ACTING ALONE: U.S. UNILATERAL USES OF FORCE, MILITARY REVOLUTIONS, AND HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY

A Dissertation

by

BRADLEY FLORIAN PODLISKA

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2007

Major Subject: Political Science
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Approved by:

Chair of Committee, Committee Members, Head of Department, Christopher M. Sprecher Michael C. Desch Alex Mintz Alexander C. Pacek Patricia Hurley

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ABSTRACT


Bradley Florian Podliska, B.A. with honors, University of Wisconsin – Madison; M.A., Georgetown University

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Christopher M. Sprecher

The premise of this dissertation is straight-forward – the U.S., as hegemon, acts unilaterally given the power disparity between it and the rest of the world. In solving the puzzle of why presidents make the “wrong” decision to act alone, I organize international conflict literature along traditional lines – international and domestic explanations – and use Gilpin’s (1981) hegemonic stability theory to test a theory of unilateral use of force decision making. In order to overcome a lack of scientific study on unilateralism, I devise a definition and coding rules for unilateral use of force, develop a sequential model of presidential use of force decision making, and construct a new, alternative measure of military power, a Composite Indicator of Military Revolutions (CIMR). I then use three methods – a statistical test with a heckman probit model, an experiment, and case studies – to test U.S. crisis behavior since 1937. I find that presidents are realists and make an expected utility calculation to act unilaterally or multilaterally after their decision to use force. The unilateral decision, in particular, positively correlates with a wide military gap vis-à-vis an opponent, an opponent located in the Western hemisphere, and a national security threat.
DEDICATION

For my parents and Katy
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents. Always patient and never critical, I owe my parents, Richard and Zee Ann Podliska, a debt of gratitude and appreciation that goes beyond the academic nature of this dissertation. I also appreciate the love and support of my brother, Richard, and sisters, Stephanie and Meghan.

I am grateful for the guidance, patience, and friendship of Dr. Christopher Sprecher. I am similarly grateful to Drs. Alex Mintz, Alexander Pacek, and Michael Desch for their time, intellectual assistance, and service. I would also like to thank Drs. Michael Koch, Nehemia Geva, Sarah Fulton, and Shuhei Kurizaki for their service to this project, namely for offering advice at the IR Works-in-Progress seminar, for allowing me to borrow an undergraduate class (or two) for an experiment, and for their informal, but productive, advice at random points throughout the process.

For their friendship, tolerance in listening to countless claims of “Reagan winning the Cold War,” and for agreeing to get “bogged down” as I discuss the particulars of my dissertation, I would like to thank Jose Villalobos, Benjamin Freeman, Laron Williams, Justin Vaughn, Cigdem Sirin, and Doug Kuberski. I also extend this thanks to friends that go back to my Wisconsin and Washington days – Dr. David McDonald, Dr. Bernard Finel, Howard Liao, Jared Wold, Susie Rynell, Adam Clampitt, and Kirk Saylor.

Lastly, and most importantly, I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Katy, a loving companion of extraordinary patience, kindness, intellect, and with whom I will always depend on for happiness and success. I love her and a cat named Mrs. Grant, for which life is never about data sets, literature reviews, or the completion of an academic project.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Puzzle and Research Question

“Well actually, he forgot Poland,” retorted President George W. Bush to Senator John Kerry during the first presidential election debate on September 30, 2004. Kerry was criticizing the 2003 Iraq invasion, saying the U.S. had invaded with a “grand coalition” of three countries – the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, and the U.S. ¹ The debate exchange signaled the perceived unpopularity of unilateral uses of force.

So, if acting unilaterally is the unpopular position to take in a foreign policy crisis, why do presidents make such an “unwise” decision as using unilateral force in the first place? A president, in deciding to use military force, is making a calculation that can make or break his presidency. His decision affects thousands of lives, costs millions (or even billions) of dollars, enhances or harms U.S. world standing, and perhaps most personally important to a president, his electoral success may depend on a successful outcome (Smith 1998, 623; Goemans 2000, 577; Mintz and Geva 1997, 83; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Downs 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999a, 1999b, 2004).

The decision to act unilaterally is especially surprising given the unparalleled success of the multilateral campaign of the 1991 Gulf War, in which President George H.W.

Bush was able to claim the benefits of multilateralism – legitimacy, burden-sharing, and capability aggregation. To many experts, the 1991 Gulf War would not have been fought without a “comprehensive, firm, and united” United Nations (UN) Security Council (Ruggie 1992, 564). The 1991 Gulf War, demonstrated that “international support, cooperation, and legitimacy are essential for any effective use of force by the United States” (Stepanova 2003, 182).

So, why would any president, whether Republican or Democrat, decide to enter or respond to a crisis with unilateral U.S. military force, when the perceived “right” decision is to approach the crisis multilaterally and use allies?

The answer to the puzzle is based on a simple explanation – hegemonic power. The U.S., as hegemon, possesses the strength to use unilateral military force, and the disparity in military power between the U.S. and other nations serves as a strong incentive for a president to act unilaterally. Unilateralism can be viewed as a superior choice given that the perceived benefits of multilateralism – legitimacy, burden-sharing, and reciprocity – are of little value to a president. Problems of inaction and collaboration further plague multilateralism, making the decision to act unilaterally even more likely.

In this dissertation, I argue that the president’s unilateral decision to use force follows a sequential process. While the first decision, whether or not to use force, has been exhaustively examined, I argue that an expected utility calculation of America’s dominance in terms of military revolutions defines the second decision on whether to use unilateral force. I focus this study on presidential decision making and U.S. uses of
force from 1937 to 1995, tracing the decision in each instance from the threat stage to the final outcome. I argue that hegemonic stability theory explains when the U.S. will use force unilaterally. This assumes the U.S. (i.e., the hegemon) uses its power to provide and maintain the public good of international order and security (see Gilpin 1981).

Problems with Current Research

In studying American unilateral uses of force, the most significant problem I encounter is the assumption that military unilateralism is perceived to be the “wrong” decision. Numerous books detail the “soft imperialism” of America and its “unsafe” unilateral power (Prestowitz 2003, 6, 272; Beinart 2006; McNamara and Blight 2001). Policy experts call upon America to reclaim the idealistic “ghost” of its multilateral past, to voluntarily reduce its military power, and to work with international institutions (Prestowitz 2003, 283; Rivkin and Casey 2006, 38; Beinart 2006).

The experts’ perception is that for most of its history the U.S. favored a unilateral foreign policy designed to protect and promote its own interests. But, there was one brief moment at the end of World War II in which the U.S. adhered to “congenial” multilateral interests and established a world order based on “a consensus of the community of nations” (Prestowitz 2003, 174). Multilateralism faded with the start of the Cold War, when Truman (as well as his successors), chose an anti-totalitarian path instead of an anti-imperialism one (Beinart 2006; Prestowitz 2003). The end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War signaled a second round of multilateralism for America. Unfortunately, this post-Cold War dream of multilateralism faded, as an American
“hyperpower” saw little need for multilateral action (Attanasio 2004, 19; Cockayne and Malone 2006, 123).\(^2\) Unilateralism would become especially pronounced in a post-9/11 world (Ikenberry 2003, 533).

Academics have been severe in their criticism of this unilateral history (see Alvarez 2000; Pellet 2000; Wedgwood 1999; Krisch 1999; Malone and Khong 2003b, 2003c; Brooks and Wohlfirth 2005). Assuming unilateralism is the wrong choice to make, scholars tend to operate on the condition that presidents, Congress, and the public prefer multilateral action (Ruggie 1992, 1996; Ikenberry 2001, 2003).\(^3\) The literature states that Democratic, and even most Republican presidents (with the possible exception of President Reagan) are proponents of the UN and its multilateral actions (Rockman 2000, 141). As such, research focuses on examining the propensity for multilateralism (Corbetta and Dixon 2004; Tago 2005).

These assumptions are problematic. There have been no ideal periods of multilateralism in U.S. history, and all presidents, whether Democrat or Republican, act unilaterally a majority of the time. Table 1.1 is a cursory frequency count of three crisis data sets that demonstrates presidents are unilateralists. Tago (2005) created a dataset – U.S. Use of Force Approach Dataset (USUFAD) – to code unilateral, full multilateral, and operational multilateral uses of force from 1948 to 1998. Presidents have used force 212 times, but only 45 of these cases were multilateral (Tago 2005, 585, 599-603).

Using my own coding of unilateral/multilateral actions, I coded two data sets, the

\(^2\) French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine first used the term, “hyperpower,” to label America’s simultaneous dominance in the military, economic, monetary, technological, and cultural realms (Patrick 2002, 14).

\(^3\) Notably though, Holsti (1998) finds that post-Cold War Republicans (Congress members, elites, and party supporters) are more willing to favor the U.S. acting unilaterally.
Fordham and Sarver (2001) U.S. Uses of Force data set and the Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) International Crisis Behavior (ICB2) data set and find that presidents have faced 158 crises from 1937 to 1995 (U.S. Uses of Force data set) and 64 crises (ICB2 dataset) from 1937 to 2002, but acted multilaterally in only 64 of the cases and 36 of the cases respectively.\(^4\)

\[\text{Table 1.1: Frequency Count of Unilateral-Multilateral Uses of Force}\]

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<td>212</td>
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Broken into time periods, there does not appear to be idealistic periods of American multilateralism (Tucker 1999, 16; Holloway 2000). The fact is presidents, whether in 1948 or in 2003, tend to act unilaterally. A frequency count of the data affirms this unilateralist perspective: the U.S. acts unilaterally and when it does act multilaterally,

\(^4\) Coding rules are detailed in Chapter IV.
through such organizations as the UN and NATO, those organizations are only effective when the U.S. takes them seriously and leads them (Bolton 2000, 66; Maynes 2000, 31).

The assumptions that presidents are multilateralists and that there have been ideal, multilateral periods in American foreign policy are not the only problems plaguing unilateral-multilateral research. The biggest shortcoming of current research may be a failure to scientifically study unilateralism at all. Scholars emphasize a unilateral dependent variable, but few, if any studies, have directly addressed the issue of a presidential unilateral decision (Jentleson and Britton 1998; Kull 1995-1996, 2001; Tago 2005). Instead, researchers, without regard to any sort of scientific testing, issue contradictory proclamations: some argue that presidents follow public demands and use unilateral force, while others find that presidents lead and act unilaterally in defiance of Americans’ preference for multilateral collective security (RFD 1969; Franck and Rodley 1973; Haass 1994; Richman 1993, 1996; Kull 2001; Rockman 2000).

A second problem with current research is a failure to adequately identify why the U.S. does not act multilaterally. The U.S., both following World War II and now in a post-Cold War world, is so dominant that it has few incentives to burden itself with multilateral rules and institutions (Ikenberry 2003, 544; Jia 2003, 204-205). Presidents simply elect to enter into multilateral agreements as they wish. In a post-1945 order, the U.S. was dominant in East Asia yet had little interest in the region. It was able to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, and other states without forgoing policy autonomy. Europe was a different story, in which the U.S. had to bargain and agree to institutional restraints in order to form a NATO security pact.
(Ikenberry 2002, 129-130; 2003, 536). In a post-Cold War world, the U.S. faces not a European situation, but an East Asian scenario, in which it can set the terms of agreements (Ikenberry 2002, 130-131; 2003, 539).

Is this a bad thing? The assumption is that the consensus of as many as 192 countries (UN member countries) or 193 countries (State Department-recognized countries) is better than the action of one country.\(^5\) But, the majority consensus is not always correct. It often represents the product of negotiation, watering down an agreement to the least common denominator; so, that the resulting pronouncement or call to action simply lacks coherence (Bodansky 2000, 345).

Presidents have legitimate reasons to be skeptical of multilateralism. There are problems of legitimacy, reciprocity, burden-sharing, and inaction. As Maynes (2000) writes, “For many, a commitment to multilateralism is only another way to decide not to act…” (31). Mobilizing governments to act in concert on one operational plan is an extremely difficult endeavor. Hegemons bear the burdens of the world, and even when they organize a multilateral effort around a clear goal, they must organize, persuade, lead, and bear responsibility for less powerful allies. The 1991 Gulf War is a prime example. The reason for fighting the 1991 Gulf War – restoring Kuwait’s sovereignty – was a universally-accepted principle (Maynes 2000, 31). Yet, it still took President George H.W. Bush months of diplomatic haggling to organize a multilateral effort.

Even multilateral security arrangements, such as NATO, that are designed to spread the

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\(^5\) The one country difference is the Vatican City, an independent but non-UN member country. Both the UN and the U.S. do not recognize arguably the 194th country, the Republic of China or Taiwan. See a list of UN member countries at http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html and a list of State Department-recognized countries at http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm.
costs and burdens have been “distinctly nonmultilateral” with the U.S. having most of the decision making power and responsibility (Weber 1992, 633; Clement 2003, 399).

A third problem is whether American military power explains a president’s unilateral decision. A president’s decision to engage in war is a political act and not one driven by a military technological advantage (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004, 364; Lieber 2005, 152-153). But, power, or the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do, defines a realpolitik system, and presidents possess a lot of power (Dahl 1961). Whether deciding to act alone or lead a multilateral operation, presidents can rely on a military that has overwhelming, unmatched power and is able to win conflicts with minimal costs. This military has superior technology, training, skills, and weapons vis-à-vis any adversary (see the Bush (2002) National Security Strategy). 6 There have been other hegemonic military powers, but the U.S. possesses a historically rare “total package” of the world’s best army in terms of lethality, technological competence, and ability to project force globally (Thompson 2006, 14; Prestowitz 2003, 27; Ikenberry 2003, 538; Maynes 2000, 36).

The power disparity between the U.S. and the rest of the world reduces incentives to act multilaterally (Ikenberry 2003, 537). Even when the U.S. does work through multilateral organizations, such as NATO, American technological superiority grants its unilateral power to define operations in its national interest (Clement 2003, 399). Minimal casualties and superior military capabilities are both necessary conditions for a president’s decision to use force, and with America’s embrace of military revolutions,

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presidents can achieve unilateral military victory in minimal time and at minimal cost with overwhelming strategic and tactical advantages against an adversary (Luttwak 1995, 121; Kamienski 2003, 2; Jia 2003, 204). This overwhelming strength in military power may offer a key piece in solving the puzzle of why a president decides to use unilateral force.

As a note, this dissertation does not propose to answer every nuance of the multilateral-unilateral foreign policy debate. This is a debate that covers a broad swath of topics – legal-institutional arrangements, structural-normative perspectives, and offense-defense theory. The specifics of these topics can range from rejection of international conventions (e.g., Kyoto Protocol and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty) to complex socioeconomic World Trade Organization (WTO) issues and even to payment of UN dues (see Smith 2000). It does not focus on the “soft power” of the U.S., in which the U.S. projects its power through a cultural and ideological appeal. It does not even address the “hard power” of America’s economic might (see Nye 1999). Instead, this dissertation concentrates on the explanatory factors of a president’s decision to use unilateral force.

 Contributions of This Study

To resolve the prevailing problems of current research and fully explain a president’s unilateral use of force decision, I examine three questions pertinent to the study of U.S. unilateral uses of force:

1. Why does a president make a unilateral use of force decision?
2. Should a president’s unilateral decision be viewed as a separate and distinct decision from his use of force decision?
3. Do international factors, such U.S. military power vis-à-vis an adversary, offer the greatest explanatory power for a unilateral decision?

This dissertation is unique in that it offers a rare, if not unprecedented, scientific explanation of unilateral use of force decision making. In doing so, it overcomes three major problems in the study of conflict and decision making. First, it expands studies beyond the traditional use of force dependent variable to a type of force used (unilateral or multilateral) dependent variable. In doing so, it offers a definition of unilateral use of force – the U.S. acting alone without any military ally or international political support. Policy experts, legal scholars, and academics offer wide-ranging operational definitions of multilateralism from UN authorization to two states acting in concert, but a definition of unilateralism is often overlooked or assumed to be not multilateralism.

Secondly (and related to the first contribution), studies on presidential decision making have exhaustively examined an executive’s decision vis-à-vis a domestic audience (see Leeds and Davis 1997; Fearon 1994; DeRouen 1995, 2000; Tago 2005) and vis-à-vis relative military capabilities (see Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997; Morrow 1989; Kugler and Lemke 1996, 2000; Maoz 1983). However, these standard explanations have failed to model a president’s decisions as a sequential process, which is at odds with significant findings in international relations research that explains crisis escalation as a “series of steps” rising from security issues and leading up to war (Vasquez 1993, 2000, 2004; Singer 1980; Reed 2000; Ruggie 1992). I theorize the use of force decision as a series of steps involving two situations: the first is a
decision to use force and the second is a decision on how to use force (either unilaterally or multilaterally). I concentrate on the second decision.

Third, I build on the previous findings that the traditional measure of military capability (the COW Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) index) does not necessarily correlate with a unilateral-multilateral action (Corbetta and Dixon 2004, 11; Biddle 2004, 20-21). Instead, I surmise that a Composite Indicator of Military Revolutions (CIMR) index offers a second alternative measure of power capability and explains unilateral uses of force. The CIMR index is based on three measures of military power – preponderance, technology, and force employment – and I argue that the greater the gap in CIMR index score between the U.S. and an opponent, the greater the likelihood of a president deciding to use unilateral force.  

**Methodological Strategy: Statistical, Experimental, and Case Studies**

In order to address these concerns and to test my adaptation of hegemonic stability theory, I use three methods to determine why a president makes a unilateral decision. In particular, I use statistics, an experiment, and case studies to test my theory and my main explanatory factor – military power – and whether this impacts a president’s decision making. Quantitative analysis allows generalizability of my theory. I use an experiment for robustness and to better understand how crisis triggers may impact the explanatory factor. The process-tracing method of the case studies reveals that the military power factor has strong explanatory power.

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7 I also test the marginal effects of these three measures, as well as the effect of my other explanatory and control variables, to determine how much these factors are impacting a president’s use of force and unilateral use of force decisions.
Sound scientific inquiry requires sound methods, and it is the goal of this dissertation to use these three methods to have a better scientific understanding of why a president makes a unilateral use of force decision. My goal is to produce valid inferences about a president’s decision and to explain and predict a president’s unilateral decision. While each method has its strengths and weaknesses, all of the methods can effectively be used to put forth a new paradigm of understanding why a president’s unilateral decision may not be as “unwise” as commonly assumed (see Kuhn 1970).

*Statistical Tests: Generalizability of President’s Unilateral Use of Force Decision*

If generalizability and parsimony are the goal of social science research, then using the statistical method with its variable control, generalizable findings, and avoidance of overdetermination allows me to reach that goal (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 22-23, 34; Lijphart 1975, 165, 172). In examining a large number of uses of force over a long temporal span, I am able to draw generalizations and avoid any of the possible selection bias problems of relying on a small number of cases (Coppedge 1999, 465). Moreover, I use an expected utility decision strategy with the rules and methods of statistical analysis to establish a causal relationship between a crisis event and president’s decision to act unilaterally.

The quantitative method may have problems of oversimplification, whole-nation bias, and random sampling and validity, and I must control for these shortcomings with my case study and experimental methods. But, it allows me to model a president’s decision theoretically and to link it to the empirical world with scientific tests (Lijphart 1975, 166-171; Frendreis 1983, 258-259; Ragin 1987, 16). Moreover, I contribute to a
scientific understanding of a president’s unilateral decision in offering a new operational
definition of unilateralism, a new model of a president’s sequential decision, and a new
test of military power.

