JORDAN IN TRANSITION:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL CODES FOR

KING HUSSEIN I AND KING ABDULLAH II

A Senior Honors Thesis

by

DWAIN LELAND SPARLING

Submitted to the Office of Honors Programs
& Academic Scholarships
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE
RESEARCH FELLOWS

April 2001

Group: Economics and Political Science

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Approved as to style and content by:

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ABSTRACT

Jordan in Transition:

A Comparative Analysis of Operational Codes for

King Hussein I and King Abdullah II. (April 2001)

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After King Abdullah II inherited the throne from King Hussein I at a very critical

transition point in 1999, it became necessary for a study to rigorously examine the

fundamental characteristics of each leaders' outlooks on the political realm.

Additionally, it created a unique opportunity to gauge the effects of a leadership

transition period on a leader's policy preferences, as well as the changes in direction for

future political action in the region. This study utilized the Verbs In Context System to

code six randomly selected texts from each leader to construct operational code indices

for both Hussein and Abdullah during two time periods: continuous, sustained periods of

leadership, and the year of rule either before or after the transition point (depending on

which leaderis being considered). Mean values for each leader were computed on nine

operational code indices spanning both philosophical and instrumental beliefs: Nature of

the Political Universe, Realization of Political Values, Predictability of Others, Control

over Historical Development, Role of Chance, Approach to Goals, Pursuit of Goals,

Timing of Action, and Utility of Means. Two-factor ANOVA tests checked for variation

over time with respect to leader, time period, and any possible interaction between these factors. The resulting data sets show that, barring some differences in relation to the negative characterization of the political universe, both Hussein and Abdullah possessed a propensity toward very cooperative means in approaching the political arena. These operational codes did not vary across time and the leaders did not differ much from each other in their characterization of and action in the political environment. Overall, Hussein and Abdullah tested to be very similar to each other in operational codes, and we can expect Abullah to pursue the policies that were begun by Hussein in an effort to preserve the moderate stance that the nation has historically taken with respect to the Middle East peace process.

To Amanda Darlene Sparling,

A beautiful and talented young woman

I am proud to have as a sister.

I love you, Amanda.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

The geography and politics of the nation of Jordan have placed this seemingly small, inconspicuous country within a context that is central to the movement and direction of the Middle East peace process. The recent transition of leadership to King Abdullah II upon King Hussein's death in 1999 makes it a necessity to assess the critical stances that the new leadership takes with respect to reaching any mutually-acceptable agreement with Israel and its other surrounding Arab nations. In addition, it is important to look at the effects of what foreign policy stances have been and will be inherited or rejected by this new leadership, and how this inheritance or rejection will influence Jordan's role in the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict. To date, qualitative studies have found that the "experiences of the 1990's have left Jordan…with the [new] capacity to articulate its preferences [to the international arena]" (Lynch, 1999, p. 270), leaving open important questions that little or no *quantitative* research has attempted to answer.

Although there are many ways to approach questions concerning the use of political power by national leaders, the single fact remains that it is necessary to concentrate on the decision-maker as an individual with a unique and personal approach to the political arena. Furthermore, it is imperative that research on such an intangible and fluid concept as that of the human psyche make its measurements via empirical evidence and a methodology that is replicable and robust. One such research methodology which has proven itself valuable and accurate in both political science and behavioral science circles is operational code analysis using the Verbs In Context

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This thesis follows the style and format of *Political Psychology*.

System. The VICS protocol, as developed by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), concentrates on the verbs used by political leaders in various forms of communication as the source of information regarding a leader's fundamental beliefs. This quantitative data is then used in this analysis to construct profiles of how Hussein I and Abdullah II characterize political actors and utilize their power both within and outside of the boundaries of Jordan. Each leader is then analyzed under two-factor ANOVA and simple effects tests in order to assess the sources of variation in operational codes across time. To summarize, the general objective of this research is to comparatively investigate to what extent Jordan's transition from King Hussein I to King Abdullah II has affected the nation's approach to the Middle East peace process, as well as how it addresses its own domestic needs.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Jordan and Israel Before the Treaty

