FRAMING CHANGE: SOCIAL MOVEMENT FRAMING
IN UNIVERSITY LIVING WAGE MOVEMENTS

A Dissertation

by

LAURIE DENNISE METCALF

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2009

Major Subject: Communication
FRAMING CHANGE: SOCIAL MOVEMENT FRAMING
IN UNIVERSITY LIVING WAGE MOVEMENTS

A Dissertation
by
LAURIE DENNISE METCALF

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Approved by:
Chair of Committee, Katherine Miller
Committee Members, Charles Conrad
Barbara Sharf
Carolyn Clark
Head of Department, Richard Street

August 2009

Major Subject: Communication
ABSTRACT

Framing Change: Social Movement Framing in University Living Wage Movements. (August 2009)

Laurie Dennise Metcalf, B.S., Abilene Christian University; M.A., Abilene Christian University

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Katherine Miller

In recent years, living wage movements have developed around the United States. In addition to advocating for living wage ordinances and laws in cities, living wage movements have developed to advocate for living wage policies at universities across the country. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine living wage movements at two universities to understand how they use communication to frame the wage issue and to push for the implementation of living wage policies.

To develop an understanding of these living wage movements, two cases, Texas A&M University and Georgetown University, were selected for this study to examine through the lens of the social movement framing perspective. Data for the cases included interviews with activists and administrators, media reports, video documentaries, and internal documents.

Results showed that the living wage campaign in each case prioritized the components of collective action frames, diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing, differently. The Texas A&M living wage campaign focused heavily on developing the problem at an emotional level and offering a clear solution to the problem. The Georgetown living wage campaign focused heavily on laying blame for
the problem. Each case also exhibited elements of master framing which linked its campaign to preexisting values. Most notably, in both cases, the existing university values and culture were used as a basis for master framing.

The results also showed that the campaign targeted different constituencies, with the Texas A&M campaign attempting to gain popular support and the Georgetown campaign focusing on the university’s administration. This, along with the degree to which each campaign was willing to accept compromise, had a large impact on the campaigns’ overall strategies. Overall, the results of this study show how communication related to an issue affects the course of a social movement and how a social movement approach can be used to create organizational change.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to my committee chair, Dr. Katherine Miller. I could not have completed this without you. I was exhausted and fragile when I came to you, and you gave me the confidence and encouragement to complete this project. When I had problems, you understood and worked with me. You cheered me on as I managed life crises and pregnancy. Words cannot express my appreciation for your academic and emotional support.

Thank you also to my committee members, Drs. Barbara Sharf, Charles Conrad, and Carolyn Clark. You made my time at Texas A&M fulfilling and fun, and you have been more than patient with me in completing this project. Thousands of graduate students can say they worked with the highest quality scholars, as I have. However, I have had the added privilege of working with genuinely good people. To Dr. Jamie Callahan, I appreciate your willingness to step up for me in a tight spot. It is this kind of willingness to give of yourself that makes the Aggie experience so powerful for me.

Most especially thank you to Kyle and Brendan. This process has required as much sacrifice of you as it has of anyone. But through it all, you supported me with love and without question. Kyle, you were always on my side and gave me everything you could to help me. Without you, I would have given up long ago. And to Peyton, you arrived for the end of this process, and made the end that much sweeter.

Finally, thank you to my parents. I never would have made it this far without you. You always encouraged me to reach for my goals and to educate myself. As I struggled through this process, you never doubted me, even when I doubted myself.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td></td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td></td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A living wage</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social movement research</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frames and framing</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From the literature to an investigation of living wage movements</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>METHODS</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The cases</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>TEXAS A&amp;M DATA ANALYSIS</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overview of the living wage campaign</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RQ1: The performance of social movement framing</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RQ2: Master framing</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>GEORGETOWN DATA ANALYSIS</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overview of the living wage campaign</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RQ1: The performance of social movement framing</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RQ2: Master framing</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V CASE COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ3: Comparison of the cases and contextual influences</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflections on the study</td>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final reflections</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Current city and county living wage campaigns</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Current college and university living wage campaigns</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Social movement framing process</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Comparing the Texas A&amp;M and Georgetown cases</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Data collected for each case</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Operational definitions used for the RQ1 data analysis categories</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Operational definitions used for RQ2 original data analysis categories</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>GSC’s living wage policy from Georgetown Living Wage Report</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Dan McOwen has been a security guard at Harvard University for 15 years. In that time, he estimates that he has seen Harvard raise 14.9 billion dollars, while his own quality of life has decreased. Though Dan sees himself as a member of the Harvard community, he feels that Harvard itself does not feel the same way. Like many low-wage workers, Dan cannot make use of the facilities for which Harvard is well known. In fact, he believes that Harvard would like to see him and many other low-wage workers retire or “die off” so that they can outsource his job for less pay and lower benefits. More than anything, he feels a lack of respect from the institution,

Sometimes I feel like I’m at the bottom rung of the food chain. We know Harvard’s rich. But what about the quality of life for the people? For my guards? For me? We’re going on five years without a raise. In the years that I’ve been here, Harvard’s raised $14.9 billion, but they don’t seem to care how we live. It’s like they don’t think about us as human beings. (Worker’s Words, n.d.)

Dan is one of many workers at universities and in communities around the nation who work full-time, yet must struggle to make financial end meet. Activists and ordinary people from around the nation have begun to take notice of the workers who earn wages

This dissertation follows the style of Communication Monographs.
so low that they live in poverty. As a result, grassroots movements have emerged to advocate for a living wage, pay rates that would keep full-time workers from living in poverty.

Since 1994, living wage movements have been springing up around the country advocating for policies, ordinances, and legislation requiring a living wage set above the federal minimum wage. Generally, these movements have been extremely successful. Since the early 1990s, 123 living wage ordinances and policies have been passed around the country (ACORN, n.d.). While much research has examined the effects of living wage initiatives and policies on local economies, and other scholars have examined how social movements mobilize, little research has examined the social and communicative processes through which living wages movements have come by their success and produced such consistent results on local levels around the country. It is very important to understand what makes these movements so successful and how they garner support for their causes. This project will examine living wage movements at major American universities, an employment sector being targeted by living wage activists that has been largely ignored by research. Specifically, this dissertation will consider two living wage movements that have been deemed to be successful (though to different extents) to examine how these movements construct meaning for themselves and other constituents through the creation of compelling framing processes that gather support for their cause. In this chapter, I will provide background on the phenomenon of living wage movements, then an overview of the theoretic lens of social movement framing.
A Living Wage

In recent years, the United States has seen a variety of small grassroots movements attempting to implement policies and ordinances requiring a living wage (Sharpe, 2001). Over the years, the federally mandated minimum wage has not kept up with inflation (Merrifield, 2000). As a result, many full-time workers, often called the working poor, must support themselves and their families on earnings which put them below the federal poverty line (Nissen, 2000) defined in 2005 as $16,090 for a three person family (USDHHS, 2005). A full-time worker earning the minimum wage earns $10,712 per year. A living wage is considered a minimum threshold for wages that allow individuals to work one full-time job and support themselves and their families at or above the poverty line. Exactly how a living wage is calculated varies, depending on factors in local economic conditions including cost of living. After the first ordinance requiring a living wage in Baltimore passed in 1994, local living wage movements began appearing all over the country (Martin, 2001; Neumark & Adams, 2003; Reynolds & Kern, 2001-2002) at the state, city, and more recently, the university level.

Most living wage movements are grassroots efforts organized by people who are frustrated with the recent ineffectiveness of national efforts to raise the minimum wage. These organizers see a living wage as financially feasible, but something that offends the political sensibilities of the corporate world. As Merrifield (2000) argues,

The U.S. working class knows full well that the corporate sector can afford to pay a decent wage. Maybe the crucial point here for progressives, then, isn’t defensive economics, but offensive politics: Getting an effective campaign going,
being confrontational, getting workers and communities organized, and embracing workers and their allies elsewhere. (p. 45)

Rarely do the local organizers run living wage movements on their own. Quite frequently the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), which has an entire section devoted to living wage advocacy (Merrifield, 2000; Living Wage Rsource, n.d.; Martin, 2001), religious-based social justice organizations (Nissen, 2000), or unions get involved in the process as well (Martin, 2001; Reynolds & Kern, 2001-2002; Neumark, 2002). In 1997, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution promising to support local living wage campaigns (Reynolds & Kern, 2001-2002). Martin (2001) found that union support, local workers alone, national organizations (such as ACORN) alone, or opposition for business had no effect on the passage of living wage ordinances and policies. What was effective, though, was the interaction between local leaders and national organizations. In fact, Martin (2001) found that the presence of a local ACORN chapter greatly improves the chances of passing living wage policies.

Living wage policies have drawn criticisms, though. Neumark and Adams (2000) argue that living wage policies and ordinances arbitrarily set the number of family members that should be supported above the poverty level with a living wage. Often, this is not beneficial to larger families with more dependents than the number designated in the living wage ordinance. Also, most living wage ordinances assume only one wage earner, and do not adjust for families with two full-time workers.

In spite of these criticisms, living wage policies have been found to have significant positive effects on local economies. Living wages have been found to create
some reductions in urban poverty (Neumark & Adams, 2000). Adams and Neumark (2005) found that living wages reduce net urban poverty and that living wages help families slightly below and slightly above the poverty line. Some commentators have also predicted that the enactment of living wage policies could lead to decreases in sick days, depressive symptoms, premarital childbirth, and even premature death and increased odds of completing high school, as these outcomes are often connected to increases in socioeconomic status (Bhatia & Katz, 2001). In spite of many economic concerns raised regarding the viability of the living wage initiatives for employers, a study predicting the outcomes of a living wage in New Orleans found that most businesses would be able to absorb the excess cost through price increases, productivity increases, and internal redistribution of income (Pollin, Brenner, & Luce, 2001).

Living wage ordinances and policies have many critics, though. Neumark and Adams (2003) found that living wage laws are either ineffective or that the effect of such initiatives are difficult to measure. Adams and Neumark (2005) further argued that living wage initiatives may not really help the lowest-skilled workers, but help the higher-paid and higher-skilled workers who live in poor families. Similarly, Brenner, Wicks-Lim, and Pollin (2002) argue that while living wage initiatives help some workers, these policies can also push the lowest-skilled workers even further below the poverty line, presumably because of eliminated jobs (see also Adams & Neumark, 2005). Additionally, a study of a proposed living wage ordinance in New Orleans found that in addition to layoffs or business relocations, price increases could result from the implementation of a living wage (Pollin, Brenner, & Luce, 2001).
So although scholars have been unable to definitively pinpoint the likely effectiveness of living wage policies and ordinances, the push for living wage proposals has continued around the country. The evidence of moderate reductions in poverty (Adams & Neumark, 2005; Brenner, et al, 2002) and of limited numbers of low-wage workers being dismissed as a result of living wage policies (Pollin, Brenner, & Luce, 2001), as well as the substantial health benefits as a result of even moderately increased wages (Bhatia & Katz, 2001) have motivated grass roots living wage movements to continue the push for these policies. Currently, the Association of Community Organizations for reform Now (ACORN) records that there are 67 living wage movement active in cities and 28 active living wage campaigns at colleges and universities across the United States. Figures 1 and 2 depict ACORN’s list of active living wage campaigns (Living Wage Campaigns Underway, n.d.):

| Washington, D.C. | Grand Rapids, MI |
| Little Rock, AR | Hazel Park, MI |
| Pine Bluff, AR | Kalamazoo, MI |
| Phoenix, AZ | Madison Heights, MI |
| Monterrey County, CA | Monroe, MI |
| San Anselmo, CA | St. Louis County, MN |
| San Diego, CA | Oxford, MS |
| San Mateo, CA | Asheville, NC |
| Santa Monica, CA | Charlotte, NC |
| Sonoma County/ Santa Rosa, CA | Wilmington, NC |
| Boulder, CO | Portsmouth, NH |
| Grand Junction, CO | Camden County, NJ |
| Bridgeport, CT | Reno, NV |
| Willimantic, CT | Binghamton, NY |
| Broward County, FL | Elmira, NY |
| Coral Gables, FL | Ithaca, NY |

Figure 1
Current City and County Living Wage Campaigns
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gainesville, FL</th>
<th>Rockland County, NY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonville, FL</td>
<td>Syracuse, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Miami, FL</td>
<td>Troy, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampa, FL</td>
<td>Utica, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens, GA</td>
<td>Columbus, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta, GA</td>
<td>Kent, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davenport, IA</td>
<td>Eugene, OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa City, IA</td>
<td>Medford, OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champagne-Urbana, IL</td>
<td>Allegheny County, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis, IN</td>
<td>Providence, RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette, IN</td>
<td>Knoxville, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bend, IN</td>
<td>Memphis, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan, KS</td>
<td>Nashville, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichita, KS</td>
<td>Austin, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexington, KY</td>
<td>Charlottesville, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton Rouge, LA</td>
<td>Richmond, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangor, ME</td>
<td>Spokane, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen Park, MI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agnes Scott College</th>
<th>Rhodes College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American University/Washington College of Law</td>
<td>Stanford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown University</td>
<td>Swarthmore College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucknell University</td>
<td>University of California—San Diego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College of William and Mary</td>
<td>University of Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornell University</td>
<td>University of Illinois—Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke University</td>
<td>University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlham College</td>
<td>University of Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfield University</td>
<td>University of Northern Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard University</td>
<td>University of Pittsburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>University of Tennessee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent State University</td>
<td>University of Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern University</td>
<td>University Pittsburgh (county wide ordinance that would affect campus workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton University</td>
<td>Valdosta State University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2

Current College and University Living Wage Campaigns
With these movements playing prominent roles in universities, cities, and even states around the United States, it is important for these movements to be studied as phenomena in their own right. Such research will help us to increase our understanding of how these movement approach advocacy for living wage policies, and shed light on communication practices within the movements and with the outsiders that must be drawn into the movement if it is to be ultimately successful.

In spite of the rapid growth of living wage movements across the country, scholars have been slow to understand this movement and its effects on organizations (Martin, 2001). This project will attempt to use the concept of social movement framing in order to gain a better understanding of the factors that contribute to the success of living wage movements on college campuses. The social movement framing perspective is particularly appropriate because it is focused on how framing processes are used to create change related to social justice issues. Next, I will briefly overview some issue in social movement research in the communication field and examine the social movement framing processes in more depth.

Social Movement Research

The communication field has a rich history of researching social movements. Social movements differ from other types of collectivity in their organization. Social movements have leaders, membership, and organizations (to varying degrees) and propose change in widely accepted norms and values or oppose change that is advocated by other groups, or as Gamson (1992a) argues, negotiate the “definition and construction of social reality.” The social movement typically attempts to address both values and
norms accepted by society and create change in institutions (Stewart, Smith, & Denton, 1994).

The communication field has viewed social movements through a variety of lenses, with the actor-oriented approach, which examines social movements from the individual’s perspective, or the system-oriented approach, which values the collective action (Simon, 1972). With either approach, though, a key element to a movement’s ability to create change is the use of persuasion and/or coercion to gain support (Simon, 1972; Stewart et al, 1994). The persuasive efforts of the social movement’s leadership must attract and maintain followers, get the establishment to adopt their perspective, and react to any opposition by the establishment (Simons, 1970).

The social movement’s persuasive efforts must also be directed toward legitimizing itself. It begins with no organization and zero legitimacy, but must be taken seriously by institutions and potential followers in order to be able to succeed (Rimlinger, 1970; Stewart et al 1994). If the social movement has no persuasive power over existing institutions, then it is unlikely to succeed in having the institutions implement the desired change. This legitimation occurs through the use of coactive strategies, which the social movement builds on accepted norms and values, and through the use of confrontational strategies, which attempt to delegitimize the existing social order in some way (Stewart et al 1994). To a large degree, this occurs by attempting to change the language used to discuss the social issue, and thus change the way people think about the issue, and by the attempt to create a compelling alternate narrative that is consistent with the social movement’s goals. This narrative must have high levels of
narrative coherence, the degree to which the narrative makes sense, and narrative fidelity, the degree to which the narrative rings true (Fisher, 1987; Stewart et al 1994).

Thus, communication is the primary tool social movements use to create change. Communication is the necessary means of raising awareness, creating new values, and promoting a desired change by involving bystanders and institutions. This study will explore the communicative framing used to motivate change in two collegiate living wage movements.

Frames and Framing

At its most basic level, the process of framing is about the organization of experience. How a person interprets an interaction or an event is often determined by a frame used as a filter for interpretation. There are many types of frames and many different views on frames and the framing process. In the following sections, I will first consider the nature of frames and then consider the nature of framing and the particular ways in which framing comes into play in the examination of social movements such as living wage initiatives.

Frames

It is important to begin with the distinction between the noun “frame” and the verb “framing,” as these two terms highlight different aspects of the framing process (Benford & Snow, 2000; Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, Aarts, Lewicki, Bouwen, & Van Woerkum, 2005). First, frames are often seen as static cognitive structures which associate information, ideas, and values together and serve as filters through which people make meaning (Minsky, 1980). For example, this use of a noun implicates
concepts such as a “frame of reference” or a “world view.” To distinguish these frames from more interactive framing processes, they are often referred to as knowledge structures or schemas (Tannen & Wallat, 1993), and they are typically conceptualized as cognitive “schemata of interpretation” (Snow et al 1986; Goffman 1974; Johnston, 1995; Gamson, 1992b) or “structures of expectation” for the social world (Ross, 1975 from Tannen, 1993). Entman (1993) argues that these frames involve processes of selection and salience. In this view, a frame selects certain aspects of reality to be more salient in a particular context. By privileging certain information, other information must be excluded, which, in effect, causes a particular frame to subvert alternate frames or explanations (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996). More specifically, these cognitive frames define problems, highlight inferences about the causes of the problems, shape moral judgments about the causal agents, and offer remedies to the problem (Entman, 1993; Gamson 1992b; Ryan, 1991). While this approach to the concept of frame can help us understand the resources an individual uses to make meaning, it does not capture the process of producing those frames through interaction.

Fairhurst and Sarr’s (1996) view that framing is the process of sharing one’s own frames with others has slightly different implications for the framing process. For these authors, framing consists of three components: language, thought, and forethought. Language is often a reflection of a frame and focuses us on certain aspects of situations, helps us categorize information, and helps us link information with certain other information. In turn, the language we use is often a reflection of the thoughts or cognitive frames that guide how we make meaning. Finally, because most
communication is spontaneous, framing work must be done before the communication occurs, when storing information or memories. By categorizing the information when it is received, subsequent communication is more likely to reflect the intended frame.

Thus, most of the framing process involves the reflection through language and organization of frames. This use of framing draws attention to what Williams and Benford (2000) identify as an ambiguity in the framing literature. Frames are simultaneously “grammars” or structures that contain meaning and logically link certain types of information with others, and frames are also display “indexicality” in which they are “window- or picture-frames” based on situated use in which information is grouped by the “context-dependent situations in which they are used” (p. 129). So, framing is used to refer to two different ways of cognitively organizing information. The literature often refers to frames as a logical structure for organizing information which serves as a foundation for a frame. Frames as grammars do not require a context, because these types of frames have their own internal logic. The concept of frames as situated use, however, refers to frames as means to group symbolic elements that are associated together based on context, whether or not those symbolic elements are logically associated. In essence, the frame is a picture frame that looks upon a context and provide a view of some elements of that context, while obscuring other elements of that context. This dual usage for the term “frame” can be problematic, because it often, social movement framing researchers are unclear about what type of frame is being examined—frames as grammars for organizing information or frames as situated use where information is grouped based on the context. Overall, this perspective views
frames as relatively static structures that guide thought and framing is the process of using and sharing those frames. In order to move beyond this concentration on static structures, it is important to distinguish between frames and framing processes.

Framing

The complicated nature of the terminology associated with frames is even further complicated by exploring the concept of framing. When referring to the relatively static frames as discussed in the prior section, the term “framing” typically refers to making use of one of those static frames. “Framing” can often have a different meaning, though, referring to the actually process of making meaning and constructing frames, rather than using existing frames. So, the view of frames as relatively static structures can be distinguished from the more interactive process of framing. Framing refers to a processual conceptualization of meaning-making (Benford & Snow, 2000). From a framing perspective, frames guide interaction and “emerge in and are constituted by verbal and nonverbal interaction” (Tannen & Wallat, 1993, p. 60). These frames become tools for interpreting meaning and well-being shaped by the meaning constructed in the framing process (Benford & Snow, 2000). As a result, frames and framing are inextricably linked with language and discourse. Though the “true location” of a frame is in the mind, as is consistent with the idea of frames as static structures, it is through discourse that frames are produced, applied, and changed, which is consistent with the processual nature of framing (Johnston, 1995). Entman (1993) relates frames to how they are produced, used, and related to culture in this way:
Communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgments in deciding what to say, guided by frames (often called schemata) that organize their belief systems. The text contains frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments. The frames that guide the receiver’s thinking and conclusion may or may not reflect the frames in the text and the framing intention of the communicator. The culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames. (p.53-54; original emphasis)

So, in using common frames such as cultural frames, or common frames endorsed by a social movement, such as a living wage movement, individuals find that they communicate using language that reflects the framing in the hope of invoking a similar frame in the receiver.

Although frames (as cognitive schemata) allow us to organize and interpret experience, framing processes are more critical for the study of living wage movements. As noted earlier, the process of framing can be seen as moving the frame from one individual’s mind to others (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996) or as the process through which a collective of people participates in the production and use of the frame and therefore reify it in the form of cultural frames (Entman, 1993). Both of these views of the process of framing are critical for drawing in supporters and encouraging them to mobilize on behalf of the cause. Sometimes this mobilization process involves the introduction of a new frame to compete with existing frames (particularly if it is the frame endorsed by
the movement’s opposition), thus creating a “multiplicity of frames” which individuals must compare and then choose between (Bouwen & Fry, 1991). It is in this competition between older frames and new frames that the social movement operates.

