

FROM THE SCHEMATIC TO THE SYMBOLIC: THE RADICAL POSSIBILITIES
OF THE IMAGINATION IN KANT'S THIRD *CRITIQUE*

A Thesis

by

TY DANIEL CAMP

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2008

Major Subject: Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

From the Schematic to the Symbolic: The Radical Possibilities of the Imagination in
Kant's Third *Critique*.

(May 2008)

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In this thesis it is argued that Kant's Copernican turn depends on his doctrine of the imagination, and that by understanding the role of imagination as symbolic rather than schematic, the resources are provided to show that his critical philosophy has more radical possibilities than those of his post-Kantian critics. To display this, it is first pointed out that the crucial role the imagination plays in Kant's Copernican turn is not fully developed in his first *Critique*. Next, it is argued that Kant's doctrine of the imagination is not fully realized until the third *Critique* in which Kant radicalizes his notion of constructivism by introducing a distinction between determinative and reflective judgments. Finally, it is suggested that while Hegel believes that Kant's idealism is not dynamic enough to support a full-fledged constructivism, in fact, when Kant's mature doctrine of the imagination is taken into account, this is no longer the case because Kant believes that our particular experiences of the world unfold artistically and creatively according to the work of the imagination. It is suggested, therefore, that in

many ways Kant anticipates the developments of thinkers such as Hegel and other post-Kantians and may even continue to lie beyond them.

To Nanny and Papaw

For all the books.

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Without the support of my parents, Shannon, Matt, Harold, Nancy, and Jesse this degree would not have even been possible. And so, even though I have learned that “Life in San Francisco is still just life,” I thank them for making the trip there possible in the first place.

My wife, Sarah, who has endured much with “quiet confidence” for the sake of my education, cannot even begin to be thanked. She has opened my imagination to beauty and love—the kind that does not die.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE CRITICAL IMPETUS

The judgement of history will be that a greater outer and inner battle for the highest possessions of the human spirit was never fought; at no time has the endeavour of the scientific spirit led to deeper experiences and experiences more rich in results than since Kant.

—F.W.J. von Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*

With Kant something new begins in philosophy. As the opening quotation suggests, Schelling, one of Kant's successors and critics, believed this was so. Despite the fact that Kant's life was relatively mundane and uneventful, his philosophy was explosive, a watershed in the history of ideas. The opening quotation also implies that Kant's nearest historical heirs understood this about his philosophy. Perhaps it is through this philosophical novelty that we discover anew the ways in which Kant's philosophy not only opens up innovative questions in the history of ideas, but also, in many ways, still lies beyond our philosophical horizon. Perhaps we ought not infer—as does the German poet Heinrich Heine—that Kant's habitual journeys up and down the “Philosopher's Walk” represent a sharp contrast with his “world-annihilating thoughts,” but rather that his walks reveal an insistence that his philosophy derives its quality and depth from patient, plodding regularity—that the regular patterns of life might conceal a radical spontaneous depth only revealed through the life of the imagination.¹

This thesis follows the style and format of the *Chicago Manual of Style*.

¹ Heinrich Heine, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, trans. John Snodgrass (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 108-109.

But what is this novelty? What is this project that still lies beyond our philosophical horizon? Furthermore, what basis is there for supposing that this horizon has not yet been glimpsed? Have not thinkers such as Hegel and Heidegger and others shown the limitations of Kant's philosophy? Has not Hegel revealed that Kant's idealism is tethered to a static rendering of the categories? Has not Heidegger concluded that whereas Kant's initial project seemed promising, he nevertheless "shrank back" from its truly radical consequences? Has not the history of philosophy since 1781 unfolded as a series of developments and refutations of Kant's guiding insight?² Perhaps this is so. Kant's philosophy, however, is resilient. Many of Kant's successors claimed to have taken his Copernican turn, but to have done so in a more radical way than Kant himself. However, insofar as these thinkers have failed to understand the full import of the imagination in Kant's philosophy they have understood Kant's project only in a limited sense. In other words, they have not yet seen the truly radical implications of Kant's Copernican turn. This radicality, when given expression, frees Kant to go beyond Hegel. It reveals a philosophy that does not "shrink back" from its potential, but rather embraces and even goes beyond Heidegger's interpretation by centering Kant's key insight in the imagination. This potential is quietly, patiently—but, nonetheless,

² Tom Rockmore, *In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 19. Robert B. Pippin, *The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32. Also see Frederick Beiser, "The Enlightenment and Idealism," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, Karl Ameriks, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 28-29.

radically—woven into the tapestry of Kant’s main philosophical insight—the Copernican turn.

The purpose of this thesis therefore will be to address this radicality by suggesting that although Kant's doctrine of the imagination is crucial to understanding his Copernican turn, its centrality to his critical philosophy and its success has largely been underappreciated. Thus, I will argue that Kant's Copernican turn depends on his doctrine of the imagination and that understanding the role of imagination as symbolic rather than schematic provides the resources which show that his critical philosophy has more radical possibilities than the versions developed by his post-Kantian critics. To display this I will first point out the crucial role the imagination plays in Kant's Copernican turn and argue that this doctrine is not fully developed in his first *Critique*. Next I will argue that Kant fully develops the imagination in the third *Critique* by introducing a distinction between determinative and reflective judgments. Finally, I will argue that while Hegel believes that Kant’s idealism is not dynamic enough to support a full-fledged constructivism, in fact, when Kant’s mature doctrine of the imagination is taken into account, this is no longer the case. I will suggest, therefore, that in many ways Kant anticipates such developments and may even continue to lie beyond them.

In Chapter II of my thesis I will suggest that Kant's doctrine of the imagination, although central, is not yet fully developed and points beyond the limits of the first *Critique*. To this end I will first point out that Kant’s key insight is that the human mind actually constructs its knowledge of the world—it serves as the source from which knowledge of the world flows. Accordingly, I will point out that in the first *Critique* one

of Kant's central concerns is to show that the two faculties of the human mind—the intuition and the understanding—coalesce to form certain knowledge. These two faculties, Kant believes, are however disparate and must be mediated by a “third thing” if they are to be synthesized at all. For this purpose, Kant uses the notion of the imagination as that third thing which schematically mediates between the intuition and the understanding. Indeed, the imagination makes the synthesis of these two faculties possible. Third, I will suggest that attempts to interpret the imagination as a “root” faculty ultimately fail to appreciate the mysteriousness in which Kant shrouds this doctrine in the first *Critique*. Here, I will criticize Heidegger's reading of the first *Critique* and suggest that while his reading is not wrong-headed on the whole, Kant's view of the imagination in this work is more suggestive than Heidegger allows. I will conclude by suggesting that while Kant's doctrine of the imagination is indeed central to his project and seems pregnant with possibility, it nevertheless remains schematic and mysterious, pointing beyond the confines of the first *Critique*.

In Chapter III I will argue that Kant's doctrine of the imagination in the third *Critique* is truly radical because it is the means by which nature is revealed as purposive. First, I will point out that Kant's main aim in the third *Critique* is to investigate the limits and possibilities of purposive thinking. To this end I will show that he expands the faculty of judgment as reflective in addition to the determinate judgments of the first *Critique*. Second, since Kant believes that it is in judgments of beauty that purposive thinking is revealed, I will argue that this leads to a new sense of the imagination for the critical philosophy. I will point out that these judgments arise from a free play between

the imagination and the understanding, a relationship that Kant did not articulate in the first *Critique*. Finally, I will argue that Kant's notion of the imagination in the third *Critique* represents the symbolic use of reflective judgments which suggests that Kant's doctrine of the imagination reveals a radical constructivism whereby aesthetic ideas provide the means by which our concepts and experience of nature are expanded and enriched.

In Chapter IV I will argue that, whereas Hegel criticized Kant for being too conservatively tethered to the categories, given the formulation of the imagination in the third *Critique*, Kant's development of the Copernican turn is indeed radical enough and that his critical philosophy anticipates and, in many ways, goes beyond Hegel's system. First, I will focus on Hegel who is often taken to advance Kant's key insight well beyond Kant's own conception by claiming that while the Copernican turn must be taken, Kant's constructivism does not go far enough since it remains tethered to an undynamic view of the categories.³ I will argue, however, that given the insight of the indeterminate and spontaneous nature of the imagination along with its unifying responsibility, Kant's view of the imagination indicates a radically dynamic development of the Copernican turn. Second, I will suggest that viewing Kant's idealism through the lens of the third *Critique*, with particular attention to the imagination, allows one to see the radical nature of Kant's project as a whole. Finally, I will conclude by making the gesture that not only does this apply to Hegel's criticism of Kant, but to other post-Kantian's as well. In other words, the upshot of my thesis will be that in so far as Kant's successors

³ Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 161.

incorporate his key insight, but fail to appreciate the creative work of the imagination in his thought, Kant's constructivism anticipates and still lies beyond them.

In Chapter V I will conclude by summarizing the work I have done and indicate some ways in which the work of this thesis is not finished. Indeed, I will suggest that, by moving from the schematic to the symbolic imagination in Kant, much research opens up with respect the philosophers who came after Kant.

With this structure in mind, let us turn to the beginning, which has already begun. If we are to inquire into the potential of Kant's view of the imagination as it is revealed in his Copernican turn, we must turn to the genesis of his critical project—the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

CHAPTER II

THE SCHEMATIC IMAGINATION IN KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

Kant proves to us that we know nothing about things as they are in and by themselves, but that we have a knowledge of them only in so far as they are reflected in our minds.

—Heinrich Heine, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*

Kant's successors recognized the prescience of his Copernican turn. Indeed, Schelling remarks that "Kant had a beneficial effect just by the fact that he really set to work once more in a methodical and serious manner, and thereby put an end to that philosophical anarchy which preceded him . . ." ⁴ Heidegger writes that his interpretation of Kant's first *Critique* lays the ground for "placing the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology." ⁵ That these thinkers believed that Kant's philosophy enacted a crucial turn in the history of philosophy does not mean however that they thought his project lived up to its potential. On the contrary, Heidegger had deep reservations about the nature of Kant's doctrine of the imagination and how it relates to his project as a whole. It is my claim that when Kant's doctrine of the imagination is taken as a crucial aspect of his Copernican turn, the radical nature of Kant's philosophy opens itself to possibilities that go beyond those of his critics. Hence, in this chapter I

⁴ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, Texts in German Philosophy, ed. Raymond Geuss, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 106.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Fifth Edition, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1990), 1.

will first inquire into the nature of Kant's project and show that his Copernican turn is a truly radical insight in the history of philosophy. Second I will argue that Kant's doctrine of the imagination is essential to the success of his philosophical project because it is ultimately the imagination which unites the understanding and the intuition through judgment. This second point is consistent with many thinkers who take Kant's view of the imagination to be central to his entire project.⁶ The centrality of the imagination in Kant's philosophy, however, has fallen out of favor with several commentators who interpret Kant from a broadly analytic epistemological point of view.⁷ Thus, while several seminal works in Kant scholarship are important for interpreting Kant on the whole, I will limit my discussion to those who take the imagination to be central. Third, I will consider Heidegger's critique of Kant's view of the imagination which suggests that Kant recoiled from the radical implications of the imagination understood as a root faculty in the A-deduction. In response, I wish to show that while Heidegger's claims are indeed warranted by some of the language of the first *Critique*, Kant, even in the B-deduction, retains the centrality of the imagination as is evidenced in the section on the Schematism. In conclusion, I will propose that since the Schematism does not fully reveal the imagination we must look elsewhere to discover

⁶ For example, Heidegger, *Kant and Metaphysics*, 89-142. Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). Bernard Freyberg, *Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (New York: Peter Lang, 1994).

⁷ For example, Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 219-222. See also Freyberg, *Imagination and Depth*, 85, n. 2.

the truly radical implications of Kant's view of the imagination. We must look to the third *Critique*.

