame processes. The two theoretical perspectives that place ideology at the center or alongside of frame processes—in other words that take ideology seriously as a potentially useful theoretical perspective on par with framing—are Meyer N. Zald’s (2000) “Ideologically Structured Behavior” and David L. Westby’s (2002) “Ideological Salience.”

6.5 SocialMovement Theories of Ideology

6.5.1 Ideologically Structured Behavior

Mayer N. Zald’s theory of “ideological structured behavior,” which he defines as behavior “guided and shaped by ideological concerns” (2000a: 3), is an attempt to introduce into the social movement literature an agenda for ideological analysis. Though contested by resource mobilization theorists (Diani 2000; Klandermans 2000) who claim that the availability or resources should be privileged in the analysis of movement behavior, Zald claims that ideology provides fruitful connections between movement participants’ behavior, political socialization and mobilization, and cultural contexts. More to the point, Zald defines ideology politically (as well as culturally) and wishes to enhance its status as a political concept in the social movement literature.

The central implications of Zald’s theory of ideologically structured behavior for social movement scholarship are that it expands the scope and sharpens the analytical intent of framing to include a description or typology of movement politics; it clarifies other social movement concepts and theories, specifically resource mobilization and collective action; and it provides a framework to explain mobilization efforts across different political and cultural contexts. In specific:
1. Ideology is an issue of theoretical scope and analytical intent: “if your goal is to describe and analyze specific movements or families of movements, then it is highly likely that you must take into account the ideological diagnoses and prognoses that shape movement adherents' world view and programs of action” (2000: 5). Also, “a social movement organization’s ability to perceive and take advantage of political opportunity and its ability to acquire resources are profoundly conditioned by the world view of SMO leaders” (2000: 6). Zald suggests that the concept of ideology has, at least, two levels. The first is abstract and corresponds to the weltanschauung (Gramsci 1971; Mannheim 1997) of social movement agents, especially leaders, intellectuals, etc. The second describes how ideas inform “behavior,” i.e. movement strategies, tactics, and the ways in which strategies are put into action and what tactics are considered legitimate for the movement (e.g. non-violent tactics only, property damage, armed insurrection [e.g. see also Williams and Blackburn 1996; Platt and Williams 1999, where they distinguish between “operative ideology” and higher-order ideology, which is more abstract, formulaic, and recursive]).

2. Ideology is an issue of conceptual and theoretical clarification in social movement scholarship: “researchers interested in core issues of the resource mobilization/collective action or the political process program end up introducing ideologically related issues through the back door when they ‘code’ or analyze specific issues, conflicts, and movements” (2000: 5). This suggests that ideology represents an absent (under-conceptualized) variable in social movement analysis. Ideology may be represented as an independent variable structuring the use of resources, the organization of the internal structure of a movement, or the application of strategies and tactics toward instances of
collective action. It can also, in this same vein, represent a dependent variable depending on
the analytic intent of particular studies.

3. Ideologically structured behavior, when put at the center of mobilization concerns,
makes it easier to understand mobilization efforts since ideologies conform to a member’s
beliefs even prior to an individual’s participation in protest actions. Hence, as a political
concept, ideologies reside both inside and outside movements either actively structuring or
passively categorizing political standpoints. Ideology has the potential to broaden the scope
of political analysis with regard to mobilizing allies (e.g. through the application of frame
alignment processes), engaging with external political forces, or configuring the relationship
between cultural values and forms of political and ideological expression in specific contexts.

6.5.2 Ideological Salience

Westby uses the term “ideological salience” to demarcate instances where ideology is
an operative factor in frame processes, distinguishing it from the social movement literature’s
more static conception of ideology. However, Westby also argues that there are instances
where ideology is not salient in establishing certain frame processes at certain moments. His
examples include the justifications for mobilization around the Three Mile Island nuclear
energy plant disaster, revisionist socialism in Europe, and the Civil Rights Movement in the
United States. Each case offers different examples where, Westby argues, political ideologies
were either rejected, jettisoned for practical and political purposes or oppositional ideologies
were appropriated, respectively. Despite the absence of an ideology, Westby claims that
movements were able to engage in successful framing activities nonetheless. One could also
make the opposite point: in order for these movements to establish a political standpoint and
engage in framing activity, they had, in some way, to define themselves apart, alongside of,
or within an ideology. The issue—as Westby puts it—is a theoretical one. However, it is also an empirical issue. More recently, Snow (2004) (see also Snow and Byrd 2007) claims that the analytical use of ideology needs to be specified at the conceptual level; it must be demonstrated how it is useful for the analysis of social movements. Snow (2004) (see also Snow and Byrd 2007) contends, repeatedly, that there is a broad diversity of perspectives as to what ideology is, how it works, and, most significantly, that “Insofar as values and beliefs constitute salient components of ideology, then such observations suggest that perhaps their presumed integration with respect to any particular ideology should be problematized and thus explored empirically rather than assumed” (Snow and Byrd 2007: 122).

