

**CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO: THE RISE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE**

A Dissertation

by

JASON MATTHEW SMITH

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2009

Major Subject: Political Science

**CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO: THE RISE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE**

A Dissertation

by

JASON MATTHEW SMITH

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Approved by:

Chair of Committee,	Robert Harmel
Committee Members,	Alexander Pacek
	Michael T. Koch
	Harland Prechel
Head of Department,	James Rogers

May 2009

Major Subject: Political Science

ABSTRACT

Challenging the Status Quo: The Rise and Consequences of Anti-Establishment Parties
in Western Europe. (May 2009)

Jason Matthew Smith, B.A., University of North Texas;

M.A., University of North Texas

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robert Harmel

This dissertation examines two interconnected research questions: What conditions give rise and lead to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and what are the consequences of this electoral success? Literature concerning anti-establishment parties fails to investigate this phenomenon in its entirety by focusing disproportionately on the electoral success of these parties neglecting the consequences of this electoral success. Although the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and the subsequent consequences have different theoretical underpinnings, the effects that anti-establishment parties have on individual parties and the party system are dependent upon the electoral success of these of parties. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on *both* the electoral success and the consequences of anti-establishment parties in Western Europe.

Concerning electoral success, this dissertation offers a new approach to the literature by arguing that anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, are born out of the dissatisfaction towards traditional parties within the electorate. Using quantitative analyses of eighteen Western European countries

covering the time period 1970-2005, this dissertation offers a unified analysis of anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, examining the political, social, and economic conditions that give rise to the anti-establishment party phenomenon. The findings indicate that while the factors leading to the emergence of anti-establishment parties may be the same regardless of the placement of these parties on the political spectrum, the factors leading to their electoral success are dependent upon their ideological orientation.

Furthermore, the electoral success of these new parties has consequences for other individual parties and the broader party system. This dissertation argues that the existence of these parties alone is not enough to accomplish this aim; these parties must be seen as threats to existing mainstream parties on either the left or the right or in some cases, both. In order to counter the threat from these anti-establishment parties, traditional parties may change their ideological positions or organizational structures. Utilizing qualitative (face-to-face interviews with party elites) and evidence from party manifestos from 1970-2005 in six countries, these analyses indicate that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties affects individual parties by altering the ideological placement, particularly on issues relevant to anti-establishment party electoral success. To a lesser extent, traditional parties alter their organizational structures (i.e., allocating more power to rank-and-file members, regional, and local branches), in order to counter this new electoral threat.

Moreover, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties causes instability within the broader party system. Utilizing quantitative, statistical methods to analyze

eighteen western European countries between 1970 and 2005, this dissertation finds that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties increases the amount of electoral volatility and the amount of polarization both within the system and between traditional parties. However, anti-establishment parties do not mobilize the electorate leading to increases voter turnout in these eighteen countries. Finally, anti-establishment parties, by gaining seats in national legislatures, upset the traditional coalitional dynamics. As such, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties leads to shorter coalitional governments within the party systems of Western Europe.

To Connie, Kellye, and Meaghan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As with any other, the completion of this doctoral dissertation was not a solo effort. I owe a debt of gratitude to many people, both here at Texas A&M University and beyond, without whom the dissertation you are about to read would not be possible. First, I would like to thank the members of my committee. I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Robert Harmel. His patience and direction from the initial proposal to the end were invaluable. We did not always see eye-to-eye during the process, but the light at the end of the tunnel is that much brighter due to his guidance. His assistance in conducting the field research for this project taught me lessons that will remain with me throughout my academic career. Dr. Michael Koch took time away from his own research agenda to assist in the writing process of this dissertation reading through many of the chapters before their completion. His assistance and guidance during the writing of the dissertation became a valuable learning experience. Dr. Harland Prechel provided guidance in crafting the survey instrument necessary for the proper conduct of my field research. All that I know concerning organizational theory comes from his instruction, patience, and time.

I owe a debt of gratitude to my colleagues and the faculty and staff of the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University. The amount of support, both in terms of financial and emotional assistance, which I received throughout my time here made the project and many others possible. I look forward to continuing the many friendships that I developed during my academic career with the department. In

particular, I owe Lou Ellen Herr and Carrie Kilpatrick my sincerest thanks for their friendship.

I also want to extend my gratitude to the European Union Center for Excellence, which provided financial support for conducting field research in both 2007 and 2008. Without this assistance, this dissertation would be a mere number crunching exercise without any real world application. Their generous grants allowed me to travel to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway to conduct interviews with various political party officials. This experience, which is probably the most rewarding to emerge from this project, would not have been possible without Dr. Guy Whitten, Lucero Carranza, Emily Weers, and Elaine Tuttle and their assistance in procuring these grants and arranging travel itinerary. Dr. Matthew Hoddie in the Department of Political Science at Towson University provided the most valuable guidance of all during the proposal stage of this dissertation. Taking time for his own research, he read through the proposal providing thoughtful and constructive criticism to get this project off the ground.

Finally, but foremost, I owe to greatest debt to my family and friends. To my parents, William and Connie, I owe everything. Their unconditional love, guidance, and constant encouragement, some pleasant and not so pleasant, allowed me to continue striving for this accomplishment. I could not wish for a better brother, Chris, or sister, Kellye, than I have. Their love and encouragement during my academic career, and it has been a career, could not make me more proud to call them my brother and sister. Without the strength and love of my family, none of my accomplishments would be

possible or have meaning. To my friends, Carl, Cary, Jonathan, and Shawn who have been around this quest for a long time, I give my thanks and gratitude. Your friendships have meant the world to me. The last, but by no means the least, debt I owe in this project is to Meaghan, my love and companion. The love, patience, and encouragement you have given me while finishing this dissertation provided all the strength necessary to see this through to the end.

To you all, I am forever in your debt.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	iii
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xiii
LIST OF TABLES	xv
 CHAPTER	
I INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES	1
Research Questions	5
Why Anti-Establishment Parties?	6
The Importance of Political Parties	7
The Changing European Electorate	10
Anti-Establishment Parties as a Single Phenomenon	15
What Are the Consequences?.....	17
What Is an Anti-Establishment Party?	20
Problems with Previous Definitions.....	21
Defining Anti-Establishment Parties	28
Defining Success	31
Structure of the Dissertation	33
 II EXPLAINING THE ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES	 36
Previous Research Concerning the Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties	 39
Institutional Explanations.....	39
Sociological Explanations	43

CHAPTER		Page
	Economic Explanations	46
	Contributions to the Literature	48
	Political Opportunity Structures: Theoretical Orientation and Hypotheses	49
	Data and Methods.....	58
	Party Stability and Party Support	63
	Unified Analysis.....	66
	Disaggregating the Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties	70
	Implications	73
	Conclusion.....	77
III	THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES ON INDIVIDUAL PARTIES	80
	Previous Research: The Mainstream Reaction to New Parties	82
	Contributions to the Literature	85
	Theoretical Orientation	86
	Programmatic Change	90
	Organizational Change	92
	Data and Methods.....	94
	Analysis and Findings	96
	Analysis: Programmatic Change	97
	Austria	97
	Belgium	104
	Denmark	112
	Germany	120
	The Netherlands	126
	Norway	133
	Analysis: Organizational Change.....	144
	Limitations	150
	Implications and Conclusion.....	151
IV	THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES ON THE BROADER PARTY SYSTEM	158
	Previous Literature: Anti-Establishment Parties and Party System Stability.....	160
	Contributions to the Literature	162
	Theoretical Orientation	164
	Data and Methods.....	169
	Analysis	177

CHAPTER	Page
Implications	187
Conclusion	191
V CONCLUSION	193
The Emergence of Anti-Establishment Parties	195
The Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties	199
Consequences of Anti-Establishment Parties	203
Paths of Future Research	207
REFERENCES	210
APPENDIX A	223
APPENDIX B	226
APPENDIX C	232
VITA	243

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1.1 Outline of the dissertation	35
Figure 3.1 Austrian party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), Social Democrats (SPÖ), People's Party (ÖVP), and Freedom Party (FPÖ)	101
Figure 3.2 Austrian party positions on immigration for Greens (G), Social Democrats (SPÖ), People's Party (ÖVP), and Freedom Party (FPÖ)	103
Figure 3.3 Belgian party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), Socialist Party (PS), Christian Democrats (CD), and Flemish Interest (VB)	109
Figure 3.4 Belgian party positions on immigration for Greens (G), Socialist Party (PS), Christian Democrats (CD), and Flemish Interest (VB) ..	111
Figure 3.5 Danish party positions on environmental protection for Socialist People's Party (SF), Social Democrats (S), and Conservative People's Party (KF)	117
Figure 3.6 Danish party positions on immigration for Socialist People's Party (SF), Social Democrats (S), Conservative People's Party (KF), and Progress/ Danish People's Party (P/DF)	119
Figure 3.7 German party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), Social Democrats (SPD), and Christian Democrats (CDU)	124
Figure 3.8 Dutch party positions on environmental protection for the Democrats 66/ Greenleft (GL), Labour Party (PvdA), and Christian Democrats (CDA)	130
Figure 3.9 Dutch party positions on environmental protection for the Democrats 66/ Greenleft (GL), Labour Party (PvdA), Christian Democrats (CDA), and List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)	132

	Page
Figure 3.10 Norwegian party positions on environment protection for Socialist Left (SV), Labour Party (A), Conservative Party (C), and Progress Party (FRP).....	140
Figure 3.11 Norwegian party positions on environment protection for Socialist Left (SV), Labour Party (A), Conservative Party (C), and Progress Party (FRP).....	142

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics	62
Table 2.2 Determinants of Anti-Establishment Support – Random Effects Model	72
Table 3.1 Austrian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1970-2002	98
Table 3.2 Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), 1970-2005.....	100
Table 3.3 Selected Issue Positions of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), 1970-2005.....	102
Table 3.4 Belgian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2003.....	104
Table 3.5 Selected Issue Positions of the Socialist Party of Belgium (PS), 1970-2005.....	108
Table 3.6 Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democrats and Flemish in Belgium (CD&V), 1970-2005.....	110
Table 3.7 Danish Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2005.....	113
Table 3.8 Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democrats in Denmark (SD), 1970-2005.....	116
Table 3.9 Selected Issue Positions of the Conservative People's Party of Denmark (KF), 1970-2005	118
Table 3.10 German Election Results, Selected Parties, 1972-2005	121
Table 3.11 Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 1970-2005.....	123
Table 3.12 Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), 1970-2005	125

	Page
Table 3.13 Dutch Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2003	127
Table 3.14 Selected Issue Positions of the Labour Party of the Netherlands (PvdA), 1970-2005	129
Table 3.15 Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democratic Appeal in the Netherlands (CDA), 1970-2005	131
Table 3.16 Norwegian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2005	134
Table 3.17 Selected Issue Positions of the Labour Party of the Norway (A), 1970-2005.....	138
Table 3.18 Selected Issue Positions of the Conservative Party of Norway (H), 1970-2005.....	141
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics – Voter Turnout, Electoral Volatility, and Polarization.....	173
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics – Cabinet Stability	176
Table 4.3 The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Voter Turnout – Random Effects Model.....	179
Table 4.4 The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Volatility – Random Effects Model.....	180
Table 4.5 The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Polarization – Random Effects Model.....	181
Table 4.6 The Effect of Anti-Establishment Party Electoral Success on Cabinet Duration – Cox Proportional Hazard Model.....	186

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

There is little doubt that new entrants into the electoral arena have changed the political landscape within Western European party systems over the past four decades. The 1973 Danish parliamentary elections experienced what is now referred to as the “landslide election” or *Jordskredsvalget*. The relatively stable party system experienced seismic electoral volatility with new parties capturing over thirty-four per cent of the votes cast. The most successful of these new entrants, the anti-tax Progress Party (*Fremskridtspartiet*), gained 15.9 per cent and twenty-eight seats becoming the second largest party in the Danish legislature, *Folketing*.¹

In 1983, the German Green Party, *Die Grünen*, seized upon the growing support for the anti-nuclear armaments movement, an issue overlooked by the traditional parties at the time, garnering 5.6 percent of the vote and twenty-seven seats in the *Bundestag*. This “breakthrough” electoral success, and impressive showings in subsequent national elections, upset the traditional coalitional dynamics within the party system of Germany.

The Austrian parliamentary elections in October 1999 witnessed the meteoric rise of the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) as the most successful party of its kind in Western Europe. The FPÖ, a far-right, anti-immigrant

This dissertation follows the style of the *American Political Science Review*.

¹ Although the Progress Party was the second largest party in the *Folketing*, it was not part of the ruling coalition due to the refusal of other parties to cooperate with the party.

party, became the second largest party within the *Nationalrat* garnering 26.9 per cent of the vote and fifty-two seats. After negotiations to form the traditional coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) disintegrated, the ÖVP enlisted the assistance of the FPÖ to form a coalition government. This coalitional arrangement quickly prompted the fourteen other members of the European Union to impose diplomatic sanctions against Austria seeking to oust the party from the Austrian government.² Although the controversial leader of the FPÖ, Jörg Haider, resigned from his leadership position at the end of 2000, the party remained in government until 2002.³

Outside of being new entrants into the political system, these parties appear to have little in common. The Progress Party in Denmark and the Freedom Party in Austria are considered by most experts to be far right, populist parties, whereas *Die Grünen*, when the party first emerged, was not easily classified on the traditional left-right spectrum. Furthermore, these parties differ with regard to ideology, organizational structure, primary goals, and electoral success. However, the one important characteristic these parties have in common is that they saw themselves as challengers to the political establishment. The Progress Party of Denmark, the Freedom Party of Austria, and the Green Party in Germany, like many other parties in Western Europe, were “anti-establishment” parties.

² These sanctions were soon seen as counterproductive and cooperation between the Austrian government and the leaders of the European Union returned to normal in summer 2000.

³ The collapse of the coalitional government was brought on by internal struggles within the FPÖ which forced the resignation of the Vice Federal Chancellor, Susanne Riess-Passer, and the Minister of Finance, Karl-Heinz Grasser, prompting early federal elections in November 2002.

As these examples briefly illustrate, the rise of anti-establishment parties transformed the party systems of Western Europe. In the forty years since Lipset and Rokkan (1967:50) concluded that the “party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few significant exceptions, the alignments of the 1920s,” the party systems of Western Europe have undergone a dramatic transformation. New entrants into these party systems have capitalized on, and possibly contributed to, a “thawing” of the once “frozen” party system by pushing new issues to the forefront of debate and challenging existing social cleavages and traditional political parties.

The rise of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum is a consequence of this transformation. New entrants into a party system can destabilize a “frozen” party system or reinvigorate a decaying system (see Harmel 1997). The success of anti-establishment parties, by garnering electoral support and/or gaining seats within parliament, changes the dynamics of the political systems within Western Europe. This dissertation investigates the rise, and more importantly, the consequences of anti-establishment parties (on both sides of the political spectrum) to the party systems of Western Europe.

The electoral success of anti-establishment parties, particularly the *Front National* (FN) in France led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, sparked the interest of political scientists to examine these new entrants into the party systems of Western Europe. In 2002, the French presidential elections made headlines across the globe as the controversial Le Pen defeated Lionel Jospin, the French Prime Minister at the time, in the first round of elections qualifying for a second round runoff election against

President Jacques Chirac.⁴ Yet, even with this much deserved interest, the success and, more importantly, the consequences of anti-establishment parties remain understudied within this body of research. While the electoral success of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum continues to generate a scholarly literature,⁵ these studies treat anti-establishment parties as a residual category since they do not easily fit into any particular theoretical model or typology. Moreover, these studies do not offer a clear operational definition of anti-establishment parties. This dissertation remedies these problems by examining anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, in a single theoretical framework; thus, allowing for a single, unified analysis of the conditions leading to the success of anti-establishment parties.

Along with the established body of literature examining success, there is a developing literature concerning the *effects* of this success, both upon individual parties within the system and upon the party system itself.⁶ In spite of this, the consequences of anti-establishment parties remain grossly understudied. While it may be widely accepted today that anti-establishment parties may reinvigorate or destabilize the broader party system, what remains unexamined is the manner by which anti-establishment parties alter the party systems of Western Europe. For example, how do anti-establishment parties affect other political parties in their own party systems? What effects do anti-establishment parties have on their party systems more generally? With

⁴ Le Pen garnered 16.86 percent of the vote in the first round of voting narrowly defeated Jospin by approximately 195,000 votes or 0.7 percent of the vote. Jacques Chirac (82.21 percent) soundly defeated Le Pen (17.79 percent) in the second round of voting in the 2002 presidential election.

⁵ For example, see Betz (1994), Betz and Immerfall (1998), Dalton and Kuechler (1990), Golder (2003a), Ignazi (1992), Jackman and Volpert (1996), Kitschelt (1988), Knigge (1998) and Müller-Rommel (1989).

⁶ For example, see Bale (2003), Mair (2001), and Rohrschneider (1993).

these questions in mind, this dissertation makes important contributions to this burgeoning body of literature.

Research Questions

No single volume systematically studies anti-establishment party success *and* the consequences of this success; thus we are left with an incomplete understanding of the anti-establishment party phenomenon. This dissertation attempts to fill this lacuna. The first section of this dissertation focuses on the institutional and environmental conditions that allow anti-establishment parties to succeed by developing a unified theoretical framework. Previous studies of anti-establishment parties often focus on one side of the political spectrum, neglecting the other. Although anti-establishment parties of the left are distinctly different from those on the right in terms of organizational structures and ideological positions, both compete under the same institutional arrangements. Moreover, the general argument is that anti-establishment parties are often a product of *postmaterialism*, a shift in the value system within the electorate that transformed the party systems of Western Europe. Because all anti-establishment parties are thought to emerge from the same root cause, this analysis examines anti-establishment parties as a single phenomenon. What conditions, both institutional and environmental (socio-economic), lead to the success of anti-establishment parties? This research question directs the analyses in the first section of this dissertation.

The second section of this dissertation investigates the consequences of anti-establishment party success upon individual parties and upon the broader party system. What are the consequences of anti-establishment party success for the establishment

parties within the system? How have establishment parties reacted and adapting to the success of anti-establishment parties? If anti-establishment parties are indeed viable electoral challengers to establishment or traditional parties, then establishment parties should alter their image, identity, and organizational structure in order to counter this new threat (see Harmel and Svåsand 1997).

Moreover, does the success of anti-establishment parties alter the characteristics and coalitional dynamics of the broader party system? The emergence of these new entrants may change the characteristics and coalitional dynamics of the party system. Anti-establishment parties help mobilize new voters by pushing new issues to the forefront of the political debate or by tapping into a growing discontent towards the traditional parties within the electorate. This discontent may increase electoral volatility within the party system, which may alter the coalitional dynamics with the legislatures of Western Europe. These questions guide the analyses in the second part of this dissertation.

Why Anti-Establishment Parties?

Why study anti-establishment parties? When answering this question, there are several important interrelated questions that must be answered before we can fully appreciate the anti-establishment party phenomenon. First, why should we study political parties at all? Second, why have anti-establishment parties emerged in the party systems of Western Europe? This question leads to the third interconnected question: Why study anti-establishment parties within a single theoretical framework? Finally, how can anti-establishment parties affect the individual parties against which they

compete or the party systems within which they operate? The following sections will discuss each of these questions in more detail.

The Importance of Political Parties

Political parties are essential to the democratic process (Bryce 1921; Schattschneider 1942; Easton 1957; Huntington 1965). As E.E. Schattschneider (1942:1) concluded, “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties.” In order to explain the importance of political parties, it is first necessary to define what the term political party means. A political party is “an organization that pursues a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions” (Janda 1980: 5). A closer examination of the elements of this definition demonstrates that a political party has “*organization*--implying recurring interactions among individuals with some division of labor and role differentiation” (Janda 1980: 5, emphasis in original). Any organization has multiple goals. However, one goal of the organization is the placement of its *avowed* representatives into government positions, which means that representatives must openly identify, and be identified, with the party name or label (Janda 1980). The term *placement* is interpreted broadly. However, for this study, the term placement means “through the electoral process (when a party competes with one or more others in pursuing its goal)” (Janda 1980: 5).⁷ Organizations that label themselves “parties,” yet are not oriented to providing governmental leadership (since they do not pursue the goal

⁷ For Janda (1980: 5), the term placement may also refer to political parties placing their avowed representatives into governmental offices by “direct administrative action (when a ruling party permits no electoral competition) *or* by forceful imposition (when a party subverts the system and captures the governmental office).”

of placing their avowed representatives in government positions), do not qualify as parties under this definition (Janda 1980).⁸

Even before E.E. Schattschneider expounded the importance of political parties to modern democracy, Bryce (1921: 119) wrote, “parties are inevitable. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them.” Democracy necessitates the existence of intermediary structures or groups between the government and the governed for the articulation, aggregation, and advocacy of disparate views and policy preferences. Indeed, if a democratic system is to survive, flourish, and remain stable, then the needs and wants of the people must be heard and satisfied. Without viable institutions to articulate and meet the demands of the public, democracy and the democratic system wither and decay (Easton 1957; Huntington 1965).

Thus, political parties are essential institutions in the processes of democracy. Political parties aggregate and articulate the interests of the people to the government. Political parties embody both conventional political participation *and* institutions. By mobilizing the electorate and representing various social groups, political parties are essential to negotiating a balance between the masses and the political elite. In other words, political parties link the electorate to the government and provide a way for citizens to hold party officials accountable for their actions in government. Sartori (1968: 471) echoed the sentiments: “citizens in Western democracies are represented *through and by* parties. This is inevitable” (emphasis added). Within the development of

⁸ Janda’s use of the term “governmental” has at times created confusion, with some assuming the “parliamentary” sense of the word (i.e., cabinet). In fact, though, Janda is using the term in its more “American” sense (i.e., positions within government more broadly defined and encompassing legislative and judicial as well as executive offices).

political institutions, the importance of the political party for providing legitimacy and stability cannot be overstated (Huntington 1965).

Aside from the functions of *interest aggregation*, *interest articulation*, *mobilizing the electorate*, and *providing legitimacy*, political parties perform several other equally important functions.⁹ First, political parties perform a *policy agenda setting or issue structuring* function. Parties play a critical role in shaping the choices and alternatives along different issue dimensions (Gunther and Diamond 2001a). Arguably, political parties structure political debate and discussion within representative government. Political parties also present the electorate with candidates and electoral manifestos (i.e., policy agenda setting or issue structuring) from which to make their electoral choices (see Epstein 1980 and Sartori 1976). The vast majority of members of parliament, across Western Europe, belong to political parties. It follows that parliamentary politics are inherently party politics. Thus, the focus of electoral campaigns and debate within the parliaments of Western Europe are the interests and preferences of parties.

Second, political parties perform a *social integration* role as they “enable citizens to participate effectively in the political process” (Gunther and Diamond 2001b: 8). Through political parties, citizens come to feel that they have a vested interest in perpetuating the democratic system (Gunther and Diamond 2001a). Third, political parties, if they perform these tasks well, can *form and sustain governments*. All competitive parties are interested in winning governmental positions; all parties seek

⁹ Gunther and Diamond (2001a) recognize seven functions of political parties. These include candidate selection, electoral mobilization, issue structuring, societal representation, interest aggregation, forming and sustaining governments, and social integration. Gunther and Diamond (2001a) observe that this list of functions corresponds closely to those identified by Epstein (1980) and King (1969).

governmental power (see Sartori 1976). The performance of these tasks has important implications for the coherence and stability of public policy in the long term (see Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a). All things being equal, parties that consistently perform these tasks will continue to gain representation within the legislature; thus, they gain the ability to influence the policy process.

Political parties are undeniably important for democracy to function properly. Political parties mobilize and represent the interest of mass public, offer alternatives and set the policy agenda within the electoral arena, and connect the electorate with the governments they help form and maintain. For all of these reasons, the importance of political parties to democratic governance cannot be overstated.

The Changing European Electorate

After the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan, the party systems of Western Europe were commonly referred to as “frozen” due to the persistence of the cleavages that underpinned party politics (see Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984). However, since the late 1970s, the party systems of Western Europe underwent a pervasive transformation. Scholars attribute this transformation to declining traditional cleavage structures that shaped the party systems of the 1960s (see Inglehart 1971, 1977). But why have the party systems of Western Europe “thawed” over the last four decades?

The party systems of Western Europe changed for several reasons. First, the value system of Western European electorates shifted. As Inglehart (1977: 3) states, “the values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life.”

This transformation of value orientations took the form of a shift from materialist (i.e., material well-being and physical security) to *postmaterialist* (i.e., quality of life) values (Inglehart 1971, 1977). Flanagan (1982a, 1982b) argues that values of a better quality of life and a tolerance for a variety of life styles replaced traditional values.

The emergence of this new set of values gave rise to what scholars refer to as the “new politics” (Inglehart 1984; Dalton 1988). This shift towards *postmaterialism* affects partisan preferences and alignments. Müller-Rommel (1989: 7) argues that this “new politics” emphasizing values of environmental quality, social equality, grassroots participation, and minority rights led to the formation of Greens parties in Western Europe beginning in the late 1970s. Moreover, Kitschelt (1988, 206) links this argument of a “silent revolution” to the success of left-libertarian parties in Western Europe. In other words, this value shift “produced new political alignments and new political movements *on the left side* of the political spectrum” (Ignazi 1992: 5, emphasis in original).¹⁰

Second, several studies published in the last decade point to rising discontent within the party systems of Western Europe. This discontent takes the form of disenchantment with established political parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a; Poguntke and Scarrow 1996) or unhappiness with the workings of the broader party system (Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Anti-party sentiments develop from the interaction of mass opinion towards politics and elite attempts to channel mass support

¹⁰ As a result of this movement to the left by the electorate and, in numerous instances, established parties themselves, Ignazi (1992) argues that populist or extreme parties on the right emerged to fill the vacuum created on the right side of the political spectrum by the movement on right-oriented traditional parties.

(Poguntke and Scarrow 1996). This interaction is obviously a two-way street. Elites may emphasize anti-party arguments to fuel popular resentment towards established parties within the electorate; in turn, electoral behavior inspired by these arguments may compel elites to propagate their anti-party stance more explicitly or forcefully (Poguntke and Scarrow 1996). The success of anti-establishment parties may force the traditional parties into unpopular grand coalitions unavoidably fueling attitudes that all establishment parties are alike.

Another sign of discontent with political parties is the decline of partisanship within many industrialized democracies. As Dalton (2000: 36) notes, “what is stunning about partisan dealignment is the commonality of trends across a wide variety of advanced industrial democracies.” If partisan ties are weaker, this allows for new parties, campaigning on new issues, to garner electoral support. Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg (2000) argue that more voters are now making their electoral choices based on campaign issues instead of partisan loyalties. Established parties may lose electoral support if they fail to articulate the interests of the electorate on new issues emerging from the changing value systems within Western Europe. This allows new political movements and parties that challenge the established or traditional parties to emerge.

Furthermore, more and more citizens are unhappy with the internal working of the party system. Trends in public opinion within Europe show “the basic picture is one of spreading disillusionment with established political leaders and *institutions*” (Putman, Pharr, and Dalton 2000: 10, emphasis added). These patterns of cynicism towards political institutions accelerated during the past decade (Putman, Pharr, and Dalton

2000). Klingemann and Fuchs (1995: 440-441) argue the citizens of Europe possess a “skeptical attitude” toward the reality of democracy. Other studies point to “clear evidence of a general erosion in support for politicians in most advanced industrial countries” (Dalton 1999: 63). Norris (1999: 26) advances these claims stating, “in established democracies, during the last decades of the twentieth century, growing numbers of citizens have become increasingly critical of the major institutions of representative government.” Public support for essential representative institutions (including parties, parliaments, and governments) is declining in many established democracies (Norris 1999). Whether it is disillusionment with the established parties or the party system, rising discontent within the electorate makes it possible for anti-establishment parties to gain a foothold within the political arena.

Third, in the four decades since Lipset and Rokkan posited the “frozen party” thesis, electoral volatility increased in Western European party systems. Exploring the electoral support of parties in seventeen western democracies, Rose and Urwin (1970: 295) deduced, “the electoral strength of most parties in Western nations since the war had changed very little from election to election, from decade to decade, or within the lifespan of a generation.” Bartolini and Mair (1990:119) validated these findings stating “there has been no substantial and sustained growth in electoral mobility across the class-cleavage boundary; in these terms at least, the cleavage remains frozen.”

However, several scholars noted shifts in the stability of voter alignments by the end of the 1970s (Pedersen 1983; Maguire 1983; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; Crewe and Denver 1985; Franklin et al. 1992). These scholars illustrated greater

electoral volatility within the party systems of many industrialized democracies. Thus, scholars concluded that the frozen party cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were “thawing.” Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck encapsulated these findings stating:

Electoral alignments are weakening, and party systems are experiencing increased fragmentation and electoral volatility. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the changes in all of these nations reflect more than short-term oscillations in party fortunes. This decomposition of electoral alignments often can be traced to shifts in the long-term bases of partisan support—party identification and social cleavages. Virtually everywhere among the industrialized democracies, the old order is crumbling. (1984: 451)

Franklin et al. (1992: 404) note that “the electoral impact of social cleavages may well have been already in decline before the 1960s.” Thus, political cleavages became more irrelevant to party success. Moreover, Schmitt and Holmberg (1995) found partisan attachments waning in many Western European nations (see also Klingemann and Fuchs 1995).

Recently, however, Mair (1997: 30) found evidence supporting the frozen cleavages model arguing that, “the electoral balance now is not substantially different from that of thirty years ago, and, in general, electorates are not now substantially more volatile than once they were.” This conclusion corroborated the findings of Bartolini and Mair (1990: 119) who argued that the electoral volatility of the 1970s appeared to be a “gross exaggeration.” Conversely, other scholars show evidence of weakening partisan loyalties, growing volatility and increased party fragmentation in many industrialized democracies since the 1970s (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b). To echo Drummond (2002:12), “political parties generally are experiencing gradual increases in

electoral volatility, variability and elasticity.”¹¹ Thus, as one can see, the stability of these party systems is subject to an ongoing debate.

Anti-Establishment Parties as a Single Phenomenon

Although a vigorous debate concerning these claims continues, little debate exists that the party systems of Western Europe have changed since the Second World War. The changing value system, rising discontent, and increased electoral volatility of the past four decades within these party systems materializes in the amount of electoral support for parties that challenge the traditional parties within the system (i.e., anti-establishment parties) (Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000; Poguntke 1996). Anti-establishment parties, and other new parties, altered the political landscape and dynamics of party politics. Therefore, the party systems of Western Europe today appear significantly different from those examined by Lipset and Rokkan in the 1960s.

However, research on anti-establishment parties dismisses the fact that these parties are indeed borne out of these changes. Ignazi (1992:6) argues that anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” as “common problems and common concerns coalesced in partisan organizations at different ends of the political spectrum” (Ignazi 1997: 318). Thus, the rise of anti-establishment parties is a by-product of the postmaterialist value system. Moreover, anti-establishment parties take advantage of, and contribute to, the growing discontent and increased volatility within the party systems of Western Europe.

¹¹ However, Drummond (2002) cautions against taking these results as definitive proof of instability within the party systems of western democracies. For a discussion of these results, see Drummond (2002).

Although anti-establishment parties of the left are distinctly different from anti-establishment parties of the right in terms of ideology, organizational structure, and bases of support, anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum are borne out of the shift to *postmaterialism*, the growing discontent, and increased electoral volatility within Western European party systems. Each of these parties challenges the political establishment providing an outlet for the voting public to voice their disenchantment with “politics as usual” in Western Europe. Anti-establishment parties provide alternatives to those among the electorate that wish to vote against the establishment (Abedi 2004). Thus, contrary to previous studies, it would be somewhat foolish *not* to put these parties into the same category.

Even though previous studies fail to examine these parties as a single phenomenon, the notion that *all* anti-establishment parties emerge from the same root causes is not lost within the literature. Mackie (1995) argues that challenger parties (e.g., parties that challenge the establishment) of the left and right are born from the same phenomenon due to the fact that left-libertarian parties and “new populist” parties share the same electoral fortunes and the same “enemy” within the same countries.¹² “To some extent the new populist parties are the mirror-image of the parties of the libertarian left. They too inveigh against the democratic leviathan” (Mackie 1995: 177). Taggart

¹² It should be noted that this definition of a “challenger” party differs greatly from the definition of a “challenger” party offered by Rochon (1985). Rochon (1985) argues that “challenger” parties locate themselves at the same ideological position on the political spectrum as an existing or established party. Thus, these parties challenge established parties in terms on vying for the same segment of voters. This differs from the definition offered by Mackie (1995: 174) that “challenger parties” are those that challenge “the status quo in terms of major policy issues or the nature of political activity.” For Rochon (1985), anti-establishment parties are more likely to be classified as “mobilizer” parties as these parties often mobilize new or apathetic segments of society against the established parties by campaigning on new or neglected issues.

further the “mirror image” argument that “New Populism” parties and “New Politics” parties (i.e., anti-establishment parties) are indeed one phenomenon by concluding:

Through examining their ideology, it is clear that their commonality lies in the fact that they are reactions to recent developments in West European politics. They are united in what they oppose. They stand in opposition to what they see as the failed post-war settlement. In their actions and organisations there is a self-conscious effort to contrast themselves with ‘old’ established parties. (1996: 45)

The “symmetrical pattern in ideological, organizational and electoral features of parties” demonstrates that these parties “represent two sides of the same coin” (Taggart 1996: 46).

The emergence of anti-establishment parties results from the “value change and the related incapacity of traditional parties to represent new issues” (Ignazi 1997: 318). This value change first spawned the rise anti-establishment parties on the left (i.e., left-libertarian or “New Politics” parties). As a reaction to this shift towards the left side of the spectrum, anti-establishment parties of the right (i.e., “New Populism” parties) emerged and thrived in many west European party systems. It is clear that anti-establishment parties should be examined as a single phenomenon.

What Are the Consequences?

The effects of anti-establishment parties are far reaching. Some scholars interpret the anti-establishment party phenomenon as a “symptom of a system in crisis” (Ignazi 1997: 318). Disaffection with democracy and a lack of confidence its institutions have been a growing concern since the early 1970s (see Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). However, the democratic systems of Western Europe are not an endangered species; democracy is in good health. Political parties and party systems are under threat more so than *democracy*. But how exactly do new entrants (e.g., anti-

establishment parties) change the political system? In other words, what are the consequences of anti-establishment parties to individual parties and the broader party system? When thinking of the different consequences of anti-establishment parties, it is important to keep in mind the various functions performed by political parties.

Harmel (1997) argues new entrants into the political arena may serve to reinvigorate as well as to destabilize a party system. New entrants often force traditional parties to address new or long neglected issues. In this manner, anti-establishment parties reinvigorate a party system. However, anti-establishment parties can destabilize a party system by gaining electoral support. This shifts the dynamics of the coalition formation process. These two examples only highlight ways in which anti-establishment parties affect individual parties and the broader party system. There are three consequences of anti-establishment parties that are of interest to this dissertation.

First, new entrants can influence the ability of established parties to *articulate* and *aggregate* the interests of the electorate and *set the policy agenda* within the national legislature. Spatial theory suggests that political parties adjust their policy programmes or manifestos in response to shifts in public opinion. In order to win elections, parties tailor their manifestos to the policy preferences of their core supporters in particular, and the electorate in general. Moreover, spatial theory suggests that political parties adjust their policy programmes in relation to their opponents, usually their nearest rival. Thus, parties' issue profiles are shaped, at least in part, by the policy positions of the other parties within the party system.

If anti-establishment parties force traditional parties to adjust their policy positions towards this new threat, they can change the very identity of the traditional parties. This adjustment, which may be accompanied by a shift in the placement of the established party on the political spectrum, influences the ability of such parties to articulate and aggregate the interests of their supporters to the government. Competition for votes may require established parties to reach out to new groups of voters by changing their election manifestos or altering the agenda within the national legislature. Thus, the important functions of interest articulate and aggregation and agenda setting (issue structuring) are altered by the emergence of anti-establishment parties.

Second, anti-establishment parties, by challenging the establishment, provide alternatives to the electorate, which in turn, influences the ability of establishment parties to *mobilize* the electorate. Changes in the behavior of the electorate and increased electoral volatility within Western Europe discussed above are but two examples of how anti-establishment parties affect the function of mobilizing the electorate. The functions of interest articulation and aggregation are obviously closely linked to the ability of political parties to mobilize the electorate. This is not to say that anti-establishment parties stop traditional parties from mobilizing the electorate. However, these new entrants, by representing new issues, may mobilize more new voters than the established parties.¹³ By pushing new issues to the forefront of political debate and articulating different demands from that of the establishment, anti-establishment

¹³ The argument could also be made that new voters are mobilized against anti-establishment parties. Thus, new voters may be mobilizing in support of establishment parties as a type of “counter-protest” to anti-establishment parties.

parties alter the range of voters that can be captured by the traditional parties. Thus, anti-establishment parties may affect the amount of electoral volatility within the party system.

Finally, anti-establishment parties may disrupt establishment parties' abilities to *form and sustain governments*. The ability of anti-establishment parties to gain representation in Western European parliaments limits the opportunities available to establishment parties in forming coalitional governments. As anti-establishment parties gain more seats, the probability of forming a majority coalition decreases. As such, the more seats occupied by anti-establishment parties, the smaller the governing coalition formed by the winning parties (based on the remaining parties) is likely to be. Smaller governing coalitions are obviously more likely to face a larger opposition group (see Warwick 1979). Therefore, the ability to maintain a stable coalition may be hampered by the number of seats won by anti-establishment parties.

What Is an Anti-Establishment Party?

In defining anti-establishment parties, a dichotomous distinction should be drawn between anti-establishment parties and establishment or traditional parties. However, a consensus does not exist in the literature concerning the definition of anti-establishment parties. Previous definitions are wrought with problems.¹⁴ The fact that previous party taxonomies treat anti-establishment parties as a “residual category” creates numerous problems within previous definitions (Ignazi 1992: 6). All of the labels detailed below convey “important aspects” of the anti-establishment party phenomenon, yet they all

¹⁴ For another detailed discussion of the problems of previous definitions, see Abedi (2004).

suffer from imprecision. Most of these definitions are too general and, therefore, they conceal the specific target of anti-establishment “crusades” (Schedler 1996: 292). The following sections detail these problems before offering a definition that overcomes many of the deficiencies with previous definitions.

Problems with Previous Definitions

Numerous previous definitions stress differences between opposition parties to “distinguish anti-establishment opposition forces from opposition parties that belong to the political establishment” (Abedi 2004: 6). In an early study of opposition parties, Kirchheimer (1966: 237) differentiates between “loyal opposition” parties, which oppose the policies of the parties in government but accept the democratic system and “opposition of principle” parties, which pursue goals that are “incompatible with the constitutional requirements of a given system.” Sartori (1976: 133) utilizes the term “anti-system” to classify a party that “undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes.”

Smith (1987: 63) argues that opposition parties can be differentiated by asking two questions: are the goals of the party “compatible with the existing regime and its adherent structures?” and do the adherents of the party “pursue a course of action that is acceptable to others” namely other political parties and officials? Refining previous definitions, Capoccia (2002:10) distinguishes “relational anti-systemness” and “ideological anti-systemness.” The “relational anti-systemness” of a party impacts the mechanics of a party system “by pushing it towards increased polarization and centrifugality” (Capoccia 2002: 24). “Ideological anti-systemness” affects the

democratic system as a whole, as the party opposes one or more of the fundamental characteristics of the democratic system (Capoccia 2002).