Experiment: Causal Analysis of a President’s Unilateral Use of Force Decision

While experimentation remains an alternative methodology in political science
research, it is a valuable methodological tool in terms of reliability and validity and in
reducing the impact of bias (McDermott 2002a, 33-35). The experiment in this
dissertation can be used to explain (i.e., causal analysis) and predict why a president
makes a unilateral decision (McDermott 2002b, 326). An experiment with its controls
and precise measurement allows me to determine whether I have correctly specified my
theoretical model with my statistical tests (McDermott 2002a, 39-40). While using
college students as subjects in my experiment may be an unrepresentative subject pool
and calls into question the generalizability of the study, it does add to the robustness of
the dissertation results (Mook 1983, Sears 1986). As one of the three methods used in
this dissertation, it fully complements the scientific inquiry of this dissertation.

Historical Cases: Accuracy of President’s Unilateral Use of Force Decision

A president’s decision to use unilateral force involves a complex pattern of factors
that may not be adequately captured with quantitative analysis. But, in order to
understand the president’s decision, I must test the main explanatory factor of a
president’s unilateral decision – military power – with a random assortment of historical
cases. Starting with case studies, I am able to perform a test of my adaptation of
hegemonic stability theory (Collier 1991). While generalizability is sacrificed in this
scientific pursuit, accuracy is achieved in understanding a set of “particulars” (e.g., individual crises, historical context, president’s decision making style, etc…) that do not lend themselves easily to generalizations (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 17; King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 35).

Historical cases are interwoven throughout the dissertation and the cases of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Panama invasion, and the 1991 Gulf War are included as a separate chapter to offer a more accurate, nuanced explanation of the other two methods – statistical and experimental. In using case studies, I make this dissertation available to a wider range of audience, an audience that may not care to understand the world in mathematical terms but rather as a world of unique, to be intensely studied empirical events. Case studies also allow me to complement the quantitative aspects of this dissertation in using an evidence-oriented strategy to describe complex social phenomenon (Gerring 2004, 342; Ragin 1987, 53).

**Plan of the Dissertation**

The following section outlines the plan of the dissertation.

*Chapter II*

In the second chapter, I begin with review of the state of the unilateral-multilateral debate. I list the criticisms of unilateralism – burden-sharing, legitimacy, and U.S. ability to overcome any collaboration or coordination problems – that are largely based on domestic factors. Then, I list the international-based criticisms of multilateralism – problems of burden-sharing, legitimacy, inaction, collaboration and coordination, and reciprocity. The evidence favors an international, unilateral approach, but it suffers from
some significant conceptual flaws. The first flaw is a problem of definition with researchers following the example of the 2004 presidential debate and arguing over what constitutes unilateral and multilateral uses of force. The second major flaw is a methodological one. Researchers assume multilateralism is the ideal choice, but fail to account for symbolic multilateral action and domestic political processes and institutions.

To reconcile the conceptual flaws of current unilateral-multilateral research, I choose the research path less traveled. I build a new conceptual framework of why a president uses unilateral force based on hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability theory is ideal given that it is a theory of action and prescribes how the U.S., as hegemon, maintains the status quo.

Chapter III

In the third chapter, I put forth this new theory of unilateral use of force decision making. I operationalize hegemonic stability theory as a sequential, expected utility decision model. While the first decision, whether to use force, has been widely-examined, the second decision of whether to use unilateral or multilateral force has not been so thoroughly studied. I list the factors of the first decision – political, congressional involvement, and public opinion – and then using public opinion, I examine whether domestic factors can explain a president’s unilateral decision.

For the second decision, I cite military power and situational factors as the main explanatory factors in a president’s unilateral use of force decision. I organize military power, along preponderance, technology, and force employment lines, and further
conceptualize power using a military revolution paradigm. I organize situational factors into crisis triggers (national security, humanitarian, and regime change) and U.S. enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine (i.e., coding countries located in the Western hemisphere).

Chapter IV

In the fourth chapter, I offer my research design. First, using arguments from Chapters II and III, I formulate hypotheses that propose a president will use force unilaterally as a military gap widens vis-à-vis an opponent, if the opponent nation is in the Western hemisphere, and if the crisis is a national security threat. Second, I detail the two main data sets I use to identify the crisis dyads and construct the use of force dependent variable. Third, I resolve problems with the prevailing operational definitions of unilateral and multilateralism and develop original coding rules to construct the unilateral use of force dependent variable. Fourth, I advance the notion that traditional measures of military power and Biddle’s (2004) military revolution analysis may not provide an adequate explanation of how a president measures the strength of the U.S. military vis-à-vis an opponent. So, I construct a CIMR index, based on measures of preponderance, technology, and force employment, and use it to calculate the gap in military revolution between the U.S. and its adversary.

I conclude the chapter with a listing of the remaining situational factors—Monroe Doctrine, national security, regime change, and humanitarian variables—and control variables. The control variables are based on domestic, international, and target characteristic explanations and are as follows: president’s approval rating, public
support for force, misery index, divided government, Republican or Democrat president, initiator, Cold War, rival, opponent regime type, and alliance.

Chapter V

In the fifth chapter, I conduct my statistical tests. A key component of my dissertation is the belief that a president’s unilateral decision follows a sequential process. Presidents are more concerned about international factors in making a unilateral decision and make an expected utility calculation based on military power and the crisis situation. To operationalize this conceptual framework, I use a heckman probit model.

I first test the domestic, target characteristics, and international variables using two separate probit models. Next, I test my unified model and find that a president’s decision making process is sequential: a president first makes the decision to use force and then makes the decision to use unilateral force. The decision to use force does not does not seem to be correlated with domestic factors, but rather, it is positively correlated with a target being a rival or being in an alliance. The decision to use unilateral force is positively correlated with an opponent not employing its forces based on the appropriate military revolution, lagging behind in terms of military technology, being located in the Western hemisphere, or posing a national security threat.

Chapter VI

In the sixth chapter, I use an experiment method to further add to the robustness of my findings. It offers an explanation (i.e., causal analysis) of why a unilateral decision is made (McDermott 2002b, 326). The experiment tests the crisis triggers explained in
Chapter III to determine if and why the crisis trigger is important to a president’s unilateral decision. In opening up the black box of realism, I argue that presidents do not blindly make just a military capability calculation, but also calculate the stakes involved in a crisis. The more severe the crisis, the more likely a president is to make a unilateral decision. Subjects making a unilateral decision seemed to be more confident in their decision, believed the crises less dangerous, and perceived higher public support for unilateral action than the multilateral-choosing subjects. This suggests a president will likely want to take less risks with less severe crises and will choose to disseminate the costs through allied partners.

The experiment uses 360 Texas A&M student subjects exposed to one of three international crisis scenarios: (1) humanitarian, (2) regime change, or (3) national security crisis. In each crisis, the difficulty of the military mission and level of public support varied and the participant had to respond and rate support for either an American unilateral or multilateral force option. For each crisis, I explain the results and whether military capabilities and/or domestic factors influenced a unilateral decision. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of why a unilateral decision is made.

Chapter VII

In the seventh chapter, I use case study examinations of the 1991 Gulf War, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, and the 1989 Panama invasion to examine the accuracy of the unilateral use of force decision making theory. The cases are selected based on the extreme values of the dependent variable: (1) the 1991 Gulf War is an ideal multilateral case; (2) the 1961 Bay of Pigs is a “middle ground” unilateral-multilateral case; and (3)
the 1989 Panama invasion is an ideal unilateral case. The results highlight the
importance of international and situational factors with presidents acting unilaterally or
multilaterally based on a cost calculation of military power, the type of crisis, and the
location of the crisis.

For each case, I begin with an introduction and summary of the crisis events. I then
review the domestic politics aspects, noting how little domestic politics influenced the
president’s decisions. I next cover the international and situational factors with an
explanation of the crisis trigger and a detailed assessment of U.S. and crisis opponent
military power as well as any other parties involved in the dispute. Subsequently, I trace
the president’s decision making process, including the two decisions – using force and
using unilateral or multilateral force. I conclude with an assessment of the case, finding
that the theory fares well in terms of accuracy.

Chapter VIII

In the concluding chapter, I analyze the results from the three methods to answer the
fundamental question of the dissertation: why does a president make a unilateral use of
force decision? Previous research has addressed different aspects of a president’s use of
decision (e.g., domestic politics and the use of force decision, the influence of military
capabilities on the decision, the consequences of the decision to a president’s political
future, etc…), but it has failed to address the final decision before a president calls on his
military commanders to carry out his orders. This is a puzzle in need of an answer, and
this dissertation fills that crucial academic- and policy-relevant gap.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Understanding a president’s unilateral use of force decision is difficult, at best, given the lack of scientific research on the topic. Most studies assume a president is inclined to make a multilateral decision, and as such, the studies focus on this decision (Malone and Khong 2003a; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Ruggie 1992, 1996; Ikenberry 2001, 2003; Rockman 2000; Corbetta and Dixon 2004; Tago 2005). This, however, is not an insurmountable obstacle.

Studies on U.S. uses of force have exhaustively examined an executive’s decision vis-à-vis a domestic audience (see Leeds and Davis 1997; Fearon 1994; DeRouen 1995, 2000; Tago 2005) and vis-à-vis international factors (i.e., relative military capabilities) (see Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997; Morrow 1989; Kugler and Lemke 1996, 2000; Maoz 1983). These studies can be used as building blocks, and indeed, I critique the state of research on unilateral and multilateral uses of force at the domestic and international levels. Doing so reveals a lack of costs associated with unilateralism.

While these studies can be used as a starting point, the lack of research on unilateral uses of force may stem from a flawed conceptual framework, and this flawed conceptual framework needs to be identified in order to properly use scientific methods in the later chapters. The most significant problem is a failure to establish universal definitions of multilateralism and unilateralism (see Wedgwood 1999, 2000; Lobel and Ratner 1999;
Keohane 1990; Ikenberry 2003; Ruggie 1992; Corbetta and Dixon 2004; Ashby 2004; Stepanova 2003; Finnemore 1998; Luck 2002b; Tago 2005; Pellet 2000; Cockayne and Malone 2006; Krisch 1999; Sands 2002; Reisman 2000; Reisman and Shuchart 2004). The only universally agreed upon definition is defining unilateralism as the conduct of a single nation-state (see Attanasio 2004; Ashby 2004; Tago 2005, 587; Ikenberry 2003, 547; Malone and Khong 2003a). As such, the terms unilateralism and multilateralism are commonly conflated as illustrated in this dissertation’s opening paragraph on the 2004 presidential debate. To some a president’s action is definitely unilateral, while others see it as definitely multilateral.

Unilateral-multilateral research is not only flawed in terms of definitions, but it’s also flawed in terms of methodology. The first illustration of this is how a president can easily make an action multilateral, if he so chooses. He can simply “shop” around, until an international organization agrees to support a U.S. military action. President Clinton resorted to this approach when dealing with the former Yugoslavia, and President George W. Bush did this when establishing the “coalition of the willing” for the 2003 Iraq invasion. A second example is a failure to understand that the American political system with its checks and balances may make a president’s decision more multilateral than winning support from an undemocratic five permanent member Security Council. A third example is the U.S. having a *quid pro quo* relationship with the UN; so, that U.S. unilateralism is cloaked as UN multilateral action. The U.S. receives legitimacy from the UN for its military actions in exchange for its leadership and promotion of Western values.
In the second half of the chapter, I build a new conceptual framework of why a president uses unilateral force, based on a realist paradigm. I first review theories of hegemony – hegemonic stability, power transition, long cycle, and Doran’s cycle. I then concentrate on hegemonic stability theory with particular emphasis on how the U.S. ensures the stability of its governance of the system through unilateral military action. Hegemonic stability theory focuses on the rise and decline of a dominant power’s control over the system, but it also offers policy implications for how a dominant power (i.e., the U.S.) maintains the status quo. The U.S., as hegemon, essentially constructed international institutions (e.g., the UN and NATO) to reflect its interests. Once a president decides to use force, he makes an expected utility calculation on whether to work through these institutions, or to work with less formal coalitions, or to act alone. Gilpin (1981) emphasizes that the dominant power has the choice and the choice alone to govern the system at it sees fit. This theoretical approach resolves the issues raised in the “Flawed Conceptual Framework” section.

**The Unilateral-Multilateral Use of Force Debate**

The first step to take in developing a scientific understanding of presidential unilateral use of force decisions is to review the state of the unilateral-multilateral debate. What are the justifications for acting multilaterally? What are the justifications for acting unilaterally? Researching the policy implications of both multilateralism and unilateralism leads one to conclude that the arguments for multilateralism are often the same arguments used against unilateralism and vice versa. Proponents state the burden-sharing and legitimacy aspects as a benefit if multilateralism is used and a cost if
unilateralism is used. For example, Ikenberry (2002) reinforces the advantages of multilateralism – reciprocity and burden-sharing – stating the U.S. locks other states’ cooperative policies in at the price of lost policy autonomy (122-123). But, the advantages of multilateralism tend to be a myth rather than a reality, as burden-sharing, legitimacy, inaction, reciprocity, and lack of collaboration plague multilateralism.

These myths of multilateralism are mostly captured with international explanations, thus adding more evidence to a realist-based unilateral decision. First, I present the propositions for unilateralism and multilateralism (notably, the international environment shapes both actions). Next, I outline the criticisms of unilateralism, which are mostly domestic-based (burden-sharing and legitimacy). But, as I argue in the criticisms of multilateralism section, these domestic-based explanations are offset by international explanations.

*Reasons for Multilateralism*

As summarized in table 2.1, Corbetta and Dixon (2004), Patrick (2002), and Luck (2002b) review the international-based benefits of multilateralism from which a list of reasons a president may act multilaterally can be deduced. First, allies lower the costs of conflict involvement, even offsetting the costs of lost policy autonomy. Second, multilateral agreements may specify the conditions in which allies have to provide support, reducing free riding and inaction. Third, on a political level, the international community is more likely to perceive collective action as legitimate. Fourth, it is in the U.S. interest militarily to use allies. Minor powers are likely to bandwagon or make a contribution in exchange for future benefits. These contributions can include tangible
military capabilities – use of forward bases, ports, sea-lanes, and overflight rights

(Corbetta and Dixon 8; Patrick 20-24; Luck 58).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1: Reasons for Multilateralism</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Cost sharing: allies lower the costs of conflict involvement, even offsetting the costs of lost policy autonomy.</td>
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<td>2. Reciprocity: alliances and institutional agreements may specify the conditions in which allies have to provide support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Legitimacy: the international community is more likely to perceive collective action as legitimate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Capability Aggregation: A win-win situation, in which minor powers are likely to bandwagon or make a contribution in exchange for future benefits. These contributions can include tangible military capabilities – use of forward bases, ports, sea-lanes, and overflight rights.</td>
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**Criticisms of Unilateralism**

The reasons for multilateralism are related to the criticisms of unilateralism.

Unilateralism is criticized on three main counts: burden-sharing, legitimacy, and U.S. ability to overcome collaboration and coordination problems. If a president decides to act multilaterally, he is sharing costs with allies, following a rule-based process, and using America’s strength to coordinate efforts that serve America’s interests.

**Domestic-Based Explanation**

The first two factors, burden-sharing and legitimacy, represent a domestic-based explanation as to why a president should act multilaterally. These factors coincide with an institutionalist argument that the U.S. should work through international institutions and with military allies, as it is in the U.S. interest to do so.
**Burden-Sharing.** U.S. unilateral uses of force are expensive. The 72-hour (December 16-19, 1998) Operation Desert Fox cost a reported $500 million, and conducting operations against Iraq from 1992 to 1998 cost more than $50 billion (Stepanova 2003, 191). So, presidents may choose a multilateral approach to strongly influence domestic audiences that a military action includes a burden-sharing component with allies (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994). This is a causal arrow that only seems to point one direction: politicians convincing a skeptical public that others are helping to pay for a U.S. military intervention, and not one in which U.S. taxpayers are funding a multilateral effort (Rockman 2000, 141).

Tago (2005) uses traditional measures of domestic political factors (recessions, election cycle, and divided government) to find that a weak economy and an election may make a president choose a burden-sharing, cost-conscious multilateral option (598). This comports with past findings that identify a “vicious cycle” between the president’s approval rating, the economy, and a decision to use force (DeRouen 1995, 688; Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Fordham 1998a, 1998b).

**Legitimacy.** Presidents may also act multilaterally for legitimacy purposes, defined as “conformity to rules that are justifiable in terms of shared beliefs and that reflect the expressed consent of subordinates” (Luck 2002b, 48). Legitimacy is often associated with an equitable, rule-based process, regardless of the outcome (Luck 2002b, 50). Following this process is important to Europeans and the belief that multilateralism is the end goal (Malone 2003, 21). But, the U.S. stands alone in this regard and defines
legitimacy based on the process and results, as well as its compatibility with American exceptionalism (Luck 2002b, 51, 55).  

This decision to act multilaterally seems to be biased toward domestic legitimacy concerns (Schultz 2003; Luck 2002b). A president, facing a divided government with opposition majority in the Senate or House, may seek international authorization for legitimacy purposes (Tago 2005, 598). Schlesinger (2000) writes of the advantages of winning UN approval, “The UN, after all, is a useful way to pool knowledge, share burdens and distribute blame” (28). Moreover, Chapman and Reiter (2004) find a significant rally effect (as much as a 9 percent increase in presidential approval), when the UN Security Council supports the American use of force (887).  

But, this rally effect does not occur with other U.S. multilateral efforts, ones supported by allies, regional organizations, or the support of the UN General Assembly. This suggests presidents cannot expect Americans to believe a multilateral effort is desired solely for burden-sharing; Americans rely on the UN Security Council as an agent to determine genuine threats (Chapman and Reiter 2004, 906). The lack of faith in the UN General Assembly may be a result of its transformation, following the wave of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s. The General Assembly reflected Third World voting power and generally took an anti-Western, anti-U.S. path (Bolton 2000, 75-76).  

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8 American exceptionalism assumes a willingness to act alone, an assumption that American values are universally valid, a domestic-based decision to act internationally, and an understanding that multilateralism is simply optional (Luck 2002a, 4).
International-Based Explanation

The U.S. ability to overcome collaboration and coordination problems represents an international-based explanation for why a president should act multilaterally. The U.S. provides the public goods of security, and it is in the U.S. interest to organize coalitions designed to promote U.S. stability of the international system.°

Ability to Overcome Collaboration and Coordination Problems. The U.S. has the political and military strength to overcome any collaboration and coordination problems associated with multilateralism. The U.S., as a preponderant power, provides public goods, not only to maintain basic international order, but also because it’s in its interest to do so. The U.S. acts as a “stabilizer” against hostile hegemons and rogue nations. It promotes an open international economic system, freedom of the seas, appropriate uses of outer space and cyberspace, and the maintenance of international laws and institutions. The U.S. provides these good unilaterally or by organizing coalitions (see Nye 1999).

Criticisms of Multilateralism

The criticisms of unilateralism are negatively correlated with the criticisms of multilateralism. Multilateralism is criticized on five main counts: problems of burden-sharing, legitimacy, inaction, collaboration and coordination, and reciprocity. If a president decides to act unilaterally, he is minimizing free-riding allies, convincing a domestic audience of the legitimacy of U.S. actions, is using America’s military power

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° This is a fact that is compatible with hegemonic stability theory.
to take action, is avoiding military interoperability problems with less-sophisticated allied militaries, and possibly even spurring reciprocal arrangements with allies.

*International-Based Explanation*

The problems of burden-sharing, inaction, collaboration and cooperation, and reciprocity represent an international-based explanation for why a president should act unilaterally. According to realist doctrine and the hegemonic stability theory, the U.S. maintains international order and with a self-help system, it is incumbent upon the U.S. alone to maintain the system based on its normative values and rules. This is especially poignant given the failure of international institutions and allies to support the public good of security.

