A POSTMODERN UNION: INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITIES

IN EUROPE

A Senior Honors Thesis

by

LACY AUTUMN NICOLE COOPER

Submitted to the Office of Honors Programs
& Academic Scholarships
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE
RESEARCH FELLOWS

April 2002

Group: History and Political Science
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ABSTRACT

A Postmodern Union: Institutions and Identities in Europe. (April 2002)

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The European Union has often been depicted as a postmodern political institution, primarily because it both transcends and erases the traditional boundaries of the modern nation-state. The implications of this conceptualization are far-reaching. For example, what effects might the nature of the EU have on public opinion? How might a postmodernist respond differently to the Union than a modernist? Is the familiar nationalist-Europeanist cleavage asserted by many to be the fundamental division of European identities adequate to explain support for the Union? Using Eurobarometer data I explore these questions about European identities and affect toward EU policies. It appears that two additional- postmodern- identities co-exist alongside the nationalist and the europeanist. These are the dual-identifier and the non-identifier who repeatedly display even more radical europeanist and nationalist tendencies, respectively, than their conventional counterparts. By weighting the votes of the European Council I illustrate that understanding all five European identity types is crucial for decisionmaking in the EU as policymakers attempt to build a qualified majority coalition among the fifteen Member States.
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INTRODUCTION

When the Second World War came to a close, a treaty was signed by six European countries in a coordinated effort to overcome their tendencies to engage in war and destruction. The hope was that firm economic ties among the Member States would hinder the rise of armed conflict and eventually secure peace for all of Europe. Half a century later, this community of nations, renamed the European Union, has broadened its scope. It now includes fifteen Member States with an eye toward further expansion in the coming years as several Eastern European nations wait anxiously to be admitted.

The EU is a political union unlike any the world has ever seen before; having been created when the modern era was fading and postmodernism was on the rise. Its institutions reflect this global setting. The most obvious manifestation of Europe’s postmodern shift is found in the supranational nature of its governing body, which increasingly transcends and erases nation-state borders. Since the 17th century, the nation-state has been the world’s primary political unit but it is no longer a concrete entity. Lines that once contained each nation-state’s sovereignty within a specific territorial boundary are breaking down; and instead of trying to patch the leaks, European leaders choose to embrace the phenomenon playing out before them. In response to the transition to postmodernism that the world is experiencing, Europe is fashioning a political institution well suited for its environment.

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Cooper, Lacy

A postmodern Union: institutions and identities in Europe
Postmodernism has, in varying degrees, affected all areas of European society: politics and economics, institutions and individuals, elites and masses. Some react with distaste clinging ever more strongly to modernity while others embrace the postmodernism drive. Europe is being pulled in two directions and the rifts between governments and individuals are gradually widening. As a result, new cleavages are emerging between modern and postmodern individuals and their states that will profoundly affect the future progress of European unification.
POSTMODERNISM DEFINED

The birth of postmodern thought cannot be pinpointed to an exact date in history but is believed to have begun in the latter half of the twentieth century. Like any philosophical or artistic movement, its tenets are not easily isolated since many individuals are involved in the creation and adaptation of its principles. Nonetheless, it is necessary for the purpose of political science theory to express postmodernism as though it were a complete set of uniform views. Yet the essentialism inherent in defining postmodern thought actually violates postmodernism itself, which advocates the absence of concrete foundations and the existence of a constantly contested political space. Although there is no way to wholly reconcile this discrepancy (an unfortunate flaw in any scientific methodology), the definition of postmodernism can be fragmented. It can be made the site of various authors’ expressions—authors whose voices are not always in tune. By compiling several diverse authors’ contributions to the meaning of postmodernism, the definition itself, though concrete in the context of this paper, is heterogeneous as it stands on its own.

Postmodernism is both the continuation and rejection of modernism and thus can best be understood in relation to its counterpart. Modernism is founded on a belief in progress, an illustration of which is Henry Ford’s assembly line. It asserts that one can move through a set of consecutive phases following a blueprint that has been laid out by the presumably more advanced Western nations, and reach a virtuous end. Modernism is
characterized by its pursuit of the following ideals: industrialization, urbanization, democratization, nationalization, and Westernization.