The Copernican Turn and Kant's Constructivism

The Enlightenment faced a debilitating crisis during the latter half of the 18th Century. Fred Beiser suggests that this crisis had two main fronts. On the one hand the scepter of skepticism had risen which challenged the Enlightenment hope that true knowledge of the world could be achieved. On the other hand, materialism threatened the possibility of complete freedom of the individual, without which the Enlightenment ideal of autonomy would be impossible.⁸ Robert Pippin also suggests that "If modern philosophy in some way culminated in Humean skepticism and Berkeleyan idealism . . . then not only was metaphysics in trouble, but, many began to fear, so were any claims to our allegiance made by any normative principle."⁹ Kant found himself, therefore, in the midst of a dilemma: either embrace empiricism and skepticism or embrace materialism and determinism. As he told the story in the Preface to the First Edition of the first *Critique*, the battleground of metaphysics had been overrun with dogmatists (rationalists) and skeptics (empiricists) who had, in spite of all their efforts, run the ship of metaphysics aground, lapsing back into the "ancient time-worn dogmatism . . . from

⁸ Frederick Beiser, "The Enlightenment and Idealism." in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, ed. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 18.

⁹ Pippin, *Persistence of Subjectivity*, 28.

which it was to have been rescued.”¹⁰ He believed that in spite of all the skepticism and dogmatism in which philosophy found itself ensnared, there was a way to break free from this dogmatism and move towards the ideals of the Enlightenment. This could only be done in a limited way though, for Kant also stated in his first preface that “Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer” (Avii). In other words, human reason inevitably surpasses its own limits. Kant believed that within these limits, however, the keys to the gates of the Enlightenment could be found. Hence, as is often pointed out, he called for a new inquiry into self-knowledge, a new tribunal the object of which would be reason itself.¹¹ Kant believed that this critique would determine the very possibility and limits of metaphysics.

In the Preface to the Second Edition, Kant elaborated further on the significance of his project. The task of metaphysics he claimed was to find *a priori* knowledge, but this had, thus far, proved an elusive goal. Those in the sciences, however, had learned that “reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own” and therefore that reason serves as a “judge” rather than a “pupil” (Bxiii). Kant believed that metaphysics ought to emulate the sciences in this way since it had proved such a benefit

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), Ax. Henceforth citations of Kant's first *Critique* will be from the Kemp Smith edition and provided in-text.

¹¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, 3. Pippin also notes that, “Kant's revolution amounted to his insistence that the proper object of reason's attention was not the noetic or substantial structure of reality, but itself.” See Pippin, 32.

for them. Thus, he proposed to “imitate their procedure” in order to discover whether *a priori* knowledge of objects is indeed possible. He strikingly claimed that, “We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge” (Bxvi). This is opposed to the view that our knowledge must conform to objects. What this suggests is that, to use Deleuze’s phrase, it is we who are giving the orders.¹² Kant then linked his project with that of Copernicus who suggested that rather than the stars revolving around the spectator, the spectator revolved around the stars. The point Kant is making is that a shift must occur if metaphysics is to be vindicated. The spectator, the human mind, now revolves around the fixed phenomena, illuminating them when they come “within the intellectual orb.”¹³ This is what has come to be known as Kant’s “Copernican Turn.” Tom Rockmore refers to this as Kant’s “constructivism” by which Rockmore means “the view that a necessary condition of knowledge is that the knower construct, make, or produce its cognitive object as a necessary condition for knowledge.”¹⁴ Rockmore also points out that there is little historical connection between Kant and Copernicus, but that the shift is crucial to understanding the novelty of Kant’s constructivism.¹⁵ The novelty of his position was not that he invented constructivism as such, but rather that he turned

¹² Deleuze, 14.

¹³ This phrase is Heine’s. See his *Religion and Philosophy*, 114.

¹⁴ Rockmore, *Kant and Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

the prevailing epistemological view on its head.¹⁶ In Schelling's view the significant effect of Kant was that he "*directed philosophy towards the subjective*" and thus opened the way to idealism.¹⁷ Kant became therefore, by means of his Copernican turn in philosophy, the father of German Idealism—opening up new possibilities for an idealist version of constructivism.

The question still remains, however: What exactly is Kant's constructivism and why should it be considered radical? Simply stating that it is the view that the objects of the world must conform to our knowledge rather than the other way around is not to say very much, for, as noted above, this doctrine is not unique to Kant. Furthermore, with respect to post-Kantian German idealism, idealist constructivism takes on many guises. While it can be said, with Schelling, that Kant "directed philosophy towards the subjective," it can also be said that subsequent philosophers—including Schelling, Hegel, and Heidegger—developed this subjectivism in ways that were different than (if not opposed to) Kant's critical philosophy.¹⁸ So, what is it that made Kant's view distinctive? More pointedly (for the purposes of this chapter at least), how is it that Kant's insight into the nature of the imagination proves his constructivism to be more prescient than those of his successors? To develop an answer to this question we must

¹⁶ Rockmore points out that Hobbes and Vico were constructivists of sorts. See *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁷ Schelling, *Modern Philosophy*, 106 (emphasis original).

¹⁸ Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 11-14. Also, Ottfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, trans. Marshall Farrier (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 55. Also, Rockmore, *Kant and Idealism*, 49.

peer deeper into the details of Kant’s Copernican turn in order to discover its possibilities. We must begin where his critical philosophy began—in the first *Critique*.

The Crucial Imagination

Kant divides his first *Critique* into two main sections. In the first, which he titles the Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements, Kant explores the functions and limitations of the faculties of the mind. In the introduction he has already set up his guiding question: “How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible?” (B19). As noted above, his unique hypothesis is that objects in the world rather than setting the terms for knowledge actually conform to knowledge. Kant also believes that while all of our knowledge begins with experience, it is not the case that all of our knowledge arises out of experience (B1). Kant therefore believes that there are two main faculties which serve as the basis for knowledge. It is these two faculties that he explores in the Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements.

This division of the faculties should not be passed over lightly, for it provides the impetus for many post-Kantian critiques. Pippin points out that Hegel saw these “dualisms” as a deep rending of the structure of reality itself. Thus, for Hegel, the very basic Kantian notion that the faculties of our mind are divided reveals a deeply incoherent form of life.¹⁹ One task of this section, therefore, will be to draw out the means by which Kant thought these divisions could be transcended. I wish to show that it is the imagination that provides such a bridge.

¹⁹ See Pippin, 36, particularly n. 23.

The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements is itself divided into two parts according to the two faculties. First, the Transcendental Aesthetic explores the faculty of the sensibility. Intuition, the means by which our knowledge immediately relates to objects, takes place only upon the event of a given. The mind must be affected in some way in order for Kant's belief that all knowledge does in fact begin with experience to hold true. This capacity or faculty Kant names the sensibility. This capacity enables the mind to receive representations from objects through sensation which must be given because "in no other way can an object be given to us" (A19/B33). That which is given, however, must adhere to a certain form and be ordered in a certain way so that sensation can occur. This capacity for ordering is the pure intuition which can be considered *a priori* and is the "form of sensibility" (A20/B34). Kant, since he is concerned with knowledge *a priori*, spends the rest of the Transcendental Aesthetic exploring this capacity.

Kant begins by articulating how time and space are to be understood as *a priori* forms of the sensibility. Time, Kant believes, is not absolute (i.e., does not exist in objects), but rather is empirically real. That is, since time—what Höffe calls "intuitive time"—must be presupposed in each and every appearance, it follows, Kant believes, that it is not something that can inhere in objects themselves. Time, therefore, is a condition for all inner intuition (A34/B50). Similarly, space is an *a priori* condition of intuition because there is no other way that objects can be presented to us—space always accompanies our intuitions (A24/B39). In short, in one of his most philosophically

original moments, Kant grasps that time and space are two sources of knowledge from which the mind obtains *a priori* synthetic knowledge (A38/B55).²⁰

It follows from this, Kant believes, that our intuition is “nothing but the representation of appearance” (A42/B59). If the intuitions of that which is given rely on conditions of the human mind (as, of course, is consistent with Kant’s Copernican turn), then if these conditions vanished, so would the objects in space and time. The faculty of sensibility, therefore, is a mode of knowing without the conditions of which sensation itself would be impossible. Furthermore, as a corollary, Kant points out that this suggests that it is never possible to have knowledge of objects “in themselves” apart from our experience of them. The representations which are formed by the sensibility are necessarily subjective, but this does not mean that they are mere illusions since they are also empirical. Kant carefully articulates the conditions for the sensibility by pointing out that in order for sensation to be possible, an object must be given. That is, while objects which have been given depend on the conditions of *a priori* sensibility, they are nonetheless “actually given” (B69).²¹ Hence, although this provides an entry point for post-Kantian criticisms, Kant believes that all of our knowledge must begin with an object given in experience and therefore our intuitions are not subjectively ideal, but rather empirically real.²²

²⁰ See Höffe, 53.

²¹ This claim is added in the second edition of the first *Critique* perhaps to more clearly distinguish his position from that of Berkeley’s. See Beiser, *German Idealism*, 88-92.

²² Höffe, 55. See also, Deleuze, 14 and Rockmore, *Kant and Idealism*, 23.

While it is true that all knowledge begins with experience, more is needed to arrive at knowledge. One aspect of how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible has been discovered, but it still remains to be seen how concepts can be extended *a priori* to form synthetic judgments. Kant's concern in the Transcendental Aesthetic though is subsumed under his broader concern of the Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements—he is concerned to show the conditions under which an object is given. This task, Kant thinks, has been achieved in so far as the forms of the sensibility have been discovered to be *a priori*. That is, by realizing that time and space are necessary preconditions for objects to be given to the sensibility, Kant believes his task in the Transcendental Aesthetic is complete and he must now move on to discover the conditions for the understanding.

This second task Kant titles the Transcendental Logic. Having already laid down the rules of the sensibility Kant is concerned here with the rules of the understanding. The understanding, Kant writes, is the “mind’s power of producing representations for itself, the spontaneity of knowledge” which “enables us to think the object of sensible intuition” (A51/B75). Indeed, this is the power of knowing an object which has been given in intuition. Again, Kant divides this section into two parts: The Transcendental Analytic, which is concerned with the *a priori* conditions of concepts and the Transcendental Dialectic, which is concerned with the illusions of transcendental judgments (A297/B354). It is in the Transcendental Analytic that Kant presents the way in which these two disparate faculties (sensibility and understanding) can be mediated to form *a priori* synthetic judgments.

The first task Kant sets out in this section, the Analytic of Concepts, is to discover the *a priori* conditions for the concepts of the understanding by investigating the understanding alone (A66/B90). Given that sensations do not provide rules by which objects can be known, concepts, Kant points out, are functions which involve subsuming various representations under one common representation, thus providing structure for empirical reality.²³ This function Kant calls judgment. Hence, the understanding is a faculty of judgment which unites the manifold of the *a priori* sensibility. That is, in order for intuitions to avoid blindness they need judgments to guide them to the proper concept (cf. A51/B75). This act of judgment which connects the manifold of sensibility and the spontaneity of the understanding Kant refers to as a synthesis. This synthesis is a gathering together of the elements of knowledge (the sensibility and the understanding) and uniting them to “form a certain content” (A78/B103). The nature of this synthesis is therefore a key to understanding how these two disparate faculties of the mind unite to form this “certain content.” Ernst Cassirer writes, “Judgment is the natural, factually demanded correlate of the object, since it expresses in the most general sense the consummation of and demand for that combination to which the concept of the object has been reduced for us.”²⁴ Kant’s view of the synthesis between the intuition and the categories of the understanding, therefore, underscores his Copernican turn: objects in experience cannot be known without rules that organize them and it is these rules that

²³ Höffe, 66.

²⁴ Ernst Cassirer, *Kant’s Life and Thought*, trans. James Haden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 172.

make truth possible.²⁵ That a synthesis between the two faculties is key, however, leads to a crucial point in the first *Critique*—a crucial point that, for Kant, will remain somewhat mysterious throughout, but on which his entire project depends.