In addition to this distinction between frames and framing, several different types of framing have been identified. DeWulf et al. (2005) identified six major types of communicative framing. Knowledge schemas are static structures that convey expectations for behaviors and help the individual classify or categorize information, similar to the static frames previously discussed. Relationship schemas perform the same function, except instead of focusing on knowledge, they focus on expectations about self and relationships. Interaction schemas guide how individuals act in certain social situations. Issue framing, the fourth schema, is more interactive, focusing on how people make meaning of issues and how these issues are defined as problems (named), assigned causality (blamed), and claimed through a confrontation process with those deemed responsible in the naming and blaming process. Relationship framing, the fifth schema, also more interactive, involves how individuals define themselves in relation to others. Finally, the sixth schema, interaction framing refers to how participants make meaning about the interaction itself. This study will focus specifically on social movement framing, which applies characteristics of issue framing (similar to diagnostic framing of social movement framing), relationship framing, (which also related to diagnostic framing as creating an identity of victimization on the part of some marginalized group), and interaction framing (which contains elements of diagnostic,
prognostic, and motivational framing) to the process of social movements and advocacy processes, such as living wage initiatives.

**Social Movement Framing**

One type of framing that has received little attention within the communication discipline is social movement framing. This type of framing, primarily studied by sociologists, is particularly salient for the analysis of living wage movements. In their desire to mandate minimum salaries consistent with living wage levels, living wage activists often organize to form a new local social movement to remedy the problem of poverty. With its formation, the movement begins to play a role in creating perceptions related to the living wage issue. At its most basic level, the social movement must identify and articulate an injustice which can be remedied by a clear target, because without that clear target, it is unclear what the social movement can mobilize against (Gamson, 1992a). In essence, the movement attempts to “disorganize consent and organize dissent” in order to promote a new, counter-hegemonic movement to contrast with the status quo (Carroll & Ratner, 1996).

Social movement framing emerges from the belief that social movements are essentially a form of meaning construction—that they are composed of “signifying agents” who are constant participants in the production and/or maintenance of meaning for the social movement and it members (Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 2000). Social movements function both as “carriers and transmitters” of beliefs and engage in meaning production for everyone connected with the movement, even if that connection emerges from opposition to that movement (Polletta, 1998; Snow & Benford, 1988). In
this process of meaning production, social movements “carry” or hold beliefs relating to the target social issues in addition to “transmitting” belief by spreading their beliefs and/or forcing the opposition to react to the tenets of the social movement organization. Thus, social movements, such as living wage movements, do not merely react to policy decisions but instead contribute to the definition and perception of issues for movement members, opposition members, and those with no stake in the conflict.

In order for a social movement such as the living wage movement to take hold, people must reframe the way they perceive an issue from a “misfortune” to an “injustice.” The existence of a grievance is not enough. Rather, the critical issues are the ways those grievances are interpreted, how those interpretations are developed, and the extent to which those interpretations are spread to others (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). In other words, a new frame or method of perceiving the grievance must be created. Rather than accepting existing frames related to the issue, social movements challenge them, and in doing so produce collective action frames that guide the way supporters and bystanders should approach the issue. In the next section, I will examine the three main processes through which social movement frames are developed.

*Processes of Framing: The Production of Collective Action Frames*

Social movements develop through the formation of collective action frames that shape understandings of social issues. An effective collective action frame must diagnose the problem, offer a prognosis for how to fix it, and provide a rationale for action (Hart, 1996; Poletta, 1998; Snow and Benford, 1988; Steinberg, 1998). Sociologists have identified three key processes in the development of these collective
action frames that relate to those functions the frame must perform: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivation framing (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988). According to this view of social movement framing, the success of the movement depends upon how well each of these framing processes is performed.

Diagnostic framing involves identifying a problem and attributing blame for that problem (Snow & Benford, 1992, 1988). Clearly, a problem must be identified and agreed upon in order for people to rally behind a social movement. However, the diagnostic framing process becomes more complicated when attributing causality. There is often empirical evidence that points to the existence of a problem, but ascribing a causal factor that the majority of people can accept is much more difficult. In the case of the living wage movements that have sprung up at universities around the country, there is clear evidence of a class of working poor who experience a variety of daily economic hardships. However, opinions on the causal factors responsible for this class of working poor are often scattered -- alternative explanations might include specific actions of political leaders, a free market economy, lack of respect of the humanity of low-paid workers, and lack of available funding within universities (Banish, 2005; Nosko, 2005; Shriver, 2005).

The second aspect of collective action framing, prognostic framing, offers a solution to the problem and “strategies, tactics, and targets” for the implementation of that solution. The proposed solution may not be correlated in any way to the causal attribution offered by the diagnostic framing process, but most of the time it is (Snow & Benford, 1988). Obviously, it is often essential to offer a solution that in some way has
answers for the accepted cause of the problem. In this way, a living wage movement that sees the existence of a class of working poor as a political problem is likely to determine that a political solution is the most rational course of action. Another feature of the prognostic framing process is that it often includes a refutation of the opposition’s prognostic frame, or proposed solution (Benford & Snow, 2000). That is, a social movement’s prognostic framing process will include both that movement’s proposed solution and an explanation of why that solution is better than the opposition’s solution.

The final, and perhaps most essential, social movement framing process is motivational framing. It is with the motivational framing process that agency is introduced to the collective action frame and a cause for activism is created. The motivational framing process involves a “call to arms” or “rationale for action” (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988). The need for motivational framing implies that for the movement’s members, as well as for interested bystanders, a cognitive understanding of the problem and solution is not enough. In addition, movement participants and others must be compelled to act to bring about that the proposed solution. For example, if the problem is framed as a moral dilemma, and the audience buys into that framing process, then the audience must believe that it has a moral imperative to act on the issue (Snow & Benford, 1988). This creation of desire to act is what separates participants in a social movement from those who take a more academic view of the issue. Academics analyze problems and consider causality and possible solutions. Social activists take the additional step of motivating others to action in pursuit of those solutions.
Frame Development and Generation

While these three aspects of collective action framing processes describe what must happen in order to propel social movements forward, they do not explain the social and communicative processes that contribute to the development of these frames. Hart (1996) argues that the production of these frames is actually a culture-making process that creates the culture of a social movement. While creators of collective action frames certainly choose frame characteristics that will appeal to potential participants, this frame production process does not focus specifically on how these decisions regarding what will appeal to participants are made. In spite of the fact that framing is defined as emergent and processual, this social movement framing perspective conceptualizes frames as a concept with a relatively fixed content, rather than as an emergent process (Oliver & Johnston, 2000). Clearly communication creates frames, but the question of “how” that communication social creation process occurs is often left unanswered (Steinberg, 1998). In sum, though the social movement framing perspective attempts to look at the creation of collective action frames as an emergent process, it does not adequately explain how the frames actually emerge.

In response to this critique, two perspectives have been proposed. Steinberg (1998) suggests looking at framing as a Bahktinian discursive process in which the frames emerge through the speech of the social movement members. In this view, the communicative meaning production process both creates and occurs within discursive fields. This approach suggests that instead of overlaying a social issue or injustice on top of a pre-existing belief system, the process of forming a social movement will
actually “impress a conscious and explicit order on ideological discourse” (p. 857), or create an ideological belief system for the social movement through communication used to create and sustain it.

In keeping with Steinberg’s discursive approach, Benford and Snow (2000) assert that frames emerge not only through the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing processes, but also through three more interactional processes: discursive processes, strategic processes, and contested processes. The discursive processes refer to the communication -- oral and written -- between movement members that pertains to the cause. Through their talk, members of the social movement create a compelling story, and movement members discuss the aspects of the cause that are most salient, bringing into prominence the issues or beliefs that are more important than others.

Strategic processes perform the function of accomplishing the purpose of the social movement by recruiting members, informing and persuading them regarding critical movement ideals, and mobilizing them for the cause. The specific strategic processes that occur during these activities are also known as frame alignment processes, discussed later. Thus, the strategic processes are the communication processes that enact the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames. While those frames are important cognitive structures, it is the enactment of the strategic processes through communication about the social issue that actually helps to create change.

Finally, the contested processes occur when movement members are trying to have their version of reality accepted as truth. Movement members have to contest the counterframes offered by their opponents, media, and others, they may not be unified
within the movement about what is accepted as reality, and they may have to deal with tensions and contradictions in defining the frames and events. Though a social movement may present a unified message to constituents and opposition, those within the movement must engage in “reality-construction work” in order to decide how to frame an issue or how to provide a counter-frame to the opposition’s persuasive message. This contested process may lead to “framing contests” among various positions on the social issue in effort to control how the reality is perceived to be related to the social issue.

While this idea of reality construction through a series of frames and counter-frames offered by both sides of an issue has not been thoroughly explored, it refers to how the collective action frames shape the collective action events, which in turn shape the discourse, and therefore the frames. The discursive, strategic, and contested processes are the communication that the social movement uses to do its persuasive work and to communicate the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames.

These processes of meaning construction and framing contribute to the creation of a sense of identity within a social movement. The identity of the social movement is derived from its commitment to advocating for change related to a perceived injustice. This commitment is both reinforced and enacted through the movement’s communication of its stance via its framing of various issues relevant to the perceived injustice. Part of the strength of the social movement is through its members’ identification and the movement’s role in the larger story of the social issue within the social world. Those framing processes become the basis for the movement’s
identification process, in which the movement creates a sense of connection between its members based on how the frame the social issue together.

*Framing and Identity*

An important by-product of these framing processes is that they organize people’s identities in relation to the social movement’s issue. This process is important for social movements because it situates all of the actors in specific role sets in the collective action process. Three identity fields have been found to be constructed by the collective action framing process: the protagonist identity field, the antagonist identity field, and the audience identity field (Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994). The protagonist identity field includes those who both support the cause (e.g., agree with the cause in theory) and advocate for the cause (e.g., act on their beliefs regarding the social movement’s issues). The protagonist identity field can involve support of the cause itself or support of organizations and individuals that have become associated with the cause. Antagonist identity fields include all of those who are active opponents or have strong beliefs counter to the movement’s causes. Audience identity fields include those who are uncommitted or neutral but may respond to the movement’s message. Even those with preexisting beliefs may be classified as part of the audience identity field; however, once beliefs become particularly strong, they will be classified in the protagonist or antagonist identity fields.

Organizing people and organizations or collectives into these identity fields often requires making moral and character attributions about the people and organizations involved. These attributions are necessary elements of the diagnostic and prognostic
framing processes previously described (Hunt et al, 1994). Essentially, the story of the injustice needs to have heroes and villains. Diagnostic framing necessitates the identification of the antagonists, so that the heroes (activists) can propose solutions with prognostic framing. Additionally, the way the identity fields are organized also serves as a boundary framing process by making a clear distinction between the protagonists, antagonists, and the audience, and allowing for attributions of good and evil (Benford & Snow, 2000). Classifying people or organizations in particular identity fields also creates stronger ties between those that are grouped within the various identity fields, allowing for a stronger sense of connection within the groups. For example, there is a stronger sense of cohesion within the activists because they identify with one another and against the establishment that is being fought.

*Other Issues in Social Movement Framing*

How well the social movement performs these various framing processes is not the only factor that influences the success of the movement. To imply that a movement could simply complete the three tasks (diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing) and produce a coherent collective action frame which binds those connected to the issue is an oversimplification of the complexity of the framing processes that motivate people to advocate for change. Both variability in collective action frames and the allusion to master frames can also influence the power of the framing processes to motivate action.
Variability in Collective Action Frames

Though all collective action frames include the processes of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing, there are several factors on which collective action frames may differ. These factors of variability that distinguish among collective action frames can affect the reception of the social movement with those in protagonist and audience roles, and can influence the relationship between protagonist and antagonist roles during the social movement process. In other words, the variability of frames explains why some collective actions frames may be more powerful than others. The four factors that affect the variability of collective action frames are: 1) the scope of the problem and the direction of attribution, 2) the rigidity of the frame, 3) the interpretive scope and influence of the frame, and 4) the resonance of the frame.

First, collective action frames can vary in terms of the scope of problem identification and the direction/locus of attribution. Frames can be very narrow and specific in their approaches to defining problem and assigning blame. They can also be broader and encompass many problems or aspects of the problem, which in turn allows them to draw in more social groups (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992, from Benford & Snow, 2000). For example, activists advocating for policies banning smoking in public places might take different approaches to the scope of the problem and direction of attribution. The activists may choose to view the problem as a public health issue or as a large scale victimization of the public by large corporations. They may try to blame the individual smokers for polluting the air with secondhand smoke or using public smoking bans as a punishment to the corporations that promote smoking by reducing the times and places
that individuals are allowed to smoke. These different definitions of the problem and attributions have implications for the identity fields within the movement and for subsequent calls for action.

Collective action frames can also vary in how rigid and exclusive or flexible and inclusive they are. Frames that are more rigid and exclusive tend to focus more narrowly on a specific problem in a specific way. Frames that are more flexible and inclusive are more likely to function as master frames (discussed in the next section). For example, activists with the same goal of passing bans on smoking in public may use a rigid and exclusive frame that focuses on the dangers of secondhand smoke, whereas a more flexible and inclusive frame might broaden its focus to a discussion of an individual’s right to exist in a relatively healthy environment.

Relatedly, the interpretive scope and influence of collective action frames can vary with some frames being applicable only to a specific problem and some frames applying to a variety of problems (again, perhaps functioning as master frames). The interpretive scope of a frame can be very narrow, focusing on a particular issue, or broader, enabling it to encompass many issues that might be related to each other. For example, though a narrow framing of public smoking bans would concentrate specifically on the dangers of second-hand smoke, a broader public health approach could include many issues in addition to smoking in public such as the presence on trans-fats in foods and allowing the sale of soda in schools.

Frames also differ in how they resonate with people, and that resonance is based on two factors: how credible the frame is and how salient it is perceived to be (Benford
The credibility of the frame is based on three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of the people employing the frame. Frame consistency is an important measure because it shows the extent to which the social movement’s behavior is consistent with its beliefs. For example, anti-smoking activists who smoke would have low frame consistency because they would not be “practicing what they preach.” For the frame to resonate it must also have empirical credibility, meaning that the truth presented by the frame must seem connected to and reflective of the real world. The frame should relate facts that are verifiable and should be believable due to its ability to reflect what individuals see in the world around them. Finally, the frame’s credibility depends on the credibility of the people employing the frame, or the frame articulators. The greater the perceived status or expertise of the frame articulators, the more likely it is that outsiders will believe them, and as a result, the frame will resonate more strongly with those outsiders (Benford & Snow, 2000). For example, a physician may have more credibility in speaking out against public smoking based on his/her health expertise.

The second factor related to the resonance of a frame is its salience. Three factors affect the salience of a frame: centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. First, salience is affected by centrality, or how important the ideas and beliefs associated with a movement are in the lives of the people that the movement is trying to mobilize. For example, it would be a natural fit for an anti-smoking movement to seek members from groups devoted to health issues. Worker treatment and compensation has always been a concern to labor unions, so there would be a high
degree of centrality for this group of constituents with the living wage issue. Salience is also affected by experiential commensurability, or the degree to which the frame resonates with the personal experiences of those same targets of mobilization. People who have had personal experience with or friends or family with diseases like lung cancer or emphysema are more likely to see the public smoking as a highly important issue. Finally, salience and frame resonance is affected by the narrative fidelity of the frame, or the degree to which the frame makes sense within in a cultural context (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson 1992a; Klandermans, 1992; Steinberg, 1998). In other words, narrative fidelity looks at the degree to which frames ring true with cultural myths or master narratives. Someone who buys into the cultural myth of America as the land of personal freedom, where an individual’s behavior should not be dictated by institutions or government, will see a public smoking ban as inappropriate or even offensive because it does not fit with the narrative lens that person uses to organize experience. Together these three factors help explain the salience of a frame which is one of the elements that affects how a collective action frame operates in society (Benford & Snow, 2000).

So, though collective action frames are defined as consisting of the processes of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames, they vary widely in how they actually function in the social world. This variability is a function of the definition of the problem, the rigidity and exclusivity of the frame, its interpretive scope, and it resonance. As mentioned previously, collective action frames are not the only type of frames that impact social movements. The frames must appeal to and motivate people in
order for social movements to be successful. As seen in the variability of the collective action frames discussed in this section, frames must tie into potential members’ previously held ideas about the world. One way this occurs is by tapping into culturally based master frames that reflect a culture’s accepted perspective on various social issues.

**Master Frames**

Some scholars argue that movement-specific collective action frames may in fact be derivative of larger, more subtle, master frames (Snow & Benford, 1992; Williams & Benford, 2000). These master frames are overarching ideas about how we organize experience that affect how we produce meaning in a variety of contexts including the collective action frames of social movements. As Snow and Benford (2000, p. 138) explain, “master frames are to movement-specific collective action frames as paradigms are to finely tuned theories.” Many movements may create collective action frames specific to the individual movement’s cause by deriving meaning from the same master frame. For example, Williams and Benford (2000) observed that movements as varying as the women’s liberation movement, the father’s rights movement, and animal rights movement all tap into the master frame of “equal rights” first created during the civil rights movement. Other potential master frames include the political-economy frame, in which power is viewed as systemic and grounded in wealth, the identity politics frame, which sees power as residing in individual’s agency or identity markers such as race, and the liberal frame, which sees power as the ability to mobilize resources (Carroll & Ratner, 1996).
Several issues can affect the way the master frames serve as paradigmatic guides to more specific collective action frames. The first variable that affects master frames is related to the process of causal attribution. Attribution theory posits that specific behavior and events can be attributed to either internal or external factors. Some master frames assign blame to the individual, and others assign blame to external societal causes. For example, the equal rights frame, previously discussed, attributed blame to the society (Snow & Benford, 1992) while certain social movements, such as Scientology, tie into the “psychosalvational” master frame in while personal unhappiness has its source within the individual, rather than external factors (Snow & Benford 1992). This distinction between external and internal attributions has a direct effect on the diagnostic framing that occurs in the development of a collective action frame, which will guide the social movement.

Another way master frames can vary in terms of function involves the mode of articulation within a master frame. Bernstein (see Snow & Benford, 1992) argues that patterns of speech come from one of two linguistic codes, the restricted code, which is rigid in terms of allowable syntax and meaning, and the elaborated code, which is more flexible in terms of syntax, meanings, and more reflective of immediate structures. In the same way, master frames can be more rigid like the restricted code or more flexible, like the elaborated code. An elaborated master frame, like the equal rights frame, allows for more expansion and extension of its ideas, and is adaptable and useful for social movements to draw upon in the construction of collective action frames (Snow & Benford, 1992). In contrast, a more rigid master frame is the nuclear freeze master
frame, which defined the early 1980s era tension between the United States and Soviet Union only in terms of the threat of the nuclear arsenals, and ignored a plethora of issues related to two superpowers’ existence in the world such as the weaknesses of international peacekeeping groups and the lack of nonviolent options for resolving disputes between independent nations and focuses solely on freezing the growth of nuclear stockpiles (Snow & Benford, 1992). This rigid frame allowed little room for expansion or elaboration because the entire issue was measured entirely by nuclear weapons stockpiles.

Finally, master frames can have variable function in terms of mobilizing potency, or the power a master frame has in the minds of individuals. The more mobilizing potency a master frame has, the more likely it is that individuals will buy into the cause strongly enough to act on it. Mobilizing potency is often related to where the frame falls on the restricted/elaborated code spectrum. The more elaborated the frame is, the more appealing and the greater the potency of the frame. The master’s frames potency is roughly equivalent to the resonance dimension of a collective action frame’s variability. The potency is also related to how much the frame resonates and affects the lives of its supporters and bystanders. How well the frame resonates depends upon the amount of credibility (empirical credibility), how much it rings true to experience (experiential commensurability), and how well the story being told hangs together with cultural narratives (narrative fidelity) (Snow & Benford, 1992). With this perspective on mobilizing potency of frame resonance, it is clear that social movement must exist within and adapt to existing understandings or the “cognitive and evaluative universe
they find, rather than create a new one” (Tarrow, 1992, p. 189). That is, successful collective action movements must tap into the beliefs and values of the social world.

While master framing has not received too much attention in most of the social movement framing literature, it is likely that these master frames play a much larger role in the creation of the collective action frames than is typically acknowledged. As some scholars argue (Snow & Benford, 1992, Williams & Benford, 2000), these master frames are the foundation upon which collective action frames are built. Thus, it is important to look at how the master frames work in conjunction with collective action frames. In summary, master frames use the attribution of cause and blame, restricted or elaborate code, and mobilizing potency to speak about a major issue within a culture on a grand scale, with such power that it is accepted by a large percentage of that culture as truth. By drawing on the widely held beliefs and values that permeate a master frame, the social movement’s leaders are tapping into currently held cultural ideas, rather than attempting to create a completely new value system related to their specific issue. From that foundation, the social movement already has a foundation for the collective action frames, as depicted in Figure 3.
By creating a firm foundation for building the collective action frame, a social movement has created better chances for attracting and mobilizing constituents because it is drawing on an existing belief structure that has previous success in mobilizing support on another social issue.

*Micromobilization Processes*

The existence of master frames and collective actions frames does not mean that individuals being targeted by the social movement will automatically accept the claims and recommendations of the movement, even if they are resonant, salient, and so on. It is also important to examine processes of micromobilization, or “interaction mechanisms by which individual and sociocultural levels are brought together,” that must occur.
enhance the likelihood that individuals will adopt the social movement’s frame and take actions requested by social movement proponents (Gamson, 1992a, p. 71). It is through micromobilization processes that individuals are moved from accepting the framing processes as truth to being willing to act on those beliefs. Two perspectives on micromobilization have been proposed: Gamson’s theory of micromobilization (1992) and Snow, et al’s (1986) examination of frame alignment processes which draws on the work specifically in the social movement framing field.