Abedi (2004) argues that definitions stressing differences in opposition parties are both too broad and too restrictive. These definitions are too broad “in that all the parties that these categories comprise have only one thing in common, namely, their anti-system stance with regard to their ideology and/or their behavior” (Abedi 2004: 7). At the same time, these definitions are too restrictive “in that they do not include parties that are ambiguous with regard to their position on democracy (Abedi 2004: 7). With many anti-establishment parties wrapping their anti-democratic attacks in democratic rhetoric, this type of definition captures only those parties that are *overtly* anti-system and/or anti-democratic (Abedi 2004).

Yet, these definitions also miss the point that anti-establishment parties, by definition of being political parties, are not anti-system parties. By competing in democratic elections, anti-establishment parties are granting legitimacy to the “constitutional requirements of a given system” (Sartori 1976:13). Although their policies and behavior may not be acceptable to other established parties within the system, anti-establishment parties are not overtly or covertly anti-system. Thus, the “anti-system” label should not apply to anti-establishment parties.

Described as a “specter” that is haunting the world, scholars utilize the term “populism” or the “populist” label to describe the parties with anti-establishment sentiments. Scholars conceptualize populism to include not only traditional agrarian parties on the right, but also non-agrarian movements on the left side of the political

spectrum (see Ionescu and Gellner 1969). Mény and Surel (2002) argue that all populist movements develop their arguments in three distinct steps. First, populists place their emphasis on “the role of the people and its fundamental position, not only within society, but also in the structure and functioning of the political system as a whole” (Mény and Surel 2002: 11-12). Populist movements emphasize “the supremacy of the will of ‘the people’ over that of any special interest group” (Abedi 2004: 7). Second, populist rhetoric usually claims that “the people have been betrayed by those in charge” (Mény and Surel 2002: 12). Third, demands are made for the restoration of “the primacy of the people” (Mény and Surel (2002: 13). In addition to these three common features, populist movements are often characterized by negativism defining themselves more by what they are against than what they are for (Abedi 2004). Populist parties stress the discontent between establishment parties and the voting public by campaigning on issues long neglected by these traditional parties.

Other scholars attempt to further demarcate the concept of populism. Canovan (1981) makes the distinction between agrarian and political populism. Agrarian populism “is a kind of rural radicalism” focused on a particular socioeconomic group (i.e., farmers), while political populism concerns itself with the phenomenon in which “the tensions between the elite and the grass roots loom large” (Canovan 1981: 8-9). In other words, political populism stresses the divide between the political establishment and the people. More recently, Canovan (1999: 3) describes populism in modern democratic societies “as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure

of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.” Populist movements are “of the people, but not of the system” (Taggart 1996: 32).

Taguieff (1995) also distinguishes between two types of populism: “protest” populism and “identitarian” populism. The main feature of “protest” populism is that “the appeal to the people is meant primarily as a criticism or denunciation of elites, be they political, administrative, economic or cultural” (Taguieff 1995: 32). This distrust in elites is inextricably linked to a trust in ordinary citizens. Thus, “protest” populism idealizes direct democracy over any form of representative democracy. “Identitarian” populism is “an appeal to the whole people” despite the heterogeneity (i.e., class divisions) of the populace (Taguieff 1995: 33). This type of populism stresses xenophobia (fear of foreigners) over distrust of elites. The emphasis of this appeal is to defend the unity of the people against immigrants or foreigners and their cultures as well as attempts to divide the people by political elites.

Taggart (2002) goes as far as to delineate six characteristics of populism. It is not necessary to discuss all of these characteristics given the amount of overlap with other aspects detailed above. However, three of these characteristics deserve further discussion. First, populism is hostile to representative politics. Taggart (2002: 66) is quick to point out that this does not mean that populism “cannot exist where there are no institutions or the ideas of representative politics,” but that it is only through the conditions created by representative politics that populism can become a political force. Second, populism lacks “core values” (Taggart 2002: 68). Populist movements develop and react against elites and institutions according to the nature of these elites and

institutions in a given country. Thus, populism can be found on the left (i.e., left-libertarian parties) or on the right (i.e., traditional populist parties) side of the political spectrum. Third, populism tends to be “highly chameleonic,” in that the nature of a populist movement depends on the national context in which it emerges. Indeed, as Taggart (2002) points out with another of his characteristics, populist movements usually emerge and thrive during times of crisis. “Populism is not the politics of the stable, ordered polity but emerges as an accompaniment to change, crises, and challenge” (Taggart 2002: 69).

Each of these definitions of populism (i.e., agrarian, political, protest, identitarian, etc.) suffers from the same deficiency in that they are all difficult to operationalize. Abedi (2004) argues that these definitions are not developed specifically to identify populist parties, but rather they capture the concept of populism itself. Furthermore, it is unclear whether a party must exhibit all, or just a few, traits in order to be labeled as populist. As Abedi (2004: 9) states:

Is it enough if a party advocates replacing representative democracy with a democratic order that contains elements of direct democracy or does a party have to appeal to the people as a whole and challenge the political establishment in order to qualify as a populist party?

The difficulty of defining populism and “finding common features across time and space when considering its manifold manifestations” lies in the fact that populism “is, by itself, and empty shell which can be filled and made meaningful by whatever is poured into it” (Mény and Surel 2002: 4).

Still other studies attempt to overcome many of these definitional deficiencies. Mudde (1996) refers to the “anti-party party,” distinguishing between those parties

having “extremist anti-party” sentiments and those having “populist anti-party” sentiments. Those parties labeled “extreme” reject political parties as a matter of principle “often on the grounds of its diverse nature or the fact that it forms a barrier between the rules and the ruled (Mudde 1996: 267). “Populist” anti-parties criticize traditional “often because of their bad functioning or because of the group they (do not) represent” (Mudde 1996; 267). These parties often condemn traditional parties as self-interested, corrupt, and anti-democratic institutions that lack the vision and motivation to properly represent the people (Abedi 2004). Although the concept of the anti-party party aims specifically at defining political parties, it is still unclear whether a party must fulfill all or some of the criteria in order to be labeled an “anti-party” party (Abedi 2004).

Several scholars utilize such terms as “protest parties” or “discontent parties” in order to better operationalize these parties (Fennema 1997; Lane and Ersson 1999). “Protest parties” blame the political establishment for all that ails society and seek to organize the citizenry who are unhappy with what they feel is “something rotten in the state” (Fennema 1997: 475). Preferring the term “discontent party,” Lane and Ersson (1999) discount a wide range of parties that would otherwise be considered as challengers to the establishment (e.g., Greens parties). For Lane and Ersson (1999: 85), discontent or populist parties are often “formed on the basis of a concrete issue” or “channeling people’s discontent.” These parties use populist rhetoric and programmes and are headed by charismatic leaders. Thus, the definition offered to distinguish “discontent” parties neglects the entire left side of the political spectrum.

In addition, these parties are often labeled as “niche” or “single-issue” parties (Meguid 2005; Adams et al. 2006). Many anti-establishment parties do indeed fill a niche on the political spectrum left vacant by parties of the establishment. However, studies that utilize this moniker frequently exclude communist parties on the left and anti-establishment parties that place themselves towards the center of the political spectrum.¹⁵ Therefore, these studies do not capture the full breadth of the anti-establishment party phenomenon. In a similar vein, labeling these parties as “single-issue” parties neglects the depth of anti-establishment parties. Anti-establishment parties politicize a *set* of issues instead of focusing one key issue. For example, Green parties emerged in the 1970s focusing on not only the environment, but also nuclear disarmament and nuclear power. Radical right-wing populist emerged and thrived in the 1980s and 1990s by emphasizing immigration, traditional values, and law and order issues. Thus, anti-establishment parties, on both sides of the political spectrum, altered the content of political debate by pushing a *set* of new issues to the forefront of the political agenda.

Schedler (1996: 293) coins the term “anti-political establishment” party referring to parties that stress the existence of a “cleavage” or fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people on one hand and a fundamental divide between themselves and the political establishment on the other. For Schedler (1996), anti-political establishment parties occupy the space between “loyal opposition” and anti-

¹⁵ One notable exception includes Adams et al. (2006) who include communist parties in eight Western European countries in their analyses. However, they fail to include anti-establishment parties located at the center of the political spectrum.

democratic opposition. Thus, we see that anti-establishment parties are not against democracy *per se* (i.e., anti-system), but are against those parties that make up the political establishment.

However, while the label of “anti-political establishment” shows promise, the definition fails in the same manner as previous attempts. Given that this definition rests on the premise that anti-political establishment parties construct a divide between themselves and the political establishment, it is necessary to define political establishment. Abedi (2004: 11) argues that although this definition puts forth the characteristics attributed to the establishment (i.e., corrupt and distant from the people as a whole) by anti-political establishment parties, it “offers no independent method of determining which parties, if any, possess these negative attributes.” Unfortunately, Schedler (1996) fails to offer a definition of the political establishment.

Defining Anti-Establishment Parties

From this discussion, we can see that there is a need for a definition that can be more readily operationalized. In order to define an anti-establishment party, it is first necessary to define what constitutes an establishment party. Using the “governing potential” criteria developed by Sartori (1976), Abedi (2004: 11) argues that establishment parties are those that participate in government or those that the governing parties deemed suitable partners for coalition formation, as well as those parties willing to cooperate with the main governing parties by joining them in a coalition government.

With this definition in place, it is now possible to define an anti-establishment party.¹⁶ The definition adopted by this dissertation was developed by Abedi (2004), but adds certain caveats that his definition overlooks. Taking aspects from various authors, this definition offers four criteria necessary to distinguish an anti-establishment party from parties of the establishment. The first of these criteria focuses on the idea that anti-establishment parties are challengers to the establishment (Ignazi 1992; Mackie 1995). Mackie (1995: 174) argues that “challenger parties” are those that challenge “the status quo in terms of major policy issues or the nature of political activity.” This definition for “challenger parties” serves as a starting point for the definition utilized for this dissertation since it specifically includes “left-libertarian” and Greens parties as well as far right parties (i.e., neo-fascist, populist, and anti-immigrant parties).¹⁷

Three additional criteria are necessary to complete this definition. First, the party must see itself as a challenger and present itself to the voting public as a challenger to the establishment (Abedi 2004). The next criterion for this definition concerns how the party sees its competition. Anti-establishment parties must make the distinction between themselves and establishment parties. For a party to be classified as an anti-establishment party, *all* three of the following criteria fulfilled:

¹⁶ For the purposes of this dissertation, I chose to term these parties “anti-establishment” placing these parties at odds with “establishment” or traditional parties. This terminology differs from Abedi (2004), who provides a discussion of both “political establishment parties” and “anti-political establishment parties.”

¹⁷ For Mackie (1995: 175), these parties are not deemed to have a realistic chance of participating in government since they “are not serious contenders for government office” or they “are not regarded as suitable partners by existing government parties.” However, despite this definition, there are numerous examples of anti-establishment on both sides of the political spectrum entering into governing coalitions.

- A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and/or political system issues.¹⁸
- A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment.
- A party that asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all establishment parties, be they in government or in opposition, are essentially the same.¹⁹

In addition to these criteria outlined by Abedi (2004), an anti-establishment party must also fulfill one additional criterion:

- A party that agrees, through participation in democratic elections, to adhere to the constitutional requirements of a given system.

By competing in free, fair, and competitive (i.e., democratic) elections, anti-establishment parties demonstrate their willingness to work within the accepted rules of the game or the “constitutional requirements of a given system.” Anti-establishment parties are not anti-democratic or anti-system parties. As detailed above, previous definitions overlook this point by grouping anti-system parties, whether overtly anti-system or not, with parties that compete within the accepted norms of the political system. The negative connotation associated with “anti-system” or “anti-democratic” parties does not apply to anti-establishment parties. Anti-establishment parties are not subversive in that they do not attempt to subvert the *whole political system* as a means of taking control of the government. These parties merely stress the divide between the

¹⁸ This criterion was adapted from Ignazi (1992); Mackie (1995); and Schedler (1996) as cited in Abedi (2004).

¹⁹ This criterion is adapted from Mudde (1999) and Schedler (1996) as cited in Abedi (2004).

people and the parties of the political establishment by pointing to the deficiencies of traditional parties.

It must be stressed that these criteria must be assessed over time for any given party. In order to classify an anti-establishment (or establishment) party, one must determine whether a party fulfills all four criteria at a particular time or not (Abedi 2004). More importantly, this definition is not exhaustive of all political parties. There are parties within the party systems of Western Europe that are neither anti-establishment parties nor part of the political establishment. These parties are neither politically relevant in that they do not have a realistic chance of participating in government nor are they perceived as challengers to the political establishment (Sartori 1976; Abedi 2004). The definition offered here should provide a meaningful dichotomy between anti-establishment parties and establishment or traditional parties.²⁰

Defining Success

Downs (1957: 127-128) contends that “some parties—founded by perfectly rational men—are meant to be threats to other parties and not means of getting immediate power or prestige.” Does merely threatening the established, traditional parties constitute *success*? It is argued that “*all* competitive parties are interested in winning some governmental positions” (Harmel 1997: 44, emphasis in original). Does becoming a member of the establishment represent *success* for anti-establishment parties? Harmel (1997: 44) asks the question, “Aside from what new parties can accomplish by

²⁰ This “dichotomy” leaves out a third category of “anti-system” parties which are neither anti-establishment nor part of the establishment. Thus, the distinction that is being offered here is between anti-establishment parties, establishment parties and anti-system parties. A list of anti-establishment is provided in Appendix A.

being in governmental positions themselves, is there evidence that new parties also affect policy by getting establishment parties to change their positions?” Is the ability of anti-establishment parties to influence the issue profiles of traditional parties considered *success*?

Each of these suggests a different manner by which to measure the success of anti-establishment parties. Thus, the question is how to measure success of anti-establishment parties in order to accomplish the goals of this dissertation? Should success be measured in terms of electoral support or in terms of the number of seats anti-establishment parties gain within the legislatures of Western Europe? Is success the ability of anti-establishment parties to gain governmental positions or to influence policymaking by getting the traditional parties to alter their positions?

In their analysis of the effects of anti-immigrant parties on traditional parties in Norway and Denmark, Harmel and Svåsand argue that:

In order for party *A* to be perceived as a relevant *threat* to party *B*, at least two conditions must hold. First, party *A* (here, the new party) must win enough votes and/or seats to be clearly noticed. Though any new formation may be a *potential* threat, of course, it is unlikely that another party will change itself—given the innate conservatism already noted—until there is evidence (i.e. in votes and/or seats) that the threat is real. And second, for party *B* to perceive *A* as a threat to its own well-being, *B* must have reason to believe that *A*’s success is substantial at *B*’s expense. (1997: 317, emphasis in original)

I argue that the ability of anti-establishment parties to garner votes and/or gain seats in the legislature and threaten the traditional parties of the party system is part of the larger concept of *success*. The ability of anti-establishment parties to influence government formation or policymaking by getting traditional parties to alter their positions is

contingent upon anti-establishment parties threatening, or ability to threaten, the establishment. Thus, *these are consequences of success not success itself*. A new party has the greatest probability of accomplishing these goals (consequences) if the party can garner enough electoral support (success) and differ from establishment parties on the issues (Harmel 1997). In other words, *consequences are predicated upon success*.

The definition of success utilized for this dissertation refers specifically to *electoral success*. As part of the larger concept of success, *electoral success* of anti-establishment parties, as with all political parties, can be measured as a percentage of votes or seats or as the simple number of seats gained in the national parliament. Indeed, this dissertation utilizes both measures for the various analyses conducted herein. In the second chapter of this dissertation, success is measured as the percentage of votes received in national parliamentary elections. In the analysis of cabinet duration presented in chapter V, success is measured as the number of seats won by anti-establishment parties.

Structure of the Dissertation


The purpose of this dissertation is to help explain the emergence, success, and consequences of anti-establishment parties. To this end, this first chapter explores the historical context and the conditions leading to the emergence of anti-establishment parties as well as to delineate the definition of anti-establishment parties and success utilized throughout the dissertation. Anti-establishment parties emerge due to shifts within the electorate across Europe. Citizens are more critical of the political parties that comprise the establishment and increasingly discontented with the institutional

mechanisms of the party system. In order to satisfy the needs of, and provide a voice for, these new “critical” citizens (see Norris 1999), anti-establishment parties emerged to challenge the establishment.

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into two connected parts. The first part examines the success of anti-establishment parties. Anti-establishment parties owe their success to a number of institutional (i.e., political and electoral system), social, and economic conditions. These conditions are explored in detail through the analyses presented in the second chapter of this dissertation. The second part of the dissertation investigates the consequences brought about by the success of anti-establishment parties. As discussed above, the success of anti-establishment parties may lead the more established parties within the party systems of Western Europe to alter their organizational structures or ideological profiles. The changes made by established parties are analyzed in chapters III and IV. Moreover, these new entrants into the political arena may reinvigorate or destabilize their respective party systems. Anti-establishment parties may increase polarization and electoral volatility as well as shift the traditional coalitional dynamics within the party systems of Western Europe. The fifth chapter examines the consequences of anti-establishment party success to the larger party system. The final chapter summarizes the findings and discusses the implications of this dissertation and concludes by providing some suggestions for future avenues of

research concerning the anti-establishment party phenomenon. Figure 1.1 illustrates the outline of the dissertation.²¹

Figure 1.1: Outline of the dissertation



²¹ The arrows in this figure only point in the direction of causality investigated by this dissertation. Investigating the effects of party system change or establishment party change on the electoral success of anti-establishment parties is outside the scope of this dissertation.

CHAPTER II

EXPLAINING THE ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES

The previous chapter discussed changes within the electorate of Western Europe that help explain the emergence of anti-establishment parties. However, emergence is but the first step in understanding the anti-establishment party phenomenon. This second chapter explores why anti-establishment parties persist and even flourish within many countries of Western Europe. What leads to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties? What conditions allow these new entrants into the political arena to garner electoral support, particularly at the national level? What role do the characteristics of the electoral system play in the electoral success of anti-establishment parties? Do social and economic conditions help or hinder these parties in the electoral market? These questions help guide the analyses conducted in this chapter.

The growing electoral support of anti-establishment parties allows these parties to exert significant influence over numerous aspects of the policy making process. These developments lead to a growing literature focused on the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in Western Europe. The vast majority of the studies neglect the fact that anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, are a product of the changing European electorate. Ignazi (1992: 6) argues that anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” as “common problems and common concerns coalesced in partisan

organizations at different ends of the political spectrum” (Ignazi 1997: 318). Likewise, Taggart (1996: 49) asserts that parties of “the New Populism and the New Politics have their bases in common factors.”

Despite these claims, previous research fails to examine these parties as a single phenomenon. To this end, this chapter develops a single theoretical framework explaining the electoral success of anti-establishment parties from an institutional perspective. Most often, previous studies focus on only one side of the political spectrum, neglecting the other. This leads to an incomplete picture and, more importantly, inaccurate representation of the anti-establishment party phenomenon. Like all political parties, anti-establishment parties compete within the same institutional environment created by the political and electoral system.

However, previous studies point out different economic and social conditions favoring the electoral success of different anti-establishment parties. That is, anti-establishment parties on the left thrive under different economic and social conditions from their counterparts on the right. To complete the anti-establishment portrait, the analyses in this chapter are disaggregated to illustrate which conditions promote the electoral success of anti-establishment parties of the left and those conditions that favor anti-establishment parties on the right. This disaggregated analysis tests the assertion that anti-establishment parties “succeed” for the same reasons, regardless of their ideological orientation. Moreover, the analyses conducted in this chapter seek to remedy, at least in part, the omissions of previous studies by incorporating variables, which

hitherto have not been fully examined. Therefore, these analyses develop a more complete picture of the anti-establishment phenomenon.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into the following sections. The first section summarizes previous research concerning the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. Previous studies provide institutional, sociological, and economic explanations for the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. The second section outlines the contributions of this chapter to this growing literature. The third section delineates the theoretical orientation and expectations of these analyses and offers several testable hypotheses. The theoretical expectations of this chapter are that institutional arrangements, political environment, and socioeconomic conditions present the opportunity for anti-establishment parties to garner electoral success. These hypotheses concern the effects of the party and electoral system as well as social and economic conditions, which establish the environment in which anti-establishment parties compete. Next, the data and methods utilized to examine these hypotheses are outlined.

The fifth section details the findings of these analyses. The results paint an interesting portrait of the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. On the one hand, the institutional constraints of the party and electoral systems affect anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, in the same manner. On the other, the social and economic conditions favoring the electoral success of anti-establishment parties on the left are different from those conditions favoring their counterparts on the right. Thus, although the spark (i.e., value shifts

within the electorate) leading to the emergence of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum, the fuel leading to electoral success is different depending on their placement on the spectrum. The implications of these analyses are discussed as the chapter concludes with an eye towards future avenues of research.

Previous Research Concerning the Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties

Institutional, sociological and economic explanations dominate the considerable literature concerning the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. Institutional explanations focus on electoral and party system characteristics. Sociological explanations concentrate on value change within the electorate, the emergence of new political cleavages, particular social conditions, and numerous others. Finally, economic explanations focus on unemployment, inflation, and labor issues. This section explores these institutional, sociological, and economic explanations offered to account for the electoral success, or lack thereof, of anti-establishment parties in Western Europe.

Institutional Explanations

Scholars demonstrate that electoral system characteristics (i.e., electoral or “effective” thresholds and the proportionality of the system) affect electoral support for anti-establishment parties. Undoubtedly, electoral system characteristics affect the electoral fortunes of all political parties; however, Duverger (1963) argues that plurality electoral systems have a “mechanical” and a “psychological” effect that may be particularly harmful to new or small parties. The mechanical effect of the electoral system relates to how the electoral system translates or converts votes into seats. For new parties, the task of gaining representation is made less difficult if the electoral

system promotes a one-to-one (i.e., more proportionate) translation of votes into seats. The psychological effect relates to how the mechanical effect of the electoral system shapes voter preferences and party responses to these shifts. For Duverger (1963: 226), voting for non-mainstream parties becomes a fruitless act; “the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party.” Thus, voters tend to vote for the lesser evil of the two major parties. In the context of new party success, Rochon (1985: 421-422) argues that high thresholds “all but eliminate the possibility of a successful party challenge.” Similarly, Jackman and Volpert (1996: 516) conclude, “electoral disproportionality (through the mechanism of electoral thresholds) increasingly dampens support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands.”

Related to electoral system characteristics, party system attributes influence the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties. Stemming from the arguments of Duverger (1963) and Lijphart (1994) concerning the electoral system, the “effective” number of parties competing within the party system, logically, affects the amount of electoral support any anti-establishment party can obtain, since parties fight over a finite number of seats. Particularly within the literature concerning far-right, anti-immigrant parties, there are two competing hypotheses about the relationship between the “effective” number of parties and anti-establishment party support. As the number of parties decreases, the likelihood that a party can gain seats increases since each party can gain a greater share of the legislative seats. However, other scholars hypothesize the opposite, arguing that as the number of parties increases, the more likely an anti-

establishment party (far-right party in their analysis) will emerge in order to gain representation (see Jackman and Volpert 1996). In examining the electoral success of far right parties, Jackman and Volpert (1996: 519) find that “multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality.” Thus, the likelihood of anti-establishment party support increases as the number of parties increases.

The amount of polarization within the party system is another aspect that factors into anti-establishment party electoral success. In one of the few studies examining anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum, Abedi (2002) demonstrates that anti-establishment parties benefit from a close positioning of establishment parties. Thus, as establishment parties converge in their policy positions, anti-establishment parties gain electoral support. Moreover, overall party system polarization does not have a strong or consistent independent effect on the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties (Abedi 2002). Party system polarization reinforces the effect of converging establishment parties as more ideological space is left unoccupied at the edges of the political spectrum (Abedi 2002). Anti-establishment parties therefore have more room to maneuver and capture voters within the electoral arena.

However, the findings concerning polarization are contradictory. For example, Mair (1995) argues that the lack of distance between the traditional parties serves to alienate part of the electorate. Given changes within the electorate, traditional parties find it increasingly difficult to “maintain a separate identity” as they continue to lose

their “natural” constituencies (Mair 1995: 49).²² Establishment parties fail to offer the electorate distinctly different policies from their establishment competitors. Thus, voters are more receptive to the anti-establishment assertion that *all* establishment parties are the same and, more importantly, to the different policies put forward by anti-establishment parties. Kitschelt (1995: 48) supports these claims arguing that conditions are more favorable for extreme right party electoral success when “moderate left and right parties have converged toward centrist positions and may have cooperated in government coalitions.”

Ignazi (1992) challenges the conclusions reached by Mair (1995) and Kitschelt (1995). Extreme right parties benefit from increased polarization on both sides of the political spectrum as traditional parties of the left react to the emergence of left-libertarian parties and established parties on the right adopt more neo-conservative tendencies (Ignazi 1992). However, traditional conservative parties risk alienating their base supporters if they move further to the right. As Ignazi (1992: 20) argues, “As it moves more and more to the right, leaving its traditional ‘hunting territory’, a potentially successful competitor might emerge on its left. The conservative party risks losing its ties to its traditional electorate by moving too much to the right.” Therefore, even as conservative parties move to the right, new parties emerge positioning themselves to the right of the conservative parties and engage in “outbidding” the established parties for the votes of disaffected segments of the electorate (Ignazi 1992: 20).

²² “Natural” constituencies can be defined in terms of class, religion, occupation, or region. The core of these “natural” constituencies identify with and belong to a particular party and “would rarely, if ever, consider voting for an alternative” (Mair 1995: 49).

Sociological Explanations

As detailed in the first chapter, changes within the value orientations of the electorate allow anti-establishment parties to gain a foothold and thrive in the electoral arena. Most often, these shifts are a result of modernization or the emergence of post-industrial society. On the right side of the spectrum, Betz (1998: 7) argues that the electoral success of far right populist parties in the past two decades is a “result of the transition from the postwar system of ‘organized capitalism’ to a system of individual capitalism.” This transition leads to “a dramatic increase in anxieties, insecurity, and pessimism about the future” which, in turn, leads to a “pronounced decline in public faith in the established parties, politicians, and the political process in general” (Betz 1998: 7). Kitschelt (1995) reinforces these claims arguing that extremist parties, particularly on the right, often flourish during periods of transition (i.e., from industrial to post-industrial society).

Alber (1989) contends that this same phenomenon occurs on the left side of the spectrum with the emergence and success of Greens parties. Educational mobilization and state penetration are two central processes of modernization, which serve to restructure the traditional cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (Alber 1989). Changes within these traditional cleavage structures facilitate shifts in the value orientation and a decline in partisan loyalties within the electorate. Ignazi (1996) argues that “New Politics” parties emerge from the structural changes associated with post-industrial society. Moreover, Taggart argues that changes within the party systems of Western Europe assist anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum:

[I]t is possible to see a very clear trend: ‘New’ Protest parties of both left and right have flourished on the fertile source of flux in West European politics. On the left the New Politics parties of a green and alternative hue have colonised the margins of parliamentary protest, and on the right a new breed of ‘New Populist’ parties have colonised the opposite margins. By examining the New Politics parties and the New Populists, we can trace the contours of protest in contemporary West Europe. (1996: 12)

As the modernization process alters the traditional cleavage structures and value orientations of the electorate, anti-establishment parties thrive in the electoral arena.

Another factor, interrelated to the processes of modernization, utilized to explain the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, is the development of new cleavages. Inglehart (1977, 1990) and Abramson and Inglehart (1995) argue that the emergence of the “New-Politics” cleavage is a result of fundamental change of the value orientations of the electorate within advanced industrial democracies. Due to the affluence and prosperity of the Western world in the post-World War II era, shifts occurred in the value priorities from one generation to the next (Inglehart 1977, 1990). Thus, the generations that grew up before and during the Second World War concerned themselves with securing their basic material needs; however, the generation that followed granted a higher priority to postmaterialist values emphasizing quality-of-life issues (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1977, 1990). As detailed in the first chapter, numerous scholars employ this argument to explain the *emergence and electoral success* of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum (for example, see Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Taggart 1996).

Previous studies identify specific social conditions that influence anti-establishment party support, particularly on the right side of the spectrum. Betz (1994)

argues that the main planks of the far right party platform concern immigration and crime and these two major issues separate far right parties from the mainstream, traditional parties on the right. Immigration is a very salient issue for anti-establishment parties on the right. Far right parties usually adopt xenophobic platforms playing to the fears of alienated voters within the electorate. Kitschelt (1995: 1) states, “[T]he contemporary extreme right is a single-issue racist and xenophobic backlash against the multi-culturalization of Western European societies caused by the influx of immigrants.” Numerous scholars hypothesize that rising immigration rates facilitate growing support for far right parties among Western European electorates (for examples of cross-national studies, see Golder 2003b, Jackman and Volpert 1996, Knigge 1998 and Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002).²³

High crime rates are yet another factor numerous scholars link to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties on the right. Betz (1993a, 1993b), Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), and Swyngedouw (1998) demonstrate crime to be an important issue to the far right. Gibson (2002) argues high levels of crime, often in conjunction with higher levels of immigration, lead to a feeling of social insecurity within the electorate. Gibson (2002: 104) contends, “concerns about immigrants and crime could be a practical matter relating to one’s physical and material security.” Although all parties, to some

²³ In numerous case studies including studies of Austria (Knight 1992, Riedlsperger 1998), Belgium (Fitzmaurice 1992), France (Bréchon and Mitra 1992, Fysh and Wolfreys 1992, Mayer 1998), Italy (Furlong 1992, Sidoti 1992), the Netherlands (Voerman and Lucardie 1992) and Scandinavian countries (Arter 1992), immigration was found to be a tailor-made issue for the far right. In their studies of Germany, Betz (1990, 1993a), Chapin (1997), Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), Minkenburg (1992), and Westle and Niedermayer (1992), each found high rates of immigration to be favorable to parties of the far right. It should also be noted that immigration and unemployment have often been linked together in these case studies as well as cross-national studies of the far right.

extent, campaign on law and order issues, right anti-establishment parties seize upon the sense of social insecurity created by higher crime rates and immigration. Thus, as both levels of crime and immigration continue to increase over the past two decades, anti-establishment parties of the right continue to flourish.

Economic Explanations

The condition of the economy affects the amount of support garnered by anti-establishment parties. However, on the right side of the political spectrum, the literature produces contradictory findings. Numerous studies demonstrate that far right parties benefit from poor economic conditions (i.e., high levels of unemployment) (for example, see Golder 2003b, Jackman and Volpert 1996, and Kitschelt 1995). These studies often conclude, as Jackman and Volpert (1996: 519) do, that “higher rates of unemployment provide a favorable environment for these political movements.” For Kitschelt (1995: 1), the far right “represents a revival of fascist and national socialist ideology in the midst of an economic crisis with high unemployment.”

Despite these findings, Knigge (1998) finds that as economic conditions worsen, levels of electoral support for anti-establishment parties actually decrease. Givens (2005) finds that higher levels of unemployment lead to higher levels of support for far right parties in Austria and France, but this relationship does not hold in Germany. These contradictory findings are possibly due to the fact that many studies of extreme right parties suffer from methodological problems relating to selection bias. According to Golder (2003a: 435), these studies “suffer from potential selection bias because they

ignore countries where extreme right parties are nonexistent or where their electoral support is extremely limited.”²⁴

On the left side of the spectrum, economic conditions are linked to individuals’ capabilities to pursue left-libertarian or postmaterialist goals (see Inglehart 1977, 1990; Kitschelt 1988). As individuals become more secure economically, they are able to shift their attention from materialist to postmaterialist goals. Thus, more affluent countries, as measured by income levels per capita or levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, see significant levels of left-libertarian party support (Kitschelt 1988; Redding and Viterna 1999). Kitschelt (1988: 206) argues that “there is a strong and significant correlation between income levels and electoral support” for anti-establishment parties of the left. Similarly, Redding and Viterna (1999) demonstrate that left-libertarian parties are more successful in countries with higher levels of GDP per capita.²⁵

These are but a few of the various explanations for the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in Western Europe. However, most of these studies focus on only one side of the political spectrum, neglecting the other, or examine only a subset of the full distribution of anti-establishment parties. Thus, although these studies contribute greatly to our understanding of the anti-establishment party phenomenon, we are still left

²⁴ Knigge (1998) examines far right parties in six Western European countries (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany.) Likewise, Givens (2005) covers a range of electoral success for far right parties; however, she only covers Austria, Denmark, Germany, and France. Thus, these studies exclude the full distribution of far right parties by ignoring countries where these parties are nonexistent or where they fail to win seats at the national level.

²⁵ In relation to electorally successful left anti-establishment parties, GDP per capita is less influential than other variables (i.e., high social security expenditures). Redding and Viterna (1999) argue that this lack of a strong influence of GDP per capita may be explained by their case selection. In advanced nations, GDP per capita may have reached a threshold by which its influence is not longer significant. Thus, the real impact of GDP per capita, as it relates to electoral success of left anti-establishment parties, should be seen in developing nations (i.e., Eastern European democracies).

with an incomplete picture. Furthermore, even though there are many cross-national examinations of anti-establishment parties, this literature still lacks broad theoretical expectations or conclusions to help explain the variation in the amount of electoral success garnered by anti-establishment across the various countries of Western Europe.

Contributions to the Literature

This chapter makes two important contributions to this literature. First, this chapter offers a unified theoretical framework to examine the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. As outlined in the previous section, the majority of previous research paints an incomplete and inaccurate portrait of anti-establishment party electoral success by focusing on only a subset of these parties. However, as quoted earlier, Ignazi (1992:6) argues that anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” while Taggart (1996: 49-50) asserts that these parties “have their bases in common factors.” Despite these assertions, the literature fails to adequately investigate the electoral success of anti-establishment on both sides of the political spectrum within a single, unified theoretical framework. This constitutes the first contribution of this chapter.

The second contribution made by this chapter relates to the more extensive and more detailed analyses of the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. As discussed in the first chapter, anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political, emerged due to the same catalysts, namely a shift within the value orientation of the electorate and disillusionment with the party system and parties of the establishment. Yet, whether anti-establishment party electoral success (both left and

right parties) is fueled by the same factors (i.e., institutional environment, economic and social conditions), remains to be examined. Given the fact that many of the factors detailed above not only explain the electoral fortunes of a particular subset (i.e., left-libertarian or far-right, populist) of anti-establishment parties but also contribute to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in general, a unified analysis of the electoral success of these parties would seem warranted. To further examine the assertions of Ignazi (1992) and Taggart (1996), the analyses in this chapter disaggregate the electoral support for anti-establishment parties. Thus, this chapter can determine if support for anti-establishment parties of the left is indeed rooted in the same factors as support for anti-establishment parties of the right. Moreover, these analyses examine a wider range of factors, including new factors, than previous studies of anti-establishment party electoral success.

Political Opportunity Structures: Theoretical Orientation and Hypotheses

Political opportunity theory provides the core theoretical orientation for explaining variations in the electoral success of anti-establishment parties (see Meyer and Minkoff 2004 and Arzheimer and Carter 2006). The basic premise underpinning political opportunity theory is that exogenous factors “enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policies” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004: 1457-1458). Thus, political opportunity theories emphasize *exogenous* conditions for party success in contrast to actor-centered theories of success (Tarrow 1998: 18). For the purposes of

this chapter, the exogenous factors of the institutional environment, macro-level socioeconomic conditions, the reaction (or lack thereof) of the political actors with the party system to a changing political environment, and the ability (or inability) of establishment parties to satisfy the needs of the voting public all create the opportunity for anti-establishment parties to be successful in the political arena. These factors either enhance or inhibit the opportunities for anti-establishment parties to disseminate their message and mobilize voters in their favor.

First, the institutional arrangements of the system (i.e., electoral system and party system characteristics) influence the opportunities for anti-establishment parties to garner electoral support. Lijphart (1994) argues that legal and “effective” electoral thresholds (due to the lack of a one-to-one translation of votes to seats) impede smaller parties from garnering electoral support and gaining representation. Under more proportional electoral systems, political entrepreneurs have greater incentives to enter the electoral arena and voters have more incentive to support anti-establishment parties (see, for example, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Blais and Carty 1991, and Duverger 1963). By contrast, less proportional electoral systems deter leaders of anti-establishment parties from fielding candidates or attempting to mobilize voters (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Jackman and Volpert 1996). Furthermore, in disproportional systems, voting for minor parties becomes a fruitless act as “electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party, whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries” (Duverger 1963: 226). Thus, voters are discouraged from voting for these parties given

their chances for gaining representation (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). From these arguments, I hypothesize that more proportional electoral systems provide a greater opportunity for anti-establishment to garner electoral support.

H2.1: The more the electoral system promotes a one-to-one translation of votes to seats, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain electoral support

The second party system characteristic of interest is the “effective” number of parties within the system. Disproportionality discourages multiple parties from emerging within the party system (Duverger 1963; Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1976). As Lijphart (1994: 76) notes, “disproportionality affects the degree of multipartism, but multipartism can in turn affect the degree of disproportionality.” Thus, disproportionality and multipartism are interdependent.²⁶ Duverger (1963) and Sartori (1976) emphasize that the degree of multipartism varies considerably given the variety of proportional representation systems (i.e., different formulas). Therefore, the relationship between the number of political parties within the system and support for anti-establishment parties needs further exploration. This examination will provide a direct test of the competing hypotheses, mentioned above, concerning this relationship. Despite these competing hypotheses, the analysis below tests the proposition that multipartism provides a greater opportunity for leaders of smaller parties (i.e., anti-establishment parties) to mobilize electoral support than would be afforded them in disproportional systems. Given the arguments of Duverger (1963), Sartori (1976), and

²⁶ Lijphart (1994) notes that the correlation between disproportionality and the “effective” number of parliamentary parties is -0.45 for the seventy electoral systems in his analysis. Although the correlation has the expected sign, the relationship should not be characterized as strong (Jackman and Volpert 1996).

Lijphart (1994), I argue that as the number of political parties increases, it is more likely that anti-establishment parties will emerge and garner electoral support.

H2.2: As the “effective” number of parties increases within the party system, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to garner electoral support

Another factor creating the opportunity for anti-establishment parties to garner electoral support is the inability, or perceived inability, of establishment parties to solve the economic and social problems plaguing the nations of Western Europe. Mair (1995: 46) argues that “changing international circumstances” reduce the ability of establishment parties to pursue policy goals to solve the main economic and social problems within their respective countries. “The freedom of manoeuvre of national states and national governments is therefore severely constricted, and the scope of partisan discretion is correspondingly curtailed” (Mair 1995: 46).²⁷ Betz (1994: 41) furthers these claims asserting that a number of surveys “tracking support for the political system” demonstrate that:

a growing number of citizens appear not only to believe that the established political class is no longer able to solve the most basic problems, but that politicians generally are too absorbed with themselves to be able to adapt to a rapidly changing world. Recent opinion polls abound in accusations that political parties and politicians are self-centered and completely oblivious to the problems they are supposed to solve. A growing number of voters charge politicians with lacking the competence, integrity, and vision necessary to respond effectively to the

²⁷ Mair (1995: 46-47) further asserts that these changes to the international environment have “two immediate effects on the capacity of parties in government to act as representative agencies. In the first place, the responses of national governments to political and economic problems increasingly tend to be influenced by international as well as local pressures, and hence they cannot always respond to domestic demands in a way, which fully satisfies the local interests on which they depend for their legitimacy and authority. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the increasing complexity of the global economy leads to severe problems for the monitoring and control of the policy-making process, and hence undermines the capacity for effective and authoritative action.”

most urgent problems, be they environmental degradation, soaring unemployment, rising crime, or mass immigration.