Postmodernism rejects the notion that virtuous ends are reached by following a step-by-step process and that the ‘West’ is the supreme moral authority in the world. Globalization, fragmentation, digitalization, and decentralization are all ideals that characterize this era. Postmodernism claims that deciding which ideals are good or right and what it means to be advanced is subjective; and because there is no objective reality, all peoples should be given a voice in the world. The increasing interdependence of global economic and political realms has encouraged the acceptance of new voices. Furthermore, the Internet has integrated public and private spaces around the world. Because the European Union was created during the postmodern era, its institutions reflect these ideals.
WHAT MAKES THE EU SO POSTMODERN?

The Modern Nation-State

To appreciate the postmodern nature of the European Union, one must first understand the character of its modern counterpart, the nation-state. A state is defined as a government that exercises authority over a territory while a nation is a group of people that claims to share a common bond, such as language, ancestry, myths, or customs. A state represents power, while a nation represents community. European nations often claim to have ethnoreligious ties that distinguish them either from each other or from non-Europeans. Though both nations and states existed before the 17th century, the combination of nation and state is an ideal of the modern era. Before the modern era, the centers of sovereign authority were viewed as points on a map around which power, stemming from the Church, seemed to radiate immeasurably. The nation-state arose out of the Middle Ages when emperors began to view their territories as though they were tangible, secular political bodies. Boundaries were drawn around specific nations and those not identifying with the ruling nation were denied rights, excommunicated, or even purged. Many European countries came close to realizing the modern ideal; the nation and the state overlapped so closely that they became inextricably linked.

The [d]evolution of Europe into self-contained spheres engendered not only modern nation-states but also modern nationalism. Lines drawn around peoples of similar ancestry helped to crystallize a fermenting in-group/out-group mentality across the continent. Any prior tendencies to distinguish 'us' from 'them' could now be
confirmed by the political boundaries dividing disparate groups. Persecution of a foreign ‘other’ could potentially be legitimized publicly by asserting national sovereignty within state borders. ‘Justification’ for persecution of this kind was especially problematic for people groups such as Jewish communities who could not claim any territory as their own. Nevertheless, this is the way in which Europe chose to define its political bodies up into the 20th century.

The Postmodern State

The way in which each society determines the form a state will take is not predetermined. Five hundred years ago Europe created the nation-state but fifty years ago it began developing a new form of government. Europe’s transformation reveals that states are constantly changing and at any time may choose to take on a new shape. States, as is clear from the EU, are not absolute, stagnate entities with clearly defined borders. In fact, states are not ‘real’ entities at all but ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson). The people of each state believe there is a tie that binds all members together, and this belief persists ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each’ (7). An imagined tie or sense of membership with others of similar language, ancestry, or ethnicity is what constitutes a nation. Each individual within state boundaries need not see its borders nor do they need to personally interact with all other citizens. The community they experience flourishes even though it is not perceptible. Thus, a nation-state is an entity with imagined boundaries, imagined individuals within those boundaries, and imagined relationships or affiliations among those people.
Given that the nation-state is not a real or tangible political body but an imagined one, it is not surprising that the borders that once defined our world are beginning to fade. Technological inventions facilitate this process. Television, media, and the Internet all work together to create a virtual environment in which citizens interact with their governments. The state and its representative bodies have themselves become a 'representation' of reality. Technology allows individuals to transcend time and space.

Europeans can actually explore EU institutions and policies, read the acquis communitaire, participate in discussions and polls, and contact their representatives all via the Internet. It is now possible to be a citizen of one nation-state but participate in the activities of other citizenry across the globe. The declining importance of national boundaries is especially clear in the European Union where every citizen of a member state is simultaneously a citizen of the Union and travel between states is enjoyed freely.