**Gamson’s Theory of Micromobilization**

Gamson argues that micromobilization occurs as a result of three processes: working together, breaking out, and adopting an injustice frame. Each of these processes may use one of three types of specific mobilizing acts. The first process, working together, challenges the participants to act as a unit, or, in effect, to organize. So, for example, anti-smoking activists will need to organize with one another, rather than working separately toward the same goal. The second process, breaking out, is a divesting act. This act attempts to break the bonds of authority that people perceive over themselves, and frees them to participate in the movement against that authority. The anti-smoking activists need to re-envision themselves as activists for governmentally backed change (the public smoking ban) rather that simply being subject to whatever the current government policies are. The final process, adopting an injustice frame, requires not only the individual to adopt the injustice frame for whatever the issue being pursued, but requires for that frame to be public, so the individual understands that others share that frame (Gamson, 1992a). For example, the anti-smoking activists need to engage in
public communication that conceptualizes secondhand smoke in public places as an infringement on an individual's right to a healthy environment.

Frame Alignment Processes

Individuals being targeted by the social movement must use frame alignment processes in order to internalize the frames. Snow, et al (1986; Hunt et al, 1994; Tarrow, 1992) outline four types of frame alignment processes that individuals may use.

Frame bridging is the “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Snow et al, 1986, p. 467). The individual being sought out by the social movement to become an activist on its behalf cognitively links the collective action frame of the social movement organization with already present “sentiment pools” or “public opinion preference clusters,” which are essentially already held opinions on issue for which the individual does not have the resources to act upon (Snow et al, 1986). So, the social movement attempts to move individuals who believe in similar or related issues to become activists on behalf of their own issue. This process may involve drawing on the power of master frames, as social movement leaders link the social movement issue to preexisting, culturally-relevant frames or themes that are experientially commensurable with a target audience’s life experience. For example, the Christian Right used the Moral Majority’s existing infrastructure, including its mailing lists, to raise over two million dollars via a mass mailing campaign during its first year of existence. The money was used to appeal to religious conservatives through widely run media campaigns, which provided much of the impetus for early days of the Christian Right. The Christian Right was particularly
successful because their frame naturally bridged with that of another group (Snow et al., 1986).

Frame amplification involves the reinvigoration and possible clarification of the interpretive frame. As previously discussed, an effective frame needs experiential commensurability, or relevance to an individual’s life experiences (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1992). However, the connection to personal experience is often unclear or “shrouded by indifference, deception, or fabrication by others” (Snow et al., 1986). In cases like this, the frame needs to be strengthened or reinvigorated through frame amplification, a process that can involve either value amplification or belief amplification. Value amplification involves the attempt to take a value, or desired end state that is relevant to the issue for the social movement, and to elevate that value to a higher level in the individual’s hierarchy of personal values. For example, nuclear freeze activists tied their activism to democratic values, often including parts of the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence in their speeches and asserting that they were using their constitutionally guaranteed rights to speak out, thus tapping into American beliefs in the democratic system. In contrast, belief amplification, which assumes that beliefs are “ideational elements” that support or interfere with action toward achieving the values, attempts to strengthen the beliefs that will mobilize individuals to action (Snow et al, 1986). For example, in a campaign in Austin in 1985 against the location of a Salvation Army homeless shelter, neighborhood activists did not attempt to malign the Salvation Army, known as a Christian charity, as such a move would be unlikely to gain sympathy. Instead, they targeted the transients that would be
served by the shelter, and the ways their presence could threaten the safety of the neighborhood. The activists worked around currently held beliefs about the Salvation Army, and amplified beliefs about the evils of the homeless population (Snow et al, 1986).

Frame extension is the third frame alignment process that serves to motivate individuals to action. Because frames often draw on preexisting values and beliefs, some of which may or may not be directly relevant to the social movement’s primary cause, it is often important for the collective action frames to encompass those beliefs and values that may be tangential to the primary purpose. As a result, the movement may enlarge its pool of adherents by offering a frame that encompasses more beliefs and values (Snow et al, 1986). For example, the peace movement used rock and punk bands to attract people to disarmament rallies who would otherwise be uninterested in such political issues (Snow et al, 1986).

The final frame alignment process is frame transformation. Frame transformation occurs when a social movement’s values seem contradictory to conventional values and interpretive frames. When this occurs, the social movement must create new values or transform existing values so they appear to be in line with those values offered by the collective action frame. For example, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) has transformed the tragic loss of a child to a drunk driver into a social injustice that can be fought on a large scale. Thus, frame transformation redefines the current interpretation of events and beliefs in a way that is consistent with the social movement’s perspective (Snow et al, 1986).
While understanding the composition and construction of the master and collective action frames being used by a social movement is vitally important to understanding how movement leaders mobilize participants and bystanders, it is also important to understand the limits that the social movement framing perspective may have on the ability to completely explain the power of social movement activism.

**Constraints on Framing**

While the investigation of frames and framing is undoubtedly very important for understanding how we socially construct reality in collective action and social movements, some scholars have identified problems with framing as a line of research. First, Snow and Benford (1988) argue that belief systems can interfere with the effectiveness of a framing process. Within larger belief systems, centrality becomes a key issue. If the issue being advocated is very important within an individual’s larger belief structure, attempts to frame the issue by social movement leaders are likely to be more effective. Another constraint related to the larger belief system is the range of an individual’s belief system and the interrelatedness of the issue at hand to other beliefs within that system. When the issue is linked to a belief or value within the larger belief system that has a high degree of scope, or importance, it decreases that issue’s overall importance to individuals the social movement is trying to attract. So, if the individuals deems the values of the social movement unimportant, they are unlikely to join it. To counteract this effect, social movement activists might expand the issue beyond their original intent in order to draw on more values within the belief system, thus making it much more important within an individual’s belief structure. So, if an anti-public
smoking movement is trying to attract followers among people who have not
experienced the health effects of secondhand smoke, they might expand the frame’s
value system to include values or issues that those individuals could accept, such as
avoiding cancer in general which has affected most people in some fashion, rather than
focusing only on lung cancer. This attempt to connect a social movement issue to
disparate parts of an individual’s belief system can have negative effects, however. For
example, if movement activists broaden the issue so much that it is difficult to
understand, individual may reject framing attempts of the social movement.

Related to issue of large belief systems constraining framing is the issue of
culture. Hart (1996) argues that much framing research, including social movement
framing, largely ignores the role of culture, even thought it could be easily integrated
into the existing conceptualizations of framing research. Entman (1993), however,
argues that culture is essentially made up of a common set of frames, and that
individuals draw on these frames for sense-making and behavior-guidance purposes. So,
if culture is a set of shared frames, as Entman argues, then understanding those shared
frames is critical to understanding how collective action frames motivate members of a
culture and how those members integrate the collective action frames into preexisting
cultural frame systems.

From the Literature to an Investigation of Living Wage Movements

Clearly, the framing perspective offers considerable promise in an investigation
of campus living wage movements. These movements must create oppositional frames
about economics, tuition, and worker pay. They must create these frames in ways that
(perhaps) connect with master frames and that avoid the problems of framing noted above. They must work within the constraints of the existing frames of the communities in which the social movement is occurring. Finally, this process of framing must occur within an interaction environment that might include disagreements among the very organizers of the social movement. Thus, drawing on the above literature that considers the social movement process and the ways in which framing is implicated in these collective action efforts, this study seeks to answer the following questions:

**RQ1:** How do living wage activists perform the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational functions of social movement framing?

**RQ2:** In what ways do living wage movements make use of master frames? What specific master frames are employed and how are they related to more specific framing functions?

**RQ3:** Do living wage movements in different organizational and community sites exhibit similar or distinct patterns of frame development? What organizational and community factors influence the framing process in living wage movements?
CHAPTER II

METHODS

In this study, two cases of social movements advocating living wage initiatives in university settings will be examined: Texas A&M University and Georgetown University. The cases are particularly compelling when compared with one another due to a number of factors. These two living wage initiatives occurred in different geographical areas, over different timelines, with differing levels of student involvement, and with differing levels of resolution. In spite of their differences, both cases also share characteristics that provide for an interesting examination of the process of managing the living wage conflict at each university. Both cases began with grassroots movements advocating for a living wage at the university. Both cases attempted to use community involvement to overcome resistance to a living wage policy. Finally, both cases achieved pay raises for workers at the universities.

These cases could be approached from a variety of perspectives. Many stakeholders – including students, administration, workers, and the surrounding communities – had an interest in the conflict over whether a living wage policy should be implemented. The purpose of this study, however, is not to examine the cases through the students’ perspectives or the universities’ administrative perspectives, but rather to develop an understanding of the organizing process of the critical parties from a social movement perspective, to examine how the strategies for conducting the collective action movement unfolded, and to consider the communicative tactics and that shaped the process and outcomes of these contrasting living wage initiations.
The Cases

*Texas A&M University*

The first case investigated is Texas A&M University, one of the largest public universities in the United States, with over 48,000 students (About Texas A&M University, 2008). Students often identify TAMU as a conservative school (Miles, 2005; McKeon 2002), and at various times TAMU has been ranked by the Princeton Review’s survey of college students at universities across the country as the #7 “Most Nostalgic for Reagan” (McKeon, 2002) and the #1 “Most Conservative Students” (Texas A&M University—College Station, 2008). Additional Princeton Review rankings that indicate the degree of conservatism at TAMU include being consistently ranked as a university where “Alternative Lifestyles Not an Alternative” (Miles, 2005; Texas A&M University—College Station, 2008) and as #13 “Most Religious Students” (Texas A&M University—College Station, 2008). Though it is obviously not religiously affiliated, the university prides itself on strong family values and the Aggie Honor Code, which states, “Aggies do not lie, cheat, or steal or tolerate those who do.” The values of caring for other Aggies, though not religiously based, are important to the identity of the university, as is the university’s reputation for being politically conservative. This becomes very important when considering a living wage policy, because conservatives have traditionally been against the implementation of minimum wage requirements.

In a 2002-2004 self-study, the university found that between 33-50% of sophomores-seniors saw racism as a problem on campus (Department of Student Life Studies, 2008). In recognition of this problem (Ezeanyim, 2002; Miles, 2005) the
The university has launched many initiatives toward increasing acceptance of diversity, both in terms of the demographic diversity of the student body and faculty and in terms of shifting attitudes and behaviors on campus. These efforts have included appointing a Vice President and Associate Provost for Diversity, and in 2006, adopting a Campus Diversity Plan (Texas A&M University—Campus Diversity Plan, 2008), increasing recruitment of minority students, and providing additional financial support in the form of programs such as “Diversity Fellowships” for graduate students. As a result of these initiatives, from the Fall of 2007 to the Fall of 2008 alone, Hispanic student enrollment increased by 11.1% and Black student enrollment increased by 10.4% (Dutschke, 2009).

Attitudes toward diversity have the possibility of affecting the reception of a living wage campaign, because at Texas A&M, many of the low-wage workers are minorities. In terms of service and maintenance jobs on campus, many of which are low-wage jobs, 71.27% of workers in 2005 were minorities, with 31% of service and maintenance employees being black and 39.2% of service and maintenance employees being Hispanic (Spring 2008 Faculty, 2008).

In addition to traditional and shifting attitudes regarding diversity and political conservatism, the ability to unionize also has the potential to play a role in a movement that addresses a conflict concerning pay rates. Texas A&M is located in a right-to-work state, where unions may form, but in reality have little power. The Bryan-College Station area is essentially a mid-sized college town, with a population of 152,415 in 2000 (Profile of General Demographic, 2009), with Texas A&M serving as the largest employer in the area. The lack of union power and job options for similar, but higher
paying jobs would theoretically affect the way the workers, living wage advocates, and the university administration would approach the living wage issue.

During the time of this study the university was in the midst of a campaign by a local coalition for the implementation of a living wage policy. The Living Wage Initiative (LWI) at Texas A&M University (TAMU) was founded in early 2004, though its organizers had been working toward actively pursuing a living wage since 2003. The LWI claimed that at this time approximately 800 workers at Texas A&M earned less than what was defined as a living wage (Nauman, 2005). The standard chosen by the LWI in determining a living wage at TAMU was that a living wage for the Bryan/College Station area should be 130% of the federal poverty level for a family of three. This guideline was chosen because it is the cut-off in eligibility for the federal food stamp programs and the living wage would need to be adjusted every year as the federal poverty guidelines change (Living Wage Initiative, personal communications, May 8, 2005).

In March of 2004, the LWI began making presentations in the community and to other organizations that LWI organizers saw as potential allies about the plight of TAMU’s workers and the need to advocate for a Living Wage. As a result, 18 campus and community organizations joined the Living Wage Coalition (LWC), a network of organizations, supporting the LWI in its pursuit of a Living Wage. Organizations in the Living Wage Coalition included the Friends Congregational Church, the Central Labor Council of the Brazos Valley, the local chapters of the NAACP and ACLU, and several TAMU organizations, including the Aggie Democrats, Global Justice, Sociology Club,
and the Mexican American/Latin American Faculty Network (Living Wage Initiative, personal communications, May 8, 2005).

In December of 2004, the Faculty Senate passed a resolution supporting the implementation of a living wage. On April 5, 2005, Texas A&M University President Robert Gates met with members of the LWI, and later formed the Task Force on Wages and Benefits chaired by Dr. Benton Cocanougher, former dean of the TAMU Mays Business School. The goal of the task force was to investigate the wages at Texas A&M in relation to the local community and other universities in the Big 12 conference. On June 21, 2005, President Gates emailed the university, announcing that the Task Force on Wages and Benefits had completed its review of wages and that the university would raise the minimum wage to $7.77/hour, above the current minimum wage of $6.57/hour, but well below a living wage, defined at $9.79/hour (R. Gates, personal communication, June 21, 2005).

The LWI remained out of the public eye for several months until December 2005, when activists staged their largest event of the campaign, Beat the Hell Outta Poverty week. This week-long project consisted of a series of events designed to draw attention to the need for a living wage at TAMU. In its title, the organizers linked concern about a living wage to TAMU’s student traditions (to Beat the Hell Outta—fill in opponent). This event involved two showings of the LWC’s recently-completed video documentary, *Where There’s a Will, There Will be a Living Wage* and a “teach-in” to teach TAMU students about the need for a living wage. Since December 2005, the public activities of the LWC have been limited.
Georgetown University

Georgetown University is a private, Catholic university, located in a major metropolis area, Washington, D.C. with 14,148 students in the Fall of 2007 (Georgetown at a Glance, 2008). While the effort at Georgetown was not the first collegiate living wage campaign, it has remained, to this date, one of the most visible campaigns in the nation. In part, this visibility is due to the University’s location in the nation’s capital that enhanced the reporting of campaign events in the Washington Post and other major news outlets.

Georgetown University is located in Washington, D.C., an area where unions wield substantial power. Though GU’s workers were not unionized throughout most of the living wage campaign, the presence of organized labor in the area provided a possible resource to the GU workers and living wage activists. Washington D.C. is home to over 200 local union groups and 150,000 area union members, according to the AFL-CIO’s Washington D.C. Metro Council (About us, 2008). In some cases, unions with no presence on GU’s campus became involved with the living wage campaign.

Georgetown’s religious affiliation provides strong values of social justice which have the potential to influence the how the university views activism on social justice issues like the living wage. Georgetown receives consistently high rankings from Princeton Review in terms of “Most politically active students” (Georgetown University, 2008; Timiraos, 2003) and U.S. News and World Report’s “Student’s Guide to Colleges” describes the University as a politically active campus where students are moved to activism on issues that they care about (Goldman & Buyers, 2005). GU has a
reputation among its students of being politically conservative but according to Goldman and Buyers (2005) it allows students of any political leaning to have a voice.

The Living Wage campaign at Georgetown University began in 2001, when members of the Georgetown Solidarity Committee (GSC), a campus organization concerned with workers’ rights, began talking with low pay workers at Georgetown and discovered that many workers hold two or even three jobs to make ends meet. Out of these conversations, the GSC began a campaign encouraging the university to implement a “Just Employment Policy” which guaranteed that workers would be treated well, have good benefits, the right to organize, and a living wage.

In March of 2003, the GSC officially launched its Living Wage Committee by publishing a report which said that while workers employed directly by Georgetown University earn $10.25/hour, workers for companies contracted by Georgetown earn as little as $7.20/hour. For a dual income family of four, the Economics Policy Institute reported that the minimum livable income required both wage-earners to earn at least $11.87/hour (Williams, 2003). The living wage campaign that followed the publication of this report was marked by protests in which students would gather in Georgetown’s Red Square and chant, give speeches, and circulate petitions. In the winter of the 2003-2004 academic year, the University agreed to require a minimum wage of $8.50/hour for all workers on Georgetown’s campus, however the policy had yet to be implemented as of October of 2004 (Landeck & Leavell, 2004).

Following these initial activities of the campaign at GU, the real kick-off for the Living Wage Coalition came in 2005 when students and faculty held a rally in front of
an administrative building at Georgetown (Lestina, 2005). This was followed by a series of rallies, storming a Georgetown University Board of Director’s meeting (Alimena, 2005), and a 9-day hunger strike backed by Washington AFL-CIO president John Sweeney (Lederman, 2005; GU Hunger Strike, 2005). The hunger strike ended with the Living Wage Coalition declaring victory with an agreement by the administration to implement a just employment policy which gradually implemented a living wage which would be adjusted yearly beginning in fiscal year 2008 and guaranteed fair working conditions (Just Employment Policy, n.d.).

Comparing the Cases

These two cases are compelling for this study for a variety of reasons. While both campaigns were pursuing similar objectives, differences in contextual factors, discussed in the previous section and depicted in Table 1, lend richness to the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TAMU</th>
<th>GU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>Mid-sized college town; in a Southern right-to-work state</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.; a union-friendly area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of University</strong></td>
<td>Large Public University Collaborative, used existing power structure</td>
<td>Jesuit Catholic University Confrontational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methods of promoting the living wage</strong></td>
<td>Pay raise, but not a living wage</td>
<td>Just Employment Policy; including a gradual pay increase to living wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turning point in achieving change</strong></td>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Hunger strike by students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>Pay raise</td>
<td>Just Employment Policy; including a gradual pay increase to living wage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Though both universities are well-respected institutions of higher education, they differ on a number of factors that are relevant to the study of the living wage conflict as seen in the table above. As issues such as location and type of university affects the management of the conflict, so do the strategies used by the living wage activists. At Texas A&M, the activists used mostly collaborative strategies, in that they worked within the existing power structure to effect change and tried to remain on amicable terms with the university administration. In contrast, the living wage activists at Georgetown were much more confrontational in their strategy for forcing the administration to focus on the living wage issue by using tactics like a hunger strike and storming board meetings. The strategies used at each university are reflected by the major turning point in seeing some form of change adopted. At Texas A&M, where the more collaborative strategy was used, the major turning point was the passage of a resolution in support of a living wage policy by the Faculty Senate, which forced the administration to begin taking notice of the wage levels on campus. The major turning point in the contentious Georgetown campaign occurred when students went on a hunger strike which received national media attention and the support of the local AFL-CIO president (who threatened to join the hunger strike).

The last factor upon which I plan to focus in this analysis is the results of the campaigns. While the campaign outcomes are not the central focus of this study, it is interesting to compare the two living wage efforts on this level. Texas A&M raised the minimum wage on campus by approximately $2/hour, which although short of a living wage, was a significant increase. Georgetown’s president agreed to a gradual wage
increase to reach the living wage in addition to approving all but one element (the right to organize) of the Living Wage Coalition’s Just Employment policy, which focused on fair treatment of all workers. As of today, the Just Employment policy has been implemented (Just Employment Policy, n.d.) and wages have been raised incrementally over four years.

Data

Because the cases are different on all of these levels as well as in terms of my ability to access data, the types of data collected were different for each case. The data collected for each case could not be standardized because each campaign occurred independently and pursued goals specific to the campaign.

For the Texas A&M case, data were collected from a variety of sources as the living wage campaign progressed. The first type of data collected was via participant-observation of a number of public events sponsored by the Living Wage Coalition. The role of the researcher was what is termed by Lindlof and Taylor (2002) as observer-as-participant. In this role the researcher central role is observation of events, though the researcher may have limited, casual interaction with the participants. This approach was selected so that interaction with the researcher would not shape the way the participants discussed the issues or living wage campaigns. Because the object of this study was to understand the communicative framing processes used by the living wage campaign, it was important that the participants not change the way they communicate about the living wage issue due the researcher’s presence. Because the events observed were open to the public and the participants expected and welcomed outsiders, it is reasonable to
expect that communication would not be significantly affected by the presence of a researcher. With this goal in mind, and as is consistent with the observer-as-participant approach, interaction with the participants were limited to gaining permission to enter the scene and developing goodwill with the participants (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). The public events observed were part of the “Beat the Hell Outta Poverty” week sponsored by the LWC. They included a screening of the LWC’s documentary, “Where There’s a Will” followed by a question and answer session, a LWC planning meeting, and a second screening of the “Where There’s a Will” documentary, which was paired with a training documentary for living wage campaign created by the former leaders of the Georgetown University living wage campaign.

Other data collected for this study included 45 newspaper articles, editorials, and letters to the editors related the living wage campaign published in the Bryan-College Station Eagle, the Battalion (the Texas A&M campus newspaper), and Maroon Weekly. These published pieces relating to the living wage campaign either reported the activities of the LWC and the TAMU administration, were used by the LWC to disseminate information to the public, and/or reflected some of the public reaction to the LWC campaign. The majority of these news articles were found via searches of the archives of those local new outlets. Others were provided by member of the LWC who kept copies of some news items for personal records. A fourth source of “published” material regarding the living wage issue was collected in the form of a series of emails about the issue sent by university president Robert Gates to the student body.
Some data used were provided directly to the researcher by the LWC. This included a copy of the LWC’s documentary, “Where There’s a Will” which was used as a tactic to persuade potential constituents to the LWC’s perspective. Also provided was an information packet and PowerPoint presentation which the LWC provided to its members and local groups identified by the LWC as potentially supportive groups, as well as copies of flyers used to advertise LWC events, two press releases, and three internal memos to LWC members.