Eatwell (2003: 69) contends that trust, defined as “feelings about the ability of the economic and political system to deliver desired goods,” is declining within the electorate of Western Europe since World War II (see chapter I for further discussion). The inability of establishment parties to cure the economic and social ills of society in conjunction with a general decline in the trust of political parties and the mechanics of the political system provide anti-establishment parties with the opportunity to mobilize the electorate in their favor (see Eatwell 2003).

For the purposes of this analysis, the political opportunity structures created by the inability of the establishment parties to solve problems are examined utilizing the economic and social conditions of a particular country. As the economic and social problems persist within Western Europe, voters will increasingly look to other alternatives to solve these problems. Gibson (2002) argues that these conditions foster a feeling of insecurity, whether it is economic or social insecurity, and therefore, anti-establishment parties garner electoral support. Thus, these arguments of Betz (1994), Eatwell (2003), Gibson (2002), and Mair (1995) prompt the following hypotheses:

H2.3: As economic conditions worsen, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain electoral support

H2.4: As social conditions deteriorate, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain electoral support

Related to the effects of economic conditions, the wealth or, more importantly, affluence of a country influences the amount of electoral support anti-establishment parties can garner. From the arguments of Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990; see also Chapter

I), it is argued that as the affluence within a country increases, the more likely voters are to embrace postmaterialist values and, therefore, vote for anti-establishment parties, particularly on the left side of the political spectrum. Taking the arguments outlined in the first chapter, the shift from materialist to postmaterialist values within the electorate prompted a movement of the established parties to the left. In turn, anti-establishment parties emerged on the right side of the political spectrum to fill the vacuum that resulted from this shift (Ignazi 1992). Anti-establishment parties are able to capitalize on the postmaterialist movement garnering electoral support from an alienated voter base (see Ignazi 1992). Therefore, I hypothesize that as the level of affluence increases, anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum will gain electoral support.

H2.5: As affluence within a country increases, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain electoral support

Political opportunity structures also emerge from the cooperation or collusion of establishment parties within the system at the expense of anti-establishment parties. This line of argument stresses that collusion undermines the legitimacy of establishment parties and their leaders and facilitates the emergence of challengers in the form of anti-establishment parties (Abedi 2004; Mair 1995). As explained in the first chapter, anti-establishment parties campaign that there is no distinction between parties of the establishment; essentially, establishment parties are all the same. Katz and Mair (1995: 24) argue that anti-establishment parties “appear to be gaining great mileage from their assumed capacity to break up what they often refer to as ‘cosy’ arrangements that exist between established political alternatives.” Thus, established parties are “often unwittingly providing precisely the ammunition” with which anti-establishment parties

can make inroads into the political arena (Katz and Mair 1995: 24). The actions of established parties help to legitimate the protest and appeals of anti-establishment parties (see Abedi 2004).

Established political parties, in order to ensure their own survival, alter ballot access requirements (i.e., recognition of candidates and monetary deposits to place candidates on the ballot) hindering the ability on new or smaller parties to gain electoral support (Katz 1997). Mair (1995) and Katz and Mair (1995) argue that ballot access restrictions are incorporated into electoral laws in order to shield establishment parties for new competitors. As Katz and Mair (1995: 16) argue in their description of a “cartel” party:

The state, which is invaded by the parties, and the rules of which are determined by the parties, becomes a fount of resources through which these parties not only help to ensure their own survival, but through which they can also enhance their capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives. The state, in this sense, becomes an institutionalized structure of support, sustaining insiders while excluding outsiders.

Furthermore, Mair and Katz (1997) argue that campaign finance regulations function to protect established political cartels as parties in office utilize their control over the allocation of campaign resources to deter challengers. Due to the fact that state subventions (i.e., campaign resources) are tied to prior electoral performance, defined in terms of electoral success or parliamentary representation, “they help to ensure the maintenance of existing parties while at the same time posing barriers to the emergence of new groups” (Mair and Katz 1997:106).

These appeals concerning collusion among establishment parties gain leverage as anti-establishment parties campaign that all establishment parties, be they in government or in opposition, are the essentially the same. In order to distinguish themselves from one another, establishment parties must provide distinct alternatives to the electorate. However, Mair (1995: 51) argues that in contemporary politics, the “capacity of individual parties to maintain a distinct, and hence also a distinct purpose” diminishes greatly. Moreover, differences between establishment parties “are less easily identified, especially by voters, and ostensible protagonists may often be lumped together as constituent elements of a more or less undifferentiated political class” (Mair 1995:51). Thus, mainstream parties are vulnerable, as are the electorate, to so-called “anti-party” appeals of anti-establishment parties (see Mair 1995). Kitschelt (1995: 48) supports these claims arguing that the environment is more favorable for anti-establishment parties on the right if “moderate left and right parties have converged toward centrist positions and may have cooperated in government coalitions.” Hainsworth (1992: 11) contends that anti-establishment parties benefit from “situations where the ideological distance between the major parties was reduced, thereby creating a vacuum” at the extremes of the political spectrum. The amount of ideological distance (i.e., polarization) between establishment parties decreases as they continue to cooperate with each other to stave off the challenge of anti-establishment parties. As this occurs, voters tend to see all establishment parties as part of the same political machine. In turn, this creates the

opportunity for anti-establishment parties to succeed.²⁸ From this discussion, I hypothesize:

H2.6: The more establishment parties collude, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain electoral support

H2.7: As the amount of polarization between the establishment parties decreases, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain electoral support

Finally, partisan dealignment and the failure of establishment parties to meet the representational needs of the electorate create another political opportunity for anti-establishment parties to gain electoral support. Bartolini and Mair (1990) argue that the “electoral availability” of voters increases given the changes within the electorate over the past four decades (see Chapter I). The symptoms of this dealignment are increased electoral volatility, increased levels of electoral abstention, decreased vote share for established parties, and a decline in party membership for more established parties (see Abedi 2004, Bartolini and Mair 1990, and Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984). Each of these “symptoms” benefits anti-establishment parties; as voters become less attached to established parties (i.e., disillusioned voters), the electorate is more likely to look for viable alternatives in order to meet their representational needs. Anti-establishment parties take advantage of this political opportunity structure by mobilizing new voters as well as attracting disillusioned voters. Therefore, I argue that:

H2.8: As voter turnout increases, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain electoral support

²⁸ Ignazi (1992) challenges this claim arguing that increased *party system* polarization creates an enlarged space at the poles of the political spectrum for anti-establishment parties to succeed.

H2.9: As electoral volatility increases, the more likely anti-establishment parties are to gain electoral support

Altogether, these nine hypotheses are designed to investigate the conditions that create the political opportunity structures that allow *all* anti-establishment parties to find electoral success. However, as will be shown below, it is necessary to disaggregate the total electoral success of anti-establishment parties into support for left and support for right anti-establishment parties. It is necessary to do this in order to further examine the assertion made by Taggart (1996:49) that parties of “the New Populism and the New Politics have their bases in common factors.” While indeed this may be true concerning their emergence, anti-establishment parties of the left and right may owe their electoral successes to different factors.

Data and Methods

These hypotheses are tested utilizing data from national parliamentary elections between 1970 and 2005 in eighteen Western European countries. The dependent variable for this analysis is the vote share of *all* anti-establishment parties (i.e., left-libertarian, ecology, populist, anti-immigrant parties, etc.) regardless of their placement on the political spectrum. To measure the effects of the electoral system, this analysis employs three variables: the “effective” threshold, the least squares index, and the “effective” number of parties. Taken from Lijphart (1994), “effective” thresholds are the minimum percentage of votes, given district magnitude, needed for a party to gain seats in the legislature (Lijphart 1994).²⁹ The intent of this measure is to take the

²⁹ “Effective” thresholds are calculated using the following formula: $T_{eff} = (50\% / M + 1) + (50\% / 2M)$, where M denotes the average district magnitude. In the cases in which the legal electoral threshold

characteristics of the electoral system, capturing the “upper” and “lower” thresholds a party or candidate could receive under the most adverse and favorable conditions, and translate them into an equivalent threshold that would have the same effect as if this “effective” threshold were a legal electoral threshold (Powell and Vanberg 2000). The least squares index measures the level of disproportionality of any electoral outcome (i.e., election), or the difference between the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats any party gets within the legislature.³⁰ To measure the extent of multipartism, this research makes use of the “effective” number of parties index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which takes into account the relative size of the competing parties in a given electoral system.³¹

The levels of inflation and unemployment as well as the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, respectively, measure the economic conditions and affluence of a particular country.³² Given the hypotheses above, each of these variables should have a positive coefficient. To assess the social conditions within a particular country, the

exceeds the effective threshold as in the case of Denmark, the legal threshold is considered the effective threshold. The data necessary to calculate “effective” thresholds were taken from Lijphart (1994), Golder (2003a), and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org).

³⁰ This measure involves taking the square root of half the sum of the squares of the difference between vote percentage and seat percentage for each political party with a given system. The formula for this index is the square of one-half times $\sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2$ where V_i is the percentage of the vote received by the i^{th} party and S_i is the percentage of seats garnered by the i^{th} party in a given election.

³¹ The “effective” number of parliamentary parties is calculated as follows: $ENPP = 1/\sum v_i^2$, where v_i is the fractional share of votes of the i^{th} party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The data used to calculate this index were taken from Mackie and Rose (1991, 1997) and the “Parties and Elections in Europe” website maintained by Wolfram Nordsieck (www.parties-and-elections.de/).

³² The data used to calculate these measurements were collected from the *World Development Indicators 2006* statistical database maintained by the World Bank. The unemployment rate is the percentage of the total labor force that is unemployed in an election year. The inflation rate is the average change in the consumer price index for the year of the election.

analysis uses the levels of immigration and crime.³³ The coefficients for these indicators should be positive.

To examine the political opportunity structures created by collusion between traditional parties within the political system, the analysis incorporates two separate variables: ballot access requirements and state support to candidates and parties.³⁴

The second variable measuring collusion incorporates two provisions of state support: free broadcasting time and the state funding campaigns.³⁵ Katz (1997) interprets the allocation of free broadcasting time and state funding based on prior electoral performance as an indication of establishment parties colluding to ensure their own survival while obstructing any potential electoral challenge for smaller parties.

To measure the ideological distance or polarization between establishment parties, this analysis utilizes the polarization measure developed by Maoz (2006). Polarization is a complex measure that must take into account the number, structure, cohesion, size, and amount of overlap between various groups within a given population. According to Maoz (2006), previous measures of polarization fail to account for the fact

³³ Data for these two variables were collected from various issues of *Trends in International Migration* published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1992-2005) and the *International Crime Statistics* volumes published by Interpol (1970-2005).

³⁴ Data concerning ballot access requirements and state support of parties and candidates were collected from Katz (1997). Ballot access requirements are measured on a 1 to 5 scale with 1 indicating no requirements and 5 indicating numerous or a higher level of requirements (i.e., a high level to overcome in order to place candidates on the ballot). Ballot access requirements may include a petition of members of parliament or signatures of voters for the recognition of a candidacy and/or an electoral deposit with conditions for the return of that deposit (Katz 1997).

³⁵ State support for candidates is measured on a 1 to 5 scale with 1 indicating no restrictions placed on state support for parties and 5 indicating numerous or higher restrictions on state support. These restrictions may include reserving broadcast time solely for parties already represented in parliament or basing financial support on performance in the previous election. Data concerning state support of parties and candidates were collected from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

that these attributes may interact; therefore, changes in polarization are not linear in nature. The measure of polarization utilized by these analyses integrates all of these properties into a single measure of polarization. For this reason, Maoz (2006) argues, and demonstrates, that this index offers the best measure for polarization for these particular analyses.³⁶

Voter turnout and electoral volatility are used to examine how the “electoral availability” of voters affects the electoral success of anti-establishment parties (see Bartolini and Mair 1990). As a measure of waning partisan ties, and therefore the “electoral availability” of voters, this analysis employs the electoral volatility indicator developed by Pedersen (1979). Electoral volatility measures the net electoral change within the party system resulting from individual vote transfers.³⁷ Thus, this measure captures the amount of “vote switching” within the electorate as partisan loyalties weaken. The descriptive statistics for each of these variables are summarized in Table 2.1.

³⁶ This measure takes into account the thirteen policy categories with both positive and negative positions from the Comparative Manifesto Project. For a more detailed discussion of this index, see Maoz (2006). It must be noted that scholars question the use of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data for the purposes of determining party positions. Harmel, Janda and Tan (1995: 10) argue that using CMP data “as a gauge of issue position would be a highly risky venture.” However, given data constraints and the number of countries included in these analyses, this measure provides a rough indicator for polarization necessary for these analyses.

³⁷ This measure of electoral volatility is derived in the following manner: If we let $p_{i,t}$ stands for the percentage of the vote, which was obtained by party i at election t , then the change in the strength of i since the previous election will be: $\Delta p_{i,t} = p_{i,t} - p_{i,t-1}$ and if we do not consider sign differences, the

following relation exists for the party system: Total Net Change (TNC_t) = $\sum_{i=1}^n |\Delta p_{it}|$, $0 \leq TNC_t \leq 200$ where n stands for the total number of parties competing in the two elections. Logically, the net gains for winning parties are numerically equal to the net losses of the parties that were defeated in the election. Thus, one may use another indicator which is slightly easier to calculate and to interpret, namely: Volatility (V_t) = $\frac{1}{2} \times TNC_t$, $0 \leq TNC_t \leq 100$ where V_t is simply the cumulated gains for all winning parties in the party system or, if you prefer, the numerical value of the cumulated losses for all losing parties. Its range has a straightforward explanation and it can be expressed in terms of percentage (Pedersen 1979).

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Anti-Establishment Party Support	12.19	10.14	0	77.4
Anti-Establishment Party Support (Left)	7.33	7.02	0	35.9
Anti-Establishment Party Support (Right)	4.86	6.29	0	44.8
“Effective” Threshold	8.64	10.09	0.7	35
Disproportionality	4.54	4.17	0.4	22.2
“Effective” Number of Parties	4.49	1.59	2.3	10.3
Inflation	7.59	8.74	0.1	76.2
Unemployment	5.11	3.02	0.1	16.6
GDP per capita	18042.5	7596.9	5507.5	48419.3
Immigration	5.28	6.46	0.2	37.2
Crime	5.05	3.10	0.2	13.9
Ballot Restrictions	2.89	1.46	1	5
State Support	3.08	1.16	1	5
Polarization	0.24	0.14	0	0.6
Voter Turnout	79.83	11.23	42.2	96.3
Electoral Volatility	11.10	7.36	0.9	46.7

Note: N = 179

Given that standard regression models assume fixed intercepts across states and uncorrelated error terms, these models are inadequate for analyzing cross-sectional data. Rather than attempting to specify a laundry list of additional country-specific factors, or incorporating dichotomous variables for each country, which may affect the estimates, the analyses below employ a panel-estimated approach. Specifically, the models within these analyses utilize a random effects model (grouped by country), which accounts for country-specific effects that are likely to be present in the error term (Wooldridge 2001).

In other words, the random effects model accounts for latent factors that are likely to persist within countries, but not between countries, across time. The disaggregated analyses employ two separate random effects models incorporating the same independent variables as the unified analysis.³⁸ The Hausman specification test, testing the appropriateness of this specification or model, indicates that the random effects model is indeed appropriate for these analyses. For each of these analyses, the unit of analysis is the election year for national parliamentary elections.

Party Stability and Party Support

Arguably, the greatest single predictor of electoral success for *any* party is the electoral success of the party in previous elections. Given this, one might argue it is necessary (both methodologically and theoretically) to include a lagged dependent variable in order to control for previous support and overcome the methodological problem of omitted variable bias (see Clarke 2005). Researchers often put forth “bloated specifications” justified by the “fear that omitted relevant variables will bias the results” (Clarke 2005: 341). However, Clarke (2005: 350) argues, “by including additional control variables in our specifications, we could very easily be making the bias on the coefficient of interest worse.” Instead, we can ameliorate this problem, at least in part,

³⁸ Although anti-establishment parties compete for a finite number of voters against *all* political parties, the argument that anti-establishment parties compete against other anti-establishment parties, despite their placement of the political spectrum, for the same group of alienated voters has a logical basis. That is, support for anti-establishment parties on the left is dependent upon, or at least not independent of, support for anti-establishment parties on the right. Given this fact, simultaneous equations, or seemingly unrelated regression, would be warranted, and indeed necessary, if the error terms for these two equations were correlated. The correlation between these two models (equations) is 0.1989. The Breusch-Pagan test of independence between these equations was significant with a chi-square statistic of 7.082. This result suggests that anti-establishment parties on the left cater to a different base of voters than anti-establishment parties on the right (i.e., the two equations are independent). Furthermore, this provides an initial test of the assumption that the anti-establishment parties on the left and right have their bases in common factors.

by utilizing “narrow, focused, controlled tests of broad theories,” which are “far more convincing than a regression equation weighed down by half a dozen control variables” (Clarke 2005: 350).

This methodological reasoning aside, there are at least two empirical reasons for not including a lag for previous party support. First, the stability of traditional mainstream parties over the last sixty years in most Western European countries allows the electorate, or at least segments of electorate, to develop and maintain partisan attachments. Given the fact that this process may take decades or even generations, it is dependent upon the stability of the party. Yet, this logic may not apply to anti-establishment parties given their relatively new entrance into the political arena. Thus, these parties may not develop a loyal partisan base within the electorate. Second, if these parties fail to mobilize voters and develop a partisan base, then their stability and longevity is severely affected.³⁹

Anti-establishment parties emerge and contest their first elections in the early 1970s; therefore, it can be argued that nearly forty years is sufficient time for these relatively new entrants to build a loyal partisan base. Nonetheless, Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) argue that *some* anti-establishment parties garner their support merely as protest votes against the establishment. If this is indeed the case, then the voter base for these new challengers is not stable in nature and previous support for anti-establishment parties would not predict current support for these parties.

³⁹ It is important to note that the inclusion of a measure for previous support for anti-establishment parties does not significantly alter the results of the analyses reported below.

More to the point, the perceived nature of anti-establishment parties, particularly on the right, as single-issue protest movements, leads to instability. For example, the controversial and charismatic Pim Fortuyn organized *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) just three months before the May 15, 2002 Dutch elections around a far-right, anti-immigrant platform. The party gained support in public opinion polls quickly through Fortuyn's forceful debating abilities and criticism of the government under Prime Minister Wim Kok. However, on May 6, a militant animal rights activist, who claimed Fortuyn exploited Muslims as "scapegoats" in order to gain political power, assassinated Fortuyn. Despite this, the party gained twenty-six seats, becoming the second largest party in the *Tweede Kamer* entering into the first Balkenende cabinet.

The fortunes of the party quickly changed as public opinion in favor of the party vanished within the year. In the January 2003 elections, the party lost eighteen seats for a total of only eight in the Dutch parliament. In 2006, following years of internal strife and a lack of leadership, the party failed to garner enough support to qualify for the parliament. Following a vote of the general assembly, the party ceased national party operations on January 1, 2008. In the span of four and a half years, *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* went from the second largest party in the Dutch parliament to extinction. This is but one illustration of the unstable nature of anti-establishment parties. The instability of these parties is both exacerbated by, and a product of, the instability of its base of support within the electorate.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ By way of comparison, the electoral base for anti-establishment parties on the left appears to be more stable possibly due to the ideological diversity of these parties since their emergence in the late 1970s. Although associated with the environmental movement of the 1970s and 1980s, left libertarian parties have not been labeled as "single-issue" parties like their counterparts on the right. Left libertarian parties

More importantly, a lagged dependent variable is not necessary given the theoretical basis on these analyses. The hypotheses developed above are borne out of the theory that the opportunity structures created by *current* institutional arrangements, economic and social conditions, and the actions of establishment parties and the electorate allow for the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in the *current* election. Previous support for anti-establishment parties may control for the opportunity structures during previous elections, but do not help explain the opportunity structures present for anti-establishment parties to garner electoral support in the current election. Thus, the exclusion of this variable should not lead to biased coefficients.

Unified Analysis

The findings from the unified analysis confirm several of the hypotheses delineated above. The results from the static model, shown in the first column (Model 1) of Table 2.2, indicate that anti-establishment parties do take advantage of the political opportunity structures created by the electoral system, economic and social conditions, the party system, and the actions of establishment parties, and “voter availability” within the electorate. The three variables utilized to test the opportunities created by the electoral system are all statistically significant at conventionally accepted levels and in the expected direction confirming the first two hypotheses delineated above. The

advocate postmaterialist issues policies concerning the environment, equality, and quality of life. In turn, this ideological diversity has increased the diversity of their electoral base contributing to their stability. Analyses including a lagged dependent variable suggest that the electoral base for left-oriented anti-establishment parties is more stable from election to election than for their counterparts on the right. An examination of the overall R-squared for the analyses indicates that the amount of variance explained by previous electoral support is 0.77 for left-oriented anti-establishment parties and 0.18 for anti-establishment parties on the right. The difference in these two measures indicates that the stability of anti-establishment parties significantly influences the stability of their electoral base. That is, as the stability of the party increases, the more variance is explained by their previous electoral support.

electoral success of anti-establishment parties is hindered by disproportional electoral systems with higher “effective” thresholds. Thus, these new, or less established, parties must overcome high electoral barriers in order to gain representation within the legislature. These findings confirm the earlier works of Duverger (1963), Rochon (1985), and Jackman and Volpert (1996).

The number of “effective” parties within the system positively influences the amount of support for anti-establishment parties. As the number of parties within the system increases, the likelihood of anti-establishment parties receiving support increases. Corroborating the conclusion of Jackman and Volpert (1996: 519) that “multipartism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality,” multipartism provides the opportunity for leaders of *all* anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum to mobilize a base of electoral support. From these three indicators, it should be apparent that anti-establishment parties are clearly affected by the characteristics of the electoral and party system.

The measures concerning economic conditions and level of affluence within the countries under analysis paint a similar portrait and confirm, at least in part, the related third and fifth hypotheses. However, the findings are somewhat mixed. Although the coefficient for inflation is in the expected direction, it does not reach statistical significance. Whereas this does not conform to the expectations of this analysis, the fact that levels of inflation do not influence the voting behavior of the electorate is not surprising. Palmer and Whitten (1999) argue that inflation does not affect voting behavior in the same manner as other economic conditions. If economic actors have

rational expectations, inflation should not have real effects on personal economy due to the fact that it takes more time for the individual voter to feel the economic effects of inflation than other economic conditions such as unemployment (see Palmer and Whitten 1999). Thus, we should not expect the electorate to punish or reward *any* political parties for increases or decreases in the level of inflation.

In contrast, the level of unemployment significantly influences the level of support for anti-establishment parties in the expected positive direction. As establishment parties struggle to solve the economic problems, including high levels of unemployment, within many Western European nations, the electorate becomes increasingly disillusioned. In turn, this disillusionment translates into electoral support for anti-establishment parties as worsening economic conditions fuel a sense of insecurity within the electorate. These findings are consistent with previous research that concludes, “higher rates of unemployment provide a favorable environment for these political movements” (Jackman and Volpert 1996: 519; see also Golder 2003b and Kitschelt 1995).

The social conditions within a country contribute to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. Immigration significantly increases support for anti-establishment parties; however, higher levels of crime do not significantly influence electoral success of these new entrants into the political arena. Along with unemployment, these results indicate that increased levels of immigration undermine feelings of security within the electorate (see Gibson 2002). At least in part, anti-establishment parties benefit from the insecurity of voters created by the inability of established parties to solve the most basic

of social problems (see Betz 1994). This result conforms to previous findings concerning the decline in trust, defined as “feelings about the ability of the economic and political system to deliver desired goods” (Eatwell 2003: 69), across Western Europe. The inability of establishment parties to cure the economic and social ills of society creates the structure, which provides anti-establishment parties the opportunity to succeed in the electoral arena.

For the most part, collusion between parties of the establishment does not lead to increased support for anti-establishment parties. Although the coefficients are in the expected direction, the indicators for ballot restrictions and requirements for state support do not reach statistical significance. The attempts of the political establishment to thwart the challenges of anti-establishment parties by restricting access to the ballot and state support during campaigns does not help these new parties to any significant degree as is argued by the sixth hypothesis above. This suggests that voters are not supporting these new parties due to collusion between establishment parties. The measure for the amount of polarization between parties of the establishment reaches significance and is in the expected direction. As the amount of polarization between establishment parties decreases, anti-establishment parties are able to gain more electoral support. This suggests that as the ideological profiles of the major established parties continue to mirror one another, voters are increasingly turning to the viable electoral alternatives embodied by anti-establishment parties.

The “electoral availability” of voters significantly influences anti-establishment party support in positive manner. Increased levels of voter turnout and electoral

volatility lead to increased levels of electoral support suggesting that anti-establishment parties are indeed mobilizing new segments of the electorate and stealing votes from the establishment. As anti-establishment parties continue to offer viable electoral alternatives to a disillusioned as well as seemingly disenfranchised electorate, establishment parties continue to lose their vote share within the electorate. This has obvious implications for the establishment as well as the larger party system itself.

Disaggregating the Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties

Although the above analysis demonstrates that various exogenous factors create the political opportunity structures anti-establishment parties need to succeed, it does not test the proposition that anti-establishment parties are a single phenomenon as asserted by Ignazi (1992), Taggart (1996), and others. In order to test this assertion, the dependent variable for these analyses disaggregates the vote share for anti-establishment parties into support for these parties on the left and right, respectively. The model for this analysis incorporates the same variables from the analyses above.

Investigating the sources of electoral success for left anti-establishment, the analysis shown as Model 2 in Table 2.2 indicates that the level of disproportionality within the electoral system hampers support for these parties. That is, in more disproportionate electoral systems, left anti-establishment parties find it harder to gain support. Consistent with the arguments of Inglehart (1971; 1977; 1990) and Kitschelt (1988), higher levels of affluence increase the amount of support for anti-establishment parties on the left. Higher levels of crime also hamper support for left anti-establishment parties. This may be due to the fact that voters do not believe these parties can

effectively solve the social ills plaguing society. Finally, the amount of polarization significantly influences the amount of support left anti-establishment parties. As establishment parties converge towards the center, these new entrants gain electoral support. This also suggests that establishment parties can counter the threat from anti-establishment parties by shifting their position on the political spectrum. As establishment parties move toward the position of left anti-establishment parties, these newer parties lose electoral support.

Examining the support for anti-establishment parties on the right, one can clearly see that the opportunity structures that favored the anti-establishment left are not the same that favor their counterparts on the right. As expected, higher “effective” thresholds dampen support for anti-establishment parties on the right. Related to this, as the “effective” number of parties increases, the level of support for these parties also increases. Thus, electoral system characteristics influence electoral support in the expected manner. Economic and social conditions also influence, at least in part, electoral support in the expected direction. Higher levels of unemployment and crime positively influence support for right-oriented anti-establishment parties. The remaining variables do not reach statistical significance at conventional accepted levels.⁴¹ Finally, anti-establishment parties on the right benefit from stealing votes from their competitors. This is indicated by the significant positive coefficient for the measure of electoral volatility. The results of this analysis are shown as Model 3 in Table 2.2.

⁴¹ Unlike previous analyses of anti-establishment parties on the right (i.e., anti-immigrant parties), this analysis does not show that immigration is significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for this indicator of immigration is significant at the .10 level. The differences in these findings are probably due to differences in time periods under analysis as well as the inclusion of different variables.

Table 2.2: Determinants of Anti-Establishment Support – Random Effects Model

Independent Variables		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
		Unified	Left	Right
Electoral System Characteristics	“Effective” Threshold	-0.47 (0.26)	0.05 (0.18)	-0.21 (0.11)
	Disproportionality	-0.46 (0.22)	-0.67 (0.15)	0.18 (0.16)
	“Effective” Number of Parties	1.29 (0.60)	-0.27 (0.41)	1.35 (0.41)
Economic Conditions	Inflation	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)
	Unemployment	0.54 (0.26)	0.24 (0.18)	0.36 (0.18)
	GDP per capita	0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0003 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Social Conditions	Immigration	0.51 (0.30)	0.02 (0.21)	0.18 (0.15)
	Crime	0.14 (0.35)	-0.40 (0.24)	0.45 (0.24)
Collusion	Ballot Restrictions	0.20 (2.41)	0.30 (1.73)	0.25 (0.89)
	State Support	0.80 (2.99)	0.54 (2.14)	0.28 (1.05)
	Polarization	-10.23 (3.78)	-8.27 (2.59)	-2.37 (2.92)
Electoral Availability	Turnout	0.18 (0.10)	0.07 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)
	Electoral Volatility	0.23 (0.07)	0.07 (0.05)	0.16 (0.05)
	Constant	-15.82 (13.07)	-0.48 (9.18)	-16.89 (6.83)
Obs.		179	179	179
R2 (overall)		0.23	0.02	0.41
R2 (within)		0.45	0.30	0.40
R2 (between)		0.18	0.0005	0.48
<i>Rho</i>		0.84	0.85	0.48

Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).
Standard Errors are listed in parentheses.

The opportunity structures are indeed different for these two sets of parties. For each set, disproportional electoral systems serve as a detriment to their electoral support (although this is indicated by different measures for each). However, only anti-establishment parties on the right benefit from having a higher “effective” number of parties in the political system. Left-oriented anti-establishments profit from more affluent societies and from less polarization between parties of the establishment. At the same time right-oriented anti-establishment parties benefit from increased electoral volatility. Higher levels of unemployment and crime help foster support for anti-establishment parties on the right, but higher crime rates significantly dampen support for their counterparts on the left. Given the failure of establishment parties to solve the economic and social problems within society, voters are turning to electoral alternatives on the right. This indicator offers the clearest picture that the support for these two sets of parties does not have their bases in common factors. Crime rates significantly influence each set of parties by in clearly opposite directions.

Implications

There are numerous implications stemming from these results. First, parties of the establishment can, for the most part, control the opportunity structures leading to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. If established parties wish to counter the threat from anti-establishment parties, they must limit the opportunities for anti-establishment parties to garner support. Establishment parties may alter the electoral system to stem the challenges from, or increase the obstacles for, new parties. More disproportional electoral systems favor established parties with established reputations

within the electorate. Duverger (1963) argued that, particularly in disproportional electoral systems, voting for non-mainstream parties becomes a fruitless act. Electoral reform, instigated by more established parties, may hamper smaller or new parties from entering the electoral arena and gaining access to the political system.

Establishment parties may limit further opportunities for new parties by solving, or at least attempting to solve, the problems plaguing numerous countries within Western Europe. Although changing international circumstances reduce the ability of political parties to pursue policy goals to solve the main economic and social problems (see Mair 1995), politicians within establishment parties must demonstrate their willingness to solve societal problems. As Betz (1994) argues, a growing number of citizens believe party politicians are too self-absorbed to adapt to a rapidly changing world. “A growing number of voters charge politicians with lacking the competence, integrity, and vision necessary to respond effectively to the most urgent problems, be they environmental degradation, soaring unemployment, rising crime, or mass immigration” (Betz 1994: 41). The future electoral success of anti-establishment parties looks extremely bright as the inability of the establishment to cure the economic and social ills of society, in combination with the general decline in the trust of political parties, provides the opportunity to mobilize the electorate in favor of new electoral alternatives.

The actions of establishment parties also contribute to the “electoral availability” of voters, which, in turn, allows anti-establishment parties to make major inroads into the political marketplace. As the ideological distance between establishment parties

decreases, voters are left without a clear choice between these parties. Thus, the electorate may indeed switch their vote preferences to parties with distinct ideological profiles. Established parties find it more difficult to maintain a distinct identity (see Caul and Gray 2000), increasing the availability of voters and fueling support for anti-establishment parties, as indicated by the statistically significant, positive coefficient for the electoral volatility measure.

In turn, these developments have implications for the larger party system itself. Although the effects of this electoral success is examined and discussed in greater detail in the next two chapters, several points need to be touched upon here. Establishment parties must shift their placement on the ideological spectrum in order to counter the threat from anti-establishment parties providing clearer alternatives to the electorate. This also leads to increased polarization within the party system. Moreover, there is the possibility that countering the threat from anti-establishment parties on the extremes of the political spectrum may lead to the emergence of new challengers as the established parties vacate the middle of the ideological space. Thus, the electorate witnesses more electoral alternatives and increased volatility, which significantly alter the once “frozen” party systems of Western Europe. In turn, this increase in the “effective” number of parties and the increased seat share of anti-establishment parties may decrease the stability of cabinet government within the legislature.

Second, and more importantly, all anti-establishment are not created equally; that is, anti-establishment parties on the left do not have their bases in common factors with their counterparts on the right. Both left-oriented and right-oriented anti-establishment

parties are affected by disproportional electoral systems (albeit by different indicators of disproportionality), but the number of “effective” parties only significantly influences right-oriented anti-establishment parties. Thus, the characteristics of the electoral system affect different sets of anti-establishment parties in a distinctively dissimilar fashion.

Social and economic conditions offer a similar conclusion. High levels of unemployment significantly affect right anti-establishment parties, but not their counterparts on the left. Similarly, higher levels of affluence, as measured by the level of GDP per capita, significantly affect the level of support for left-oriented in a positive manner; however, this benefit is not shared by their counterparts on the right. High levels of crime arguably offer the greatest contrast between these two groups of anti-establishment parties, and therefore, provide the best evidence that the support base for different sets of anti-establishment parties differs depending upon ideological orientation. Higher crime rates significantly affect these new entrants, but in opposite directions; higher crime rates reduce electoral support for left-oriented anti-establishment parties and foster support for their equivalent on the right.

Collusion between parties of the establishment and the “electoral availability” also paint a mixed portrait of anti-establishment party electoral success. The amount of polarization between establishment parties significantly influences these non-mainstream parties on the left, but not the right. The level of volatility within the electorate significantly affects these parties on the right, but not the parties on the left. Once again, the opportunity structures created by the actions of establishment parties and the

electorate affect the different sets of anti-establishment parties in a distinct manner depending upon ideological orientation.

Whereas these results do not dispute that anti-establishment parties emerge due to the same factors (see Chapter I), the factors that fuel their electoral success depend upon which side of the political spectrum the party is situated. Thus, the assertions that anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” (Ignazi 1992: 6) or that these parties “have their bases in common factors” (Taggart 1996: 49) must be made in reference to their emergence, not their electoral success. Given the political opportunity structure differs for parties on the left from parties on the right, one might argue that anti-establishment parties emerge due to the same catalyst or spark, but owe their electoral success to different types of fuel.

Conclusion

Kitschelt (1986: 58) defines political opportunity structures as “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others.” The analyses in this chapter demonstrate that anti-establishment parties do indeed take advantage of the opportunity structures created by the configuration of resources (i.e., voter availability) and institutional arrangements (i.e., electoral system) within the countries of Western Europe. These new entrants into the political arena benefit from poor economic and social conditions that encourage a disaffected electorate to search for electoral alternatives to the more established parties. Moreover, as these problems mount, parties of the establishment fail to offer voters a

clear choice, as witnessed by anti-establishment parties gaining support as establishment parties move closer together on the ideological spectrum. Thus, anti-establishment parties garner support through opportunities that establishment parties can control to some extent.

The political opportunity structures for anti-establishment parties differ depending upon their placement of the ideological spectrum. Left-oriented anti-establishment parties garner more support within more proportionate electoral systems, more affluent societies, and when there is less ideological distance between the establishment parties. Right-oriented anti-establishment parties gain more support within electoral systems with lower “effective” thresholds and more “effective” parties, in societies with higher levels of unemployment and crime, and when there is more electoral volatility. Clearly, the conditions that allow anti-establishment parties to succeed are not common to both sides of the political spectrum. Therefore, if the assertions that anti-establishment parties have their foundation in common factors pertain to their emergence, then they may indeed be correct. However, if these previous assertions concern the electoral success of these new entrants to the political arena, then they are clearly wrong. The political opportunity structures differ greatly depending upon which side of the political spectrum the anti-establishment party positions itself.

Given the factors for electoral success of anti-establishment parties, traditional, mainstream parties may attempt to counter this electoral success by limiting the opportunity structures available to these smaller, less-established parties. The actions taken by establishment parties are only one possible consequence of the electoral success

of anti-establishment parties. This electoral success may not only alter the organizational structures and policy positions of establishment parties, but the larger party system itself as establishment parties react to this growing, and now recognized, threat. The following chapters examine the consequences of this electoral success for both individual parties within the same party system as well as the larger party system itself in greater detail.

CHAPTER III

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES ON INDIVIDUAL PARTIES

The previous chapters explored the emergence and investigated the factors leading to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. Despite the vast literature concerning the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, the consequences stemming from this electoral success remain grossly understudied. Thus, this chapter shifts focus to the *consequences* of anti-establishment party electoral success. In particular, this chapter examines the effects of anti-establishment parties on other political parties competing within their respective party systems. The emergence of these new parties coincides with shifting value orientations of the electorate across Western Europe (see Chapter I). With this change in values, anti-establishment parties push new issues and demands to the forefront of the political agenda changing the political debate within society. The electoral success of anti-establishment parties allows these parties to gain a foothold within the party system.

This chapter argues that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties forces establishment parties to react or face further electoral consequences or worse. Anti-establishment parties pose organizational and programmatic challenges that traditional mainstream parties must address in order to remain viable electoral alternatives in the political arena. Parties – like all large organizations – are reluctant, and sometimes unable, to change. Organizational inertia often makes adaptation difficult, if not

impossible. However, by adapting concepts from organizational theory within the discipline of sociology, this chapter asserts that establishment party adaptation is a product of external stimuli (i.e., the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in combination with poor electoral performance) that threatens the very existence of these traditional parties. Utilizing elite interviews and evidence from party manifestos, I argue that parties of the establishment (i.e., traditional mainstream parties) alter their ideological profiles and organizational structures to counter the growing electoral threat from anti-establishment parties. On relevant policy issues, traditional mainstream parties shift their policy position towards the policy positions of anti-establishment parties. However, these analyses find that establishment parties are more reluctant to change their organizational structures and strategies in order to counter the anti-establishment threat.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section discusses previous research concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on other competitors within the party system. The second section discusses the contribution this chapter makes to this burgeoning literature. The third section details the theoretical orientation of this chapter. I argue that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, in combination with poor electoral performance, forces traditional parties, albeit reluctantly, to adapt or face further consequences. The data and methods used to examine this theoretical orientation are described in the fourth section. The fifth section outlines the results from the analyses conducted in this chapter. The chapter concludes

with a discussion of the implications of this research with an eye toward future research concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on more established parties.