The conflict in the Middle East, which is embodied by the contest of the Arabs and the Israelis over the lands of Palestine, has been a fact of life for the inhabitants of the region for centuries. The relatively recent return of Jews from across the world to build the state of Israel in 1948 made the conflict a salient matter for the modern world. It was a moment in the annals of history when a regional collection of many independent nation-states formed identities and perspectives which to this day remain critical to the political dynamics of Arab-Israeli relations. Shortly after this turning point, the relatively small and centrally-located nation of Jordan saw a new, young leader ascend to the throne of its constitutional, hereditary monarchy. King Hussein I came to power in an age when Arab attitudes toward the state of Israel were both bitter and potent, and saw the loss of the strategic portion of land known as the West Bank to Israel during the Six Day War of 1967. He also became the new protector of the millions of Palestinian refugees that were displaced from their land in Palestine when Israel took possession of it in 1948, instantaneously acquiring the need to rule his own Jordanian subjects and to strike a delicate balance in meeting the needs of an uprooted and unsettled Palestinian constituency.

Hussein proved to be a valuable leader that directed his nation through violent times and constant dissension that existed even within his own borders. Nationalist ideologies differed between the Palestinians and the Jordanians, leading to bloody uprisings in 1970 and 1971. He survived a coup attempt in 1957 and numerous attempts

on his life by various factions, despite his attempts to quell tensions among his people. Although he encountered troubles of this sort, his authority and political legitimacy were not widely questioned, as was the case with most of the leaders in Arab countries at the time. Overall, Hussein was a very successful leader that served as a stabilizing factor in the equation of Middle Eastern relations, leading to a peace treaty that effectively ended a 50-year state of war with Israel in 1994.

Jordanian Leadership Since 1994

This study begins its comparative analysis of leaders at a definitive point in the timeline of the peace process with Israel: July 26, 1994. On this day, Israel and Jordan entered into The Washington Agreement, which "jointly reaffirmed the five underlying principles of their understanding on an Agreed Common Agenda designed to reach the goal of a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between the Arab States and the Palestinians, with Israel" (Laqueur, 1995, p. 655). This agreement was the predecessor to the historic Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in October of the same year, which explicitly ended the state of war between the two nations. In addition, Jordan's internal politics of the 1990's were greatly influenced by Hussein's foreign policies and the almost amiable disposition toward Israel that led to their peace treaty. This cooling of hostilities continued to propel Jordan in the direction it had always been by Hussein: one of moderation in the region.

The late 1990's saw the faltering health of Hussein as his body was taken over by cancer, and treatments left him weak and absent from his country for sustained periods of time. His death in 1999 saw him depart from a nation with 6.3 million constituents,

about one-quarter of which were registered Palestinian refugees. These subjects were entrusted to his heir, Abdullah II, who ascended to the throne on June 23 that same year. King Abdullah II is of particular interest to the peace process due to the fact that he is married to Queen Rania, a woman of Palestinian descent. Additionally, he seems interested in continuing the policy directions of Hussein, yet at the same time he has had little experience in domestic politics and international diplomacy. The major issues which Abdullah faces in his new position are (1) reaching a final status agreement with Israel to address the question of Palestine, (2) overcoming economic hardship and scarcity of resources, (3) improving inter-Arab relations, and (4) modernizing the Jordanian military. An immediate concern for the throne that is perhaps second only to reaching a final status agreement is ridding the region of the new *Intifada*-esque violence that has continuously flared in the Palestinian-Israeli border regions since late September of last year. Abdullah is not alone in pursuing these daunting tasks, however. The last two years have seen a younger generation of Arabs inherit the leadership of Morocco and Syria with the ascendance of King Mohammed and Bashar Assad, respectively. Crushing economic concerns and the ever-present reality of Israel are forcing them to reconsider upholding the ideological reasons for conflict their fathers held in order to reach a peace agreement that will benefit their individual domestic scenes.