Finally, interviews were conducted with five members of the LWI and two members of Texas A&M’s Task Force on Wages and Benefits. All members of both the LWI Steering Committee (7 total; plus two individuals who were not official members of the steering committee, but were reported by steering committee members as having integral roles) and the Task Force (10 members total) were asked to participate in interviews, which occurred in the Fall of 2006 (the pay raise to $7.77/hour was implemented September 1, 2005). Each member of the LWI was contacted via phone and/or email and asked to participate in the study. I had previously met most of the members of the LWI when observing at LWI events, but for those I had not personally met and for the Task Force members, I introduced myself, explained that I was completing dissertation research about the framing processes in the Living Wage movement, and asked for their participation. The interviews ranged in length from 45 to 90 minutes. See Appendix A for a copy of the interview protocol used. All of the interviews were conducted via telephone, with the exception of one member, who was
out of the country during the data collection time period. For this interviewee, the interview protocol was sent via email and was returned by postal mail.

*Georgetown Case*

The data collected for the Georgetown case was much more limited than the data collected for the Texas A&M case. This is because the Georgetown’s living wage campaign had concluded before this study began. The data from the Georgetown living wage campaign comes from three sources. The first set of sources includes 63 newspaper articles and editorials published by a number of newspapers, including the *Georgetown Hoya*, the *Georgetown Voice*, and the *Washington Post*. These articles were obtained through extensive searches of the newspapers’ archives as well as a Lexis Nexis search on Georgetown’s living wage campaign.

Additionally, I attended a speaking engagement by two of the Georgetown living wage committee’s student leaders about their experiences with the living wage campaign at Georgetown, which included a viewing of a retrospective documentary about the events of that campaign. Finally, an in-depth interview, lasting approximately 2 hours at a local coffee shop with those same two student leaders was conducted. This interview used the same interview protocol as used with the TAMU LWC members as well as follow-up probing questions based on information obtained at their speaking engagement. Table 2 describes the data collected:
### Table 2
Data Collected for Each Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Texas A&amp;M</th>
<th>Georgetown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with Living</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 interview with 2 activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Activists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with Administration</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant-Observation Data</td>
<td>Collected at a planning</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>meeting, informational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>meeting, and two formal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>showings of the documentary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Data from Activists</td>
<td>Internal LWC memos, documents</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and powerpoint used to approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organizations to joint he</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LWC, list-serv archives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Reports</td>
<td>45 newspaper articles,</td>
<td>63 newspaper articles and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>editorials, and letters to the</td>
<td>editors published by the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>editors published in the</td>
<td><em>Georgetown Hoya</em>, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Bryan-College Station Eagle,</td>
<td><em>Georgetown Voice</em>, and the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>the Battalion</em>, and</td>
<td><em>Washington Post</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Maroon Weekly</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video Documentary</td>
<td>A video documentary</td>
<td>A video documentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intended as a persuasive</td>
<td>which recorded the events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>appeal</td>
<td>of the campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flyers</td>
<td>3 event flyers</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Texas A&M case, some of the data were collected as the campaign progressed through its final stages in the Fall of 2005. This portion of the data includes participant-observation data from public events and planning meetings, the video documentary produced by the Living Wage Coalition, and media reports. However, interviews with the activists, the granting of access to some archival data, and interviews with members the Task Force on Wages and Benefits occurred after the pay raise was implemented.

For the Georgetown case, all of the data including the interview with two student
activists and collection of media reports and activists’ websites were collected after the approval of the living wage policy, as it was approved prior to the development of this study.

*Methods of Analysis*

Once the various types of data about these two cases were collected, the information was analyzed by first unitizing the data. Then the unitized data were sorted into a set of categories designed to answer RQ1. Then, the unitized data were again sorted into categories designed to answer RQ2. Finally the results of RQ1 and RQ2 for each case were compared, along with contextual data, to answer RQ3.

Upon collection of the data, the information was unitized as is consistent with Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) two recommendations for processing data. First, each unit of data is heuristic, meaning that it is “aimed at understanding or some action that the inquirer needs to have or take” (p.345), meaning it is divided into units that are meaningful to the study in some way. Second, it is divided into the smallest piece of information that can have meaning on its own. So, the lengths of each unitized piece of data varied, with some being only a sentence or two, and others being much longer—entire paragraphs or stories. Based on these recommendations, the data was broken into these units by dividing the data into the smallest pieces possible without losing its meaning. A unit was defined as a piece of data that conveys a single idea, story, or piece of information related to the living wage campaign or wage issues. For example, the following quote from the interview with Diane Foglizzo from Georgetown became four units (the beginning of each unit is marked with *):
*Yeah and I think it’s interesting like on the individual level and then on the like the larger level yeah. *It has to do with the administrators like making decisions, *but it is also you know that’s how our society functions. *Like it needs a class of low-wage workers to support it. *And I mean, I mean I’m an anti-capitalist.

Each unit conveys a single idea related to how Diane conceptualized the wage issue at Georgetown. Each unit makes sense individually and is useful for categorizing the data as discussed below.

The data collected were then analyzed in a variety of ways. These methods of analysis stemmed from the specific requirements of the research questions posed in Chapter I. The first method of analysis involved the categorization of the data based on theoretical framework provided by the social movement framing theory. This data analysis method is used to answer RQ1 about the performance of the functions of social movement framing by the living wage activists. The three functions of social movement framing, diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing were used as categories, which, according to Lindlof and Taylor (2002) are “concepts, constructs, themes, [or] other types of ‘bins’ in which to put items that are similar” (p. 214). By using these functions of social movement framing as categories, the existing theory was used in a deductive way to guide the examination of the data, and sensitize the researcher to aspects of the data that needed to be focused upon. The approach provides the additional benefit of supplementary validation of the researcher’s conclusions (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). By using the existing categories from social movement framing theory, the salient issues were determined by focusing on the communicative
The events most relevant to the social movements’ framing processes. The existing social movement framing processes were operationalized into categories as depicted in Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic framing</td>
<td>Data units which identify the source of the wage problem and/or attributes blame on someone or something for that problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Data units which present some form of solution to the wage problem and/or gives direction for how a solution could be implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivational framing</td>
<td>Data units which compel social movement constituents to act on the wage issue in some way by offering reasons, opportunities, or examples to act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To uncover the master framing processes and answer RQ2, data that consisted of the LWC’s public statements about the living wage issue, (press releases, interviews granted to newspapers, and observational data, and interviews with the researcher) on how they attempted to persuade others of their position were examined. Master framing requires that a social movement relate the goals of their movement to larger, already accepted values (the master frame), in an attempt to tie the social movement’s goals to already existing values. To determine whether social movement advocates were arguing for a connection to a previous campaign or widely accepted goals, this set of data was combed with the efforts to find references to previous social movements and existing values in the communities. These references were then coded, or marked as they “meaningfully relate to…themes” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 216) based on the values
and/or social movements being referred to. This coded data was then analyzed to uncover patterns in the types of values that were alluded to by the data which were translated into categories of accepted value being tapped into by the LWCs. Categories that contained a substantial amount data were determined to be indicative of the presence of a master framing process within the groups’ social movement framing processes.

To determine the categories for the master frames used by both cases, I started by identifying the most significant (adopted by other social movement) master frames that focus on injustice and/or domination identified by prior research. These became the basis for the original categories for RQ2. The operational definitions for these categories are described below in Table 4. To categorize the data, I considered the values that seemed to underlie the various arguments made by the data in each case and compared how those values fit with the definitions in Table 4.

Table 4
Operational definitions used for RQ2 original data analysis categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political-economy master frame</td>
<td>Data units that imply an understanding that oppression is result of material deprivation by those in power, which is centered on those with wealth and/or institutional power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity politics master frame</td>
<td>Data units that imply an understanding that power results from certain identity markers, such as race or gender, and that oppression is a result of exclusion from those groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal frame</td>
<td>Data units that imply an understanding that the state’s power results from its ability to distribute resources amongst competing self-interested groups, and that oppression results from a distance from those in power from their constituents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights master frame</td>
<td>Data units that imply an understanding that there is a human right to justice or fairness and that nonviolent activism is the best way to promote change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As I sorted the data into the preexisting categories, I observed trends in the data for each case that pointed to commonly accepted values that did not fit the traditional master frames produced by prior research. These data were examined more closely and two new categories were created for this data which reflected a clear pattern relating to what were commonly accepted values unique to each case’s context. These categories/frames were the Texas A&M culture/traditions master frame and the Georgetown Catholic/social justice master frame.

According to Yin (2003), studies that use multiple case designs offer the advantage of being more complex and compelling, in that the comparisons of the similarities and differences of those cases can provide different insights about the phenomenon being studied. It is for this reason that the both the Texas A&M and Georgetown cases were used in this study. In this dissertation, the comparison of the two cases provides the answers to the final research question. Comparison of two cases allows the researcher to fixate on a few aspects of the cases (Stake, 2005) that are theoretically relevant. By comparing the results for RQ1 and RQ2 for each case, the study can use the comparison (and contrasting) of the cases to give more insight into the cases individually. The results for RQ1 were compared by examined similarities and differences in how the living wage movements enacted and prioritized the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing functions. The results from RQ2 for each case were compared by examined which master frames were used as the basis for each living wage movement and comparing similarities and differences in to whom the persuasive power of the master frame choice targeted, and how the master frames were originated
and appropriated in each movement. Additionally, other factors unique to each case were compared, including the overall tone and tactics of each campaign and how contextual differences at each university affected the campaigns.

In summary, the analysis methods for the data were chosen based on what was most appropriate to answer the research questions for the study. Categorization of the data using the existing framework of social movement framing theory was most appropriate to answer RQ1 about how the campaigns enacted the functions of social movement framing theory. In order to answer RQ2 about whether master frames were employed in the two campaigns’ framing processes, data was coded based on references to commonly accepted values within the target audience. Patterns in these categories were then used to establish the presence of master frames. Finally, comparison of the results of the cases answers to RQ1 and RQ2 were used to answer the final research question about how the cases compare and contextual issues affected them.
CHAPTER III

TEXAS A&M DATA ANALYSIS

In this chapter the social movement framing efforts that occurred during the living wage campaign at Texas A&M University will be analyzed in depth. First, the events of the campaign will be described. This overview will be followed by the results regarding Research Question One (the performance of social movement framing functions), and Research Question Two (the presence of master frames in the TAMU living wage campaign).

Overview of the Living Wage Campaign

The Living Wage Initiative (LWI) at Texas A&M University (TAMU) was founded in early 2004, though its organizers had been working toward actively pursuing a living wage since 2003. According to LWI founding members Laura and Nola, the LWI began with the Just Peace Institute at Friends Congregational Church, a local progressive church. The LWI actually started with the overall goal of improving wages throughout the entire Bryan-College Station area. After researching wage issues and a number of meeting discussing the findings, it was decided that the LWI would target Texas A&M since the TAMU is the largest employer in the area.

Nola and Laura relate that the LWI had observed instances in other areas where the largest employer would raise wages and other employers would follow, Nola says “things [wages] kind of lifted up with them being the biggest employer and just kind of brings everybody up.” The TAMU living wage campaign was part of an overall strategy to raise wages in the community. Laura recounted, “it certainly wasn’t just A&M. We
have an advocate now on the school board in College Station” and the LWI hopes start a wave on increased wages throughout the area, “we decided that if it were called a living wage, then people would choose to work for A&M or continue to work for A&M, and then it would force them [other employers] to raise wage, like the city and the school districts for other employees.” She believed that wages in the area were much lower than they should be based on a belief that the community has an unlimited supply of cheap labor in the form of college students who want part-time jobs. This perspective on the available labor, she believes, has kept the wages in full-time jobs low as well. As a result of this overarching goal of raising wages throughout the community, the LWI chose to focus on gaining support not only from students, faculty, and staff at TAMU, but also from other organizations and individuals in the community, but not directly connected to TAMU and to maintain a strategy which would cooperate with the major employers, rather than force or embarrass them into action.

The LWI claimed that approximately 800 workers at TAMU earned less than what it defined as a living wage (Nauman, 2005). The standard chosen by the LWI in determining a living wage at TAMU was that a living wage for the Bryan/College Station area should be 130% of the federal poverty level for a family of three. This guideline was chosen because it is the cut-off for eligibility for federal food stamp programs (Living Wage Initiative, personal communication, May 8, 2005). In March of 2004, the LWI began making presentations in the community and to other organizations that LWI saw as potential allies about the plight of TAMU’s workers and the need to advocate for a Living Wage. As a result, 18 campus and community organizations
joined the Living Wage Coalition (LWC), a network of organizations, supporting the
LWI in its pursuit of a Living Wage. Members of the coalition included the Friends
Congregational Church, the Brazos Valley chapters of the NAACP and the ACLU, the
Central Labor Council of the Brazos Valley, the Mexican/American Latin American
Faculty Network at TAMU, and several TAMU student organizations, including the
Sociology Club, Global Justice, and the Aggie Democrats, among others. Later in 2004,
LWI began getting more attention by continuing to make presentations on campus and in
the community about the living wage issue, and in December the Faculty Senate passed
a resolution supporting the implementation of a living wage.

In response to the Faculty Senate Resolution, TAMU President Robert Gates, in
an article published in The Battalion, the university’s newspaper, expressed sympathy
for the cause of the living wage, but indicated that achieving it could cost the university
between 5 and 17.5 million dollars to fund it, saying, “I wish we could pay them more.”
He also indicated that fringe benefits, such as insurance, retirement plans, and holidays,
actually add value to employees' wages (“A&M Can’t Offer,” 2005). Gates’ interview
published in The Battalion marked the first official comment given to the media by
TAMU’s administration on the living wage issue. His remarks were greeted by two
letters to the editor in The Battalion, condemning Gates position as an additional “insult”
to minority workers who already performed demeaning jobs (Nealy, 2005). One long-
time “low-pay” employee of the university noted that President Gates, with his
comfortable lifestyle, could not possibly understand her role as a single parent
supporting three children on poverty wages. She also noted that the fringe benefits
Gates referenced in *The Battalion* interview had gradually shrunk over the years (Flores, 2005).

The next month, on April 5, 2005, President Gates met with members of the LWI and, later that day, formed the Task Force on Wages and Benefits to be chaired by Dr. Benton Cocanougher, former dean of the Mays Business School. In an email to university constituents, including faculty, staff, and students, that announced the formation of the task force, Gates expressed concern that implementing a living wage would be a “significant financial stretch for the university” and further concerns about the lack of comparative information for similar employees locally, at other comparable universities, and nationwide (R. Gates, personal communication, April 5, 2005). Gates indicated that if the LWI’s claim that TAMU ranks eighth in the Big 12 (the 12-school NCAA conference to which TAMU belongs) in terms of worker pay was true, “I’m not pleased with that” (Nauman, 2005). The task force was described as being assigned the task of finding this information and making recommendations in time for implementation in Fiscal Year 2006 (beginning September 2005) (R. Gates, personal communication, April 5, 2005).

The appointment of the Task Force was met with mixed reviews expressed in a number of editorials and letters to the editor, but most seemed appreciative that the administration was looking into the issue more deeply (Berger & Bethman, 2005a; Berger & Bethman, 2005b; Cossette, 2005; Goodwin, 2005; Steed, 2005) Among those opposed to the task force included some people that spoke out against the living wage policy (Helcel, 2005; McCaig, 2005) and, interestingly, some who supported the living
wage but believed the university was being disingenuous in appointing the Task Force (Harvey, 2005; Tekleab, 2005). On June 21, 2005, President Gates emailed the university, announcing that the Task Force on Wages and Benefits had completed its review of wages and that the university would raise the minimum wage to $7.77/hour, above the current minimum wage of $6.57/hour, but well below a living wage, defined at $9.79/hour (R. Gates, personal communication, June 21, 2005). Interestingly, the pay raise recommended by the task force only raised the pay level at TAMU from eighth in the Big 12 to seventh (Kapitan, 2005).

It was around this time, in the Spring of 2005, according to director Patrick Phillips, that members of the LWI began assembling a video documentary which would feature interviews with employees and community members in the attempt to “[put] a face on the issue of poverty as employees share their personal stories of trying to support themselves and their families on poverty level wages” (Hawkins, personal communication, 2005). According to the documentary’s director, Patrick, after viewing a documentary film regarding the impact of the Iraq war on Texas, LWI members contacted him with the main purpose of finding a way to get the workers’ stories out to the public. As a College Station native with interests in social justice, Patrick was drawn to the idea of collaborating with the LWI on the project.

The LWI remained out of the public eye for several months until December 2005, when they staged their largest-scale event to that point, “Beat the Hell Outta Poverty” week. This week-long event consisted of a series of opportunities designed to draw attention to the need for a living wage at TAMU. The organizers linked the week
to TAMU’s student traditions (to Beat the Hell Outta—fill in opponent). This event involved a showing of the LWC’s now-completed video documentary, *Where There’s a Will, There Will be a Living Wage*, followed by a question and answer session. At this screening, two student leaders from Georgetown University were introduced to the audience and they described their efforts at Georgetown to have a living wage policy accepted. These students held a “teach-in” later that week to teach TAMU students about the need for a living wage. Approximately 15 people attended the teach-in.

Another event that week was a planning session for the LWC, which was open to anyone and led by the Georgetown students, who essentially recommended that TAMU duplicate the tactics that were successful at Georgetown, in spite of opinions by the LWC members that tactics like storming the university president’s office and a hunger strike would not be successful at TAMU. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this planning session was the vocal frustration of the LWC members with the student body. While they were thrilled with attendance at the events of BTHO Poverty week, they were frustrated by students’ seeming unwillingness to follow through. They reported that student organizations would often express interest and get involved only to drop out after being given tedious tasks to complete (making copies, etc.) or would not want to approach the issue in the ways advocated by the LWC. The final event of BTHO Poverty week was a showing of the documentary at an alternative bar in downtown Bryan. Approximately 30 people were present, most of whom were members of the LWC or their friends. The few bar patrons who were obviously not there for the event left as soon as the video started.
In sum, the LWI began with a group of interested individuals at Friends Congregational Church (a progressive College Station congregation affiliated with the United Church of Christ) and grew to become the Living Wage Initiative, which went on to form the Living Wage Coalition which included a number of student organizations, businesses, community organizations, and churches in the Brazos Valley area. Its efforts provided the impetus to have both the Faculty and Student Senates pass resolutions in support of the living wage, and to eventually pressure the administration to form the Task Force on Wages and Benefits. The Task Force eventually recommended a wage increase in June of 2005, but that wage increase was smaller than the amount advocated by the LWC. The LWC continued to work for a number of months after this limited wage increase, but much of the organized campaigning ceased when several of the original LWI members left the project.

RQ1: The Performance of Social Movement Framing

The first research question for this study focuses on the functions of social movement framing. The social movement framing perspective argues that in creating the collective action frame which guides a campaign and draws supporters in, framing processes must include diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing to portray a certain perception of the problem, to advocate a solution, and to move people to act on behalf of the campaign. To discover how Texas A&M’s LWI constructed its collective action frame, I performed a thematic analysis using these three major types of framing, with the constituent parts of those processes as themes.
Diagnosis Framing

The first theme is the diagnostic framing that occurs when the campaign identifies the problem or issue of concern and attributes blame to the people or societal forces responsible for the problem. These two key elements of diagnostic frames are considered below.

Identifying the Problem

In order to identify the problem, I examined the data for framing statements that labeled the problem in some way or statements in which someone tried to explain the nature of the situation that precipitated the living wage activism. This analysis led to a consideration of two sub-themes regarding problem identification: the objective problem and the personal problem.

The objective problem sub-theme refers to a definition of the living wage issue in primarily economic and systemic terms. In establishing the objective problem, many figures were often cited, comparing TAMU wages to poverty guidelines, TAMU wages to other Big 12 school, and a variety of other objectively determined measures. The objective problem sub-theme that emerged in this data focused on economic hardship, but did so through objective standards and measures.

In contrast, the personal problem sub-theme reflected personal hardships that individual employees and their families must endure as a result of low wages. Personal problem definitions tended to be more emotional in an effort to encourage empathy and have more shock value. These problem definitions also tended to be grounded in individual employees’ experiences.
Interestingly, most of the problem identification occurred on the objective problem level. The Living Wage Initiative’s published objective very clearly defined the problem. The following quote is the LWI’s official objective statement:

We support a living wage because we believe that hardworking, full-time workers:

- Should not have to live in poverty.
- Deserve to earn wages that support self-sufficiency.
- Should not require government assistance.
- Can provide for their families and help the local economy through a decrease in health care assistance, food programs, housing and community service costs and an increase in buying power for the worker.

(Living Wage Initiative, personal communication, May 8, 2005)

All the points of the LWI objective statement were measurable against objective standards, and dealt little with the emotional side of the issue. Although the LWI defined the problem for its own benefit, and published it on its website, that website is a relatively obscure one that was linked to an organization that originated in the Friends Congregational Church, and later also became a TAMU student organization, the Just Peace Institute. So, even though the statements were publicly available, it is doubtful that they received wide circulation; therefore the breadth of their impact is questionable. As a result, we must look to public discourse to try to understand the likely perceptions of how the problem was defined.
The first truly public action that brought attention to the living wage issue was a resolution that the Faculty Senate passed in support of implementing of a living wage at Texas A&M, which heavily promoted in the Faculty Senate by one of the members of the LWI. The resolution clearly defined the problem in objective terms. The resolution focused strongly on identifying current pay rates as a problem (probably because the issue has received little public attention, and there was the need to establish a problem):

Whereas, the starting wages of many TAMU employees rank near the bottom versus comparable positions at other universities in the Big Twelve, even when adjusted for the cost of living; and

Whereas, the Texas A&M Department of Human Resources estimates that 801 workers currently are working in job classifications with wages of $9.00/hour or less ($18,792 annually); and

Whereas, wages less than $18,792 annually fall below:

• $130% of the current federal poverty guideline for a family of three ($20,371),

• The current standard for fair market rent in Brazos County ($23,840 for a 2 bedroom apartment), and

• The current estimated self-sufficiency budget for a family of three in Brazos County ($31,033); and

Whereas, wages less than $18,720 annually may force Texas A&M University employees to rely on federal government assistance including, but not limited to, food stamps and Section 8 housing; and
Whereas, employees making poverty-level wages face personal hardships and often are forced to depend on public assistance, take second jobs, and live in sub-standard housing. (Faculty Senate Meeting Minutes, 2004)

The Faculty Senate resolution focused to some extent on the personal hardships of employees earning poverty wages in the community, but arrived at that conclusion regarding personal difficulties through objectively measurable comparisons. The resolution was consistent with LWI’s message about low salaries, and the economic hardships workers and their families faced as a result of these wages.