Previous Research: The Mainstream Reaction to New Parties

Previous research concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on individual parties focuses on organizational and ideological adaptation of traditional mainstream parties. This burgeoning literature argues that traditional parties react to the programmatic, electoral, and organizational challenges posed by these new parties. However, Rohrschneider (1993) argues that although established parties react to the programmatic and electoral challenges posed by anti-establishment parties, traditional parties are less successful in reacting to the organizational challenges of these parties. Historically, the emergence of hierarchical and rigid nature of organizational structures within Western European political parties is closely related to the evolution of mass parties (see Epstein 1980). New social movements – including anti-establishment parties – question the hierarchical, and often oligarchic, leadership structure undermining the distribution of power within established parties. Rohrschneider (1993) contends that established parties fail to meet the organizational challenges of these new parties because doing so would require traditional parties to devolve power from their leadership to rank and file members. According to Rohrschneider (1993: 169), it is considerably easier to integrate new issues into party platforms than to “fundamentally reorganize the internal distribution of power” within established political parties. Thus, it is easier for traditional mainstream parties to meet the programmatic demands than the organizational demand of new social movements.

The majority of previous research focuses on the effects of new parties on the policy preferences of established parties. Harmel and Svåsand (1997) provide evidence of more established parties in Denmark and Norway altering their ideological identity to counter the electoral threat of anti-immigrant parties. Focusing on several issues (i.e., individual freedoms, taxes, and scope of government), Harmel and Svåsand (1997) use evidence from party manifestos to demonstrate the Progress Party in Denmark influenced the Social Democrats and Conservatives to change their ideological positions on these issues. Likewise, the Progress Party in Norway affected the Labour Party and Conservatives in the same manner. This evidence supports the conclusion that anti-establishment parties prompt change by proving to be an electoral threat to these traditional mainstream parties.

Downs (2001) argues that mainstream parties can react by ignoring these new “pariah” parties. Established parties may also chose to contain these new parties by isolating then through legal and political means. Legal means include outlawing the party completely, changing electoral laws (i.e., raising the threshold for representation), or controlling the voice of the party by restricting media or ballot access (Downs 2001). Political means of containing anti-establishment parties include “blocking” or “grand” coalitions “among most or all of the established parties to exclude the pariah from any share of executive authority is a frequent tactic” (Downs 2001: 27). Thus, establishment parties form a “circle of isolation” around the anti-establishment party.

Downs (2001) further argues there are multiple options established parties may choose to engage anti-establishment parties. First, established parties may co-opt anti-

establishment policies expanding the programmatic agenda of the party to directly address the issues that allowed the anti-establishment parties to gain electoral success (e.g., immigration, taxes, environment, and crime). Second, and more dramatically, established parties can overtly collaborate with anti-establishment parties. This most often happens in the legislative arena with traditional and anti-establishment parties voting in support for or against particular pieces of legislation (Downs 2001). The collaboration in the legislative arena may spill over into the executive arena if traditional mainstream parties agree to govern in coalition with anti-establishment parties.

Established parties deploy these strategies differently depending upon their own goals and ambitions. Politicians seeking reelection in stable electoral markets will often ignore or isolate “pariah” parties in an attempt to disengage themselves from these parties (Downs 2001). In more unstable electoral environments, traditional parties “face greater pressures to trade principle for expedience and pragmatism and thus seek more innovative, engaging tactics for dealing with the pariah party” (Downs 2001: 40). Thus, the electoral fortunes of establishment parties or perceived electoral environment influence the reaction particular traditional mainstream parties have to the emergence of anti-establishment parties and their subsequent electoral success.

Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) argue that political parties shift their policy positions in the same direction that their opponents shifted in previous elections. Furthermore, parties are particularly responsive to policy shifts by members of their “ideological families” (i.e., left-oriented parties responded to other left-oriented parties whereas right-oriented parties reacted to other right-oriented parties). Adams and

Somer-Topcu (2009) argue that parties are *more responsive* to ideological family member policy shifts than they are to the policy shifts of other parties within the system. Thus, established parties *should react* to the policy shifts of newer parties (i.e., anti-establishment parties) on the same side of the political spectrum and vice versa.

Contributions to the Literature

This chapter aims to broaden the examination of political party adaptation by making several contributions to this growing literature. First, these analyses utilize an interdisciplinary approach intertwining political science and sociology. Using organizational theory from the discipline of sociology, this chapter argues that organizations must overcome structural inertia in order to adapt to their environment. By incorporating organizational theory, this chapter aims to broaden the study of political parties, providing a wider theoretical basis. Organizational theories explain how organizations respond to their environment and how these organizations may alter that environment to improve their chances for survival. Further, organizational theories help explain how internal and external stimuli affect organizational change. Thus, by combining theories from political science and sociology, these analyses offer a broader insight into political party ideological and organizational adaptation in the face of external threats to their survival.

Second, these analyses broaden previous research concerning the effects of new parties on more established parties within Western Europe. Previous quantitative research focuses on cross-national analysis of political party change in Western Europe. However, qualitative research of the same nature as these analyses rarely reaches beyond

two countries. This chapter focuses on six countries in Western Europe using elite interviews and coding of election platforms of the parties. Moreover, previous studies often utilize data originally meant to examine *issue emphasis* to examine *issue position* (i.e., Comparative Manifestos Project). These analyses use original data collected for the sole purpose of examining issue positions. Thus, the data examined in this chapter measure issue positions not issue emphasis.⁴²

In a similar vein, these analyses broaden the study of political change by including organizational change as well as programmatic change. The majority of research focused on political party change addresses programmatic change in the face of internal and external stimuli (i.e., changes to the leadership or dominant faction, poor electoral performance, or the emergence of new competitors). However, few studies focus on adaptation of the organizational structures of political parties in light of these stimuli.⁴³ These analyses go beyond previous research by concentrating on both ideological *and* organizational change by political parties in response to the emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties.

Theoretical Orientation

For a democracy to thrive, the interests and demands of its people *must* be satisfied. The interests of the electorate are aggregated and articulated to the government through the vehicle of political parties. Thus, if a democratic system is to

⁴² This distinction is important given the following example: Party A mentions education in 15 percent of their platform. However, we do not know from the coding of the Comparative Manifestos Project whether this 15 percent called for a larger governmental role providing education or less of a governmental role in education. We simply do not know if the party is for or against a particular issue or stance from the coding of the Comparative Manifestos Project. Thus, we truly do not know the *position* of the party, merely the emphasis of the party for this particular issue.

⁴³ One notable exception addressing organizational change is Rohrschneider (1993).

survive and remain stable, its *political parties* must remain vibrant and its party system stable.⁴⁴ Without viable institutions meeting the demands of the public, democracy withers and decays (Easton 1957; Huntington 1965). Within the development of political institutions, the importance of the political party for providing legitimacy and stability cannot be overstated (Huntington 1965). Therefore, political parties are undeniably important for a democracy to function properly. However, the environment in which democracy operates constantly changes prompting its institutions to adapt or face extinction. Thus, it is the *adaptation and reactionary nature of political parties* that drives the stability of democracy.

However, like all large organizations, political parties are reluctant to change. Taking from the discipline of sociology, structural inertia theory asserts that existing organizations frequently have difficulty changing strategy and structure quickly enough to keep pace with the demands of uncertain, changing environments (see Hannan and Freeman 1977 and Aldrich 1979). Inertial pressures (i.e., age and accountability) may make organizations (i.e., political parties) risk averse in times when adaptation is necessary to avoid consequences (e.g., electoral defeat).

Furthermore, population ecology theory argues that organizational forms with the best fit to environmental characteristics will be selected and proliferate. Although this theory assumes *environment determinism* to some extent, this does not mean that the actions of particular individuals do not matter for organizational survival.⁴⁵ Individuals

⁴⁴ The next chapter examines the effects of anti-establishment parties on the stability of the broader party system.

⁴⁵ Scholars often argue that population ecology theory maintains that individual actors cannot affect or manipulate the environment for their advantage. However, there are two reasons for this misconception.

(i.e., party leaders) can clearly influence their organization's future; however, under conditions of uncertainty, there are severe constraints on the ability of party elites to formulate and implement changes that improve organizational success in the face of increased competition. Therefore, in an environment with "high uncertainty, adaptive efforts by individuals may turn out to be essentially random with respect to future value" (Hannan and Freeman 1984: 150). In addition, structural inertia theory holds that organizations that are accountable and reliable are favored by the environment and thus, can survive. However, one negative consequence of this need for accountability and reliability is the high degree of inertia and a resistance to, or impossibility of, change. The process of change itself can be so unsettling as to result in organizational failure or demise; thus, political parties do not undertake the process of change haphazardly or without good reason.

Yet, we do know that political parties change and that this change is oftentimes substantial. However, political parties face a dilemma. Political parties must adapt in pursuit of electoral support while remaining accountable and reliable to their base supporters and the electorate as a whole. Any movement away from the current organizational structures or policy preferences of the party increases the risks and uncertainty about the outcomes of change because parties lack information about how

First, determinism is mistakenly contrasted with *probability*. Whether their actions are intelligent and thought out or foolish and poorly planned, individual actors can clearly influence the future of their organization. Yet, the uncertainty of the environment severely constrains the ability of individual to implement changes that improve organizational success. Second, the confusion may concern the level of analysis (Baum 1996). The actions of individuals matter more to their own organization than they do to the population of organizations as a whole. The actions of particular individuals may not explain much of the diversity in organizational populations given the constraints on the influence of individual actions for variation in organizational properties (Baum 1996).

party members (or activists) will react to change or whether the party will lose credibility within the electorate. Therefore, if we observe change in political parties, the catalyst for change must be significant. In order to overcome this dilemma, parties seek information about public opinion through past election results – both their own performance and the performance of their competitors and rivals (see Janda 1990). I argue that traditional mainstream parties take into account the performance of anti-establishment parties as well as their own performance in past elections when deciding to adapt their ideological profiles or organizational structures.

Building upon previous research, anti-establishment party electoral success acts as an external stimulus, in combination with previous electoral performance, prompting ideological and organizational adaptation within more established parties in the political system. New political parties and social movements challenge the traditional role of established parties as mediators between the governed and the government (Rohrschneider 1993). These new parties demand organizational changes and programmatic changes from the more established parties and are often adept at mobilizing the mass electorate to challenge traditional parties. The emergence, and subsequent electoral success, of new parties and social movements despite the opposition of most established parties indicates a failure of traditional mainstream parties to “perceive citizen’s interests and channel them into the political system” (Rohrschneider 1993: 158). Thus, anti-establishment parties force traditional mainstream parties to adapt to the changing environment or face electoral repercussions. Although there are many forms in which adaptation from establishment parties manifests

itself, organizational and ideological change is the particular focus of this chapter. In particular, establishment parties alter their ideological profiles by shifting their positions on issues advocated by anti-establishment parties and their organizational structures by modifying the power distribution structure within the party, giving rank and file members more of a voice.

Programmatic Change

Downs (1957: 127-128) contends, “some parties—founded by perfectly rational men—are meant to be threats to other parties and not means of getting immediate power or prestige.” Arguably, the greatest influence new parties have on more established parties is to influence the very identity of other parties causing them to alter their ideological positions on key issues (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). New parties have the greatest probability of accomplishing these goals if the party can garner enough electoral support and differ from establishment parties on the issues (Harmel 1997). However, Downs maintains that getting a traditional party to alter its identity is no easy task:

Ideological *immobility* is characteristic of every responsible party, because it cannot repudiate its past actions unless some radical change in conditions justifies this. Therefore its doctrinaire policies alter slowly to meet the needs of the moment. Once more uncertainty is the decisive factor, because it may prevent the party from knowing what policies are most appropriate. In the absence of this knowledge, responsibility makes it ideologically immobile, i.e., tends to encourage slow rather than rapid changes in doctrine. (1957: 110, emphasis in original)

Therefore, as I argue above, establishment parties – in order to remain accountable and reliable to the electorate – do not undertake change in a haphazard or random manner. To do so may spark uncertainty within the party possibly alienating party members and provoking a credibility crisis within the electorate.

However, for new parties, whose own primary purpose is to influence the positions of more established parties, simply contesting elections is not likely to be sufficient cause to prompt an established party to change. Yet, new parties can reduce the uncertainty for established parties by garnering votes – especially if the established party is losing supporters to a new party – indicating shifts within the voting behavior of the electorate (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). In their analysis of the effects of anti-immigrant parties on traditional parties in Norway and Denmark, Harmel and Svåsand (1997) argue:

A nearby, established party is likely to change its positions in a new party's direction only (or at least, most dramatically) when (a) the new party is winning a significant number of votes and/or seats and (b) the established party itself is concurrently experiencing what it considers to be bad elections. (317)

Furthermore, Harmel and Svåsand (1997) contend:

In order for party *A* to be perceived as a relevant *threat* to party *B*, at least two conditions must hold. First, party *A* (here, the new party) must win enough votes and/or seats to be clearly noticed. Though any new formation may be a *potential* threat, of course, it is unlikely that another party will change itself—given the innate conservatism already noted—until there is evidence (i.e., in votes and/or seats) that the threat is real. And second, for party *B* to perceive *A* as a threat to its own well-being, *B* must have reason to believe that *A*'s success is substantial at *B*'s expense (1997: 317, emphasis in original).

This theoretical orientation is consistent with the “performance theory of party change,” which posits parties are conservative organizations, changing only in response to poor electoral performance (see Janda 1990 and Harmel and Svåsand 1997).⁴⁶ It must be noted that a new party need not necessarily win seats to be perceived as a worthy threat.

⁴⁶ For critiques of this “performance” theory, see Deschouwer (1992) and Harmel and Janda (1994)

However, if the established party perceives that it is losing support due to the emergence of a new party, then it is not particularly important for the new party to win seats in the legislature. From this brief discussion, I hypothesize the following:

H3.1: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will influence changes to the issue positions of establishment parties.

I argue that in order to offset the possible threat from anti-establishment parties, traditional parties will change their identity by altering their issue positions (ideological adaptation hypothesis). In particular, these changes should concern the issues on which anti-establishment parties of the left and right campaign. For example, with the definition presented above, anti-establishment parties on the left campaign on environmental issues while anti-establishment parties on the right campaign on immigration issues.

Organizational Change

As mentioned above, Rohrschneider (1993) argues that establishment parties fail to meet the organizational demands of new social movements in Western Europe. More specifically, Rohrschneider (1993) asks how the participatory demands of social movement activists affect the internal organization of established political parties. These movements, particularly on the left side of the political spectrum, are decentralized organizations and attempt to maintain the least amount of centralized authority possible. However, Rohrschneider (1993) contends that these demands pose the biggest challenge for the establishment parties given their hierarchal organizational structure.

The traditional mass parties within Western Europe developed hierarchical structures due to what Michels ([1915] 1962) termed the “iron law of oligarchy.” Large

organizations (i.e., mass parties) experience some degree of oligarchy because these organizations need experts who are able to manage them skillfully, creating a division between leadership and rank and file party members (Michels [1915] 1962). However, anti-establishment parties attempt to maximize the involvement the rank-and-file members within the party. These parties attempt to minimize the dominance of party leadership and place more decision-making opportunities into the hands of ordinary members (Rohrschneider 1993). In order to meet the organizational challenges presented by anti-establishment parties, traditional mainstream parties must alter their own organizational structures (organizational adaptation hypothesis). Thus, it is hypothesized that:

H3.2: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will influence changes to the organizational structures of establishment parties.

For Rohrschneider (1993), this is the most difficult challenge establishment parties face from anti-establishment parties since changing the organizational structures risks alienating either the leadership or rank-and-file party members. Rohrschneider (1993: 168-169) argues:

For instance, the organizational challenge questions the leadership of established oligarchies, thereby undermining the historical distribution of power among party functions. Meeting the organizational challenge would require devolvement of party power from the leadership to activists or even the local rank and file... Furthermore, meeting the organizational challenge would create its own electoral repercussion for parties. For example, if the programmatic appeal of a party to the electorate at large is placed second to activists' interests, traditional constituencies may no longer feel integrated by their party, which may affect a party's overall vote share.

It is easier for traditional parties to shift their policy positions or integrate new issues into their platforms than to fundamentally change their organizational power structures (Rohrschneider 1993). Due to the difficulty in meeting the organizational challenge, traditional parties should be more resistant to changing their organizational structures in order to adapt to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. Furthermore, any change, whether a shift in policy or adaptation of the organizational structure, may alienate the traditional support base of the party.

In summary, I argue that establishment parties will adapt their ideological profiles and organizational structures to counter the threat from anti-establishment parties if their own electoral fortunes decline. Ideological change should be more prevalent than changes to the organizational structures of these parties given the risk of alienating the leadership or support base of the party. Thus, as anti-establishment parties steal votes from traditional mainstream parties, established parties must adapt in order to remain viable electoral alternatives.

Data and Methods

I employ multiple methods to examine these hypotheses. First, I conducted 21 interviews with party officials from 18 parties – both establishment and anti-establishment parties – and two academics in six countries.⁴⁷ I conducted these interviews with officials in various positions within these parties including party chairman, deputy party leader, general secretary (or secretary general), organizational

⁴⁷ I conducted these interviews in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. Two officials were interviewed from the Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*) in Norway. In addition, I conducted two interviews with leading academics in Denmark and Norway.

secretary, international secretary, members of the national board for the party, members of parliament, and directors of the research department or institute for the party. These interviews asked open-ended questions related to organizational and ideological changes, and the stimulus for this change, within both establishment and anti-establishment parties.⁴⁸ Moreover, interviews conducted with anti-establishment party officials asked questions pertaining to the impacts of the party on other competitors within the system and on the larger party system. Thus, these interviews concentrated on party adaptation within both types of parties along with its causes and the effects of anti-establishment parties in particular.

Second, I utilize coding schemes developed for the Party Change Project to determine issue positions from the text of party platforms. Specifically, I measure, among a series of published *election* platforms for both anti-establishment parties and their closest (ideologically) establishment rival, stated policy positions for nineteen issues. It must be noted that there is a legitimate distinction between parties' stated positions and the actual behavior of these parties while in government (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). For the purposes of these analyses, I am only interested in the former.⁴⁹ For each of these issues, there are 11 possible positions operationalized with each position assigned a value ranging from -5 (for extreme left) to +5 (for extreme right)

⁴⁸ These questions and confidentiality statement are provided in Appendix B.

⁴⁹ I recognize, as other scholars have, that parties may choose to state more extreme positions within their platforms in order to placate or please some segment of the electorate or their base supporters. However, the nature of coalitional politics often necessitates a moderation of stated policy positions in a party's platform. Regardless, election platforms are carefully constructed statements of party identity having strategic value and changes from one platform to the next reflect *deliberate decisions* of the party to alter their identity (Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 321, emphasis in original).

(see also Harmel and Svåsand 1997).⁵⁰ Using these coding schemes, I assigned an appropriate value based upon reading the relevant content in the electoral platform of the party. This process is repeated for all platforms during the time period under examination (1970-2005).⁵¹

In order to identify changes within the platforms of establishment parties, it is first necessary to identify its position along the continuum of possible positions in the platforms covering the relevant time period. Furthermore, it is necessary to determine the position of the anti-establishment party in order to ascertain which changes, undertaken by establishment parties, might be attributed to the effect of anti-establishment party electoral success. Finally, although it is possible to produce data on all nineteen issues, I analyze only issues that are most applicable (i.e., those issues most closely related to anti-establishment party support) given the theoretical orientation of this study. These include, but are not limited to, issues that fit the left-right dimension of politics (i.e., taxes, social services, and the scope of government) as well as “narrower” issues such as the environment and immigration.

Analysis and Findings

The analyses below demonstrate mixed support for these hypotheses. In several of the countries, anti-establishment party electoral success, in combination with poor electoral performance, leads to programmatic and, albeit to a lesser extent, organizational adaptation within establishment parties within the party system. However,

⁵⁰ The judgmental coding schemes were developed for the Party Change Project funded by the National Science Foundation (SES-91112491 and SES-9112357) with Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda as principal investigators. These coding schemes are included in Appendix C.

⁵¹ For non-English platforms, I used both SYSTRAN translation software as well internet-based translation applications to translate these platforms.

in other countries the effects of anti-establishment parties are not quite as strong as would be expected given the strength of electoral support for these new countries. In particular, organizational adaptation is not as prevalent as expected. However, this may be due, in part, to the fact that it is easier for establishment parties to shift their ideological positions or integrate new issues into their platforms than to fundamentally change their organizational power structures as Rohrschneider (1993) points out. Each category of change (i.e., programmatic and organizational) is discussed separately below.

Analysis: Programmatic Change

In order to effectively present the findings concerning programmatic change, I report on each country in these analyses separately below. These analyses provide strong support for the hypothesis that anti-establishment parties are indeed a stimulus to change in the policy positions of traditional mainstream parties. In countries where anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum garner significant electoral support, parties of the establishment are indeed shifting their policy positions particularly on issues central to anti-establishment party electoral success. Thus, for the most part, the ideological adaptation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3.1) is supported by the evidence from six Western European nations.

Austria. Table 3.1 shows results for 11 Austrian parliamentary elections between 1970 and 2002. From these results, we can see the electoral success of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum in Austria. Given the theoretical orientation of this chapter, we should expect to see the Social Democratic Party of Austria (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*, SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party

(*Österreichische Volkspartei*, ÖVP) alter their ideological profiles especially during the 1990s as both the Austrian Greens (*Die Grünen*, GRÜNE) and the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) gained in electoral strength and these two establishment parties lose electoral support at the polls. However, we should only expect ideological change if the SPÖ and the ÖVP believe Die Grünen and the FPÖ are challenging and stealing votes from these parties.

Table 3.1: Austrian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1970-2002
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats)

Party	1970	1971	1975	1979	1983	1986	1990	1994	1995	1999	2002
ÖVP	44.7 79	43.1 80	43.0 80	41.9 77	43.2 81	41.3 77	32.1 60	27.7 52	28.3 53	26.9 52	42.3 79
SPÖ	48.4 81	50.0 93	50.4 93	51.0 95	47.7 90	43.1 80	42.8 80	34.9 65	38.1 71	33.2 65	36.5 69
FPÖ	5.5 5	5.5 10	5.4 10	6.6 11	5.0 12	9.7 18	16.6 33	22.5 42	21.9 40	26.9 52	10.0 18
GRÜNE	- -	- -	- -	- -	1.9 -	4.8 8	4.8 10	7.3 13	4.8 9	7.4 14	9.5 17

Key: ÖVP: Austrian People's Party; SPÖ: Social Democratic Party of Austria; FPÖ: Freedom Party of Austria; GRÜNE: The Greens

The interviews confirm that anti-establishment parties are seen as challenging traditional parties in Austria. When asked how the party challenges establishment parties with the system, an official with Die Grünen argued:

Well, I think there is, of course, that the Greens take the voters from them, so we are in competition, so there's a new player they have to be in competition with them.... And they also, what happened was that the bigger parties take some topics from the Greens in their identity.... So ten years ago nobody would talk about ecology. And now also the other parties are taking some topics and think that they really may be important, so they changed in parts of their programmes.

Despite this influence from both sides of the political spectrum, establishment parties within the Austrian system (i.e., SPÖ and ÖVP) reacted differently to this challenge. A party official in SPÖ stated:

The Greens attacked us from the left, and the Haider party [FPÖ] from the right. The Greens were attractive for the young, educated people, more left. And the Haider party, yes, they all were attracted for the workers, for the older people and for the lower educated people. We had a very difficult situation. And that's the background of why we had many discussions about our future and our possibilities to handle this situation. The influence has gone down, but we have to see that it is finished.... I think we, we lost to the left and to the right. The Green voters who were especially young people, first voters.

However, the ÖVP, who faced a significant challenge on the right from the FPÖ, did not react to this challenge in the same manner. An ÖVP official argued:

The values, on which the party is considered to be built, didn't change at all. There may be, because of demographic changes, or maybe because of changes in society, like the standing of women or the importance of the Cold War ending, or because of the European Union, but there always has been ... the Christian social value system.

Thus, the core values of the ÖVP did not change to counter the growing electoral threat of anti-establishment parties in Austria.

Evidence from the election manifestos suggests that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in Austria forced establishment parties to alter their ideological profiles. As we can see from Table 3.2, the SPÖ moved to the left on “key” issues, championed by the anti-establishment left, during the period of increased support for Die Grünen. Given recent election results of SPÖ, the average *net* change of 1.375 (with a *maximum* change of 1.5) to the left across these eight issues conforms to the theoretical

expectations posited above.⁵² Combining this observation with support for Die Grünen, we see evidence confirming the “hybrid” performance hypothesis.


Table 3.2: Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	-1 to -3	-2	-2
Income taxes	-1 (to -3) to -2	-2	-1
Total taxes	-2 to -2	0	0
Scope of government	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Social Services	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Environment	-1 to -3	-2	-2
Women's Rights	-1 to -3	-2	-2
Minority Rights	-2 to -4	-2	-2

Despite this tabular evidence of ideological adaptation, the best manner in which to demonstrate this change is graphically. Figure 3.1 shows the movement of the SPÖ during this period on the issue of the environment. As we can see, the SPÖ dramatically shift their position (-1 to -3) towards the position of Die Grünen on this issue. Moreover, other establishment parties shifted their positions concerning the environment. The effects of the electoral success of Die Grünen reach across the center to the right side of the political spectrum as the ÖVP shifts its position from a right-oriented +1 to a left-oriented -1.

⁵² *Net* change refers to the entire position change from the beginning to the end of the period under investigation for a particular issue for a particular party. *Maximum* change refers to the distance between a party's two most extreme positions on a particular issue during the period under investigation. Thus, if a party moves from a +1 to a +4 during this period and then back to a +3 before the end of this period, then the *net* change would be a +2 whereas the *maximum* change would be +3.

Figure 3.1: Austrian party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), Social Democrats (SPÖ), People's Party (ÖVP), and Freedom Party (FPÖ)⁵³



⁵³ As with all of the figures presented in this chapter, the years on the left side represent election years for the particular country.


Despite information gathered during the interview with the ÖVP, evidence from the elections manifestos of the ÖVP does indeed provide support, although weaker than expected, for the ideological adaptation hypothesis. Given the recent swings in electoral results for the ÖVP and the meteoric rise of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ),⁵⁴ the average *net* change of 0.875 and an average *maximum* change of 1.00 to the right is less than expected given the theoretical orientation of this chapter. Table 3.3 displays the movement of the ÖVP on seven issues. On two of the “key” issues (scope of government and immigration), the ÖVP dramatically shifted its policy position in the direction of the FPÖ. However, on the issue of taxes, the party did not significantly shift its position. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the change of the ÖVP on the issue of immigration towards the position of the FPÖ. As we can see, the ÖVP shifts its position to the right. Interestingly, the SPÖ also shifted its policy position on immigration slightly to the right during this period. This suggests that the influence of the FPÖ reaches across the center of the political spectrum.

Table 3.3: Selected Issue Positions of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	+1 to +3	+2	+2
Income taxes	+2 to +3	+1	+1
Total taxes	+3 to +3	0	0
Scope of government	+2 (to +4) to +3	+2	+1
Social Services	+2 to +2	0	0
State Ownership	+1 to +2	+1	+1
Immigration	+1 to +3	+2	+2

⁵⁴ The ÖVP experienced a sharp decline in electoral support in the 1990s at the same time the FPÖ experienced its greatest electoral success. In 1990, the ÖVP garnered 32.1 per cent of the vote down 9.2 per cent from 1986. In the same election, the FPÖ gained 6.9 per cent (9.7 to 16.6) from the previous election. In 1999, the ÖVP reach its electoral low point garnering the same amount of support as the FPÖ (26.9 per cent).

Figure 3.2: Austrian party positions on immigration for Greens (G), Social Democrats (SPÖ), People's Party (ÖVP), and Freedom Party (FPÖ)



The SPÖ changed more in the direction of Die Grünen than the ÖVP changed in the direction of the FPÖ. Despite the fact that the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) gained

more electoral support than the Greens and the two traditional parties both lost support in numerous elections, SPÖ undertook more ideological change than the ÖVP. Thus, the changes of the SPÖ strongly support the ideological adaptation hypothesis whereas the ideological change of the ÖVP lends support to this hypothesis to a lesser extent.

Belgium. Like Austria, anti-establishment parties are successful on both sides of the political spectrum in Belgium. On the left side of the spectrum, the Flemish Greens (*GROEN!*), along with their Walloon sister party *Ecolo*, gained steadily in the electoral

Table 3.4: Belgian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2003
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats)

Party	1971	1974	1977	1978	1981	1985	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003
VLD	16.7 34	15.2 30	15.5 33	15.5 37	12.9 28	10.7 22	11.5 25	12.0 26	13.1 21	14.3 23	15.4 25
CD&V	30.0 67	32.3 72	36.0 80	36.3 82	19.3 43	21.3 49	19.5 43	16.8 39	17.2 29	14.1 22	13.3 21
PS	27.2 61	26.7 59	27.0 62	25.4 58	12.7 35	13.8 35	15.6 40	13.5 35	11.9 21	10.2 19	13.0 25
VB	- -	- -	- -	- -	1.1 1	1.4 1	1.9 2	6.6 12	7.8 11	9.9 15	11.7 18
ECOL											
O	- -	- -	- -	- -	2.2 2	2.5 5	2.6 3	5.1 10	4.0 6	7.4 11	3.1 4
GROE											
N!	- -	- -	- -	- -	2.3 2	3.7 4	4.5 6	4.9 7	4.4 5	7.0 9	2.5 -

Key: VLD: Flemish Liberals and Democrats; CD&V: Christian Democratic and Flemish; PS: Socialist Party; VB: Flemish Bloc; ECOLO: Ecologists; GROEN! (1982-2003: Agalev, Live in Another Way); N-VA: New Flemish Alliance (1954-1999: People's Union, VU); FN: National Front.

arena peaking with seven per cent of the vote in the 1999 parliamentary elections. On the right of side of the spectrum, Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang*, formerly *Vlaams Blok*, VB) continues to increase its vote share despite being isolated by the establishment parties in the political system.

Table 3.4 displays the results from 11 parliamentary elections in Belgium between 1971 and 2003. As we can see from these election results, establishment parties on both sides of the spectrum have seen declines in electoral support since the late 1980s. This is due, in no small part, to the emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties that challenge the establishment, according to an official with the Flemish Greens who contends:

The entrance of Green parties in parliament has had quite an impressive effect on the party system and mainly the topics that were discussed in parliament and politics in general. I think that Green parties had an impact on the political agenda by putting things like ecology, environment on the agenda.... The effect was actually quite big; all the parties have changed their party programme. They had to introduce chapters on environment, on ecology, on energy, and I think this has to do with the presence of Greens in parliament and local councils and in several governments as well.... I think that the main influence we had maybe it was not so much on the organization of other parties, but mainly on agenda setting, introduction of new, relatively new themes, in political debates in parliament and in local councils.

When asked specifically if the Flemish Greens challenged the establishment in Belgium, the official stated:

We are a challenger. And I think, let's say up to some years ago, we were more than we are now an anti-establishment party... so that can play a role as well, but we have been an anti-establishment party and I think we are still perceived more or less this by the issues we promote, by the other parties, because I think in a way they know that what we are saying is correct, but they are not willing to know it because it threatens what they are standing for. If you really want to change a society in an ecological

way, it's a serious change, of course, and you see it as well when you look at the history of concepts like sustainable development or sustainability. Again and again the concepts have been, how shall I say, taken over and pacified, in a sense, so made less dangerous for the system... And that, of course, is the strategy of the established party, of the established order... to try to minimize the message we have been carrying along all these years. I think if you see the political agenda in Europe let's say the past ten, 20 years on the environmental and ecological issues, we have had quite an impact on mainstream politics.

On the right side of the spectrum, Vlaams Belang remain isolated within the political system in what has been labeled as a "*cordon sanitaire*" or "quarantine line" put in place by an agreement among establishment parties. A party official within the Vlaams Belang stated:

In the beginning of the nineties all Belgian political parties signed sort of treaty that they will never do business with Vlaams Blok. It's very undemocratic. It would be unthinkable. In fact, it is always unbearable to democracy... now it would be unthinkable but it existed and it still exists. And it damages us as a political party.

Despite the quarantine, Vlaams Belang challenge the establishment in terms of ideology and specific ideologically stances.

We forced the established parties to take positions towards some thorny social issues and moreover, succeeded in making them outline a more right-wing policy. We pay a lot of attention to the actual realization of this policy and we will not hesitate to judge them on their pledges... Flemish political parties are moving over to the right. This evolution is more in accordance with the average political preference in Flanders, which is moderate right-wing... We challenge the ideological consensus of a political practice and... the ideological merger to the center.

From these two interviews, it would appear that anti-establishment parties on both sides of the spectrum challenge the establishment prompt ideological adaptation from establishment parties.

Indeed, establishment parties in Belgium reacted to the emergence of successful anti-establishment parties. In discussing the effect of the Flemish Greens, a prominent party official from the Christian Democratic and Flemish (*Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams*, CD&V) stated:

If we go to environmental policy, and show that it is an issue now for our party, it was hardly one in 1999. Is that because of standpoints that the Greens took? Probably yes. But at least, because they were first, they are first, and at a certain point of time, not only because they take this point of view, but we can see that in a way that they were [quicker] than us seeing that we have to do something about environmental policies. So all these things helped to a certain point in time to realize that this is something where we have to make standpoints and where we have to come up with solutions for problems that actually are presenting themselves. And I think the Greens were first. So it's difficult to say it is because of what the Greens told us, but we have to admit that they were first, and that in a way on some point of view we have been followers.

However, the Vlaams Belang also concerns the *Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams* party:

But of course Vlaams Belang taking twenty-five percent of it, or about twenty percent now of the voters, is not good, and it has taken away voters from us... So we know that if Vlaams Belang now is on twenty percent, twenty-five almost, I think who lost votes to Vlaams Belang, Socialist Liberals and us, all traditional parties lost voters to Vlaams Belang... not just VLD, because you could say that they are closer, but certainly we lost a lot of voters to Vlaams Belang.

In addition, changes within Belgian society contributed to the adaptation of election manifestos. This party official argued, “of course there is an influence from the change in society on programmes. Some parties on some topics are quicker and faster to respond to some problem and other parties will follow and have different standpoints.” Thus, as anti-establishment parties respond to the discontent within the electorate (see Chapter I), these parties continue to threaten parties of the establishment.

Table 3.5: Selected Issue Positions of the Socialist Party of Belgium (PS), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	-1 (to -3) to -2	-2	-1
Income taxes	-1 to -2	-1	-1
Total taxes	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Scope of government	-2 (to -4) to -3	-2	-1
Social Services	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Environment	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Women's Rights	-1 to -3	-2	-2
Minority Rights	-2 to -4	-2	-2

Table 3.5 shows the movement of the Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste*, PS) in Belgium. Given the decline in electoral support for the party since the 1980s and the steady electoral support of the Flemish Greens, the changes within their party manifestos confirm the ideological adaptation hypothesis. The average *net* change of 1.25, with an average *maximum* change of 1.5, to the left across these eight issues demonstrates the movement of the Socialist Party towards the position of the Flemish Greens. However, on the key issues of taxes, social services and the environment, the movement of the Socialist Party was not as pronounced. This may be due, in part, to the fact that the Flemish Greens fail to garner more than seven per cent of the vote. Thus, while the Flemish Greens push left-oriented anti-establishment issues onto the agenda challenging the mainstream traditional parties, they fail to garner significant electoral support or representation in parliament. Figure 3.3 displays the movement of the establishment parties in Belgium on the issue of the environment protection. Interestingly, the right-center Christian Democrats experienced the most dramatic shift on this issue. Thus, the influence of the Flemish Greens reaches across the center of the political spectrum.

Figure 3.3: Belgian party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), Socialist Party (PS), Christian Democrats (CD), and Flemish Interest (VB)




Table 3.6: Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democrats and Flemish in Belgium (CD&V), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	+1 to +2	+1	+1
Income taxes	+2 to +3	+1	+1
Total taxes	+2 to +3	+1	+1
Scope of government	+1 to +3	+2	+2
Social Services	+2 to +3	+1	+1
State Ownership	+1 to +2	+1	+1
Immigration	+1 (to +3) to +2	+2	+1

The CD&V shifted their policy positions in response to anti-establishment parties. On average, the party shifted its positions 1.14 (*net change*) to the right (1.285 average *maximum change*). Thus, as the CD&V slipped at the polls since the mid-1980s and Vlaams Belang made electoral gains during the same period, the party shifted its positions to the right on these seven issues. Furthermore, on the “key” issues of scope of government and immigration, the party dramatically shifted its position towards Vlaams Belang.⁵⁵ Table 3.6 shows the results of this analysis. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the movement of traditional mainstream parties on the issue of immigration. The figure shows that establishment parties shift their policy positions to the right on this issue. Interestingly, Vlaams Belang shifts its policy slightly to the left in the mid-1990s.


This shift in their ideological position, taken from their election programme, confirms the interview conducted with an official in Vlaams Belang:

Since the mid-nineties the repatriation policy for non-European Union foreigners has been replaced by the watchword “assimilation or

⁵⁵ On the issue of immigration, the CD&V moderated its position in the late 1990s. Thus, this shift towards the position of Vlaams Belang does not appear as dramatic in Table 3.6. Figure 3.4 offers a better graphically display of the party’s shift in this issue.

repatriation". It's not that we adapted our program to reality; on the contrary, we think a political programme needs to be practically attainable. That explains why we replaced the policy of unexceptional repatriation with a firm discourse pleading for an integration policy.

Figure 3.4: Belgian party positions on immigration for Greens (G), Socialist Party (PS), Christian Democrats (CD), and Flemish Interest (VB)



Denmark. Table 3.7 displays the results from 14 Danish parliamentary elections from 1971-2005. These results show that anti-establishment parties are very successful in Denmark. On the left, the Socialist People's Party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*, SF) carries the anti-establishment flag pressing an environmentalist agenda. On the right, the Progress Party (*Fremskridtspartiet*, FRP) exploded onto the political scene in 1973 garnering 15.9 per cent of the vote. However, the FRP split in 1995 after a long internal fight for power. As a result, many members, most notably Pia Kjærsgaard, the leader of the Progress Party at that time, left and formed the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*, DF). Since the split, the Danish People's Party steadily increased their electoral share whereas the FRP failed to garner more than one per cent of the vote in 2001 parliamentary elections and did not run candidates in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Thus, much like the establishment parties in Austria and Belgium, the traditional mainstream parties in Denmark must protect themselves from electoral threats on both sides of the political spectrum.

The Socialist People's Party challenges establishment parties particularly on the issue of the environment. A high-ranking party official stated:

The way we have run the issues of climate change and on the environmental question have been undoubtedly adopted by the other parties... Quite often, if other parties shift to our standpoint, or hear our point of view, then we take it as a victory.

On the right side of the spectrum, the Danish People's Party challenges the traditional mainstream parties particularly, as most extreme right parties in Western Europe do, on the issue on immigration and the issue of Denmark's relationship with the European

Union (EU). A Member of Parliament (MP) representing the Danish People's Party argued:

In the beginning, we had two goals; that was a change to the policy concerning immigration in Denmark and also to protect ourselves from transferring power from the Danish Parliament to Brussels. The two goals have in some way both been reached, but I think the greatest success is the immigration laws... [the] new immigration law ...concerning asylum – the amount [of immigrants] getting asylum in Denmark but also the amount of family reunifications which was a big problem in 2001 and the years before that. So, I think if you ask me this is the biggest success. Because now we have a number of immigrants that we can control and where we can start integrating many people who come to Denmark.