METHODOLOGY

Research Objective

The transition's recency has placed this research on the forefront of deciphering the cognitive constructs of Hussein and Abdullah and placing them within the context of a comparative analysis. To date, only qualitative research has made gestures toward this end, and a more rigorous research design is called for in order to answer the unique questions that the change in leadership for Jordan has posed. Therefore, the quantitative effort of this analysis will serve to determine how the predispositions and preferences of Abdullah are similar to or different from those of Hussein, thus supporting or rejecting the qualitative data that demonstrates the seemingly high degree of similarity between these two leaders. Finally, analysis across time is required to discover if and to what extent Hussein and Abdullah were influenced by a period of continuous rule versus the year preceding and the year following the transition point, respectively.

Operational Code Analysis

At this point it is obvious that this analysis has chosen the leader as the decision unit, as it compares and contrasts Hussein and Abdullah across time. In following the "Decision tree for determining [the] ultimate decision unit" as developed by Hermann and Hermann (1989), the result for each leader was "Decision Unit is Predominant Leader." The definition for "predominant leader" as explained in their study relates that "a single individual has the power to make the choice for the government." When this definition is evaluated with respect to the broad legislative and executive powers given to the monarch of Jordan, the justification for analyzing the single leader as the decision

unit is clear. Yet, although the monarchy has powers that approach the absolute mark, the parliamentary and democratic structure of Jordan's government leads the monarch to be a sensitive instrument that is open to many viewpoints, opinions, constituencies, and interests involved in making political decisions. Hermann and Hermann make room for this pragmatic type of leader within the "Predominant Leader" category (even citing Hussein as an example), yet emphasize the need for data sets that encompass more than just personality and include other information regarding environment, views of other political actors, and prediction of how other governments will act and react (1989, p. 366).

The need for examining two predominant leader decision units from a distance on the factors listed above fits nicely within the framework of the operational code analysis as constructed by George (1969). His concept of the operational code in that particular study is a defined, coherent system of beliefs that guides the decision maker in the cognitive deliberation of what available alternatives will be chosen in a given situation. This notion of a stable and coherent cognitive construct, however, was later revised by Holsti (1977) when operational code research found variation within leaders' belief systems. The new concept was of flexible states of mind that can vary within the individual as well as across time, while preserving some sense of a core (or default) state of mind. This new framework then directs attention not to the specific content of a decision maker's operational code, but rather to the propensities a decision maker has on philosophical (perception of political environment) and instrumental (exercise of political power) levels (Walker, 1998, p. 176).

The Verbs In Context System

The Verbs In Context System was developed by Walker, Schafer and Young in order to discern an "individual's 'state of mind' [as] articulated in public texts from which we infer propensities for a) diagnosing occasions for decision, b) making choices among the decision alternatives, and c) shifting among choices" (1997, pp. 5-6). As such, the source material gathered in this VICS content analysis consists of the texts of public speeches, personal correspondence, interviews, and journal articles by Hussein and Abdullah. Each text randomly selected for content analysis had to conform to a minimum length of 1,400 words and possess political content on more than one issue. In keeping with the timeframes for this study as mentioned in the Historical Overview, three eligible texts were selected at random for both leaders in two time periods for each, allowing for analysis of variation in operational codes across time:

1. July 26, 1994 – February 7, 1998: Hussein's leadership across a continuous amount of time after The Washington Agreement, which charted the course for the later Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in October.

2. February 8, 1998 – February 7, 1999: Hussein's leadership in the year leading up to his death on February 7. This year is used as the transitional time period for Hussein in the operational code analysis.

3. February 8, 1999 – February 7, 2000: Abdullah's leadership in the year following the transition point at the date of Hussein's death; this year is used as the transitional time period for Abdullah in the operational code analysis. Although Hussein was not technically a leader during the full

       year (he was enthroned in June), he had still been chosen as heir to the throne since before Hussein's death, and was already making his policy preferences known to the world.

4.   February 8, 2000 – February 1, 2001: Abdullah's leadership across a continuous amount of time after the transitional year. The ending date was the last day for gathering speeches before the coding for this time period in this study began.

A list of the texts coded in this study can be found in the Appendix, and are presented in their corresponding time categories as outlined above.