“Synthesis,” Kant writes, “is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious” (A78/B103). This power of imagination does not yield knowledge, but it does synthesize the manifold of the intuition with the concepts of the understanding (A79/B104).²⁶ It is the concepts though, Kant believes, that actually make knowledge possible (i.e., they are how the understanding “thinks” an object of intuition (A80/B106)) and these he goes on to elaborate in the following pages. The means by which knowledge takes place, however, is the synthesis which depends on the power of the imagination. Freyberg writes, “The imagination is not merely the middle term of the three [thought, intuition, and imagination], but the power that allows all three terms (including its own) to come forth.”²⁷ Without this synthesis the two disparate faculties of the mind would remain divided. Thus, since Kant’s Copernican turn is dependent on the categories making rules for the intuition, the nature of this synthesis is a crucial aspect of his project.

In the A-Deduction Kant suggests that “sense, imagination, and apperception” are the three subjective sources of knowledge without which experience and knowledge

²⁵ Höffe, 68.

²⁶ Deleuze 17.

²⁷ Freyberg, *Imagination and Depth*, 53.

would not be possible (A115). As noted above, the synthesis of the manifold of intuition and the concepts is an essential aspect of Kant's view. He makes a pointed observation at the beginning of the A-deduction: "That a concept, although itself neither contained in the concept of possible experience nor consisting of elements of a possible experience, should be produced completely *a priori* and should relate to an object, is altogether contradictory and impossible" (A95). This, of course, is due to Kant's belief that concepts need percepts and percepts need concepts. The disparity of the faculties becomes readily apparent at this juncture—a point which Freyberg suggests actually makes Kant's work all the more difficult.²⁸ Kant goes on to argue though that the pure aspects of the categories (i.e., those aspects that contain nothing from experience) actually make the experience of an object possible and that this, in turn, is sufficient for a "deduction" (A97). But knowledge is a whole and therefore depends upon all three sources and therefore this deduction hinges, Kant believes, on the unity of apperception (A110).

Kant thinks that it is simply an "empirical law" that we can associate various representations in accordance with a fixed rule and the faculty which accomplishes this is the imagination (A101-102). Kant labels this particular function of the imagination the "reproductive imagination" because it simply reproduces representations from the manifold of the intuition. It has an *a priori* grounding, however, because it does not simply associate random representations, but rather associates them in an orderly manner. This reproductive synthesis of the imagination Kant includes as one of the

²⁸ Ibid., 56.

transcendental acts of the mind which contributes to the ground of any knowledge whatsoever (A102).²⁹

When considering the three sources of knowledge together Kant includes the imagination as one of the elements which makes empirical knowledge possible. He believes that for intuitions to be taken up into consciousness we must have a sense of unity or self (apperception) which serves as a necessary condition for even the possibility of representations (A116). This very unity however involves a synthesis which, as noted above, is a power of the imagination. Kant can conclude therefore that “the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience” (A118). It follows, then that since the unity of apperception is necessary for knowledge, and the synthesis of imagination is necessary for the unity of apperception, the synthesis of imagination is necessary if we are to have any empirical knowledge at all. In so far as the imagination serves as the *a priori* grounds for the unity of apperception it too is a pure faculty of the mind. Indeed, Kant believes that it is “one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul” which serves to connect the manifold of intuition with pure apperception. In short, since Kant has already stated that concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind, he needs a way to connect these two disparate aspects of the human mind and the imagination performs this function because without it “the [sensibility], though indeed yielding appearances,

²⁹ J. Michael Young suggests that the imagination should not be equated with the sensibility. See his, “Kant’s View of Imagination,” *Kant-Studien* (79. Jahrgang, Heft 2), 1988: 147.

would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience” (A124).

This result is of no small significance for Kant. If we can have *a priori* grounds for the unity of our experiences we can explain how it is the Copernican turn may be completed. That is, through this deduction Kant is suggesting that it is not nature that introduces regularities to our mind, but rather “the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle *nature*, we ourselves introduce” (A125). Without the synthesis of the imagination therefore, the understanding would be cut off from nature and unable to impose its laws. As Deleuze writes, “The imagination embodies the mediation, brings about the synthesis which relates phenomena to the understanding as the only faculty which legislates in the interest of knowledge.”³⁰

The B-deduction seemingly presents the imagination in a different guise. There Kant remarks that the imagination “is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present” and that it “belongs to the sensibility” given that all of our intuition is sensible (B151).³¹ He also remarks that it is an expression of spontaneity (understanding) and is thus “able to determine sense *a priori* in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception . . .” (B151-152). He thus makes a distinction between the productive imagination (*a priori* spontaneity) and the reproductive imagination (subject to empirical laws), both of which are necessary to connect the sensibility and the understanding. The imagination connects the manifold of sensible

³⁰ Deleuze, 17.

³¹ See note 29 above.

intuition, but at the same time, is dependent for its unity on the understanding. On the one hand, the imagination “is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the understanding” while on the other it is dependent “for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon sensibility” (B164). This is merely an extension of Kant’s more general purpose in the B-deduction which is to show that objects cannot be thought without the categories. The imagination therefore in the B-Deduction seems deeply dependent upon the heterogeneous faculties which it labors to unite.³²

There appears to be a somewhat different picture of the imagination between the A- and B-deductions. Indeed, this fuels a major criticism of Kant’s project that will be discussed below. On the face of it, the A-deduction seems to present the imagination as a distinct faculty that works alongside the faculties of the sensibility and the understanding in order to provide unity to the faculties and hence, order and regularity in nature (A125). The B-deduction, on the other hand, seems to suppress the imagination’s autonomous function—it fades into the background, only making an appearance to connect the manifold of intuition and for itself to be unified by intellectual synthesis (B164-165). I wish to suggest, however, that this apparent disparity (or ambivalence) points to the further development of Kant’s first *Critique*. He has deduced the categories, but now he needs to show the means by which they apply to the sensibility—for this he needs to further elaborate on the function of judgment—the means by which synthesis is enacted. The second task Kant introduces in the Transcendental Doctrine of

³² See Heidegger, 104, and Freydberg, 76. For a different view see Young, 149, and Deleuze, 17. I am indebted to Freydberg for this point. See Freydberg, 85-86, n. 4.

Elements, therefore, is to discover the means by which appearances apply to the concepts of the understanding. This is done, as he has already indicated, by judgment. Thus, in the *Analytic of Principles*, Kant seeks to discover the conditions under which an object can be subsumed under one category or another (A177/B138). This process he entitles Schematism which, as we shall see, intricately involves the imagination.

Kant has already shown that concepts are necessary to think objects of experience, but at this point the means by which this takes place remains hidden from view. In order for these two heterogeneous faculties to combine for certain knowledge, there must be some “third thing” which is both homogeneous with the concept and with the appearance—it must be both intellectual and sensible. Such a representation Kant titles the “transcendental schema” which is a “transcendental time determination” since time is a condition for intuition and determination proceeds according to a rule as do the categories. The application of appearance to category, therefore, takes place because the transcendental schema is heterogeneous with both intuition and understanding.

There are two parts to the transcendental schema, but it is always a product of the imagination. On the one hand, the schema—which are the formal conditions of the sensibility—provide an image for a concept. This use of the word “image” should not be taken in the strict sense, but rather in a more general sense. That is, the schema must apply to both the concepts of the understanding and the intuition and therefore must be compatible with both, but identical with neither.³³ Kant makes it clear that these “images” are representations whereby the manifold of intuition might be applied to

³³ For a detailed discussion on this point see Allison, 220-221 and 225-229.

concepts in general. Thus, “this thought is rather the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept, than the image itself” (A140/B179). On the other hand, the synthesis of the imagination with respect to pure figures, Kant entitles “schematism of pure understanding.” This aspect of the Schematism can only exist in thought and is a product of the pure *a priori* imagination. Hence, images can only be connected with concepts via the schemata and the schema of a pure concept can only be brought to an image by a “pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression” (A142/B181).

Surprisingly, however, the Schematism remains partially concealed from our view. Kant maintains that this function of the human mind is “an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze” (A141/B181). Despite the fact that there must be a connection between the two disparate faculties of the human mind, and that this disparity, Kant believes, requires a “third thing” to mediate between them, this third thing, this Schematism, this product of the imagination remains a mysterious aspect of the human mind. Kant later echoes this sentiment in the Transcendental Dialectic when he maintains that the products of the imagination are blurry, shadowy, representations which are not determined by a particular rule (A570/B598). We are thus privy to what the imagination *must* do—it must be a time-determination, because that is what the forms of each faculty require. We are not, however, privy to what it does *in fact* do. The Schematism, and therefore, the imagination remain partially eclipsed from

our view. We know it is there. Indeed, it must be there. But we are unable to see it clearly.

This schematism, however, is absolutely crucial to Kant's project. If the gap between these two disparate faculties of the human mind cannot be bridged, the prospects for knowledge of things become rather bleak. Kant concludes the section on the schematism by claiming the following:

The categories without schemata are merely functions of the understanding for concepts; and represent no object. This [objective] meaning they acquire from sensibility, which realizes the understanding in the very process of restricting it (A147/B187).

This shows that the Schematism, and therefore the imagination, is essential to Kant's belief that the two faculties of the human mind can be mediated. Without the Schematism the deduction of the categories would be impossible since while it might be necessary for objects to be thought by concepts, concepts would not have the means by which they could be applied to those objects. Furthermore, Kant's dictum that "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" would itself be an empty generalization, for there would be no means by which their interdependence could be displayed. In short, the Copernican turn itself, as Kant conceives it, would fail to get off the ground without the imagination—the hypothesis that objects must conform to our knowledge would be nothing more than that, a hypothesis. Heidegger will take this a step further and claim that not only is the imagination central to Kant's project, it also underwrites his Copernican turn.

Heidegger's Critique

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Kant has many critics. One critic in particular, Martin Heidegger, has focused his work on Kant's conception of the imagination in the first *Critique*. Heidegger believes that the imagination should be understood as a faculty in its own right rather than being simply a function that links the understanding and the sensibility. Moreover, he claims that these two faculties are stems of which the imagination is the root. He writes, "The transcendental power of imagination is hence the ground upon which the inner possibility of ontological knowledge, and with it that of *Metaphysica Generalis*, is built."³⁴ Indeed, the whole Kantian project, Heidegger thinks "leads to the power of the imagination" and, ultimately, to the ground of the transcendental power of the imagination, namely, time.³⁵ According to the first *Critique*, however, especially in the second edition, Heidegger suggests that Kant "shrank back" from this belief and attempted to present the imagination as a subordinate portion of the understanding. He argues that this shrinking back results in a searching for human finitude in pure rationality rather than in sensibility where Heidegger thinks it belongs.³⁶ Hence, Heidegger offers a re-interpretation of what Kant had "wanted to say" by setting before us that which remains unsaid "in and through what has been said."³⁷

³⁴ Heidegger, 90.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 141.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 118.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 140.

Heidegger begins by pointing out that, for Kant, the laying of the groundwork for metaphysics is the answer to the question of the unity of ontological knowledge and determining what is the ground of its possibility. He notes that while the imagination is given a central role in the Schematism, it did not originate there, for Kant used the doctrine of the imagination in the Transcendental Deduction. This usage, Heidegger suggests, highlights “in a much more original way” the mediating role the imagination plays between the sensibility and the understanding than some of Kant’s earlier lectures had. The Schematism also suggests a more “creative” function of the power of the imagination. These considerations lead Heidegger to believe that “the pure productive power of imagination, free of experience, makes experience possible for the first time.”³⁸

Heidegger believes that understood in this way the imagination should not be thought of as a mere mediating faculty between the understanding and the sensibility, but rather as a “basic ability to do something,” namely, the ability to make possible the unity between the two faculties and to be “the essential unity of transcendence as a whole.”³⁹ Nevertheless, he points out that the imagination remains “homeless” in the first *Critique*—only receiving treatment here and there when necessary. Heidegger believes, however, that a proper interpretation of Kant’s “ground-laying” shows that the imagination is indeed a third faculty which is no mere “bond which fastens together two ends,” but is, on the contrary, an “originally unifying” common root to both.⁴⁰

³⁸ Ibid., 93.