*A Problem of Burden-sharing.* Multilateralism makes burden-sharing difficult. It minimizes U.S. coercive power and makes it difficult to extract payment from free riders. From a choice-theoretic perspective, multilateralism does not seem a “convincing bargain” (Weber 1992, 637). Multilateral arrangements include transaction costs, which is defined as all exchange costs, including “the costs of acquiring information, bargaining, and enforcement, as well as the opportunity cost of the time allocated to these activities” (North 1984, 7-17; Caporaso 1992, 609). Transaction costs “almost certainly” increase as the number of actors involved increases (Caporaso 1992, 609).

These institutionalized inefficiencies are why neoliberals argue that multilateralism will fail, especially as obstacles are raised with increasing membership (Kahler 1992, 682). Olson (1968) specifies three reasons to explain an inverse relationship between increasing group size and likelihood of providing a collective good: (1) the group benefit
fraction received by an individual declines as group size increases; (2) larger groups are less likely to engage in small-group strategic interaction; and (3) organization costs increase with a group size increase (48).

Rather, bilateral arrangements, such as the ones the U.S. negotiated in East Asia, represent a better deal to minimize opportunistic behavior and free riding (Caporaso 1992, 611). While South Korea and Japan receive a U.S. military presence for “cheap,” the U.S. wins as well. South Korea, Japan, and its other Asian allies provide the U.S. with forward-basing options, intelligence on adversaries, and military support (Mack 2003, 382). As a result, the U.S. is better positioned to counter China (and North Korea), which follows the Pentagon’s strategy of countering emerging capabilities rather than intentions (Mack 2003, 379-380).

Realists argue that multilateralism fails because hegemonic powers, such as the U.S., can exploit their power advantage in a bilateral bargaining without the scrutiny of other nations (Kahler 1992, 682). In a bilateral arrangement, both sides agree to fund defense, and the U.S. does so without forgoing autonomy (Ikenberry 2003, 536). Establishing nuclear deterrence bilateral deals is the cheapest form of extending security, as the U.S. could extend the nuclear umbrella with little or no cost and without detracting from the security of others (Weber 1992, 638).

Weber (1992) argues that one of the major goals with regard to NATO was to create a multipolar world with Europe bearing the costs of its own defense (634, 643). Multipolarity is seen as a method of discouraging hegemonic powers (the Soviets and

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10 In fact, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum is the only officially multilateral security organization in the Asia-Pacific region (Mack 2003, 375).
Americans) from taking foreign policy risks (Weber 1992, 641-643). It was in America’s interests, through such measures as the Marshall Plan, to establish Europe as an “independent power” (Kennan 1947). But, Soviet threats (e.g., the 1948 Czechoslovak coup, the 1948 Soviet closing of land routes to Berlin, and the 1950 Korean War) led to a “deterrence scenario” in which the U.S. decided preventing Soviet victory was greater than avoiding European dependency (Weber 1992, 648, 650). This led to the formation of NATO, but the U.S. signed the treaty with hopes of maintaining a multipolarity scenario. The U.S. did not have a privileged position within the alliance (Weber 1992, 649).

After the Korean War, President Eisenhower made a push for Europe to assume the burden of its defense. Eisenhower believed in cutting American defense expenditures, and as such, he made an effort to incorporate West Germany with its military resources into NATO. He also pushed for NATO to substitute tactical nuclear weapons for conventional forces, all of which would help alleviate free riding. NATO members were expected to purchase nuclear delivery systems, but Eisenhower’s nuclear plan failed, largely due to congressional opposition (Weber 1992, 652-669). Kennedy ended the burden-sharing debate by adopting a flexible response strategy, in which the U.S. would retain control of NATO’s nuclear weapons and prepare for a conventional war in Europe (Weber 1992, 671-675).

As illustrated in figure 2.1, Europe has continued to lag behind the U.S. in terms of military resources and means. The U.S. military budget is 15 times larger than the budget of Europe’s leading power, the UK. This wide gap became evident with the
Balkans crisis in the 1990s. Europe was unable to respond, though it was located a very short geographical distance from the crisis. It still needed the U.S. to provide troops and transportation (Dolzer 2004, 68).

In terms of the post-9/11 effort, the U.S. has had to resort to financial incentive payments to coalition partners in order to call the action multilateral. In 2005, Congress created a $200 million Coalition Solidarity Fund, in which countries receive payment for sending their troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. Estonia received $2.5 million for placing 40 troops in Iraq and 80 troops in Afghanistan. Albania and the Czech Republic each received $6 million for sending 120 and 100 troops to Iraq and 35 and 60 troops to Afghanistan respectively. Poland received $57 million, as well as having its troops airlifted, camps built, and equipment provided (Weistman 2006).

A Problem of Inaction. While unilateralism is blindly criticized as illegitimate and a violation of a state’s right to act as a sovereign, some international lawyers and leaders have raised questions about unilateralism being a better choice than doing nothing at all (see Brenfors and Petersen 2000). Multilateralism often means inaction (Bodansky 2000; Prins 2000). Enter the “good Samaritan” of unilateralism, in which actors capable of responding to a crisis will act and will not be stymied by the antiquated process of obtaining UN approval (see Chinkin 2000; Reisman and Shuchart 2004).

Originally, the UN was expected to have a permanent international military force established under Article 43 in order to respond quickly to international threats. But, a military force was never established, and the founders did not envision a competing U.S.-Soviet bipolar world in which the veto power of the permanent Security Council members would stymie most international responses to humanitarian crises (Brenfors and Petersen 2000, 474). Whether intentional or not, the UN for the past several decades has played a “peripheral” role in international relations (Mahbubani 2003, 143). Not only has the UN failed to respond rapidly to crises (e.g., Kosovo and Rwanda), but it also has largely failed to respond at all to vital crises (e.g., Vietnam and the Middle East peace process) (Chinkin 2000, 34; Brenfors and Petersen 2000, 474; Mahbubani 2003, 143).

Fear of abuse (i.e., citing humanitarian intervention as a camouflage for illegal intervention) is used as an argument against unilateralism (Brenfors and Petersen 2000, 481, Cockayne and Malone 2006, 123). Even a seemingly clear-cut humanitarian case, such as Kosovo, draws criticism. Before being arrested on April 1, 2001, Serbian (and
later Yugoslav) President Slobodan Milosevic had overseen the unilateral killing of hundreds of thousands of people and turning approximately 1.6 million more into refugees as part of a 10-year reign of violence.\textsuperscript{11} In doing so, he had violated a formal 1991 European foreign ministers condemnation, a 1992 UN peace plan, the 1995 Dayton Accords, a 1998 NATO ultimatum, as well as Security Council Resolutions 713 (1991), 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) (see Chinkin 2000; Krisch 1999). Prins (2000) writes of the collective failure, “Milosevic was told formally [on November 9, 1991], with all of Europe’s assembled will, to cease and desist from the bombardment of the ancient city [Dubrovnik], or else; and he did not; and we did nothing” (91).

NATO tried from the summer of 1998 to March 1999 to obtain Security Council authorization. But, the Security Council refused to allow military action, as it was “paralysed” by the veto of one or more Security Council members (Brenfors and Petersen 2000, 497; Dupuy 2000, 27). When NATO did take collective military action (i.e., bombing targets throughout Yugoslavia) against Milosevic on Mar. 24, 1999, Russia, China, India, Belarus, Ukraine, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia, South Africa, and the Group of Rio (29 Latin-American and Caribbean countries) protested, saying NATO had violated the UN Charter. Russia, China, and India argued against NATO’s “military aggression,” saying it was not justified, even if done for humanitarian reasons (Krisch 1999, 84). The NATO action was even challenged before the International Court of Justice (Brenfors and Petersen 2000, 449).

\textsuperscript{11} A copy of the indictments can be found at http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm.
But, at least NATO took action in Kosovo. There was no Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) response to the humanitarian crisis in East Timor in 1999. Fighting for independence from Indonesia since 1975, East Timor legally asserted its independence on August 30, 1999 in an UN-organized referendum. Indonesia, reluctant to grant independence, led a resistance campaign of violence, leaving up to 1,000 people dead. Australian peacekeepers eventually arrived to restore order (Chinkin 2000, 36-37).

Another example of inaction is Panama. General Manuel Noriega declared war on the U.S. on December 15, 1989, and on the same day, Panamanian Defense Forces killed a U.S. Marine officer. Noriega had also been indicted by U.S. grand juries on drug trafficking charges, an international crime. President George H.W. Bush ordered an invasion on December 20, 1989, invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 21 of the OAS charter. The invasion was a success; it restored democracy, removed the threats from Americans living in Panama, and brought Noriega to justice (Nanda 1990, 502). But, the international community (including OAS) condemned the invasion, saying Panama’s war declaration, threats to American citizens, and restoration of a democratically-elected candidate to office still did not justify intervening in a sovereign nation (Nanda 1990, 502).

The inaction problem can be traced to the UN’s relative lack of power, given the paralysis of the Security Council (see Dupuy 2000). Collective action requires power, and power is often a zero-sum exchange: increases in UN influence reduce state-based influence (Reisman 2000, 13). But, a post-Cold War UN, specifically its Security
Council, is only willing to take multilateral action in cases of sovereignty violations (e.g., Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait). The Security Council becomes paralyzed by vetoes in matters of intra-state problems (e.g., human rights violations in Kosovo) (Reisman 2000, 14-15).

Dolzer (2004) even goes so far as to describe the Council member voting system as a form of unilateralism. Each member of the five permanent member Council has the right to block an international military action, and thus prevent a multinational-based military solution from being labeled multilateralism. Russia and China’s blocking of a UN response to the genocide in Kosovo is a prime example.

A Problem of Collaboration and Cooperation. As described in the “Criticisms of Unilateralism” section, the U.S. does have the power to overcome collaboration and cooperation problems, but it requires a significant amount of effort by the U.S. and other involved states. In order for collaboration to work, the U.S. and another state must engage in a joint effort and mutually adjust their policies, move away from their suboptimal equilibrium, and reject their dominant strategy. As illustrated in figure 2.2, the well-cited Prisoner’s Dilemma collaboration game exemplifies the collective action problem (see Martin 1993):

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<tr>
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<th>Country B</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. 0</td>
<td>3, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. 1</td>
<td>4, 1, 2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1, 4</td>
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Figure 2.2: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
The collaboration problem can be overcome with proper strategy, extensive exchange of information between states, extending the shadow of the future to ensure immediate costs are offset by long-term benefits, and relying on a centralized mechanism (i.e., an international organization) (Martin 1993, 95-96).

However, the multilateral norms of diffuse reciprocity and indivisibility exasperate attempts to collaborate. As illustrated with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, specific reciprocity allows a nation to engage in a tit-for-tat or trigger strategy. Diffuse reciprocity simply relies on generalized norms of cooperation, and with no direct means of enforcement, there is the temptation to free ride or cheat and realize immediate benefits. Free riding is also tempting given the indivisibility norm of multilateralism. Multilateralism creates public goods with security applied equally to all members; so, members can free ride without being excluded from the security arrangement, given the indivisibility principle (Martin 1993, 97-98).

The best solution for the collaboration problem is to minimize the number of actors responding to the crisis. The smaller the number of actors, the lower the transaction costs, and the quicker and more decisive the response (Martin 1993, 99).

Cooperation is also another significant problem with multilateralism. Cooperation requires two states with divergent interests to choose one equilibrium outcome over the other. Once an equilibrium is established, there is no incentive to defect. As illustrated in figure 2.3, the Battle of the Sexes game demonstrates the coordination problem (see Martin 1993):
Establishing a military interoperability standard amongst military allies is another example of a coordination problem. Standards are often set at the domestic level, but coordination is required at the international level. NATO suffered from an interoperability problem with its Kosovo campaign (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 514). The increasing gap between American military technology and the technology of its allies exasperates this problem.

A Problem of Reciprocity. Article 1 of the UN Charter specifies the organization’s three constitutive pillars: (1) maintain peace and security, (2) develop friendly relations among nations, and (3) achieve international cooperation. This last principle, cooperation, is interpreted to mean that no state can unilaterally impose its will on another state (i.e., violate Article 2(1) – the principle of sovereign equality of states). Instead, states must make good faith efforts to find a solution through dialogue (Dupuy 2000, 22-24). Cooperation, also, implicitly requires reciprocity, or as Dupuy (2000) points out, an aggrieved state may resort to “unilateral countermeasures” (25).

Multilateralism requires a diffuse reciprocity arrangement between states (Weber 1992; Caporaso 1992; Keohane 1986). Reciprocity is defined as the exchange of
“roughly equivalent values in which the actions of party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad” (Keohane 1986, 8). Diffuse reciprocity, while not establishing a quid pro quo exchange as in specific reciprocity, does require that a state benefit over the long term from a relationship with other states (Caporaso 1992, 602; Keohane 1986, 4). This long term benefit is often lacking in multilateral situations given the incentives to free ride (Keohane 1986, 12). The “rough equivalence” requirement is also lacking in terms of U.S. military capabilities vis-à-vis its allies. This means that the U.S. cannot expect reciprocity in terms of military actions with its allies (Keohane 1986, 8).

The prime example of the failure of reciprocity is NATO’s response to military operations in Afghanistan following the September 11th attacks. The U.S. practically rejected NATO assistance in Afghanistan, instead relying heavily on the Russians for their experience in the area. The high-tech American military has interoperability problems with NATO members (a significant issue also in Kosovo), and the interoperability gap continues to increase as the U.S. defense budget increases relative to European defense budgets (Konovalov 2004, 219-220; Brooks and Wohlfforth 2005, 514).

Unilateralism may even spur reciprocal arrangements. The act of the bully, a state imposing its policy without regard to the interests of others, is often criticized (see Chinkin 2000). But it can induce a positive international response. Though addressing environmental problems, Bodansky (2000) cites several examples of how unilateral action prompted international standards. In the 1970s, the U.S. threatened to unilaterally
enforce a double-hull standard on all oil tankers entering U.S. ports. The international community responded by adopting the double-hull standard with the 1973 MARPOL Convention and its 1978 Protocol (Bodansky 2000, 344).

_A Domestic- and International-Based Explanation_

As a criticism of multilateralism, the problem of legitimacy represents, as Lyman (2002) writes, the “increasingly blurred” dividing line between domestic and international explanations (75). Presidents seek international support, but this often fails due to Russia and China vetoes on the Security Council. Failing a lack of UN support, presidents will “shop around” for legitimacy, but as Luck (2002b) finds, international legitimacy matters little for domestic audiences and whether or not they support a use of force action.

_A Problem of Legitimacy._ Presidents want international legitimacy when they decide to use force (Luck 2002b, 58). Krisch (1999) and Cockayne and Malone (2006) cite the 1998 airstrikes on Iraq as an example of an attempt to justify unilateral military actions based on UN Security Council legitimacy. With the 1998 airstrikes, Iraq began prohibiting UNSCOM (UN Special Commission) from visiting strategic sites associated with disarmament obligations in January 1998. After a series of Iraqi provocations, the U.S. and UK attacked Iraq from December 16th to 20th to force compliance with disarmament obligations (Krisch 1999, 64-65). In attacking Iraq, the U.S. and the UK claimed a multilateral basis, specifically Iraq’s violations of Security Council Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), 1154 (1998), and 1205 (1998). Western nations mainly supported the airstrikes, while opposing nations, such as Russia and China, cited
legal arguments against it (Krisch 1999, 67). These opposing nations argued that Iraqi compliance was a Council matter and not one conferred to individual Council members (Krisch 1999, 69-73).


These are examples of action taken in the context of UN Security Council resolutions, but in general, the veto powers of UN Security Council members makes approval difficult and raises the costs for presidents seeking multilateral approval (Kahler 1992, 704; Brenfors and Petersen 2000, 474, 499). So, if UN Security Council support is not possible, presidents can resort to regional organizations for legitimacy. Presidents have often relied on the OAS to convey legitimacy for essentially unilateral action in the Western hemisphere (Maynes 2000, 33). But, legitimacy cannot be conveyed, if no region-wide organization exists to convey it, as is the case in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. For example, the Arab League is limited due to the fact
Israel is not a member. In Europe, there is NATO, the EU, and the Council of Europe, but none of these organizations include all European countries (Maynes 2000, 34-35).12

Perhaps, most importantly, presidents do not need international legitimation to increase domestic support for a use of force. Luck (2002b) cites the 1991 Gulf War, invasions of Grenada, Panama, and Haiti, as evidence of the modest influence of legitimacy on domestic support. President George H.W. Bush has acknowledged that he would have acted without a UN mandate, probably by putting together a multinational coalition (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 356). President Reagan tried to win UN and OAS approval but ended up being internationally condemned for the Grenada invasion. The footage of the jubilant returning students and their testimony of the danger on the island was all that was needed to convince the American public that it was a legitimate operation. President Bush invaded Panama without consulting the UN and OAS, and as in the case of Grenada, the invasion was internationally condemned. But, the American public viewed the unilateral invasion as legitimate based on national interests, values at stake, the high probability of success, and the modest military commitment (Luck 2002b, 64).

President Clinton, unlike Reagan with Grenada and Bush with Panama, did win UN approval for invading Haiti. But, international legitimation did not compensate for a doubting public and Congress that did not see U.S. national interests at stake. The operation was carried out successfully and President Clinton received a modest boost in approval ratings but the not significant boost that Reagan and Bush received for Grenada

12 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe includes all of countries of Europe, but it’s an institution in transition.
and Panama respectively (Luck 2002b, 66). In short, a president is less concerned with the rules and procedures of legitimacy than making a unilateral-multilateral decision based on benefit-cost calculations (Luck 2002b, 62).

*Reasons for Unilateralism*

Based on the work of Corbetta and Dixon (2004), Patrick (2002), and Luck (2002b), a list of international-based reasons a president may act unilaterally can be deduced. These reasons are summarized in table 2.2. First, the U.S. and a potential, less powerful ally may simply have conflicting interests. Second, the U.S. may fear erosion of its power and status, if it agrees to join a coalition. Third, less powerful allies may not share the burden. They may offer insignificant political or military support and may even be a hindrance to U.S. military commanders. Fourth, multilateralism suffers from free riders and inaction. The U.S. has the military capability to act quickly and win conflict; so, garnering political and military support may cause unnecessary, even costly, delays.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 2.2: Reasons for Unilateralism</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Conflicting interests: the U.S. and its potential, less powerful state may have conflicting interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Loss of power and prestige: the U.S. may fear the erosion of its power and status in a coalition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Lack of burden-sharing: less powerful states may contribute insignificant political or military and may even be a hindrance to U.S. military commanders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Problems of inaction: the U.S. has the military capability to act quickly and win a conflict, so garnering political and military ally support may simply cause unnecessary, even costly, delays.</td>
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Unilateralism: The No Cost Option

Examining the international-level costs assumed be associated with unilateralism, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) conclude that unilateralism does not necessarily have high costs (509). Rather, it makes sense for a president to act multilaterally based on the substance of a given issue/crisis, rather than blindly as part of a process (510). They examine the key cost arguments of unilateralism: (1) U.S. power will be checked by the formation of a counterbalancing coalition (balance-of-power theory); (2) reduced efficiency and lost opportunities realized through institutional cooperation (institutionalism) and (3) the legitimacy of the U.S.-led international order will be undermined (constructivism) (510).

For the first argument against unilateralism – U.S military power, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) identify three causal factors that make counterbalancing against the U.S. “improbable.” The first is geography. The U.S. is isolated from Eurasia, and historically, counterbalancing coalitions have occurred against centrally located land powers. The second is material capabilities. The gap between the U.S. and all other states is larger than any other gap in the history of the modern system. The U.S. is dominant militarily and economically, other leading states have been dominant militarily or economically but not both simultaneously. Moreover, the U.S. maintains its military dominance with devoting only a small proportion of its economy to national defense (less then 4 percent of GDP in 2004), and the U.S. leads the way in terms of technology and shifting to new military revolution paradigms. The third factor is American primacy. Historically, counterbalancing coalitions were established to check a rising
power from reaching hegemony, but the U.S. is clearly the hegemonic power. Also, potential counterbalancers seem unwilling to pay the costs to overthrow American hegemony, given the problems of coalitional collective action and free rider problems (511).