      The detailed VICS coding process used for the texts can be found as an extensively outlined method in Appendix 1 of Walker (1997, pp. 38-47). The premise for this content analysis is that the texts, as coded by this thorough process, will reflect the leader's "fundamental predispositions regarding the nature of political life" (Crichlow, 1998, p. 689). Essentially, patterns of preferences for characterizing the political arena and exercising political power will surface in the quantitative data, revealing the operational code of the speaker. The VICS method focuses on the politically-related verbs in a text, basing the operational code on the relative frequency of different types of verb attributions that are used by the speaker. Each verb construction, consisting of a subject, verb, target and context, is then coded for seven different categories: Whether

1. the subject is self or other.

2. the verb is used for action (transitive) or description (intransitive).

3. the verb is a word or a deed.

4. the entire construction is describing a positive or negative word or deed.

5. the verb category is reward (+3), promise (+2), appeal (+1), oppose (-1), threaten (-2), or punish (-3).

6. the verb tense is past, present, or future.

7. the topic/context of the verb is foreign or domestic.

Operational Code Indices

The operational code construct, as utilized in tandem with the VICS in Crichlow (1998), evaluates a leader's profile for nine different indices on two levels, each individual text being the unit of analysis. The five philosophical indices measure the speaker's characterizations of the political world, and the four instrumental indices measure the speaker's propensities toward the *use* of his political power. Each of these indices, with its corresponding formula, is described below. (The following has been adapted from Chrichlow, 1998, as the synthesis of Table I on p. 691 and the VICS Coding Formulas in the Appendix on pp. 704-5.)

The Philosophical Indices

1. Nature of the Political Universe

   Description: Range: $-1 < x < 1$. A lower (or, negative) score indicates that the speaker characterizes his political environment to be conflictual; a higher (or, positive) score indicates that the speaker characterizes his political environment as cooperative.

   Formula: (% positive Other attributions) – (% negative Other attributions)

2. Realization of Political Values

Description: Range: $-1 < x < 1$. A lower (or, negative) score indicates that the speaker is pessimistic about achieving his goals; a higher (or, positive) score indicates that the speaker is optimistic about achieving his goals.

Formula: The mean intensity of Other, transitive, verb categories ÷ 3. The verb categories were coded as reward (+3), promise (+2), appeal (+1), oppose (-1), threaten (-2), or punish (-3).

3. Predictability of Others

Description: Range: $0 < x < 1$. A lower score indicates that the speaker sees others as highly unpredictable; a higher score indicates that the speaker sees others as highly predictable.

Formula: $1 - IQV$ (the Index of Qualitative Variation).

$IQV = [k(N^2 - \Box f^2)] \div [N^2 (k-1)]$ where k = number of categories, N = number of cases, and f^2 = sum of the squared frequencies.

The IQV is defined as "a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications" (Watson & McGraw, 1980, pp. 87-90).

4. Control over Historical Development

Description: Range: $0 < x < 1$. A lower score indicates that the speaker characterizes others as having control of events; a higher score

indicates that the speaker characterizes himself as having control of events.

Formula: (# of Self attributions) ÷ [(# of Self attributions) + (# of Other attributions)].

5.   Role of Chance

Description: Range: $0 < x < 1$. A higher score indicates that the speaker identifies chance as having a greater role in the political arena.

Formula: $1 - [$(Predictability of Others index) x (Control over Historical Development index)].

Instrumental Indices

1.   Approach to Goals

Description: Range: $-1 < x < 1$. A lower (or, negative) score indicates that the speaker tends to strategize with conflictual means; a higher (or, positive) score indicates that the speaker tends to strategize with cooperative means.

Formula: (% positive Self attributions) – (% negative Self attributions).

2.   Pursuit of Goals

Description: Range: $-1 < x < 1$. A lower (or, negative) score indicates that the speaker tends to utilize conflictual means to achieve goals; a higher (or, positive) score indicates that the speaker tends to utilize cooperative means to achieve goals.

Formula: The mean intensity of Self verb categories ÷ 3. The verb categories were coded as reward (+3), promise (+2), appeal (+1), oppose (-1), threaten (-2), or punish (-3).

3.   <u>Timing of Action</u>

Description: Range: $0 < x < 1$. A lower score indicates that the speaker seldom shifts tactical approach between cooperative and conflictual means; a higher score indicates that the speaker usually shifts tactical approach between cooperative and conflictual means.