Table 3.7: Danish Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2005
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats)

Party	1971	1973	1975	1977	1979	1981	1984	1987	1988	1990	1994	1998	2001	2005
SD	37.3 70	25.6 46	29.9 53	37 65	38.3 68	32.9 59	31.6 56	29.3 54	29.8 55	37.4 69	34.6 62	36.0 63	29.1 52	25.8 47
V	15.6 30	12.3 22	23.3 42	12 21	12.5 22	11.3 20	12.1 22	10.5 19	11.8 22	15.8 29	23.3 42	24 42	31.3 56	29.0 52
KF	16.7 31	9.2 16	5.5 10	8.5 15	12.5 22	14.5 26	23.4 42	20.8 38	19.3 35	16.0 30	15.0 27	8.9 16	9.1 16	10.3 19
DF	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	7.4 13	12.0 22	13.3 24
SF	9.1 17	6 11	5 9	3.9 7	5.9 11	11.3 21	11.5 21	14.6 27	13 24	8.3 15	7.3 13	7.5 13	6.4 12	6.0 11
RV	14.4 27	11.2 20	7.1 13	3.6 6	5.4 10	5.1 9	5.5 10	6.2 11	5.6 10	3.5 7	4.6 8	3.9 7	5.2 9	9.2 16
FRP	- -	15.9 28	13.6 24	14.6 26	11 20	8.9 16	3.6 6	4.8 9	9 16	6.4 12	6.4 11	2.4 4	0.6 -	- -

Key: SD: Social Democrats; V: Left - Denmark's Liberal Party; KF: Conservative People's Party; DF: Danish People's Party; SF: Socialist People's Party; RV: Radical Left; FRP: Progress Party.

The electoral success of the Danish People's Party caught the eye of academia as well. A leading scholar on political parties in Denmark argued:

The party turned Danish politics upside down because it's always been the center parties and more of this moderate force... and now you have on your right side a party with a very explicit agenda and a very narrow defined issue. [The government] majority had to cooperate with the Danish People's Party and it was very clever and very good at saying, it okay, we support you on this part, but we have to have this and this and this conversation. Danish parties have changed rather dramatically since 2001.

The consequences of this electoral success reach across the center of the political spectrum as the party steals voters from the left-oriented Social Democratic Party (*Socialdemokratiet*, SD).

The voters, many of the Social Democratic voters actually vote for the Danish People's Party. And that's the part of the Social Democratic Party, which always has been there, intolerance in their perspective, very narrow in their perspective... So that section of the Social Democratic Party, they left the party and voted for the Danish People's Party and they are still there. No doubt about it. Because the Danish People's Party is clever on that... many people say that they are the Social Democratic Party of the fifties.

Thus, the influence of the Danish People's Party is wide ranging within the political system in Denmark.

Despite this influence, officials in the Conservative People's Party (*Konservative Folkeparti*, KF), the closest rival to the Danish People's Party on the right side of the spectrum, argue that this new competitor exerts more influence on the Social Democrats. Officials in the party argued:

We can defend the discussion about our values. We have switched them from more traditional right/left discussions to a discussion about values. And, if you said, is that our change to a more right wing party, I don't think so because we take the more traditional issue like taxation... instead

of talking left and right on an economical scale, certainly you have this value scale... that adds a different dimension to the debate. [T]he Danish People's Party have been able to sort of like grab the left voters who tend to have a critical view about immigrants or some would say xenophobic and the Liberal Party has been very good or taking those swing voters back to the Liberal Party.

A prominent member of the Social Democrats echoed these sentiments:

We have adopted some political issues from the right side. To actually use some of the foreign issues and it is mostly those two issues [taxation and immigration] that we have adopted – adopted some of the right political party issues. The immigration issues, I think that is because of the Danish Peoples Party. It seems like that.

As can be seen in Table 3.5, the Social Democrats experienced two consecutive elections in which the party lost significant support. When asked whether this support was lost to anti-establishment parties, the party official stated:

We lost to the Socialist People's Party mostly. And five years ago, it was to the Danish People's Party. But I think we have lost what we should lose to those parties. And it was on the immigration issue that we lost there. The members and voters who were afraid of what is going to happen with the organization and mostly elderly people who didn't think that we could deal with that properly – with immigration and whether it would be safe to go out in the evenings, and all those things like that. And I think five years ago we lost, you know, that way. Now, we are losing to the Socialist People's Party. And that is, I think, because we have turned a little to the right or towards the middle.

Anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum attacked the Social Democrats. The Danish People's Party stole working class and elderly voters from the party whereas the Socialist People's Party stole support as the Social Democrats attempted to move right to counter the threat from the Danish People's Party. Table 3.8 displays the movement of the Social Democrats on eight issues. The evidence presented confirms the information gather from the interviews. The Social Democrats

moved to the right on several issues and to the left on others. When we consider the decline in electoral support for the party since the 1990s, this suggests that the party was indeed under attack from anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum. The average *net* and *maximum* change for the party was 0.5 to the left. Thus, the party shifted slightly more to the left overall. On the “key” issue of the environment, the Social Democrats moved considerably towards the position of the Socialist People’s Party. In addition, Figure 3.5 shows that the Conservative People’s Party (KF) dramatically shifted its position to the left crossing the centrist position.

Table 3.8: Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democrats in Denmark (SD), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	-3 (to -4) to -3	+2	0
Income taxes	-3 to -2	+1	+1
Total taxes	-5 to -5	0	0
Scope of government	-5 (to -4) to -3	+1	+2
Social Services	-5 (to -4) to -5	-1	0
Environment	-1 (to -3) to -4	-3	-3
Women’s Rights	-3 to -5	-2	-2
Minority Rights	-1 (to -2) to -3	-2	-2

Figure 3.5: Danish party positions on environmental protection for Socialist People's Party (SF), Social Democrats (S), and Conservative People's Party (KF)




Table 3.9 displays the ideological adaptation of the Conservative People's Party (KF). The average *net* and average *maximum* change was 2.00. Given the rise of the Danish People's Party and the decline of party support in the 1990s, one might expect the KF to adapt or shift their policy position more than they did during this period. However, the Danish Conservatives moved considerably to the right on several of the "key" issues championed by the anti-establishment right. On the issue of the scope of the government, the KF shifted its position dramatically to the right towards the position of the Danish People's Party.


Table 3.9: Selected Issue Positions of the Conservative People's Party of Denmark (KF), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	-1 to -1	0	0
Income taxes	+1 to +1	0	0
Total taxes	0 to +1	+1	+1
Scope of government	-3 to +2	+5	+5
Social Services	-5 to -1	+4	+4
State Ownership	0 to +2	+2	+2
Immigration	+1 to +3	+2	+2

Figure 3.6 demonstrates the movement of Danish political parties on the issue of immigration. From this, we can see that the influence of the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party reaches across the center of the political spectrum. The Conservative People's Party shifted their position towards the position on the Progress/Danish People's Party in the late 1980s. The Social Democrats move to counter this electoral threat by shifting their position on the issue of immigration in the early 1990s.

Furthermore, the Social Democrats dramatically shifted their position from the left to the right side of the political spectrum. This confirms the information gathered from the interview with the Social Democrats. The party has indeed adopted “some political

Figure 3.6: Danish party positions on immigration for Socialist People’s Party (SF), Social Democrats (S), Conservative People’s Party (KF), and Progress/ Danish People’s Party (P/DF)



issues from the right side.” The influence of the Progress/ Danish People’s Party reaches anti-establishment parties on the left side of the spectrum as well. The Socialist People’s Party shifted their position slightly to the right in the late 1990s. Thus, on the issue of immigration, the Progress Party and now the Danish People’s Party reach across the political spectrum forcing establishment parties to adapt and change their policy positions.

Germany. Table 3.10 shows the results of ten parliamentary elections in Germany from 1972-2005. Within the German party system, the anti-establishment movement has arguably the most successful Greens party (*Die Grünen*, GRÜNE) in Western Europe; however, the anti-establishment movement on the right has never organized effectively to challenge the traditional mainstream parties of the establishment. More recently, a new left-oriented anti-establishment party *Die Linke* (LINKE) emerged creating another challenge to the establishment. Given the theoretical orientation of this chapter and these election results left-oriented establishment parties are more likely to alter their ideological profiles than establishment parties on the right.

Table 3.10: German Election Results, Selected Parties, 1972-2005
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats)

Party	1972	1976	1980	1983	1987	1990	1994	1998	2002	2005
SPD	45.8 242	42.6 224	42.9 228	38.2 202	37.0 193	33.5 239	36.4 252	40.9 298	38.5 251	34.2 222
CDU	35.2 186	38.0 201	34.2 185	38.2 202	34.5 185	36.7 268	34.2 244	28.4 198	29.5 190	27.8 180
CSU	9.7 48	10.6 53	10.3 52	10.6 53	9.8 49	7.1 51	7.3 50	6.7 47	9.0 58	7.4 46
FDP	8.4 42	7.9 40	10.6 54	7.0 35	9.1 48	11.0 79	6.9 47	6.2 43	7.4 47	9.8 61
GRÜNE	- -	- -	1.5 -	5.6 28	8.3 44	5.0 8	7.3 49	6.7 47	8.6 55	8.1 51
LINKE	0.3 -	0.3 -	0.2 -	0.2 -	- -	2.4 17	4.4 30	5.1 36	4.0 2	8.7 54
REP	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2.1 -	1.9 -	1.8 -	0.6 -	0.6 -

Key: SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany; CDU: Christian Democratic Union of Germany; CSU: Christian-Social Union in Bavaria; FDP: Free Democratic Party; GRÜNE: Federation 90/The Greens; LINKE: The Left; REP: Republicans

The interviews with two establishment parties in Germany confirm this expectation. An official with the Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD) confirmed that the party focused more on environmental issues after the emergence of *Die Grünen* in the 1980s.

As the Greens came up, the SPD focused much more on environmental issues. One could say that [we changed] in a programmatic way but in a very practical way as well when we were in power until '82.

The SPD does not see *Die Grünen* as an anti-establishment party, but does view the party as a *competitor* and *ally* within the system.

[T]he Greens have been our closest ally since I would say the mid-eighties or since the beginning of the nineties, so that's the reason why we were in government with them for seven and a half years.... So, of course they are our main competitors within the political system, but in a way they are part of a left alliance within the German political system.

However, the SPD reacted to the emergence and electoral success of Greens by adopting their issues and attempting to forge alliances with this new challenger.

We mainly reacted by adopting Green issues. We did it in a credible way for some voters, not for all the voters, but if you look at the polls, most of the people, or most of the electorate, says that the SPD is more competent than, for example, the Conservatives in questions of the environment and all the other Green issues... So the first reaction was, as I said, that we adopted a couple of Green issues in a pretty successful way. And the second point is that we tried to forge alliances with them...

Like the anti-establishment right in Denmark, the influence of *Die Grünen* reaches across the center of the political spectrum. A department head within the center-right Christian Democratic Union of Germany (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU) argued that *Die Grünen* presented a problem for the party:

From my perspective, we have a problem with the Greens in that the values people supporting the Greens [have]... they are close to the values of supporters of [the] CDU. So we are thinking about nature and environmental protection in a very close way... And so, and we are looking at the same pool of people from where we can get support. And then we are in competition with the Greens.

Thus, the Greens may influence the CDU, but the CDU does not have an effective anti-establishment challenger on the right side of the political spectrum.

Table 3.11: Selected Issue Positions of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	+4 to +1	-3	-3
Income taxes	-3 to -2	+1	+1
Total taxes	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Scope of government	-3 to -4	-1	-1
Social Services	-5 (to -3) to -5	-2	0
Environment	-2 to -4	-2	-2
Women's Rights	-1 to -3	-2	-2
Minority Rights	0 to -2	-2	-2

Table 3.11 displays the policy positions of the SPD on eight issues from 1970 to 2005. On these eight issues, the party had an average *net* change of 1.25 to the left and an average *maximum* change of 1.5 to the left. On the “key” issues of the scope of government and environment, the party moved towards the position of the Greens.⁵⁶ This magnitude of change is expected given the decline in party support in the 1990s and the steady support for the Greens during this time. The influence of the Greens can be seen in Figure 3.7. On the issue of environmental protection, the SPD gradual shifted its position to the left during this time. This shift demonstrates the reaction of the SPD to the anti-establishment threat by “adopting Green issues.” The gradual nature of this shift also points to the party adopting this issue in a “credible way” instead of drastically shifting their positions from one election to the next. On the right side of the party system, the CDU dramatically shifts its position in 1990 towards the position of the

⁵⁶ On the issue of social services, the SPD moved to the right only to return to the position of the Greens later during the period under examination.

Greens. Thus, the traditional mainstream parties in Germany shifted their positions on this issue in the direction of an anti-establishment party.

Figure 3.7: German party positions on environmental protection for Greens (G), Social Democrats (SPD), and Christian Democrats (CDU)




Table 3.12 shows the ideological movement of the CDU along the political spectrum. As expected, the CDU has not significantly altered their ideological positions. The average *net* change, as well as average *maximum* change, was 0.86 on these seven issues. With no credible anti-establishment threat on the right, the CDU shifts to the right on only two of these issues. The party shifted to the left on three of the issues while not changing its positions on two of these issues. Thus, the CDU shifted more towards the position of the Greens during the period than towards any anti-establishment threat on the right. To some extent, this finding corresponds to the hypothesis posited above. Although the CDU lost electoral support in the 1990s, the lack of a significant anti-establishment threat to the party has not prompted the party to shift its positions in that direction. Instead, as the interview suggested, the party faced a challenge from the anti-establishment left. Therefore, the party shifted more to the left to counter this anti-establishment threat.

Table 3.12: Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	0 to (to -1) to +1	+2	+1
Income taxes	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Total taxes	-3 to -3	0	0
Scope of government	+3 (to +2) to +3	-1	0
Social Services	-4 (to -3) to -5	-2	-2
State Ownership	+3 to -3	-6	-6
Immigration	-1 to +1	+2	+2

The Netherlands. The electoral success of anti-establishment parties in the Netherlands fluctuates during this period. Table 3.13 shows results from 11 Dutch parliamentary elections from 1971 to 2003. On the left side of the spectrum, the GreenLeft (*GroenLinks*, GL) campaign on an environmental agenda and average 5.4 per cent of the electoral vote. On the other side of the spectrum, the anti-establishment right enjoyed recent electoral success with List Pim Fortuyn (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, LPF). During its brief existence, the party pushed for tougher action against immigrants who did not assimilate into Dutch culture, tougher measures to fight crime, and for a smaller role (or scope) of government. Days before the 2002 election, the leader of the party, Pim Fortuyn was assassinated following a radio interview. Despite this, the LPF gained 17 per cent of the vote. However, following this electoral breakthrough, the party only gained 5.7 per cent of the vote in the 2003 parliamentary elections. In the 2006 general elections, the party failed to receive enough votes to secure a seat in parliament. Despite the steady electoral success of the anti-establishment left and the “flash-in-the-pan” meteoric rise of the anti-establishment right, traditional mainstream parties have not lost significant electoral support (one exception being the 2002 election for the Labour Party, PvdA). Thus, given the theoretical underpinnings of the ideological adaptation hypothesis, we should not expect the parties of the establishment to alter their ideological profiles.

Table 3.13: Dutch Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2003
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats)

Party	1971	1972	1977	1981	1982	1986	1989	1994	1998	2002	2003
CDA	-	-	31.9	30.8	29.3	34.6	35.3	22.2	18.4	27.9	28.6
	-	-	49	48	45	54	54	34	29	43	44
PvdA	24.6	27.4	33.8	28.3	30.4	33.3	31.9	24.0	29.0	15.1	27.3
	39	43	53	44	47	52	49	37	45	23	42
GL	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.1	3.5	7.3	7.0	5.1
	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	5	11	10	8
D66	6.8	4.2	5.4	11.1	4.3	6.1	7.9	15.5	9.0	5.1	4.1
	11	6	8	17	6	9	12	24	14	7	6
SP	-	-	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.4	1.3	3.5	5.9	6.3
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	9	9
LPF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.0	5.7
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	8

Key: CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; PvdA: Labour Party; GL: GreenLeft; D66: Democrats 66; SP: Socialist Party; LPF: List Pim Fortuyn;

According to the interviews, the influence of the GreenLeft reaches across the center of the political spectrum. An official within the GreenLeft argued that the Dutch green movement affects the Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*, PvdA) on the left and the Christian Democrats (*Christen Democratisch Appèl*, CDA) on the right. In his opinion, these establishment parties have a choice:

And now they have to choose between those two groups [labor unions and intellectuals], and it's very difficult because their traditional focus is more conservative and the new voters are more progressive. And that's why we came with our new ideas; we can influence maybe... the Social Democratic Party, then we have the most impact. And on some issues, for instance, the environment, we influence the Christian Democrats, too, because they want to keep the Earth as a gift from God, and because we stress that you're only here in the world and you are only one person. That's an issue that attracts many Christian Democrats too.

Thus, the GreenLeft believes its influence, particularly on the environment, extends across the center of the political spectrum possibly leading to the attraction of Christian Democratic voters.

However, the CDA did not echo the sentiments of the GreenLeft. The CDA reacted to anti-establishment parties on either side of the political spectrum in a calculated and calm manner. When asked how the party reacted to the LPF, an official with the CDA stated:

[Prime Minister] Jan Peter Balkenende in the election campaign, he did not try to isolate Fortuyn, the others did... He said, "You are right with your problems, but we have better solutions." So he did not demonize Fortuyn as the others did.

Moreover, this CDA official argued that any change on the issue of the environment had "nothing to do with the Greens; it was more to do with societal changes." Thus, the CDA reacted to societal changes more than the emergence of anti-establishment parties.⁵⁷

Table 3.14 shows the ideological movement of the Dutch Labour Party between 1970 and 2005. On these eight issues, the average *net* change was 0.5 to the left with an average *maximum* change 0.875 in the same direction. On the "key" issues of the environment, scope of government, and social services, the party only moved slightly to the left. At the same time, the party did not experience a loss of electoral support, with the exception of the 2002 election, during this period. Thus, despite the consistent showing for the GreenLeft at the polls, the GreenLeft does not threaten the PvdA.

⁵⁷ This may lead to the question of whether establishment parties react to the societal changes addressed in the first chapter regardless of the success of anti-establishment parties or do traditional mainstream parties react to these problems only after the success of these new parties.

Therefore, the lack of ideological adaptation for the PvdA is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of this chapter.

Table 3.14: Selected Issue Positions of the Labour Party of the Netherlands (PvdA), 1970-2005

	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	-1 to -2	-1	-1
Income taxes	-2 to -2	0	0
Total taxes	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Scope of government	-3 to -4	-1	-1
Social Services	-2 (to -4) to -3	-2	-1
Environment	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Women's Rights	-2 to -2	0	0
Minority Rights	-1 (to -2) to -1	-1	0

Figure 3.8 displays the policy positions for Dutch political parties on the issue of environmental protection. The influence of the GreenLeft does indeed reach across the center of the political spectrum. However, the influence of the party is not as prevalent as the interviews would indicate. The Labour Party moved slightly more to the left. Likewise, the CDA moves slightly to the left but maintains its right-oriented position on the issue of the environment. This movement may be due to the influence of the GreenLeft or, as was indicated in the interview with an official from the CDA, this movement may be due to societal changes within the electorate. Given the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1970s and the relatively recent shift in the policy of the CDA, this indicates that the CDA reacted more to the electoral success of the GreenLeft than to the emergence of the environment movement. This finding offers limited support for the ideological adaptation hypothesis posited above.

Figure 3.8: Dutch party positions on environmental protection for the Democrats 66/ GreenLeft (GL), Labour Party (PvdA), and Christian Democrats (CDA)




Table 3.15 shows the ideological movement of the CDA on seven issues. The average *net* change for the party was 1.00 and the average *maximum* change 1.285.


Given the lack of a credible threat to the party from the anti-establishment right as well as consistent support (with the exception of the 1998 election) for the party, these changes do not correspond with the hypotheses of this chapter. On the “key” issue of immigration, the party shifted its position significantly to the right. This finding contradicts the ideological adaptation hypothesis. However, on other “key” issues (i.e., taxes and scope of government), the party has not altered its ideological positions, offering some support for the hypothesis. Thus, there are contradictory findings concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on the Dutch CDA.

Table 3.15: Selected Issue Positions of the Christian Democratic Appeal in the Netherlands (CDA), 1970-2005

	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	-1 to +2	+3	+3
Income taxes	+2 to +3	+1	+1
Total taxes	+3 to +3	0	0
Scope of government	+2 to +2	0	0
Social Services	+2 (to +4) to +2	+2	0
State Ownership	+2 to +3	+1	+1
Immigration	+2 to +4	+2	+2

Figure 3.9 graphically demonstrates the movement of Dutch political parties on the issue of the immigration. As the figure indicates, the Dutch political parties have not significantly altered their positions on immigration. Even after the meteoric rise of the LPF in 2002, the traditional mainstream parties did not shift their position on immigration. Instead, the establishment parties altered their positions in the mid-1990s before the emergence and sudden electoral success of the LPF. Thus, we can assume

Figure 3.9: Dutch party positions on immigration for the Democrats 66/ GreenLeft (GL), Labour Party (PvdA), Christian Democrats (CDA), and List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)



that anti-establishment parties did not influence the shift in policy of the traditional mainstream parties. Therefore, on each side of the political spectrum, the influence of

anti-establishment parties is not as widespread as indicated by the interviews. The effect of anti-establishment parties in the Netherlands provides limited support for the ideological adaptation hypothesis.

Norway. Table 3.16 displays the results of nine Norwegian parliamentary elections from 1971-2005. On the left side of the political spectrum, the Socialist Left (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*, SV) pushes a socialist environmentalism agenda challenging the establishment on issues of equality, social welfare, and the environment. On the right, the Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*, FrP) challenges the establishment championing an anti-immigration, anti-tax platform. Each of these anti-establishment parties garners significant support in the electoral arena creating a credible threat to establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum. This threat most often manifests itself to the Conservative Party (*Høyre*, H). The Conservative Party experiences a steady decline in electoral support since the early 1980s, with the exception of the 2001 elections. At the same time, the FRP continues to rise in the polls. The Norwegian Labour Party (*Det norske arbeiderparti*, A) remains steady at the polls, with exception of the 2001 general election, despite the electoral success of the Socialist Left. From these election results and given the hypothesis above, we should expect the Conservatives to react more to the anti-establishment threat than the Labour Party.

Table 3.16: Norwegian Election Results, Selected Parties, 1971-2005
(Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats)

Party	1973	1977	1981	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005
A	35.4 62	42.2 76	37.1 66	40.7 71	34.4 63	36.9 67	35.1 65	24.3 43	32.7 61
H	17.4 29	24.8 41	31.7 53	30.4 50	22.1 37	17.0 28	14.3 23	21.2 38	14.1 23
SV	11.2 16	4.2 2	4.9 4	5.5 6	10.0 17	7.9 13	6.0 9	12.5 23	8.8 15
FRP	5.0 4	1.9 -	4.5 4	3.7 2	13.0 22	6.3 10	15.3 25	14.6 25	22.1 38

Key: A: Norwegian Labour Party; H: Right (Conservative); V: Left; SV: Socialist Left Party; FRP: Progress Party.

However, the interviews point to the influence of both of these anti-establishment parties. In two interviews with officials from the Socialist Left, each official pointed to the influence of the party within the party system, particularly on the issue of the environment. An official with the party argued:

By being the first party taking it, we influenced the other parties. And of course we had an influence in addition to these arguments and these debates by [being an] electoral threat. So even if they didn't have it in their programmes, they saw this as an opportunity to come out with a better profile... But it's because [of] our strength... and our strength could lead to leftist policies.

A member of the party leadership suggested that the Socialist Left plays a larger role within the Norwegian party system in addition to challenging the Labour Party.

Traditionally our role has been, of course, to be a force of opposition from the left, bringing in new ideas, giving voice to various grass root movements, and putting pressure on the Labor Party especially to implement more radical reforms. Historically, the reforms and the proposals of the Labor Party have been suggested by our party first and then later adopted by the Labor Party.

Furthermore, this official argued that the party alters the characteristics of the larger party system by providing an electoral challenge to the traditional mainstream parties.

In answering a specific question pertaining to challenging the establishment, the official responded:

We definitely do. The Norwegian party system for the last 20 or 30 years has been a lot of parties crammed in the middle and the Socialist Left and the Progress Party on two different sides. There is no doubt that we've been able to – in that position you have a lot of possibilities to set the agenda for the parliament – so we have been able to influence policy. So there's no doubt that the Labor Party, for instance, will always have to watch their back in a way if they know that if they go too far to the right, if they slip up on policies important for core lateral groups, then there's actually an alternative there that might grow there and that would cost them dearly. So we, I think we influence the other parties both directly and indirectly in those ways.

Speaking about their impact of the specific issue of the environment, the party official argued:

I think we've had a lot of impact on that issue. Norway is one of the very few countries in Europe that doesn't have a Green Party of any considerable size, which is because we, along with Denmark, adopted those positions correctly... The Socialist Party adopted that position quite early in the mid-80s, when the Green Party started to grow. The Socialists became the Green Party of Norway in many ways... So there's no doubt that we're influencing the other parties. Along with quite a strong environmentalist we [influenced] putting environmental issues on the political agenda in Norway

Thus, the Socialist Left, through its electoral success, place pressure upon the traditional, mainstream parties.

On the right side of the political spectrum, the Progress Party also affects establishment parties within the Norwegian party system. The Progress party steals votes from both sides of the political spectrum. When asked whether the party is

stealing votes from the Labour Party or the Conservatives Party, a high-ranking official within the leadership of the Progress Party responded:

Both. But I think mostly, and I don't have the statistics to prove it, but when I see where our voters come from, ... we take a lot of voters from the Labor Party, we take a lot of voters from the Conservative Party, but we also take a lot of voters from the couch, people who won't vote, but they come and vote for us. And I think that is also the fact when it comes to membership. We have a lot of members and lot of politicians who have been active members of other parties, and also a lot of members who have never been active before.

The influence of the Progress Party continues to grow as they push an anti-immigration stance in Norway. This stance leads to a shift in the policy positions of traditional mainstream parties. Furthermore, their policy stances specifically affect the Conservative party.

[I]t's slowly dragged the other parties in the right direction on several political issues.... and, of course, immigration politics. I have to say that as well, because when we started to criticize the way immigration politics in Norway was felt, we were laughed at, of course. And their big problem is that they are conservative... I think you know what I mean when I say they are still conservative. They are stuck somewhere and they have never come down from there. And they are struggling, and... their biggest problem is our existence. They have never accepted or, and they don't like it of course, but I don't think they have realized that the Progress Party is twice as big them, nearly. And that makes us the greatest party of opposition in Norway, [the] leading party of opposition; they still behave like they are the big star on our side of politics.

According to the interviews, the specific effects of the anti-establishment movement in Norway impact the establishment parties differently. Despite recognition of the challenge from the Progress Party, the Conservative Party did not dramatically react to the increased electoral support of this new threat.

We have had discussions in the leadership of the Conservative Party about the rising, of course, of the Progressive Party and how we should

adapt to the challenge. And from the grassroots of the Conservative Party of course... you've got messages about something has to be done and therefore this is much discussed. But have these discussions force the Conservative Party into some dramatic shift of politics, no. It's very much discussed, it is on both the leadership and the grassroots, but when it comes to ...should we tighten up the immigration policy just to compete with the Progressive Party when it comes to immigration and integration? When we are finished discussing, our people say, well, we think immigration is good.... We have moved, but not dramatically when it comes to some fields of the integration and immigration politics... We have tightened a bit, but not dramatically.

Thus, the Conservative Party altered its position on the issue of immigration, but not dramatically in the direction of the Progress Party.

The Labour Party, on the left side of the spectrum, argues that the influence of the Progress Party has diminished, but the threat remains. A member of the Labour Party leadership hierarchy, speaking about the issue of immigration, stated:

I think they [the Progress Party] have had an effect, forced the other parties to discuss it. But now I think the Labor Party and also other parties are, we are more mature to discuss it, but maybe we would frame the debate differently. Because it is also, there's acceptance for discussing problems related to immigration, but there is also acceptance related to possibilities and opportunities that you have due to integration. We're finally able to discuss immigration and integration as two different issues, really. We think of the Progress Party as our most important, one of the most important rivals along with the Conservative Party, but we think of those as two conservative parties... and we take them seriously and we take their politics seriously.

An interview with two scholars on Norwegian party politics confirmed the responses regarding the Progress party from party elites. The Progress Party does indeed challenge establishment parties, both the Conservatives and the Labour Party, in terms of votes and policy issues, particularly immigration.

It's been the most important mobilization issue for [the] Progress Party and there has sort of been a consensus among the other parties about

immigration. The Progress Party has been an alternative and, to some extent, all the other parties have had to adjust their immigration policy to meet the pressures. And of course voters, most voters have traveled between the Progress Party and the Conservative Party, and the Progress Party always takes more votes from the Conservative Party. They take votes from everybody, but mostly from the Conservatives. They [Conservatives] were challenged by the Progress Party on these issues, ... and the Labor party, the Progress Party really challenged them on these issues. In the 2001 election, the Labor Party lost a percentage of votes and they had to adjust their course.

Thus, similar to other party systems in Western Europe, the anti-establishment right challenges establishment parties on both side of the political spectrum.

Table 3.17: Selected Issue Positions of the Labour Party of Norway (A), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	-2 to -3	-1	-1
Income taxes	-3 to -3	-0	0
Total taxes	-5 to -5	0	0
Scope of government	-4 to -3	+1	+1
Social Services	-5 to -5	0	0
Environment	-2 to -4	-2	-2
Women's Rights	-3 to -5	-2	-2
Minority Rights	-2 to -4	-2	-2

The evidence from the party manifestos confirms much of the information gathered during these interviews. Table 3.17 displays the ideological movement on eight issues. The average *net* and *maximum* change for the party was 0.75. Given the steady nature of the Labour Party, the lack of adaptation, despite the steady electoral showing for the Socialist Left, is expected. On the “key” issues of taxes and social services, the party did not shift their policy positions. Surprisingly, the party shifted its position on the issue of the scope of government towards the right calling for a slightly smaller role for the government.

However, on the issue of environment protection, the Labour Party significantly shifted its policy position towards the position of the Socialist Left. This is shown in Figure 3.10. The Labour Party shifts its position in 1993 following a breakthrough election for the Socialist Left in 1989. Interestingly, the influence of the Socialist Left stretches across the center of the political spectrum pulling the right-oriented anti-establishment FRP from a decidedly right position to a left-of-center position by the end of the period under examination. Furthermore, although the Conservative Party started the period already on the left side of the spectrum, the party shifted its position slightly more to the left. Thus, the influence of the Socialist Left on the issue of environmental protection spreads to all parties with the Norwegian party system.

Figure 3.10: Norwegian party positions on environment protection for Socialist Left (SV), Labour Party (A), Conservative Party (C), and Progress Party (FRP)




Table 3.18 displays the ideological movement of the Conservative Party from 1970-2005. The Conservative Party dramatically shifted its position on almost every

one of these seven issues. On average, the party's *net* change was 2.86 and the *maximum* change was 3.14 to the right. On the “key” issues of taxes, scope of government, and immigration, the party shifted its positions at least two positions to the right towards the position of the Progress Party. Given the decline in electoral support for the party and the rise of the Progress Party, these significant changes are expected and warranted in order for the party to counter this growing electoral threat.


Table 3.18: Selected Issue Positions of the Conservative Party of Norway (H), 1970-2005

Issue	<i>Change from</i>	<i>Max. Change</i>	<i>Net Change</i>
Individual freedoms	+2 to +3	+1	+1
Income taxes	-3 to +2	+5	+5
Total taxes	-2 (to +3) to +2	+5	+4
Scope of government	-3 to +1	+4	+4
Social services	-5 to -3	+2	+2
State ownership	+1 (to +4) to +3	+3	+2
Immigration	+1 to +3	+2	+2

Figure 3.11 graphically displays the movement of Norwegian political parties on the issue of immigration. As the figure shows, the parties moved, in some cases significantly, to the right. The Conservative Party gradually shifts their position from +1 to a +3 moving closer to the position of the Progress Party. The Labour Party undertakes the most significant shift in position on the issue of immigration. Following the breakthrough election for the Progress Party in 1989 in which the party garnered 13 percent of the vote and 22 seats in parliament), the Labour Party shifted dramatically to the right from a left-oriented -2 to a +1 position right-of-center. If the Progress Party is

indeed stealing votes from the Labour Party, this shift in a “key” electoral issue for the Progress is expected by the ideological adaptation hypothesis. The Labour Party, in an

Figure 3.11: Norwegian party positions on immigration for Socialist Left (SV), Labour Party (A), Conservative Party (C), and Progress Party (FRP)



effort to stem the tide of the Progress Party, would shift their position on the issue of immigration. However, the party has not experienced a decline in the polls that would warrant such a shift in policy. Thus, the party attempted to counter the threat based on the mere perception that the Progress Party was stealing votes.

In summary, establishment parties in Austria – the SPÖ and, to a lesser extent, the ÖVP – altered their ideological profiles to offset the threat from anti-establishment parties. The Belgian establishment altered their ideological position on numerous issues championed by anti-establishment parties. In Denmark, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties led to dramatic shifts in the policy positions of the traditional mainstream parties. In Germany, without a credible anti-establishment threat on the right, the influence of *Die Grünen* on the anti-establishment left pulled the establishment towards its position on numerous issues. Anti-establishment parties in the Netherlands are not as successful as their counterparts in other Western European countries. The Dutch establishment did not shift its policy positions despite slipping at the polls during this period. Finally, the traditional mainstream parties in Norway shifted their ideological positions on many of these “key” issues as a reaction to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. Therefore, the ideological adaptation hypothesis finds abundant support in these six countries.

Analysis: Organizational Change

The analysis of the organizational adaptation hypothesis (Hypothesis 3.2) finds little, if any, support in these six countries.⁵⁸ In Austria, an official with the SPÖ acknowledged that the party discussed altering its organization due to the electoral success and structure of the Greens; however, these changes have not taken place.

Yes, we know from several discussions, about our structure and how to change our structure, but our members like to have more possibilities to have more influence on the course of the party, at the federal level as well as on the state level... We had very, many discussions about opening the party... about changes in the party, in the 1990s...in the late 90s.

When asked specifically if the Greens were a catalyst for these discussions, the official offered:

The Greens, oh my, yes, of course. We had a new party with the Greens and we have a special situation in Austria where we have great problems, and the 80s and 90s with the SPÖ and the higher party organization.

However, despite the electoral success of the FPÖ on the right, the ÖVP did not alter its organizational structures or even hold discussions to this effect. Establishment parties did not alter their organizational structures to grant more power to rank-and-file members. Although, the SPÖ held discussions concerning the impact of the Greens on the party's organization, the party has not implemented any changes to date. Meanwhile, the ÖVP has not adapted its organizational in any noticeable fashion. Therefore, unlike

⁵⁸ There is no reason to suggest that these party officials would be less than truthful as it relates to organizational changes within the party. Given that these officials admitted to no adaptation within the organizational structures of the party, but cited numerous occurrences of ideological change provides some validity to the indicator for organizational adaptation. One reason for the lack of evidence of organizational adaptation may be that organizational changes are harder to recognize unless these changes are dramatic and occur over a short period of time. If these changes are gradual over a long period of time, they may be less noticeable to party officials.

the ideological adaptation hypothesis, the organizational adaptation hypothesis does not hold in Austria.

In Belgium, establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum adapted their structures due to a reorganization of the federal election structure. An official with the CD&V argued, “it’s not a coincidence that the party structure went together with the structure for elections.” Thus, as the federal election structure changed, the parties were forced to adapt their structures accordingly. Furthermore, according to the official with the CD&V, the grassroots structure of the party and the ability of rank-and-file members to vote on party decisions have been in place for nearly fifty years. Thus, there was no need for the party to alter or adapt its organizational structures devolving power to the rank-and-file members to counter the electoral threat from anti-establishment parties. Therefore, like in Austria, anti-establishment parties do not influence establishment parties in terms of organizational adaptation as they do in terms of ideological adaptation. As such, the organizational adaptation hypothesis does not find support.

The organizational adaptation hypothesis does not receive support from the interviews conducted in Denmark. A leading scholar on Danish political parties argued, “I think that the smaller parties do not have that influence on organizations, not at all. Actually it’s been the other way around.... they [anti-establishment parties] had an organization like all the established parties” An official with the Social Democrats confirmed these sentiments when asked about the catalyst for several organizational changes stating, “we made these changes before the emergence of the Green movement or the Socialist People’s Party.” This official further noted, “elections may have been a

catalyst for these changes, but the Socialist People's Party did not influence this." A prominent member of the Socialist's People Party leadership maintained, "I think the other parties respect our organization, but I do not think that we have influenced their organization." Thus, although the establishment parties in Denmark altered their organizational structures during this period, these changes were not due to the emergence or electoral success of anti-establishment parties.

The establishment parties in Germany altered their organizational structures due to reunification in 1990. An SPD official stated, "I think the most significant change in the organizational structure of the SPD was after the reunification in 1990.... But the changes that took place were due to the reunification, not due to the membership wanting change or the party leadership wanting change; it was due to the society change." Moreover, the official declared:

There has been a discussion about reorganizing the party, but it's been a reform regarding our party statutes, but these haven't been very significant changes in the organization of the party itself. It has been much more like a technical approach, to technical and legal questions, party organizations, but it hadn't anything to do with new emerging parties.

When asked specifically about the influence of the Greens' party organization, this official noted similarities between the role of members in *Die Grünen* and the SPD, but the party does not have the same grassroots movement parallel to *Die Grünen*.

There are possibilities for all members to initiate resolutions at the party congress. There is a possibility for them, so there are similarities with the Greens; however, we never had the grassroots movement and I'm not sure if we had any discussion about this.

The power distribution of the party has not changed towards the decentralization of *Die Grünen*. Instead, the party moved towards more centralization due to new media technology. “I would say there was trend toward more centralization. The executive board became more powerful, which has something to do with media and new media trends.”

Without a significant anti-establishment threat on the right, the CDU discussed adapting their organization, but these changes have yet to take place. A CDU official acknowledged, “it was the idea to get the normal member more possibilities to participate in the party life. It’s a thing we can’t implement from the top, so the decision has to be made from the bottom up.” However, when asked if these discussions followed the emergence and electoral success of the Greens, the party official stated, “I would say not directly. We have nothing to do directly with new parties or--but I think the idea to strengthen the membership in the way that they can participate more often is an idea that the Greens came up with in the 1980s.” Thus, the organization of *Die Grünen* influences establishment parties; however, this influence is not direct or significant enough to confirm the organizational adaptation hypothesis.

In the Netherlands, the GreenLeft argues that establishment parties learn from the organizational structures of the party. A prominent member of the party leadership contends:

I think some parties may have learned from the way we have our roots in those movements. Some parties, they are learning. They try to find the same way to modernize. For instance, the Socialist Party is using their members in all sorts of social movements to establish their power there.

However, the CDA disagreed with this assessment arguing that all organizational changes undertaken by the party reflect societal changes within the Netherlands. A CDA official contends, “Our changes had nothing to do with the Greens. These changes came from within to adapt to changes within society.” Therefore, anti-establishment parties in the Netherlands do not affect organizational change within the parties of the establishment.