For the second argument against unilateralism – reduced efficiency gains from institutionalized cooperation, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) believe that the costs of unilateralism may apply to economic matters but not to military matters (514). The U.S. has asymmetric bargaining power and absorbs little cost if it fails to establish multilateral cooperation (515). Institutionalists specify a loss of reputation, if the U.S. squanders its multilateral reputation, but Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) specify the Downs and Jones (2002) rational choice model, in which states have multiple reputations with each reputation specific to an agreement or issue area. So, the U.S. failure to act multilaterally in terms of the military will probably not impact its efforts to gain cooperation on an economic issue (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 516).

For the third argument against unilateralism – undermining legitimacy of the American-led international order, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) argue that the fear of American policymakers creating a cognitive and social mindset in other actors that American hegemony offers unilateral military action without legitimate authority is under specified (517). They argue that some unilateral actions threaten legitimacy more than others, compensating strategies may mitigate the costs of unilateralism, and unilateralism can produce legitimacy benefits. For this latter point, they cite the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. pushing through new rules based on an
expanded definition of self-defense as potentially leading other states to see the American action as the new standard of legitimacy (518).

**A Flawed Conceptual Framework of Unilateral and Multilateral Uses of Force**

So, current research does offer a starting point, but as stated in the introduction, the almost complete lack of scientific research on American unilateral military action raises doubts about the accuracy, reliability, and precision of this research. Indeed, current research suffers from conceptual flaws, and before moving toward a scientific explanation of unilateralism, it is best to first cite these flaws. The most glaring problem is the inability to derive a universally accepted definition of unilateralism and multilateralism. So, the first issue is to review the competing unilateral-multilateral definitions. These definitions organize nicely along realist-institutionalist lines. Institutionalists argue that multilateralism is institution-organized actions, while realists argue that multilateralism is an alliance or coalition that serves U.S. interests (see Ruggie 1992).

The next issue, probably related to the lack of adequate definitions, is a flawed concept of multilateralism and unilateralism. Researchers fail to account for other multilateral options available to a president wanting legitimacy in a U.S.-dominated system. Presidents are realists in the sense they will bypass an inept international organization, whether it is the UN or another organization, in finding a military solution that serves U.S. interests. Presidents can turn to regional organizations (e.g., OAS) or existing alliances (e.g., NATO) if individual Security Council members (e.g., Russia and China) stymie a UN response. A UN response may not even be an “ideal” multilateral
response. Often, the U.S. and UN nations are involved in a *quid pro quo* deal; the U.S. leads a UN response and furthers its interest in exchange for legitimacy. All of this suggests that in an American hegemony, the U.S. is setting and enforcing the rules of the system, which is compatible with hegemonic stability theory.

*Problems of Defining Unilateralism and Multilateralism*

Researchers cannot agree on operational definitions of multilateralism and unilateralism. Some legal scholars adopt a stricter institutionalist definition of multilateralism, defining it as UN Security Council-authorized actions. Academics tend to accept a more minimalist, realist definition, defining multilateralism as the action of three states or the action of two states. Unilateralism is also not clearly defined with legal scholars citing it as any non-Security Council action, while academics define it as the action of one state. The problem of definition lies with placing discrete, operational definitions on actions that are best understood as being on a continuum with unilateral and multilateral at the ends (Brooks and Wohlfarth 2005, 509; Patrick 2002, 2).

*Operational Definitions of Multilateralism.* The most significant shortcoming of research on multilateral uses of force is the operationalization of multilateralism. In short, there is no consensus on what constitutes multilateral action (Corbetta and Dixon 2004, 6). The problem is especially compounded by the fact that even clearly defined multilateral acts (e.g., the 1991 Gulf War) can simply be a masquerade for American hegemony (Chinkin 2000, 38).

*The Institutionalist Argument.* To institutionalists, the U.S. should work through international institutions, as it is in the U.S. interest to do so. International lawyers are
most adamant about relying on and working through institutions. They define multilateral uses of force as “explicit” UN Security Council authorization (Wedgwood 2000, 359). This means the only multilateral uses of force are as follows: Korea in 1950, Iraq in 1990, and Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s (Lobel and Ratner 1999, 126). They are clear to define multilateral and multinational as two separate terms. The former is a UN authorized action (e.g., a UN observer team in the Sinai), while the latter is not necessarily an institutional-based action, which according to Ruggie (1992) means it misses the “qualitative dimension of the phenomenon” (566).


The first example is the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the Council did not vote on a Soviet resolution disapproving of the U.S. interdiction of Soviet ships en route to Cuba. The second example is the 1991 U.S., UK, and French effort to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq and to establish no-fly zones. This effort did not have explicit Council approval, but many UN members agreed with the establishment of safe havens.

The third example is the 1998 Iraqi inspection crisis, in which the U.S. threatened to use force to enforce Resolution 1154, though the Resolution was a memorandum of understanding allowing UN inspections and not authorizing use of force. The fourth example is the 1998 U.S. and NATO threat to use force to enforce Resolution 1199
against Yugoslavia unless it withdrew from Kosovo. The Resolution condemned Yugoslavia’s actions in Kosovo but did not explicitly authorize the use of force (Lobel and Ratner 1999, 131-133, 152). Lobel and Ratner (1999) are left to conclude that the difficulty of interpreting Council authorization results in “uncertainty for world order” (133).

_A Realist-based Three-State Argument._ To realists, the U.S. will organize a formal or informal military effort based on whether the collective effort serves U.S. interests. Academic researchers tend to define multilateralism based on this principle and on how many states are involved in the U.S.-led effort. One group espouses a minimum of three states acting in order for the action to be defined as multilateral. Collective efforts by states against states “defecting” from international regimes, agreements, and norms are considered multilateral (Corbetta and Dixon 2004, 6; Weber 1992, 637-638).

Ruggie’s (1992) seminal definition of multilateralism consists of three features that define relations between states: indivisibility, generalized organizing principles, and diffuse reciprocity (Ruggie 571; Weber 1992, 633; Caporaso 1992, 601). Indivisibility is the scope (geographic and functional) over which costs and benefits are spread. It is a social construction that states collectively make (e.g., behaving as though peace were indivisible) (Ruggie 1992, 571). Generalized principles refer to the generalized, if not universal, norms of states relating to other states based on equal rights of participation and equal voting power (Zacher 1993, 399). Diffuse reciprocity is a utilitarian view that states expect to benefit over the long term and over many issues and not on every issue every time (Caporaso 1992, 602; Keohane 1986, 4).
Operationalization is often quantified as the effort of three or more states. Keohane (1990) defines multilateralism as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states” (731). Ikenberry (2003), Ruggie (1992), and Corbetta and Dixon (2004) agree, but they add to the “three states” definition. Ikenberry (2003) defines multilateralism as involving “the coordination of relations among three of more states according to a set of rules or principles,” while Ruggie (1992) defines it on the “basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those [three or more] states” (Ikenberry 2003, 534; Ruggie 1992, 567). Corbetta and Dixon (2004) use the three state definition in a statistical test but also include a restrictive test, requiring that each state of the multilateral action begin its dispute involvement on the same day (8-9).

The “three states” multilateral definition is used on the assumption that collective decision-making requires a threshold of three states (Corbetta and Dixon 2004, 6). Otherwise, there may be an issue of a more powerful state setting the terms for its bilateral partner (Ruggie 1992, 635-636; Kahler 1992, 681). Ruggie (1992) is adamant about this point, “…everyone agrees multilateralism is not: bilateralism” (568). Caporaso (1992) defines multilateral as a minimum of three countries and a maximum of all countries (603).

A Realist-based Two-State Argument. Operationalization can also be quantified as “narrow multilateralism,” in which two or more states consult and informally coordinate their political and military efforts (Ashby 2004, 43; Stepanova 2003, 192). This is sometimes termed “unilateral multilateralism,” as when a multilateral military coalition uses force unilaterally (i.e., without UN authorization) (Stepanova 2003, 196). The
more minimalist, “two states” definition assumes that uses of force rarely follow easily
discernible multilateral rules and institutions. The U.S., for instance, often acts at a point
between full unilateralism (acting alone without consulting with others) and consulting
with others but acting alone. The operational and procedural dimensions account for this
type of action (Ikenberry 2003, 547).

Finnemore (1998), Luck (2002b), and Tago (2005) have developed such minimalist
definitions of multilateralism. They organize multilateralism into two dimensions:
operational and procedural. The operational dimension defines multilateralism as
military coalitions with unified command and control and joint operational coordination
and execution of military operations. Slocombe (2003) gives practical examples of
operational multilateralism: allied special operation forces, smaller scale precision strike
capabilities and naval forces, bases, overflight rights and access, and intelligence (120).
The procedural dimension defines multilateralism as the international community’s
political and diplomatic endorsement, including formal authorization of the U.S. military
action. This endorsement does not need to have Security Council approval. As
Slocombe (2003) states, it is nonsensical to believe that Russia and China have the
power to have an action labeled as unilateral or multilateral, depending on how they vote
(122).

Operational Definitions of Unilateralism. As a lack of consensus plagues deriving
an operational definition of multilateralism, unilateralism is also not “consistently” or
“coherently” defined (Alvarez 2000, 393; Chinkin 2000, 31). Unilateralism, in its
simplest form, is defined as the conduct of a single nation-state (Attanasio 2004, 14;
Ashby 2004, 42). Institutionalists dominate this definitional debate, arguing that non-UN actions, U.S. defection from institutions and norms, and even regional organization actions are unilateral. Realists have a more minimalist, the U.S. acting alone, as a definition of unilateralism

*The Institutionalist Argument.* Sands (2002) defines unilateralism as “measures taken without recourse to international or military authority” (89). A state acts independently with minimal (if any) involvement by other nations in putting its “interests before that of the collective interest, without even speaking of the ‘common good’” (Bodansky 2000, 340; Dupuy 2000, 20). A more legalistic, alternative definition is “an act by a formally unauthorized participant which effectively preempts the official decision a legally designated official or agency was supposed to take” (Reisman 2000, 3).

Unilateralism is when the president’s decision displaces the legally authorized decision making procedure (Reisman and Shuchart 2004, 26). To Cockayne and Malone (2006), unilateralism is “defection from enforcement arrangements…laid out in…Security Council resolutions” (124). The definition can become even more convoluted, as Krisch (1999) explains, when the U.S. unilaterally enforces the collective will (i.e., uses force to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions). Thus, operationalization proves problematic. To international lawyers, unilateralism is a non-UN Security Council authorized action (Ruggie 1992, 566). Uses of force, such as NATO’s intervention in Serbia, are defined as “regional or collective unilateralism,”
while actions, such as US intervention in Panama, are defined as “state unilateralism” (Wedgwood 1999, 833; Pellet 2000, 387).

*A Realist-based Argument.* Academics tend to favor a more informal or realist-type definition. They define it as a use of force action “without any type of support from allied armed forces and without consultation with the UN,” or as a state acting alone without consulting others (Tago 2005, 587; Ikenberry 2003, 547; Malone and Khong 2003a, 3).

*A Flawed Concept of Multilateralism and Unilateralism*

The inability to universally define multilateralism and unilateralism is a significant problem, and it may be related to a more severe methodological problem – the fluid nature of a president’s multilateral or unilateral decision. The first conceptual flaw stemming directly from the failure to define unilateralism and multilateralism is a president that seeks multilateral alternatives to the UN (e.g., using NATO). Research also conflates the fact a president’s multilateral action may be unilateral (e.g., using the UN as cover for an operation that serves U.S. interests). Or, the president’s unilateral action may be multilateral, given the checks and balances of the American political system.

*Shopping Around for Collective Security Legitimacy.* If no institution exists to convey legitimacy, presidents can “shop” around until they find an entity willing to endorse their action. Shopping around for collective security legitimacy may be a sign of the times and a competitive, deregulated solution to overcome the “paralysis” of the monopolistic Security Council (Dupuy 2000, 29; Patrick 2002, 12). Cold War era
treaties and agreements are simply inadequate, and the U.S. has moved toward taking more unilateral action and toward new forms of multilateralism that lack UN endorsement and are not formal organizations with laws and regulations. A recent unilateral example (with roots in the Cold War) regarding America’s approach to nonproliferation is the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the operationalization of its National Missile Defense (NMD).

Paralysis at the Council has also led to a new form of multilateralism (or unilateralism -- depending on which definition is being used), in which the U.S. organizes multilateral cooperation on a specific issue outside of the UN. A multilateral example of this is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which works to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of rogue nations. PSI includes 11 original participants as well as more than 50 nations signed on to its principles. Countries participate based on need and capabilities and under U.S. leadership. Most importantly, this form of multilateralism is not subject to a Security Council veto (Russia and China do not endorse it). It is an action-oriented group designed to be proactive, agile, and move quickly to stop WMD shipments (see Joshi 2005).

A second example of “shopping around” is President Clinton being forced to improvise in dealing with the former Yugoslavia. He was forced to select the option of “narrow multilateralism,” which infers that presidents will use existing alliances (e.g., NATO) or build informal coalitions (Stepanova 2003, 192). President Clinton and his European allies initially sought EU legitimacy, then UN legitimacy, and then they

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13 Information on the PSI can be found at http://www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm.
created a group to include NATO allies and Russia. Eventually, a group of 19
democratic countries endorsed the war against Serbia (Maynes 2000, 35-36).

A third, more prominent example is the “coalition of the willing” for the 2003 Iraq
invasion (Brooks and Wohlfarth 2005). The U.S. from 1990 to 2002 followed a
multilateral path through the UN, overseeing 16 resolutions passed against Saddam
Hussein. It even scored a diplomatic victory with Resolution 1441 passing (15-0 vote)
on November 8, 2002, but as Dombrowski and Payne (2003) describe, the process for
authorizing UN force became “bogged down” as some states began pleading for more
time (402). President Bush’s response to a mid-March 2003 final, failed new UN
resolution is well-known. He organized a 46-state coalition, representing 20 percent of
the total world population and invaded Iraq. In this coalition, the UK and Australia were
the only countries to provide a substantial number of troops (though it should be noted
that Poland did contribute troops) (Dombrowski and Payne 2003, 398, 400, 403).14

*Multilateralism: A Reflection of American Domestic Values.* America’s domestic
institutions are designed to make war decision making a “difficult and cumbersome”
process (Maoz and Russett 1993, 626). Presidents, wanting to wage war, must first
mobilize public opinion and successfully navigate the proposal through the legislature,
bureaucracies, and interest groups (Maoz and Russett 1993, 626). They must convince
the American people (and the international community) that they are following an
“international legal process,” in which due process is carried out in an objective and
orderly fashion (Reisman 2000, 16-17). In short, the checks and balances of the

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14 The coalition included six unarmed countries: Costa Rica, Iceland, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, and Solomon Islands.
American government system serve as a powerful barrier against an overzealous president using force arbitrarily (Dolzer 2004, 70).

Burley (1993) and Cowhey (1993) argue multilateralism is simply an extension of American domestic values. Multilateralism is inexorably linked to domestic politics, and successful U.S. stewardship of multilateral actions requires credible domestic constraints that prevent defection from a multilateral commitment. The U.S. has been remarkably successful in delivering a credible American version of multilateralism based on five domestic factors. First, the U.S. electoral system is designed to encourage parties to take stands on foreign policy issues. Second, American voters support multilateralism, thus creating electoral incentives for politicians to support it. Third, checks and balances in the U.S. government make reversal of a major commitment by one branch difficult. Fourth, division of power allows divergent legislative and executive interests to agree on fine-tuning new institutional arrangements that result in promoting multilateralism (e.g., Congress creating the National Security Council to represent diverse constituencies and authorizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report directly to Congress). Fifth, it was in the U.S. interest to make its political and economic transactions transparent and credible to other nations (Cowhey 1993, 164-174).

The U.S., following World War II, sought to project the principles of its New Deal regulatory state onto the world. Multilateralism, as defined by Security Council-authorized actions, is based on U.S. domestic law and its New Deal-based liberal welfare state. The three distinctive features of multilateralism – its general organizing principles, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity – are a reflection of the U.S. domestic
liberal polity. American policymakers learned two lessons from the Great Depression: (1) economic prosperity and political stability form an inextricable link and (2) the responsibility of governments to assure minimum welfare standards for its citizens. American policymakers transposed these lessons to the international law of cooperation, and in doing so, attempted to remake the world in the American image (Burley 1993, 125-127).

Claude (1971) writes of the post-war new liberalism, “…if the liberalism which inspired the League was essentially a nineteenth-century phenomenon, the doctrinal foundation of the night-watchman state, the liberalism which underlay the new system was the twentieth-century version, the theoretical support of the welfare state” (87-88). In short, the U.S., leaders of the new system, was taking responsibility for the welfare of the world (Burley 1993, 131). International institutions were designed based on domestic regulatory agencies (Burley 1993, 133).

Patrick (2002) does not agree that international institutions are necessarily a reflection of the American domestic realm. The institutions suffer from democratic deficits (after all, one permanent Council member can block an internationally-authorized use of force action). Also, international institutions make decisions affecting states and their citizens without national legislatures having a voice in the process (Patrick 2002, 17).

Presidents want the same world as they have at home, but when these international institutions do not operate efficiently (or not in the U.S. interests), presidents are realists and want to have a say in world affairs. This is why the U.S. (and other major powers)
has a Security Council veto, and it is why, the U.S. reserves the right to act unilaterally or multilaterally to defend threats to the system (Burley 1993, 145-146). If the rules break down at the international level, presidents want to act (often unilaterally) to right the ship of international law and institutions (Burley 1993, 147).

Legitimacy or Leadership? Undoubtedly, the West, especially the U.S., has significant influence over Security Council decisions. The U.S. has so much power, in fact, that some scholars describe a *quid pro quo* relationship between the U.S. and the UN. In this relationship, the U.S. serves as custodian of international norms and institutions, not the UN (Reisman and Shuchart 2004, 34).

The U.S. receives legitimacy in exchange for its leadership and promotion of Western values. Freudenschuss (1994) states that political will and public support for an international response to a crisis requires U.S. leadership. The U.S. president is in the best position to carry out an internationally-mandated response, and most importantly, his leadership is exercised with democratic constraints (i.e., constitutional checks and balances). The UN Secretary-General does not have a leadership position (i.e., there is no world government) and is not subject to checks and balances (i.e., there are no impeachment provisions).

U.S. leadership begets UN legitimacy, but it comes at a price. The U.S. is simply carrying out Western interests unilaterally but promoting the actions as multilateral. Multilateralism, by definition, requires generalized principles of conduct based on equal participation, but the institutional form of the Security Council violates this definition (Zacher 1993, 399). Krauthammer (1990-1991) describes the Council authorization to
use force in the 1991 Gulf War as “pseudo-multilateralism” (25). Huntington (1993) writes of the legitimacy-leadership tradeoff:

Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council…that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the international community. The very phrase ‘world community’ has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing the ‘Free World’) to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers (39).

Even under the strictest operationalization of multilateralism – UN Security Council approval – a country still has to militarily lead the operation. The UN does not possess command elements; so, this task often falls to the U.S. (Krisch 1999, 61-62; Cockayne and Malone 2006, 136). A fact recognized by the UN Secretary-General when asked about Iraqi compliance with UN inspections in February 1998, “You can do a lot with diplomacy, but with diplomacy backed up by force you can get a lot more done” (Krisch 1999, 72).