Interestingly, in public statements, TAMU President Robert Gates affirmed the LWI’s identification of the problem. In response to the Faculty Senate Resolution, TAMU President Robert Gates, in an article in *The Battalion*, the university’s newspaper, expressed sympathy for the cause of the living wage, but he did offer one modification to the LWI’s identification of the problem by indicating that fringe benefits such as insurance, retirement plans, and holidays actually add value to employees’ wages (“A&M Can’t Offer,” 2005). This modification was still consistent with the objective problem definition seen in the Faculty Senate resolution because it refuted the resolution in terms of things, such as benefits, which could be compared objectively with other local employers. However, in light of Gates’ seeming agreement on the overall nature of the problem, his argument about fringe benefits went largely ignored in future statements that both sides presented.

Gates’ acceptance of the LWI’s definitional terms is important because it established mutuality regarding the primary issue of the conflict. The administration
seemed more cooperative as a result, but the acceptance of the problem definition created problems later in the process when the administration’s problem definition subtly shifted. This shift occurred when Gates appoints a Task Force on Wages and Benefits to investigate wages at TAMU.

In an email to faculty, staff, and students announcing the formation of the task force, Gates expressed concern that implementing a living wage would be a “significant financial stretch for the university.” Further, Gates noted that he was concerned about the lack of comparative information for similar employees locally, at other comparable universities and nationwide (R. Gates, personal communication, April 5, 2005). Gates indicated the LWI’s claim that TAMU ranks eighth in the Big 12 in terms of worker pay. Then, in appointing the Task Force to address these issues for the TAMU administration, the definition of the problem shifted slightly. To this administrative group, the problem was not about poverty and personal hardship, it was now fully a bureaucratic issue to be investigated and fixed, and, to some extent, a reputational issue of insuring a favorable standing for TAMU when its salaries are compared with other Big 12 schools and other objective standards, such as the federal poverty guidelines. By bureaucratizing the problem, the nature of the problem changed for university administration from empathy and recognition of individual hardship to a systemic and public relations problem.

According to LWI member Nola, this caused a great deal of frustration, amongst certain LWI members, though others, such as Laura, saw the appointment of the task force as progress. Though the shift in problem definition for the administration is subtle, it
means that the types of solutions that were acceptable to the administrative might be
different from those that were acceptable to LWI activists.

While the majority of the problem identification occurred at the objective
problem level, some problem identification also occurred at the personal level. Personal
problem definitions are emotional, experiential, and intended to induce empathy with the
workers.

Though the LWI identified the problem objectively in some cases, in others, such
as local community presentations, it identified the problem personally. In these
presentations (Living Wage Initiative Organizing Meeting, personal communication,
July 10, 2005), LWI often identified the problem by profiling a full-time TAMU
employee, Janice, who earned $7.71/hour, or $14,803/year. After deductions, Janice’s
take home pay was $830/month. The LWI provided a list of her monthly expenses,
showing that on her salary, she could only pay for rent, utilities, gas, telephone, and
transportation. Janice had no money available for food, medical care, and extras for her
children, such as school pictures or dances. Even after she eliminated the non-necessary
expenses, she still could not pay for her bills, food, and transportation; thus something
always went unpaid (Living Wage Initiative, personal communication, May 8, 2005).
By telling Janice’s story, LWI invited its audience to imagine Janice’s life and trying to
live on her salary. Thus, through identification with this individual employee, LWI
identified the problem of being a full-time worker living in poverty. These presentations
were made to individual organizations to convince them to join the Living Wage
Coalition, and hence, they did not reach a large-scale audience, but Janice’s story was
repeated in newspaper editorials which, presumably garnered a much larger audience (Blakley, 2005).

In reporting on the formation of the Task Force on Wages and Benefits, *The Battalion* profiled four workers trapped in low pay jobs. The first worker retired as mechanic for TAMU in 1970 making $12/hour. He was hired back three months later when a suitable replacement could not be found. Now, thirty five years later, that same employee earned $7.50/hour. A five-year custodial worker told of remaining in her $7.23/hour job because she loved working with the students, and said, “It’s hard for people to talk about being poor...You don’t really want people to know you’re poor or struggling. It’s embarrassing.” Another custodian said, “I manage...when you have kids, you have to put them first. What I bring home is $423 every two weeks. My rent is $395 per month. I have to wait until the next pay period to get stuff for him. I don’t go shopping for myself—it’s all for him” (Filbin, 2005). Though *The Battalion* did not openly advocate for the living wage, the emotional stories in the article certainly left the impression that the newspaper supported it. Interestingly, *The Battalion* put the first public human face on the living wage issue (based on the LWI’s foundation), which had previously been dealt with in the media from a much more logical and statistical perspective.

*Attribution of Blame for the Problem*

Interestingly, in the TAMU living wage campaign, little focus was given to the other important element of diagnostic framing, the attribution of blame for the problem. For effective diagnostic framing to occur, campaigns need to identify a clear source of
the problem. However, the LWI never pinpointed a clear enemy or source of the problem. By not explicitly identifying a cause, the implication seemed to be that low salaries are just a by-product of TAMU’s structure and a U.S. economy whose minimum wage stood at $6.15/hour.

The LWI did name “poverty” as the enemy during its series of “Beat the Hell Outta Poverty Week” events. However, one could argue that poverty, while clearly a social problem, is a rather vague enemy to attack on several levels. First, poverty is a large concept encompassing many social and economic factors. Many people associate poverty with inner cities and starving children in third world countries, and the LWI’s definition of poverty is not consistent with that perception. While the LWI was making the point that poverty does occur locally, people who operated out of the perception that poverty occurs in the inner cities and in other countries would not make that connection unless they actually attended an event to learn about a different way of viewing poverty. Additionally, many people may not have made the connection between “Beat the Hell Outta Poverty” and the living wage issue. So, while the event was designed to educate students about wages and poverty, those students may not have understood the connection unless they actually attended the events. As a result, the events likely did not define poverty and wages as a clear enemy for potential supporters on a large scale, but primarily for the potential supporters who attended the events.

Second, upon closer examination, poverty is really caused by low wages. Low wages are not (on the surface, anyway) caused by poverty. It seems faulty to identify poverty as the cause of the problem labeled as the living wage issue, when it seems to be
a product of it.\(^1\) This again, left the living wage advocates with no clear causal attribution, with exceedingly complex economic explanations. LWI member Jessica related that this was a problem the LWI consistently faced. The economic factors underlying the living wage campaign were very complex, and it was difficult to clearly explain those factors in a way that was quick and accessible to people not well versed in wage issue.

In sum, in performance of the diagnostic framing processes, the LWI was very clear about the definition of the problem and did not shift that definition, even when its opposition engaged in a subtle definition shift, but never attributed causation to the problem. This lack of focus on the diagnostic framing process by the LWI is surprising, especially in light of the heavy focus on the next theme, prognostic framing.

**Prognostic Framing**

Prognostic framing offers a solution to the problem and a plan for implementing that solution. There are two themes that contribute to prognostic framing, which include offering a solution, usually based on the accepted causality of the problem and refuting the opponent’s solution to the problem.

**Offering a Solution**

Most of the LWI’s public efforts were focused on offering a solution in the prognostic framing process. The LWI determined that the solution to the problem of full-time workers who live in poverty was the implementation of a living wage. According to the LWI, a living wage for the Bryan/College Station area was a wage that

\(^1\) Some might argue that poverty does indeed cause low wages, because impoverished people are more willing to work for poverty-level wages, perpetuating the cycle of poverty.
was 130% of the federal poverty standard, which at the beginning of the campaign was $9.76/hour, plus basic benefits (Living Wage Initiative, personal communication, May 8, 2005). By using a percentage based on the federal poverty levels, the LWI ensured that the living wage would require adjustment each year as the federal poverty standards were adjusted. Using the 130% threshold also ensured that employees would not have to rely on food stamps because this is the federal food stamp eligibility cut-off (Living Wage Initiative, personal communication, May 8, 2005).

The LWI, members of LWC, and other supporters of the living wage were very clear that this was the best solution. In their presentation to local organization (Living Wage Initiative, personal communication, May 8, 2005), in the Faculty Senate Resolution (2005), and the Student Senate Resolution (2005) the exact amount of a living wage was clearly laid out. In fact, the TAMU administration made no effort to refute the contention that the LWI calculations, endorsed by the Faculty Senate, correctly defined a living wage that would solve the problem of the low-paid workers. Gates reportedly told the Faculty Senate that raising the workers’ pay would cost the university $5-17.5 million dollars (A&M Can’t Offer, 2005). It is interesting that he did not attack the LWI standard for the living wage, but said it would cost too much. In doing so, he lent credence to the living wage as calculated by LWI and, indirectly, to the LWI’s arguments about pay at TAMU and the cost of living in the community. He essentially legitimizied the solution proposed by the LWI as the right thing to do, but argued that it was not feasible.
Refuting the Opponents Solution to the Problem

The LWI engaged in refutation on two levels at different points in the campaign. These refutations fall into two sub-themes; 1) worker choice, and 2) smaller-than-desired wage increase.

The worker choice sub-theme is seen in arguments that low-paid workers choose to work at TAMU knowing that the pay is low. These arguments posited that raising TAMU’s base pay isn’t the best solution to the problem, and that if workers were unhappy with their pay, they should seek employment elsewhere or find a second job. Data that fall in the worker choice sub-theme involve statements that rebut the argument that dissatisfied workers should find other jobs.

Early on, no counter-solution was offered to this notion of worker choice. Indeed, several editorials argued that if workers do not get paid enough they should find employment elsewhere, Goodwin (2005) wrote,

> It is truly a shame that there have to be workers who make less-than-adequate wages. However, to say that their employers should be forced to increase salaries is silly. If workers were truly making below what they deserved, then they should quit and begin looking for work elsewhere.

This theme was repeated many times in the arguments against the living wage (Goodwin, 2005; McCaig, 2005; Quillen, 2005). The refutation of these arguments was primarily left to individuals angered enough by these statements to write letters to the editor attacking them. Kimberly Carter (2005), a TAMU employee, wrote in response:
If it were that easy to quit a job because we were not making enough money, then we would all be quitting our jobs and finding new ones, wouldn’t we? The reality is that the people you see every day cleaning up the messes left behind by others are often treated as invisible and not really there. It’s one thing to say that someone should quit his job because he doesn’t make enough money and another to actually be able to do it.

The LWI never officially got involved in the debate over whether dissatisfied workers can simply move away, until the release of their documentary, *Where There is a Will, There Will Be a Living Wage* (2005). The documentary includes an interview with a low-paid worker who explains the hardships that would be caused to an already financially challenged household for a worker to take time off work to find a new job and possibly miss a paycheck during the transition period.

The second sub-theme is the smaller-than-desired pay raise sub-theme. In June of 2005, after the university approved a pay raise on the recommendation of the Task Force on Wages and Benefits, the LWI had to refute the idea that the administration had solved the problem by implementing a smaller than desired pay raise. Data that reflects this sub-theme includes any statements or comments that reflect on the relationship of the raise to $7.77 to a living wage.

Leaders of the LWI reported that they were often congratulated for their “win” on the wage issue, assuming that any pay raise was a win, even if it did not reach the living wage level. In the LWI’s only media statement on the issue, Cecelia Hawkins, chair of the LWI, told the Battalion, “Basically, I think we’re pleased for those few
workers affected…but we’re disappointed that the president and the Task Force didn’t get to the issue between wages and poverty” and expressed hopes that the conversation would remain open (Fromme, 2005). Independent letter writers to the editor put their disappointment in stronger terms calling it “shameful” (Witt, 2005). The nature of the LWI response became a major factor in its attempts at motivational framing.

Motivational Framing: Call to Arms/Rationale to Action

Motivational framing is, arguably, the most important aspect of social movement framing, because it is what motivates people to actually join the fight for the cause, rather than just philosophically agreeing with it. Motivational framing is the call to arms which provides the rationale for actually getting involved. The LWI’s attempts at motivational framing can be classified into two sub-themes: 1) cooperative vs. competitive, and 2) recruiting organizations.

The cooperative vs. competitive sub-theme reflects the decisions made by the LWI to use cooperative or competitive tactics as part of the overall strategy to win a living wage for TAMU workers. This will be analyzed by examining statements that reflect how the LWI justified its choice of tactics on this cooperativeness/competitiveness continuum.

One of the interesting aspects of the LWI’s actions throughout their efforts is how little focus was actually placed on motivational framing. From the outside, it seems that the LWI established the problem and offered their solution, as if that alone will motivate supporters to act on their behalf. However, LWI members reported that this was actually a strategic decision. In a planning meeting during Beat the Hell Outta
Poverty week, TAMU LWI organizers were questioned about this approach by members of the Georgetown University LWI. They responded that they had been very careful to appear cooperative with the administration, and not competitive with them. They did not want to make enemies with those who have the power to implement the policy. This is why they chose to work through the Faculty Senate rather than have major campaign events to rally support early on in the process. Given that the LWI’s overarching goal was to raise wages throughout the community maintaining a cooperative approach would almost certainly smooth the way other employers in the area. This strategic decision heavily affected their attempts at motivational framing.

The second sub-theme is the recruiting of followers, characterized by motivational framing efforts during which the LWI attempted to recruit either individuals or organizations to join the LWI in advocating for a living wage. The attempts to recruit followers began very early in the process, when the LWI began making presentations to local community organizations. In terms of motivational framing, these presentations were fairly weak. They consisted of explaining the economic factors that go into calculating a living wage and profiling Janice’s story as she struggles to make ends meet.

However, it was not essential for the motivational framing to be particularly strong in these early presentations for two reasons. First, the LWI was asking for very little in terms of action. They just wanted to educate the local organizations for them to consent to be listed as a member of the Living Wage Coalition in support of the Living Wage. While the LWI hoped that at some point this support would translate into action,
at this phase, according to LWI member Nola, coalition development and education was really the objective. Second, the LWI primarily approached organizations that they expected would be sympathetic with the cause, including the local chapters of the ACLU and NAACP, several campus organizations for Democrats, and several campus organizations targeted at minorities.

The next real attempt at motivational framing occurred during Beat the Hell Outta Poverty Week. This was the first real series of events sponsored by the LWI targeted toward raising awareness and recruiting students to the cause. The more successful events (in terms of attendance) were several screenings of the LWI’s documentary. As far as motivational framing tactics, the LWI used the same approach as before and tried to communicate the depth of the problem through the emotional rendering of the hardships suffered by individual workers because of their low wages. Though the tactic was essentially the same, the method of delivery was so much more powerful in the documentary, that it created much more compelling motivational framing. For example, a particularly compelling scene in the documentary took viewers on a visit to a low-wage worker’s house and where she showed exposed electrical wiring and how she heats her home with her oven left open because she cannot afford needed repairs. Actually seeing the conditions that a full-time TAMU employees lived in increased the emotional impact of her hardships caused by the low wages.

At one screening of the documentary in the evening, just before finals during BTHO Poverty Week, the students in attendance were actually very engaged and fairly disturbed by the stories told in the documentary. Most of the students in attendance
were there because they were receiving extra credit for being there. In spite of the fact that it may reasonably be assumed that most of them would not have been there otherwise, they asked lots of questions, most of which were very insightful, and showed openness to discussing the issue. It was interesting because after the documentary was shown, two of the student leaders of Georgetown’s living wage campaign spoke about their efforts at Georgetown and what they felt TAMU should do next. They offered some very radical ideas, including a hunger strike, but during the question and answer session at the end of the program, the students in attendance did not ask much of the Georgetown speakers, but asked many questions which focused on the plight of the workers, how the living wage could be implemented, and how it would affect them. Clearly the video documentary was the most powerful tool that the LWI produced to aid in their motivational framing efforts.

RQ2: Master Framing

Master frames are rarely discussed outright by campaign activists and typically must be inferred from the discourse on the issue. As previously discussed, master frames are cultural values and/or ideas that are co-opted by a specific social movement and which inform the social movement’s approach to an issue. What is interesting in the TAMU case is how the various parties seem to be operating out of different master frames, and how the master frame with the most resonance seemed to be ignored by the LWI.

First, I will examine the LWI’s master frame. One master frame that had been very frequently adopted in many social justice initiatives began in the 1960s with the
civil rights movement. The civil right movement advocated equal rights, regardless of who you were, integration, and nonviolence. Since the civil right movement began, many other movements have based their values on the template provided by the civil right movement (Snow and Benford, 1992). The living wage campaign, as pursued by the LWI, seems to be one example of the equal rights master frame at work. Their core belief that full-time workers should not have to live in poverty or require government assistance (Living Wage Initiative, personal communication, May 8, 2005), indicates reasoning in line with the reasoning in the civil right movement and equal right master frame. LWI activists believed that all full-time workers should be treated with a certain minimum level of dignity. Jessica, one LWI member interviewed for this study said, “I believe that all human beings who are working full-time should be making enough money to get the basics in life.” Another LWI member, Nola, said,

You know when you see the effects of poverty. You know for instance, at our church, we see lots of people who are workers [at TAMU] who are needing to get food assistance. So seeing the effects of several of low wage jobs [sic] you know you want to at least start to address the root problem.

In this case, the LWI defined that minimum level of dignity as a wage that allows self-sufficiency. They believed that everyone who works full-time should have that right.

This framing is consistent with the equal rights master frame and its foundational beliefs that all people should be treated equally. Many of the arguments offered by living wage supporters are in line with the ideas of the equal rights master frame. This is most apparent in the LWI’s repeated promotion of the story of Janice, a full-time worker
who lives in poverty, in the Battalion and to organizations targets to become members of the Living Wage Coalition, as well as in the documentary, Where There’s a Will, which details the several workers’ pay and living conditions.

The most direct tie to the equal rights master frame, which derived from the civil rights movement, were the quotes from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the figurehead of the civil right movement, that were used in support of the LWI position, “There is nothing but a lack of social vision to prevent us from paying an adequate wage to every American citizen…There is nothing except shortsightedness to prevent us from guaranteeing an annual minimum and livable income for every American family” (Living Wage Initiative, personal communication, May 8, 2005, p.13). By associating themselves with King, the LWI established a linkage with the civil rights movement, a movement with which few Americans would admit philosophical differences. Paul, one member of the LWC reflected his belief of the LWI’s own sense of connection to the civil rights movement, “You know imagine if people like Martin Luther King, Mother Jones, Rosa Parks, you know you could list on and on, now think if these people who played such a vital role in bringing progress to the nation, think if they had that attitude [that change could not happen].” This connection to the civil rights movements clearly served as a guide for LWC members as they advocated for low-wage workers. How appealing this master frame was beyond the LWI itself is difficult to judge, but at least one Battalion writer connected with this master frame and connected his argument for a living wage to Martin Luther King Jr., saying “As the debate of the living wage at A&M ensues, we should remember the wise words of Martin Luther King, Jr., ‘I can’t be what
I ought to be until you can be what you ought to be” (Anthis, 2005). If it is difficult to argue against the civil rights movement, then by associating itself closely with the equal rights master frames, the LWI attempted to place itself in a position that is emotionally difficult for opponents to refute.

One of the ironies of this specific living wage initiative was the minimal involvement on the part of TAMU’s low-paid workers. It is difficult to assess how the low-paid workers framed the issue based on their minimal public participation. The lack of worker participation, however, could be an indicator that the low-paid workers framed the issue using the political-economy master frame. This frame asserts that power is systemic and derives from wealth. Within the political-economy master frame, oppression occurs through material deprivation of those being oppressed by those in power. From this frame, creating change requires resistance to opposition and systemic transformation (Carroll & Ratner, 1996). If one tries to identify with the low-paid workers at TAMU, most whom have to this point refused to speak out on the issue; it seems to make sense that this master frame was relevant to those low-paid workers. The LWI was sensitive to the low-wage workers’ perspective on this. Paul a member of the LWI, related,

The reason these workers’ stories weren’t being told is because they were very scared. Although they felt passionate about this, it was almost a very hostile environment for them. They weren’t receiving direct threats from Gates and the administration, but they felt that they were putting, that they would be putting their jobs on the line if they publicly spoke. And that’s why we didn’t include
any full-face shots [in the documentary] of any of the workers in because they were afraid of retaliation of whether, you know, from their boss. Some of their bosses had threatened them. There was a point in time after we have been filming for awhile that people were told, workers around campus were told not to speak to anyone with a camera.

Most of the low-paid workers addressed by the LWI were custodial, maintenance, and groundskeeping staff, with low education, and sometimes limited fluency in English. An organization as large as TAMU could easily make individuals feel small. Organizational change may have seemed completely beyond their reach, because even approaching those with the power to change, who reside in a different strata of the organization, are more educated, and have a better command of the language, would be very intimidating. In this situation it is very easy to feel that one has little control over one’s own job.

Thus, the political-economy master frame may have prevented low-paid workers from advocating for themselves because they did not feel that it was possible for them to have an impact or feared that speaking out would endanger their jobs.

The TAMU administration seemed to be operating out of yet another master frame. In the liberal frame, the state or government is seen as the locus of political action, and thus the state must balance the needs of competing groups in society. The state’s power is in its ability to allot and mobilize resources between many competing groups that act out of self-interest (Carroll & Ratner, 1996). In the TAMU living wage campaign, it appears that the administration saw itself as the state and the living wage supporters as one of the many competing groups vying for the resources that
administration controls. With Dr. Gates’ statement, “I wish we could pay them more” (A&M Can’t Offer, 2005), he indicated sympathy with issue but implied that the resources required were not available or were already promised elsewhere, and he later stated that more support would be “a significant financial stretch for the university” (R. Gates, personal communication, 2005). He used a fairly typical bureaucratic response to resource allocation issue by setting up a committee to investigate the issue.