³⁹ Ibid., 95.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 96.

Having established the imagination as the unifying root of the possibility of both the understanding and the sensibility, Heidegger develops what he means by this with respect to each individual faculty. He claims that the transcendental power of the imagination provides the means by which the pure intuition can be what it “‘really’ can be.”⁴¹ Since pure intuitions are by their very nature “original” or a “springing forth,” the pure power of the imagination is realized in these presentations because it “formatively gives looks (images) from out of itself.”⁴² In other words, the formation of the images in intuition is original because it is *a priori* and thus not based on previous experience, but rather on the various patterns of the imagination.

On the other hand, that the understanding is likewise formed from the imagination proves more problematic for Heidegger, for given that the two faculties—understanding and sensibility—are heterogeneous, how is it that they share a common root? Heidegger believes that the answer to this question is that the nature of the understanding, its very essence, is that it is dependent upon the intuition.⁴³ That is, since the understanding represents from within the Schematism and the Schematism is a product of the imagination and the imagination is that which gives rise to the intuition, the understanding is thus organically linked with the intuition. Hence, Heidegger thinks that the understanding does not produce the schemata, but that the Schematism constitutes the “original Being of the understanding” and that original thinking is

⁴¹ Ibid., 96.

⁴² Ibid., 98.

⁴³ Ibid., 104.

therefore pure imagining while the understanding considered as a “taking in stride of what gives itself” is pure intuition.⁴⁴ It is in this way, Heidegger thinks, that both the intuition and the understanding find their root in the imagination.

Heidegger recognizes that this interpretation is not consistent with Kant’s presentation of the Transcendental Deduction particularly with respect to the second edition. Nevertheless, Heidegger wishes to show that the second edition thrust the imagination from the “impassioned course of its first projection” and re-interpreted it as a function, not as a ground, of the understanding.⁴⁵ The imagination on this view becomes limited to a mere effect of the understanding on the sensibility. Heidegger believes therefore that Kant re-interpreted the imagination because it confronted him with the unknown and “frightened him” to such a degree that he fell under the spell of “pure reason as reason” and that this pushed aside the power of the imagination “and with that it really first [concealed] its transcendental essence.”⁴⁶ In short, Heidegger thinks that by re-interpreting the imagination as a function of the understanding, Kant drew back from that which is unknown and thereby diminished the possibility of explaining how the two heterogeneous faculties can be united in a finite human being and that his (Heidegger’s) interpretation brings out what Kant “had wanted to say.”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Ibid., 106-109.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 112-114.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 118.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 137-8, 140.

Heidegger's account shows Kant's critical philosophy to be radical to a certain extent. It suggests that initially Kant believed that knowledge depends upon the operation of the imagination in so far as the imagination proves to be the root faculty of which the sensibility and the understanding are the stems. This radicality ceases, however, when Kant reformulates the deduction of the categories in the second edition of the first *Critique*. Heidegger believes that at this point Kant loses faith—he surrenders his radical philosophy to the safety of the ever-constant categories of the understanding.

Heidegger may be right, but it seems that, based on what I have shown above, Kant does not present the whole picture of the imagination in the first *Critique* and therefore addresses some of the concerns Heidegger wishes to approach. First, as far as the language of the B-deduction is concerned, it is not clear that Kant “recoils” from his earlier position. Recall that the imagination, as Kant expresses it in the B-deduction, is that faculty which represents an object in intuition that is not itself present (B151). In this sense, Kant notes, it “belongs to sensibility.” In so far as the imagination forms a synthesis which determines sense, however, it is “an action of the understanding” (B152). Furthermore, recall that all synthesis is subject to the categories (B161). This *seems* to indicate that the imagination is not an independent faculty from which the other two faculties spring. I believe, however, that this is an overly ambitious claim. Granted, as Freyberg points out, “Kant's language stands in a dissonant relationship with itself with respect to the imagination,” but it does not follow from this that the imagination can

no longer be understood as the root from which the other two faculties stem.⁴⁸ On the contrary, the synthesis of both the manifold of intuition and the understanding are transcendental which means that they condition “the possibility of other *a priori* knowledge” (B151). Consistent with this Rudolf Makkreel suggests that the imagination is subservient to the understanding only in so far as it synthesizes.⁴⁹ Perhaps it is in this way that the sensibility and the understanding are, to use Freydberg’s phrase, “afterimages of imagination’s work.”⁵⁰ The imagination, on this angle of vision, therefore seems to present possibilities that go beyond Heidegger in so far as he did not allow the radical nature of Kant’s doctrine of the imagination to spring forth from the B-deduction.

Second, as I pointed out above by quoting Freydberg, Kant’s language does reveal a dissonance which he fails to eradicate from the second edition of the first *Critique*. Heidegger is certainly correct to point out this disharmony, but even so, perhaps there is more in Kant’s text than Heidegger could see. Even granting this disharmony, Kant tells us that the sensibility and the understanding can only be connected by means of a schema which is dependent on the imagination. Thus, whether or not there is disharmony in the B-deduction, the very conditions under which the understanding and the sensibility can operate depend on the imagination. The

⁴⁸ Freydberg, *Imagination and Depth*, 76.

⁴⁹ Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 42. See also, John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, Second Edition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 164.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

conclusion that the imagination is subservient to the understanding is, therefore, not necessarily global, i.e., it cannot be stated without qualification. In fact, in this instance it appears that the imagination remains the root of the two faculties of the human mind and that Kant has not abandoned his earlier position—the imagination is crucial for the synthesis of the two disparate faculties and thus still crucial for Kant’s Copernican turn. In these two ways Kant’s view seems to indicate radical possibilities that have not yet been realized—at least by Heidegger.

The Imagination Beyond the First *Critique*

I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that Kant’s philosophy is radical and resilient. It is radical in that it proposes a dramatic shift from the belief that our knowledge depends on objects to the belief that, on the contrary, objects depend on our knowledge of them. Kant unfurls this Copernican turn in his first *Critique*. What makes this even more radical is that he believes that the linchpin for this turn is the imagination. Hence, the unfurling of the Copernican turn is the unfurling of the work of the imagination. Kant’s philosophy is resilient because it continually eludes critics—proving to be, in some sense, still beyond their horizons. Despite this resilience, however, the questions with which this chapter began have still yet to be answered. I pointed out that while Kant takes the Copernican turn and radically suggests that the imagination is crucial to this turn, he nevertheless does this obliquely. This obliquity remains at the end of the Schematism when he asserts that the actual workings of the imagination through the schema will perhaps never be revealed. Indeed, this partial eclipse of the imagination gives rise to Heidegger’s criticism. On the other hand, this

partial eclipse points beyond itself. It raises further questions. It raises again the questions with which this chapter began: If the imagination is partially eclipsed, where is it revealed? When it is revealed, how does it illuminate Kant's constructivism? For answers to these questions we must turn to the third *Critique*.

CHAPTER III

THE SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION IN KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF
JUDGMENT*

The Third Critique finds its decisive concerns neither in questions of beauty nor in questions of empirical biology, but rather in the ultimate questions of the place of man in the order of the world—his freedom and his destiny.

—John Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*

In the previous chapter I suggested that Kant's Copernican turn depends crucially on his doctrine of the imagination. I argued that while the imagination is not clearly revealed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it nevertheless provides the necessary means by which the two disparate faculties of the understanding and the sensibility can be synthesized. Thus, the motivating question with which I began my previous chapter went unanswered. The question was, What exactly is Kant's constructivism and why should it be considered radical? I suggested that while the imagination does in fact play a crucial role in Kant's constructivism, Kant's formulation of the means by which the synthesis of the two faculties takes place obscures the underlying significance of the imagination.

The *Critique of the Power of Judgment* elaborates further on the radical nature of the imagination for Kant's critical philosophy. In this work the imagination is presented as a spontaneous faculty of the mind which works in free harmony with the understanding to yield judgments of beauty. In this chapter I will argue that Kant's doctrine of the imagination in the third *Critique* is truly radical because it is the means

by which nature is revealed as purposive. First, I will point out that Kant's main aim in the third *Critique* is to investigate the limits and possibilities of purposive thinking. To this end I will show that he expands the faculty of judgment as reflective in addition to the determinate judgments of the first *Critique*. Second, since Kant believes that it is in judgments of beauty that purposive thinking is revealed, I will argue that this leads to a new sense of the imagination for the critical philosophy. I will point out that these judgments arise from a free play between the imagination and the understanding, a relationship that Kant did not articulate in the first *Critique*. Finally, I will argue that Kant's notion of the imagination in the third *Critique* represents the symbolic use of reflective judgments and this points the way to answering the question posed in Chapter II: What exactly is Kant's constructivism and why should it be considered radical? I will suggest that Kant's doctrine of the imagination reveals a radical constructivism through the symbolic work of the imagination whereby aesthetic ideas provide the means by which our concepts and experience of nature are expanded and enriched.

Purposivity and Reflection in the Third *Critique*

Ernst Cassirer points out that Kant's main concern in the third *Critique* is to discover how the faculties of the mind make purposive judgments.⁵¹ John Zammito similarly claims "The *Third Critique* finds its decisive concerns neither in questions of beauty nor in questions of empirical biology, but rather in the ultimate questions of the place of man in the order of the world—his freedom and his destiny."⁵² These claims

⁵¹ Ernst Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*, trans. James Haden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 287.

are substantiated in the First Introduction to the third *Critique* where Kant maintains that purposiveness can only be ascribed to nature in relation to the power of judgment.⁵³ That is, it is only through the ability of the human faculty of judgment that our experiences of nature and beauty reflect a certain unity and order. Furthermore, Kant also claims in the First Introduction that the means by which this purposiveness is perceived requires the harmony of the imagination and the understanding. Thus, in order to have a purposive experience of nature and beauty the imagination is required, but this purpose is not found in the objects themselves. Rather, consistent with Kant's Copernican turn, the purposivity of nature is a result of the harmony of the faculties of our mind.

Kant believes that the power of judgment is an original power of cognition. He begins the First Introduction to his third *Critique* by stating that the systematic representation of the faculty of thinking is threefold: the understanding represents the means by which rules are applied, the faculty of reason determines the particular through the general, and the power of judgment subsumes the particular under the general.⁵⁴ It should follow from this, Kant thinks, that judgments provide some kind of ground for a special part of philosophy since laws of nature do this in the case of concepts and laws of freedom do this in the case of ideas. What the faculty of judgment does, however, is

⁵² John H. Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 342.

⁵³ Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of the Power of Judgment*, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer & Allen Wood, gen. eds., trans. Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 24 (20: 221).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 8 (20: 202).

provide a “concept of a purposiveness of nature in behalf of our faculty for cognizing it . . .”⁵⁵ The faculty of judgment provides a law or a rule similar to the understanding and reason, but it is not a law or a rule in the same sense. Given that the faculty of judgment serves to subsume given concepts under general rules, it cannot provide concepts itself, yet Kant believes that something original does arise from the power of judgment.⁵⁶

Judgment, Kant believes, concerns the purposivity of experience. The originality that arises from the faculty of judgment is altogether foreign to the understanding because, for example, while the understanding contains transcendental laws for cognizing experience in general, the vast number of empirical laws, in all their particularity, do not follow with any necessity (or any possibility for that matter) from such general laws. To use Cassirer’s illustration, according to the general concepts of cognition, one can know that causality occurs in nature, but one cannot determine each particular instance in which it occurs. The concepts of the first *Critique* are sufficient to determine *that* causality occurs, but it does not extend to each and every instance of causality.⁵⁷ Furthermore, because the power of judgment does not give rise to concepts or ideas and because its main function is to subsume the particular under the general which is given beforehand, the originality of the power of judgment is that things in nature cannot be formed unless their “arrangement conforms to our faculty for subsuming the particular given laws under more general ones even though these are not

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ See Cassirer, 292.

given . . .”⁵⁸ Kant calls this “a concept of things in nature insofar as nature conforms to our power of judgment.”⁵⁹ Hence, the originality, which arises from the power of judgment, is that of a system of particular empirical laws and, as he will later put it with respect to judgments of beauty, purposivity without purpose.⁶⁰

Consequently, judgments are not conditioned upon the objects that are judged, but rather on the cognizing subject. The purposiveness of nature therefore is that nature is discovered as a “systematic interconnection of empirical laws” which must be conformable to the faculty which takes these particular laws and subsumes them under more general rules and this is precisely the function of the power of judgment.⁶¹ Kant believes that purposiveness must be assumed of nature because without it no experience of unified particular laws of nature would be available to us—we expect to find the interconnection of empirical laws in nature.⁶² However, the formal purposiveness in nature, which we assume *a priori*, provides a principle for judging our investigation of nature by moving from particular observations to more general laws. Kant believes, therefore, to use Cassirer’s phrasing, that we approach the system of nature not as

⁵⁸ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 8 (20: 202).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ See *Ibid.*, 120 (5: 236).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 9 (20: 203).