Theories of Hegemony

The most basic conclusion from the state of unilateral-multilateral research and from the conceptual problems plaguing that research is that the U.S. has the power to act
alone, and when it acts alone, its action can be defined as unilateralism. This is a conclusion that stems from realism, and as such, this dissertation assumes an inherent bond between realism and unilateralism and between institutionalism and multilateralism. As Ruggie (1992) states, the term “multilateral” is an adjective modifying the noun “institution” and the term “unilateral” can be assumed to modify the noun “realism” (570). *Given all of this, a realist-based international and power explanation should explain American unilateralism.*

To realists, anarchy defines the international system (Lebow 1994, 250; Waltz 1979, 111). Given this, states must guarantee their own sovereignty and security and increase their power relative to other states (see Morgenthau 1973; Waltz 1979; Lebow 1994; Kugler and Lemke 2000). Realists also place the nation-state as the key actor in a world in which there is no “government over governments” (Claude 1971, 14; Morgenthau 1973, 12; Vasquez 1997, 899). Competition and the quest for self-preservation define international behavior among states (Morgenthau 1973, 5; Waltz 1979, 109).

To realists, power is either balanced or distributed unequally. Balance of power bases global stability on an equal distribution of power. Thus, inequalities in power should be viewed as dangerous, but the uneven distribution of power is a considered a basic law of international politics, according to realists (Nye 1990, 185). While neorealism relies on a balance of power formula as a method to predict global stability, other power theories suggest stability occurs with unequal distributions of power.

When power is distributed unevenly, it is often the result of hegemony, defined as a situation in which “a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the
system” (Gilpin 1981, 29). Political hegemony is “being able to dominate the world militarily” (Goldstein 1988, 281). Systemic theories, notably the theory of long cycles, define hegemony as a concentration of economic and military power. Realist theories, notably hegemonic stability, power transition, Doran’s cycle, and neorealism, define hegemony by a state’s relative power to other states in the international system.15

Hegemony, in this dissertation, means one state governing the system politically, economically, and militarily. In maintaining the status quo, the U.S., as hegemon, must be prepared to take unilateral action to assert its power and influence over states not acting in the U.S. interest. While theories of hegemony often predict the rise and fall of dominant powers, I concentrate on the policy implications of the theories. Unilateralism requires action, and as such, it is best to review hegemonic theories in order to find the one most suitable for explaining and predicting unilateral U.S. uses of force.

*Hegemonic Stability Theory.* Gilpin’s (1981, 1988) theory of hegemonic stability and war involves a nation governing the international system as a result of its dominant military and economic strength. Relative power is important; the hegemon seeks to maintain the status quo through reaching an equilibrium position. War occurs as the equilibrium between governance of the system and actual distribution of power becomes unbalanced. The hegemon attempts to maintain its dominant position, but the commitments and costs of leadership cannot be supported with its resource base. The hegemon often fails to reduce its commitments or increase its resources, and as a result, other states challenge the hegemon, greatly increasing the probability of war.

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15 The theories in this section explain the five centuries of the modern system.
Hegemonic wars are defined as a direct contest between the dominant power, the challenger(s), all major states, and most minor states for governance of the system. The wars are unlimited in means as well as their ends and expand to encompass the entire international system (Gilpin 1981, 199-200). Hegemonic war redistributes territory, offers a new set of rules, and results in a new international distribution of labor (Levy 1985, 351). But the new order is never permanent, as the cycle of declining hegemon and rising challenger repeats itself, though it should be noted that the UK and U.S. have created and enforced a liberal economic order since the industrial revolution (Gilpin 1981, 144).

*Power Transition Theory.* Power transition theorists, like neorealists, marginalize motivation and advocate that system stability and state behavior can be understood through an objective measure of power distribution. The international system structure is hierarchical rather than anarchical, with the most powerful nation at the apex of a “power pyramid” (Organski 1958, 326-333; Kugler and Lemke 2000, 131). The dominant power establishes and enforces the status quo, and there is peace in the system, as long as other powers are satisfied with the status quo (Organski 1958, 326-333; Kugler and Lemke 2000, 131; Kugler and Organski 1989, 173). However, the dominant power cannot prevent the internal development of dissatisfied states, and if these states, approximate parity with the dominant power, then there is an increased likelihood of conflict (Kugler and Lemke 2000, 132).

*Theory of Long Cycles.* The long cycle theory (Modelski 1978, 1987; Modelski and Thompson 1988) characterizes the global system as a hierarchical system, in which a
hegemon emerges from war and uses its monopoly to structure the political and economic system. The hegemon maintains order through its power, defined as global reach and measured by its sea power. The hegemon’s power gradually declines as a result of the high costs and burdens of maintaining its role and its reductions in naval capabilities. New rivals emerge and war results (Modelski 1978, 233-234). Wars often begin as localized affairs and are rarely direct contests between the hegemon and challenger. They become global wars, when the hegemon fears the challenger represents a global threat (Levy 1985, 347).

*Doran’s Cycle of Relative Power.* Doran and Parsons (1980) and Doran (1983) explain a state’s foreign policy as largely based on a power cycle determined by the state’s internal economic cycles. A state’s relative power follows a cycle of ascendance, maturation, and decline. Hegemonic war results from a major power’s national expansion and attempt at hegemony. But, the major power’s attempt at hegemony stems from a failure to grasp its new role in the system, in which the state’s fears and overreactions are heightened. This failure is likely to occur at points of maximum and minimum power and at points of inflection (Doran and Parsons 1980, 963; Doran 1983, 437; Levy 1985, 352).

**A Conceptual Framework: Hegemonic Stability Theory as the Guiding Principle in a President’s Unilateral-Multilateral Decision**

The conceptual flaws reviewed in the previous section can be explained away with Gilpin’s (1981) hegemonic stability theory. A simplified solution to these conceptual problems is to understand the world as a hierarchical system with an uneven distribution of power. The U.S., as hegemon, sets the rules of the system and maintains the stability
of the system with its economic and military capabilities. Domestic factors, along with international factors, may explain a president’s decision to enforce the status quo with military force. But, the president’s decision on how to use force is based on an expected utility calculation, using the main explanatory argument of a hegemon’s enforcement of the status quo – military power.

*American Hegemony*

America is a hegemonic power, but its hegemony is different from that of its historical predecessors – Greece, Rome, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain.\(^{16}\) According to hegemonic stability theory, hegemonic states are *alike* in their goal of articulating and enforcing the rules of the international system (Ruggie 1992, 585). But, as Ruggie (1992) argues, using counterfactuals, all hegemonies are not alike. Nazi Germany would have had different rules from the Soviet Union, if either one would have been the dominant power following World War II. If Britain had maintained its hegemony, colonialism would have lasted longer, and the international monetary system would have been based on sterling (585).

Ruggie (1992) credits *American* hegemony and not *American* *hegemony* for the establishment of the post-World War II institutions (568, 585-593). As World War II was ending, President Roosevelt, fearing a retreat back into isolationism, devised the collective security apparatus of the UN to be compatible with balance-of-power politics. The UN would be capable of multilateral enforcement, while preserving the veto of the

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\(^{16}\) Gilpin (1981) argues that American governance of the international system is in decline, but he notes that the U.S. “continues to be the dominant and most prestigious state in the system” (232). This dominance and prestige has become especially pronounced in a post-Cold War unipolar world.
great powers (Ruggie 1992, 587). Moreover, it preserved a great power’s unilateral right
to self-defense (Article 51 of the UN Charter) (Ruggie 1992, 589). But, with the start of
the Cold War, the UN soon became “marginalized to core U.S. security concerns”
(Ruggie 1992, 588).

The uniqueness of American leadership of the international system following World
War II is not adequately explained by structural theories, but rather illustrates the
importance of the American domestic realm (Ruggie 1992, 592). Presidents Roosevelt
and Truman simply institutionalized America’s economic and social order at the
international level, and Cowhey (1993) even argues that multilateralism reflects the
credibility of the American polity (Ruggie 1992, 593).

American hegemony may be different from other historical hegemonies, and
America may have created a liberal interdependent world based on international rules
and institutions, but realists argue the U.S. took these post-WWII measures to protect
and advance its own interests. Cox (1987) writes of how the UK from 1845 to 1875 and
the U.S. from 1945 to 1967 obtained consensus on a generalized set of principles that
ensure the supremacy of the hegemon. The U.S. established the UN, the Bretton Woods
system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), as well as the universality of democratic norms because it makes its
hegemony legitimate in the eyes of other nations and other states are behaving as the
Hegemonic Stability Theory

Differences between American hegemony and other hegemonies are real and not to be marginalized, but American hegemony can still be generalized to theories of hegemony. All theories of hegemony refer to a paradigm of dominant powers, challengers and general wars confirming a new distribution of power in the system. But, the theories all have different assumptions and propositions ranging from definition of hegemony to the consequences of general war (Levy 1985, 356). One of these differences, and the focus of this dissertation is on a hegemon’s power and how a hegemon uses it power to maintain the status quo.

Hegemonic stability theory, as opposed to other realist theories, is ideal for examining U.S. unilateralism, given its emphasis on the necessity of a politico-military framework. This framework entails that the U.S. must fulfill a security role (in addition to an economic role) in order to maintain a stable international system (Spiezio 1990, 168). Hegemonic stability theory also offers specific factors (prestige based on relative economic and military power) that permits operationalization of variables necessary for scientific analysis. More specifically, it talks about the role of technology, spheres of influence, and decision makers making expected utility calculations, all of which serve as a conceptual framework for explaining why presidents make unilateral use of force decisions.

Gilpin (1981) offers five assumptions to explain state behavior. These assumptions are as follows:

1. An international system is stable if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system.
2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.
3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.
4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established (10-11).

While the assumptions are similar to other theories of hegemony, Gilpin (1981) offers policy details of how a hegemon maintains the status quo. Gilpin models a state’s expansion and control over the system as a logistic or S curve, and as illustrated in figure 2.4, I am interested in the top of the curve (1981, 107). The following subsections detail Gilpin’s analysis of the top of the S curve, and it serves as a foundation for why the U.S. acts unilaterally.

**Figure 2.4: S Curve of a State’s Control Over the System**

The top of the S Curve is the focus of this dissertation.
Hegemonic Governance. Citing an “international governance” perspective, Gilpin argues that dominant states govern the international system, bringing “order and stability to the system” (Gilpin 1981, 42). Historically, there have been three types of international governance: imperial or hegemonic, bipolar, and multipolar (Gilpin 1981, 29). Hegemony is defined as a situation in which “a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system” and as the “fundamental ordering principle of international relations” (Gilpin 1981, 29, 144). The hegemon uses its material resources to order the system in a manner that satisfies its political and economic interests. The hegemon expands its spheres of influence and redistributes territory in order to gain resources (Gilpin 1981, 37). In setting the rules that shape international interactions, the dominant state manages to minimize conflict and maximize cooperation (Gilpin 1981, 34). The necessary condition for international economic order is a stable politico-military framework (Gilpin 1981, 133).

Hegemonic governance is based on three factors. First, the distribution of power determines who governs the system and which state is able to promote its interests (Gilpin 1981, 28-29). Second, governance is based on a hierarchy of prestige. Prestige is closely linked to power and is defined as the probability that a command will be obeyed. A state’s prestige is based on its economic and military power (Gilpin 1981, 30). Gilpin writes, “Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular” (Gilpin 1981, 31). Third, governance sets out rights and rules that govern or

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17 Gilpin (1981) notes that territorial distribution is still a fundamental feature of the governance of the international system, but domestic consolidation and economic expansion complement and partially replace territorial expansion in the modern era (146).
influence the system. The rights and rules are based primarily on the dominant state’s interests (Gilpin 1981, 34-35).

This latter factor, a hegemon setting the rules of the system, seems to dispel the confusion illustrated in the “A Flawed Conceptual Framework of Unilateral and Multilateral Uses of Force” section. Many of the authors in that section (Burley 1993; Cowhey 1993; Resiman and Shuchart 2004; Freudenschuss 1994; Huntington 1993; Krisch 1999; Thakur 2003; Ruggie 1992) argue that the U.S. designed the UN and international system to reflect its interests. Gilpin (1981) agrees with this assessment and cites several multilateral treaties throughout history as being designed to assert the rights of the dominant state (36). He writes, “In the modern era, what we call international law was imposed on the world by Western civilization, and it reflects the values and interests of Western civilization” (36). Western civilization is based on the UK and U.S. hegemonies dating back to the industrial revolution. In its present form, the U.S. enforces Western values and ensures its dominant position through a mixture of unilateral military action, financing of allies, and foreign aid (Gilpin 1981, 156).

Military Power. A state must be militarily dominant to be a hegemon. To Gilpin, a hegemon must possess both superior economic capabilities and “corresponding political-military strength.” An economically strong but militarily weak state is not a hegemon (Gilpin 1981, 129, 145). The state is a hegemon based on two factors: the ability to enforce its will on other states and the ability to provide public goods of security (Gilpin 1981, 34). Hegmons use their military unilaterally to ensure a world economy that is profitable to them (Gilpin 1981, 139).
This ability to enforce its will and the fact global governance is based on prestige explains why the U.S. must be willing to use force unilaterally. If negotiations fail or a UN coalition cannot be established, an adversary must believe that the U.S. is willing to act alone. Maintaining a “hierarchy of prestige” and lessening ambiguity about its potential action are necessary for the U.S. to maintain a stable system organized around its interests (Gilpin 1981, 31). Prestige is achieved through successful uses of force (Gilpin 1981, 32).

A decline in power relative to other states makes it less likely that the hegemon will be able to “impose its will on others” (i.e., act unilaterally) (Gilpin 1981, 33). Given this overriding concern of relative gains, each dominant power fears a significant military technology breakthrough by another dominant power (Gilpin 1988, 612). But, if one nation (i.e., the U.S.) has preponderant capabilities, then there is systemic stability. Military innovation, defined as superior armament or technique, is positively correlated with system dominance (Gilpin 1981, 60). The U.S., which is at the leading edge of military revolutions, can supply public goods of security and economic order, resulting in stability and the absence of major conflict (Gilpin 1981, 145). The cost to a state wishing to challenge U.S. hegemony would require advancing past the U.S. in terms of military innovation, a cost that no state has been able to or willing to bear.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I critiqued the unilateral-multilateral debate, and this critique reveals that international explanations support a unilateral use of force decision. International explanations offer reasons why both multilateralism and unilateralism should be used,
but the advantages of multilateralism tend to be based on domestic factors (burden-sharing and legitimacy) that diminish in significance to realist-based international explanations. These explanations and criticisms of multilateralism – problems of burden-sharing, collaboration/coordination, reciprocity and inaction – better explain why the U.S. uses force unilaterally. The Brooks and Wohlfforth (2005) article offers further evidence with its finding that unilateralism is not associated with significant costs.

I then specified the conceptual flaws of unilateral-multilateral research, namely a failure to define unilateralism and multilateralism and a failure to account for a dynamic environment. I then argued that U.S. unilateral uses of force stem from a realist, power-based theory – hegemonic stability theory – in which the U.S. must take unilateral action to preserve the status quo and protect its interests. Turning from this literature review, I offer a theory of U.S. unilateral use of force in the next chapter that is derived from hegemonic stability theory.

As I will detail, hegemonic stability theory can be modeled as a sequential decision process, in which the president makes an expected utility calculation in deciding how to use force based on relative military power and the crisis trigger. Military power and the crisis trigger serve as the main international explanation for unilateral use of force, while a domestic explanation for using force is comprised of presidential decision making, political factors, congressional involvement, and public opinion.

The theories of hegemony and an international level propensity to explain unilateralism reviewed in this chapter serve as the basis for the next chapter and throughout the dissertation. As I move into the scientific tests, I realize that I am
sacrificing nuances of the empirical world for generalizability and parsimony. However in using three methods, I attempt to capture all of the explanatory elements of a president’s unilateral decision in the hopes of answering the puzzle: why does a president make a unilateral use of force decision?. It is in this spirit that I move to the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
A THEORY OF UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE DECISION MAKING

Introduction

In this chapter, I construct a theory of unilateral use of force decision making. I argue that hegemonic stability theory shapes a president’s decision (whether Republican or Democrat) and answers the research question: why does a president make a unilateral use of force decision? Hegemonic stability theory uses expected utility as its basis for explaining how states determine their foreign policy (Gilpin 1981, 50). As such, I also argue that a president makes an expected utility calculation in determining whether to use unilateral or multilateral force.

A relative military power gap vis-à-vis an adversary is positively correlated with a president deciding to use unilateral force. However, all use of force decisions are not alike, and the crisis trigger (i.e., situational factor) may play a significant role in a president’s calculation. For example, a president is likely to respond differently to a national security threat as opposed to a humanitarian crisis. Other determinants (Western hemisphere and military revolution gap) also make the president more likely to act unilaterally, given the problems of multilateralism specified in Chapter II.

I operationalize hegemonic stability theory as a sequential decision process. While research has focused on a president’s first decision – whether to use force or not, it has failed to model the subsequent decisions following this initial calculation. I argue that a
president decides to use force, based on traditional domestic explanations for uses of force: presidential decision making, political uses of force, congressional involvement, and public opinion as well as some traditional international- and target-level explanations: rivalry, regime type, and alliance. The president then makes a second expected utility calculation on how to use force. For this second decision, I advocate two types of explanatory factors – military revolutions and situational factors – that make it more likely a president will make a unilateral decision. This second decision is the focus of my dissertation.

**Hegemonic Stability Theory and Presidential Decision Strategy**

Hegemonic stability theory can be applied to a presidential decision strategy. Gilpin (1981) argues that states “have no interests” and foreign policies are determined by “dominant members or ruling coalitions” (18-19). Gilpin uses an indifference analysis, in which decision makers do not maximize based on a hierarchy of goals, but they make tradeoffs in seeking to find an optimum position (1981, 20). The relative cost of objectives and the capacity of the state to achieve the objective largely influences a president’s decision (Gilpin 1981, 23).

In Gilpin’s assessment, he emphasizes both economic and military (or security) objectives, but in this dissertation, I am modeling a president’s decision after he has already decided to use force. This negates the necessity of focusing on an economic calculation and allows me to model a president’s military calculation with a rational choice approach. The president’s tradeoff decision in this dissertation is whether to
enforce the rules of U.S. governance alone or with allies, and this tradeoff decision is based primarily on an international factor of relative military power.

While the literature on U.S. unilateralism (as specified in the “Flawed Conceptual Framework” section of Chapter II) is convoluted as to the influence of domestic factors, the legitimacy of unilateralism, and whether an action is even defined as unilateral or multilateral, I argue that a president’s unilateral-multilateral decision is calculated based on one objective – whether unilateral or multilateral force offers the greatest probability of advancing or protecting U.S. interests. As I will demonstrate, Americans, in general, are ambivalent about how force should be used, and this level of ambiguity affords a president the “freedom” to make an expected utility calculation for his unilateral-multilateral decision.

**Sequential Decision Process**

The puzzle of a president’s unilateral or multilateral decision can be conceptualized as a sequential decision making process. Studies on presidential decision making have exhaustively examined an executive’s decision vis-à-vis a domestic audience (see Leeds and Davis 1997; Fearon 1994; DeRouen 1995, 2000; Tago 2005) and vis-à-vis relative military capabilities (see Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997; Morrow 1989; Kugler and Lemke 1996, 2000; Maoz 1983). However, these standard explanations have failed to theorize the use of force decision as a series of steps involving a first decision to use force and a second decision on how to use force (either unilaterally or multilaterally).
This failure to model a president’s decisions as a sequential process is at odds with significant findings in international relations research. Vasquez (1993, 2000, 2004) defines the pattern of steps that states go through with each step involving increasing hostility, resulting in violence, and perhaps in full-scale war. It should be noted that going through each step is not a necessary condition, as steps can be skipped. Also, states that have gone through some of the steps do not always go to war. The steps are a sequential process with de-escalation becoming increasingly difficult with each step toward war taken.