Thus, one of the most interesting features of the living wage conflict at Texas A&M University is that each of the three main constituencies (activists, workers, and administration) was operating out of different master frames. The result of this is that each group may have assumed certain things about the conflict and how it was defined, but their public communication never indicated that they realized that others were operating from different assumptions. This exacerbated the problem discussed in RQ1 of the various parties arguing their own sides, but approaching the problem at different levels (the objective sub-theme vs. the personal sub-theme).

Another interesting feature of the Texas A&M living wage campaign was the potential for a fourth, highly unconventional master frame to be used that spanned every constituent group. This potential master frame was never fully realized, but the seeds for it were planted and a moderate response was seen from some of those constituents.

This potential master frame actually requires a small change in the way master frames are traditionally conceived. As discussed earlier, master frames are frames that draw on the established and accepted values that pre-exist the social movement in question. These values have typically been established by successful social movements
that have gone before. However, in this case, it is clear that other strong values are at play within the various constituents that are tapped by the living wage campaign but are not related to prior social movements. This evidence of a fourth master frame can be seen in how both the LWI and the other constituents, especially students, related the living wage issue to Texas A&M’s culture and traditions.

Texas A&M University has a strong culture with a well defined sense of what it means to be an Aggie. It fact, this sense of “Aggie-ness” is so strong that individuals who do not fully embrace the university’s culture and traditions are known by the derogatory term “two-percenters,” implying that they are members of the two percent of the university community that are not full Aggies. Aggies should be highly loyal to the university and each other as members of the “Aggie family” and this sense of camaraderie extends beyond graduation. The university and its students tout the power of the “Aggie network” which is the connection that former Aggies use to connect with and look out for one another even after graduation. Texas A&M is also known for its long-lasting traditions practiced by current and former students.

It is this strong culture that exists at Texas A&M that functions as an underdeveloped master frame for the living wage issue. Though the traditions of Aggieland are not a social movement per se, these values have the potential to function in the same way that a master frame based on a prior social movement would.

The most obvious example of the use of the TAMU culture as a master frame is in how the LWI titled its biggest event of the campaign. “Beat the Hell Outta Poverty” week directly refers to the university’s tradition to “Beat the Hell Outta” whatever
athletic opponent it faces, particularly on the football field. When viewing this tactic in
the context of the campaign, one must also tie the “Beat the Hell Outta” tradition to
another tradition that is highly significant to getting students involved. One of TAMU’s
most visible traditions is the tradition of the twelfth man. This tradition is manifested by
the entire student section of Kyle Field remaining standing for the duration of every
football game to symbolize its readiness to step in and help the team whenever needed.
Connected to this tradition is the real sense that students can actually affect the outcome
of the game on the field by their behavior in the stands, particularly by making noise
through participating in “yells,” which would be known as cheers elsewhere, together,
one of which is “Beat the Hell Outta ____________”.

This constellation of traditions that is being tapped by the “Beat the Hell Outta
Poverty” week has the potential to be very powerful based on the traditional Aggie ideas
that all students can make a real difference on the football field when they work
together. Additionally, other events and traditions at TAMU exemplify how the
university can and does come together in support of a cause. Each Spring, TAMU
students participate in The Big Event, the largest student-run, one-day service event in
the nation, where students take a Saturday and complete service projects across the
community (The Big Event, 2009). Another example of the TAMU coming together in
support of a cause occurred at the first football game after September 11, 2001, when
students sold red, white, and blue t-shirts to the fans in the stadium, raising over
$250,000 for the victims’ families (Bethea Honored, 2009). If the LWI could
successfully transfer that same sense of the student body’s ability to make things happen
by working together to the living wage issue, it would have a formidable group of people allied with them in advocating for a raise in wages for the low pay workers.

Two issues may have hindered the effectiveness of this strategy, though. The first is the choice of the word “poverty” and the second is the timing of the event. The statement “Beat the Hell Outta Poverty” is fairly vague and does not immediately connect a constituent, particularly a student, with the living wage issue. The term poverty can connect with a variety of issues, which may or may not be related to living wage, particularly if the individual is unfamiliar with the LWI’s prior efforts toward pay increases for low-wage workers. This problem is exacerbated by the event’s timing, which was in December, right at the end of the semester and just before the holidays. During this time of year many people think about and even donate to those less fortunate than themselves. References to poverty could easily conjure images of holiday time giving opportunities, rather than images of the full-time worker on the TAMU campus whose wages cause them to live in poverty. There is a second issue with the event’s timing that relates to the effectiveness of this TAMU culture master frame overall. Student spirit is at its height in the fall semester during the football season. By the time the event occurred, the football season was over, and students’ focus had turned to finals and completing the semester. While this alone would not make the event ineffective, it did not take full advantage of the student body’s existing interests and concerns.

Another aspect of the underdeveloped Aggie culture master frame is the sense that everyone associated with TAMU is a member of the Aggie family. This aspect manifests itself much differently that the “Beat the Hell Outta Poverty” week tactic,
though. Instead of originating with the LWI, the talk of the low-wage workers originated from individuals who were not a part of the LWI, primarily bystanders who supported the cause and spoke out. A variety of news articles and editorials appeared with the purpose of validating the importance of the low-wage workers to TAMU, and by extension to the Aggie family. In a series in the *Battalion* focusing on campus workers, Johnson (2005), writes of a cafeteria worker,

Ramirez said one thing she likes about working at the MSC Cafeteria is the students, along with the impact she is able to make on them.

“What I like is when the students come in and they might have had a rough day and if you just smile at them, you can tell it makes them feel better,” she said. “It really makes me feel good when you help them out.”

A March 2005 letter to the editor of the Battalion also tried to underscore the value of these workers to TAMU,

These invaluable individuals have supported this University since its founding in 1876. For years, they have performed tasks that others felt were beneath them, and they have done an admirable job. In return for their services, they are often treated with little respect by faculty and students alike. (Nealy, 2005)

Another article traced the pay and contributions of an employee who has been with TAMU for 55 years and had seen many historic changes at TAMU, but who currently makes $7.50/hour and another employee who felt like TAMU students were her family,

“‘They relate to me sort of like I’m a mom,’ she said. ‘They’re my Family, my people. I just love them.’” (Filbin, 2005).
A few published statements make direct connections to TAMU traditions and culture. One letter to the editor directly tied adjusting wages to TAMU traditions: “Increasing the wage would also reflect better on how the University treats its minority members. Let’s make it a tradition. It would be a worthy and meaningful tradition to add to some of our good traditions” (Tekleab 2005). Another refers to the Aggie identity, “Not only are Aggies well known for their generally conservative beliefs; we are also well-know for our compassion and generosity” (Cossette, 2005). One student interviewed for a Battalion article, was quoted as saying, “Every single custodian, I consider an Aggie…They’re on campus probably more than I am. It’s not what we owe them. It’s what they deserve” (Foley, 2005).

Even President Gates acknowledged this grassroots support for viewing low-wage workers as valuable members of the Aggie family when he emailed the university community notifying it of his decision to raise the minimum wage at TAMU to $7.77/hour saying, “Texas A&M is one of America’s great universities and every employees contributed to our unique spirit, culture, and traditions. We are all part of the Aggie family” (Gates, personal communication 2005 June 21).

Interestingly, though, only one member of the LWI interviewed for this study attached much significance to this. Jessica was the lone member of the LWI interviewed who felt that tying this issue to the Aggie family was a truly strategic choice, because of the loyalty at A&M, because of the rhetoric about the family feeling at A&M and being a part of the Aggie family, we wanted to try to come up with
a way that the Aggie family could take care of other members of the Aggie
family without starting an us vs. them fight.

No other members of the LWI interviewed suggested any sort of strategic tie to the
existing values related to the family. The vast majority of the connection to the Aggie
family culture came from the constituents that the LWI tried to target. This is why the
Aggie culture master frame remained less developed. Unlike a typical use of a master
frame that motivates individuals to get involved, the social movement leaders were not
promoting the frame that resonated the most with the students based on their creation
and employment of the master frame.

Summary

This chapter reviewed the events of the TAMU living wage campaign and
answered Research Question One, regarding the performance of the three social
movement framing functions, and Research Question Two, regarding the use of master
frames. For Research Question One, I found that the LWI focused primarily on the
diagnostic and prognostic framing processes. Of particular interest in the diagnostic
framing processes, the arguments made for and against the living wage policy took place
within different sub-themes, with the LWI arguing largely out of the personal sub-theme,
and its opponents arguing out of the objective sub-theme. In answering Research
Question Two, I found that several master frames were used, but of most interest was the
grassroots use of a new, TAMU culture/traditions master frame, but which was never
capitalized on by the LWI.
CHAPTER IV
GEORGETOWN DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter will analyze the social movement framing functions in the living wage campaign at Georgetown University, the second case study considered in this dissertation. First, the events of the Georgetown living wage campaign will be described. Then, this chapter will address Research Question One, regarding the performance of the social movement framing functions and Research Question Two, regarding the use of master frames by the activists.

Overview of the Living Wage Campaign

The living wage movement at Georgetown University began unofficially in 2002, when members of Georgetown Solidarity Committee (GSC), a campus organization devoted to workers’ rights, began to hold informal appreciation breakfasts on Friday mornings for approximately a year before the campaign began in earnest. The breakfasts were directed toward low pay campus workers and included discussions about working conditions with the workers themselves. At these breakfasts, according to Jack Mahoney, a GSC member interviewed for this study, the GSC learned that many Georgetown workers were forced to work two to three jobs to cover the high cost of living the Washington, D.C. area. As the GSC learned about the working conditions and low pay on GU’s campus in 2002 and 2003, the GSC members began privately approaching administrators about improving working conditions on campus. The administration’s response was characterized by student activist Mike Wilson as the “first
reaction from the administration was to just put us into a committee process that seemed to be endless” (Student Hunger Strike, 2005).

The GSC made its first public move on March 17, 2003 when it delivered a 12-page report entitled, “Georgetown Living Wage Report: A Study of the economics and ethics of work and employment at Georgetown University, a Catholic and Jesuit institution in Washington, D.C.” (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003) to a variety of administrators and faculty members. This report recommended that the university implement a living wage (Anderson, 2003). Its specific recommendation for a living wage was based on judgment by the Economic Policy Institute that a living wage for a family of four in Washington, D.C. was $11.87 per hour for each worker in a dual-income family. The report also emphasized that a living wage is not a fixed pay raise, but is adjusted yearly based on yearly adjustments to the local cost of living (Anderson 2003; Williams, 2003). In making specific recommendations to university administrators, the GSC recommended a pay raise, advocating for the passage of an 11 point Living Wage Policy which covered working conditions as well as wages (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003).

While the report from the GSC did not elicit an immediate response from university administration, Georgetown President John DeGioia was questioned about the report several days later at a question and answer session on a variety of issues with Georgetown students. His response defended GU’s wages and “said that the controversy lay in the income of the workers who are technically employed by other companies whose services are contracted by the university” (Wigg, 2003).
For several months, there was little public movement by the GSC or the administration. During this time, though, the GSC was under the impression that in the winter of 2003-2004 the administration, via the Business Ethics Committee and in response to the GSC’s Living Wage Report, had agreed to ensure that all subcontracted workers on campus would receive health insurance and a minimum wage of $8.50/hour (Landeck and Leavell, 2004). While this committee received little attention as a response to the Living Wage Report, its actions were confirmed when Senior Vice President Spiro Dimolitsas announced that GU would ensure that contract workers with P&R Enterprises would receive the pay raises to $8.50/hour that were promised in the Spring of 2004, and that those raise would be retroactive to July 1, 2004 (McIntosh, 2004). No action was ever taken with regards to the wages or the health insurance, which prompted an angry editorial to *The Hoya*, accusing university officials of reneging on their promises and stating that GU was not prioritizing its mission of social justice (Landeck & Leavell, 2004). Copies of this letter to the editor were personally delivered to the office of Dimolitsas. Three days later, Dimolitsas issued a statement indicating that the university planned to renegotiate wages and secure healthcare benefits with a major subcontractor, in addition to reconvening the inactive Business Ethics Committee to be renamed the Advisory Committee on Business Practices. *The Hoya* characterized these moves by the GSC and Demolitsas as the result of miscommunication over the issue over the summer (Progress Made, 2004).

Three weeks later, on October 29, 2004, the Advisory Committee on Business Practices met for the first time. This committee included administrators, faculty,
students, a facilities worker directly employed by GU, and Jesuit priests. The initial meeting of this committee sparked a protest by the GSC over the perception that Dimolitsas attempted to exclude contracted workers from the committee. For 15 minutes every hour for six hours, at least ten students dressed in black with dollar bills taped to their mouths demonstrated outside the university’s administration building. Dimolitsas stated that he was misunderstood and a contracted worker was subsequently included on the committee. GSC member and protester Mike Wilson later said that he felt the protest led the administration to include the worker on the committee and that, “it’s too bad that we have to consistently do public actions before the administration does something” (McIntosh, 2004).

The next public comments on the living wage issues were made on January 13, 2005, when members questioned President DeGioia about whether he would commit to a living wage policy at a forum open to the student body. DeGioia refused to commit to a living wage policy, saying he wanted to avoid disagreement over what that statement would imply. He noted the raise to $8.50 for contracted workers that had been negotiated and said, “We do think that where we are right now is appropriate…we will continue to evaluate the situation” (Veale, 2005). Within two weeks, the GSC responded with an editorial saying that GU should commit to a living wage policy immediately (Murphy, 2005).

Several days later, on January 31, 2005, the GSC staged a protest which involved students and faculty. At the protest, Georgetown University Student Administration Vice President Luis Torres spoke in favor of the living wage campaigners on behalf of
the Student Administration, the GU student government. The protesters attempted to enter Healy Hall, the university’s administration building, but were barred by campus police. Several protestors who were able to enter the building through another entrance presented administrators with banners and posters supporting the living wage campaign (Lestina, 2005). The GSC later demanded and received an apology from the Department of Public Safety (DPS) for being barred entry to the building (Cerna, 2005).

On February 9, 2005, the GSC held a protest outside the building where the GU Board of Directors was meeting. After reading their demands to the assembled crowd, members of the GSC made their way into the meeting, where the board allowed them to present their demands. The GSC also planned to present these demands at an upcoming meeting of the Advisory Committee on Business Practices, stating, “that this would be their ‘last way of cooperating’ with the administration” (Alimena, 2005). The GSC argued that if the Advisory Committee did not vote in favor of the GSC’s demands, such lack of action would be taken as “a ‘clear sign’ that the administration has ‘no intention of taking this issue seriously’” (Alimena, 2005). Over the next several weeks, until the Advisory Committee’s meeting, the GSC submitted four editorials supporting the implementation of a living wage to The Hoya, keeping the issue in the news (Murray, 2005; Gonzalez, 2005; Mahoney & Salvador, 2005; Fremstad, 2005).

The Advisory Committee met on March 14, 2005, with members of the GSC waiting outside for the committee’s decision (Ziajka, 2005). The committee did not reach a decision, and the next day, independent of the Advisory Committee, Dimolitsas indicated that he planned to raise the minimum wage at GU to $14/hour by July of 2008
Unhappy with the proposal because it did not call for a yearly adjustment of the wage based on inflation, the GSC responded by announcing that “we’ve been forced to start a hunger strike because all attempts at negotiation have failed” (Ziajka, 2005). The 23 hunger strikers camped in tents on campus (Santulli, 2005; Frankel, 2005), giving themselves maximum campus visibility. Four days later, the university sent letters to the hunger strikers’ parents asking them to intervene. Meanwhile, the AFL-CIO issued a statement supporting the GSC’s actions. Dimolitsas issued an email statement to the university offering a compromise of an immediate compensation package of $11.33 to $13.42 per hour, including wages and health insurance. The GSC countered that this was still below a living wage for the Washington, D.C. area (Santulli, 2006) and that the administration had not made enough progress toward a living wage in spite of the GSC working with them for several years. In an editorial, the GSC called on member of the GU community to fast and attend rallies, vigils, meetings, and performances at the site of the hunger strike (Stack & Leavell, 2005).

On day seven of the hunger strike, one student was rushed to the hospital for intravenous fluids, and a number of administrators approached the hunger strikers in person and via email, encouraging them to eat. Later the university announced that it would hold a special meeting of the Advisory Committee on Business Practices to discuss the wage compensation issue (Mendoza, 2005a). The hunger strike ended on day eight, when the administration and strikers reached an agreement that GU would adopt the GSC’s Just Employment Policy, which involved the demands originally made.
by the GSC in its March 2003 report and raise wages to $14.08 by July. In their presentation in December of 2005 at Texas A&M, hunger strikers Diane and Jack reported that what really motivated the agreement was that the AFL-CIO president privately threatened President DeGioia that if the university did not reach an agreement by 11:30 that night, he would join the students’ hunger strike. GSC organizer Mike Wilson also provided this assessment in an interview with the televised and radio-broadcast news show *Democracy Now* (2005). Both the University and the GSC subsequently declared victory regarding the issue. Speaking of a meeting between DeGioia and other administrators with several hunger strikers and AFL-CIO members, university spokesperson, Julie Green Bataille, said, “the meeting was a good conversation where all parties discussed how glad they were for this to be resolved and to have taken steps that will make a difference for workers at Georgetown” (Mendoza, 2005b). In a letter to university officials, Dimolitsas wrote, “Clearly the approach we have developed…significantly exceeds regional norms and practice, and is consistent with our Catholic and Jesuit identity” (Kinzie, 2005). Living Wage supporter Rachel Murray, stated, “We’re very happy and couldn’t be any happier” and students held a “dance party in Red Square” where the hunger strike took place (Mendoza, 2005b). In an editorial, the *Georgetown Voice* stated,

University President John DeGoia [sic] made a fool of himself by recognizing that “the passionate engagement of students over the past two years has helped us to achieve the goals this policy addresses,” while failing to acknowledge that the bulk of the work on this project has come directly from students, and even more
specifically, that this announcement is the direct result of the hunger strike. We’re not sure who DeGoia [sic] thinks he’s fooling, but we hope it isn’t the student body. (Our Georgetown, 2005)

RQ1: The Performance of Social Movement Framing

The first research question for this study focuses on the functions of social movement framing. To understand the role of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing in creating a collective action frame, I performed a thematic analysis using the three major functions of social movement framing as themes for the Georgetown case.

Diagnostic Framing

Diagnostic framing involves establishing the problem that the activists are working to correct and assigning blame for the problem. As a result, the diagnostic framing theme subdivides into themes of identifying the problem and attributing blame for that problem.

Identifying the Problem

In this section of analysis, I examined the data for framing statements that labeled the problem in some way and statements in which someone tried to explain the nature of the situation that precipitated the living wage activism. This analysis suggested that problem identification for the Georgetown case could be divided into two sub-themes: the objective problem and the ethical problem.

In this case, the GSC employed both problem definition sub-themes, though the prominence of the themes varies at different points in the campaign. Both are addressed from the beginning, though as the campaign proceeded, the ethical problem sub-theme
takes over at the primary definition of the problem by the GSC. I will now explore how the GSC used both the objective and the ethical subtheme.

In its Living Wage Report, the GSC’s earliest public statement which kicked off the living wage campaign and provided the basis for the next two years’ work, the GSC focused heavily on objective definitions of the problem. Much of the argument presented in this document was aimed at taking a logical approach at convincing potential constituents, including students, faculty, staff, and administration, that there was really a problem with the wages and treatment of GU workers. Even the professional design and graphics included in the document seemed to have been created to enhance the credibility of the arguments (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003).

The report explained that, at the time, 103 living wage ordinances had been passed in cities, campuses, and municipalities around the nation, and 35 campus living wage campaigns were ongoing. The report cites a few specific cities and campuses where these living wage campaigns had occurred, many of which were argued to be comparable to Washington, D.C. and GU in some way. According to the report, some comparable cities with living wage ordinances included Cambridge, MA, Buffalo, NY, Los Angeles, CA, and Alexandria, VA. Some campuses cited with active living wage campaigns included Princeton, Notre Dame, and Yale (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003). This served the purpose of making the living wage policy being recommended seem reasonable when compared with similar situations nationwide.

The report also provided specific figures based on research from two independent organizations on what it costs to actually live in the Washington, D.C. area. The
Economic Policy Institute determined that in 1999, four years before the GSC’s report was issued, a family of four, with two working parents, required a wage of $48,218/year between the two workers, or $11.87/hour when accounting for food, housing, clothing, childcare, healthcare, and transportation. The Living Wage Report also related that Wider Opportunities for Women Organization completed a self-sufficiency study which found that, in order to live without any government or charitable assistance, a family of four would need two incomes at $12.48/hour. This was then contrasted with the $16,000/year, or $8/hour, that many contracted workers at Georgetown earned at the time. This amount, the report cited, is not only below a living wage level, but is also below the federal poverty line for a family of four, which at the time was $17,650 (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003). This report provided the basis for all subsequent objective definitions of the problem. In many of the subsequent public statements by the GSC, the arguments presented in this report are assumed as accepted by or familiar to the audience (the students, faculty, staff, and administration at GU), and are often implied, but rarely explicitly detailed again.

Though the objective sub-theme was important in the initial documentation of the GSC’s efforts, the ethical sub-theme figured much more prominently throughout all stages of the campaign. The ethical sub-theme played a prominent role in the initial Living Wage Report, and in the many public statements made by the GSC throughout the remainder of the campaign.