⁶² For the idea of “expectation” I am indebted to Höffe. See Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, trans. Marshall Farrier (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 214.

legislators, but rather as questioners and inquirers.⁶³ That is, when we attempt to understand nature as a whole, we do not apply the general concepts of the understanding as legislators, but rather we presume that nature will conform to our judgments, that the particular will be able to be subsumed under the more general rules. Only these rules are not given in this experience, but must be sought through the power of judgment. Kant concludes, therefore, that this “presupposition is the transcendental principle of the power of judgment.”⁶⁴ Indeed, the unity of our experience in general (and aesthetic experience in particular) depends on this notion of purposiveness.⁶⁵

It should be noted, however, that this view of judgment supplements—expands on—not replaces Kant’s main arguments in the first *Critique*. The conditions for experience in general are still only available through a deduction of the categories of pure reason. What Kant is doing here is moving beyond the generalities of the first *Critique* in order to understand the whole of our experience of nature while still maintaining the conditions for knowledge in general. What Kant has established in the First Introduction is that the purposiveness does not lie in things themselves, but rather in the conformability of the system of empirical laws to our faculty of judgment and, as we will see below, the pleasure of the mutual agreement of the imagination and the understanding. Hence, Kant maintains the tenets of his Copernican turn (that objects of

⁶³ See Cassirer, 293.

⁶⁴ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 14 (20: 109-110). I will point out in the next section that Kant develops these claims with respect to particular judgments of beauty.

⁶⁵ See *Ibid.*, 10 (20: 204).

knowledge conform to our knowledge rather than vice versa) while at the same time extending this principle to our experience of nature in all its particularity. As Cassirer puts it, “Following its fundamental tendency [the critical standpoint] works not so much toward the form of actuality itself but toward the form of our concepts of the actual; the system of these concepts, not the system of the world, constitutes its starting point.”⁶⁶

The notion of purposivity, however, develops Kant’s key insight in terms of the construction of nature in all its particularity, rather than the mere general laws of our understanding, generating an ever-expanding territory for his Copernican turn.

Many Kant scholars agree that a key development in Kant’s critical philosophy is his focus on reflective judgments in the third *Critique*.⁶⁷ In the first *Critique*, as I pointed out in Chapter II, Kant speaks of judgments in their determinate (or constitutive) form. Determinate judgments are those which begin with a rule or a concept and subsume particulars under more general rules. As I noted in Chapter II, this act of judgment is, crucially, a work of the imagination. The imagination, however, fulfils its function through the schemata by which concepts are made ready to match up with intuitions.⁶⁸ By contrast, reflective judgments, as Kant discusses them in the third

⁶⁶ Cassirer, 288.

⁶⁷ Representative scholars are: Cassirer, 285 & 293, Zammito, 4 & 88, Gilles Deleuze, *Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 47, Höffe, 213, and Makkreel, 45.

⁶⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A140/B179.

Critique, begin with particular experiences of nature and look for concepts under which those experiences might be subsumed. He famously writes:

The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it . . . is **determining**. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely **reflecting**.⁶⁹

As has been noted above, however, the laws of nature are too many to be given by the concepts of the understanding and therefore it is necessary to presuppose a purposiveness within nature with respect to our faculty of judgment. Moreover, this presupposition is grounded by the faculty of the power of reflective judgment which moves from the particular to the more general.

Reflection, Kant wishes to show, “is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible.”⁷⁰ Thus the reflective power of judgment requires a principle so that it does not become “arbitrary and blind.” This principle, Kant thinks, is that for every particular a determinate concept can be found. This follows from his view that we must presuppose “nature has observed a certain economy suitable to our power of judgment and a uniformity that we can grasp” and that the comparison (reflection) of the empirical laws of nature and empirical representations must be preceded by this presumption.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 66-67 (5: 179).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 15, (20:210).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 17, (20: 213).

Here Kant makes another key distinction between determinate judgments as he conceived them in the first *Critique* and reflective judgments. Whereas the concepts of determinate judgments were applied to intuitions schematically, given appearances of reflective judgments are brought under empirical concepts technically or artistically in accordance with the purposive arrangement of nature. Kant argues that the system of nature which accords with our power of judgment involves a “classification of the manifold” whereby the genus is specified by comparing the various classes of a determinate concept until the appropriate concept is found.⁷² He suggests that this movement of nature by comparison of particulars with the various classes of empirical concepts is an artistic movement and that nature, therefore, should also be regarded as artistic.

Accordingly, Kant believes the purposiveness of nature is not found in the forms of nature themselves, but rather purposiveness is revealed subjectively through the capacity for reflection.⁷³ According to Kant, an aesthetic judgment of reflection is formed when the imagination agrees *mutually* with the understanding “for the advancement of their business.”⁷⁴ They must agree mutually because in reflective judgments no concept is specified and thus the imagination plays a mutual role to the understanding rather than a merely subordinate one. Moreover, reflecting judgments are aesthetic judgments in which the imagination and the understanding are held in

⁷² Kant refers to this as the “highest genus.” See, *Ibid.*, 18, (20: 214).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 19, (20: 216) & 21, (20: 218).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 23, (20: 221).

relationship by the power of judgment.⁷⁵ This relationship produces a feeling of pleasure or displeasure which serves as the ground for aesthetic judgments in general. Thus, the determining ground for aesthetic judgments is the “harmonious play of the two faculties of cognition in the power of judgment, imagination and understanding . . .”⁷⁶ This grounding is also a subjective grounding because it is made without the specification of a concept.

What is significant about this outline of Kant’s view of reflective/aesthetic judgments for the purposes of this chapter is that in them the imagination receives a new function, one which differs from its function in the first *Critique*. In reflective judgments the imagination does not serve the understanding in a subordinate way, but rather in a mutual relationship of free play. This free play produces a sensation of pleasure and pain which serves as the ground for aesthetic judgments. Thus, our particular experiences of nature and beauty, which are too many to be specified by the concepts of the understanding, find their grounding in reflective judgments, which in turn find their grounding in the free play of the understanding and the imagination. Reflective judgments, therefore, are crucial for the purposiveness of nature and beauty, for without them neither the interconnectedness of experience nor the beauty of a sunset would be possible at all.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Ibid., 26, (20: 224).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ See also Cassirer, 334. He writes: “The harmonious play of the mind’s powers is what endows nature itself with the content of life: aesthetic judgment passes over into teleological judgment.”

The point of the foregoing discussion has been to suggest that reflective judgments are a radical and significant development of Kant's critical philosophy. Lurking in this discussion, it turns out, are some rather controversial claims about the systematicity of the third *Critique* if not properly qualified. Essentially, what Kant seems to be suggesting in the First Introduction is that reflective judgments *in general* reveal the connection of empirical laws. As the third *Critique* unfolds, however, it is less clear precisely how Kant believes the connection should be made between teleological judgments and judgments of beauty.⁷⁸ My purpose, therefore, will be to focus, not on teleological judgments, but rather on judgments of beauty because it is with respect to these judgments that Kant most clearly reveals the freedom and spontaneity of the imagination, which we shall see below.

At least two significant points may be suggested here. First, Kant is determined to go beyond the "arbitrary and blind" work of the reflective power of judgment. As I pointed out in Chapter II, Kant left the nature of the work of the imagination in the Schematism partially hidden from view claiming that nature might never reveal its secrets. In the third *Critique*, however, he is more willing (or more able) to radicalize the seemingly blind and arbitrary work of reflective judgment in order to establish a principle upon which the purposiveness of aesthetic experience might be grounded. Second, just as the imagination functioned as the linchpin for determinate judgments in the first *Critique*, they also function as crucial aspects of reflective judgments,

⁷⁸ Even the most able of scholars are wary of speculating on the nature of this connection. See Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6-7.

particularly judgments of beauty, in the third *Critique*. Consequently, the question can be raised: If the reflective judgments of the third *Critique* differ from the determinate judgments of the first *Critique*, might Kant's doctrine of the imagination also differ in a similar way? The answer to this question must be pursued in the Analytic of the Beautiful where Kant's notion of the imagination is most prominent. The following discussion, therefore, will focus on judgments of beauty rather than teleological judgments because, as will hopefully become clear, it is in these judgments that Kant reveals the imagination in a radical and dynamic way.

Reflective Judgment and the Free Play of the Imagination

In this section I will point out that the imagination in the third *Critique* develops into a faculty that is more dynamic than the imagination in the first *Critique*. This can be seen in Kant's notion of the free play of the understanding and the imagination with respect to judgments of beauty. Kant has said that aesthetic judgments are grounded in pleasure and displeasure. That is, in the agreement or disagreement of the imagination and the understanding, a judgment of beauty is made with respect to the form of the representation. That this judgment of beauty is made with respect to the form of the representation indicates that this judgment is universal even though it is not specified by a concept of the understanding. This notion of the universality of judgments of taste, therefore, is in need of a critique. What needs further elaboration at this point is how these judgments can be universally valid since they are particular judgments of pleasure and displeasure which are subjective.⁷⁹ Kant seeks to ground these judgments in the

⁷⁹ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 77, (5: 191).

Analytic of the Beautiful, which unfolds as a series of four moments in accordance with the four kinds of judgments he describes in the first *Critique*.⁸⁰

To be clear, universally valid judgments of taste require a critique because, as reflective judgments, they are related to sensation and are therefore subjective since they are not determined by any concept. These judgments of beauty, however, are made as universal judgments—when something is judged as beautiful, it is judged as beautiful for everyone. Thus, Kant wishes to show in the Analytic of the Beautiful the conditions under which these universally valid judgments of beauty can be made.

In this section I will limit my discussion to the aspects of the Analytic of the Beautiful in which Kant specifically draws on his ideas about the imagination. This is partly due to the scope of my chapter and partly due to the fact that I have already argued that the imagination is a central aspect to Kant's development of reflective judgments in general and am here merely explicating how this central aspect of his thought unfolds. The most important passage for this discussion is §9 in which Kant argues that judgments must precede the feeling of pleasure in judgments of taste.

Kant begins §9 by arguing that if judgments of taste are universally valid, then it would be a contradiction to claim that the pleasure in the given object came before the judgment had been made. The reason for this is that placing pleasure before the judgment places its validity in the merely subjective sphere because it immediately depends on the empirical “representation through which the object is given.”⁸¹ Kant has

⁸⁰ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A79/B95.

⁸¹ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 102, (5: 217).

already argued, however, (in §6) that the only way one can make judgments of beauty (as opposed to the agreeable) is by supposing that “it [the judgment of beauty] must contain a ground of satisfaction for everyone.”⁸² Moreover, these judgments must also be subjective. Kant explains: “. . . the aesthetic universality that is ascribed to a judgment must also be of a special kind, since the predicate of beauty is not connected with the concept of the object considered in its entire logical sphere, and yet it extends it over the whole sphere of those who judge.”⁸³ Thus, to be warranted in claiming that pleasure comes first would be denying that there can be universally valid judgments of beauty. If Kant were to allow this, he would be going back on his radical claims about universal subjective judgments of beauty and on the nature of reflective judgments discussed above.