Research reveals empirical evidence of this sequential process. For example, Ruggie (1992) details a multilateral collective security model that involves a sequential decision process. A community of states responds to potential or actual aggression, first through diplomatic means, second through economic sanctions, and finally by collective force (Ruggie 1992, 569). U.S. action in the 1991 Gulf War followed the model, and NATO offers a truncated version of the model (Ruggie 1992, 570). A second example is Corbetta and Dixon’s (2005) work on third-party participation in militarized disputes and their conclusion that third-parties may join ongoing conflicts gradually, following the “steps of war” process. The progressive involvement of third-parties may even be included as an additional step to war (42).

Also, notable findings from the Correlates of War project explain crisis escalation as a “series of steps” rising from security issues and leading up to war (see Vasquez 1992; Singer 1980; Reed 2000). Dispute onset and escalation are “interconnected but distinct” processes with contextual (e.g., democratic peace and power transition) variables playing
a significant role in onset and the interdependent relationship between states probably playing a significant role in escalation (Reed 2000, 92).

A leader’s decision comports to this “interconnected but distinct” process (Reed 2000, 92). As a first step, presidents contemplate using force in order to gain “stakes” that they have not yet been able to attain (Singer 1982, 40). As a next step, leaders use threats and coercion in a test of their willingness to use their capabilities (either unilaterally or multilaterally) vis-à-vis an opponent’s willingness to use their capabilities (Vasquez 1992, 346; Maoz 1983; Leng 1980, 1983). Throughout the process, a leader, in facing a crisis, has both a domestic and international audience that compels him to take escalatory actions (Singer [1970] 1979, 72-78; 1982, 40).

As shown in figure 3.1, this dissertation models a president’s use of force decision using this series of steps conceptual framework. The decision is modeled as two steps, the decision to use force and the decision on how to force. The literature has thoroughly examined the former but largely ignored the latter, and in doing so, has “missed” an important step in a president’s decision making process. *This dissertation focuses on this second step.* A unified model incorporates the interaction between domestic political and military power capability factors in suggesting that a president’s decision to use force can be a separate decision from how he uses force.
Expected Utility Decision Strategy

The lack of domestic pressure to act multilaterally and the abundance of international factors to act unilaterally must be modeled as a presidential decision strategy. Expected utility is a natural extension and complement to hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin 1988, 605-606; Spiezio 1990, 169). Gilpin (1988) writes, “Statesmen try to make rational or cost/benefit calculations concerning their efforts to achieve national objectives…” (612). Subordinate states make a calculation and if the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs, they challenge a dominant power. This calculation is made based on a relative power difference between the subordinate and dominant state (Gilpin 1981, 187). The greater the disparity in power between a dominant and subordinate state, the less likely a challenge will occur. A hegemon’s self interest in maintaining the status quo compounds a subordinate’s calculation (Gilpin 1981, 145).
As part of the rational school of decision making, expected utility theory focuses on predicting decision outcomes and relies on a basic premise: actors are assumed to be utility maximizers, make holistic and compensatory decisions, and “do what they believe is in their best interest at the time they must choose” (Morrow 1997, 12; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). Using a game theory approach of strategic interaction, actors in a game consider the other actor’s motivations and choice sets before making their own choice (Morrow 1997, 11, 17; Smith 1999, 1255). This basic assumption of utility maximization and strategic interaction belies the predictive capability of expected utility, a president’s decision to use force can be modeled based on choices available and costs and benefits information (Stein and Welch 1997, 52).

In *The War Trap*, Bueno de Mesquita (1981) puts forth a formal model of an expected utility of war strategy. Decision makers, assumed to be single actors and rational expected utility maximizers, calculate going to war as the sum of the utilities of the possible outcomes (i.e., winning or losing) times their probabilities. When expected utility is estimated to be negative, maximization rules out use of force, but when it is positive, the option to negotiate is ruled out (Lalman 1988, 596). Each leader is assumed to be a rational actor, but each leader has his own inclination for risk and uncertainty (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 44-45). Risk-acceptant leaders attach some added utility to taking a gamble and are less constrained in making war decisions than risk-adverse leaders (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 34-35). Both the expected utility model and the risk attitude have been supported with formal and empirical tests (see Smith 1998; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992; Wang 1996).
Presidents base their expected utility calculation on military capabilities and can estimate the following with relatively little uncertainty: (1) the marginal advantage (or disadvantage) in war capabilities of his nation vis-à-vis a potential opponent; (2) how much he values the policies of his own nation vis-à-vis a potential opponent’s value of his policies; and (3) the capabilities of other nations that might become involved in the war (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 36). A fourth item, the relative value or utilities that other countries may contribute to him via-a-vis the value they may contribute to his potential opponent, is more difficult to calculate (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 36-37).

There is usually not a great amount of uncertainty with the first three issues. The first two points address the initiator’s capabilities and motivation and his knowledge of his opponent’s capabilities, and the third point concerns the capabilities of third parties. Given that national capabilities change slowly, these first three points should not involve a lot of uncertainty. However, national interests and commitments from third parties change quickly, and these changes may increase or decrease uncertainty (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 38). Also, the theory assumes that a nation’s power to wage war decreases as the location of the war increases in distance from the nation’s territory (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 45).

Given these factors, a president does not have complete information, and this uncertainty makes it difficult to make an accurate assessment of an opponent’s strength. But, this scenario of incomplete information resolves itself through a non-linear process with ex ante indicators of capabilities influencing a leader’s decision to initiate or escalate crises (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997, 25). Uncertainty
precludes a leader from knowing the probability of outcome success, but at each stage of the crisis, leaders gain an understanding of each other’s strength through signaling (Fearon 1994; Morrow 1989). A leader’s strategic choice is then based on his anticipation of an opponent’s subsequent behaviors (Smith 1999, 1255).

A Rational Actor Model of Unilateral and Multilateral Decisions

Presidential decision making should follow this sequential process with the president making an expected utility calculation as a second decision after he has already decided to use force. In general, democracies win wars they start, suffer fewer casualties, and they do so by choosing military strategies that “promise” short, low-cost victories (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 824; Reiter and Meek 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999a, 1999b, 2004). Major powers, engaging in collective security initiatives or multilaterally, lower the costs and are also more victorious (Stoll 1998). So, the president is likely to win the conflict regardless of choosing an unilateral or multilateral option, but he must still calculate the utility of acting alone or with allies.

Domestic politics may compel presidents to use force and influence how they use force, but the president himself, must answer the question of utility in terms of how best to project American military power.¹⁸ For this, a president may make an expected utility calculation, in which he calculates how easily victory can be obtained with and without ally military support (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 36). This is a tradeoff decision:

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¹⁸ The presidential decision making literature takes two approaches in explaining the interaction between a president and domestic political factors. One approach suggests the president is a strong leader with considerable freedom to conduct foreign affairs as he sees fit (see Kennedy 1956; Rockman 2000; Zoelllick 1999-2000; Prestowitz 2003; Patrick 2002; Fisher 1991a, 1991b). A second approach suggests the president is a weak leader and is held to the whims of Congress and the public (see Edwards 1989, 1997; Neustadt 1990; Foyle 1999; Sobel 2001; Laird 2005; Rockman 2000; Zoelllick 1999-2000, Cameron 2000; Binder 1999; Conley 2003; Jacobson 2003a; 2003b; Burke and Greenstein 1989).
maximize cooperation but minimize ineffectual action (Attanasio 2004, 19). More specifically, for how to use force decisions, a president can either increase the “benefit” side of the calculation by acting quickly, albeit alone, to defeat an opponent before that opponent has time to increase its capabilities or recruit additional allies. Or, the president can decrease the “cost” side with the addition of allies (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1989; Lalman 1988).

A president may choose a multilateral track if the benefits flowing from policy coordination outweigh the costs of lost policy autonomy (Ikenberry 2003, 535). President Clinton made this calculation during the 1990s civil war in Bosnia and the 1999 Kosovo crisis and decided that the loss in the U.S. preferred course was not greater than the delays and diplomatic bargaining used to convince other NATO countries to carry out airstrikes (Corbetta and Dixon 2004, 8; Gordon and Shapiro 2004, 33-36).

Multilateral force can be just as an important goal to Europeans as the end result, but U.S. presidents make multilateral decisions on whether or not they advance U.S. interests (Malone 2003, 21). Multilateralism slows down the process of using force (Stepanova 2003, 190). Multilateralism also means entangling rules and institutions (Maynes 2000, 36). The U.S. has little incentive to burden itself with rules or to bargain away its interests. All nations want to shed entanglements, rules, and institutions, if they can, but only powerful nations, such as the U.S. can do so without significant cost (Ikenberry 2003, 538). This is why Kagan (2002) calls multilateralism a “weapon of the weak” (4).
This also explains why presidents are more willing to use force, especially as military capabilities increase (Most and Starr 1989, 43; Fordham 2004, 652). It also solves the puzzle of why presidents, who understand that they must achieve victory quickly and with minimal casualties, would want to forgo multilateral actions that may simply delay or hamper U.S. military operations (Kamienski 2003, 2-3; Luttwak 1995, 121; Mueller 1993, 85; Konovalov 2004, 216).

Even if a president selects to decrease the “cost” side with burden-sharing, it may not necessarily mean significant military contributions from allies. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994) demonstrate in a 1991 Gulf War case study that President George H.W. Bush was forced to pressure allies for contributions and yet the U.S. still bore most of the cost (41, 74). Weitsman (2006) cites the $200 million cost (in 2005 dollars) to U.S. taxpayers that is being paid to U.S. coalition partners in Afghanistan and Iraq. More often, other nations realize the asymmetric power of the U.S. and understand the U.S. is willing to act unilaterally without international approval; so, they offer tacit UN Security Council political support of a U.S. draft resolution in exchange for putting some conditions on the proposed action (Voeten 2001, 856). These instances of nominal international political and military support may appease the public’s preference for multilateral action, but presidents are still faced with – what is for all practical matters – a decision to act alone.

Perhaps the best evidence that a president’s unilateral-multilateral decision is a cost calculation is the 2001 military campaign against Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The campaign was a procedural and operational multilateral effort, but President Bush relied
on a “hub-and-spoke” strategy. The U.S. alone made the key decisions and drew on its coalitional partners individually as needed for military or diplomatic purposes (Malone 2003, 33; Clement 2003, 403-406).

As illustrated in table 3.1, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) summarize the benefits and costs of acting multilaterally and the factors a president must weigh when making a unilateral-multilateral decision (514).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Common war plans</td>
<td>1. Slow decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Specialization of military tasks</td>
<td>2. Loss of secrecy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sharing of burdens and risks</td>
<td>3. Circumscribed freedom of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Economies of scale</td>
<td>4. Cumbersome systems of command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Common equipment and interchangeable parts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A president weighs these factors in making a rational choice calculation of whether to act unilaterally. Per figure 3.2, the actual costs and benefits of the policy coordination-policy autonomy trade-off are difficult to calculate in advance, but presidents must attempt to estimate the trade-off (Ikenberry 2002, 136).
Explanatory Factors for a President’s Use of Force Decision

In the previous chapter, I applied both the domestic and international explanations to the unilateral-multilateral debate, and demonstrated how domestic factors (burden-sharing and legitimacy) mainly explain why a president would want to act multilaterally, while international factors (problems of burden-sharing, inaction, collaboration and cooperation, reciprocity) mainly explain why a president would want to act unilaterally.

The First Decision: Use of Force

The central conclusion of this dissertation is that international factors, specifically American power, explains U.S. unilateral uses of force, but it is necessary to include domestic explanations for two reasons. First, Lyman (2002) writes of the “increasingly blurred” dividing line between domestic and international explanations for a president’s use of force decision, and how it is necessary to understand both levels in order to draw
reliable conclusions (75). Second, and perhaps most importantly, numerous works (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; Betts 1982; James and Oneal 1991; DeRouen 1995, 2000; Brule and Mintz 2006) conclude that domestic factors are important and necessary for explaining uses of force. A conclusion that even some realists do not dismiss (Gilpin 1981, 96; 1988, 599). Thus, this section covers the domestic environment, specifically politics, congressional involvement, and public opinion.

**Political Use of Force.** Recent efforts have focused on a political-based explanation of a president’s decision to use force as a challenge to the realist view that the international environment shapes this decision. Betts (1982) writes that nations go to war for political reasons, and domestic political factors often explain a leader’s crisis decisions (e.g., domestic politics reinforced Israel’s reluctance to mobilize in Sept.-Oct. 1973 despite Arab threats) (138-141). These efforts have bore significant results, and now domestic political forces are commonly associated with being the impetus for a president’s decision to use force (Tago 2005, 588). In fact, these domestic factors are found to be “more consequential” in the president’s political decision to use force than international factors (James and Oneal 1991, 307).

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19 In terms of political uses of force and unilateralism, there is little empirical work. Holloway (2000) tests whether or not partisanship determines nonaccommodating or nonmultilateral (i.e., unilateral) U.S. voting in the UN General Assembly from 1968 to 1993. He finds that the U.S. votes unilaterally (having a negative or “rejectionist” vote) as a general trend regardless of whether a Democrat or Republican is president. In terms of administration changes, he finds more unilateral voting with the Reagan and Ford administrations than with the Carter administration, but there was little variation in voting between the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. In fact, unilateral voting increased as a proportion of total votes from 1968 to 1993. Stepanova (2003) believes that U.S. unilateral uses of force during the 1990s and early 2000s can be tied to domestic politics. As examples, she cites President Clinton’s decision to strike Iraq on the eve of the impeachment vote in December 1998 and ties President Bush’s February 2001 strikes against Iraq to a worsening Israeli-Arab crisis (186-187).
Most significantly, absolute and relative levels of popular support are “the most important influence” on a political use of force decision (Ostrom and Job 1986, 559). Presidents can translate these high levels of support into successful uses of force in order to secure U.S. interests or to stabilize a deteriorating situation until a more suitable policy can be orchestrated (Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 532; Mueller 1993, 85). They can also synchronize “low-cost military actions” with elections or use a weak economy as the impetus for using force abroad to divert attention from domestic problems (DeRouen 1995, 671, 686-687; 2000, 323, 326; Fordham 1998a, 436).

Congress and the Use of Force. Presidents want congressional support for their use of force decision. Congress has the exclusive power to authorize war, a power that can muddy the Constitutional waters of placing U.S. troops at the behest of a collective security organization (Schlesinger 2000, 21). So, a president would be wise to consult with Congress and have its approval for military action. Congressional approval convinces Americans that the action was decided upon multilaterally (though Kull (2002) blames Congress for wrongly interpreting a public sentiment toward unilateralism). The intention is to diffuse the cost in the case of military defeat. But, Congress can be a fair-weather supporter and its members can be influenced by a vocal minority (Zoellick 1999-2000, 34; Lindsay 1995, 88; Lyman 2002, 84-85).

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20 Notably though, the diversionary hypothesis has little direct empirical support (Levy 1989; Foster and Palmer 2006).
21 As cited here, congressional involvement has been traditionally associated with the use of force decision. But, the Tago (2005) finding that a divided government is correlated with multilateralism is controlled for with the statistical tests. In short, I use a divided government variable as a control for the second unilateral decision.
Public Opinion and the Use of Force. Mueller (1971, 1973), Gartner and Segura (1998), and Brule and Mintz (2006), use polls as a proxy measure, to cite the importance of the public’s opinion to a president’s crisis decisions. Mueller (1973) claims polls “can suggest patterns of popular response that seem to have considerable generality” (268). Democratic leaders are dependent on public consent, and the greater the level of public participation in choosing leaders, the less likely that state is to initiate a dispute (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 824).

After all, presidents view domestic politics as “the essence of decision” (i.e., a noncompensatory decision) and use force as the public desires in order to ensure their political survival (Mintz and Geva 1997, 83; Mintz 1993; Brule and Mintz 2006). The domestic audience (i.e., constituents) serves as a constraint on the president’s decision to use force, but it can also empower a president to use force (see Foyle 1999; Sobel 2001; Reiter and Tillman 2002; Brule and Mintz 2006). Presidents, in using force may receive an initial “hawkish” boost of public support, but their electoral success often depends on a successful outcome (Mueller 1993, 85; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Goemans 2000). Moreover, the public becomes disillusioned with wars that become prolonged, especially as casualties increase (Mueller 1971, 371; Gartner and Segura 1998, 296).

Americans are “pretty prudent” in how American military force should be used. When they want force to be used, they issue “marching orders,” telling the president to reject “non-force” alternatives (Brule and Mintz 2006). The American public is supportive of using force for “restraining” governments or resisting aggression but not
for fostering regime change (see Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996). Americans are also “highly selective” of the countries they want the U.S. military to defend, and their support for defending these countries depends “strongly on the nature of the threat” (Russett and Nincic 1976, 429-430).

The American public also recognizes the costs and problems associated with using force, and in general, they “almost always” prefer non-force options to using force (Jentleson and Britton 1998, 415). Americans understand that military humanitarian operations are difficult and long-term responsibilities with U.S. soldiers often becoming the target of military opposition forces (e.g., Somalia) (de Waal and Omaar 1994, 3; Duffield and Prendergast 1994, 9-10; Haass 1994, 36). They also tend not to support committing U.S. military forces outside the Western hemisphere and do not support intervention in countries located in the “less strategic area of the global economy” (Russett and Nincic 1976, 430; Duffield and Stork 1994, 20).

Public support may also waiver, depending on how the media scrutinizes the president’s crisis decision (Mermin 1997). Since the Vietnam War, presidents have had to account for the role of the media (see Hallin 1986, 1991). The media are primary drivers in limiting U.S. humanitarian interventions to those that “can be done quickly with a minimum of risk” (Jakobsen 1996, 213). However, the media effect has an opposite influence on decision makers when national security is involved. Decision makers, in these instances, mobilize domestic and international support with less concern about casualties (Jakobsen 1996, 212-3).
The International Environment. There are notable international level assessments of adversaries, regime type and rivalry, that should influence a president’s decision. For regime type, democratic peace theory, in which democracies rarely, if at all, fight each other, has become a law-like theory in international relations and should matter to a president’s decision (see Russett and Starr 2000; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993). In particular, Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter, and Huth (1996) and Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (1999a) find that democracies are more willing to negotiate with one another rather than fight given the potential high costs. Also, whether the adversary is a rival should matter, based on the work of Goertz and Diehl (1993, 2000) and the finding that the U.S. and an enduring rival have historically used military action to deal with issues.

Do Domestic Political Factors Influence a President’s Unilateral Decision?

Given the lack of research on American unilateral uses of force, it is difficult to assess to what extent domestic factors may influence a president’s second decision. However, if presidents view domestic politics as “the essence of decision” and use public opinion as a proxy for domestic influences, then a review of how the American public views unilateralism and multilateralism should offer some guidance (Mintz and Geva 1997, 83; Brule and Mintz 2006).

Public Opinion and the Unilateral-Multilateral Use of Force

If the president is to follow public opinion, he will find that the public is ambivalent, and even contradictory, in terms of whether force should be used unilaterally or multilaterally. For example, “RFD” (1969) finds that the president, congress, the
military, and a substantial majority of the American public “strongly preferred substantially unilateral American action even when...it has meant a very large United States commitment of forces” (743). Haass (1994) also argues that U.S. military force should be unilateral, “the larger the U.S. stake and the larger (and more demanding) the U.S. contribution...” (35).

The failure of President Wilson’s League of Nations to win Senate ratification exemplifies the unwillingness of the American public to put its troops in harms’ way for abstract collective security matters (Bolton 2000, 64). Schlesinger (2000) writes of the political problem politicians faced in ratifying the treaty: “how to explain to the American people why their husbands, fathers, brothers, sons should die in conflicts on remote lands where the local outcome makes no direct difference to the United States” (20-21).