Snow is correct in that the relationship of ideology to social movements has to be demonstrated empirically. A demonstration of the analytical utility of ideology in analyzing aspects of social movements represents a jumping off point for a social movement theoretical perspective on ideology. A case where ideology is a singularly salient factor in interpreting the practices of a social movement will help to define the concept of ideology, explore its limits (within the terms of a set of cases or a single case) and suggest places where further investigation might be made. The following section will briefly discuss how ideology has been explored in the study of social movements across the social sciences literature.

6.6 Ideology in the Context of Political Theory and Ideology in the Context of Social Movements

Studies where ideology is defined as a political concept (Plamenatz 1970; Carlsnaes 1981; Abercrombie and Turner, 1982; Ashley and Orienstein 1985; Mészáros 2005) and explored as salient for social movements (Freeman 1972; Mooney and Hunt 1994; Johnston 1995; Mooney 1995; Freeman 1997; Carroll and Ratner 1997; Noonan 1997; Westby 2002)
provide valuable perspectives on the relationship between social movements, framing practices, and ideology. However, within the literature on social movements, the theorization of ideological processes within social movements, when discussed, remains within the parameters of social movement studies; it fails to engage with other literatures on ideology. If ideology remains subordinate to the frame process both empirically, as a resource or repository for cultural values, and conceptually, as analytically non-specific, then the literature on framing will continue to situate ideology as a static cultural resource and oppose it to framing, which is considered active and dynamic (Benford 1997; Williams 1999; Oliver and Johnston 2000a; 2000b; Platt and Williams 2002; Westby 2002; Snow 2004; Snow 2008). I will demonstrate how ideology is salient in the analysis of politics generally and social movements specifically.

In other sociological literature, ideology is connected to a broader context: the political forces in society. This perspective is popular in classical sociological theory (Marx and Engels 1960; Gramsci 1971; Mannheim 1995), political sociology and political theory (Lenin 1929; Marx and Engels 1960; Lukacs 1969; Korsch 1970; Plamenatz 1970; Althusser 1968, 1997a, 1997b; Gramsci 1971; Carlsnaes 1981; Abercrombie and Turner, 1982; Ashley and Orienstein 1985; Mészáros 2005), and in new social movement literature (McNally 1995; Touraine 1981, 1985; Castells 1983; Freeman 1972, 1997). Due to the fact that the definition of ideology, in the framing literature, is limited—in total—to culture, cognition, linguistics, and symbolic interaction (Goffman 1974; Hall 1982; Johnston 1995, 2001; Hallgrímsdóttir 2003; Rohlinger and Snow 2003; Snow 2004), it cannot account for how social movements participate strategically in a broader ideological and political context. If, as Hank Johnston claims, the true location of the frame is in the minds of movement members
ideology, which requires a persistent engagement with political forces, must be introduced in order to “break the frame” and allow social movement frames to engage in political and ideological forces (Oliver and Johnston 2000b; Johnston 2001).