Kant asserts therefore that pleasure itself cannot be universally communicated. If he is to proceed he must explain the conditions under which judgments precede the pleasure which follows. The grounds for the judgment of taste, he therefore suggests, must be in “the universal capacity for the communication of the state of mind in the given representation” and not the pleasure that results from this state.⁸⁴ This puts Kant in somewhat of an awkward situation, for he has just claimed that a “state of mind” is universally communicable, but he has also claimed that the only things that are universally communicable are “cognition and representation so far as it belongs to

⁸² Ibid., 96, (5: 211).

⁸³ Ibid., 100, (5: 215).

⁸⁴ Ibid., 102, (5: 217).

cognition.”⁸⁵ Pleasure, he maintains, is entirely subjective and therefore can only give “private validity” or “agreeableness” and yet universal judgments of beauty require pleasure in order to be experienced.⁸⁶

Kant believes, therefore, that the “feeling of free play of the powers of representation” is the subjective universally communicable aspect of judgments of taste.⁸⁷ This is his solution to the above dilemma which leads to one of his most significant claims about the imagination in the third *Critique*. He claims that the universal communicability of the representation is the “the state of mind that is encountered in the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as they relate a given representation to cognition in general.”⁸⁸ The powers that are in relationship here are the imagination and the understanding which are in a relationship of “free play” because there is no determinate concept restricting them to a particular rule of cognition. This feeling of pleasure, of course, arises from the agreement of the two faculties and not their disagreement.⁸⁹ It is this agreement upon which—along with the representation of the object—our claims of beauty are grounded and thus without this

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ See, Ibid., 89, (5: 203).

⁸⁷ Ibid., 102, (5: 217).

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 103, (5: 218).

feeling, Kant believes, there is no beauty.⁹⁰ That is, Kant's claim is that without the "free play" of the imagination and the understanding, beauty cannot be experienced.

One key aspect of this relationship between the imagination and the understanding is that the two powers are in "free play," which reveals that rather than the imagination being subservient to the understanding it is in a reciprocal relationship to it. Kant insists that this relationship cannot be a concept which somehow unites the understanding and the imagination because then the relationship would be intellectual or schematic as in the first *Critique* and would therefore not be a judgment of taste since it determines an object in accordance with a concept.⁹¹ On the contrary, judgments of taste are made based on satisfaction and are thus made via sensation which can only be universally communicated through the play of the imagination and the understanding which are "enlivened through mutual agreement."⁹² Moreover, Kant goes on to claim, in the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments, that the subjective condition of all judgments requires the "agreement" of the imagination and the understanding. He explains that what he means by this is that the "freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept . . ." and that it follows from this that " . . . the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ For Kant's notion of the schematism see Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A137/B176-A147/B187.

⁹² Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 104, (5:219).

animating imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its **lawfulness** . . .”⁹³

What is significant about these claims for the purposes of this chapter is that Kant’s notion of free play puts the imagination in a reciprocal rather than subservient role to the faculty of the understanding. The whole notion of judgments of beauty are conditioned on the fact that the imagination must interact freely, mutually, and reciprocally with the imagination to provide subjective universally valid judgments of beauty. As Gilles Deleuze points out, this gives rise to an aesthetic common sense grounded on “a pure subjective harmony where imagination and understanding are exercised spontaneously, each on its own account.”⁹⁴

Recall that in Chapter II I argued that Kant’s notion of the imagination remained partially eclipsed from our view. That is, I argued that in spite of the fact that Kant’s doctrine of the imagination is central to his Copernican turn, he nevertheless shrouds the radical nature of the imagination behind the capacity of the concepts of the understanding to legislate our experiences of nature. Furthermore, in the Schematism, Kant conceded that the imagination schematizes, but only according to concepts. Thus, Kant, in the first *Critique*, left the imagination in a subservient position to the understanding. Recall also that at the end of Chapter II I made a promissory note that in the third *Critique* the truly radical nature of Kant’s doctrine of the imagination is made explicit. This is precisely where the imagination is revealed for Kant—in the free play, the harmonious agreement, of the imagination and the faculty of the understanding as a

⁹³ Ibid., 167, (5: 287).

⁹⁴ Deleuze, 49.

condition for subjective universally valid judgments of taste. Indeed, in the third *Critique* Kant affirms that the imagination “schematizes without a concept” because it presents and suggests creative ways in which experiences of beauty might be understood.⁹⁵

What this section suggests is that the imagination, precisely because it is not conceived as subservient to the understanding, makes judgments of beauty possible. Thus, reflective judgments in general require the free play of the imagination, an imagination that is not tethered to the determinate concepts of the understanding, but is rather in a mutually animating relationship with them. It is in this way that the imagination in the third *Critique* is more radical than the imagination in the first *Critique*. It is in this way that the imagination is revealed rather than eclipsed as it was in the first *Critique*, presenting us with a radical spontaneity of the imagination alongside the understanding.

The third *Critique*, therefore, reveals the imagination as free and spontaneous through reflective judgments of beauty. This claim serves as the origin from which Kant moves beyond the conservative constraints of the concepts of the understanding. Presently, the most that can be substantiated is that the imagination provides the means by which judgments of beauty can be grounded *a priori*. Kant, however, goes on to elaborate on the function of the imagination. Of particular importance for the purposes

⁹⁵ On this point see also Makkreel, 55. He writes, “In the *Critique of Judgment* the schematization of concepts of the understanding is placed under the more general heading of presentation (*Darstellung*).”

of this chapter are his notions of Aesthetic Ideas and the Symbolic function of the imagination.

The Symbolic Imagination and Kant's Constructivism

In the Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, Kant sets up an antinomy between the subjectivity of judgments of taste and the universality of those judgments. The problem is that if judgments of taste are made subjectively, how is it possible for them to be universal claims of beauty (which we take them to be)? He wishes to show that this antinomy can only be solved through the recognition that judgments of taste find their ground in reflective judgments which, although they are related to a concept, are not determined by that concept, but rather are based on an indeterminate concept. Hence, as Kant argued in the Analytic of the Beautiful, reflective judgments are those which are not determined by a concept, but rather are grounded by the harmonious play of the imagination and the understanding. The antinomy, Kant believes, is therefore resolved and the subjective nature of judgments of taste can also be understood as universal judgments of taste. Kant furthermore suggests that the purposiveness in nature is discovered aesthetically by the “correspondence of its representation in the imagination with the essential principles of the power of judgment in general.”⁹⁶ As Cassirer puts it, “The artistic feeling remains a feeling of self, but precisely as such it is at the same time a universal feeling of the world and life.”⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 221, (5:347).

⁹⁷ Cassirer, 319.

Kant goes on to make two significant points in the remaining portions of the Dialectic of the Beautiful. The first point is that the imagination allows us to interact with nature by means of aesthetic ideas which Kant defines as representations of the imagination that allow unnamable additions to concepts.⁹⁸ This can be seen most distinctly in beautiful art because it is considered to be a product of genius and finds its rule in the aesthetic ideas.⁹⁹ The imagination, therefore, can be used to create “another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it.”¹⁰⁰ In order to do this we must, of course, use “analogous laws,” but we are nonetheless able, Kant believes, to transform the material given to us by nature into “something entirely different, namely into that which steps beyond nature.”¹⁰¹ Hence, through the imagination and beautiful art not only we are able to experience nature, we can also creatively interact with nature through the transformation of the aesthetic ideas of the imagination. In other words, the imagination allows us to construct the world creatively.

The imagination, in its creativity, can therefore “aesthetically enlarge” a concept by being presented alongside it and setting the intellectual ideas into motion. The output of this creativity “gives more to think about than can be grasped and made distinct in it” and therefore cannot be made intelligible by language.¹⁰² As John Sallis writes,

⁹⁸ Kant *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 194, (5: 314).

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 224-225 (5:350-351).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 194, (5: 314).

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 194, (5:315).

“Aesthetic ideas are representations of imagination which provoke thought but to which no concept of understanding is adequate.”¹⁰³ Hence, although aesthetic ideas cannot be fully distinguished, they enable us to “express only the implications connected with it [the concept] and its affinity with others.”¹⁰⁴ Genius, Kant therefore claims, is found in the animation of the imagination which serves to find the interconnected relations between the concepts of the understanding and thereby find the means by which these ideas can be expressed to others.¹⁰⁵

The second point that Kant makes in the remaining portions of the Dialectic of the Beautiful is that although ideas cannot adequately be expressed in intuitions schematically, they can be expressed symbolically. That is, the means by which the aesthetic ideas “aesthetically enlarge” various concepts of the understanding is not schematic or according to a rule, but rather symbolic or indirect. For example, he points out that Jupiter’s eagle is an attribute of the powerful king of heaven, but this is not a logical attribute—this is not an attribute that we can connect to Jupiter by means of a proof. Rather, the imagination spreads out over a multitude of representations which yield an aesthetic idea by which the mind is animated to make novel connections.¹⁰⁶ The connection is creative rather than constitutive.

¹⁰³ John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason*, Second Edition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 166.

¹⁰⁴ Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 193, (5:315).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 194, (5:317).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 194 (5:315).

Kant believes that the intuitive representations can be divided into two kinds. First, the schematic are those which are presentations of the object of intuition, but not designations of the intuitions themselves. Second, the symbolic representations of intuitions, by contrast, unfold by means of analogy. Like the schematic representations they also unfold as “mere expressions for concepts,” but because reflective judgments cannot be determined by a concept, symbolic representations contain only indirect presentations of the concept, which form according to “the laws of association of the imagination” and are thus “expressions for concepts.”¹⁰⁷ Kant explains that a “double judgment” is made in this indirect presentation (*hypotyposis*) because the concept is first applied to the object of sensible intuition and then the rule of that intuition is applied to an “entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol.”¹⁰⁸ Thus, ideas, namely aesthetic ideas, through reflective judgment are taken up by the symbolic presentation and applied first to intuitions and then to other ideas. More particularly, Kant wishes to suggest that the other ideas for which the first are symbols are moral ideas. Thus, ideas of beauty are analogous to ideas of morality.

These symbolic representations show that the imagination creatively connects concepts for which there is no strict one-to-one correspondence between the concept and the aesthetic idea because, as Kant has already argued in the *Analytic of the Beautiful*, the beautiful cannot be the same thing as the good because the beautiful is not determined by a concept. What Kant seems to be suggesting is that, through the

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 226, (5:352).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

symbolic presentation of concepts, reflective judgments or, as he puts it, “applying the mere rule of reflection,” a concept which has been specified may be applied to another concept.¹⁰⁹ The relationship between this new concept and the old, however, is not direct, but rather symbolic. Therefore, as Kant asserted with respect to the aesthetic ideas, the means by which the imagination creatively connects various concepts with others and enriches our experience of nature is not a direct route, but is rather, to use Makkreel’s phrase, an imaginative cross-referencing.¹¹⁰

In the third *Critique* Kant wishes to show that the imagination is free. It is free to create ideas which, although they go unnamed, they nevertheless symbolically apply to other ideas which are already understood. The imagination is not a subordinate faculty of the understanding, as it appeared to be in the first *Critique*, but neither is it completely autonomous and independent from the understanding. Kant consistently maintains that the imagination functions in mutual harmony with the laws of the understanding. The free play of the imagination serves as the ground for reflective judgments of taste which reveal purposivity without a purpose. This purposiveness, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, can only be revealed subjectively—purposiveness for the faculty of judgment. This purposiveness must also be presupposed, for without it experiences of beauty would be impossible. These experiences are subjective, but, because they depend on the harmony of the imagination and the understanding, they are universally communicable. This is revealed through the reflective power of judgment and is

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ See Makkreel, 127.

grounded in the free play of the imagination. Furthermore, the ways in which new ideas, and concepts are discovered are through the imagination, which creatively constructs new aesthetic ideas which apply symbolically to concepts already understood. In short, the imagination allows us to construct the world by the symbolic broadening of aesthetic ideas.