Because the nation-state is no longer tightly contained (and never truly was), political territories must be reestablished and membership redefined.\(^1\)

### Time in Motion

In addition to being a postmodern state, the EU has produced a postmodern 'history.' In modern thought, history is perceived to be linear, as though it exists on a time continuum where one event follows closely after and results from all those before it. Historical events are recorded meticulously and proclaimed to be an accurate account

\(^1\) For more on the development of a postmodern state, see Rogers Brubaker's *Nationalism Reframed* and Yasemin Soysal's *Limits of Citizenship*
of what has occurred. In contrast, stories created by people groups and passed down through generations are considered fiction. Local myths and legends might be based on real occurrences but are not truth. On the other hand, history as it is written in historical records is thought to be absolute; it provides the foundation for what is to come.

According to postmodern theorists, however, history is no better than a fable. Its storytellers, like those who pass down oral traditions, have preconceived ideas and beliefs that shape their perception of events. Their imaginings of the truth are distorted reproductions of what really occurred; and their expressions of those ideas in writing, a second copy. Thus, when an ‘historical’ event is finally presented on a page, it is not simply a watered down version of the facts but rather a representation at least twice removed from reality. “Postmodernism declares the ‘end of history’... by rejecting the notion of history as a unitary process with the ‘West’ at the political center of gravity” (van Ham, 8). History, therefore, is a social creation, a story, a fictional account; it does not exist as an absolute. And historical events cannot be envisioned as stagnant points on a time continuum but as constantly moving through space, never pinned down to a specific location.

It is not the case that history was permanent and absolute in the modern era and only now has it become untrustworthy. On the contrary, the instability of historical facts has always been. Postmodernity has simply brought it to light as some philosophers, poets, and other academics have begun to recognize its impermanence. The unreliability of historical facts has become especially clear in the second half of the 20th century as
non-Western peoples have begun to protest the biased view of the Western, dominant version of history.

Even though they live in a postmodern age in which history has been re-envisioned, Europeans, in general, are still historically minded. Their experiences in the past, specifically the Great Wars of the 20th century, affect their mindsets, beliefs, and ways of life in the present. Of course, one European's past, especially as it relates to the wars, varies greatly from another. And each European country has a unique collective history. So how would it be possible for all European histories—both the German and the French histories, for example—to serve as the foundation for the European Union? How can two or more countries with a bloody past that is deeply rooted in division have as their starting point unification?

The founding fathers of the ECSC must have perceived this dilemma as they began to construct the Union, and their successors continued in the traditions they established. The EU was not built on a shared history because those involved did not have a common past that would lead to unification. Rather it seems the opposite is true. The purpose of the ECSC—unification—was a backlash against Europe's divisive past. European visionaries did not choose 'reality' as their starting point in time—that is, reality as it is recorded in the history books—nor did they follow linearly after the series of events of the 20th century. Instead Europe chose to found its institutions on the myth2 of European unity, which had often been envisioned but never realized. The leaders of

2 For the myth of Europe, see Robert Darton's "Euro State of Mind"
Europe rejected modernity's logic and proclaimed that which was once considered fable to be truth. They declared a futuristic utopia to be their past and began moving forward.

Progression

In the modern era, states are built on a foundation, whether it is a Constitution, an ideology, or a monarch. The EU has no such foundation. The creation of a Constitution has been debated but never resolved. Therefore, for fifty years the Union has existed propelled by treaties alone. Each successive treaty either nullifies or builds on those before it with no standard set of rules to follow or principles to incorporate. The Union chooses to entitle its entire body of laws, rules, treaties, regulations, and directives the acquis communitaire: a jumble of laws that are constantly interacting with and drawing from each other and at any moment may reach their pinnacle achievement or lose all importance in the Union. For example, the treaty that founded the ECSC recently expired but time and official expiration dates are less important in a postmodern state. In fact, the purpose of the ECSC had faded long before, as it was superseded by many subsequent treaties. The only body of law that is actually safeguarded by the Union and serves as a basis for its actions is the United Nations Charter on Human Rights but this piece of writing finds its greatest purpose in setting the standard for human rights that prospective Member States must achieve before they are allowed to enter into the Union. In its common use, the UN Charter acts more as a symbol of democracy than as a sculptor of Union law. At its root, then, the Union has no groundwork, just as it has no
historical beginning from which it grows. In postmodernity, this is the optimal mode of
government. The absence of a framework gives the EU room for constant progression.