6.7 Bringing Ideology Back In: Antonio Gramsci

Building off of Zald and Westby, it is my contention that a better way to conceive of the role that ideology plays in social movement literature, then, is not to view it as a static pool of cultural resources, but as active and central to the political standpoint (or standpoints), the internal structure, and the strategic planning of a social movement as some studies have shown (Freeman 1972, 1997; Williams 1999; Oliver and Johnston 2000a; 2000b; Platt and Williams 2002). In the literature on social movement framing, framing describes a process internal to the social movement affecting, primarily, movement members (Johnston 1995). The process demarcates the inventory of interpretations, constructions of strategies, and mobilization practices within a single movement (Johnston 1995; Rucht and Neidhardt 2002). I am seeking a way to describe social movement interpretations, strategies, and mobilization practices as a part of a political process (and not, primarily, as a cultural concept). Ideology provides the conceptual means to do this. If ideology is a rational attempt at an expression of a political standpoint (Mannheim 1995) and ideology allows for and, at times, coordinates multiple perspectives within a social movement organization (Lenin 1920; Gramsci 1971, 1977), then ideology can be understood, in the language of social movement

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29 Contemporary social movement literature defines frames as “collective patterns of interpretation with which certain definitions of problems, causal attributions, demands, justifications and value-orientations are brought together in a more or less consistent framework for the purpose of explaining facts, substantiating criticism and legitimating claims” (Rucht and Neidhardt, 2002, p. 11). The frame process describes how small group interaction produces a shared cognitive schema or “frame.” The group that shares this schema, or frame, is the social movement. The term framing is derived from Erving Goffman’s extended essay, Frame Analysis. Goffman describes a “frame” as a “schemata of interpretation;” according to him frames can “locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of complete occurrences defined in its terms” (Goffman 1974, p. 21).
theory, as a marriage between the political process model (McAdam 1999) and the frame perspective.

In my view, a social movement takes an ideological perspective that is (if not in part, in total) different from, or in opposition to, the predominant ideology (Gramsci 1971; Mannheim 1995). It becomes a part of the political forces that comprise political standpoints and counterpoints. The concept of ideology, in the context of social movement studies, implies a contest within the political forces in society at a given moment in time (Gramsci 1971; Freeman 1972, 1997). As the movement struggles within these forces it adapts and changes. As it expresses the form that political challenges take it provides both a narrative and an internal discourse—contested even from within a movement—of political contest.

This is empirically and analytically grounded in the myriad of media discourses that are expressive of politics written from the standpoint of media institutions, movement participants, and political commentators alike (Krippendorff 1980; Brown and Yule 1983; Fairclough 1985, 1995, 2001; Van Dijk 1988, 1993; Priest 1996). The reasons for, and differences across, the particular adaptations and changes made by social movements can be linked to the movement’s ideology. As Jo Freeman (1997) puts it, “[B]oth movement ideology and structure, which shape each other, are created by the members’ adaptive responses to external forces. Once created, neither ideology nor structure is static; both influence strategic choices that organizations make” (Freeman 1997: 304).30 Freeman’s concept of ideology breaks the frame: social movements identify and interpret problems,

30 This perspective is echoed in the framing literature by Platt and Williams (2002), who make a distinction between “operative ideologies,” which function like a frame process, and “ideology,” which is defined, in line with the framing literature, as abstract and static (Westby 2002). Platt and Williams state that the empirical contribution of ideology to the social movement frame perspective is that “ideology is a cultural resource acting as a structural and structuring feature in organizing social movements” (Platt and Williams 2002, p. 10). Although ideology remains conceptually subordinate to the frame perspective, this distinction provides valuable support for the view that ideology is a central structural feature of social movements. I can’t remember how you get rid of these blank lines between notes, but you need to do so.
propose solutions, and mobilize participants (i.e., they organize and strategize) through ideology. As movement ideology is crafted and changed in response to external forces—to the extent that the movement survives and participates in politics, in whatever way—a social movement demonstrates its world view. The movement’s perspective survives in that it has an empirical foothold—it may achieve its goals—and members adhere to the ideology (as members, allies and fellow travelers) believing not only in the ideology, but in the potential success of the socio-political program espoused through the ideology.

6.8 Gramsci and the Role of Intellectuals in Diagnostic, Prognostic, and Motivational Frames

Antonio Gramsci provides needed concepts that help to explain political process, movement interpretation processes—as factors internal to the movement and as engagements with external political forces—and the effects of political contentions on the organization and structure of social movements. Gramsci’s (1971) work describes the role that intellectuals (e.g. social movement, union and party leaders as well as members) play in political organizations whether these organizations are, for example, social movements, political parties, or trade unions. Intellectuals are central to framing messages, strategizing within movements, and providing organizational cohesion. They dynamically define and redefine ideology to account for and organize multiple perspectives, collective strategic and tactical plans within a single political organization. Gramsci’s conception of ideology is central to explaining how ideological processes work. This is missing from the frame perspective.