Formula: 1 - |(% positive Self attributions) – (% negative Self attributions)|.

4.   <u>Utility of Means</u>

Description: Range: $0 < x < 1$. These are the percentages in decimal form for each verb category of Reward, Promise, Appeal, Oppose, Threaten, and Punish. The higher the percentage, the more frequent the use of the corresponding tactic in a political arena.

Formula: Percentage of each verb category in the total set of transitive verb attributions, expressed in decimal form. The verb categories were coded as reward (+3), promise (+2), appeal (+1), oppose (-1), threaten (-2), or punish (-3).

Comparative Analysis

The first set of data results gleaned from statistics gathered during the coding process will comprise a table of mean scores on the philosophical and instrumental indices for Hussein and Abdullah both during the periods of continual rule and transition,

respectively. These numbers, when placed within their corresponding ranges, will show to what degree each leader was conflictual or cooperative during each time period. A second set of data results will be extracted from the coded texts using a two-factor ANOVA (analysis of variance) test for each of the nine indices. These tests will demonstrate any sign of variation from two sources, either the Leader effect, the Time effect, or an Interaction of the two. The Leader effect tests for variation that results from how the leaders differ from each other in predisposition toward political environment, regardless of time. The Time effect tests for variation that results from how the operational codes of the leaders might change over time, without differentiating between individual leaders. The Interaction effect tests for variation that results from a combined interaction of both differences in leader and change over time. Finally, if any p-values for the Interaction effect are statistically significant (i.e., if $p < .1000$), then it will be necessary to conduct a simple effects test for the influence of Time to see if one leader may have changed over time on an index for which the other did not.

Expectations and Predictions

This comparative analysis is predicated on the fact that various informal hypotheses based on qualitative data exist concerning the similarities and/or differences between the nature of both Hussein's and Abdullah's approaches to domestic and foreign policy decisions. It is therefore necessary that this study provide a generalized set of expectations for what results the quantitative VICS and operational code framework will produce. Numerous press reports and the presentation texts contained in press releases of the General Assembly of the United Nations provide an informal base of information

which have demonstrated Abdullah's overall re-direction of Jordanian foreign policy away from the public embrace of the state of Israel that Hussein espoused (i.e., the Timing of Action index should be higher for Abdullah than for Hussein). Abdullah's policies have not been driven by peaceful co-existence with Israel as Hussein's were, yet this factor still seems to be a key element in Jordan's approach to international politics (i.e., similarity should be expected across the Approach to Goals index). Abdullah has also tended to characterize Israel as using conflictual means over the status of Jerusalem (a negative value for the Nature of the Political Universe is expected for him). He has reached out to other Arab nations for improvements in relations with each, contrasted by Hussein who had somewhat divisive relationships with other Arab nations because of his acceptance of Israel. The Role of Chance appears to dominate present-day Jordan as uncertainty of economic future looms large for Abdullah (for whom higher values on this index are expected), unlike Hussein who had expected with certainty a final status agreement with Israel by 1998 (lower values).

More formal qualitative studies corroborate the press' assessment of differences between leaders' approaches (Bronson, 2000; Robinson, 2000). They also address variation over time, emphasizing that the recent transitions in leadership should have been accompanied by turmoil and vastly differing policy preferences (as based on past experiences of Arab leadership transitions). This leads one to predict that a salient difference should exist between mean scores for the leaders' periods of transition rule and continuous rule. However, as some time had passed before these studies were conducted, each was surprised to find that every transition had been a relatively smooth

one, informing this study that no substantial difference should appear between the transitional and continual periods of rule for Hussein and Abdullah.

To summarize, this study predicts that:

1. Abdullah's higher values will appear in Realization of Political Values and Timing of Action.

2. Both leaders should show similarity in Approach to Goals.

3. Abdullah will have a low to negative number for Nature of the Political Universe.

4. Abdullah should have higher values on the Role of Chance index; Hussein, lower values.

5. Hussein will have higher mean values for the philosophical indices than will Abdullah.

6. If differences occur between the mean values for the periods of continual rule and the periods of transition, they should be slight.