The means by which states come to participate in the Union is also a postmodern
phenomenon. Modern states are created and expanded through force. They gain territory
by invading and conquering militarily weaker lands. Voluntary surrender is virtually
unheard of because states are reluctant to give up their national sovereignty. In the EU,
what was hitherto unheard of has become common occurrence. States are not forced to
join the Union but rather they ask to be a part of it. Prospective members in the East are
conforming their countries to the standards set by the EU and willingly sacrificing some
measure of sovereignty for the opportunity to share in what the EU has to offer its
Members, especially in the rewards of a single market. At the same time because
membership is voluntary not compulsory, states may also opt to leave the Union at any
time. Of course, regaining membership might be difficult if a state has proven they may
not fully commit. Nonetheless, it is the decision of each state to join and to disjoin from
the Union.

The world has never witnessed a supranational authority offering voluntary
involvement to its participants. There are no military troops driving states to enact EU
law. Instead, states have economic and ideological incentives that compel them to go
along as well as the belief that a divided Europe will be less prosperous and more prone
to engage in war than one that is unified. States enact EU law because they know it is in
their national interest to move toward unification. They will even pay the fines imposed
on them by the European Court of Justice for breaking Union law in expectation that
other states will reciprocate their measure of good faith. In fact, the Member states are so eager to create common laws and practices with their neighbors that many have de facto implemented the tenets of the Nice Treaty even though it was not ratified in 2001. In this way, unlike in a modern state, the Members of the EU enact legislation, pay taxes, and in other ways surrender sovereignty to a supranational government institution.

In the same way that states may willingly enter into the Union so are they free to exit. In a modern state, territory is not relinquished unless it becomes more trouble than it is worth (and even then it is often not surrendered) or is taken away. For example, when the southern states in the United States of America attempted to secede from the Union, the U.S. government denied them this demand and civil war was the result. Participation in the EU, on the other hand, is a choice. Member States are only bound by a treaty, which means their individual state governments may choose to renege or nullify if it suits their national interests. The European Union is a postmodern political institution because it allows states the freedom to choose the way in which their state will develop, to associate or disassociate with the Union, to relinquish or retain sovereignty, to embrace a European identity or be content with a national one. Postmodernity creates a forum void of certainties and have-tos where individuals and states are at liberty to define themselves and can have fluid, dynamic, and multi-layered identities. The EU takes on the qualities of the postmodern era and presents this political space to the nations of both Western and Eastern Europe in the hope that peace will be the result.

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3 The public in the Republic of Ireland did not ratify the Nice Treaty when it was put to a vote.
Multiplicity

The postmodern era has revealed that it is impossible to wrap up individuals in neat little packages. Broad sweeping generalizations about categories of people are politically incorrect and often untrue. The site of identity, therefore, is not metaphysical or supranational, but rather it is local. Additionally, each person cannot be summed up into one identity category. A sister may also be a mom, a libertarian, and a garbage collector. Each of those identities exist within and define one person; and each one is likely to transform, fragment, or disappear at any moment. One individual may even have dialectical identity markers, such as enemy and friend. A postmodern political institution, then, must provide outlets on a local level for individuals with multiple, mutable identities.

In the context of the European Union, it is often cultural identities that must be contended with since each citizen of the EU is a composite of a local, regional, national, and European identity. Some citizens may in fact claim more than one of these identities or may have a feeling of membership to a foreign country. Obviously, if the EU is to be effective, it must be open to a citizenry of multiple identities and attune to their needs at a grassroots level. Voices from every location in Europe must find a forum in the Union.