31 Jo Freeman has also described how the absence of ideological standpoints leads to an incapacity for social movements to engage in “contentious politics” with external political forces. The result of this is movement fractionalization, demobilization, and dissolution (Freeman 1972).
To demonstrate, Snow and Benford’s (1988) claim—which is persistently repeated in the framing literature—that frames “assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.” is linked to the conceptual categories within the frame perspective. These categories are: 1. diagnostic, the identification of a social problem; 2. prognostic, proposing a strategy; 3. motivational, mobilizing movement members as well as others who may be affected by the problem (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow and Benford 2000a). But stating that a frame—which describes the forms of cognitive, cultural, and symbolic connections between a movement, its members, and potential members—can identify a problem, propose a strategy, and mobilize individuals is both empirically dubious and begs the question of political practice and coordination within a social movement. It’s impossible to assign intention to a process. In other words, a frame, which is a concept, cannot assign meanings or make interpretations.

However, according to Gramsci’s study of the Turin Factory Council Movement (1977/1917), the Russian Revolution (1977/1918), and Lenin’s role in the revolution (1977/1920), as well as his paramount work on intellectuals in his Notebooks (1971), an intellectual, social movement, trade union or party leader can, and does, assign meaning to a problem, interpret events, mobilize members, garner support and demobilize antagonists. Furthermore, it is possible, in Gramsci’s work, for “rank-and-file” members of a movement to do this as well. This contradicts Snow’s (2004) criticism of the Marxist concept of ideology in social movements, which either “masks” social relationships or has an opposing “remedial” function (2004: 381). In point of fact, from a Marxist and Gramscian standpoint, ideology can serve a theoretical, scientific, and pedagogic function. (Murphy and Augelli
1987; Sassoon 1987; Gramsci 1995). Ideology is the medium for this process, regardless of who is responsible. In short, the role of the intellectual is to coordinate the ideological standpoint of a specific social movement for both members and antagonists.32

6.9 Ideological Contention: A Gramscian Approach to Frame Alignment

Frame alignment is a concept (introduced into the social movement lexicon in 1986) that categorizes modifications and changes within the framing process. Frame alignment (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; see also Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982 and Westby 2002) signals a process whereby a frame “could be modified or aligned in various ways so as to better fit the beliefs and sentiments of those to whom they were directed” (Westby 2002: 288). These alterations to frames are viewed as tactical. Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986) describe four tactics that are active in the process of aligning frames: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. Although these categories that describe tactical practices are demonstrated in a handful of cases (Coles 2001; Van den Brink, M; Kuipers, K and Lagendijk 2005; Daniel 2008; Tombari 2010) these cases demonstrate the existing theory but fail to add substantively to the theory. Questions remain with regard to testing how frame alignment processes work, testing when and how they may not work, or instances where they may not be necessary. Questions also remain as to what types of political practices modify and align frames and when these tactics are necessary. This, of course, is an empirical question requiring an investigation of these tactics. However, Gramsci’s analyses of ideological

32 Westby (2002) and Snow (2004) argue that ideology is often understood unilaterally: a movement has an ideology. Westby, however, points out that studies demonstrate ideological fissures within a single movement. Of course there are multiple perspectives within a movement. Lenin and Gramsci both discuss the process of negotiating multiple perspectives. Frames do not account for those contests internal to a movement.
process and Gramsci’s study of the role of the intellectual in Italy offer insights not explored in the literature on frame alignment processes (1971; see also Augelli and Murphy 1988).

Gramsci’s discussion of the intellectual’s role in fostering an ideology, and intraining movement members to be active participants in the construction of movement ideology (teaching the “rank-and file” how to analyze events, i.e. how to be intellectuals) contributes an analytical perspective not offered in the frame perspective. Gramsci’s historical case studies demonstrate, empirically, and explain when these tactics are necessary and for whom they are necessary and why. I have already noted that a discussion of the role of agents as central to framing is absent. Gramsci’s discussion of the role that intellectuals play in constructing and adapting ideology to engage with external political forces and, also, to define the internal strategy and overall character of a social movement demonstrates how interpreting events within a larger political context is necessary for the survival and strategic continuity of a social movement. During the Turin strike of 1917 Gramsci observed that ideological statements during the protest failed to mobilize allies in the city center as well as managers and engineers sympathetic to the Italian Socialist Party. Rigorous dichotomies, structured as class difference as opposed to the common interests of all workers—including foremen—damaged the strike’s longevity (Fiori 1971; Gramsci 1971; Sassoon 1987). In this example, ideological justifications for the strike demonstrated problems with cohesion amongst potential allies. Framing often fails to account for both the positive and negative effects of debating ideological positions.