7. Neither leader will score high values on the conflictual indices of the Utility of Means (i.e., the Punish, Threaten, and Oppose) because the nation has been characterized as moderate and peaceful in the Middle East conflict dynamic.

RESULTS

Data Trends and Patterns

The results of the coding of each individual text, as processed through the formulae for constructing operational code indices, were averaged to produce the mean index values presented in Table I. Perhaps the most striking feature of this data set is its lack of negative values. Only two negative values appear, and both belong to Abdullah during his year of rule after the transition. A value of (-.83) for Nature of the Political Universe shows his striking characterization of the political environment to have been very hostile. A value of (-.11) for Realization of Political Values reveals he was slightly pessimistic and felt somewhat helpless in attaining his goals. Sources for these negative values could lie in the fact that in mid-1999 Abdullah was having to deal with the existence of Islamic militants within Jordan's borders that had links to external networks and foreign regimes that were seeking to undermine his leadership. That he was an inexperienced diplomat that assumed leadership under the circumstances of a depressed economy, Arab disunity, and dissent over the 1994 peace treaty undoubtedly contributed to lower values on this index as well. As time passed, the Nature of the Political Universe value dramatically increased to a moderate score of (.13), communicating a greater ease with which Abdullah participated in the political universe. Additionally, this moderate score demonstrates that he possessed a wariness that kept him from becoming too friendly with other political actors or enemies.

Another trend which is important to note is that Hussein and Abdullah possess very similar -- in some cases identical -- values on four indices: Control over Historical

Table I. Operational Code Indices for Hussein and Abdullah During Years of Sustained Rule and Periods of Transition

	INDEX	Hussein 1990's (*n=3*)	Abdullah 2000's (*n=3*)	Hussein Transition (*n=3*)	Abdullah Transition (*n=3*)
		MEANS			
Philosophical	Nature of the Political Universe	0.42	0.13	0.08	-0.83
	Realization of Political Values	0.42	0.07	0.14	-0.11
	Predictability of Others	0.16	0.35	0.55	0.41
	Control over Historical Development	0.88	0.88	0.86	0.86
	Role of Chance	0.86	0.69	0.46	0.65
Instrumental	Approach to Goals	0.70	0.79	0.57	0.88
	Pursuit of Goals	0.41	0.38	0.30	0.62
	Timing of Action	0.30	0.21	0.43	0.12
	Utility of Means (Reward)	0.48	0.35	0.38	0.43
	Utility of Means (Promise)	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.31
	Utility of Means (Appeal)	0.30	0.45	0.43	0.10
	Utility of Means (Oppose)	0.10	0.03	0.08	0.03
	Utility of Means (Threaten)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
	Utility of Means (Punish)	0.06	0.12	0.09	0.13

Development, Utility of Means (Oppose), Utility of Means (Threaten), and Utility of Means (Punish). Both leaders clearly felt that they had great control over events (most likely an artifact of monarchical rule), and that they knew that a negative utility of means was not the most beneficial tactic to use in politics. Yet another pattern in the data shows declining values for Hussein over his continual rule in the 1990's up to the transition point in 1999. One such index is the Realization of Political Values, which decreases from (.42) to (.14), most likely a result of Hussein's failing health and inability to be a truly effective leader at that point in his life. Similarly, Abdullah saw himself as

Table II. Two-Factor ANOVA Results for the Operational Code Indices of for Hussein and Abdullah During Years of Sustained Rule and Periods of Transition

	INDEX	VARIABLE EFFECTS (Two-Factor ANOVA)					
		Leader		Time		Interaction	
		F	p	F	p	F	p
Philosophical	Nature of the Political Universe	5.58	0.0774	6.55	0.0626	1.59	0.2761
	Realization of Political Values	0.56	0.4970	0.33	0.5988	0.01	0.9109
	Predictability of Others	0.01	0.9211	0.90	0.3966	0.48	0.5250
	Control over Historical Development	0.00	1.0000	0.11	0.7533	0.00	1.0000
	Role of Chance	0.00	0.9768	0.80	0.4208	0.51	0.5165
Instrumental	Approach to Goals	0.71	0.4479	0.01	0.9194	0.25	0.6461
	Pursuit of Goals	2.08	0.2225	0.42	0.5530	3.03	0.1566
	Timing of Action	0.71	0.4479	0.01	0.9194	0.25	0.6461
	Utility of Means (Reward)	0.08	0.7937	0.02	0.9025	0.43	0.5498
	Utility of Means (Promise)	2.55	0.1856	1.34	0.3120	2.55	0.1856
	Utility of Means (Appeal)	0.55	0.5010	0.74	0.4373	3.72	0.1259
	Utility of Means (Oppose)	1.96	0.2342	0.01	0.9128	0.12	0.7440
	Utility of Means (Threaten)	1.00	0.3739	1.00	0.3739	1.00	0.3739
	Utility of Means (Punish)	0.43	0.5477	0.08	0.7926	0.02	0.8835