Arguably the greatest influence of anti-establishment parties on the organizational structures of establishment parties occurs in Norway. A member of the Labour Party leadership confirmed the party adopted a new strategy since 2001 to bring members closer to the party. This new strategy employs new technologies to better connect members to the leaders of the party and to re-educate members about the party.

I would say the party has been brought closer together due to new technological developments. The internet is playing a central part of the every day running of politics and also in the platform process. We have made changes to involve the most people in it ... you can be on the websites, and there are certain websites for the platform process. And it means also that it's easier to get in contact with the party leadership or the central board, it's easier to give your opinion on a certain issue.... The most important thing is that it's easier to get in contact with the Norwegian Labor Party and say what you mean. Along those lines, in the last five years, we have had a lot of effort on education of the members and also of politicians, so all kinds of education and study groups, certain programs for different people, for women's program or leadership program or minority programs, as well as ordinary schooling for both the elected and also the party officials.

Furthermore, the party continues to discuss the role of membership and how to get the ordinary member more involved in the decision-making process within the party.

And when it comes to the rules [statutes], it's been a continuous debate on how each member could be more involved in the party ... there is a value to the membership in itself. It's been a continuous debate and it's

not just about the elected officials being able to say what they mean, but ordinary members that hold no positions, not in the party, not in any official government arenas, that they can decide more, be more involved.

When asked specifically what caused these changes, this official acknowledged that poor electoral performance was a catalyst for these changes within the party's organization.

The 2001 parliamentary elections were the worst elections for the Labour Party since 1926.

I think one, a clear cause is the election of 2001. It was a wakeup call to the Norwegian Social Democrats, and it was a clear message both from members, from the unions, and the union members, which is part of the party in itself, which is an important force in Norway. The members of the unions decided not to vote for the Labor Party, and we had great motivational problems with our own members as well. And this--well, it affected the electorate, of course. And I think the party has realized that we got away from the people. We were governing and making decisions and running Norway but we didn't do it with the Norwegians. So I think that is one of the clearest reasons why we have had to change, an obvious reason.

Given the rise of anti-establishment parties threatening the Labour Party from both sides contributing to this poor electoral performance, these changes can be, at the very least, indirectly attributed to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. In other words, this is the evidence one would expect to see if anti-establishment parties are indeed influencing organizational changes within establishment parties. Thus, of the six countries analyzed, Norway presents the best evidence, albeit limited, of the effects of anti-establishment parties on the organizational structures of establishment parties.

In summary, the organizational adaptation hypothesis does not receive support from these six countries. For the most part, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties led to discussions concerning changes to the organizational structures; however,

these changes have yet to be implemented by traditional parties. At the most, anti-establishment parties have an indirect effect on organizational structure changes undertaken by establishment parties. Perhaps the best evidence supporting the organizational adaptation hypothesis comes from the Labour Party in Norway, which undertook changes to better educate and connect to their members following their worst election in 75 years. Thus, there is simply not enough evidence to support the second hypothesis concerning organizational change.

Limitations

It must be noted that there are limitations to this method of data collection and that these limitations may contribute to the lack of evidence of organizational change. As with any survey instrument, the questions that you ask may dictate the answers you receive.⁵⁹ The adaptation hypothesis focused on the organizational power structures of the more established parties as result of the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. In order to obtain data concerning the particular organizational changes, both broad and specific organizational questions were asked of the various party officials. In particular, one question asked of establishment party officials concerned the implementation of primary elections for the selection of party candidates. This question concerns the distribution of power within the party and whether party members were given more organizational power as a consequence of anti-establishment party electoral success.

⁵⁹ This is akin to the selection bias argument made by Geddes (1990) in which the cases you select may dictate your findings.

However, questions concerning other forms of organizational change may not have been asked. If the proper follow-up questions were not asked, it is entirely possible that the proper information regarding other types of organizational change was not gained from these interviews. This may account for the lack of evidence of organizational adaptation from the established political parties in these six countries. It is possible that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties prompts different organizational changes not under investigation within this dissertation.

Another concern of this method of data collection concerns whether the party officials were able to recognize organizational changes. Organizational change can occur in a slow, incremental process or at a rapid, frenzied pace. Changes that occur at a faster pace may be easier to recognize by party officials. Slow, incremental change may not catch the attention of party leaders. Having not recognized organizational change, party officials may not offer this information during the interviews regardless of the questions asked. Furthermore, given the tenure of the official with the party, the party officials may not be able to offer information concerning changes that occurred before their time with the party. As such, changes that are a reaction to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties early in the period under investigation may be missed by these interviews.

Implications and Conclusion

There are numerous implications of the analyses in this chapter. First, although parties are conservative organizations, parties do indeed adapt to the environment created by the emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties.

Establishment parties adapt their ideological profiles on numerous issues in order to counter the growing electoral threat from anti-establishment parties. In particular, establishment parties shift their ideological position on the issues of the environment and immigration (as shown in Figures 3.1 – 3.11), two issues championed by anti-establishment parties on different sides of the spectrum. This movement confirms earlier research from Downs (2001). Traditional parties engage anti-establishment parties by co-opting anti-establishment policies expanding the programmatic agenda of the party by directly addressing these issues. Thus, in order to remain in power in the unstable environment created by the emergence of anti-establishment parties, traditional parties trade principle for pragmatism and seek more innovative, engaging tactics to counter the threat from anti-establishment parties (see Downs 2001).

However, traditional mainstream parties do not alter their organizational structures to adapt to this new electoral environment. Despite the lack of support for the organizational adaptation hypothesis, the analyses in this chapter confirm earlier work by Rohrschneider (1993). For Rohrschneider (1993), the most difficult challenge for establishment parties in countering the threat from anti-establishment parties is changing their organizational structures. As mentioned above, it is easier for traditional parties to shift their policy positions and integrate new issues into their platforms than to fundamentally change their organizational power structures (Rohrschneider 1993). Therefore, as the analysis demonstrates, establishment parties are more resistant to changing their organizational structures than their ideological profiles in order to adapt to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.

Second, by instigating movement among parties of the establishment, anti-establishment parties may hinder their own electoral fortunes. By moving away from the center of the spectrum, as is indicated by these analyses, traditional mainstream parties are creating more distinct ideological profiles and more polarization within the system. In turn, this may help stem the tide of anti-establishment party electoral success in these countries. Anti-establishment parties campaign on the notion that all establishment parties are the same.⁶⁰ If establishment parties are more ideologically distant and distinct, this argument made by anti-establishment parties may fall on deaf ears. Moreover, from the analyses in the second chapter, the electoral support for anti-establishment parties decreases as the amount of polarization between establishment parties increases. Thus, as anti-establishment parties continue to gain electoral support, they sow the seeds of their own destruction. Clearly, the circular relationship between polarization and anti-establishment parties warrants further research.

Third, the movement of establishment parties alters the dynamics of the party system, particularly the process of coalition formation. As establishment parties distant themselves from each other, the likelihood of “grand” coalitions between establishment parties decreases. Establishment parties must look for new coalition partners as traditional coalition alliances no longer remain viable options. The movement of traditional mainstream parties forces these parties to look for alliances with parties closer to their ideological placement including anti-establishment parties. Therefore, the

⁶⁰ See the definition of anti-establishment party detailed in the second chapter.

electoral success of anti-establishment parties may lead to the inclusion of these parties in coalitional governments across Western Europe.⁶¹

Finally, the movement of establishment parties may lead to governing coalitions introducing new legislation or implementing new policies favored by anti-establishment parties. The analyses in this chapter examine the *issue positions* of establishment parties; however, these issue positions may become implemented policies if these parties enter into government. In order to remain in power, establishment parties must deliver on their campaign promises or face the electoral consequences. In Denmark, the electoral success of the Danish People's Party (and the earlier electoral success of the Progress Party) led to arguably the most stringent immigration laws in the European Union. Thus, the influence of anti-establishment parties can lead to changes to governmental policies creating greater electoral success for these less established parties.

These implications guide several avenues of research. First, does the adaptation of traditional mainstream parties help or hinder the electoral fortunes of these parties? Does the decision to alter their ideological profiles or organizational structures help the party counter the threat from anti-establishment parties or further fuel the decline of the party? Do voters punish parties for moving too far from their core ideology or base supporters? Although it is possible, to some extent, to see if establishment parties increase their vote share in elections following these changes from these analyses, further research could shed light on the consequences of these changes for establishment parties. In a similar vein, future research may demonstrate the effects of these

⁶¹ The next chapter examines the effects of anti-establishment parties on the duration of cabinet governments.

adaptations on the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties. Do these changes allow establishment parties to limit or reverse the electoral successes of anti-establishment parties?

Second, how does the movement of establishment parties influence other traditional mainstream parties within the system? Traditional mainstream parties compete against each other for the ability to form cabinet governments. Thus, establishment parties' main rivals in pursuing governmental offices are other establishment parties. In order to be in position to form governments, establishment parties must balance between reacting to threats from anti-establishment parties as well as their closest establishment rivals. In turn, there are consequences for the larger party system. If establishment parties move too far from the center in the process of adapting to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, then new parties may emerge in the center of the spectrum filling the void created by the movement of the traditional parties. This may further the instability created by the emergence of anti-establishment parties. The next chapter examines, in great detail, the effects of anti-establishment party electoral success on the larger party system. However, future research must consider the effects the movement of traditional mainstream parties has on similar parties within the system. Does the electoral success of anti-establishment parties initiate a chain reaction creating ripples throughout the entire party system?

Third, does the movement of establishment parties lead to changes in governmental policies favored by anti-establishment parties? As mentioned above, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in Denmark led to tougher immigration

laws. Anti-establishment parties on the left often campaign on an environmentalist agenda. Does the electoral success of these anti-establishment parties lead to changes to the environmental policies of different governments across Western Europe? Have other anti-establishment parties on the right seen similar electoral success in other countries and other issues (i.e., welfare policies)? These questions deserve greater attention through future research to fully appreciate the consequences of anti-establishment parties.

Finally, how has the electoral success of anti-establishment parties affected these parties themselves? In some instances, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties leads to the inclusion of these parties in governing coalitions throughout Western Europe. In these instances, the party ceases to be an anti-establishment party. However, after the collapse of the coalition or new elections, the party oftentimes will continue its anti-establishment rhetoric or campaigning. Do voters punish anti-establishment parties for being part of the establishment or continue to support them in subsequent elections? Do the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties wane after being in a governing coalition? Given the electoral success of these parties, do anti-establishment parties attempt to become part of the establishment by moderating their extreme positions? Do anti-establishment parties become victims of their own electoral success?

The next chapter explores the effects of anti-establishment parties on the broader party system. Does the movement of establishment parties lead to increased volatility and polarization within the party system? Do voters abandon establishment parties to vote from anti-establishment parties leading to increased volatility within the system? Does the movement of establishment parties increase the amount of polarization within

the system? Does the electoral success of anti-establishment parties further destabilize the party system by decreasing the length of cabinet governments? Does the amount of seats garnered by anti-establishment parties limit the opportunities establishment parties have to form viable governing coalitions in parliament? These research questions stemming, in part, from the analyses in this chapter are addressed in greater detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES ON THE BROADER PARTY SYSTEM

The last chapter examined the effects of anti-establishment parties on the organizational structures and ideological profiles of the more established parties within the party systems of Western Europe. This chapter investigates the consequences of anti-establishment party electoral success on the broader party system. New parties may serve to reinvigorate or destabilize an institutionalized party system (Harmel 1997). Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984) argue new parties are a result and contributor to the realignment that has occurred within the once “frozen” party systems of Western Europe. Furthermore, Harmel (1985: 414) contends “new parties may be seen as part of a solution to what has generally been viewed as decline in the importance of parties.” The environment in which representative democracy operates is ever changing prompting its institutions to adapt or face extinction. As the theoretical expectations of the second chapter indicate, if the electorate does not feel that establishment parties meet their needs and interests, the voting public can, and indeed does, look elsewhere. Thus, in the forty years since Lipset and Rokkan (1967:50) concluded that the “party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few significant exceptions, the alignments of the 1920s,” the party systems of Western Europe have undergone numerous changes.

Despite the possible effects of anti-establishment parties, the literature concerning their consequences on the larger party system has merely scratched the surface (for example, see Powell 1986). Previous qualitative research demonstrates that

anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum increase the amount of polarization with the party system (Bale 2003; Mair 2001). Yet, other important aspects of the party system remain unexamined. By pushing new issues and gaining electoral support, anti-establishment parties activate new voters, force parties to alter their ideological positions (see Chapter 3), and stealing votes from traditional mainstream parties, anti-establishment parties alter the stability of their respective party systems. Utilizing quantitative analyses, this chapter argues anti-establishment party electoral success increases voter turnout and electoral volatility by activating new voters and offering viable electoral alternatives to traditional parties. Furthermore, I argue that the electoral success of anti-establishment increases polarization between establishment parties, as these parties shift their positions on the ideological spectrum, and within the party system. Moreover, I contend that anti-establishment parties alter the coalitional dynamics within the party systems of Western Europe leading to increased instability.

The remainder of the chapter is divided into six sections. The first section discusses previous research concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties on the broader party system. The second explains the contributions to the literature made by the analyses in this chapter. The theoretical orientation of this chapter is outlined in the third section. The next section details the data and methods utilized for the different analysis contained in this chapter. The results and implications of these analyses are discussed in the fifth and sixth sections, respectively. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of future avenues of research concerning the effects of anti-establishment parties.

Previous Literature: Anti-Establishment Parties and Party System Stability

Despite the extensive literature concerning the effects of new parties on the broader party systems (see, for example, Downs 1957, Sartori 1976, Harmel and Robertson 1985, and Hug 2001), a specific focus on the effects of anti-establishment parties is lacking. Anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, may destabilize or reinvigorate the party systems in which they compete. Despite the possible consequences stemming from the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, literature concerning this topic merely scratches the surface. The majority of research investigating the effects of anti-establishment parties focuses on the relationship between electoral success and the amount of polarization within the party system (see Mair 2001 and Bale 2003). In addition, studies examining cabinet stability in Western Europe use support for anti-establishment parties as a proxy measure for system or parliamentary polarization (see Sanders and Herman 1977 and King et al. 1990).

Recent scholarly work on the effects of anti-establishment parties argues that the electoral success of these parties leads to increased polarization within the party systems of Western Europe. Mair (2001) contends that the emergence of the Greens parties serves to polarize the left side of the political spectrum in many party systems. Mair (2001: 111) states, “Green parties have not simply joined governments, but they have also provided the necessary extra weight to the left to allow for the possible emergence of a sustained bipolar pattern of competition.” Thus, political competition, which is

largely center based, shifts to a more polarized environment. Mair (2001: 112) further maintains that across Western Europe, coalitional support from Greens parties may:

prove necessary to maintain what has been a traditional pattern of bipolarism and to prevent a new drift towards centrist coalition-forming. In other words, although the Greens may end up by joining an establishment against which they were mobilised, their presence may be sufficient to permit a shift away from a consensual, centre-based, coalitional style of politics and towards the sort of competitive bipolar pattern.

Moreover, Greens parties help to change the political character of the mainstream parties, and hence breathe new life into an otherwise moribund political world (Mair 2001).

Mair (2001) argues that these anti-establishment parties on the left do not necessarily need to achieve major electoral breakthroughs to play this role. However, “they may prove substantial enough to make the crucial difference between the continuation of centrist coalitional politics, on the one hand, or the emergence of a more bipolar pattern of competition, on the other” (Mair 2001: 112).

Bale (2003) argues that the emergence and mainstreaming of the anti-establishment parties on the right affects the right side of the political spectrum in the same manner. By adopting many of the policy positions of the far right, the mainstream parties legitimize the far right (Bale 2003; see also Downs 2001). With the expansion of the right bloc, traditional mainstream parties help to prime far-right issues and, in some cases, deliver upon far-right campaign promises, particularly on the issue of immigration. Thus, the right side of the political spectrum in many of the party systems of Western

Europe expanded to include the anti-establishment right.⁶² Combined with the findings of Mair (2001), these findings suggest that the electoral success (or even emergence) of anti-establishment parties, on both sides of the political spectrum leads to a more polarized party system.

The literature also examines, albeit in a cursory manner, the effects of anti-establishment parties on the stability of coalitional government in Western Europe. Utilizing the proportion of seats occupied by anti-system parties as a proxy measure for polarization, Sanders and Herman (1977) found anti-system parties shorten the lifespan of coalitional governments. In a similar vein, for their examination of cabinet duration, King et al. (1990) uses electoral support for extreme parties to measure the amount of polarization in the party system. These authors find this measure to have a negative significant influence of the duration of cabinet governments. Furthermore, Warwick (1979) argued that the ideological cleavage *within the cabinet* itself significantly affects the tenure of the government.⁶³

Contributions to the Literature

Despite these studies examining the effects of anti-establishment parties on the broader party system, I contend that there are at least three omissions from this literature. First, this literature fails to address how the electorate reacts to the emergence, and subsequent electoral success, of anti-establishment parties. Has the electoral success of

⁶² Bale (2003: 85) argues that this increased polarization does not help far-right parties as this coalition “leads not to mutually sustaining relationships but rather to unceremonious cannibalisation of a junior partner swiftly seen to have outlived its usefulness.”

⁶³ This finding suggests that the inclusion of extreme (i.e., anti-establishment) parties shortens the duration of coalitional governments. However, the effects of anti-establishment parties as coalitional members are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

the anti-establishment activated new voters leading to an increase in voter turnout? Do anti-establishment parties steal votes from parties of the establishment or increase the amount of volatility within the party system? Intuitively, if these parties serve as voice of discontent, then it is reasonable to assume that anti-establishment will influence the electorate in some manner. Yet, the literature neglects to asks and examine these questions.

Second, this literature fails to quantitatively examine the effect of anti-establishment party electoral success on the level of polarization between parties of the establishment and within the party system itself. The studies conducted by Mair (2001) and Bale (2003) suggest that anti-establishment parties increase the amount of polarization both between traditional mainstream parties and, in turn, within the party system. However, these studies utilize qualitative methods. Using quantitative methods, this study asks the question, do anti-establishment parties increase the amount of polarization between parties of the establishment and within the party system? In other words, do the qualitative findings of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003) hold using quantitative measures for polarization?⁶⁴ Third, and finally, previous research fails to directly investigate the effect of anti-establishment parties on the duration of coalitional governments while controlling for the level of polarization. As mentioned above, previous studies use support for, or seats occupied by, anti-establishment parties as a

⁶⁴ By asking this question, I do not mean to suggest that qualitative research leads to invalid or insignificant findings. Single case or small-N studies can be beneficial to the development of generalizable theories if executed properly (see Lijphart 1971 and Mayer 1989). Indeed, many of the generalizable theories concerning the electoral success of anti-establishment parties were first tested using single case or small-N studies. Lijphart (1971, 692) argues that these “theory building” case studies are necessary in the understanding of political phenomena. In analyzing this question, I am examining these claims using new quantitative measures of polarization.

proxy for polarization. Does support for anti-establishment parties affect the duration of coalitional governments while controlling for polarization in a different manner.

Theoretical Orientation

As discussed in the first two chapters, changes in the value orientation of the electorate, weakened partisan loyalties and disaffection with the traditional parties over the past four decades have manifested themselves in the amount of electoral support for parties that challenge the traditional parties within the system (i.e., anti-establishment parties) and allowed these parties to gain a foothold and thrive in the electoral arena (see also Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000 and Poguntke 1996). Anti-establishment parties alter the political landscape of their respective party systems instigating instability. However, previous research fails to systematically and quantitatively examine the consequences to the larger party system stemming from the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.

As argued in the last chapter, for a democratic system to survive and remain viable, its institutions (i.e., political parties) must remain vibrant and its *party system* stable. Without viable institutions meeting the demands of the public, democracy withers and decays (Easton 1957; Huntington 1965). Thus, party systems must adapt and change as new competitors emerge and threaten the established order. But how do anti-establishment parties alter the party system? I argue that electoral success of anti-establishment parties alters party systems by increasing voter turnout, electoral volatility, and the amount of polarization between establishment parties and within the larger party system. In addition, anti-establishment parties, by gaining seats within parliament, upset

coalitional dynamics increasing cabinet instability within the party systems of Western Europe. Therefore, instability begets instability, albeit in a different form.

First, anti-establishment parties increase voter turnout and electoral volatility within the party system by bringing new voters into the political arena. Anti-establishment parties often campaign on new issues or issues long neglected by traditional parties challenging the status quo of the political system. These new parties emphasize the fundamental division between parties of the establishment and the electorate. Moreover, anti-establishment parties campaign on the assertion that a fundamental divide exists between themselves and traditional, mainstream parties. If the electorate does not believe that establishment parties are articulating their interests and meeting their needs and demands, the voting public can, and indeed does, look elsewhere. With the electorate “shopping” within the electoral marketplace, anti-establishment parties offer viable electoral alternatives to the traditional parties.

Three hypotheses arise from this argument. First, by campaigning on new or long neglected issues, we should expect anti-establishment parties to activate and attract new voters to the political arena. Thus, anti-establishment party electoral success increases voter turnout. In addition, as the electorate becomes increasingly disillusioned with traditional, mainstream parties, we should expect anti-establishment parties to steal votes from other competitors in the party system. Therefore, anti-establishment parties increase the amount of electoral volatility within the party system. From this argument, the following is hypothesized:

H4.1: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly increase the turnout in subsequent elections

H4.2: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly increase the amount of electoral volatility within the party system

The electoral success of these new parties, as measured by the percentage of votes received in national parliamentary elections, leads to increased instability.

However, this second hypothesis does not provide a direct test of the notion that the electoral volatility experienced during the 1970s and 1980s was a result of anti-establishment parties stealing votes from parties of the establishment. This hypothesis tests the argument that anti-establishment parties increase the overall volatility of vote shares within their respective party systems. It is entirely possible that the volatility of these party systems is merely a result of traditional parties switching vote shares with other traditional parties. Similarly, anti-establishment parties may steal electoral support from other anti-establishment parties. To examine whether anti-establishment are stealing electoral support from traditional, mainstream parties, I hypothesize:

H4.3: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly increase the amount of electoral volatility for establishment parties

If the vote share received by anti-establishment parties, on both sides of the political spectrum, significantly influences the amount of electoral volatility of establishment parties, then one may assert that anti-establishment parties are indeed offering viable electoral alternatives. Thus, anti-establishment parties are stealing votes from establishment parties increasing the amount of electoral volatility.

As noted in the third chapter, established political parties must adapt to electoral threats from new entrants into the political arena. In turn, this has important implications for the amount of polarization between establishment parties and within the

party system. Traditional, mainstream parties shift their ideological positions to counter the electoral success of anti-establishment parties increasing the amount of polarization between establishment parties. Moreover, political parties shift their policy positions in response to policy shifts of their closest rival (see Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). Thus, I argue that anti-establishment parties shift their ideological profiles to maintain a distinct identity (see Harmel, Janda and Tan 1995) from parties of the establishment. In turn, the degree of polarization within the party system increases as anti-establishment parties distant themselves from traditional, mainstream parties. From this discussion, I posit a second set of hypotheses:

H4.4: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly increase the amount of polarization between establishment parties in subsequent elections

H4.5: The electoral success of anti-establishment parties will significantly increase the amount of polarization within the party system in subsequent elections

Couched in these terms, parties of the establishment become more polarized as a reaction to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. At the same time, anti-establishment parties react to the movement of established parties increasing the amount of polarization in the party system.

Finally, I argue that anti-establishment parties upset the coalitional dynamics within the party systems of Western Europe. Previous studies of the effects of anti-establishment parties on cabinet stability utilize support for these parties as a proxy measure for polarization. Yet, these studies fail to examine the effects of anti-establishment parties on the duration of cabinet governments while controlling for the

amount of polarization within the parliament. The electoral success of anti-establishment parties, as measured by the number of seats occupied by these parties in parliament, decreases the bargaining space available to traditional mainstream parties in forming and sustaining coalitional governments. Logically, the number of seats occupied by anti-establishment decreases the size of possible governing coalitions since anti-establishment parties, by definition, do not have a realistic chance of participating in government due to their challenge to “the status quo in terms of major policy issues or the nature of political activity” and are not seen as suitable coalitional partners by the parties of the establishment (Mackie 1995: 174-175).⁶⁵ Thus, the following is hypothesized:

H4.6: As the proportion of seats anti-establishment parties occupy within parliament increases, the duration of coalitional governments decreases

With increases in the proportion of seats occupied by anti-establishment parties, the number of viable governing coalitions decreases. Thus, winning parties experience difficulty in merely forming coalitional governments and may be forced to form coalitions with unreliable or reluctant partners. In turn, this increases the likelihood of government failure. Additionally, the percentage of anti-establishment party seats decreases the size of winning coalitions, which increases the likelihood of these coalitions facing opposition challenges. This proliferation in opposition challenges increases the likelihood that coalitional governments will dissolve. As such, the

⁶⁵ There are numerous examples of anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum entering into governing coalitions. However, the consequences of anti-establishment party participation in coalitional governments are beyond the scope the current research.

electoral success of anti-establishment parties, translated into to seats in parliament, leads to more instability within the party systems of Western Europe.

In summary, by campaigning on new or long neglected issue and activating new voters, anti-establishment parties increase voter turnout. In turn, this increases the amount of electoral volatility between establishment parties and within the larger party system. Furthermore, anti-establishment party electoral success increases the amount of polarization between parties of the establishment as these parties attempt to counter this new electoral threat. This electoral success also increases the amount of polarization within the system as anti-establishment parties attempt to maintain a distinct identity from their closest mainstream rival. Finally, I expect the proportion of seats garnered by anti-establishment parties to decrease the bargaining space and the number of viable governing coalitions available to establishment parties when forming and maintaining coalitions. In turn, this leads to increased instability within the party system as the duration of coalitional governments is shortened.

Data and Methods

The distinct nature of these hypotheses requires multiple datasets. The first of these datasets examines the first hypothesis and utilizes voter turnout as the dependent variable. Voter turnout is measured as the percentage of eligible voters casting a ballot in an election. For this hypothesis, the major explanatory variable is the percentage of votes received by anti-establishment parties in the previous national parliamentary election. In order to make valid causal inferences or, at the very least, a temporal link, the electoral support for anti-establishment parties is lagged one election. Thus, I argue

that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties will lead to increased turnout in the subsequent election. To control for other factors that help explain voter turnout, this analysis includes indicators for the level of disproportionality within the electoral system, the “effective” number of parties, type of electoral system, compulsory voting, economic conditions (i.e., inflation and unemployment), and turnout in the previous election.⁶⁶

The second and third hypotheses utilize a second dataset. For the second hypothesis, the dependent variable, electoral volatility, is measured using the indicator developed by Pedersen (1979). Electoral volatility measures the net electoral change within the party system resulting from individual vote transfers.⁶⁷ This measure captures the amount of electoral volatility for *all parties* competing in two consecutive elections. For the third hypothesis, the dependent variable is a modification of this indicator. This modification accounts for the electoral volatility for *only establishment parties* competing in two consecutive elections. Thus, this variation captures the amount of electoral support lost by establishment parties from one election to the next.

⁶⁶ These institutional and economic variables are described in greater detail in the second chapter. The least squares index measures the level of disproportionality of any electoral outcome (i.e., election), or the difference between the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats any party gets within the legislature. The “effective” number of parties is measured using the index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Compulsory voting is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 if voting is compulsory). The type of electoral system is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 for proportional representation system, 0 if otherwise).

⁶⁷ This measure of electoral volatility is derived in the following manner: If we let $p_{i,t}$ stands for the percentage of the vote, which was obtained by party i at election t , then the change in the strength of i since the previous election will be: $\Delta p_{i,t} = p_{i,t} - p_{i,t-1}$ and if we do not consider sign differences, the

following relation exists for the party system: Total Net Change (TNC_t) = $\sum_{i=1}^n |\Delta p_{it}|$, $0 \leq TNC_t \leq 200$ where

n stands for the total number of parties competing in the two elections. Logically, the net gains for winning parties are numerically equal to the net losses of the parties that were defeated in the election. Thus, one may use another indicator which is slightly easier to calculate and to interpret, namely: Volatility (V_t) = $\frac{1}{2} \times TNC_t$, $0 \leq TNC_t \leq 100$ where V_t is simply the cumulated gains for all winning parties in the party system or, if you prefer, the numerical value of the cumulated losses for all losing parties. Its range has a straightforward explanation and it can be expressed in terms of percentage (Pedersen 1979).

The major explanatory variable for this analysis is support for anti-establishment parties in the national parliamentary elections. However, given that parties fight for the same voters during the same election, the amount of support for anti-establishment parties has an immediate effect on the amount of volatility within the party system and for establishment parties. As with the previous dataset, this dataset includes measures for the level of disproportionality within the electoral system, the “effective” number of parties, economic conditions, and the amount of volatility in the previous election to control for other factors, which influence the amount of volatility.

In order to calculate the most accurate volatility score, careful investigation was undertaken to follow the historical development (i.e., name changes) of these parties. In many instances, the volatility scores reflect continuous parties although the names of the parties have changed from election to election. For example, numerous parties underwent name changes ahead of the Belgian parliamentary elections in 1981, however, these do not constitute new parties and therefore, their previous vote share is factored into the calculation for the volatility index.

The third dataset examines the two hypotheses concerning the amount of polarization between parties of the establishment and within the party system. To measure the amount of polarization, this analysis utilizes the polarization measure developed by Maoz (2006). As noted in the second chapter, polarization is a complex measure that must take into account the number, structure, cohesion, size, and amount of overlap between various groups within a given population. Previous measures of polarization fail to account for the fact that these attributes may interact; therefore,

changes in polarization are not linear in nature (Maoz 2006). The measure of polarization utilized by these analyses integrates all of these properties into a single measure of polarization. For this reason, Maoz (2006) argues, and demonstrates, that this index offers the best measure for polarization.⁶⁸

As with the measure for electoral volatility, the indicator for polarization has two distinct variations. For the fourth hypothesis, this measure takes into account the amount of polarization (i.e., ideological distance) between parties of the establishment. For the fifth hypothesis, this measures accounts for the amount of polarization within the broader party system. As with the analysis concerning voter turnout, the variable of interest is electoral support for anti-establishment parties in the previous election. Therefore, I argue that previous support for these parties leads to increased polarization between establishment parties and within the party system in subsequent elections. This dataset includes controls for the level of disproportionality within the electoral system, the “effective” number of parties, the type of electoral system, economic conditions and the amount of polarization from the previous election. Table 4.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the analyses of voter turnout, electoral volatility, and polarization.

For each of these three datasets, the unit of analysis is national parliamentary elections. These datasets cover the time period 1970-2005 for eighteen countries within Western Europe. Because standard regression models assume fixed intercepts across states and uncorrelated error terms, these models are inadequate for analyzing cross-sectional data. Rather than attempting to specify a laundry list of additional country-

⁶⁸ This measure takes into account the thirteen policy categories with both positive and negative positions from the Comparative Manifesto Project. For a more detailed discussion of this index, see Maoz (2006).

specific factors that may affect the estimates, I employ a panel-estimated approach utilizing a random effects model which accounts for country-specific effects that are likely to be present in the error term (Wooldridge 2001).

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics – Voter Turnout, Electoral Volatility, and Polarization

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Anti-Establishment Party Support	12.21	10.10	0	77.4
Anti-Establishment Party Support (Lagged)	12.16	10.38	0	77.4
Voter Turnout	79.88	11.18	42.2	96.3
Establishment Party Volatility	6.63	4.54	0.3	22.6
System Volatility	11.10	7.36	0.85	46.65
Establishment Party Polarization	0.31	0.10	0.05	0.71
System Polarization	0.46	0.11	0.24	0.80
“Effective” Number of Parties	3.91	1.45	1.73	9.05
Disproportionality	4.58	4.35	0.41	25.25
Inflation	7.81	8.84	0.14	76.2
Unemployment	6.11	4.30	0	22.7
Compulsory Voting	0.16	0.37	0	1
Unicameralism	0.46	0.50	0	1
Prop. Representation System	0.84	0.37	0	1

Note: N = 164 for analyses with lagged variables

For the final hypothesis above, I constructed a monthly dataset of government duration for eighteen countries in Western Europe. For this analysis, the dependent variable is the time, as measured in months, until government failure.⁶⁹ Given the

⁶⁹ A government fails if any of the following occur: “1) a change in Prime Minister; 2) a change in the party composition of the Cabinet; or 3) resignation in an inter-election period followed by re-formation of the government with the same Prime Minister and party composition” (Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 2000: 10). This is indicated as a dichotomous measure (1 if failure occurs in that month, 0 if otherwise).

availability of data, the timeframe for this analysis is 1970-2005. Duration models are the appropriate estimation techniques for modeling temporally dependent observations and pose many advantages over traditional approaches such as ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).⁷⁰ Duration or survival models allow researchers to test many theories that, at their core, have implicit or explicit interests in the notions of timing and change (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The advantages to using survival models to test the hypotheses developed above rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) have been well documented (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

The major explanatory variable for this analysis is the proportion of seats garnered by anti-establishment parties within the national parliament for each specific country. The measure is calculated by dividing the number seats occupied by anti-establishment parties by the total number of seats in parliament and is expressed as a percentage. In addition, this dataset includes control variables measuring economic conditions (i.e., inflation, unemployment (both lagged) and GDP growth) and institutional factors (i.e., the amount of polarization in parliament), which may influence the duration of coalitional governments.⁷¹ First, I control for the type of government.

⁷⁰ The other principle advantage to using duration analysis over OLS is that OLS is unable to deal with the naturally occurring time dependence of a process like government tenure. I assume that the probability of a government failing depends partially on whether the government was in office in the previous period. This assumption leads to the natural conclusion that any omitted variables will lead to autocorrelation, which OLS cannot deal with satisfactorily. Further, logistic regression analyses fail because “an indicator variable cannot capture the variability in duration time a state spends prior to adoption—precisely the effect we are trying to understand” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997: 1417). This causes inefficient estimates with large variances.

⁷¹ For the analysis of cabinet duration, the variables for inflation and unemployment are lagged one month to establish “causality” or, at the very least, a temporal link between economic conditions and cabinet stability. Missing data for the measure of GDP growth were interpolated using STATA.

For this analysis, there are six types of government, which are broken down into two categories: majority governments and minority governments.⁷² These variables are coded as a dichotomous measure, one (1) for presence and (0) if not. Majority governments (i.e., single-party, minimal winning coalitions, and surplus coalitions) and the minority governments (i.e., single-party minority, multi-party minority government, caretaker governments) are coded together. In this analysis, the majority variable is tested with minority status being the baseline category.

Moreover, this analysis controls for the “effective” number of government parties, partisanship of the government, the constitutional inter-election period, and type of governmental system as well as the rules of the government formation process, which might serve as constraints to the durability of cabinet governments. The “effective” number of government parties is derived from the index created by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The measure for partisanship of the government takes the left-right score for each party from the Comparative Manifestos Project data (Klingemann et. al. 2006) and weights this score by the percentage of government seats. This measure ranges between -100 (far left) and 100 (far right). The constitutional inter-election period (CIEP) indicator measures the time left (in months) before the next constitutionally mandated election and is obtained from Kurian (1997). Presidential systems are coded 1

⁷² The six types of government identified by Muller-Rommel et al. (2004) are as follows: (1) single-party government (one party holds majority of parliamentary seats and all government positions), (2) minimal winning coalition (all parties in government are necessary to form a majority government), (3) surplus coalition (coalition governments that exceed the minimal winning coalition criteria), (4) single-party minority government (the party in government does not hold majority of seats in parliament), (5) multi-party minority government (the parties in government do not hold majority of seats in parliament), and (6) caretaker government (temporary cabinet).

if there is a directly elected president who is not accountable to the parliament.⁷³ Further, I also coded whether a vote of investiture is required for the formation of the cabinet government (1 if required), whether parliament has the power to pass a vote of no confidence against the government (1 if possible), and whether the prime minister has the power to dissolve parliament (1 if allowed). These variables were collected from Strøm, Müller, and Bergman (2003). Finally, to control for the amount of polarization within the system, I use the measure developed by Maoz (2006). Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the analysis of cabinet stability.

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics – Cabinet Stability

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Anti-Establishment Party Seat Share	9.18	10.40	0	79.52
Inflation (Lagged)	0.46	0.87	-6.19	10.4
Unemployment (Lagged)	6.30	3.86	0	20.6
GDP Growth	1.93	0.56	-0.02	5.72
“Effective” Number of Government Parties	1.90	0.98	1	5.48
Government Partisanship	-3.04	17.85	-58	61.07
Polarization	0.47	0.12	0.24	0.8
Type of System	0.11	0.32	0	1
Majority	0.75	0.43	0	1
CIEP (Months)	28.87	14.74	0	60
Investiture	0.53	0.50	0	1
Prime Minister Dissolution	0.10	0.30	0	1
No Confidence Vote	0.94	0.23	0	1

⁷³ From Shugart and Carey (1992), Switzerland and France (5th Republic) are coded as presidential regimes.

This hypothesis is tested using a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972). The underlying logic to the Cox model is to provide a truly flexible duration model where one “could obtain estimates of the covariates of interest, and leave the particular form of the duration dependency *unspecified*” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 48, emphasis in original). Choosing the proper model specification may be difficult; however, the Cox model does not require that you specify the underlying hazard rate. If the wrong distribution is specified, this will cause the inferences “regarding the relationship between the covariates and the duration time [to] be misleading since covariate estimates can be sensitive to the distribution function specified” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 21). The baseline hazard rate is assumed to be unknown and is left unparameterized; therefore, Cox models are often referred to as a “semi-parametric” model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 49). Given the nature of the dependent variable, the Cox model provides the best test for these hypotheses.

Analysis

The analyses confirm support for five of the six hypotheses stated above. The results indicate that anti-establishment parties do not increase voter turnout in subsequent elections. However, anti-establishment party electoral success does lead to instability within the party system by significantly increasing electoral volatility and polarization – both for establishment parties and for the broader party system – as well as upsetting traditional dynamics shortening the duration of coalitional governments. Table 4.3 shows the results of the analysis regarding the relationship between voter turnout and the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. The coefficient for anti-

establishment party support is negative. This suggests that anti-establishment party support negatively influences voter turnout in subsequent elections. However, this relationship is not statistically significant.⁷⁴

The control variables – the measures for disproportionality, compulsory voting, and the previous level voter turnout – significantly affect voter turnout. Each of the coefficients for these variables is in the expected direction. Disproportional electoral systems dampen voter turnout whereas compulsory voting increases voter turnout. Furthermore, higher levels of turnout in the previous election lead to increased voter turnout in subsequent elections. The remaining control variables – the “effective” number of parties, unemployment, inflation, and unicameral legislatures – do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Table 4.4 shows the results concerning the effects of anti-establishment party electoral success and electoral volatility. The electoral success of anti-establishment parties significantly increases the amount of volatility within the party system in subsequent elections (Hypothesis 4.2). This finding implies that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties furthers the continued decline of partisan attachments within the party systems of Western Europe (see Chapter I). Furthermore, the results indicate that economic conditions are most influential as it relates to the amount of system volatility. The remaining control variables fail to reach statistical significance.