The relationship between the creative function of the imagination and Kant's constructivism is not difficult to see. In Chapter II I suggested, with Tom Rockmore, that Kant's constructivism should be understood as the view that nature depends on our knowledge of it and not vice versa.¹¹¹ In the first *Critique*, this amounted to Kant's insight that the deduction of the concepts of the understanding provide the conditions under which synthetic judgments *a priori* can be made. Thus, experience in general can be understood with respect to the laws of the understanding. My suggestion, in Chapter II, was that the imagination plays a crucial role in these judgments despite Kant's wariness of making this claim explicitly in the B-deduction. I suggested that the truly radical implications of Kant's doctrine of the imagination were more fully developed in the third *Critique*. Indeed, the third *Critique*, as I have argued, unfurls the imagination as a free, creative, and spontaneous faculty which works in mutual harmony with the understanding to produce a feeling of pleasure in judgments of taste. These judgments are reflective—not constitutive—because they are not grounded by concepts of the understanding, but rather the subjective feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Through the purposivity of aesthetic judgments the imagination is revealed to us as a creative faculty

¹¹¹ See Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 9.

that constructs the world symbolically rather than schematically. Thus, the world is revealed to us through the free, creative, and symbolic work of the imagination.

Kant's Copernican turn, therefore, becomes even more radical in the third *Critique* because, rather than being a claim about the conditions for experience in general (which is already a bold claim), the Copernican turn, when considered through the lens of the third *Critique*, becomes a claim about constructing the world through the spontaneous, free, symbolic work of the imagination. What makes this radical for Kant is that world is not only constructed through the determinate concepts of the understanding, but also through the creative and symbolic work of the imagination. Furthermore, because judgments of beauty are always particular, they are the primary means by which we construct the world. They are both immediate and indirect. Thus the radical nature of the imagination reveals that the world, in all of its particularity is constructed aesthetically and symbolically. It is the imagination that allows us to find the connections between various concepts. It is the imagination that creates for us the symbolic representations of language, morality, and even God.¹¹² It is the imagination that allows the transformation of our concepts through aesthetic ideas to be communicated to others. It is the imagination, and therefore on this reading the Copernican turn, that allows us to indirectly go beyond that which we are given and to make nature meaningfully beautiful for us.¹¹³

¹¹² See Makkreel, 125.

¹¹³ I am indebted to a similar point made by Makkreel, 129.

Returning to the Critics

My purpose in this thesis has been to show that Kant's constructivism reveals radical possibilities that go beyond those of his successors and critics. I argued in Chapter II that while the imagination plays a crucial role in the synthesis of the faculties of the mind, it nevertheless remains eclipsed from our view in the first *Critique*. I suggested in this chapter that in the third *Critique* the imagination is unfurled as a faculty in free play with the understanding which, through the spontaneous connection of aesthetic ideas, constructs the world creatively rather than discursively. The upshot of this chapter is that our experience is grounded in and sustained by the creative, spontaneous, symbolic work of the imagination. Yet, questions still remain.

In Chapters I and II I raised several questions regarding Kant's constructivism and its relationship to various post-Kantian thinkers. I pointed out that many of Kant's successors criticized his philosophy for being too conservative and suggested that their views, therefore, either develop or even surpass those of Kant. It is now time to return to this question and raise it again in light of what I have suggested in Chapters II and III. The question, therefore, is: Given that Kant's constructivism reveals the imagination as a spontaneously free faculty of the mind, how is it that this suggests radical possibilities that go beyond those of his critics? In the following chapter, therefore, I will make good on the promissory note from Chapters I and II by gesturing towards how an answer to this question might begin to unfold.

CHAPTER IV

THE DYNAMIC IMAGINATION: THE POSSIBILITIES OF KANT'S

CONSTRUCTIVISM

For a strange thing came to pass, that with this work [the Critique of the Power of Judgment], which seems to have grown out of the special demands of his system and to be designed only to fill a gap in it, Kant touched the nerve of the entire spiritual and intellectual culture of his time more than with any other of his works.

—Ernst Cassirer, *Kant's Life and Thought*

Hegel is often taken to be at the same time one of Kant's fiercest critics as well as one of his chief supporters. He is a supporter because, like many of his contemporaries (Fichte and Schelling, for example), he endeavored to develop Kant's key insight which has been articulated in the previous two chapters of this thesis as Kant's Copernican turn.¹¹⁴ Like Fichte and Schelling, Hegel desired to make good on the promises of Kant's critical philosophy while at the same time avoiding the difficulties into which he believed it inevitably fell. Kant, Hegel believed, had made a decisive insight in the history of philosophy which, as Robert Pippin points out, Hegel self-consciously appreciated as the origin of his (Hegel's) thought.¹¹⁵ Particularly, Hegel agreed with Kant that philosophy should be subject to critique and that philosophy up until Kant had been just so much dogmatism.

¹¹⁴ For a discussion on Hegel's early life and his relationship to Kant through Fichte and Schelling see Frederick Beiser, *Hegel*, Routledge Philosophers, ed. Brian Leiter (New York: Routledge, 2005), 7-17.

¹¹⁵ Robert B. Pippin, *The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 47.

Also like Fichte and Schelling, Hegel believed that Kant's philosophy was fraught with problems. Indeed, immediately after Kant's first *Critique* was published it was subject to much criticism and, to Kant's dismay, misinterpretation. For example, the famous Garve-Feder review of Kant's first *Critique* charged Kant with being a Berkeleyian, a charge that Kant went to great lengths to reject.¹¹⁶ In his *History of Modern Philosophy*, Schelling articulated one of the deepest concerns that he, along with Fichte and Hegel, shared about Kant's project. Schelling wrote, "Looked at more closely, it is revealed that it is here a question of a knowing of knowing, and that this knowing of knowing itself is, in turn, precisely a knowing. Accordingly it would first require an investigation of the possibility of such a knowledge of knowing, and in this way one could keep on asking to infinity."¹¹⁷ Hegel shared this sensibility and, therefore, went on to develop his organicism in response to Kant (and in accordance with Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*).¹¹⁸ Hegel thought that Kant's constructivism was too conservative, too wooden, too tethered to the categories. He believed that both his similarities and differences with what I have been calling Kant's constructivism would provide a critical platform from which metaphysics could be developed more

¹¹⁶ See Frederick Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 89. For a discussion on the various ways in which Kant's successors took his critical philosophy see Frederick Beiser, "The Enlightenment and Idealism," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, Karl Ameriks, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 28-29.

¹¹⁷ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, Texts in German Philosophy, ed. Raymond Geuss, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 98.

¹¹⁸ For discussion on Hegel's organicism with respect to Kant see Beiser, *Hegel*, 95-107.

dynamically. Indeed, as Beiser observes, Hegel thought his philosophy was a necessary development of Kant's philosophy.¹¹⁹

In this chapter, therefore, I will gesture at the claim that Kant's constructivism, in virtue of his view of the imagination, reveals radical possibilities that go beyond those of his critics. I will first focus on Hegel's criticism of Kant's philosophy which generally takes Kant's constructivism to be relatively conservative. I will point out that one standard Hegelian criticism of Kant's philosophy was that Kant's constructivism is too conservative because it relied on a determinative *a priori* deduction of a fixed set of categories. I will suggest, however, that, given the radicality of Kant's doctrine of the imagination, this counterpoint reveals a failure on Hegel's part to grasp the creative possibilities in Kant's constructivism. This articulation of this Hegelian criticism is not meant to be controversial, but rather representative of the main interpretations of Hegel's thought. It will be worthwhile to set it up at some length because, while it is a typical and well-known criticism, it nonetheless represents a deep divide in the unfolding of philosophical ideas and provides a means by which my suggestions about Kant's constructivism can be shown to go beyond Hegel's. Second, I will suggest in more detail what the philosophical consequences of Kant's view of the imagination are as it has been discussed in Chapters II and III. My point will be to elaborate on what it means for our knowledge to unfold creatively rather than discursively and to emphasize, in contrast to Hegel's assessment, that Kant's doctrine of the imagination reveals a constructivism that is dynamic and creative. Finally, my parting gesture will be that

¹¹⁹ Beiser, *Hegel*, 158.

insofar as post-Kantian thinkers fail to account for the radical nature of the imagination in Kant's philosophy, they also fail to realize the creative, radical depths of Kant's constructivism. Thus, this chapter should be seen as programmatic rather than definitive. I see it as an opening through which further research might begin to emerge with respect to Kant's view of the imagination and the critiques his successors leveled against him.

Hegel believes that Kant's constructivism is too conservative. One main point of departure for Hegel's critique of Kant's philosophy is Hegel's belief that the concepts in Kant's work limit the function of the understanding to a strict mechanical paradigm of explanation, to use Beiser's apt phrasing.¹²⁰ The concepts for Kant are limited to twelve in number and serve as an *a priori* means by which our experiences can be explained. Kant's epistemology is limited and conservative, therefore, because it sets up an *a priori* standard for the categories of the understanding. Hegel argues that, on the contrary, the concepts should not be limited to any number in particular and that their inner being is to be discovered through dialectic. That is, whereas Kant believes that concepts are derived from *a priori* considerations, Hegel's insight, in the Introduction to his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is that "Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself . . ."¹²¹ Concepts therefore, on Hegel's view, are taken to unfold in the process of dialectic and are thus *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*. He suggests that we do not need to import

¹²⁰ See Beiser, *Hegel*, 165. See also Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 161.

¹²¹ G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 53, §84. I am dependent on Pippin for this reference. See Pippin, 52.

criteria external to concepts because “it is precisely when we leave these aside that we succeed in contemplating the matter in hand as it is *in and for itself*.”¹²² As Beiser puts it, the dialectic “is the inner movement of the subject matter, what evolves from it rather than what the philosopher applies to it.”¹²³ Another way to put the objection Hegel has in mind here is that knowledge is used as a means rather than an end. Hegel is concerned that Kant’s *a priori* deduction of the categories uses knowledge as a “tool,” but then does not allow for a critical examination of the tool itself.¹²⁴ By contrast, Hegel’s “method” proceeds by experience and does not claim to rise above experience.¹²⁵

How does Kant’s view of the imagination reveal possibilities that allow him to go beyond those of Hegel? How does the imagination suggest that Kant’s project really lies ahead of Hegel’s? In the previous chapter, I pointed out that Kant famously makes a key distinction in the Introduction to his third *Critique* between determinative judgments and reflective judgments. Determinative judgments—the kind found in the first *Critique*—begin with general concepts and subsume particulars under them according to the schematic work of the imagination.¹²⁶ Reflective judgments, by contrast, begin with

¹²² Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 54, §84 (emphasis original in Miller’s translation).

¹²³ Beiser, *Hegel*, 160.

¹²⁴ I’m indebted to Karl Ameriks for this point. See his “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 46, No. 1. (September, 1985), 17.

¹²⁵ See Beiser, *Hegel*, 172.

¹²⁶ See Kant, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp

the particular and search for a general concept under which the particular may be subsumed. He writes, “If the universal . . . is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is **determining**. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely **reflecting**.”¹²⁷ This distinction leads to one of Kant’s most provocative insights with respect to the imagination.

Kant suggests that through reflective judgments—particularly judgments of beauty—the imagination is revealed as a creative spontaneous faculty of the mind through which the world is creatively constructed. These reflective judgments of beauty depend on the free play of the imagination and the understanding and the accord produced by this mutual relationship of the two faculties results in pleasure which grounds these judgments.¹²⁸ Something, a work of art, say, is judged to be beautiful insofar as the imagination and the understanding produce a feeling of pleasure in the subject. The imagination, Kant goes on to suggest, produces aesthetic ideas whereby unnamable connections between concepts are discovered. The work of the imagination, through reflective judgments, is to make novel and creative connections between concepts of the understanding always beginning with the particular and moving to the more general.

Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A177/B138.

¹²⁷ Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of the Power of Judgment*, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer & Allen Wood, gen. eds., trans. Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 67 (5:180).

¹²⁸ See, *Ibid.*, 102 (5:217).

This is a crucial point because Hegel believes that the critique of knowledge proceeds dialectically, by which he means according to the logic of the concept itself.

He writes,

Consciousness, however, as essence is this whole process itself, of passing out of itself as simple category into a singular individual, into the object, nullifying the object as distance [from it], *appropriating* it as its own, and proclaiming itself as this certainty of being all reality, of being both itself and its objects.¹²⁹

The dialectical process, therefore, unfolds according to the category itself. Of course, it proceeds *a posteriori*, but, Hegel suggests, the way in which knowledge is attained is by means of the concept, i.e., the universal. Thus, knowledge of the world is gained by a process of moving from the general to the particular. Hegel takes this to be a radical move beyond Kant's constructivism, a move which Hegel believed Kant was too conservative to make.

By contrast, Kant believes that experiences, particularly experiences of beauty, unfold according to reflective judgments. That is, they begin with the particular and, through the free play of the imagination and the understanding, look for a universal under which that particular can be subsumed. This, as I noted in Chapter III, shows that for Kant experience unfolds as a question rather than a legislation.¹³⁰ Moreover, the imagination reveals the creative, spontaneous way in which the human consciousness constructs experience. Experience is revealed dynamically; it is not dependent upon the legislation of the concepts, but rather the free, creative work of the imagination.

¹²⁹ Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 144, §237 (emphasis original in Miller's translation).

¹³⁰ The phrasing of "questioning," as I noted in chapter III is Cassirer's. See his *Kant's Life and Thought*, trans. James Haden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 293.

Thus, Kant's doctrine of the imagination suggests that, while the categories are necessary for knowledge in general, the free work of the imagination—in all of its spontaneity and creativity—is required for the construction of our particular experiences. Hegel's claim, therefore, that Kant's constructivism is too conservative or, to use Beiser's formulation, too paradigmatically mechanistic, does not account for the radical work of the imagination through reflective judgments. Hegel's dialectic proceeds on the assumption that the deduction of the categories in Kant's critical philosophy is the linchpin for his constructivism. What my view suggests is that the linchpin is more incorporative than Hegel supposed. Kant's view of the imagination presents a creative means by which the whole of experience unfolds, not according to the fixed nature of the categories, but rather according to the radical work of the imagination.

It is my claim, therefore, that Kant's view of the imagination show that Kant's constructivism is more dynamic than Hegel's. Through reflective judgments—and therefore the imagination—Kant's view of the mind is free in a way that Hegel's is not. Hegel's dialectic proceeds by moving from the general to the particular and is indeed more dynamic than Kant's constructivism as conceived in the first *Critique*. What I wish to claim is that, given the development of the imaginative constructivism in Kant's third *Critique*, the tables have been turned. It is now Hegel who is more conservative. It is now Hegel who is limited to starting with the general concept and, from there, determining the particular. Kant, on the other had, begins with the particular and, depending on what measure of wit, creativity, or spark of genius one might possess, one moves to the more general, connecting concepts by means of aesthetic ideas.

Kant's view of the imagination shows us that much of our experience unfolds creatively and artistically rather than discursively and mechanistically. Through aesthetic ideas, the imagination connects and combines concepts in novel and surprising ways. Thus, it is through the imagination that our experience becomes connected to novel philosophical ideas. Accordingly, as noted in chapter III, the imagination unfolds symbolically insofar as concepts are taken to represent other concepts with which they have no direct connection. As Makkreel points out this reveals the interpretive nature of the imagination.¹³¹ This interpretive work unfolds as aesthetic ideas provide us with connections in our experience when concepts cannot. These connections, however, are not determinate, but rather creative, reflective, artistic.¹³² They are not "knowledge" in the Kantian sense, but they provide a creatively connected whole of experience which would not be possible without the spontaneous work of the imagination. As Kant puts it the mind is animated by the creative work of aesthetic ideas.¹³³

In the third *Critique* Kant indicates that various artistic mediums open up our experience in ways that the discursive work of the concepts of the understanding do not. Beautiful art is most truly revealed in the art of poetry.¹³⁴ He writes that poetry "expands the mind by setting the imagination free and presenting, within the limits of a

¹³¹ Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 122.

¹³² For discussion see *Ibid.*, 119.

¹³³ Kant, *The Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 193 (5:315).

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 203 (5:326).

given concept and among the unbounded manifold of forms possibly agreeing with it, the one that connects its presentation with a fullness of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate, and thus elevates itself aesthetically to the level of ideas.”¹³⁵ In other words, poetry reveals novel connections of our experience to us that cannot be determined by the understanding. It is through this artistic medium that we find ourselves constructing the world, not according to determinative concepts, but rather according the artistic free play of the imagination. Kant’s view of he imagination suggests, therefore, that the world is constructed poetically rather than logically.¹³⁶

Hence, the construction of our experience, according to Kant, offers us the possibility of a dynamic unfolding of experience. The imagination, as noted in Chapter III, works symbolically to reveal new connections between the concepts of the understanding. Through poetry that which is unnamable according to the categories becomes part of our experience. According to Kant’s view of the imagination, therefore, the possibility of a dynamic, artistically constructed world comes into view. This possibility does not arise in Hegel and it is to that extent that Kant’s constructivism can be said to lie beyond Hegel’s.

As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, my purpose is to gesture in the direction that Kant’s radical view of the imagination might proceed. I have suggested that, with respect to Hegel, one of Kant’s greatest critics, Kant’s constructivism provides possibilities that go beyond Hegel’s system. Indeed, Kant’s constructivism is not

¹³⁵ Ibid., 203-204 (5:326).

¹³⁶ I am indebted to Ted George for this phrasing.

mechanistic and conservative, but rather dynamic and creative. This gesture could expand in several directions. First, Kant's constructivism, as has been noted by many scholars, has left its traces on the philosophy of Romanticism and German Idealism.¹³⁷ One way in which research might unfold is by questioning the extent to which Kant's immediate successors appreciate the radical insight Kant's doctrine provides. Second, as Rockmore has noted, much philosophy in the twentieth century has unfolded "in Kant's wake." That is, many philosophers in the twentieth century—Dewey, Quine, Heidegger, and others—are to an unappreciated degree dependent upon their various interpretations of Kant.¹³⁸ Insofar as this is the case, my suggestion is that to the degree that these philosophers fail to account for Kant's radical view of the imagination, they still remain behind Kant's project rather than in front of it. Thus, my claim that the symbolic imagination reveals radical possibilities for Kant's constructivism opens up as an inquiry into the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy.

¹³⁷ For the influence of Kant's influence on Romanticism with respect to the imagination see Jane Kneller, *Kant and the Power of the Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4. Also, see Beiser "The Enlightenment and Idealism," 34.

¹³⁸ Tom Rockmore, *In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 19. On this point see also Pippin, *The Persistence of Subjectivity*, 32.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: REALIZING THE RADICAL IMAGINATION

The imagination . . . is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it.

—Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*

I began Chapter I by stating that with Kant something new begins in philosophy. I also pointed out that many of his successors believed this to be so. I would like to conclude by suggesting that not only does Kant's view of the imagination show that his philosophy reveals possibilities that go beyond those of his critics, but also that, insofar as we fail to welcome the creative work of the imagination, Kant still lies ahead of us. To this end I will briefly summarize the conclusions of my argument in order to take stock of what is at stake for looking beyond this thesis. Then, I will suggest that the research of this thesis gives occasion to examine and reflect upon the responses to and appropriations of Kant throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century because it claims that not only is Kant's philosophy pivotal, but also, in some sense, still yet to be discovered.

I argued in Chapter II that although the imagination is crucial to Kant's Copernican turn, it nevertheless remains partially eclipsed from our view. In the face of Heidegger's criticism that Kant "shrank back" from his radical work in the A-deduction, I suggested that, while Kant's language does seem to belie a certain disparity of thought between the two deductions, the imagination is not fully revealed in the first *Critique*. I suggested in Chapter III that, in the third *Critique*, the imagination is unfurled (through

reflective judgments) as a faculty in free play with the understanding which, through the spontaneous connection of aesthetic ideas, constructs the world creatively rather than discursively. The conclusion of that chapter was that our experience is grounded in and sustained by the creative, spontaneous, symbolic work of the imagination. In Chapter IV I pointed out that one standard Hegelian criticism of Kant's philosophy was that Kant's constructivism is too conservative because it relied on a determinative *a priori* deduction of a fixed set of categories. I argued, however, that, given the radicality of Kant's doctrine of the imagination, this criticism reveals a failure on Hegel's part to grasp the creative possibilities in Kant's constructivism because the imagination in the third *Critique* is the creative, symbolic, and reflective means by which the world is discovered. Furthermore, I suggested that Kant's constructivism is more free than Hegel's dialectic because the dialectic always begins with the concept and moves to the particular, whereas Kant's notion of reflective judgment opens up the occasion for beginning with particulars and moving creatively to more general concepts. I concluded, therefore, that, in this sense, the possibilities of Kant's constructivism could be said to lie beyond those of Hegel's dialectic.

As in the previous chapter, my parting gesture will be towards that which is beyond the scope of this thesis, namely, the many ways in which the radicality of the symbolic imagination opens up paths of research into nineteenth and twentieth post-Kantian philosophy. First, research might unfold with respect to Kant's immediate predecessors and successors. That is, by taking Kant's innovative and provocative claims about the imagination as central to his project, it would be interesting to see how

this sheds light on the nature of his relationship to Early Modern philosophers such as Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume. For example, as I mentioned in Chapter IV, the Garve-Feder review criticized Kant by suggesting that his idealism was the same as that of Berkeley's. Research is needed in this area to inquire into the relationship between Kant's and Berkeley's view of the imagination as it pertains to their formulations of idealism. The guiding thread would be that the imagination is a crucial aspect of Kant's critical philosophy which allows the world to be constructed creatively. Insofar as Berkeley's view failed to take this into account, Kant could be seen as holding an importantly distinctive form of idealism.

Second, research might unfold with respect to Kant's philosophical heirs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, I argued in Chapter I that Heidegger's criticism of Kant was somewhat misplaced. My suggestion was that the first *Critique* did not fully reveal the radical notions that Heidegger wished it would. Another avenue of research this thesis opens up is how Kant's formulation of the imagination in the third *Critique* might correspond to Heidegger's suggestion that the imagination is the root of which the faculties of the mind are the stems. Again, the point would be to consider the radical and creative nature of the symbolic imagination with respect to how Heidegger relates the imagination to aesthetic experience.

These are only a few examples of the many possibilities Kant's radical imagination brings into view. It has been suggested that much of philosophy after Kant has unfolded "in Kant's wake" because philosophers have recognized the significance of his insights and either critically appropriated them, resolutely rejected them, or

wholeheartedly agreed with them.¹³⁹ Thus, Schelling's claim with which this thesis began seems importantly striking:

The judgement of history will be that a greater outer and inner battle for the highest possessions of the human spirit was never fought; at no time has the endeavour of the scientific spirit led to deeper experiences and experiences more rich in results than since Kant.¹⁴⁰

If this thesis is right, then one might say that the judgment of history will be that, insofar as the symbolic imagination is taken to be a crucial means by which the world is constructed, Schelling will have been right. Indeed, insofar as philosophy is taken to be a work of the imagination, a free and creative source from the depths of which spring our particular experiences of the world, the possibilities of the Kantian imagination will have been realized. That is, the richness of experience awakens by the movement from the schematic to the symbolic work of the imagination.

¹³⁹ Tom Rockmore, *In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 19.

¹⁴⁰ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, Texts in German Philosophy, ed. Raymond Geuss, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 94.

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