The EU has taken significant strides to conquer identity politics within its borders. First, it has attempted to institutionalize a European identity. Many Europeans have historically felt a cultural connection to each other that they do not share with other nations. Extensive vacations, coffee on a veranda, and workers’ rallies are just a few examples. The Union formalizes that shared identity by creating a European
government, flag, and anthem. Second, national identity is not strained by the institution of a European one. National governments still exist and exercise authority over their citizens and also have a significant role in the European system. Heads of state make up the Council of Europe and the nation-state is the political sovereign responsible for enacting the regulations agreed upon at the European level. The EU may create and adjudicate legislation, but it is left to the states to implement the decisions. For example, each Member State has its own education system but the EU unifies these independent systems by creating a system of equivalencies to be used at the intergovernmental or supranational level. Third, and maybe most impressively, the Union offers a space for local and regional political voices to be heard through the Committee of Regions. There are 222 members in the CoR each representing a specific region of Europe. The role of the committee is twofold: to express local and regional needs at the level of the Union and to educate their constituencies about relevant European law. As stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the CoR must be consulted on all issues that might affect local or regional politics. Lastly, the needs of the individual, if not met by any of the overarching institutions, may be expressed to the European ombudsman whose job it is to attend to the personal requests of European citizens. Europe has set in place institutions for multiple identity markers and has not neglected the importance of local foci.
POSTMODERN IDENTITIES

The European Union has developed into a postmodern political institution as it has been influenced by an increasingly postmodern world. The same effect can be found among segments of the European population. While some individuals cling ever more tightly to their modern roots, others have embraced the postmodern world with all of its uncertainties. The result has been unique cleavages in Europe that determine Europeans' support for further integration.

Postmaterialist vs. Materialist

The traditional means of identifying Europeans as they relate to the European Union is to determine whether they are europeanist, nationalists, or ambivalents. In fact, this is the most obvious cleavage that would emerge when exploring factors determining support for the Union. However, recent attempts have been made to understand individuals and the European Union based on their degree of postmodernism. Ronald Inglehart posits an alternative way to conceptualize European identities as either postmaterialists or materialists. In his opinion a postmaterialist has postmodern values, such as protecting freedom of speech, beautifying the environment, and creating a more humane, less impersonal world. A materialist, in contrast, has modern values, such as order, stability, and prosperity. A postmaterialist is considered more favorable toward the European Union than a materialist. Additionally, Inglehart prescribes that a postmaterialist feels a certain level of economic stability and order already in the world,
and thus is given the luxury of being able to value non-material things like quality of life. Whereas in the spirit of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the materialist is inclined to first pursue the basic material social needs before desiring postmaterial ones.

Inglehart’s desire to understand European identities in terms of postmodern thought is a worthy objective, for a postmodern individual may respond differently than a modern one to a postmodern political institution such as the EU. However, Inglehart’s postmaterialist-materialist argument inadequately addresses the shift from modern to postmodern. Postmodernism is not just about what one values in the world; it is a reflection of how one envisions the self and its place in the world. Specifically, postmodernism posits that identities are fragmented, multiform, impermanent, and socially constructed. It claims that selves are not composed of essential identities unchanged since birth. Instead, the self consists of an array of identities, some complementing and others contradicting each other; and all are subject to be changed by the influences of society and other individuals. Inglehart does not address these key principles belonging to a postmodern perception of identity.

Inglehart also does not analyze the effects that a world of unreality and language games may have on European identities. Postmodernism claims that the world is so consumed by images that it is no longer possible to determine what is false and what is real. In fact, that which we proclaim to be real is often actually a constructed reality. Not just what we see and experience is socially constructed but also what we say. The words that we use in everyday life have a fabricated meaning, not an inherent one. Words are created by society so that ideas can be communicated, but interpretation of their
meanings are still subjective. All words have a unique significance to their
communicator that is different from the meaning understood by the hearer. Language
discrepancies can be reduced but never erased. Any theory of postmodern identity must
consider that a postmodernist recognizes and embraces unreality in the world and
language.

Like the world and language, states are also socially constructed entities, created
to maintain peace and order. Thomas Hobbes calls his conception of the state, Leviathan,
because of its mighty and fearsome power over its citizens. Europe has labeled its state
the European Union because of its objective to bring peace and harmony to the
continent. Though Hobbes’ state was a fictional theoretical model and the EU is an
actual political institution, the two are not so different; both are social creations-
imaginings of how the world should function. Similarly, the nation is a fabricated body
of individuals, what Benedict Arnold calls an “imagined community.” Likenesses and
connections between individuals which make up their national bonds are imagined.
Certain circumstances lead to the development of a national identity among a particular
group of people and each individual’s feeling of membership to the group. Thus, both
the state and the nation which bind us together with other member’s of our community
are fabricated entities. A postmodernist recognizes the ephemeral and constructed nature
of both the nation-state and the EU, a concept that Inglehart does not include in his
postmaterialist definition.