ineffectual at reaching goals during the transition period, as described previously by his negative score of (-.11). Last, but not least, both Hussein and Abdullah show very high values on the Approach to Goals index during both time periods, emphasizing their strong commitment to wholly cooperative means for achieving goals.

The operational code indices, as individually analyzed through two-factor analysis of variance tests, have their results displayed in Table II above. The *p*-values for

the effects of Leader, Time, and an Interaction between the two, become of primary concern when significance reaches below the (.1000) threshold. In this data set, both the Leader and Time effects were significant for the Nature of the Political Universe index. The Leader effect, with a p-value of (.0774), shows that regardless of time period, both Hussein and Abdullah fundamentally differed on their view of how friendly or hostile the political arena was. The Time effect, with a p-value of (.0626), shows the opposite: that with disregard to leader, both Hussein and Abdullah shifted their perception of a friendly political climate from lower levels during transitional periods to higher levels during periods of sustained rule. Finally, the ANOVA tests found no significant interactions between the two effects of leader and time, and therefore no simple effects tests were needed.

Discussion

In order to gain a greater understanding of how the data trends and patterns from the operational code indices work to achieve the objective this research, it is necessary to evaluate the seven expectations and predictions which were in Chapter III:

1. *Abdullah's higher values will appear in Realization of Political Values and Timing of Action.* This hypothesis was not supported by the data. These values, representing both Abdullah's optimism for future chances at reaching a goal and the frequency with which he shifted between cooperative and competitive means resulted in some of his lowest scores in the operational code (.07, -.11, and .21, .12) Hussein actually had greater Timing of Action values at (.30 and .43), meaning that he took a more

well-rounded approach to international relations by including a large and complex repertoire of action means.

2. *Both leaders should show similarity in Approach to Goals.* This hypothesis was among the strongest supported by the data, with each leader consistently scoring high values: Hussein (.70) and (.57) and Abdullah (.79) and (.88). An operational code with this feature is translated as the total commitment to a wholly cooperative approach, therefore Abdullah's higher values on this index should indicate that he is more willing to reach agreement than to perpetuate conflict in order to benefit the greater good.

3. *Abdullah will have a low to negative number for Nature of the Political Universe.* This hypothesis was in fact supported by the data, as this value turned out to be the most extreme negative value on the operational code for Abdullah as found during the transition period. Furthermore, this propensity shifted as the valence increased to a positive (.13) by the time Abdullah reached a point of sustained rule in the years 2000-2001.

4. *Abdullah should have higher values on the Role of Chance index; Hussein, lower values.* The amount of chance that Abdullah believed had control over the domain of politics remained consistently high across time at (.65) and (.69). Hussein's attribution of chance's role in politics went from a high (.86) during continual rule to a more moderate (.46) during the transition period. So while both leaders viewed the future with uncertainty of circumstance, they both felt they possessed an ability to control subsequent action and events.

5. *Hussein will have higher mean values for the philosophical indices than will Abdullah.* This hypothesis attempted to predict that Hussein had a more positive (i.e., cooperative) outlook on international politics than Abdullah, and turned out to be only slightly higher. Both leaders tended to have a relatively low positive view of a political environment that consisted of moderately stable actors and a very high ability for the self to influence control over events. Finally, each leader felt somewhat unable to completely control circumstances as the role of chance was seen as having had a great influence over occurrences in the political domain.