In the “Georgetown Living Wage Report,” a significant portion of the document was devoted to creating this ethical definition of the problem. The report began by
discussing Georgetown’s commitment to social justice, along with President John DeGioia’s statement challenging the university to pursue social justice. It went on to state,

The true reality of social justice today at Georgetown University contradicts our spoken intentions to a degree that is appalling. While the rhetoric of justice flows through our campus, it is the very individuals who clean our classrooms, feed us and spend their days and nights ensuring a safe environment who have been denied justice in the University’s policies. (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003, p. 2)

This clearly established the problems created by low wages as one that is not merely unfortunate, but wrong. In discussing the low wage workers, the report stated,

One would think that such a striking example of American work ethic in cooperation with the Jesuit tradition would result in some hope of upward social mobility; however, social barriers such as language have negated their efforts toward personal improvement…When asked, the majority of [the contracted workers] showed a great desire to learn English; they understand learning English to be an essential step in improving their lives. Unfortunately, given the time constraints of working multiple jobs and their lack of financial and other resources very few workers are able to take English classes. These barriers, as well as the insufficient wages individuals earn working at Georgetown, have trapped them in a cycle of poverty, with no hope of upward social mobility. (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003, p. 6)
So, the problem was not merely the wages being paid to these workers, but how the wages influenced their quality of life and ability to pursue the American dream. The fact that this could occur at a Catholic institution only magnified what the GSC framed as an unethical situation:

It is clear that Georgetown has failed in its mission to justice within its own gates. Ignoring the plight of the most marginalized individuals on our campus, the University’s policies are not in concordance with our stated ideals of social justice. As a Jesuit university, Georgetown should be working to end poverty—not creating it. (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003, p. 9)

To reiterate the ethical nature of the problem, upon release of the report, *The Hoya* reported, “[GSC Spokesperson] Cope said that the GSC’s argument is rally a moral one. ‘We should have our actions in line with our values’” (Williams, 2003).

The ethical sub-theme was featured prominently throughout the remainder of the campaign. In the GSC’s first editorial on the living wage issue, in October 2004, Landeck and Leavell wrote, “We have alerted the administration to just how glaringly our supposed commitment to social justice contradicts our policy of sub-contracting out the majority of work on campus to exploitative companies…As a Catholic institution with a dedicated moral imperative, we must do better.” This type of language was a consistent theme throughout the remainder of the living wage campaign.

In a later editorial, GSC member Megan Murphy argued, “We at Georgetown celebrate the resilience of the poor and simultaneously perpetuate their suffering. As Catholics and Christians we derive our identity from the way we treat the poor…As
Hoyas, we identify with this campus, yet pay poverty wages to the people who enable it to operate.” After lamenting that GU was moving slowly on the issue, she went on to say, “We must afford a living wage now, because we simply cannot be a place that imposes pain on members of our community” (Murphy, 2005). The purpose of this editorial was clearly to impress upon the reader the urgency and necessity of a good and moral community to act on behalf of the low-wage workers. This was also reinforced in the language used by the GSC which consistently referred to the low wages as “poverty wages” (McIntosh, 2004; Lestina, 2005a; Murphy, 2005; Murrary 2005), as it is difficult to formulate a counter-argument if one accepts that the wages being paid force workers into poverty.

These arguments continued as the GSC issued other statements to The Hoya, saying,

Georgetown’s mission statement calls on us to live generously in service to others, but our university pays its subcontracted workers poverty wages. How is this in line with our commitment to justice and the common good?...Georgetown can and must find a way to stop paying poverty wages. If we can find the money to hire celebrity professors such as George Tenet or muster $15 million to build a new boathouse, we can find the money to put Georgetown’s Jesuit ideals into practice. (Murray, 2005)

And a month later, these ideas were reaffirmed with the statement,

Georgetown has an obligation to every worker in the campus community. Our stated commitment to justice, the Catholic tradition and the common good means
that we must pay all employees enough to ensure that they can provide for themselves and their families without falling into poverty…Georgetown’s mission statement calls for us to “live generously in service to others.” To guarantee that the principles central to our Catholic identity do not become empty rhetoric, the Living Wage Coalition demands that Georgetown act in concrete and accountable ways to uphold them. (Stack & Leavell, 2005)

All of these statements served to frame the living wage issue as an ethical problem for the university and its students. Rather than being caught up in numbers and logistics, the GSC continually juxtaposed the Christian mission of the university with the wages that force workers into poverty. This created a clear ethical problem when viewed as a Catholic institution perpetuating poverty amongst members of its community.

Interestingly, while the GSC operated so heavily out of the ethical sub-frame, the administration’s responses (in the rare instances of public response) tended to ignore this framing effort and addressed the issue from the objective sub-theme. In response to the GSC’s first editorial, which focused on the ethical imperative of the living wage issue, the university moved in favor of the GSC by stating it would renegotiate the contract with a major sub-contractor. However, the administration framed its response objectively, saying “the university is committed to the goals of ensuring a gross hourly wage of at least $8.50 and providing access to health care for its contracted employees and is implementing these changes” (McIntosh, 2004). At a forum with students in January of 2005, President DeGioia, when questioned about whether the university would commit to a living wage policy responded again out of the objective sub-frame,
reminding listeners of the contract negotiation which raised wage to $8.50 (Veale, 2005).

It can be conjectured that the university took the objective approach in order to avoid the ethical issue, which would have placed the administration at a disadvantage with relation to the GSC’s position.

**Attribution of Blame for the Problem**

The second element of diagnostic framing is laying blame for the problem. Throughout the living wage campaign, the GSC was very clear that GU’s administration was to blame for the low wages being paid. GSC member Jack stated in an interview, “I think administrators of a university are largely at fault, only because they have the power to say, like you know, all these workers are going to make more or less or, you know, we are going to spend out money here or there.” Indeed, much of the campaign was focused on laying blame at the administration’s door, and particularly at the feet of Senior Vice President Dimolitsas and President DeGioia.

This attribution of blame began in the initial Georgetown Living Wage report when the GSC quoted President DeGioia’s calls for commitment to social justice, while showing that GU is responsible for keeping some of its workers in poverty. As the campaign proceeded, the GSC continued to remind potential constituents that the GU administration was keeping workers in poverty, because, if the administration so chose, they could change the policy.

This approach continued when the GSC wrote an editorial in *The Hoya*, detailing all of the opportunities the university had to rectify the wage situation, and discussing a promise the university had made to raise worker to $8.50 an hour, which the GSC argued
the administration has reneged on (Landeck and Leavell, 2004). When the administration agreed to conditions requested by the GSC, as when Dimolitsas agreed to include a contract worker on the Advisory Committee for Business Practices, the GSC continued to talk about the administration as the enemy, saying, “It to bad that we have to consistently do public actions before the administration does something” (McIntosh, 2004). When the GSC was criticized in an editorial for protesting for a committee position for a contracted worker, the GSC was quick to respond with a letter back to The Hoya detailing all the ways the GSC felt Dimolitsas had acted inappropriately in the recreation of the committee (Wilson, 2004). This process of demonizing the administration continued when a GSC member told President DeGioia, after he told a student forum that he would continue to evaluate the wage situation, “Evaluation doesn’t bring people out of poverty” (Veale, 2004). The GSC also criticized DeGioia for implying that the university could not afford to pay higher wages when DeGioia had recently received a $120,000 raise (Alimena, 2005) and other financial decisions related to the hiring of “celebrity professors” and building projects (Murray, 2005).

According to Jack, a GSC member interviewed for this study, the GSC focused increasingly on DeGioia and the administration as the campaign continued. These attributions of blame became even more explicit in the spring when the GSC distributed flyers around campus with pictures of DeGioia and Dimolitsas and their phone numbers encouraging people to call them and press for a living wage.

In addition to the many public statements made by members of the GSC, their actions were also designed to place blame on the administration. All of the GSC’s
protests and hunger strike occurred in Red Square, outside Healy Hall, the university’s administration building. This served not only to capture the administration’s attention, but also to show students, faculty, and staff that they should see administration members as responsible for the wage situation on campus. When students were arrested entering the building, it further served to show the administration in a negative light. Finally, a dual purpose was served when the GSC forced its way into a GU board of directors meeting. This confrontation was meant to persuade the board regarding the merits of the GSC position, but the entrance also made an implicit statement that the administration could not be trusted to accurately communicate about the living wage issue with the board.

Prognostic Framing

The second function of social movement framing is prognostic framing, which involves offering a solution to the problem and a plan for implementing that solution. Prognostic framing consists of two sub-themes, offering a solution to the problem and refuting the opponent’s solution to the problem.

Offering a Solution

Interestingly, the GSC focused surprisingly little attention on the solution to the problem. The majority of the campaign focused on diagnostic framing processes. The GSC laid out its solution very clearly in the initial “Georgetown Living Wage Report” but after this report, few details about the GSC’s proposed solution ever emerged again in its public discourse.
Two pages of the 13-page Georgetown Living Wage Report (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003) are devoted to outlining the living wage policy, which includes the 10 demands listed in Table 5 along with explanations of what those demands mean:

Table 5
GSC’s living wage policy from Georgetown Living Wage Report (Georgetown Solidarity Committee; 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Component</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  All working members of the Georgetown community guaranteed a living wage.</td>
<td>All employees who worked at GU, both GU employees and contract employees would receive a living wage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Annual adjustment of living wage.</td>
<td>Accepting that cost of living changes living yearly, living wage would be recalculated annually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Guaranteed wage parity</td>
<td>Wages paid will be equivalent to similar positions with other employees in the area for the same job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Access to appropriate resources</td>
<td>Workers’ resources will include health care, child care, English as a second language education, job training, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Fair working conditions</td>
<td>GU will provide a safe, harassment free working environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Commitment to sustainable work force</td>
<td>GU will provide full-time rather than part-time jobs whenever possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Job security</td>
<td>In any organizational change, no jobs or wages will be cut; if subcontractors choose to pull out of contract with GU, GU will employ any displaced workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Right to organize</td>
<td>GU workers will be allowed to unionize and will recognize union bargaining agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Implementation of the living wage</td>
<td>GU will revise all contracts to include the living wage policy before they are renewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Disclosure</td>
<td>GU and sub-contractors must disclose information on pay scales, benefits, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These ten demands are the solution provided by the GSC and remained consistent throughout the campaign.\textsuperscript{2} In the Georgetown Living Wage Report, the necessary living wage was cited as $11.87 per hour (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003). Although this number changed during the several years of the campaign, the actual wage was rarely explicitly stated from that point forward. The other issues addressed by the Living Wage Policy, also know within the GSC as the Just Employment Policy, were almost never publicly addressed. GSC member Jack indicated in an interview that this was a conscious choice made by the GSC because they felt it would be too difficult to deal with many of the other elements in the policy. For example, if they were to communicate much publicly about the demand related to unionizing, they would have to educate students about the process of unionizing, and then convince them that the policy they were advocating is the best way of handling the situation. They felt that this would be too complicated for the campaign.

So unless one was familiar with living wage issues or had been following the Georgetown living wage campaign, it could be difficult to understand exactly what the GSC was fighting for. This could be especially confusing because the term “living wage” seems to relate to the employees’ pay scale, but in reality the GSC’s living wage policy went far beyond pay scales to consider health care, English language education,

\textsuperscript{2} There was an 11\textsuperscript{th} component in the Georgetown Living Wage Report (Georgetown Solidarity Committee, 2003), which was “11. A timely response. The Georgetown Solidarity Committee requests a response to this policy from University President Dr. John J. DeGioia on or before March 31, 2003 as the implementation of a living wage is a matter of utmost urgency to the university community.” This component was dropped after the stated deadline passed and the living wage policy had the ten components list above from that point forward.
grievance procedures, and the right to unionize -- all demands that were rarely publicly addressed.

Refuting the Opponents’ Solution to the Problem

The GSC did little substantial refuting of the administration’s solutions. This is primarily because the administration never offered alternative solutions or public refutations of the GSC’s argument. Quite frequently, the GU administration’s response was to seemingly ignore the GSC, until some public move was made by the GSC. Then the administration would respond by giving in on the issue of the moment. Because the administration never really argued against the GSC’s definition of the problem or proposed solution, there was nothing for the GSC to actively refute. This may be why the GSC focused so heavily on the diagnostic framing processes—in particular, the ethical problem sub-theme and assigning blame for the problem.

Motivational Framing: Call to Arms/Rationale to Action

The final component of social movement framing is motivational framing, which attempt to motivate people to actually fight for the cause. The GSC took an unconventional approach to the motivational framing processes. While committee members sought to educate the Georgetown student body about the living wage issue, they were not heavily focused on drawing in individual supporters to join the campaign.

According to GSC member Diane, the GSC had many smaller scale educational events, which included, “dorm-storming,” which involved entering a dorm and canvassing among the students there, hosting sessions where student could talk to actual low-wage workers, and a rally where workers spoke about their experiences. Jack
mentioned that these events were designed to raise awareness with broad groups of people. And though they would welcome anyone who wanted to get involved at whatever level of involvement, they desired, both Diane and Jack agreed that living wage campaign was driven by a core of 8-15 people, who were responsible for the majority of the campaign.

At later stages of the campaign, the efforts to involve other went beyond having a primarily educational objective to joining them in a coalition with the GSC on behalf of the living wage issue. A few supportive groups formed on campus including a drama group that acted out a living wage play written by a GSC member and a politically minded Chicano group that became involved with the campaign. These events had limited impact on the overall direction of the campaign. These groups’ participation may have had an impact on the number participating at rallies and the hunger strike, but these instances were too limited to be considered a form of motivational framing.

In fact, the only aspect of the GSC campaign that could be seen as motivational framing involved the choice of tactics used to gain attention. The use of inflammatory editorials, highly visible protests, and the hunger strike, were exciting and showcased the GSC members’ passion for their cause. Jack reported that this was a strategic choice so that the GSC’s activities would be a topic of conversation around campus. Overall, it seems that the hope was that other students would be motivated to become involve based on the GSC’s visible passion and commitment.

Much of this perspective, that seeing the GSC’s passion and commitment to the living wage initiative would inspire other students to join it, was based on the GSC
member’s personal experiences before becoming involved in the GSC. Diane related that she became involved in the GSC after participating in protests against the Iraq war. Many of her fellow protesters were GSC members who introduced her to the living wage issue and the GSC. Jack was already interested in labor issues when he arrived at Georgetown and wanted to work with an issue that he could take action on. For both, the protesting tactics the GSC was known for and the fact the GSC had recently concluded an anti-sweatshop campaign drew them into the living wage campaign. They discussed that most members of the GSC were leftists, progressives, and many were anti-capitalists and were known around campus for having somewhat radical tendencies. Because these individuals were motivated by activist tactics, they seemed to expect that others would be motivated by them, too.

A perhaps unusual aspect of the Georgetown campaign is that there was not a crucial need for large numbers of people to be involved in the campaign. Most of the advances toward the acceptance of the living wage policy came in response to highly visible, dramatic actions made by a few members or occasionally, all members of the GSC. In fact, according to Diane and Jack, during the 2004-2005 academic year, when most of the activity on the campaign occurred and when the living wage policy was adopted, there were only “12 or 15 people who were really dedicated.” So, though the involvement in the campaign beyond the core group of GSC members was relatively limited, it did not affect their ability to have the living wage policy implemented.
RQ2: Master Framing

Master frames are used by social movements to ease the acceptance of the ideas the social movement is trying to promote. Typically master frames are employed when a social movement co-opts the framing processes used by previous, successful social movements. Because the movements being mimicked are successful, it should be easier for constituents to accept the ideas of the new social movement, which appear to be extensions of already accepted ideas.

The most striking feature of the master framing within the Georgetown case was the difference between the private and public master frames used by the GSC. Privately, the GSC operated out of a political-economy master frame. Publicly, though, the GSC uses the Catholic value of social justice as a master frame.

The Political-Economy Master Frame

In their interview, Jack and Diane indicated that the members of the GSC tended to discuss and conceptualize the living wage issue as a part of a large-scale economic problem. This perspective indicates that the GSC used the political-economy master frame to conceptualize the wage problem.

In the political-economy master frame, less privileged individuals are oppressed by those in power through the control of material things. Power is derived from wealth, so it is the wealthy that oppresses the poor and the middle class. These attitudes were prevalent within the GSC. In fact, the GSC embarked on the living wage campaign after completing a campaign demanding that GU adopt anti-sweatshop policies against all manufacturers that produced licensed GU merchandise. So, the GSC had a history of
attacking the corporate entity on behalf of those who either could not or would not advocate for themselves. This is one of the reasons that the right unionize, and to unionize with relative ease were two components of the Living Wage Policy the GSC advocated. They saw unionization as essential to give some power to the group of workers who had very little power. In fact, Diane said that the ultimate goal of the GSC was to give the workers more power. The GSC felt that if the workers had the power to advocate for themselves, then they would be able to advocate in the future for the better wages and benefits that were also included in the Living Wage Policy.

The GSC conceptualized a clear distinction between the wealthy oppressors and the marginalized victims, and many saw this as a byproduct of a flawed capitalist system. As Jack put it:

I think the individuals of power, you know, power to decide whether or not to pay a living wage or pay a poverty wage are the people at fault. But I also feel that’s a part of a larger context of global capitalism wherein…I think I mean especially in America like we have lots of white folks who are administrators and a lot of people of color and like immigrant workers who are making you know way below the poverty line or being fired constantly for speaking out on the job. And like I think, speaking for myself and also I think for a lot of the people in our group [the GSC], I think it was important to see all of this in the context of that larger struggle of you know working people against a system that you know really puts them on the bottom and places them in a situation without much power at all.
Diane elaborated on this point saying:

It has to do with administrators like making decisions, but it is also you know, that’s how our society functions, like it needs a class of low-wage workers to support the rest of it. And I mean, so I mean I’m an anti-capitalist. I know a lot of my friends that are in the group [the GSC] are anti-capitalists as well.

Also, within the GSC, the Living Wage policy was more commonly referred to as the Just Employment Policy, a term which did not appear in public communication about the campaign. The term “Just Employment” draws a closer relationship to this political-economy master frame because it reflects the attitude that the low-wage worker need to be protected from injustices perpetuated by their wealthy, powerful employers.

In spite of this dominant perspective guiding internal discussions, the GSC made a concerted effort not to present the problem in this way to the public. They were aware that the GSC had a reputation for radical tactics and behavior. Diane related that the GSC had “an image of being like you know crunchy hippies or like creepy inner kids, [or]…crazy people with funny hair.” So on top of that campus reputation, presenting arguments based on the assumption of oppressive capitalist systems would only serve to make them appear more extreme and alienate potential constituents.

*The GU Catholic/Social Justice Master Frame*

The master frame that the GSC uses in its public communication is not the same frame they used conceptualize the issue privately. Instead, the GSC used GU’s Jesuit heritage and stated value of social justice as a master frame. It is interesting to note that
the master frame appears to have been chosen to target a select few individuals, rather than large numbers of people as is typically the case with social movements.

As discussed above, the GSC focused the campaign heavily on the administration, especially President DeGioia and Senior Vice President Dimolitsas, because, as noted by GSC members Jack and Diane, they were the people who had the power to actually change the policy. So this master framing effort was really focused on persuading the GU administration to implement the living wage policy more than on persuading student to join the campaign.

As of 2000, 58% of Georgetown students identified themselves as Catholic, but GU has been criticized by Catholic groups for de-emphasizing Catholicism and for engaging in debate on issues condemned by the church (van der Werf, 2000). It is unclear how strongly committed the average student at GU is to the values of social justice that the university professes. What is clear is that the GU administration had prominently promoted the Catholic, and more specifically Jesuit, ideal of social justice on campus. Statements regarding social justice feature prominently on the GU website and members of the administration (Service and Social Justice, 2008), especially President DeGioia, have spoken out promoting social justice among Georgetown students on a number of occasions. In fact, social justice is such a core value at GU that the administration has created a Center for Social Justice on Campus.

As discussed at length above, much of the GSC’s public communication focused on the diagnostic framing process of defining the problem. The most prominent sub-theme of the problem definition was the ethical sub-theme. In establishing that the
wages being paid to the workers were unethical, the GSC frequently contrasted the unethical nature of the situation with the Jesuit ideal of social justice promoted by the university. While this aided in defining the problem for the general population at Georgetown, it also served an additional purpose of acting as a master frame targeted at members of the GU administration.

As one of the values that the administration had worked hard to promote on campus, it was difficult to provide an argument against the Living Wage Policy when it was consistently presented as the solution to a grave injustice. It became even more difficult to reconcile that the very administration that promoted social justice to students refused to rectify, and in fact, perpetuated that injustice.

This could be a reason why the GU administration remained silent on the living wage issue throughout much of the campaign and when it did respond, it was typically in reaction to a highly visible move by the GSC. Feeling the power of the master frame themselves, it is possible that administration was reluctant to speak for fear of bringing attention to that discrepancy. With over half of the student population being Catholic, they may have assumed that, if that student population accepted the value of social justice and accepted the problem definition presented by the GSC, then drawing attention to the issue by speaking out on it would only cause the dissent to grow.

Regardless of the reasoning for the administration response, it is clear that the GSC selected values that the GU administration held dear and attached the living wage issue to those values, in hopes that it would ease the acceptance of their views of the wage situation at Georgetown.
Summary

This chapter reviewed the events of the Georgetown living wage campaign and answered research questions one and two with regard to the Georgetown case. For Research Question One, which analyzed the performance of the three major social movement framing functions, I found that the GSC focused primarily on the diagnostic framing processes, in particular establishing the ethical nature of the wage problem and setting up the GU administration as being responsible for the problem. For a variety of reasons, the prognostic and motivational framing processes received much less attention throughout the campaign. In answering Research Question Two, I found that the GSC actually used two different master frames. Internally, GSC members conceptualized the issue using the political-economic master frame, while external communication used the Jesuit values of social justice as a master frame targeted toward the GU administration.
CHAPTER V

CASE COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, the results of the analysis of the Texas A&M and Georgetown cases will be compared and contrasted and reflected upon. First, I will answer Research Question Three, comparing the cases. This will be followed by observations of how this study contributes to the social movement framing perspective and the limitations of this study. Finally, I will discuss potential future directions for this research and reflect on the project as a whole.

RQ3: Comparison of the Cases and Contextual Influences

One of the most interesting facets of this study is the exploration of Research Question Three, which involves a comparison of the two cases. A number of similarities and differences in the campaigns’ use of the social movement framing functions and the contexts each campaign operated in were found.