An additional criticism of Inglehart’s argument is his belief that only those
societies or individuals that are prosperous and stable will be able to have postmodern
values. Clearly postcolonialists would find this statement degrading, for many residents of former colonies have been some of the staunchest supporters of and greatest contributors to the postmodern movement. Yet, inconsistent with Inglehart's argument, their societies are far from having the order and sound economy that is necessary, according to Inglehart, to have postmodern values. Postmodernism is a state of mind that need not follow after financial and military security. Individuals from all types of surroundings may recognize the instability inherent in their own identities and in the world.

**Postmodern vs. Modern**

Based on a firm understanding of postmodernism, European identities can be described in an alternative fashion to that offered by Inglehart. First, the traditional Europeanist, ambivalent, and nationalist identifications can be classified as either modern or postmodern. Additionally, two new postmodern identities may be found alongside the traditional three: the dual identifier and the non-identifier. Table 4.1 demonstrates the identification of each European identity type with Europe and the nation.

To ascertain the existence of these five European identity types, Eurobarometer data was analyzed. In this public opinion survey, individuals were asked questions regarding their relationship to the nation and the EU. Selected questions focused on their identification with and pride in the nation and EU.
4.1 Five European Identity Types

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<td>European Identifier</td>
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<td>Non-Identifier</td>
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As expected, a europeanist identifies entirely with the EU (not with the nation) and is proud of the EU (not of the nation) while a nationalist identifies with and is proud of only the nation. An ambivalent identifier moderately identifies with both. In addition to these identities, a dual-identifier exists who identifies entirely with both the EU and
the nation and a non-identifier who identifies with neither political institution. Each of these identity types can be categorized as either modern or postmodern.

**National Identifier**

The nationalist is a modern individual because he is attached to the nation-state, which is a modern phenomenon, constructed by society during a particular era to distinguish one section of the globe from another. It is a designation of geographic, cultural, and collective identity traits. The nationalist identifies solely with his national identity and finds his self-worth in national pride. He feels no attachment to local or European concerns but only to the familiar boundaries of the modern era. He is fighting against a postmodern world by refusing to be a part of it and instead clinging ever more strongly to a stable modern world, which provides him with a safe, haven from the ‘Others’ he so greatly fears.

**European Identifier**

The European Identifier could be modern. It is possible that he views the EU as the next logical step in a progression from nation-state to supranational state. He may translate the borders of the nation-state- those defined lines that keep ‘Others’ out and contain one’s own identity within- to that of Europe so that now it is no longer France versus every other country in the world but rather Europe versus any foreign ‘Other.’ “Turning ‘Europeanness’ into a postmodern badge of privilege and superiority, a new marker of pride and dignity, would risk emulating the trappings of nationalism on a
European level” (Van Ham 73). Though this is a possible interpretation of the European identifier, it is highly unlikely. For the European identifier to be modern he must have a very strong nationalistic tie to Europe; and his European pride must be juxtaposed with disdain for foreign nations. He would see himself positioned in the heart of Europe looking out toward strange foreigners. But the EU does not create this personality. According to Timothy Garton-Ash, “There is no European demos” so there is no imagined community to which all Europeans belong. Also, the European identity seems inwardly focused, based not on the construction of a wall around all of Europe but on the destruction of walls within Europe. Because the EU works to blur the boundaries between modern nation-states, those who identify with it are rejecting modernism and embracing a postmodern world with permeable, unstable boundaries.