Framing is a theory of interpretive unification; it does not allow for the investigation of disagreements internal to the movement; framing implies cohesion. Freeman has asserted that ideology is a factor in movement structures (1997). She explains that when ideology is
absent movements risk dissolution (1972). Westby notes that it has been demonstrated empirically how ideology can produce tensions, or worse, within movements. He claims:

Although a single movement ideology from which frames are derived sometimes seems implicit in the ideology/framing commentaries, a moment’s reflection reveals the limitations of this: (1) movements frequently have internal schismatic struggles over ideology; (2) the various forms of collaboration in movements often engender contentious ideological variants; (3) there may be differences regarding the primacy of particular aspects of the ideology; or (4) the movement may march under an eclectic banner of more than a single distinct ideology (2002: 290-291).

He goes on to state that “despite an absence of systematic treatment in the literature, there is at least some reason to think that ideological diversity can be important in framing” (2002: 291). From an analytical standpoint, ideology is salient to the structure of a social movement. It has been demonstrated in social movement studies—through an analysis of peace movements, the farmworkers movement in the US, and the women’s movement in Chile (Benford 1993; Mooney 1995; Noonan 1997)—that ideological fissures are a social fact within movement’s framing capacities and processes. Where framing verges toward a seamless structure of interpretation for a social movement the examples above indicate that, from an analytical standpoint, ideology could explain how frames are formed, how they transform, and why, and in what way they are salient in specific cases. Westby (2002) (see also Snow 2004 and Byrd and Snow 2007) points out that though little work has been done to theorize the role of ideology for social movement framing processes these examples “do seem to support the intuition that ideological diversity is an important condition of movement framing” (2002: 291).
In this vein, if ideology is understood as a platform for political participation, movement organization, and as a rationalized perspective (Plamenatz 1971; Carlsnaes 1981; Mannheim 1997) that, empirically, is manifest in contention but still works toward identifying the goals of a movement, it would need to be brought into social movement literature as a central concept. Using ideology as a standpoint and measure—delineating what a movement stands for and if its actions are in line with its philosophy—will enable social movement scholarship to explain several things. First, ideology helps explain the relative successes and failures of social movement strategies. It contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between stated goals (movement’s ideological standpoint) and political gains. Ideology explains differences with regard to the internal organization of different social movements (in accordance with explicit ideological positions, e.g. class, gender, race). It demonstrates that the process of interpretation involves political agents who produce interpretations through a contentious process. And, most fundamentally ideology allows researchers to investigate whether or not social movements that seek a strong position within national political frameworks can achieve their ideological goals within structural constraints at the macro level (interstate, regional, and national politics).
7. CONCLUSION

I wish to conclude with a brief discussion of my hypothesis, thesis and argument, contributions that the study makes, the methods used, as well as the problems and limitations to the study. In this dissertation, I hypothesize that knowledge cannot be fully understood, and that the benefit to social science epistemology would be fundamentally limited, unless it is placed into its historical and cultural context. I have tried to demonstrate that the cultural and political forces extant and contemporaneous, more than influential, are determinant on theoretical knowledge. In this project, historical contextualism provides a series of methodological guidelines to help me demonstrate my hypothesis. One of these guidelines is within historical contexts the intentions of the author should be our principal guide. Gramsci sought to extend a historical-materialist framework by developing it theoretically and methodologically. In doing so, he avoided the lamentable political perspectives that informed, for example, positivist criminology. More to the point in his work Gramsci prefigures attention to and descriptions of the importance of ethnic, racial, and cultural variability in determining and challenging political practices. In short, this dissertation demonstrates how Gramsci still offers a viable theoretical discourse on social change, social structures, and political power. By tarrying with knowledge, in the context of challenging certain assumptions, the epistemological underpinnings of Gramsci’s work are laid bare; we are able to perceive and determine the presumptive and empirical bases for theories through contextualist approaches.