Americans’ disinclination with the League of Nations is also reflected in their skepticism of relying on the UN to protect America and its interests. The inherent nature of collective security organizations, such as the UN, is that reliance is placed on a collection of nations not chosen by the U.S. It is difficult, if not impossible, to convince the average American that such countries as Pakistan, Malaysia, or Montenegro are going to be able to, much less want to, protect America. Conceding American decision making authority to the Security Council or any other entity is simply unacceptable to the average American (Bolton 2000, 74).

Unilateralism is even endorsed along left and right ideological lines. Those on the right call for a policy of American hegemonic unilateralism, while those of the left call

But, as Richman (1993), Kull (1995-1996, 2002), and Lyman (2002) argue, Americans, in general, have an internationalist attitude and want a multilateral approach to foreign policy (Richman 1993, 264; Kull 1995-1996, 104, 2002, 99; Lyman 93). A German Marshall Fund and Chicago Council on Foreign Relations study supports the public’s multilateral bent. Seventy-one percent of Americans said the U.S. should act to solve problems together with other countries, and 61 percent said the U.S. should not act alone in responding to an international crisis (Ikenberry 2003, 543-544). A 1995 Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll found that 89 percent of Americans believe that the U.S. should work through the UN when using military force, and only 29 percent favor acting alone, even when the U.S. would be more successful on its own. A 2000 PIPA poll found that 79 percent of Americans favored using allies, regardless of the lack of confidence in allies effectively protecting shared interests (Kull 2002, 105).

It seems that Americans are telling the president that in terms of choosing unilateral or multilateral force that they want to have their cake and eat it too. For instance, Franck and Rodley’s (1973) argument that the “use of unilateral force remains and should remain illegal except in instances of self-defense against an actual attack” seems farcical and not supported by the American people (276). After all, the public wants to avoid Vietnam-type quagmires and feels U.S. commitment to international institutions, such as
the UN, should be limited to issues of “minimal United States interest” (RFD 1969, 743; Haass 1994, 36; Kull 2001, 30).

But, Franck and Rodley make a valid point because the public does prefer pursuing U.S. security interests multilaterally and does want “shared [world] leadership” (Richman 1996, 307; Kull 1995-1996, 104). Unilateral proponents partially acknowledge this collective security point, conceding that the U.S. should rely on some forms of multilateralism, including building military coalitions of “concerned states” (Haass 1994, 35).

Multilateral proponents acknowledge the imperial military capability of the U.S., but they argue Americans do no have an imperialist mindset. Maintaining a hegemonic position requires ruthlessness, but Americans want policies of “mailed fists” when necessary but also policies of “the helping hand” (Maynes 2000, 39).

In terms of “helping hand” military operations (i.e., humanitarian or human rights), the public seems to want multilateral action (Kull 2002, 107). If the U.S. acts alone, it leads to the perception of the U.S. acting as a bully (Kull 2001, 30). But more importantly, Americans want to minimize the costs, especially in terms of casualties. They are reluctant to accept casualties in cases in which the singular goal is unreciprocated humanitarian interests. One humanitarian disaster (e.g., Somalia) can even result in Americans being unwilling to assist in more serious humanitarian crises (e.g., Rwanda) (Nye 1999, 32).

Moreover, intervention in the name of human rights often means violating the sovereignty of another state. Fifty-nine percent of Americans are willing to support a
multilateral intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, while only 39 percent support unilateral intervention (Kull 2002, 108). NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is a prime example of public support for multilateralism. President Clinton, as well as other NATO leaders, presented the intervention as an international police action with an international mandate. The fact was the U.S. largely conducted the air war with the UK, France, and Germany conducting less than 10 percent of the airstrikes. President Clinton, understanding the fragility of public support, sought to minimize the costs (e.g., ruling out using ground force and keeping bombers at altitude with minimal risk from Serb ground fire) while trumpeting the burden-sharing components (Rabkin 2000, 120-121).

**Explanatory Factors for a President’s Unilateral Use of Force Decision**

So, domestic politics (i.e., public opinion) may influence a president’s unilateral decision, but the influence is ambiguous and without a clear domestic signal, presidents make a unilateral decision based primarily on international factors.23 Given the problems of reciprocity, inaction, and collaboration and the zero costs of unilateralism, a president may use the overwhelming capability of the U.S. military to act unilaterally. Not only does the U.S. have a traditional military capability advantage over a potential adversary, but it also operates on a new military revolution paradigm.

This military revolution advantage allows a president to make a unilateral decision more easily, given the high probability of minimal casualties and quick victory. Not only does a military revolution gap make a president more likely to act unilaterally, but

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23 The extent to which public opinion influences a president’s unilateral-multilateral decision is tested in Chapter VI.
situational factors – enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and a national security threat – also make a president more likely to act unilaterally.

The following section contains a review of the explanatory factor for a president’s unilateral decision – military power – as measured in terms of preponderance, technology, and force employment. I extend this definition of military power and its three measures to military revolutions. I conclude with situational factors, which is organized into crisis triggers and the Monroe Doctrine.

*The Second Decision: Unilateral Use of Force*

Once a president reaches the unilateral-multilateral decision stage, he will choose unilateralism based on superior relative military capabilities, a military revolution gap vis-à-vis an adversary, and in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. This decision is an expected utility calculation. However, in terms of crisis triggers, domestic politics may greatly impact a president’s calculation when facing a national security threat. In general, the American public is ambivalent about whether unilateral or multilateral force is used, but they may urge a president to act unilaterally when facing national security crises.

Realist theories, at their core, are about power in a *realpolitik* system, a system in which states “take care of [themselves]” and “no one can take care of the system” (Waltz 1979, 109). As such, America’s unrivaled power should serve as the main explanation for a unilateral use of force. International norms and rules require enforcement, and America is the only country able to militarily enforce the norms and rules (Luck 2002b, 54).
The international explanation in this section is comprised of military capabilities and the crisis trigger (or crisis environment). Biddle (2004) organizes capabilities into three main categories: preponderance, technology, and force employment (14). I follow his lead and also organize military power into these three categories but will argue in the following section that military revolutions encapsulates the aggregate of these three categories. I then discuss the crisis trigger or how the location, nature, and characteristics of the opponent influence an international level use of force decision.

*Military Power*

America has the strength of a great military power, whether it is measured as preponderance, technology, or force employment. To understand U.S. military dominance of the system, it is best to understand how capability can be measured using these three benchmarks.

*Preponderance.* The prevailing measure of military capability is numerical preponderance. States with the largest military, military expenditures, population, economy, etc… are expected to win conflicts. Realism and hegemonic theory, in particular, use preponderance to define power and explain the nature of international relations (see Morgenthau 1973; Gilpin 1981; Grieco 1990). A state seeks to gain a numerical advantage or increase its relative capability to another state (or states).

The study of capabilities and their influence on conflict initiation and outcome has been well-examined but with mixed results. Maoz (1983) and Wayman, Singer, and Goertz (1983) examine a nation’s military capabilities and conclude that allocating more

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24 The CINC score is the ideal example of how preponderance can be quantified.
resources to the military does not equate to outcome success (Maoz 1983, 195, 207). Unilateral military buildups are also not related to conflict initiation (Diehl and Kingston 1987, 801). In fact, the side with weaker military capabilities achieves success more often, and the most accurate estimators of success are industrial and urban capabilities (Wayman, Singer, and Goertz 1983, 497, 510). Moreover, a supreme advantage in military capability, such as possessing nuclear weapons, does not deter a challenger from initiating militarized disputes (Huth, Bennett, Gelpi 1992, 513).

Specific military capabilities may not matter, but in general, democracies, which “possess greater national wealth, and devote greater absolute resources to national security,” usually win their wars, at least in the short run (Lake 1992, 24, 32; Bennett and Stam 1998, 344). Bremer (1992) also suggests the strength of a great military power may matter as the absence of “overwhelming preponderance” often characterizes a war-prone dyad (322, 338).

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25 It should be noted that Gilpin (1981) cites military spending as a “nonproductive expenditure” and a “drain on the economy” (169). He cites it as a factor that may affect a hegemon’s decline.
America is certainly a great military power, and as illustrated in figure 3.3, the U.S. is willing to spend to maintain its military advantage. The U.S. has superior military technology, training, skills, and weapons vis-à-vis any adversary (see the Bush (2002) National Security Strategy). This is an especially poignant point in a post-Cold War unipolar world in which the U.S. possesses a historically rare “total package” of the world’s best army in terms of lethality, technological competence, and ability to project force globally (Thompson 2006, 14; Prestowitz 2003, 27; Ikenberry 2003, 538; Maynes 2000, 36).

Prestowitz (2003) and Ikenberry (2003) write about the totality of the package the U.S. military can bring to bear in projecting power. The U.S. has 12 carrier battle
groups (no other country has even one battle group). One forward deployed carrier with more than 50 strike aircraft can deliver more than 150 strikes a day, if called upon to do so. The U.S. has more than 250,000 troops at more than 700 U.S. installations in 40 countries. It has a 40 percent share of the total defense spending of all countries in the world, spending as much as the next 14 countries combined. It accounts for 80 percent of world military research and development. Prestowitz writes, “In terms of sheer military dominance the world has never seen anything like this” (2003, 26).

![Figure 3.4: UN Security Council Individual Member Expenditure, 1988 to 2005](https://first.sipri.org/non_first/milex.php)

This type of power disparity between the U.S. and the rest of the world, as illustrated in figure 3.4, reduces incentives to act multilaterally (Ikenberry 2003, 537). Multilateralism may even impugn a nation’s deterrence capability, if an adversary can
block any international effort against it. Wedgwood (2002) cites the credibility costs of multilateralism if adversaries can block the “mechanisms of multilateral machinery” (186). This may result in more international conflict, thus it is wise for the U.S. to maintain a reputation of a willingness to act alone and avoid the time-consuming, cumbersome process of establishing a multilateral coalition.

**Technology.** A second measure of military capability is technology, which can be organized into one of two categories: systemic and dyadic. Systemic technology holds that technology affects the international system and not particular states. Offense-defense theory is a prime example in which technology either favors the attacker or defender (see Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999; Lieber 2005). Relative capability between states matters little; the systemic technological advantage of being the attacker or defender is what determines conflict outcomes. For example, the invention of the machine gun and utilization of trenches favored all defenders regardless of nationality. Dyadic technology specifies that individual states can gain an advantage over an opponent by incorporating the latest technology. The U.S. military and policy communities follow this relative technological capability concept. The U.S. can use technology to outpace potential opponents and to minimize casualties in the event of conflict.

Even when the U.S. does work through multilateral organizations, such as NATO, American technological superiority grants its unilateral power to define operations in its national interest (Clement 2003, 399). For example, the U.S. military capability for the 2001 Afghanistan campaign so far exceeded NATO’s capabilities that NATO’s

**Force Employment.** Biddle (2004) argues that force employment is a significant, yet overlooked, third measure of military power. Force employment involves intangible factors, such as tactics, doctrine, leadership, and morale. Preponderance and technology do not adequately explain or predict conflict outcome; the inclusion of force employment is necessary (Biddle 2004, 20, 23, 52, 190, 196). Force employment, when used, is often held as a constant, causing problems when interacted with tangible factors (Biddle 2004, 18). Realists, in particular, largely ignore force employment based on the assumption that force is employed optimally (Biddle 2004, 18).

The modern system of force employment has been in place since 1918, in which trench warfare was replaced with “reducing exposure to hostile fire and enabling friendly movement while slowing the enemy’s” (Biddle 2004, 28). The tactics involve coordinating infantry and artillery efforts. A brief artillery barrage suppresses defenders, as small tactical infantry units use covering terrain to attack and exploit the defender’s weak points. The limited artillery barrage and the small, independent attack units do not allow a defender the time or ability to decipher the place of attack and amass reserve troops at the breakthrough point (Biddle 2004, 33). To successfully defend against an attack, a modern defensive system requires depth, reserves, and counterattack (Biddle
States win or lose conflicts based on mastery of this modern force employment system.

**Military Revolutions**

As discussed, military capability can be measured as preponderance, technology, and force employment. Traditionally, power has been defined as preponderance or the possession of certain resources. These resources include population, territory, natural resources, economic size, political stability as well as traditional measures of military capabilities (e.g., military expenditures and size of the armed forces) (Nye 1990, 178). These traditional measures of military capabilities play a role in a president’s decision, but, as Biddle (2004) and Corbetta and Dixon (2004) find, there is more to it.

The Correlates of War project defines a major power as having tangible assets, such as military capabilities, and intangible assets, such as reputation, global (and regional) interests and domination (Singer 1987, 121; Siverson and Starr 1991, 61-62; Corbetta and Dixon 2004, 7). Gilpin, while not explicit about what military capabilities are necessary for a hegemony, does cite the importance of significant military revolutions and how it affects the relative gains argument (Gilpin 1981, 62; 1988, 611). He writes, “The introduction of a novel military weapon or technique into an international system may give a particular type of society a significant advantage over others…” (63). As an example of military technological breakthroughs, he cites nuclear weapons and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Gilpin 1988, 612). For this reason, it is necessary to include an under-examined measure of military power – military revolutions.
Fordham (2004) writes of how tangible assets affect a president’s calculation, “Improvements in American military technology are at least partly offset by improvements in the capabilities of potential adversaries” (641). Presidents certainly need to account for an opponent’s improved capabilities, but what about a factor that bridges the tangible-intangible gap? This factor is military revolutions. How does the president calculate for the fact that an opponent is operating on an outdated military paradigm?

The U.S., dating back to the Civil War, has embraced military revolutions, and the fact that the U.S. is often at the front of them, may be the determining factor in whether a president chooses unilateral force (Krepinevich 1994; Hundley 1999). After all, military revolutions are like “earthquakes,” and states that embrace these revolutions and transform their militaries find themselves at an advantage in projecting power and winning conflicts (Murray and Knox 2001, 6-7). Military revolutions are comprised of technological change, systems development, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation that “fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict” (Krepinevich 1994, 30). Presidents may use military revolutions as a significant, yet simplified measure to calculate potential success in deciding to act alone.

*Land Warfare and Naval Revolutions.* Since the American Civil War, the competitive advantages of military revolutions are becoming increasingly short-lived in terms of time and duration (Krepinevich 1994, 40). The land warfare and naval revolutions from the mid-19th century to World War I involved railroads, telegraphs, rifled muskets, and metal-hulled ships with turbine engines. Information was
transmitted quickly, allowing military forces to concentrate quickly. Defensive trenches became standard as a counter to the murderous volume of fire from machine guns and improved artillery (Krepinevich 1994, 37; Van Creveld 1989, 172-173).

**Mechanization, Aviation, and Information Revolution.** The land and naval revolutions were followed by the mechanization, aviation, and information revolution from World War I to World War II. In this revolution, mechanized warfare (e.g., Blitzkrieg) and aircraft carrier warfare became the dominant paradigms for offensive-minded militaries (Hundley 1999, 12; Krepinevich 1994, 38; Van Creveld 1989, 168-171, 182). The use and exploitation of radios and radar made those dominant paradigms possible (Krepinevich 1994, 38). Winning wars became a “a contest between machines,” and this meant keeping ahead of one’s opponent in all areas: scientifically, industrially, and economically (Van Creveld 1989, 224-225).

**Nuclear Revolution.** The nuclear revolution accompanied the onset of the Cold War. When the U.S. built the first atomic bombs and dropped them on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the nature of warfare changed completely. To Bolton (2000), U.S. possession of nuclear weapons was “unilateralism in its most compelling form” (70). Nuclear weapons obliterate a potential defense, ensuring a “nuclear balance of terror” (Van Creveld 1989, 264). This balance assured that no country could use force to the extreme; so instead, the major powers concentrated on dispersion, which requires wireless communications and the miniaturization of electronics. This quest for electronic innovation resulted in electronic warfare, guided weapons, new military organizations (e.g., U.S. nuclear submarine fleet), and eventually integrated networks of
ground, sea, air, and space systems all connected to the “heart” of the network – the command center (Van Creveld 1989, 268-273, 279; Krepinevich 1994, 38).

*Current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).* The end of the Cold War signaled the U.S. launch of its current RMA. RMA involves using advanced technologies with a strategy that calls for quick and decisive victory with minimal casualties (Kamienski 2003, 2; Mazaar 1994, 12). More specifically, RMA involves using digital and information technology, sophisticated and automated command and control, and stand-off, precision-strike weapons with synchronized, rapid, global military operations to make quick, simultaneous attacks against an enemy’s strategic centers (Metz and Kievit 1994, 3; Warner 1999, 3; Mazaar 1994, 12; Biddle 1996, 141). The U.S. remains at the forefront of this revolution, as most other countries struggle over whether to adapt it (Hasim 1998, 1).

Most scholars note the overwhelming victory in the 1991 Gulf War as the first evidence of the U.S. military’s RMA (Krepinevich 1994, 30; Biddle 1996, 141; 1998, 1; Murray and Knox 2001, 189; Mazaar 1994). For the first time, the U.S. defied the Clausewitzian principles of destroying an enemy’s forces first with its strategic “decapitation” air campaign designed to kill or isolate Hussein and force Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait without a ground battle (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 78-80; Pape 1996, 222, 250; Press 2001, 12).

The U.S. victory, achieved in 42 days and with only 240 dead, is regarded as “a triumph of concepts and doctrine” with the U.S. employing “revolutionary changes in combat” and bringing “dissimilar weapons of forces” to bear against the Iraqis (Murray
and Knox 2001, 189; Keaney 1997, 149; Press 1997, 137). Press (1997) finds that superior U.S. technology and training were each sufficient conditions for overwhelming victory (138). The signal from the war was clear, as cited by India’s defense minister: “Don’t fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons” (Huntington 1993, 46).

The lopsided victory demonstrates the main advantage of RMA: disengaged combat. In disengaged combat, a general can fight the enemy “without ever placing his (or her) forces within range of most enemy weapons” (Mazaar 1994, 12). U.S. tanks and helicopters, using new “operational concepts,” destroyed Iraqi forces at will from safe distances (Mazaar 1994, 11-12; Murray and Knox 2001, 189). Disengaged combat offsets the public’s intolerance for risk-taking and casualties in use of force decisions, an intolerance often associated with the CNN effect or the media’s repeated airing of casualties (Jakobsen 1996, 213; Mazaar 1994, 11).

Minimal casualties and superior military capabilities are both necessary conditions for a president’s decision to use force (Kamienski 2003, 2-3). In meeting these conditions, presidents face a paradox: use superior U.S. military technology, training, and skills to wage campaigns alone or work with the international community. For presidents, quick and low cost victories are essential because “only decisive results are worth having,” and with RMA, presidents, as illustrated in table 3.2, can achieve unilateral military victory in minimal time and at minimal cost with overwhelming strategic and tactical advantages against an adversary (Luttwak 1995, 121; Kamienski 2003, 2; Jia 2003, 204).
Table 3.2: U.S. Battle Deaths in Principal Wars and Selected Military Operations, 1991 to 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War/Operation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Battle Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Iraq)</td>
<td>Jan. 16 – Apr. 6, 1991</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti)</td>
<td>Sept. 1994 – Apr. 1996</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Allied Force (Kosovo)</td>
<td>Mar. – Jun. 1999</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)</td>
<td>Mar. 20 – Apr. 30, 2003</td>
<td>109&lt;sup&gt;26&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)</td>
<td>May 1, 2003 – Sept. 30, 2006</td>
<td>2,046&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of Battle Deaths</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,513</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In crises, presidents, following the public’s orders, may appease legitimacy concerns with nominal political or military multilateralism, but the cost-benefit decision may be calculated based on whether an opponent has undergone a military revolution. This concept of the significance of military revolutions, along with domestic political factors, may best explain a president’s two-stage decision process. But, this decision may be tempered with situational factors.

**Situational Factors**

Realists, like Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Zelikow (1987), assume the state is a unitary actor, and the president uses the military to advance U.S. interests. Uses of force are a result of a combination of U.S. interests and capabilities (Zelikow 1987, 44). The

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<sup>26</sup> Data reflect the number of battle deaths from period of declared major combat operations.