**Ambivalent Identifier**

At first glance the ambivalent identifier seems postmodern. He is uncertain about his connection to governments and collective identities and is unwilling to completely define himself by his locality, region, nation or Europe. But in actuality he is a modernist. The ambivalent identifier has not completely rejected modern ideals, as the non-identifier has, nor has he fully embraced all elements of his identity like the multiple-identifier. Instead, he is in limbo. The hesitation to fully commit to either Europe or his nation signifies that the ambivalent identifier is disillusioned with modern society but unwilling to give it up. David Riesman argues that in a modern world, individuals necessarily conform to find a place in the society in which they live. “In
order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the kind of character which makes them _want_ to act in the way they _have_ to act as members of the society or of a special class within it. They must _desire_ what is objectively _necessary_ for them to do” (Riesman 5). But what if the roles that individuals in society are supposed to play are not clearly defined. Living in a postmodern world, modern man becomes disillusioned. He is bombarded by virtual images and constantly reminded that boundaries and institutions are not permanent, fixed entities. What if society itself is constantly a blur, a simulacrum, so that its members cannot locate their places? It is practically impossible to avoid contact with these everyday reminders and this makes the modern man uneasy. He deeply desires for his world to be stable and clearly defined and wishes he could say, “Yes I’m a Frenchman and yes I’m proud of my country,” but in light of postmodernism he cannot convince himself that his world is really so concrete.

**Non-Identifier**

The non-identifier is a pessimistic/cynical postmodernist who finds no value in labels and in fact feels constrained by them. The non-identifier is an individual. She chooses not to define herself by the government under which she lives. The context and meaning of ‘Europe’ or ‘France’ is subjective anyway and constantly changing. Any attachment to these shape-shifting concepts would be meaningless. In the spirit of Baudrillard, the non-Identifier believes that ‘reality’ as we know it is in fact a simulation, or “simulacrum.” Specifically, nations do not exist until they are drawn on a map. “Henceforth, it is the map that proceeds the territory... it is the map that engenders
the territory...” (Baudrillard 2). Finding one’s self-worth in a socially constructed, momentary entity such as a nation would be absurd.

**Dual Identifier**

The dual identifier is postmodern. An individual might characterize herself as equally a Venetian, an Italian, and a European. The dual identifier believes her identity does not have to be singular but can be a conglomeration of many parts, some overlapping and others contradicting each other. Chantal Mouffe declares, “It is therefore impossible to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, homogeneous entity. We have rather to approach it as a plurality... this plurality does not involve the coexistence, one by one, of a plurality of subject positions but rather the constant subversion and overdetermination of one by the others” (Mouffe 372). The dual identifier does not find it problematic that she wholeheartedly identifies with the EU even though some of its policies do not benefit her nation. Nor is she disturbed that he is greatly attached to a nation that sacrifices some of its sovereignty for the good of Europe. She recognizes and embraces the many aspects of her identity even though some may be diametrically opposed.
DATA TESTS AND RESULTS

Identities: Support for EU Policies

European identities are more complex than the traditional European-national cleavage portrays. An understanding of postmodernism reveals an entirely new vision of the European constituency. One that imagines them belonging to one of five identity types and not simply to the traditional three. To appreciate the significance of this breakdown across the five identity types, and specifically the importance of recognizing the two new postmodern identity types, each identity's support for the EU across issue domains is analyzed. By looking at the identity types' stance on EU policies using Eurobarometer data, the importance of the five types becomes evident.

The five identity types are divided into two camps with the ambivalent identifier usually falling somewhere in the middle. The dual identifier and the europeanist comprise the pro-EU camp while the non-identifier and the nationalist belong to the pro-nation camp. As graph 5.1 illustrates, the dual identifier is more supportive of EU expansion than the Europeanist in four policy domains: enlargement, EU sovereignty, protection, and reform. On the other side, the non-identifier is the least favorable identifier toward to the EU on reform, protection, and enlargement policies. It is, therefore, not the case that european identifiers are most supportive and nationalists least supportive of EU expansionist policies as the traditional view would advocate. Instead, the dual and non-identifiers are equally important to the progress of European integration. Therefore, it is critical that the European public be viewed, engaged, and
5.1 Five European Identity Types:
Percent support for EU across policy domains

studied according to these five identity types for politicians and academics alike to have accurate perceptions of European identities.
Identities: Influence in European Institutions