6. *If differences occur between the mean values for the periods of continual rule and the periods of transition, they should be slight.* The ANOVA tests of Table II helped support this hypothesis in that there was, in fact, just one slight difference between Hussein and Abdullah concerning the Nature of the Political Universe across time. The rest of the values on Table II served to demonstrate that the periods of transition were, with some small exceptions, similar to longer periods of leadership for both Hussein and Abdullah, making both leaders' predispositions constant over time and similar in nature and direction.

7. *Neither leader will score high values on the conflictual indices of the Utility of Means (i.e., the Punish, Threaten, and Oppose) because the nation has been characterized as moderate and peaceful in the Middle East conflict dynamic.* This hypothesis was overwhelmingly supported by the data in that the lowest values in the entire operational code appeared in these indices. The tendency to rely on conflictual tactics, such as opposing and threatening other political actors, that Hussein and Abdullah possessed was close to zero. There was a small trend to punish other

political actors, however this was very well-balanced by more cooperative means of supporting and rewarding.

SUMMARY

This study has attempted to determine to what extent the transition of King Hussein I to King Abdullah II has affected the nation's approach to the Middle East peace process, as well as its domestic affairs. A systematic study of comparison utilizing the operational codes of these two leaders as articulated in public texts has provided quantitative data supporting the popularly-held notion that Abdullah has demonstrated a somewhat similar thrust in his diplomatic relations with Israel and surrounding Arab nations as his father, the late King Hussein. This study also provides evidence that Abdullah will continue to stabilize the region with a moderate stance in the politics of the peace process, and that he has a vested interest in a comprehensive peace that will benefit his nation.

Additionally, several key hypotheses that have been formed on the basis of recent qualitative analysis were supported by this study. The first is that both Hussein and Abdullah shared a commitment to fulfill their goals and agendas through means which were in every way cooperative across national and ethnic lines. The second is that Abdullah had the tendency to characterize the political universe as being hostile when he first took on leadership during the transition phase, revealing the only noted point of departure from Hussein's policies that was discovered in this study. Third, the seemingly contradictory balance of each leader having attributed a large role to chance in influencing the political environment versus each leader also having felt the ability to have great control over historical development was synthesized for both Hussein and Abdullah, showing a special continuity across operational codes on an introspective

level. Fourth, the fact that, for the most part, Hussein and Abdullah did not differ in their operational codes either across time or between themselves means that the world can expect Abdullah to follow in Hussein's footsteps for taking a moderate stance in the region and for attempting to affect a comprehensive peace plan between the Arabs, Palestinians, and Israelis. Finally, both Jordanian leaders constantly chose cooperative tactics based in positive systems of reward and support, cementing Jordan's reputation as a moderate force in the region that is supportive and that understands all sides of the conflict.

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APPENDIX

1.   **July 26, 1994 – February 7, 1998**: Hussein's continuous leadership

   Speech 1:   Address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress, 26 July 1994

   Speech 2:   Address to Mo'tah University, 1 June 1996

   Speech 3:   Address to the Meeting of Arab Political Parties, 16 December
                 1996

2.   **February 8, 1998 – February 7, 1999**: Hussein's transition period

   Speech 1:   Address to Representatives of the German Media, 24 April 1998

   Speech 2:   "Embracing the Future", May-June 1998 (an article in *Middle East
                 Insight* that was based on an interview with Hussein)

   Speech 3:   Address to the Nation of Jordan, 16 January 1999

3.   **February 8, 1999 – February 7, 2000**: Abdullah's transition period

   Speech 1:   "CNN WorldView: King Abdullah of Jordan Reflects on His and
                 Jordan's Future", 3 May 1999 (interview)

   Speech 2:   Royal Crown Address, 1 November 1999

   Speech 3:   Speech to the World Economic Forum, 30 January 2000

4.   **February 8, 2000 – February 1, 2001**: Abdullah's continuous leadership

   Speech 1:   Speech at the CNN World Report Conference, 2 June 2000

   Speech 2:   Addess to the Fourth Session of the Thirteenth Jordanian
                 Parliament, 25 November 2000

   Speech 3:   "Prospects for Moving Forward", Winter 2000 (Abdullah II 2000)

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