Differences Between the TAMU and GU Cases

In comparing the results of research questions one and two for the two cases, there are a number of interesting differences between the two campaigns. The living wage campaigns at TAMU and GU showed differences in each campaign’s goals, contextual differences, the tactics used, the overall strategies for the campaigns, and each campaign’s ability and/or willingness to accept compromise.

Differing Goals

One of the most noticeable differences between the TAMU and GU living wage campaigns is in each campaign’s overall goals. Within the TAMU campaign, the LWI’s
goal throughout the campaign was to persuade the administration to implement a living wage policy. There was a clear recognition that the university administration had control over the acceptance of a living wage policy, and the LWI used the university’s accepted means of proposing and advocating change, including resolutions from the faculty and student senates and meetings with university officials. Persuading the university administration may have been the original goal of the Georgetown campaign, but the goal quickly changed from persuading to forcing the administration to implement the living wage policy, by using tactics that were highly public and potentially embarrassing to the GU administration. These differing goals are clearly reflected in each campaign’s choice of tactics and how those tactics were used to enact each campaign overall strategy.

Differing Contexts and the Influence on Goals

The different contexts at TAMU and GU also had a large effect on the living wage campaigns’ goals. One of the biggest differences between the two universities is the difference between who would benefit from a living wage policy. At TAMU, the university itself was the actual employer of the low-wage workers. With the goal being a pay raise for actual TAMU employees, the funding for the policy had to come from within the university itself.

At GU, the majority of the workers that would be affected by the living wage policy were not direct Georgetown employees, but were employed by companies under contract with the university. As a result, the goal was to implement a living wage policy that not only included actual GU employees but subcontracted employees, as well. This
would almost certainly affect the way the administration responded to the living wage campaign. While the funding for direct GU employees would have to be found, the administration also needed to consider the expiration dates for the contracts, the potential that contracted companies would be unwilling to renew their contracts under the terms set by the living wage policy, and the ability to replace lost contractors with other contractors or by expanding GU’s own workforce to compensate for lost contracts. Thus, the administration at GU had more competing interests to consider before agreeing to the living wage policy. However, unlike the administration at TAMU, the GU administration never spoke out about the interests they had to balance when considering the living wage policy. This resulted in little to no actual conversation about the implications of the policy beyond the GSC’s discussion of the living wage policy’s effect on the workers themselves. Because the administration did not offer a counter-argument, there was no reason for the GSC to expand its master framing efforts beyond the administration, as discussed in Chapter IV.

Another major contextual factor that differed between the two campaigns is the scope of the living wage policy being advocated. At TAMU, the living wage campaign was really about just raising the minimum wage on campus and adjusting it yearly based on the local cost of living. The GU policy was much more broad in that it covered many aspects of employment, including benefits, fair treatment, and right to unionize with ease. Though most public discussion of the GU policy focused on the wages, the GSC saw the other elements of the policy, especially those related to unionizing, as essential to being sure GU followed through on its promises. So when the living wage policy was
accepted, it was much broader than TAMU’s policy and included all proposed elements except card-check neutrality with regards to unionization. This could relate to the GU administration’s reluctance to speak out about the policy. The breadth of the policy could have been a complicating factor in renegotiating its contracts.

Differing Tactics

In addition to the differences in goals and contextual factors between the TAMU and GU campaigns, the two campaigns used very different tactics to reach those goals. The LWI at TAMU chose tactics that allowed them to consistently focus on working within the university’s existing organizational structure. They gained endorsements from the Faculty Senate and Student Association, and attempted to gain the support of the Graduate Student Association. Though the approval of the organizations was not necessarily easy, the tactics themselves are cooperative in nature because they followed the bureaucratic path preferred by the university. Further, the use of these tactics gained the LWI the opportunity to meet directly with President Gates to make their case for a living wage policy. It appears that these tactics were overall relatively successful, because all members of the President’s Task Force on Wages and Benefits interviewed reported the expectation that the Task Force would find some way to answer the concerns related to workers in poverty. Two task force members even stated that they believed they were expected to approve some kind of wage increase.

At GU, however, the GSC did not use tactics that followed a university-endorsed method of advocating for change. They used what would be considered more competitive tactics designed to force the administrative action, such as inflammatory
editorials, protests, and hunger strikes. In doing so, however, the GSC lost the ability to work cooperatively with the administration. In fact, as time went on, the only direct interaction that the GSC had with the administration occurred on the occasions when it stormed the administration building or the Board of Trustees meeting.

In terms of tactics, then, each of the living wage campaigns approached the task of creating change in very different ways. The LWI at TAMU used tactics that could be classified as cooperative, meaning that they worked within the existing organizational structure to create change. The use of cooperative tactics does not mean it was easy to achieve change, but rather indicates a willingness to cooperate with the administration’s structures and practices for creating change. The GSC, however, used tactics that rejected the existing organizational structure in preferences by engaging in activities, such as protests, that promoted the issue in keeping with their own preferences and not the university administrations preferences for creating change.

Differing Strategies Resulting from the Use of the Social Movement Framing Functions

This difference in tactics can also be seen in the ways that the two campaigns strategies focused on the social movement framing functions as a means of accomplishing their goals. The LWI at TAMU focused their efforts on the prognostic framing processes. That is, the LWI had a solution focus throughout the campaign, which was consistent with their tactical choices, previously discussed, to use the university’s preferred path for change. The GSC at GU focused primarily on the diagnostic framing of attributing blame for the problem, which was consistent with their tactics of creating their own path for forcing change at GU. Additionally, these strategic
choices also affected the extent to which each campaign was willing or able to accept compromise from their ideal solution to the issue.

The campaign at TAMU’s strategic choices focused most heavily on the prognostic framing processes, while the campaign at GU chose a strategic focus on the diagnostic framing processes. The LWI at TAMU maintained a solution focus throughout much of the campaign. They repeatedly explained how the implementation of a living wage would solve the problem of campus workers living in poverty. They attempted to make a living wage seem like a reasonable solution by comparing TAMU’s wages with those of other Big 12 universities, calculating the total cost of the policy, and so on. This strategy of a focus on the diagnostic framing processes was consistent with their choice of cooperative tactics in the campaign. By focusing on the solution to the problem as opposed to laying blame, they were able to bring attention to the issue and present a problem. This allowed the LWI to use the university’s organizational structure to its advantage because they felt it was the path that would enable them to succeed, rather than making the university administration an enemy. The GSC at GU explained little about the living wage policy they advocated beyond the initial presentation of the living wage policy in the “Georgetown Living Wage Report.”

The GSC’s strategy required them to maintain a problem focus throughout the campaign through their concentration on diagnostic framing processes, especially assigning blame for the problem. Much of the public discourse in the campaign focused on how the administration had the power to make changes in the wage structure, and refused to do so in contradiction of the value of social justice GU promotes. Many of
the protests were targeted at the administration by staging them at the administration building. Also, most of the public statements by the GSC in *The Hoya* condemned either President DeGioia, Senior Vice President Dimolitsas, or the administration as a whole. GSC members reported that this was deliberate as the administrators held the power to make change. They used the attributing blame diagnostic framing process as a strategy to put public pressure on who they perceived as the relatively few members of the GU administration who could actually implement the desired change. Members of the LWI at TAMU reported that they made a strategic decision not to follow this path, for fear of alienating the administrators, who had the power to make the change. As a result, they deliberately avoided laying any type of direct blame on the university for the workers living in poverty.

*Differing Approaches to Compromise*

The way the campaigns approached the issue also affected their willingness to accept compromise. Throughout the campaign, the GSC issued ultimatums to the administration, and when they were not met, they responded with dramatic public reactions. They continued to condemn the administration, and arguably increased their fervor when the administration implemented a partial wage increase. Whereas, the LWI at TAMU were more gracious in the acceptance of the partial wage increase offered by the administration. They were clear that the wage increase was not enough, but were grateful for the increase and saw it as a positive step toward the eventual implementation of a living wage.
Clearly, each campaign exhibited a number of differences in how they approach the need to implement a living wage policy at each university. There were clear differences in each campaign’s overall goals, tactics, strategies, and ability and/or willing to accept compromise on the campaigns’ perceptions of the ideal solution to the wage issue.

*Similarities and More Differences Between the TAMU and GU Cases*

In addition to yielding major differences between the two campaigns, comparison of the results of research questions one and two also yielded an interesting similarity between the two cases related to their use of the universities’ values as a tool for master framing. From a social movement framing perspective, to use the existing values of the university as a foundation for building a social movement is highly unusual. Master frames employed by social movement typically reflect values that are less organizationally specific, and that are more reflective of societal values or previously well-accepted social movements. Though the way the master frames were actually used differed, in both cases, this use of the universities’ values as a master frame was an important component of the overall social change effort.

The way these master framing efforts actually played out differed between the campaigns though. At TAMU, though the LWI built on the culture via the “Beat the Hell Outta Poverty Week,” most of the connection between the living wage issue and the culture actually came from LWI outsiders who were moved to support the campaign via letters to *The Battalion*. The LWI never took full advantage of the persuasive power of this approach. In contrast, at GU, the GSC was responsible for consistently connecting
the living wage issue to the university’s stated social justice value. This theme permeated almost all of the statements made by the GSC throughout the campaign. Fewer people unconnected with the campaign seemed to build on this idea than in the TAMU campaign, but there was very little public activity in the campaign by non-GSC members. At TAMU, the LWI’s campaign inspired a large number of articles, editorials, and letters to the editor by non LWI-members.

In addition to different groups of people making use of existing university values for master framing, the existing values were used for different purposes. In the TAMU case, the university values/culture master frame was used a rallying point for a variety of constituent groups, including students, faculty, staff, and the administration. The purpose of connecting the case to the university’s values was to connect the issue with elements of the university community that generate a good amount of excitement and enthusiasm. Transferring that excitement and enthusiasm to the living wage issue seems to have been the primary purpose of the master frame.

At GU, though, the use of the university values/social justice master frame was not directed toward a wide variety of constituents, but to the university administration, with the purpose of critiquing the administration’s actions. With the diagnostic framing process of attributing blame being so central to the GSC’s strategy, showing the inconsistency of the administration’s actions with respect to the widely proclaimed social justice values was critical to establishing their argument for the living wage policy. So, in this case, the use of existing values was not for building enthusiasm for the issue, but more directed toward establishing their argument regarding causality for
the social problem and applying public pressure to the administration to live up to its social justice values.

This difference in participation in the living wage advocacy by those independent of the care group of activists may also be related to way the master framing processes were used. As stated before, most of the use of the TAMU culture master frame originated from interested bystanders. These were people who had been exposed to the campaign in some way and decided to act to convince others to support a living wage. So, the employment of the TAMU culture master frame was intended to persuade others to support a living wage. At GU, the use of the GU social justice master frame seemed to be focused primarily on convincing the administration to implement the living wage policy. The argument did not inspire the same sort of response that it did for the TAMU campaign largely because the social justice value seems to be most heavily promoted by the administration itself, whereas the traditions at TAMU are perpetuated primarily by the students. So, these master frames in both cases were targeted toward the group that is most responsible for the values being connected with the living wage issue.

Theory Extensions

This study highlights several areas where the social movement framing theory can be extended. First, social movement framing theory to needs to expand to account for the unique nature of social movements that occur within organizations. The social movement framing perspective also needs to expand to include not only the content of the collective action frame, but also the tactics used, or how those frames are presented. Lastly, this study demonstrates that with high levels of narrative fidelity, master frames
can expand beyond the traditional conceptions of master frames as based on widely accepted social movements or societal values approach that is seen in the literature.

While the performance of the social movement functions is very important, the actual tactics used and how those tactics fit within the normal processes of the decision-making body is important, too. Obviously, social movements occur in a context. Every context has its own process for change. In contexts that require governmental power to implement change, the political process is used. In organizational contexts, such as the universities in this study, there is a process to approve and implement changes in policy. Social movement framing theory as it has previously been conceptualized does little to explain how the tactics used in communicating the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing processes, as well as the master framing processes, fit within that organizational structure. Most of the social movement framing literature seems to focus on social movements that occur in the society at large, and does not adequately account for how social movements affect and are affected by an organization. This study shows that though the organizations have clear decision makers and decision making processes, groups can approach change as social movements.

In order to approach an issue as a social movement, the issue must be framed as an injustice rather than a grievance or complaint (Snow, et al, 1986). Then the group must attempt to “disorganize consent and organize dissent” within the organization on a particular social justice topic to work against the status quo (Carroll & Ratner, 1996) and producing new meaning related to social justice issues (Benford & Snow, 2000) within the organization. In both the TAMU and GU cases, the living wage movements
moved their desire for change clearly into the social movement realm. However, prior research on the social movement framing perspective does not adequately explore the unique nature of an organizational context for a social movement. So, it is clear that more study needs to focus on social movements that occur within organizations and how the organizational context affects the social movement framing processes.

The comparison of these two cases demonstrated that, as is accepted within social movement framing theory, how the social movement organization (SMO) frames the social issue is critical to how the issue is accepted (Hart, 1996; Poletta, 1998; Snow & Benford, 1988; Steinberg, 1998). However, this study also demonstrated that the tactics the SMO uses, or the way it communicates its framing of the issue is also very important to how the issue is accepted. Much of the social movement framing perspective is based on the arguments. Both the diagnostic and prognostic framing processes are meant to make a clear argument about the nature of the problem and how to fix that problem. So this approach focuses primarily on the “what” of the arguments, and not on how the arguments are presented. The GU case makes a more thorough focus on tactics within the social movement framing perspective seem even more important. While the GSC made clear arguments, especially about attributing blame for the problem, the high publicity tactics they used, such as protests, storming board meetings, and the hunger strike placed a high level of public pressure on the GU administration. Thus, understanding the how the issue framing interplays with the tactics used by a SMO is an area that needs more study within the social movement framing perspective.
Another area of social movement framing theory enlightened by this study relates to master framing. Master framing has typically been conceptualized as an already accepted social movement or set of social values (Williams & Benford, 2000) that allows social movements to capitalize on the social world they exist in, rather than creating a new “cognitive and evaluative” world for the issue (Tarrow, 1992). This study demonstrates that master framing can be broadened particularly when the SMO is advocating for change within an organization. As seen in both cases, the organizations each had values that functioned as master frames in the same way as traditional master frames building on prior social movements or societally accepted values. The values that exist within organizations can be highly relevant to members of those organizations, which makes these values powerful foundations for an SMO’s framing efforts. It would seem then, that basing a social movement on an organization’s values would increase its mobilizing potency (Snow & Benford, 1992) for members of the organization. This is because the master frame would have a high degree of narrative fidelity, or would hang together well with the culture’s narratives (Snow & Benford, 1992). In fact, it is possible that for social issues in an organizational context, organizationally specific values, like the ones in this study, may hold more persuasive power for members of the organization than values that held for society as a whole. Looking at both of these cases through the lens of narrative fidelity demonstrates the value of considering the organizational context for the basis of a master frame.
Reflections on the Study

Limitations of the Study

As in all studies, there are limitations that affect the results and scope of the research. Two interrelated issues which affect this study are the timing of the data collection for the study and my ability to access certain types of data as a result of the timing of the data collection.

Obviously, the living wage campaigns covered in this study occurred during separate time periods with very little chronological overlap. I became focused on living wage campaigns as the subject of this study shortly after the public phase of the TAMU living wage campaign began. By that point, the GSC at GU had received its promise from the administration that it would implement a living wage policy. So, I studied the GU campaign retrospectively, whereas I was able to follow at least portions of the TAMU campaign as it unfolded. Due to the differences in the timing of the campaigns, the data available to me for each campaign was different.

While I was able to become quite familiar with the each campaign’s events, I was limited in the way I could access the feel of those campaign events. I was able to attend and observe many events in the TAMU campaign. However, because the campaign had already concluded at GU, the best way for me to get a sense of the campaign event there was based on news reports, the interview with the two GSC members, a public lecture by those same two GSC members, and their video documentary which reflected on the events of the campaign. This means that instead of having directly experiencing the campaign, all of my exposure to the GU campaign was filtered through the news source
or GSC members. The difference in the methods I was able to use in these cases almost certainly affected my perceptions of the campaigns.

Additionally, the timing of the campaigns as well as my status as a student at TAMU, but not a GU, affected the access I had to individuals for interviews. I knew one member of the LWI at TAMU and other LWI members became familiar with me from my presence at various campaign events. As a result, when the time came to conduct interviews for this study, many of the LWI members already felt comfortable with me and were willing to be interviewed. Also, my role as a student at TAMU likely affected how the members of the President’s Task Force on Wages and Benefits received my requests for interviews. A few of them accepted, a few ignored me, and others declined me, sometimes with outright hostility. Because I was a student and this was a sensitive issue, it likely affected their decision to accept my interview requests and even how those who accepted participated in the interview.

Because I collected data about the GU campaign after it had concluded and I had no connection to GU, my ability to get the same kind of data that I could obtain at TAMU was limited. By the time I began collecting data for the GU case, many of the core GSC members had graduated and left the university and/or had moved on, and so I was not able to access most of the GSC members for interviews. As a result, I was able to interview a much smaller percentage of the GSC, than I was of the LWI.

It is possible that the fact that I had no real connection to GU also affected my ability to get interviews with GU’s administration members. My requests for interviews were either ignored or denied by every GU administrator I approached. This could be
that since I was not a student there, they had no real incentive to grant me an interview. But it is also possible that the GU simply continued to follow their standard procedure of not commenting on the living wage issue if possible. The result was that while I was able to get a few interviews with TAMU administrators, I was not able to interview any of the GU administrators.

In sum, in looking at this study as a whole, it is limited by the differing types of data available for each case. The study attempted to analyze the case based on the same theoretic structure, but the conclusions of that analysis were based on different data sources.

**Future Directions for Research**

This study highlights the need for more research on social movement framing theory within an organizational context. The organizational context is a unique context for social movements because organizational leaders are affected by the organization’s members differently than those with power to create change in a typical social movement. Also, the organization may have unique values which can and/or should be tapped by a SMO. Finally, the organizational context leads to an interesting strategic choice by the SMO as to who should be considered the primary target of a social movement’s focus: the organizational leaders or the organization’s general population.

While it is clear that there has been much study on organizational change and on social movements, this research is often seen as two separate areas of study. However, based on this study it seems that there is an area of overlap that needs more focus. When organizational members view a change initiative as a social movement, that change
initiative may become imbued with issues of value and morality that are absent in other organizational change initiatives. Further, communication tactics may change substantially, as change agents (or movement organizers) can employ social movement framing processes as a means of persuading others to join in advocating for the social issue in the same way that a societal-level social movement would.

However, the organizational context is different than a general societal context that requires large-scale opinion change (e.g., for SMOs that advocate against racism or advocate for other political action or social policy). For a social movement within an organization, large scale societal attention and persuasion is less important, and the leaders that can create change are not dependent on their do not answer to the organization’s general population for their jobs.

Additionally, organizations, especially organizations with strong cultures, have values that may be different than the values outside of those organizations. This study shows two cases where the organizations’ values affected the social movements in the form of shaping the campaigns’ master framing efforts in ways that do not fit the traditional expectations for master framing. This indicates that the organizational context affects the application of social movement framing theory. It is important that more research be conducted explore how the unique context of an organization affects the use of social movement framing theory in creating change within that organization.

Finally, within organizations, SMO face a unique dilemma in choosing how to target their framing efforts. They can primarily target either the organization’s leaders or the organization’s general population. Traditionally, SMO’s gather support in a larger
population in order to gain large-scale support to put pressure on the leaders. However, as stated above, in an organization, leaders are not accountable to their employees in the same way a politician is to his/her constituents. As a result, large scale pressure from organizational members may not affect those in power in the same way it would in a traditional social movement context. At the same time, targeting the organizational leaders can disable the organization’s general population’s ability to become involved or even fully understand the issue at hand. In an organization, the leaders’ and the general population’s interests may have little to no overlap. As a result, a choice may have to be made by the SMO to focus on one group of the other. How exactly these choices are made and the implications of that choice, are areas that need a great deal of further study to be understood more clearly.

Final Reflections

This study showcases two living wage campaigns which are fascinating in their own right. The comparisons of how each campaign communicated their concerns in such divergent ways and in very similar, but at the same time, different, contexts showcases the critical connection between communication and creating change. It highlights that for anyone who sees an injustice in the world and wants to see it corrected, the way they communicate is the means for empowering people to act on their beliefs and on behalf of those who are unable or unwilling to speak for themselves and to see change happen. It also shows the power of a relatively small number of people who speak out. In both cases those small groups communicating their concerns were able to influence others and have policies passed that changed hundreds of lives. In
essence, it this study is more evidence is the key to achieving social change is in people communicating about the injustices they see and their ideas for how correct those injustices. In doing so, people can use communication to create needed changes in their social worlds.
REFERENCES


Faculty Senate meeting minutes. (2004, December 13). Available at http://facultysenate.tamu.edu/minutes/Minutes%202004-2005/FS.1204.min.html.


Georgetown Solidarity Committee. (2003, 17 March). *Georgetown living wage report: A study of the economics and ethics of work and employment at Georgetown*


Phillips, P. (Producer/Director). (2005). *Where there is a will there will be a living wage* [Motion picture]. Austin, TX: New Spark Media.


APPENDIX A

Interview protocol for living wage activists

How did you first learn about the issues with university workers living in poverty?

Tell me about how you personally moved from being sympathetic to workers to organizing a movement on their behalf.

If you had to focus, what is the most important issue/issues that someone must understand when dealing with this problem?

- an economic problem?
- A wage-salary scale problem?
- Class/societal problem?

What caused the situation? How does that relate to how to fix it?

How did you connect with other students and community members on this issue and encourage them to mobilize with you?

In your opinion what has been the most powerful element of your campaign (and was it directed more toward the administration or the support you were trying to muster)?

How do you feel about the progress of the campaign so far?
VITA

Laurie Dennise Metcalf earned a Bachelor of Science in Human Communication from Abilene Christian University in 2000, a Graduate Certificate in Conflict Mediation from Abilene Christian University in 2001, and a Master of Arts in Communication from Abilene Christian University in 2002. Laurie can be reached at Department of Communication, 4234 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843.