The implications of this finding are numerous. For example, understanding European identity can directly impact policy concessions in the European Council and in the Parliament. When trying to build a qualified majority of Member States’ votes in the Council and EP, states must often make compromises in order to convince others to join their side. On policies that are salient to a Member State’s public, policy concessions are targeted toward mass opinion. For this reason, it is necessary to know the make-up of a Member State’s constituency: who is pro-European and who is not. In addition, one must know the influence each European identity type has within a Member State’s population. If the segment of the population represented by an identity type is insignificant, then it may be futile to sway their opinion. Conversely, if an identity type’s proportion of the population is momentous, then an attempt must be made to appease Europeans having that identity type.

In order to assess the influence of each Member State’s identity types in both the Council and EP, their votes have been weighted according to each type’s percentage of a Member State’s population, the votes needed for a qualified majority (QMV), and the Member State’s weighted vote in each political institution. The formula is as follows:

**Council**

$$\frac{\text{# of respondents with identity type}}{\text{total respondents in Member State}} \times \frac{\text{total votes in Council (87)}}{\text{# of votes for QMV (62)}} \times \text{Member State’s weighted vote}$$

**Parliament**

$$\frac{\text{# of respondents with identity type}}{\text{total respondents in Member State}} \times \frac{\text{total votes in EP (626)}}{\text{# of votes for QMV (314)}} \times \text{Member State’s # of votes}$$
The bar graphs reveal that in many Member States, the dual and non-identifiers represent a greater number of weighted votes than the other three identities. In Germany, for example, the non-identifier accounts for over 5.5 votes while the other member of its camp, the nationalist, has less than 2 votes in the Council. Thus, to appease the anti-EU camp in Germany, it is the non-identifier who must be targeted and not the nationalist.
Similar judgments can be made about each of the other Member States and about the graph representing votes in the EP (graph 5.3). The graphs portray the significant roles that dual and non-identifiers play in the EU decision-making process. Their weighty influences in the Council and EP force policy-makers to take their opinions into account when pursuing the further widening and deepening of the EU.
CONCLUSION

The evidence suggests that postmodernism has had a tremendous impact on the development of European political institutions and identities in the mass public. Two postmodern identities, a dual and a non-identifier, exist alongside the Europeanist and the nationalist in the Member States of the European Union. The non-identifier often shows even greater support for the nation than the national identifier does. The dual identifier oscillates between camps often showing even greater support for the EU than the european identifier when favoring a European identity.

Recognizing the presence of these postmodern identities is crucial for coalition building in the Council. As Heads of State make concessions to their fellow Council members in order to obtain the qualified majority necessary to pass policies, they must know the composition of each Member State's population. The most effective compromises will target the group of individuals within a Member State that has the greatest impact on that state's policy decisions. As the data suggests, it is the dual and the non-identifiers who represent the greatest number of weighted votes in Council.

Further research may explore the affect of these five identity types on specific issue domains and across Member States. Why are dual identifiers more supportive of European integration than European identifiers on issues of enlargement, sovereignty, protection, and reform? Why are non-identifiers least supportive on issues of enlargement, protection, and reform? Is there a quality inherent in these policies that encourages a strong positive response from constructive postmodernists and a strong
negative response from cynical postmodernists. Why does Germany have such a high percentage of non-identifiers in its population while Spain is comprised of a large group of dual identifiers? Additionally, interesting trends have been discovered regarding Member States' support for EU enlargement. It appears that European identifiers in the original six states of the European Coal and Steel Community are unexpectedly insupportive of enlargement compared to those states that joined the European Community at a later date. Other similar trends may be found by conducting further research based on the five identity types of the European Union.

The results of this Eurobarometer data analysis offer a more precise description of identities within the European Union. They suggest that the dual and the non-identifier, which are unique additions to political theory, are in fact the most critical opponents and valiant supporters of EU policy. Further exploration of these identity types and the unique characterization of the EU as a postmodern political institution may offer insights into the continued deepening and widening of the Union and could contribute to an additional 50 years of peace in Europe.
REFERENCES