In specific the research in this dissertation offers, at least, two distinctive contributions: Section 2 demonstrates, through Gramsci, important characteristics that mark the conceptual relationship between structural and cultural perspectives in the analysis of
racial discourse (e.g. the persistence of racisms). Sections 5 and 6 demonstrate the *sui generis* role of intellectuals as maintaining a continuity and intelligibility (legitimacy) in social movements and the role of ideology (as determinant) in the structure, organization, strategy, tactics and political outcomes of social movements.

In specific, with regard to Section 2, the political, economic, and cultural composition of the population constructed a series of discourses amongst which scientific discourses of race was most prominent. Gramsci’s theoretical and political perspective marks a specific intervention into the predominant racial discourse but his analysis of political, economic, cultural, and class composition demonstrates an enduring theoretical intervention into historical materialism. His “specifying” of analytical levels within an historical materialist framework lays the groundwork for connecting non-commensurable theoretical discourses within theories of race, racism, and racialization.

Regarding Sections 5 and 6, which discuss social movements, ideology, and politics, Gramsci’s conception of ideology and intellectuals provides insights into empirical effects of social movements efforts to mobilize members and others that are not offered in the current literature. The presumptions in the social movements literature, regarding Gramsci—and which I discuss in detail in section five—depend upon a specific interpretation that is formal and not contextual.

Along with historical contextualism at different points in each of the sections, I also rely on discourse analysis and intellectual historiography as methodological guidelines and approaches. These methods are applied to historical data in the form of Gramsci’s prison notebooks in the context of his personal correspondences as well as biographies of Gramsci’s life, the Italian Communist Party, and historical studies of the context in which Gramsci
wrote. Where appropriate I also discuss the role of interlocutors in contemporaneous theoretical discourses.

Historical contextualism argues that the intentions of the author should serve as the central guide as to the specific formalism of a (historical) text. However, intellectual historiography very rarely demonstrates direct causal relationships but provides potential influences. Unless marginalia provides notation, in detail, with regard to the effects of sources and the structure of a text (drafts, proofs, etc.) such a methodological approach will vary. This is compounded by the veracity of competing of secondary sources is sometimes questionable (genealogical). It is my contention in this dissertation that Gramsci’s responses to political and intellectual opponents provide excellent guidelines to determine intentions and I try to discuss the ramifications of these arguments for Gramsci and contemporary theoretical frameworks that rely on Gramsci’s work.

Gramsci initiates a theoretical discourse that stands between the modern and the intellectual traditions that emerge after modernism. Interpretations of his theories must be grounded contextually and can be inserted into contemporaneous studies and tested empirically (which I intend to do in future research). The point of this project is to demonstrate that if social science and humanities scholars approach theories from two angles: contextual and in the context of contemporary issues the contributions to disciplinary knowledge are clearer specifically to theoretical knowledge; it can grow in more than one way.

It is possible that the distinction that I draw between modernism and the intellectual traditions that emerge from modernity is not as salient as I make them out to be. Also, since my approach in this dissertation is dependent upon the interpretation of historical data, there
may be other possible interpretations of the data. In fact, others have established specific approaches to Gramsci’s work: The “absolute historicist” approach (attributable to Christine Buci-Glucksmann and Quentin Skinner); post-Marxist approaches (mostly attributable to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe); also the idea that Marxism constitutes a *sui generis* “research program” for the social sciences (mostly attributable to Goran Therborn and Michael Burawoy). Each of these approaches and interpretations are in no way independent of one another. They overlap in significant ways and distinctions amongst them depend largely upon disciplinary perspectives.

Other limitations of this study include the limitations of conducting historical research and the broad orientation of the study. Further research into historical archives would allow me to consider marginalia and other artifacts not published. With this information I may be able to make significant distinctions with regard to causal vs. inferential connections (in other worlds problems of intellectual historiography vs. contextualism which I mention above). The broad focus of this dissertation research disallows intensive studies into specific rubrics (e.g. race and social movements). However, and in conclusion, I should say that the broadness and exploratory nature of this study is also its strength, in that it outlines several significant departure points for further research which I intend to pursue at the conclusion of this project.
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