⁷⁴ This finding that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties does not significantly affect voter turnout may be due to model misspecification. It is entirely possible that the success of anti-establishment parties produces significant changes in voter turnout that are not witnessed through aggregate totals of voter turnout. In order to capture whether anti-establishment parties are mobilizing voters, future research should develop measures and control for *changes* (increases or decreases) in the number of first-time voters. Furthermore, future research should consider controlling for changes in voting age population.

Table 4.3: The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Voter Turnout – Random Effects Model

	Voter Turnout
Anti-Establishment Party Support (Lagged)	-0.02 (0.03)
Disproportionality	-0.17 (0.08)
“Effective” Number of Parties	-0.04 (0.23)
Inflation	0.01 (0.03)
Unemployment	0.05 (0.07)
Compulsory Voting	1.86 (0.87)
Unicameralism	-0.11 (0.65)
Turnout (Lagged)	0.94 (0.03)
Constant	4.22 (2.83)
Obs. (elections)	164
R ² (overall)	0.90
R ² (within)	0.48
R ² (between)	0.99
<i>Rho</i>	0

Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test). Standard errors shown in parentheses

The second column in Table 4.4 shows the results for the analysis of volatility between establishment parties. Anti-establishment party electoral success increases the amount of volatility within the vote shares for establishment parties (Hypothesis 4.3). This suggests that anti-establishment parties are indeed creating more instability within the party system by stealing votes from traditional, mainstream parties and influencing

individual vote choice. As for the control variables, the level of disproportionality and inflation significantly increase the amount of volatility between establishment parties. The remaining control variables do not significantly affect establishment party volatility.

Table 4.4: The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Volatility – Random Effects Model

	System Volatility	Establishment Party Volatility
Anti-Establishment Party Support	0.25 (0.06)	0.11 (0.04)
Disproportionality	0.19 (0.14)	0.18 (0.09)
“Effective” Number of Parties	0.41 (0.43)	0.28 (0.27)
Inflation	0.14 (0.06)	0.11 (0.04)
Unemployment	0.23 (0.14)	0.10 (0.08)
System Volatility (Lagged)	0.08 (0.08)	
Establishment Party Volatility (Lagged)		0.12 (0.08)
Constant	2.28 (2.33)	1.20 (1.46)
Obs. (elections)	164	164
R ² (overall)	0.19	0.17
R ² (within)	0.16	0.09
R ² (between)	0.34	0.47
<i>Rho</i>	0	0

Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).
Standard errors shown in parentheses

Table 4.5: The Effects of Anti-Establishment Party Support on Polarization – Random Effects Model

	Establishment Party Polarization	System Polarization
Anti-Establishment Party Support (Lagged)	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)
Disproportionality	-0.005 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)
“Effective” Number of Parties	-0.014 (0.004)	-0.013 (0.004)
Proportional Representation	-0.046 (0.017)	-0.033 (0.018)
Inflation	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Unemployment	0.001 (0.0002)	0.003 (0.002)
Establishment Party Polarization (Lagged)	0.619 (0.054)	
System Polarization (Lagged)		0.575 (0.057)
Constant	0.216 (0.036)	0.240 (0.039)
Obs. (elections)	164	164
R ² (overall)	0.62	0.64
R ² (within)	0.35	0.26
R ² (between)	0.89	0.89
<i>Rho</i>	0	0

Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).
Standard errors shown in parentheses

The results shown in Table 4.5 demonstrate support for the fourth and fifth hypotheses posited above. First, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties leads to establishment parties distancing themselves from one another in subsequent elections. The coefficient for anti-establishment party support indicates that support for these parties in the previous election leads to increased polarization between parties of the

establishment. This suggests that establishment parties alter their ideological positions along the political spectrum to counter the electoral threat from anti-establishment parties (see Chapter III).

The control variables indicate mixed results. The measures for the “effective” number of parliamentary parties and proportional representation systems significantly influence the amount of polarization between establishment parties in a negative direction. As the number of parties increases in proportional representation systems, the ideological distance between establishment parties decreases. This may indicate an overcrowding of the political spectrum where there is simply no room for establishment parties to spread out across the political spectrum if they wish to maintain a distinct identity. However, the amount of polarization between traditional mainstream parties also decreases in more disproportionate electoral systems. Although these findings seem at odds, in disproportionate systems (e.g., the United States), parties often place themselves at the middle of the political spectrum in order to attract as many voters as possible – i.e., the median voter (see Downs 1957). Thus, the polarization between parties of the establishment decreases. The variables measuring the economic conditions within a country do not reach statistical significance, whereas the previous amount of polarization between establishment parties proves to be significant predictor.

The second column of Table 4.5 demonstrates that anti-establishment party support in previous elections leads to increased polarization within the party system. This suggests that anti-establishment parties increase the ideological space along the political spectrum. These quantitative empirical findings confirm the conclusion from

the qualitative work of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003). Anti-establishment parties alter the landscape of the political spectrum by providing the “necessary extra weight” to create “a sustained bipolar pattern competition” (see Mair 2001: 111).

Like the analysis of establishment party polarization, the control variables offer some interesting results. As the number of parliamentary parties increases in proportional representation systems, the amount of polarization within the system decreases. Whereas this finding seems counterintuitive, there may be a reasonable explanation. In political systems in which smaller parties are “drafted” into government and opposition groups, the amount of polarization within the system decreases (see Schneider 2004). This is most likely to happen in proportional representation systems in which coalitional governments of three or more parties are necessary to form a majority. Thus, smaller, possibly extreme, parties are co-opted in order to form majority coalitions and opposition groups. In turn, this may decrease the amount of polarization within the system as these smaller parties lessen their extreme stances and shift their position on the ideological spectrum to form a more cohesive coalitional, whether in government or in opposition.

However, higher levels of disproportionality decrease the amount of system polarization. Duverger (1963: 226) argues that in disproportional systems, voting for minor parties becomes a fruitless act as “electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party, whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries” (Duverger 1963: 226). Thus, voters support traditional mainstream parties, which have a greater opportunity to gain

governmental office, decreasing the amount of polarization within the system. Higher levels of unemployment lead to increased system polarization. This suggests that during poor economic conditions, voters may look at electoral alternatives at the extremes of the political spectrum in order to solve economic difficulties. Previous system polarization is also a significant predictor of system polarization.

Table 4.6 shows how anti-establishment party electoral success affects the duration of cabinet governments in Western Europe. Hazard rates above one *decrease* the lifespan of coalitional governments, whereas a hazard rate below one *increases* the lifespan. From this, one can see that anti-establishment parties are threats to the stability of coalitional governments. For every one percent of seats occupied by anti-establishment parties, the hazard rate *increases* by one percent. Thus, anti-establishment party electoral success *decreases* the duration of cabinet governments. As the proportion of seats garnered by anti-establishment parties grows, traditional parties are increasingly limited in their opportunities to form stable governing coalitions. This leads to smaller winning coalitions, which face larger opposition groups and thus, more opposition challenges. Therefore, the duration of cabinet governments is shortened as a larger opposition group, gaining support from anti-establishment members of parliament (MPs), challenges these smaller governing coalitions.

The control variables, with the exception of unemployment, all behave in the expected manner although some do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Higher levels of inflation increase the hazard rate *decreasing* the duration of the government. Higher levels of GDP growth decrease the hazard rate *increasing* the

duration of the cabinet. These findings confirm the conclusions of previous research that better economic conditions improve the probability of government survival. However, higher levels of unemployment actually increase the duration of coalitional governments. Although, this finding is not consistent with Warwick (1994), this may be due to the preponderance of left-oriented governments in this analysis. Warwick (1994: 92) suggests that left-oriented governments do not terminate when unemployment rates are higher due to their favorable reputation on the issue.⁷⁵

Furthermore, as the “effective” number of governmental parties increases, the duration of a coalitional government increases. Moreover, the amount of polarization significantly decreases the hazard rate increasing the lifespan of cabinet governments. Although these findings may seem counterintuitive, this implies that coalitions with more parties and more polarized systems promote compromise in order for coalitional governments to remain in power. Majority coalitions have a greater probability of remaining in government longer. The variables for the rules of the government formation process and institutional constraints (i.e., a vote of investiture, dissolution of parliament by the prime minister, and a vote of no confidence) do not significantly affect the duration of coalitional governments.

⁷⁵ For this analysis, the mean for government left-right position is -3.04 and the median is -3.58. These measures indicate the preponderance of left-oriented governments in the sample. Warwick (1994) argues that economic conditions interact with the partisanship of the government. During times of high unemployment, left-oriented governments are more likely to remain in office. However, right-oriented governments are more likely to survive during periods of high inflation.

Table 4.6: The Effect of Anti-Establishment Party Electoral Success on Cabinet Duration – Cox Proportional Hazard Model

	Hazard Rate	Coefficient
Anti-Establishment Party	1.01	0.01
Seat Share		(0.01)
Inflation (Lagged)	1.29	0.26
		(0.13)
Unemployment (Lagged)	0.85	-0.16
		(0.03)
GDP Growth	0.45	-0.80
		(0.23)
“Effective” Number of Government Parties	0.81	-0.22
		(0.09)
Government Partisanship	0.99	-0.01
		(0.004)
Polarization	0.28	-1.26
		(0.74)
Type of System	0.16	-1.81
		(0.32)
Majority	0.66	-0.42
		(0.16)
CIEP (Months)	1.04	0.04
		(0.005)
Investiture	0.87	-0.14
		(0.17)
Prime Minister Dissolution	0.88	-0.12
		(0.28)
No Confidence Vote	0.92	-0.08
		(0.49)
Number of Subjects	6522	
Number of Failures	281	
Log Likelihood	-2048.36	
LR Chi-squared	226.79	

Note: Hazard rates in bold are significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).
Standard errors shown in parentheses

Implications

There are several implications stemming from these analyses. First, and foremost, the emergence, and subsequent electoral success, of anti-establishment parties alters the party systems in which they compete. Although it is debatable whether anti-establishment parties reinvigorate or destabilize, there can be little debate that these parties alter the political landscape in Western Europe. Anti-establishment party electoral success increases the amount of volatility and polarization, both between traditional mainstream parties and within the system. Moreover, these new entrants into party system further contribute to the instability experienced by these party systems since the 1970s by garnering seats in parliament and upsetting traditional coalitional dynamics. The party systems examined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in the 1960s look drastically different forty years later due, in no small part, to anti-establishment parties altering the political landscape

Second, the emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties cannot stem the tide of declining voter turnout in Western Europe. Although Gray and Caul (2000) highlight the importance of group mobilization in increasing voter turnout, anti-establishment parties cannot reverse the trend of declining turnout. At the same time, this finding suggests that parties of the establishment, or the voters themselves, are not mobilizing groups against the anti-establishment movement. Furthermore, if anti-establishment parties are not significantly increasing voter turnout, then their electoral support must be coming from voters that previously supported other competitors within the party system. This furthers the claim that anti-establishment parties are stealing votes

from other parties. Finally, the argument can be made that as anti-establishment parties gain electoral support, more and more of the electorate, which participated in previous elections, are no longer participatory in the electoral process (i.e., voting). This implies that previous studies of declining partisan attachments in Western Europe are correct.

Third, if they wish to remain viable electoral competitors, traditional mainstream parties must counter the electoral threat of anti-establishment parties. The emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties provides the electorate with viable alternatives, which leads to increased volatility and “vote switching” within the electoral system. Furthermore, these findings suggest that this increased volatility and “vote switching” comes at the expense of establishment parties as anti-establishment parties steal votes from traditional mainstream parties. In turn, this may force traditional parties to shift their policies, organizational structures, or campaign strategies in order to counter the threat from anti-establishment parties and regain lost electoral support (see also Chapter III). Traditional mainstream parties must learn to adapt to the new environment produced by anti-establishment party electoral success. If the establishment fails to change, these parties face the possibility of not regaining these votes and losing their viability in the electoral market. Thus, it is the traditional parties within these democratic systems, and not necessarily the system itself (see also Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975, Dalton 1999, Norris 1999, Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a, and Putman, Pharr, and Dalton 2000), which are under attack from anti-establishment parties.

Fourth, despite electoral system factors that significantly decrease the amount of polarization, both between establishment parties and within the larger party system, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties significantly increases polarization. Thus, the effects of anti-establishment parties counteract the effects of the electoral system. Furthermore, this suggests that other competitors within the system are reacting to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and to the segment of the electorate that support these new entrants into the political arena. If the needs of citizens are not satisfied, then the institutions of the democratic system may decay (Easton 1957; Huntington 1965). Political parties, as vehicles for the people to articulate and aggregate their demands, must remain vibrant. In order to do so, political parties must adapt to this new environment. These results suggest that the parties of the establishment are indeed shifting their positions along the political spectrum to meet this electoral challenge. This confirms earlier work concerning the movement of traditional parties particularly on the issues upon which anti-establishment parties campaign (see Harmel and Svåsand 1997). Thus, it appears that the establishment parties are attempting to meet the demands of those voters who are either *mobilized* by anti-establishment parties or feel *abandoned* by establishment parties in favor of these new parties.

These findings also suggest that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties has indeed increased the ideological space within the party systems of Western Europe. This confirms the findings of Mair (2001) and Bale (2003). This does not confirm that parties of the establishment are co-opting anti-establishment parties into government or opposition coalitions; however, from these findings, one can conclude

that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties is “substantial enough to make the crucial difference between the continuation of centrist coalitional politics, on the one hand, or the emergence of a more bipolar pattern of competition, on the other” (Mair 2001: 112). The combination of these findings leads to the conclusion that anti-establishment parties produce the latter patterns of competition rather than the former.

Finally, anti-establishment parties upset the traditional dynamics of coalition formation and coalitional duration. By gaining seats and reducing the opportunities available for traditional parties to form coalitional governments, anti-establishment parties significantly shorten the length of cabinet governments within parliament. What remains to be seen is how the establishment (i.e., traditional parties) attempts to counter this threat. As mentioned in the last chapter, traditional parties may choose to alter their policy positions, organizational structures, or campaign strategies to counter the anti-establishment threat to the stability of the party system. However, countering the threat to the coalitional dynamics within parliament may require different tactics. In order to counter this threat, traditional parties may choose to establish new, non-traditional coalitional ties by co-opting anti-establishment parties or traditional enemies in governing coalitions. Therefore, we may see the advent of “grand” coalitions or coalitions between traditional enemies or fundamentally different parties. If this is indeed the case, anti-establishment parties may serve to usher in a new era of party competition within the party systems of Western Europe.

Conclusion

Recent scholarly work demonstrates that anti-establishment parties on both sides of the political spectrum alter the patterns of party competition with the political systems of Western Europe. These new parties help to foster a bipolar pattern of political competition (Mair 2001; Bale 2003). However, the analyses conducted in this chapter demonstrate that anti-establishment parties do much more than this to alter the political landscape within these systems. Anti-establishment parties, through their electoral success, increase volatility and polarization within the party system and increase the instability of coalitional governments. In turn, traditional mainstream parties must adapt in order to stabilize the party system.

This does not suggest that democracy itself is under attack, but rather, that establishment parties and the party systems in which they compete must adapt to a new environment. Anti-establishment parties contribute to, and take advantage of, a “thawing” of the once “frozen” party systems of Western Europe (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This is due, in no small part, to the new or long neglected issues that anti-establishment parties bring to the forefront of the political landscape. In addition, the shift in values across Western Europe since the early 1970s (see Inglehart 1971, 1990) creates the environment for anti-establishment parties to thrive and challenge the traditional parties. However, the adaptation of establishment parties allows these vehicles for the people to remain viable, continue to meet the demands of their citizens, and counter the electoral threat of anti-establishment parties. Thus, the stability of the democratic system endures even as these party systems become more fluid.

What remains is whether anti-establishment parties influence other aspects of the political system. How does the electoral success of anti-establishment influence policy and the policymaking process? Does the support garnered by anti-establishment parties lead to new policies or changes to old policies? Anti-establishment parties on different sides of the spectrum campaign on environmental, law and order, and welfare retrenchment. Do governmental policies shift leading to more or less expenditures in these areas? Furthermore, on rare occasions, anti-establishment parties enter into governing coalitions with traditional, mainstream parties. Although these parties would be considered part of the establishment, does their inclusion into the governing coalitions alter governmental policies? Have these new parties altered the policymaking process by entering into governing coalitions? These questions, which must be left to future research, can further our understanding of the complete anti-establishment party phenomenon.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Anti-establishment parties alter the political landscape within the party systems of Western Europe. This dissertation seeks to explain the emergence, electoral success and consequences of anti-establishment to provide the most complete portrait of this phenomenon. The emergence of these parties coincides with the shift in the value orientations of the European electorate towards *postmaterialism*. The vast literature investigating the electoral success of anti-establishment parties offers a broad yet incomplete analysis of the institutional, sociological and economic factors that account for the electoral success of these new parties. Despite the accumulation of literature focusing on the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, there remains a dearth of literature concerning the consequences of this electoral success. This dissertation overcomes various deficiencies within the literature regarding the electoral success and consequences of anti-establishment parties.

This examination of anti-establishment parties leads to several broad conclusions. First, the party systems examined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were not “frozen” or, at the least, “thawed” soon after their seminal work. Within a decade of their observation that the “party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few significant exceptions, the alignments of the 1920s” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50), Denmark experienced a “landslide election” or *Jordskredsvalget* in which new parties capturing over thirty-four per cent of the votes cast. The anti-establishment Progress Party (*Fremskridtspartiet*) gained 15.9 per cent and twenty-eight seats in the Danish legislature, *Folketing*. In 1983,

the German Green Party, *Die Grünen*, garnered 5.6 percent of the vote and twenty-seven seats in the *Bundestag* becoming the first successful party of its kind. Thus, shortly after the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), new entrants into the party system altered the landscape of party politics in Western Europe.

Second, the lack of a definitional consensus hinders the study of anti-establishment parties. The electoral success of anti-establishment parties across Western Europe sparked the interest of political scientists prompting extensive examination of these new parties. However, these studies reach different, often contradictory, conclusions concerning the factors favoring the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. The lack of a consensus on a clear operational definition of anti-establishment parties further exacerbates this problem. Various studies claiming to examine the same subset of anti-establishment parties (i.e., left-libertarian or far right) actually examine different parties due to the use of different definitions. This dissertation remedies these problems by offering a definition that overcomes the pathologies from which previous definitions suffer. This definition allows for an examination of anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum in a single theoretical framework.

Finally, although there is a developing literature concerning the *consequences* of anti-establishment parties, the effects of these parties remain understudied. Depending upon one's viewpoint, anti-establishment parties may reinvigorate or destabilize the broader party system. This dissertation examines the manner by which anti-establishment parties alter the individual parties and party systems of Western Europe.

These new parties influence ideological change within individual parties and alter party systems by increasing electoral volatility, increasing polarization, and upsetting the traditional coalitional dynamics within these parties. Despite this effort, future research must do more to appreciate the full consequences of anti-establishment parties.

The remainder of this concluding chapter focuses on the specific conclusions about the emergence, electoral success and, finally, the consequences of anti-establishment parties derived from the analyses in this dissertation. The focus then shifts to a discussion of future research concerning anti-establishment parties. In other words, this chapter asks two questions: What have we learned from these analyses and where do we go from here in the study of the anti-establishment party phenomenon?

The Emergence of Anti-Establishment Parties

Anti-establishment parties changed the face of the “frozen” party systems of Western Europe. These new parties seized upon the emergence of a new set of values that led to the decline of traditional cleavage structures (i.e., culture, region, class and/or religion) that shaped the party systems of the 1960s. Value orientations shifted from materialist (i.e., material well-being and physical security) to *postmaterialist* (i.e., quality of life) values and a tolerance for a variety of life styles (Inglehart 1971, 1977; see also Flanagan 1982a, 1982b). The emergence of this new set of values gave rise to what scholars refer to as the “new politics” (Inglehart 1984; Dalton 1988). This shift towards *postmaterialism* affected partisan preferences and alignments producing the need for, and allowing for, new parties (e.g., anti-establishment parties) to emerge and gain support based on these new values.

Moreover, several studies point to rising discontent and disenchantment within the electorate towards more established political parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a; Poguntke and Scarrow 1996) or unhappiness with the workings of the broader party system (Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Another sign of discontent with established political parties is the decline of partisanship within many industrialized democracies. If partisan ties are weaker and voters are making their electoral choices based on campaign issues instead of partisan loyalties, this allows for new parties, campaigning on new issues, to emerge and garner electoral support (see Dalton 2000 and Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000). Furthermore, more and more citizens are unhappy with the internal workings of the party system. Trends in public opinion within Europe show “the basic picture is one of spreading disillusionment with established political leaders and *institutions*” (Putman, Pharr, and Dalton 2000: 10, emphasis added). These patterns of cynicism towards political institutions accelerated over the last twenty years since the European electorate possesses a “skeptical attitude” toward the reality of democracy (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995: 440-441). Norris (1999: 26) advances these claims stating, “in established democracies, during the last decades of the twentieth century, growing numbers of citizens have become increasingly critical of the major institutions of representative government.” Disillusionment with the established parties and eroding public support for essential representative institutions in many Western European democracies are both catalysts for the emergence of anti-establishment parties and allow for these parties to gain a foothold within the political arena.

Finally, in a similar vein, electoral volatility increases within these party systems over the last forty years.⁷⁶ Several scholars note shifts in the stability of voter alignments by the end of the 1970s (Pedersen 1983; Maguire 1983; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; Crewe and Denver 1985; Franklin et al. 1992). Franklin et al. (1992: 404) note that “the electoral impact of social cleavages may well have been already in decline before the 1960s.” Thus, the party systems observed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were already changing as political cleavages became more irrelevant to party electoral success. More recently, Schmitt and Holmberg (1995) found partisan attachments waning in many Western European countries (see also Klingemann and Fuchs 1995).

Despite the fact that anti-establishment parties emerge from these changes, research on these new parties dismisses the fact that these parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, are part of the same phenomenon. Ignazi (1992:6) argues that anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” as “common problems and common concerns coalesced in partisan organizations at different ends of the political spectrum” (Ignazi 1997: 318). Thus, the rise of anti-establishment parties is a by-product of the *postmaterialist* value system as well as the disenchantment and disillusionment with established political parties and the larger political system taking advantage of, and contributing to, the growing discontent and increased volatility within the party systems of Western Europe.

⁷⁶ There remains a vigorous debate regarding claims of increased electoral volatility in Western European party systems. For a discussion of these claims, please see Rose and Urwin (1970) and Bartolini and Mair (1990). However, from the analyses in the fourth chapter, it is clear that anti-establishment parties increase the level of volatility within their respective party systems.

However, previous studies treat anti-establishment parties of the left (i.e., left-libertarian) as a different phenomenon from anti-establishment parties on the right (i.e., far-right, populist). Although anti-establishment parties of the left are distinctly different from anti-establishment parties of the right in terms of ideology, organizational structure, and bases of support, anti-establishment parties are part of the same phenomenon. *All* anti-establishment parties emerge from the same root causes. Mackie (1995) argues that parties challenging the establishment are born from the same phenomenon due to the fact that left-libertarian parties and “new populist” parties share the same electoral fortunes and the same “enemy” within the same countries. “To some extent the new populist parties are the mirror-image of the parties of the libertarian left. They too inveigh against the democratic leviathan” (Mackie 1995: 177). Taggart furthers the “mirror image” argument that all anti-establishment parties are indeed one phenomenon by concluding:

Through examining their ideology, it is clear that their commonality lies in the fact that they are reactions to recent developments in West European politics. They are united in what they oppose. They stand in opposition to what they see as the failed post-war settlement. In their actions and organisations there is a self-conscious effort to contrast themselves with ‘old’ established parties. (1996: 45)

The “symmetrical pattern in ideological, organizational and electoral features of parties” demonstrates that these parties “represent two sides of the same coin” (Taggart 1996: 46). Each of these parties challenges the political establishment providing an outlet for the voting public to voice their disenchantment with “politics as usual” in Western Europe. Anti-establishment parties provide alternatives to those among the electorate that wish to

vote against the establishment. Thus, contrary to previous studies, it would be somewhat foolish *not* to put these parties into the same category.

The Electoral Success of Anti-Establishment Parties

There are several conclusions and implications drawn from the analyses in the second chapter. First, anti-establishment parties do take advantage of the political opportunity structures created by the electoral system, economic and social conditions, the party system, and the actions of establishment parties, and “voter availability” within the electorate. Anti-establishment parties benefit from more proportional electoral systems with lower “effective” thresholds and higher “effective” number of political. These new parties are clearly affected by the characteristics of the electoral and party system. Economic conditions and level of affluence affect electoral support for anti-establishment parties. Higher levels of unemployment lead to increases in anti-establishment party support. At the same time, higher levels of affluence lead to higher levels of support for these parties. Each of these findings conforms to expectations.

However, higher levels of inflation do not affect support for anti-establishment parties as expected. Although this does not conform to the expectations of this analysis, there may be a logical explanation for this finding. As noted in the second chapter, Palmer and Whitten (1999) argue that inflation does not affect voting behavior in the same manner as unemployment or other economic conditions. If economic actors have rational expectations, inflation should not have real effects on personal economy due to the fact that it takes more time for the individual voter to feel the economic effects of inflation than other economic conditions such as unemployment (see Palmer and

Whitten 1999). Thus, we should not expect the electorate to punish or reward *any* political parties during periods of high or low inflation.

The social conditions within a country further contribute to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. Immigration significantly increases support for anti-establishment parties. Surprisingly, however, higher levels of crime do not significantly influence electoral success of these new entrants into the political arena. Thus, the “physical insecurity” argument finds support (see Gibson 2002). At least in part, anti-establishment parties benefit from the insecurity of voters created by the inability of established parties to solve the most basic of social problems (see Betz 1994). These results confirm previous findings regarding the decline in trust, defined as “feelings about the ability of the economic and political system to deliver desired goods” (Eatwell 2003: 69), across Western Europe. The inability of establishment parties to cure the economic and social ills of society creates the opportunity for anti-establishment parties to succeed in the electoral arena.

Surprisingly, collusion between establishment parties does not increase support for anti-establishment parties. Ballot restrictions and requirements for state support do not influence anti-establishment parties; therefore, attempts of the political establishment to thwart the challenges of anti-establishment parties by restricting access to the ballot and state support during campaigns does not significantly help or hinder these parties. However, as the amount of polarization between establishment parties decreases, anti-establishment parties are able to gain more electoral support. This suggests that anti-establishment parties gain traction in the electoral arena from the argument that *all*

establishment parties are the same. Thus, as the ideological profiles of the more established parties continue to mirror one another, voters are increasingly turning to the viable electoral alternatives embodied by anti-establishment parties.

The “electoral availability” of voters affects the electoral success of anti-establishment parties as increased levels of voter turnout and electoral volatility significantly increases electoral support for these new parties. This suggests that anti-establishment parties are indeed mobilizing new segments of the electorate and stealing votes from the establishment. As anti-establishment parties continue to offer viable electoral alternatives to a disillusioned and seemingly disenfranchised electorate, establishment parties continue to lose their vote share within the electorate.

However, when we disaggregate the analyses of the second chapter, we find that the exogenous factors that create the political opportunity structures for one subset of anti-establishment parties do not create the same opportunities for their counterparts on the opposite side of the political spectrum. While some factors influence support for both left-oriented and right-oriented anti-establishment parties, there are factors that affect left-oriented anti-establishment which have not effect of their right-oriented counterparts and vice versa. Thus, the opportunity structures are indeed different for these two sets of anti-establishment parties.

Several implications are drawn from these findings. First, establishment parties can, for the most part, control the opportunity structures leading to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. If established parties wish to counter the threat from anti-establishment parties, they must limit the opportunities for anti-establishment parties to

garner support. Establishment parties may alter the electoral system to stem the challenges from, or increase the obstacles for, new parties. More established parties might limit further opportunities for new parties by solving, or at least attempting to solve, the problems plaguing numerous countries within Western Europe. The actions of establishment parties also contribute to the “electoral availability” of voters, which, in turn, allows anti-establishment parties to make major strides into the political marketplace.

In turn, these developments have implications for the larger political system. Parties of the establishment must shift their placement on the ideological spectrum in order to counter the threat from anti-establishment parties providing clearer alternatives to the electorate. Increased polarization within the party system from the movement of establishment parties may lead to the emergence of new challengers as the established parties vacate the middle of the ideological space. Thus, the electorate witnesses more electoral alternatives and increased volatility, which significantly alter the once “frozen” party systems of Western Europe. This potential increase in the “effective” number of parties and the increased seat share of anti-establishment parties may decrease the stability of cabinet government within the legislature.

Second, and more importantly and surprisingly, all anti-establishment are not created equally; that is, anti-establishment parties on the left do not have their bases for electoral success in common factors with their counterparts on the right. Whereas these results do not dispute that anti-establishment parties *emerge* due to the same factors (see Chapter I), the factors that fuel their *electoral success* depend upon which side of the

political spectrum the party is situated. Thus, the assertions that anti-establishment parties are “the legitimate and unwanted children of the New Politics” (Ignazi 1992: 6) or that parties of “the New Populism and the New Politics have their bases in common factors” (Taggart 1996: 49), must be made in reference to their emergence, not their electoral success. Given the political opportunity structure differs for parties on the left from parties on the right, one might argue that anti-establishment parties have the same catalyst or spark, but owe their electoral success to different types of fuel.

Consequences of Anti-Establishment Parties

There are two important findings from the analyses in the third chapter. First, establishment parties adapt their ideological profiles on numerous issues in order to counter the growing electoral threat from anti-establishment parties. In particular, establishment parties shift their ideological position on issues championed by anti-establishment parties on different sides of the spectrum. This movement confirms earlier research from Downs (2001) as traditional parties *engage* anti-establishment parties by co-opting anti-establishment policies expanding their own programmatic agenda. Thus, in order to remain in power in an unstable electoral environment, traditional parties trade principle for pragmatism and seek more innovative, engaging tactics to overcome the threat from anti-establishment parties.

Surprisingly, contrary to the theory advanced in the third chapter, traditional mainstream parties do not alter their organizational structures as a consequence of this new electoral environment. Despite the lack of organizational adaptation within traditional parties, confirms the contention that the most difficult challenge for

establishment parties in countering the threat from anti-establishment parties is changing their organizational structures (see Rohrschneider 1993). It is easier for traditional parties to shift their policy positions and integrate new issues into their platforms than to fundamentally change their organizational power structures. In other words, traditional parties are more resistant to changing their organizational structures than their ideological profiles in order to adapt to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties.

Furthermore, there are several implications stemming from the analyses in the third chapter. First, anti-establishment parties may hinder their own electoral fortunes by instigating movement among parties of the establishment. Traditional mainstream parties are creating more distinct ideological profiles and more polarization within the system, which may help dampen support for anti-establishment parties. Second, the movement of establishment parties alters the dynamics of the party system, particularly the process of coalition formation. Establishment parties must look for new coalition partners, as traditional coalition alliances no longer remain viable options and the likelihood of “grand” coalitions between establishment parties decreases. Finally, the movement of establishment parties may lead to governing coalitions introducing new legislation or implementing new policies favored by anti-establishment parties. These new issue positions may become implemented policies if these parties enter into government since parties must deliver on their campaign promises in order to remain in power.

Moreover, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties alters the larger party systems in which these parties compete. Anti-establishment party electoral success

increases the amount of electoral volatility within the system and the amount of polarization, both between traditional mainstream parties and within the system. These new entrants into party system further contribute to the instability experienced by these party systems by garnering seats in parliament and upsetting traditional coalitional dynamics. However, and most surprisingly, the emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties cannot stem the tide of declining voter turnout across the countries of Western Europe. Although anti-establishment parties cannot reverse the trend of declining turnout, at the same time, this finding suggests that traditional parties, or the voters themselves, are not mobilizing groups against the anti-establishment movement. This further suggests that anti-establishment parties are stealing voters from other competitors within the party system. Finally, as anti-establishment parties gain electoral support, more and more of the electorate, which participated in previous elections, are no longer participating. This finding further confirms previous studies of declining partisan attachments in Western Europe.

These findings also suggest that if they wish to remain viable electoral competitors, traditional mainstream parties must counter the electoral threat of anti-establishment parties. This increased volatility and “vote switching” comes at the expense of establishment parties as anti-establishment parties steal votes from traditional mainstream parties and increase their electoral success. Traditional mainstream parties must learn to adapt to the new environment produced by the emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties. If the establishment fails to change, these parties face the possibility of not regaining these votes and losing their viability in the electoral

market. Thus, it is the traditional parties within these democratic systems and not the system itself, which are under attack from anti-establishment parties.

More interestingly, the effects of anti-establishment parties counteract the effects of the electoral system. Electoral system factors significantly decrease the amount of polarization, whereas the electoral success of anti-establishment parties significantly increases polarization. This suggests that other competitors within the system are reacting to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and their supporters. It appears that the establishment parties are indeed attempting to meet the demands of those voters who are either *mobilized* by anti-establishment parties or feel *abandoned* by establishment parties. This has increased the ideological space within the party systems of Western Europe. This does not confirm that parties of the establishment are co-opting anti-establishment issues, but one can conclude that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties is substantial enough to alter traditional coalitional politics and patterns of competition (see Mair 2001).

Finally, stemming from this finding and further analyses, anti-establishment parties upset the traditional dynamics of coalition formation and coalitional duration. By gaining seats and reducing the opportunities available for traditional parties to form coalitional governments, anti-establishment parties significantly shorten the duration of cabinet governments within parliament. How will parties of the establishment attempt to counter this threat? Countering the threat to the coalitional dynamics within parliament may require different tactics than those required to counter the electoral threat of anti-establishment parties. In order to counter this threat, traditional parties may choose to

establish new, non-traditional coalitional ties by co-opting anti-establishment parties or traditional enemies in governing coalitions. Therefore, we may see the advent of coalitions between traditional enemies or fundamentally different parties as anti-establishment parties usher in a new era of party competition.

Paths of Future Research

The analyses conducted in this dissertation prompt several avenues for future research. Arguably, the most important of these avenues concerns the further investigation into the consequences of anti-establishment parties. The first of these avenues relates to the aftermath of the movement of establishment parties following the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. This induces a series of related questions. Does the adaptation of traditional mainstream parties help or hinder the electoral fortunes of these parties? Does the decision to alter their ideological profiles or organizational structures help the party counter the threat from anti-establishment parties or further fuel the decline of the party? Do voters punish parties for moving too far from their core ideology or base supporters? Although it is possible, to some extent, to see if establishment parties increase their vote share in elections following these changes from the analyses presented in this dissertation, further research must shed light on the consequences of these changes for establishment parties.

In a similar vein, future research may demonstrate the effects of these adaptations on the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties. Do these changes allow establishment parties to limit or reverse the electoral successes of anti-establishment parties? How do anti-establishment parties react to the movement of more established

parties? If traditional parties encroach upon the issue positions of anti-establishment parties, the electoral success of these new parties may decline as voters return to the establishment fold. Future research must look at the consequences of established party movement on the anti-establishment parties. In addition, research needs to explore how other establishment parties react to the movement of their traditional rivals. How does the movement of establishment parties influence other traditional mainstream parties within the system? Does the electoral success of anti-establishment parties initiate a chain reaction creating ripples throughout the entire party system? Establishment parties' main rivals in pursuing governmental offices are other establishment parties. In order to be in position to form governments, establishment parties must balance between reacting to threats from anti-establishment parties as well as their closest establishment rivals.

Furthermore, how has the electoral success of anti-establishment parties affected these parties themselves? In some instances, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties leads to the inclusion of these parties in governing coalitions; therefore, the party ceases to be an anti-establishment party. However, after the collapse of the coalition, the party oftentimes continues its anti-establishment rhetoric. Do voters punish anti-establishment parties for being part of the government or continue to support these parties? Do the electoral fortunes of anti-establishment parties wane after being in a governing coalition? Given the electoral success of these parties, do anti-establishment parties attempt to become part of the establishment by moderating their extreme positions? Do anti-establishment parties become victims of their own electoral success?

These questions are important to determine how anti-establishment party electoral success affects anti-establishment parties themselves.

Finally, future research must answer whether the electoral success of anti-establishment influences policy and the policymaking process? Does the support garnered by anti-establishment parties lead to new policies or changes to old policies? Just as the electoral success of anti-establishment parties in Denmark leads to tougher immigration laws, does the electoral success of these anti-establishment parties lead to changes to other policies championed by anti-establishment parties? For example, left-oriented anti-establishment parties often campaign on environmental issues whereas anti-establishment parties on the right often advocate welfare reform. Do we see similar success on these issues due to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties?

This dissertation encourages just as many questions as it attempts to answer. The emergence and electoral success of anti-establishment parties generates several possibilities for research. More importantly, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties has numerous consequences for other competitors within the party system and the broader political system itself. Clearly, the insights gained by these analyses further our knowledge of anti-establishment parties. However, by asking and answering these questions in future research, we will gain a better understanding of the consequences of anti-establishment parties. Therefore, continued research beyond this dissertation is necessary to fully appreciate the anti-establishment party phenomenon.

REFERENCES

- Abedi, Amir. 2002. "Challenges to Established Parties: The Effects of Party System Features on the Electoral Fortunes of Anti-Political-Establishment Parties." *European Journal of Political Research* 41(4): 551-583.
- Abedi, Amir. 2004. *Anti-Political Establishment Parties: A Comparative Analysis*. New York: Routledge.
- Abramson, Paul, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. *Value Change in Global Perspective*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. "Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties?: The Causes and Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976-1998." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 513-529.
- Adams, James, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009. "Do Parties Adjust Their Policies in Response to Rival Parties' Policy Shifts? Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Postwar Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science*. Forthcoming.
- Alber, Jens. 1989. "Modernization, Cleavage Structures and the Rise of Green Parties and Lists in Europe." In *New Politics in Western Europe*, ed. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. pp 195-210.
- Aldrich, Howard E. 1979. *Organizations and Environments*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Arter, David. 1992. "Black Faces in the Blond Crowd: Populist Racialism in Scandinavia" *Parliamentary Affairs*, 45(3): 357-372.
- Arzheimer, Rai, and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. "Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success." *European Journal of Political Research* 45(3): 419-443.
- Bale, Tim. 2003. "Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems." *West European Politics* 26(3): 67-90.
- Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Baum, Joel A. C. 1996. "Organizational Ecology." In *Handbook of Organization Studies*, eds. Stewart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, and Walter R. Nord. London: Sage.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 1990. Politics of Resentment: Right-Wing Radicalism in West Germany *Comparative Politics*, 23(1): 45-60.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 1993a. "The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe." *Comparative Studies*, 25(4): 413-427.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 1993b. "The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe." *The Review of Politics* 55(4): 662-683.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Betz, Hans-Georg. 1998. "Introduction." In *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*, eds. Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 1-10.
- Betz, Hans-Georg, and Stefan Immerfall. 1998. *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Blais, André, and Kenneth R. Carty. 1991. "The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor." *British Journal of Political Science* 21(1): 79-93.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Jones, Bradford S. 1997. "Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(4): 1414-1461.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Bradford S. Jones. 2004. *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bréchon, Pierre, and Subrata Mitra. 1992. "The National Front in France. The Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement." *Comparative Politics* 25(1): 63-82.
- Bryce, James. 1921. *Modern Democracies*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan.
- Canovan, Margaret. 1981. *Populism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Canovan, Margaret. 1999. "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy." *Political Studies* 47(1): 2-16.

- Capoccia, Giovanni C. 2002. "Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14(1): 9-35.
- Caul, Miki L., and Mark M. Gray. 2000. "From Platform Declarations to Policy Outcomes: Changing Party Profiles and Partisan Influence over Policy." In *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 208-237.
- Chapin, Wesley D. 1997. "Explaining the Electoral Success of the New Right: The German Case." *West European Politics* 20(2): 53-72.
- Clarke, Kevin A. 2005. "The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22(4): 341-352.
- Cox, David R. 1972. "Regression Models and Life Tables." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Serial B* 34(2): 187-220.
- Crewe, Ivor, and David Denver, eds. 1985. *Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility*. London: Croom Helm Ltd.
- Crozier, Michael, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. *The Crisis of Democracy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1988. *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1999. "Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies." In *Critical Citizens*, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 57-77.
- Dalton Russell J. 2000. "Decline of Party Identifications." In *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-36.
- Dalton, Russell J., Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Beck. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J., and Manfred Kuechler. 1990. *Challenging the Political Order: New Social Movements in Western Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Dalton, Russell J., and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. 2000a. *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J., and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2000b. "Partisan Change and the Democratic Process." In *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 261-285.
- Dalton, Russell J., Ian McAllister, and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2000. "Consequences of Partisan Dealignment." In *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-66.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers.
- Downs, William M. 2001. "Pariahs in their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to Extremist Threats." *West European Politics* 24(3): 23-48.
- Drummond, Andrew. 2002. "Electoral Volatility and Party Decline in Western Democracies: 1970-1995." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
- Duverger, Maurice. 1963. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Wiley.
- Easton, David. 1957. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, 9(3): 393-400.
- Eatwell, Roger. 2003. "Ten Theories of the Extreme Right." In *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*. eds. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg. London: Frank Cass. pp. 47-73.
- Epstein, Leon. 1980. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Fennema, Meindert. 1997. "Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe." *Party Politics* 3(4): 473-492.
- Fitzmaurice, John. 1992. "The Extreme-Right in Belgium: Recent Developments." *Parliamentary Affairs* 45(3): 300-308.

- Flanagan, Scott. 1982a. "Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies: Inglehart's Silent Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings." *Comparative Political Studies* 14(4): 403-444.
- Flanagan, Scott. 1982b. "Measuring Value Change in Advanced Industrial Societies." *Comparative Political Studies* 15(1): 99-128.
- Franklin, Mark, Thomas Mackie, and Henry Valen et al. 1992. *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Furlong, Paul. 1992. "The Extreme Right in Italy: Old Orders and Dangerous Novelties" *Parliamentary Affairs* 45(3): 345-356.
- Fysh, Peter, and Jim Wolfreys. 1992. "Le Pen, the National Front and the Extreme Right in France." *Parliamentary Affairs* 45(3): 309-326.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1990. "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics." *Political Analysis* 2(1): 131-150.
- Gibson, Rachel. 2002. *The Growth of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Givens, Terri E. 2005. *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Golder, Matt. 2003a. "Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4): 432-466.
- Golder, Matt. 2003b. "Electoral Institutions, Unemployment and Extreme Right Parties: A Correction." *British Journal of Political Science* 33(3): 525-534.
- Gray, Mark, and Miki Caul L. 2000. "Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 1997: The Effects of Declining Group Mobilisation." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(9): 1091-1122.
- Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond, eds. 2001a. *Political Parties and Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond. 2001b. "Types and Functions of Parties" In *Political Parties and Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 3-39.

- Hainsworth, Paul, ed. 1992. *The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman. 1977. "The Population Ecology of Organizations." *American Journal of Sociology* 82(5): 929-964.
- Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman. 1984. "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change." *American Sociological Review* 49(2): 149-164.
- Harmel, Robert. 1985. "On the Study of New Parties." *International Political Science Review*. 6(4): 403-418.
- Harmel, Robert. 1997. "The Impact of New Parties on Party Systems: Lessons for America from European Multiparty Systems." In *Multiparty Politics in America*, eds. Paul S. Herrnson and John C. Green. Lanham, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. 43-57.
- Harmel, Robert, and John D. Robertson. 1985. "Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis." *International Political Science Review* 6(4): 501-523.
- Harmel, Robert, and Kenneth Janda. 1994. "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6(3):289-305.
- Harmel, Robert, Kenneth Janda, and Alexander Tan. 1995. "Substance vs. Packaging: An Empirical Analysis of Parties' Issue Profiles." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.
- Harmel, Robert, and Lars Svåsand. 1997. "The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms: The Cases of Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway." *Party Politics* 3(3): 315-340.
- Hug, Simon. 2001. *Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1965. "Political Development and Political Decay." *World Politics* 17(3): 386-430.
- Ignazi, Piero. 1992. "The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 22(1): 3-34.

- Ignazi, Piero. 1996. "The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties." *Political Parties* 2(4): 549-566.
- Ignazi, Piero. 1997. "New Challenges: Postmaterialism and the Extreme Right." In *Developments in West European Politics*, eds. M. Rhodes, P. Heywood, and V. Wright. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 300-319.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies." *American Political Science Review*. 65(4): 991-1017.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. *The Silent Revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1984. "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society." In *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Russell Dalton, Scott Flanagan and Paul Beck. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 25-69.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Interpol. 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005. *International Crime Statistics*. New York. Interpol.
- Ionescu, Ghita, and Ernst Gellner. 1969. *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Jackman, Robert W., and Karin Volpert. 1995. "Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe." *British Journal of Political Science* 26(4): 501-521.
- Janda, Kenneth. 1980. *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*. New York, NJ: The Free Press
- Janda, Kenneth. 1990. "Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties." Presented at the 12th World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Madrid, Spain.
- Katz, Richard. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. New York: Oxford University Press..
- Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1(1): 5-28

- King, Anthony. 1969. "Political Parties in Western Democracies." *Polity* 2(2): 111-141.
- King, Gary, James E. Alt, Nancy Elizabeth Burns, and Michael Laver. 1990. "A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 846-871.
- Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966. "Germany: The Vanishing Opposition." In *Political Opposition in Western Democracies*, ed. Robert A. Dahl. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. pp. 237-259.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16(1): 57-85.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1988. "Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems." *World Politics* 40(2): 194-234.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, and Dieter Fuchs. 1995. *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge and Michael D. McDonald. 2006. *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Governments and Electors in the OECD, EU and Central and Eastern Europe 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Knigge, Pia. 1998. "The Ecological Correlates of Extreme-Right Extremism in Western Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 34(2): 249-279.
- Knight, Robert. 1992. "Haider, the Freedom Party and the Extreme Right in Austria." *Parliamentary Affairs* 45(3): 285-299.
- Kurian, George Thomas. 1997. *World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 12(1): 3-27.
- Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante Ersson. 1999. *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, 4rd ed. London: Sage.

- Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *The American Political Science Review* 65(3): 682-693.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- Lubbers, Marcel, and Peer Scheepers. 2000. "Individual and Contextual Characteristics of the German Extreme Right-Wing Vote in the 1990s: A Test of Complimentary Theories." *European Journal of Political Research* 38(1): 63-94.
- Lubbers, Marcel, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. "Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 41(3): 345-378.
- Mackie, Tomas T., 1995. "Parties and Elections." In *Governing the New Europe*, eds. Jack Hayward and Edward C. Page. Cambridge: Polity Press. pp. 166-195.
- Mackie, Thomas T., and Richard Rose. 1991. *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. London: Macmillan.
- Mackie, Thomas T., and Richard Rose. 1997. *A Decade of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac*. Glasgow, Scotland: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy. Typescript.
- Maguire, Maria. 1983. "Is There Still Persistence? Electoral Change in Western Europe, 1948-1979." In *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, eds. Hans Daalder and Peter Mair. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. pp. 67-94.
- Mair, Peter. 1995. "Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege." *West European Politics* 18(3): 40-57.
- Mair, Peter. 1997. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mair, Peter. 2001. "The Green Challenge and Political Competition: How Typical Is the German Experience?" *German Politics* 10(2): 99-116.
- Mair, Peter, and Richard S. Katz. 1997. "Party Organization, Party Democracy, and the Emergence of the Cartel Party." In *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*, eds. Peter Mair and Richard S. Katz. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 93-119.

- Maoz, Zeev. 2006. "An Index of Network Polarization." University of California-Davis. Department of Political Science. Typescript.
- Mayer, Lawrence C. 1989. *Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise Versus Performance*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Mayer, Nonna. 1998. "The French National Front," In *The New Politics of the Right*, eds. Hans-Georg Betz, and Stefan Immerfall. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 11-25.
- Meguid, Bonnie. 2005. "Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy and Niche Party Success." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 347-60.
- Mény, Yves, and Yves Surel. 2002. *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meyer, David S., and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity." *Social Forces* 82(4): 1457-1492.
- Michels, Robert. [1915] 1962. *Political Parties*. New York: Macmillan.
- Mudde, Cas. 1996. "The Paradox of the Anti-Party-Party: Insights from the Extreme Right." *Party Politics* 2(2): 265-76.
- Mudde, Cas. 1999. "The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue." *West European Politics* 22(3):182-197.
- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand. 1989. *New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and the Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, Katja Fettelschoss, and Phillip Harfst. 2004. "Party Government in Central Eastern European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990-2003)." *European Journal of Political Research* 43(6): 869-893.
- Norris, Pippa. 1999. *Critical Citizens*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1992, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005. *Trends in International Migration. SOPEMI, Continuous Reporting System on Migration: Annual Report*. Paris: OECD.
- Palmer, Harvey, and Guy Whitten. 1999. "The Electoral Impacts of Unexpected Inflation and Economic Growth." *British Journal of Political Science* 29(4): 623-39.

- Pedersen, Mogens N. 1979. "The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility." *European Journal of Political Research* 7(1): 1-26.
- Pedersen, Mogens N. 1983. "Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948-1977: Explorations and Explanation." In *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, eds. Hans Daalder and Peter Mair. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. pp. 29-66.
- Pharr, Susan J., and Robert D. Putnam. eds. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Poguntke, Thomas. 1996. "Anti-Party Sentiment: Conceptual Thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield." *European Journal of Political Research* 29(3):319-344.
- Poguntke, Thomas, and Susan E. Scarrow. 1996. "The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: Introduction." *European Journal of Political Research* 29(1): 257-262.
- Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1986. "Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles." *American Journal of Political Science* 30(2): 357-378.
- Powell, G. Bingham, Jr., and Georg S. Vanberg. 2000. "Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 30(3): 383-411.
- Redding, Kent, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 1999. "Political Demands, Political Opportunities: Explaining the Differential Success of Left-Libertarian Parties." *Social Forces* 78(2): 491-510.
- Riedlsperger, Max. 1998. "The Freedom Party of Austria: From Protest to Radical Right Populism." In *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*, eds. Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 27-44.
- Rochon, Thomas. 1985. "Mobilizers and Challengers: Toward a Theory of New Party Success." *International Political Science Review* 6(4): 419-39.
- Rohrschneider, Robert. 1993. "Impact of Social Movements on European Party Systems." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528(1): 157-170.

- Rose, Richard, and Derek W. Urwin. 1970. "Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems Since 1945." *Political Studies* 18(3): 287-319.
- Sanders, David, and Valentine Herman. 1977. "The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Democracies." *Acta Politica* 12(3): 346-377.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1968. "Representational Systems." *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. 13: 470-475.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. *Party Government*. New York: Rinehart.
- Schedler, Andreas. 1996. "Anti-Political-Establishment Parties." *Party Politics* 2(3): 291-312.
- Schmitt, Herman, and Soren Holmberg. 1995. "Political Parties in Decline?" In *Citizens and the State*, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schneider, Gerald. 2004. "Falling Apart or Flocking Together? Left-Right Polarization in the OECD Since World War II." University of Konstanz, Germany Department of Politics and Management. Typescript.
- Shugart, Matthew and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sidoti, Francesco. 1992. "The Extreme Right in Italy: Ideological Orphans and Countermobilization." In *The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA*, ed. Paul Hainsworth. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 151-174.
- Smith, Gordon. 1987. "Party and Protest: The Two Faces of Opposition in Western Europe." In *Opposition in Western Europe*, ed. Eva Kolinsky. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 52-76.
- Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. 2003. *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Swyngedouw, Marc 1998. "The Extreme Right in Belgium: Of a Non-existent Front National and an Omnipresent Vlaams Blok." In *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*, eds. Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. 59-76.

- Taggart, Paul A. 1996. *The New Populism and the New Politics: New Protest Parties in Sweden in a Comparative Perspective*. London: Macmillan.
- Taggart, Paul. 2002. "Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics." In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, eds. Yves Mény and Yves Surel. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 62-80.
- Taguieff, Pierre-Andre. 1995. "Political Science Confronts Populism: From Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem." *Telos* 103: 9-43.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van der Brug, Wouter and Meindert Fennema. 2003. "Protest or Mainstream? How the European Anti-Immigrant Parties Developed into Two Separate Groups by 1999." *European Journal of Political Research* 42(1): 55-76.
- Voerman, Gerrit, and Paul Lucardie. 1992. "The Extreme Right in the Netherlands: The Centrists and the Radical Rivals." *European Journal of Political Research* 22(1): 35-54.
- Warwick, Paul V. 1979. "The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 11(4): 465-98.
- Warwick, Paul V. 1994. *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Westle, Bettina, and Oskar Niedermayer. 1992. "Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany: The 'Republicans' and Their Electorate." *European Journal of Political Research* 22(1): 83-100.
- Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman and Ian Budge. 2000. *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998). Composition-Duration-Personnel*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Wooldridge, Jeffery M. 2001. *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
- World Bank. 2006. *World Development Indicators*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

APPENDIX A

Anti-Establishment Parties

Austria

Alternative List/Green Alternative (ALO/GA), Communist Party of Austria (KPO) (since 1948), League of Independents/Freedom Party of Austria (VdU/FPO) (1970 and since 1986), NO-Citizens' Initiative (NEIN), The Independents (DU).

Belgium

All-Power-To-The-Workers (AMADA-TPO), Communist Party (PCB-KPB) (1970-78), Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour (UDRT-RAD), Flemish Block (VB), Flemish Christian People's Union (CVV), Flemish Concentration (VC), Greens (ECOLO-AGALEV) (until 1992), Growing Old in Dignity (WOW), Labour Party (PTB-PvdA), National Front (FN), Flemish People's Union 1970-1977), Radical Reformers Fighting for an Upright Society (ROSSEM-ROSSUM/ BANANE-BANAAN), Revolutionary Workers' League/Socialist Workers' Party (LRT-RAT/ POS-SAP), Walloon Rally (RW) (until 1974), Walloon Front.

Denmark

Communist Party (DKP), Communist Worker's Party, Socialist Worker's Party, Common Course (FK), Danish People's Party (DF), Danish Union (DS) (until 1948), Greens, Independents' Party, Left Socialist Party (VS), Progress Party (FRP), Red-Green Unity List (ELRG)

Finland

Alliance for Free Finland (VSL), Communist Party of Finland (SKP) (since 1997), Democratic Alternative, Finnish Peoples Democratic Union (SKT4L--)-(1948_46), Finnish Smallholders' Party/Finnish Rural Party/True Firms (SPP/ SMP/PS) (1962-83, and, since 1990), Green League (VL/VIHR) (until 1995), Progressive Finnish Party (NUORS), Reform Group (REM).

France

French Communist Party (PCF) (1947-81), Greens/Green Coalition (EE) (until 1993), National Front (FN), New Ecologists, Poujadists/Union for the Defense of Traders and Artisans (UDCA), Republican Communist Front (LCR), Unified Socialist Party (PSU), Workers' Struggle (LO), other extreme left, other extreme right.

Germany

Bavarian Party (BP), Communist Party (KPD/DKP), Economic Reconstruction League (WAV), German People's Union (DVU), German Reich Party (DRP), Greens (until 1990), Greys, National Democratic Party (NPD), Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/ Die Linke, Republicans (REP)

Greece

United Left (EDA, KKE, KKE Interior), National Democratic Union, National Alignment/ National Front (EP), Communist Party (KKE), Alliance of Progressive and Left-Wing Forces (KKE Interior), Progressive Party, National Political Union (EPEN), Coalition of Left and Progress, Alternative Ecologists, Ecologists Greece, Communist Party of Greece (KKE Interior)-Renewal Left, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Greece, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Greece, Union of Ecologists, Coalition of the Radical Left, other green lists

Iceland

Candidature Party (Frambodsflokkurinn), Citizens' Party II (Borgara-flokkurinn) (until 1991), Left-Green (Vinstrihreyfingin-Graent Frambod), National Party (Thjodarflokkur), Women's Alliance (Samtok um Kvinnalista) (until 1998)

Ireland

Comhaontas Glas/Green Party, Sinn Fein II, Sinn Fein III, Workers' Party (WP)

Italy

Common Man Front, Communist Party/Democratic Party the Left (PCI/PDS) (1947-95), Communist Refoundation (RC), Continuous Struggle, Forza Italia (1994), Greens (Liste Verdi), Green Federation (until 1996), Italian Social Movement/National Right/National Alliance (MSI/DN/AN) (until 1994), Lombard League, MS-Fiamma, Northern League (LN), Proletarian Democracy (DP), Radical Party/Panella List (PR), Referendum List, Sicilian Independence Movement, The Network/Movement for Democracy (La Rete/MPD) (until 1994), Venetian League

Luxembourg

Action Committee 5/6 Pensions for All/Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice (ADR), Alternative List, Communist Party (KPL/PCL)/ The Left (LENK), Ecologists for the North, Greens, Green Alternative (GAP), Luxembourg for the Luxembourgers National Movement, Middle Class Party, Popular Independent Movement.

The Netherlands

Center Democrats (CD), Center Party (CP'86), Communist Party (CPN), Evangelical People's Party (EVP), Farmers' Party (BP), General Association of Elderly People (AOV), Green Left (GL), Middle Class Party, Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), Political Reformed Party (SGP), Radical Political Party (PPR) (since 1978), Reformed Political Union (GPV), Reformed Political Federation (RPF), Socialist Party (SP), Union 55+ (U55+).

Portugal

Communist Party (PCP), People's Democratic Union (UDP), People's Socialist Front (FSP), Party of Christian Democracy (PDC), United People Alliance (APU) (until 1985), Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP), Unitarian Democratic Coalition (CDU), The Ecologist Party (PEV), Left Bloc (BE), Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers

Norway

Anders Lange's Party/Progress Party (FRP), Communist Party (NKP), Red Electoral Alliance (RV)

Spain

Communist Party (PCE), Popular Alliance, Basque National Party (PNV), National Union (UN), Herri Batasuna (HB), Izquierda Unida (IU), Andalucist Party (PA)

Sweden

Ecology Party-Greens (MP) (until 1992), New Democracy (NYD)

Switzerland

Alliance of Independents (LdU/AdI), Federal Democratic Union (EDU), Labour Party (PdA/PdT), Green Alternatives (GRAS), National Action for People and Homeland (NA)/Swiss Democrats (SD), Motorists' Party Switzerland (APS)/Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS), Progressive Organizations of Switzerland (POCH), Republican Movement, Ticino League, Vigilance

United Kingdom

Green Party, National Front, Plaid Cymru (PC), Scottish National Party (SNP), United Ireland/Sinn Fein, Respect/The Unity Coalition (RES)

APPENDIX B

Interview Questions for Establishment Parties

Organizational Changes

- 1) In recent years, has your party undertaken any changes to the organization of the party?
- 2) Has the party adopted primary elections to elect their candidates or leaders? Did the party change their selection procedures? If so, why?
- 3) Were there major issues about the need to reorganize the party? Did these changes include allowing the decisions to be made by the lower level members of the party?
- 4) Did these significantly change the party? In what ways? Were they major or minor changes?
- 5) What caused these changes?
 - a) How do you think these changes affected your party?
 - b) Did these changes affect your electoral success? How?
- 6) Were any of these changes due to the emergence of new parties?
 - a) Did any of these changes take place after the electoral success of new parties?
 - b) Did any particular new party prompt these changes?
- 7) Are any of these changes still in effect today?

Programme Changes

- 8) Has your party changed its ideological position, in recent years? If so, on what issues has the party changed its positions?
- 9) Why did the party make these changes?
 - a) How do you think these changes affected your party?
 - b) Did these changes affect your electoral success? How?

10) Did these significantly change the party? In what ways? Were they major or minor changes?

11) Were any of these changes due to the emergence of new parties?

a) Did any of these changes take place after the electoral success of new parties?

b) Did any particular new party prompt these changes?

General Questions

12) What do you feel is the greatest threat to your party's electoral success?

a) Do you feel that newer parties threaten your party's electoral success?

13) How has your party reacted to the emergence of new parties?

Personnel Changes

14) If any leadership changes took place, what was the difference in the leadership styles between leader A and leader B? How did this affect the party?

15) What was the cause of the leadership change?

Interview Questions for Anti-Establishment Parties

Questions Concerning Impacts

- 1) What do you feel is your party's greatest impact within the party system?
- 2) Do you think you challenge the more established parties within your party system? In what ways do you feel you challenge established parties?
- 3) How do you think the more established parties within the system view your party?
- 4) How do you think your party has influenced the more established parties within the party system?
- 5) Do you think your party has affected organizational changes, ideological position changes, or campaign activity changes within the more established parties within the system?
- 6) Which party in particular do you feel you have impacted? What about parties on the opposite side of the political spectrum?
- 7) What must your party do to continue the success you have seen in elections? What do you think is the greatest threat to your party's survival?

Organizational Changes

- 8) In recent years, has your party undertaken any changes to the organizational structure of the party?
- 9) What caused these changes?
- 10) How do you think these changes affected your party? How did these changes affect your electoral success?
- 11) Did these significantly change the party or were they minor changes?
- 12) What was the duration of these changes? Are any of these changes still in effect today?

Programme Changes

- 13) Has the party altered its ideological position in recent years? If so, what issue positions has your party changed?

14) What caused these changes?

15) How do you think these changes affect your party? How did these changes affect your electoral success?

Consent Form

The Consequences of Anti-Establishment Parties in Western Europe

You have been asked to participate in a research study investigating organizational changes made by establishment parties in response to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. You were selected due to your position as party secretary or another party official within these particular parties. A total number of 50 individuals have been asked to participate in this study. The purpose of this research is to determine whether, and to what extent, establishment parties within the party systems of Western Europe have altered their organizational structures in response to the formation of anti-establishment parties.

If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to participate in a face-to-face interview in which you will be asked a series of questions related to the organizational structures of your parties. These interviews will last about one hour and thirty minutes and will be audiotaped with your permission. At any point during the interview, please let me know if you wish to go “off the record” with any comments. These comments will not be attributed to you in any documentation of this research. There are no risks involved with participation in this study. There are no direct benefits to your participation and you will receive no monetary compensation for your participation.

This study is not anonymous or confidential. In order to report the results, it will be necessary to convey your position, although not your name, within the party as part of any documentation of this study. The audio tapes of these interviews will be stored securely and only Jason Smith (principal investigator) will have access to the tapes. The information on these audio tapes will be used as part of my dissertation and subsequent research. Any personal identifiers contained within the tapes will be used solely by Jason Smith (principal investigator). Any shared data produced using the audio tapes will have all personal identifiers removed before public dissemination.

If you decide to participate in this study, you are free to refuse to answer any of the questions or stop the audiotaping process at any time. You may withdraw from the interview at any time. You can contact Jason Smith at the address listed below with any questions regarding this study.

This research study has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board – Human Subject in Research, Texas A&M University. For research-related problems or question regarding subjects’ rights, you can contact the Institutional Review Board through Ms. Melissa McIlhaney. IRB Program Coordinator, Office of Research Compliance, (979) 458-4067, (mcilhaney@tamu.edu).

Please be sure that you have read the above information and have asked and receive answers to your satisfaction before participating in this study. Please keep this information sheet for your records.

By signing this form below, you are giving your consent to participate in this study and to have this interview audiotaped for the purposes of documentation.

Signature of Participant: _____ Date: _____

Thank you,

Jason Smith

Doctoral Candidate
Department of Political Science
Texas A&M University
4348 TAMU College Station, TX 77843-4348
Phone: (979) 845-2511
e-mail: jsmith@polisci.tamu.edu

APPENDIX C

Coding Schemes

LIMITATION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS

-5 (PRO-strong)	Advocates strict governmental control over what would normally be considered private affairs, regulating behavior in a wide variety of personal matters; strict enforcement and severe penalties are favored in at least some areas.
-3 (PRO-moderate)	Advocates governmental control over many personal matters, but recognizes individual sovereignty in certain areas; favors moderate levels of enforcement and penalties.
-1 (PRO-weak)	Generally favors a low level of government involvement in personal matters, but does advocate maintenance of some regulation already in place plus extension in one or more specific areas seen as having special affect on society.
0 (NEUTRAL)	Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist on the issue.
+1 (ANTI-weak)	Accepts necessity of intrusions into personal matters in some areas where they may affect others than those directly involved (sometimes justifying such as a necessity for social responsibility), but opposes most attempts to extend such areas.
+3 (ANTI-moderate)	Accepts necessity of intrusions in very limited number of areas, but generally is strongly opposed to extension of such intrusions.
+5 (ANTI-strong)	Advocates no governmental intervention in personal matters, and gives broad scope to "personal matters; favors what are generally considered extremely libertarian positions with regard to private affairs; those behaviors considered "victimless crimes" should be legalized

INCOME/PERSONAL TAXES

Special instructions: Personal taxes would include such as individual property tax or a tax on personal wealth, but would not include sales or value added taxes.

- 5 (PRO-strong) Strongly favors a heavy tax on personal income and/or property or wealth, as the primary means of paying for government programs; though different groups, society may be taxed at different rate all rates would be considered heavy; advocates very strict enforcement and major penalties for violators.

- 3 (PRO-moderate) Favors a generally high level of personal taxation, but does advocate lower tax rates for certain groups in society, may advocate alternative forms of revenue as well, so as to avoid increasing personal taxes much further.

- 1 (PRO-weak) Favors a personal tax, but advocates that the- range , be kept low-to-moderate generally; may favor slight increase in current rate, though emphasizing need to minimize the increase; may have a pattern of favoring only very limited increases

- 0 (NEUTRAL). Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue.

- +1 (ANTI-weak) Accepts need for a low level of personal taxation,. but, generally urges small reductions from current levels, at least for some segments of society; has a tendency to oppose increases beyond current rate, with few exceptions.

- +3 (ANTI-moderate) Accepts need for just a very low level of personal taxation, and may generally urge major reductions from current levels; advocates developing alternative sources (to personal taxes of any kinds) of revenue so as to limit or reduce personal taxes.

- +5 (ANTI-strong) Opposes any income or other personal tax; strongly advocates funding government through other means.

TOTAL TAXATION

Special instructions: To code this variable, it is necessary to consider the material used also in coding H02; that is, "total taxes" obviously includes "income tax" as an important component. However, since "total taxes" will normally include more than just personal taxes, information on H02 alone (i.e. in the absence of statements on other taxes or taxes more generally) may be insufficient for coding HO2B.

- 5 (PRO-strong) Favors heavy taxation of many types to pay for massive government spending; does not advocate reduction in the overall level of taxation, though may occasionally endorse shifting of burdens among categories of taxes or taxpayers.

- 3 (PRO-moderate) Favors a high level and many types of taxation, though does see limits to growth in tax revenues, and may advocate planning for alternative, additional types of revenue; generally supports current taxes and levels, and regularly endorses increases, but occasionally resists.

- 1 (PRO-weak) Favors a moderately high level and several types of taxation, but strongly advocates planning for alternative sources of revenue so as to avoid continual increases in the future; expresses the need to be cautious about over-taxing; does not generally support decreasing the current overall level of taxation (unless in situations where objective observers would judge the current level to be higher than "moderately high").

- 0 (NEUTRAL) Has, contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist", on the issue.

- +1 (ANTI -weak) Accepts a substantial role for taxes as one source of revenue, but tends to favor modest reductions to ease the overall burden; regularly cautions about overtaxing, and sees the latter as something of a current problem rather than just something to be avoided in the future; regularly opposes increases that would result in an a greater overall tax burden.

- +3 (ANTI-moderate) Opposes a high level of overall taxation on grounds of principle; accepts the need for some taxes but strongly advocates keeping the overall level low; opposes most increases and regularly advocates reductions in various specific taxes and in the overall level.

+5 (ANTI-strong) Opposes all forms of taxes on principle; strongly advocates abolishment of all existing forms of taxation; opposes any proposals for new forms or higher levels of taxes.

SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT (Size of Public Sector)

Note 1: For this variable, all levels of government (national, state, local) are included in "public sector." This variable is not about federalism; it is about the role of government in

Note 2: Coding of this variable is based as much as possible on program statements specifically referring to governmental scope. When such statements do not exist, then -- even more so than for other variables -- coding of H03 depends heavily on coders' general impressions based on overall tone and content of the document as regards size of the public sector.

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| -5 (PRO-strong) | Favors a very broad range of governmental programs, including in defense, foreign affairs, and social and economic programs; includes not just direct governmental provision of programs and ownership of means of production, but widespread regulation of private sector and personal behavior as well. |
| -3 (PRO-moderate) | Favors a broad range of governmental programs, but also sees the needs for some limits on governmental involvement in certain areas; may favor regulation rather than direct governmental action or ownership in some areas, for instance; even identifies some areas as off-limits to government involvement of any kind. Government is legitimately involved, tends not to oppose expansion of the government's role. |
| 0 (NEUTRAL) | Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. |
| +1 (ANTI-weak) | Accepts the need for a small public sector, but tends to oppose substantial expansions even in those areas where government is currently and legitimately involved. |
| +3 (ANTI-moderate) | Accepts the need for a very small public sector, the range for which should be clearly stated in the constitution; tends to favor reductions in governmental roles in all but a few activities. |
| +5 (ANTI-strong) | Prefers no public sector at all, but may recognize that government is necessary for one or a very few activities (e.g. defense); where government is bigger than that now, tends to favor major reductions to bring about the minimal state. |

SOCIAL SERVICES: RANGE (excludes education)

- 5 (PRO-strong) Favors a very broad range of governmental provision of social services, covering health care, social welfare for the needy, care for the aged/infirm, family (parent/child) assistance, pensions, unemployment benefits, and more; tends to favor expansion of such programs, even where the range is already very broad.

- 3 (PRO-moderate) Advocates a "middle" range of social services provided by the government, seeing some areas as more appropriately provided for in the private sector, where some regulation may still be necessary; will include favoring governmental provision of many, but not all, of the programs listed under -5 above.

- 1 (PRO-weak) Strongly advocates direct government provision of a few of the items listed under -5 above, but also sees many areas in which the government's direct role should be nil or limited; tends to favor governmental regulation to assure good treatment of citizens rather than direct government provision/ownership of the programs.

- 0 (NEUTRAL) Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue.

- +1 (ANTI-weak) Accepts the need for government to be engaged in directly providing for one or a few of the items above, but would clearly see the government's role in providing social services as a very limited one; strongly prefers regulation to direct provision when a governmental role is necessary; tends to support incremental reductions in many social services.

- +3 (ANTI-moderate) May grudgingly accept the need for government to directly provide just one of the items listed under -5 above, but tends not to support increases even in that area; prefers regulation to direct provision, but prefers that even the regulatory role be used sparingly; tends to oppose any expansion of the range of social services already provided.

- +5 (ANTI-strong) Advocates that government provide no social services; prefers that these areas be handled completely by the private sector, without government regulation.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: GOVERNMENT ROLE

- 5 (PRO-strong) Advocates extensive direct governmental involvement (including extensive expenditures) in environmental protection/improvements; also advocates governmental regulation of the private sector to prevent environmental problems and governmental incentive programs to encourage environmental improvements, but does not see such indirect programs as a replacement for direct governmental involvement.

- 3 (PRO-moderate) Advocates some (broader than for -1) direct governmental involvement in environmental protection/improvement, but limited to specific areas of concern; also advocates substantial, relevant (see -5 above) regulation and incentive programs.

- 1 (PRO-weak) Would accept (and possibly advocate) just a very limited direct role for government in environmental protection/improvement, but advocates substantial regulation of the private sector and relevant incentive programs to accomplish the same objectives indirectly; clearly prefers the primary responsibility to rest with the private sector, but under the watchful eye of government. (This code should be used, in preference over +1, when there is at least tacit agreement to some regulation and/or direct government role.)

- 0 (NEUTRAL) Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue.

- +1 (ANTI - weak) Opposes all but very limited conservation programs that would involve the government directly in environmental protection/improvement, but does accept a limited regulatory role; would oppose moves to make the regulatory role a substantial/extensive one. (Scores on the + side, including +1, should be assigned only when there is some opposition to a government role.)

- +3 (ANTI-moderate) Opposes any direct involvement of the government, and all but a very limited regulatory role; tends to seek reductions in governmental involvement where it is now more than minimal and regulatory.

- +5 (ANTI-strong) Opposes any involvement of the government in programs related to environmental protection/improvement, whether direct or regulatory.

STATE OWNERSHIP OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION

- 5 (PRO-strong) Strongly favors government ownership; advocates governmental ownership of all basic industries; advocates government ownership of means of production generally.
- 3 (PRO-moderate) Favors government ownership, but with some limitation; advocates government ownership of some basic industries but not all; may advocate acquiring some industry not currently under government ownership, while it could oppose acquiring something else.
- 1 (PRO-weak) Advocates very limited government ownership, with the limitations clearly stated; would oppose moves to have government take over most basic industries, for instance, but tends to base its preferences in this regard on practicality rather than principle
- 0 (NEUTRAL) Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue.
- +1 (ANTI-weak) May grudgingly accept very limited government ownership, but tends to oppose extension to additional industries, and certainly opposes the idea of governmental ownership of all basic industries; may advocate returning some government-owned industry to private ownership, while stopping short of advocating that all government industries should be returned.
- +3 (ANTI-moderate) Opposes government ownership generally, on principle; may advocate returning one or more government-owned industries to private ownership as a short-term measure, while probably holding return of all remaining state-owned industries as a long-term goal; would oppose government assuming ownership of any industry now in private hands.
- +5 (ANTI-strong) Strongly opposes government ownership as intolerable; would advocate immediate return of any government-owned industry to private ownership.

MINORITY RIGHTS

Special instructions: When providing text to support the code on this variable, include information on which minority group(s) are involved. Examples: racial, linguistic, regional. (Note that there is a separate variable on Women's Rights; see H17.)

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| -5 (PRO-strong) | Favors extensive government action which promotes rights of minorities in all areas of concern, even at the expense of the rights of the dominant group in the population; favors strict enforcement of the policies with severe penalties for non-compliance. |
| -3 (PRO-moderate) | Favors government action to promote rights of minorities, but only if the dominant group will not be affected negatively (or only minimally so); may advocate policies directed at many areas of concern (more than for a code of -1), but not all. |
| -1 (PRO-weak) | Favors only limited measures to promote opportunities for minorities; tends to oppose policies that would significantly advantage the minority at the expense of the dominant group. |
| 0 (NEUTRAL) | Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue. |
| +1 (ANTI-weak) | Favors a small number of programs that would clearly have a negative impact on minority rights, even though may pay lip service to advocating minority rights; supports no concrete programs that would clearly enhance minority rights; clearly opposes any policies that would enhance minority rights at the expense of the dominant group. |
| +3 (ANTI-moderate) | Favors a number of policies that would clearly have a negative impact on minority rights; may couple this with language that is anti-minority in tone; rights of the dominant group are clearly to be favored when in conflict with minority rights. |
| +5 (ANTI-strong) | Favors exclusionary government policies which promote the interests of the dominant group at the expense of minority rights; opposes any policies designed to single out rights of minorities for protection; may favor legislation to keep or reduce rights of minorities to a level below that of the dominant group. |

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

(Note: "Equal work for equal pay" normally implies support for women's rights; i.e., not a position of neutrality on the issue.)

- 5 (PRO-strong) Advocates strong government action to promote social, economic, and political status of women, even when such policies may be detrimental to men's rights or treatment; strict enforcement is advocated, with harsh penalties for noncompliance.

- 3 (PRO-moderate) Advocates action in many areas of concern for women's rights, but opposes some policies which would enhance women's rights or opportunities at the expense of men's, or where other justification is accepted for maintaining inequality.

- 1 (PRO-weak) Advocates only limited action in promotion of women's rights; may tend to oppose policies that would clearly have a negative impact on men's rights and/or treatment.

- 0 (NEUTRAL) Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue.

- +1 (ANTI-weak) Advocates few, if any, policies that would clearly discriminate against women, but statements make clear that the party holds a negative view of special protections for women's rights; may tend to oppose women's rights legislation, but without making a major issue of it.

- +3 (ANTI-moderate) Advocates a number of policies which would be exclusionary or in other ways discriminatory against women; justifications tend to be ad hoc rather than based on a general principle; tends to consistently oppose new women's rights legislation.

- +5 (ANTI-strong) Advocates a broad range of policies which are discriminatory against women; may do so on the basis of general principle; opposes any legislation designed to give special protection to women's rights.

OPEN IMMIGRATION

(To the extent that it is possible to distinguish between pledges and rhetoric on this variable, focus should be placed on the pledges.)

- 5 (PRO-strong) Favors an open immigration policy, with only very minimal restrictions; would effectively allow all applicants (both asylum seekers and others) to immigrate; may base the position on a general principle of openness and/or extreme libertarianism.

- 3 (PRO-moderate) Favors a policy that is generally open, but with significant restrictions and/or exceptions; may advocate very open policy with regard to applicants seeking asylum, while placing some restrictions on others; restrictions/limitations tend to involve very general quotas, and do not seem to be designed to discriminate against particular racial or ethnic groups.

- 1 (PRO-weak) Advocates a very open policy with regard to asylum seekers, while favoring a much more restrictive policy for others; the restrictions/limitations tend to be based on general rules of practicality, rather than designed to discriminate against particular racial or ethnic groups.

- 0 (NEUTRAL) Has contradictory positions that seemingly offset one another, and/or is truly "centrist" on the issue.

- +1 (ANTI-weak) Accepts a policy for asylum seekers that exceeds the minimums set by international organizations, but advocates a very restrictive policy with regard to others; may (but not necessarily) favor restrictions that seem to discriminate against one or more particular racial or ethnic groups.

- +3 (ANTI-moderate) Advocates (at most) a policy that would give immigrant status to only the minimum of asylum seekers established by international organizations, and a very few others; restrictions/limitations on the latter would be very severe; may favor particularly harsh limitations on specific racial or ethnic groups.

- +5 (ANTI-strong) Favors an extremely "closed" immigration policy, effectively closing the borders to immigrants; may even favor ignoring minimums for asylum seekers set by international organizations; may advocate expulsion of all or some recent immigrants.

VITA**Jason Matthew Smith*****Contact Information***

Department of Political Science
Texas A&M University
TAMU 4348
College Station, Texas 77843-4348
e-mail: jsmith@polisci.tamu.edu

Education

Ph.D. Political Science, Texas A&M University, 2009
Fields: Comparative Politics, International Relations

M.A. Political Science, University of North Texas, 2003

Thesis: Extreme Politics: An Analysis of the State Level Conditions
Favoring Far Right Parties in the European Union

B.A. History, University of North Texas, 2000