<sup>27</sup> Data reflect the number of battle deaths since the declared end of major combat operations.
crisis trigger and location of the crisis are less an influence on a president’s decision to use force, than the international distribution of power. Gochman and Maoz (1984) studied over 160 years of military conflicts and concluded that the “objectives, motives, and methods of states remain the same” (165). Meernik and Waterman (1996) also studied domestic political factors, specifically the diversionary theory, and conclude that presidents use force when national security is at stake, when compelled to do so as a hegemon, and depending on the “peculiarities” of the crisis (587).

Presidents should marginalize public opinion and act in the national interest. Favorable public opinion allows more freedom of action, but national security is objective and adherence to sound realist policies creates a favorable public (James and Oneal 1991, 310). In fact, Lian and Oneal (1993) find a president’s approval rating increase is close to zero following a use of force, and Chiozza and Goemans (2004) find that a president’s tenure in office is not affected either positively or negatively with a win or a loss in conflict.

Though critics of realism, Ostrom and Job (1986), James and Oneal (1991), and DeRouen (2000) conclude that international factors do partially explain a president’s use of force decision. Ostrom and Job (1986) operationalize international factors as level of international tension, relative strategic balance, and extent of U.S. involvement in ongoing war (546). James and Oneal (1991) include an additional international variable, severity, in their replication of Ostrom and Job’s study. Severity measures five components: (1) number of states directly involved, (2) level of Soviet involvement, (3) geostrategic salience of location of a crisis, (4) degree of diversity among states involved
in a crisis, and (5) measure of the range of issues under dispute (James and Oneal 319). As such, even to realist critics, the international environment influences a president’s use of force decision.

Corbetta and Dixon (2004) in their multivariate analysis of the positive correlation between major power status and multilateral dispute participation argue that controls are necessary for state level and situational factors, as they may possibly mediate the effect of major power status on multilateral proneness (9). They find that situational factors do have an effect in that major powers tend to act multilaterally in disputes that escalate to war, that are of long duration, and have multiple opponents. Interestingly, they find that multilateralism is negatively correlated with a major power opponent (12).

Stepanova (2003), though confining her analysis to the 1990s, believes that U.S. unilateral military operations was based on a series of situational factors (tactical in nature): (1) conventional operations limited in scope, intensity, and duration; (2) highly selective and used against “semi-isolated backlash states or statelets” (Iraq, North Korea, Bosnian Serbs); and (3) based on vague military goals (Stepanova 2003, 184). Gilpin (1981) also expands beyond military revolutions and includes several factors based on military, technological, and economic factors that affect global governance.

Following the Corbetta and Dixon (2004) findings and Stepanova (2003) and Gilpin (1981) presumptions, I also include situational factors that may intervene to mediate the effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable, a president’s unilateral decision. These factors are as follows: (1) Monroe Doctrine, (2) humanitarian crises, and (3) national security crises.
Monroe Doctrine. The fundamental goal of rising powers and hegemons is to increase their spheres of influence and territories (Gilpin 1981, 37, 146, 187). To the U.S., the Western hemisphere has been considered its sphere of influence, and presidents may be tempted to act unilaterally against opponents located in the Western hemisphere in order to maintain the status quo (Fonseca 2003, 321; Meinig 2004, 319). This sphere of influence involves enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine (1823) informs other nations that the Western hemisphere is to be free from their influence, and the U.S. views any violation “as dangerous to [its] peace and safety” (Richardson 1907, 287). The U.S., in turn, vowed to remain neutral in wars between European powers and between European powers and their colonies, unless these colonies were located in the Americas.

The Doctrine, while derived independently, succeeded for 100 years because it met British interests and was enforced by the Royal Navy (Hendrickson 2006, 279). The UK wanted to prevent France and Spain from colonizing the Americas. So in a sense, for a century, America’s right to unilateralism in the Western hemisphere was made possible through the “free security” of the Royal Navy (Schlesinger 2000, 19).

But as Nye (1990) writes, the rise of American hegemony and the surpassing of British economic and naval power at the turn of the century resulted in uncontested U.S. leadership of the Western hemisphere. This transition from British to U.S. power was evident with the U.S. backing Venezuela in its 1895 boundary dispute with British Guiana and the UK appeasing America (185).
Soon thereafter, the UK formally ceded its naval supremacy in the Caribbean, and the U.S. took additional steps to maintain its hegemony (Meinig 2004, 331). President Theodore Roosevelt added a Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, in which the U.S. maintained the right to act as an “international police power” and intervene in countries of the Western hemisphere. The U.S. would spend the first three decades of the 20th century sending its troops to the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Panama to quell civil disorder and to protect Americans and American interests (Meinig 2004, 319).

By the 1930s, the U.S. was working to promote more of a multilateral, collective security image. It even agreed to a no forcible intervention agreement with the governments of South American states (Hendrickson 2006, 281). But, despite U.S. participation in these Pan American conferences, U.S. agreements were more about advancing its security and less about collective security (Meinig 2004, 324-325). The symbolism of a multilateral effort ended with the start of World War II, when the U.S. assumed responsibly for the defense of the hemisphere in a September 1940 “destroyers-for-bases” deal with the UK. In exchange for 50 of its warships, the U.S. gained controls of naval stations and airfields in eight British territories that extended a “shield” of American sovereignty from Newfoundland to British Guiana (Meinig 2004, 333-335).

After World War II, fear of Communism replaced fear of European intervention, and the U.S. aggressively defended the Monroe Doctrine with unilateral force (Wilson 1966, 322; Gibson and Pastor 1965). The Cuban Revolution of 1959, in particular, proved to be a particularly vexing problem for the U.S. The U.S. first sought to overthrow Dictator Fidel Castro and then it sought to isolate Cuba and use it as an example to
demonstrate the high costs of defying the U.S. to other Western Hemisphere countries (Meinig 2004, 384).28

Based on this historical record, it can be assumed that a president whether in 1907 or in 2007, will demonstrate the willingness of enforcing the doctrine with unilateral force (Wiarda and Wylie 2002, 16).

_Humanitarian Crises._ As suggested in the “Public Opinion and the Use of Force” section, nations, including the U.S., are reluctant to intervene in humanitarian crises, crises that often involve territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and the collapse of government authority (Helton 2004, 121). Intervention seems to occur only when one of the situation exists as follows: (1) the mission is relatively cheap, (2) against a militarily weak nation, (3) in an accessible and strategic location, (4) supported by public emotion, and (5) does not interfere with other political and economic priorities (Chinkin 2000, 37). Bureaucratic obstacles also plague both U.S. and UN humanitarian interventions (see Helton 2004). As such, presidents should be more likely to use multilateral force in a humanitarian crisis to lower the costs and risks.

The difficulty with humanitarian interventions is that they often involve violating the sovereignty of another state. Moreover, states can use humanitarian operations as precursors for other strategic interests. Cockayne and Malone (2006) trace the “creeping unilateralism” of U.S. actions in Iraq from 1991 to 2003. The U.S. initially intervened for humanitarian purposes with its Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, in which the U.S. with ambiguous UN support (Resolution 688) protected the Kurdish refugees in

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28 See Chapter VII for the Bay of Pigs case study.
northern Iraq. Operation Provide Comfort led to establishment and enforcement of the no-fly zones in 1991 and 1992, which was tolerated by the Security Council. But, all forms of multilateral legitimacy were shattered in 1998 with Operation Desert Fox and certainly in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq (Cockayne and Malone 2006, 123).

National Security Crises. When national security is at stake, the U.S. is more likely to act unilaterally than multilaterally (Bajpai 2003, 217). The most significant explanation for a correlation between national security threats and unilateralism may stem from American exceptionalism. Americans are reluctant to rely on international assistance in guaranteeing national security (see RFD 1969; Haass 1994; Mearsheimer 1994-1995; Kissinger 2001; Nye 2003; Franck and Rodley 1973).

Americans have legitimate reasons to be skeptical of allied assistance. From a military perspective, the U.S. military learned from its multilateral Kosovo campaign, lessons which included political constraints, complicated decision making, and marginal allied military capabilities. It then decided to incorporate unilateralism in its strategic doctrine (Clement 2003, 404). U.S. strategic doctrine relies on the unmatched military power of the U.S., and its ability to use its intelligence, precision-guided munitions, well-trained armed forces, and global reach capabilities to respond quickly to a threat (i.e., use its RMA advantage). The U.S. military is reluctant to share its strategic and tactical warfare plans with an underwhelming ally for fear collective action will diminish its response capability (Clement 2003, 404).

The 9/11 attacks provide an ideal example of the unilateral proclivity of the president, Congress, and the public. After the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of
the NATO Treaty, which regarded the attacks as an attack on all of its members. However, NATO military support was mostly symbolic, as the U.S. military decided to react unilaterally to the asymmetrical attack per its strategic doctrine (Clement 2003, 403).

*Regime Change Crises.* Regime change involves the infringement on another nation’s sovereignty, a controversial issue perhaps dating back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which recognized the sanctity of national sovereignty. Ironically, as the Treaty recognized the sovereignty of states as the defining unit of the international system, unequal distribution of power between states also defined the system (Fonseca 2003, 325). The fundamental equality of states forms the basis of legitimacy and should limit unilateralism (Fonseca 2003, 329). This probably explains why the American people are reluctant to want force to be used to foster regime change (see the “Public Opinion and the Use of Force” section).

As such, presidents may want to use multilateral force when using the military for regime change. But, the normative values restraining democratic states does not apply to how they act toward autocracies (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Presidents, with the public’s backing, may unilaterally topple a dictator in order to install a regime more friendly to the U.S.29 This ambiguity makes it difficult to formulate a generalizable, directional unilateral-multilateral hypothesis.

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29 See Chapter VII for the 1989 Panama invasion case study.
Conclusion

In the last two chapters, I have critiqued the domestic and international explanations for a use of force decision and how hegemonic stability theory can be used to conceptualize a president’s unilateral decision. I have used hegemonic stability theory to model a president’s crisis decision as a sequential process. The first decision, the decision to use force, has been thoroughly studied. But, the second decision and the significance of international factors in compelling a president to use unilateral force has not been well-examined; thus, it is the focus of this dissertation. I use the expected utility decision strategy to test this model with military revolution and situational explanatory factors.

In the next chapter, I correct the main conceptual flaw of previous research – what exactly is considered a unilateral use of force – specified in this chapter. Specifically, I offer coding rules for unilateral and multilateral uses of force, based on the work of Finnemore (1998), Luck (2002b), and Tago (2005). Even with coding rules designed to use a restrictive definition of unilateralism, presidents still act unilaterally a majority of the time. I also build on the Biddle (2004) and Corbetta and Dixon (2004) findings that the traditional measure of military capability (the COW CINC index) does not necessarily correlate with a unilateral/multilateral action. In its place, I offer the CIMR index as an alternative measure of military power.

The purpose of the last two chapters and the scientific test chapters is to illustrate that presidents are acting unilaterally based on a cost-benefit calculation. Domestic politics does not seem to be as significant a factor in a president’s calculation as
international factors. The president has considerable discretion, and as prescribed by hegemonic stability, chooses the best strategy to maintain the status quo. The best strategy is to act unilaterally, given the dominant capabilities of the U.S. militaries and the burdens of relying on multilateral partners. While the literature review and theory chapters serve as the foundation of this dissertation, the case study, statistical, and experimental chapters offer a thorough and rigorous test and an explanation as to why a president makes a unilateral use of force decision.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

In this chapter, I correct the problems with current research and detail the hypotheses, data sets, the crisis dyad, and dependent, explanatory, and control variables of my research design. In testing my hypotheses, I examine all dispute dyads from 1937 to 1995 using a two-stage bivariate model.30

I first continue the arguments from Chapters II and III and use that evidence to formulate my hypotheses. I argue that presidents, making an expected utility calculation, are likely to use force unilaterally given a revolutionized military vis-à-vis an opponent lacking in economic power (i.e., preponderance), military spending (i.e., technology), or not employing or not able to employ its forces consistent with the appropriate military revolution (i.e., force employment). I also believe that presidents are more likely to act unilaterally, when enforcing the Monroe Doctrine or facing a national security crisis.


30 1995 is the end date of Fordham’s (2001) descriptive list.
data set is ideal for identifying the crisis dyad, given its consistency with the decision making and conflict literature that emphasizes crisis escalation as a “series of steps” with decisions being made at distinct stages of the crisis (see Vasquez 1992, 1993, 2000, 2004; Singer 1980, 1982; Reed 2000). However, the COW MID data set is best for identifying the first decision, whether or not to use force, as it offers an ordinal scale that allows uses of force to be coded from a threat (level 2) to a war (level 5).

These two data sets allow me to identify the crisis dyad and code the use of force, but no data set exists for coding the second decision, the decision to use unilateral force. So, I offer a significant contribution – a decision matrix that allows researchers to code uses of force as unilateral or multilateral to obtain a universally valid unilateral use of force definition. The decision matrix allows a historian, social researcher, or novice to consistently define unilateralism as a U.S. use of force action without any military ally or political international support.

I next move to my other significant contribution and construct a CIMR index as an alternative measure of military power. Both Biddle (2004) and Corbetta and Dixon (2004) conclude that the traditional Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) score is not an adequate predictor of conflict success. I build on their findings and construct a Composite Indicator of Military Revolutions (CIMR) index, using accepted measures of military power – preponderance, technology, and force employment. In constructing the CIMR index and a series of military revolution variables – *preponderance gap, technology gap, and target country force employment*, I address Biddle’s (2004) criticism of using military revolution as a doctrinal concept and measure
of battlefield success. I conclude the chapter with a listing of the remaining situational factor and control variables.

**Hypotheses**

Using the evidence presented in Chapters II and III, I propose an inexorable link between power and unilateral action, based on American hegemony and America’s military revolution enabling advantage. The president, using an expected utility calculation, chooses a unilateral force option (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1989; Lalman 1988; Morrow 1997). Presidents tend to be realists and will rely exclusively on the U.S. military, if a victory can be assured quickly and with minimal costs and as it is necessary to maintain America’s governance of the international system (RFD 1969; Haass 1994; Kamienski 2003; Gilpin 1981, 32-34). The most significant explanatory factor in a unilateral use of force decision should be superior U.S. military power, more specifically a revolutionized military vis-à-vis an opponent.31

**Military Power**

As discussed in Chapters II and III, the most appropriate manner to operationalize military revolution, as an alternative measure of military power, is to use its three traditional components – preponderance, technology, and force employment – in a CIMR index. In doing so, I make two assumptions: (1) the president wants to maintain the U.S. position of military dominance and (2) presidents make a unilateral calculation with the goal of “winning” a crisis.

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31 An unavoidable problem is the fact that the U.S. rarely faces a strong opponent (i.e., a small gap as measured in terms of preponderance, technology, or force employment). This is a potential criticism, and it is perhaps the main reason why presidents are acting unilaterally a majority of the time. However, there is enough variation to allow statistical tests, and this issue does not affect the experiment and case studies chapters.
Preponderance. Hegemonic governance is based on power and prestige. The hegemon governs the system in establishing rules that allow it to profit (Gilpin 1981, 28-35). This is a casual arrow that goes in two directions: a hegemon maintains the stability of the system to reap economic profit and economic profit allows a hegemon to increase its reign over the system (Gilpin 1981, 34, 37, 139). A hegemon must possess both superior economic and military capabilities, and it must be willing to use its military to defeat an opponent that challenges the status quo of the economic system (Gilpin 1981, 129, 145). Based on a “hierarchy of prestige,” the hegemon must be willing to use force to defend its economic system and reputation, especially as the gap in material resources widens between it and a challenger. Hegemonic stability theory does not allow for a weak nation to defy the hegemon’s political-economic order (Gilpin 1981, 31, 32).

Hypothesis 1: A president’s decision to use unilateral force will correlate positively with an increasing gap in preponderance between the U.S. and an opponent.

Technology. Military innovation or technological advancement is associated with hegemonic stability. It is also associated with system dominance, and with the U.S. being at the forefront of technological breakthroughs since its Civil War, it can supply the public good of security unilaterally (Gilpin 1981, 60, 145). As the U.S. fears the relative gains of a technological breakthrough by a challenger, it can also take advantage of a challenger’s lack of technological advancement (Gilpin 1988, 612). The greater the technological gap between the U.S. and an opposing nation, the less the opposing nation is able to competently challenge the U.S. Technologically less advanced nations have engaged in conflict with the U.S. (e.g., North Vietnam in 1964 and the Taliban in 2001),
and in fact, a military capability advantage may not correlate with victory (see Maoz 1983; Wayman, Singer, and Goertz 1983). But, a president, for better or worse, can still estimate the war capabilities of an opponent with little uncertainty and is likely to choose unilateralism as the gap widens in technologies between the U.S. and the opponent (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 36).

*Hypothesis 2: A president’s decision to use unilateral force will correlate positively with an increasing gap in technology between the U.S. and an opponent.*

*Force Employment.* A scenario of incomplete information precludes using force in a crisis, but presidents can use ex ante indicators of an opponent’s capabilities to determine whether or not to initiate or escalate a crisis (i.e., use force) (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997, 25). A president calculating how to use force is likely to view an opponent with a military operating on an outdated military paradigm as easier target for unilateral force. As with a technology gap, the U.S., as a dominant military power, should use innovative military tactics, and if an opponent isn’t using innovative tactics, the president should be more willing to act alone and avoid the costs of adding allies (Gilpin 1981, 60).

*Hypothesis 3: Presidents are more likely to use unilateral force, if an opponent is not employing its forces consistent with the appropriate military revolution.*

*Situational Factors*

The other international explanations, based on situational factors, also should correlate positively with U.S. unilateral uses of force. Specifically, the U.S. will use
unilateral force in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and when facing a severe crisis (i.e., a national security threat).

*Monroe Doctrine.* The U.S. should enforce its interests unilaterally, as one of the fundamental goals of a hegemon is to increase its spheres of influence and territories (Gilpin 1981, 37, 146, 187). This unilateralism should be especially pronounced given the Monroe Doctrine and the declaration that the U.S. will use unilateral force in the Western hemisphere (Fonseca 2003; Wilson 1966; Hendrickson 2006; Wiarda and Wylie 2002; Gibson and Pastor 1965). A frequency count illustrates that the U.S. since 1946 has used force unilaterally 24 out of 33 times or 73 percent of the time in the Western hemisphere.

*Hypothesis 4:* *In accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, presidents are more likely to use unilateral force in the Western hemisphere.*

*Crisis Trigger.* U.S. unilateral uses of force will correlate positively with severe crisis triggers (i.e., national security threats) and correlate negatively with less severe triggers (i.e., humanitarian interventions). One of the fundamental assumptions of this paper is that presidents are realists, are less concerned about motive, and will use the military to advance and protect U.S. interests (see Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Zelikow 1987). Presidents should act instinctively to national security threats and use the path of least resistance to defend America (i.e., act unilaterally). They should be more calculating for crises (i.e., humanitarian) not vital to national security.

Using unilateral force, when facing a national security threat, should be a necessary condition of being a hegemonic power, and in fact, the U.S. is more likely to act
unilaterally than multilaterally when facing a national security threat (see Bajpai 2003). Meernik and Waterman (1996) find that presidents use force when national security is at stake, and presidents can use military force in national security incidents with little or no negative political effect (see Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Lian and Oneal 1993). This may be due to the fact that Americans, like presidents, are realists and are reluctant to rely on international assistance in guaranteeing national security (see RFD 1969; Haass 1994; Mearsheimer 1994-1995; Kissinger 2001; Nye 2003; Franck and Rodley 1973). This reluctance is grounded in empirical evidence (e.g., the problems with the multilateral Kosovo campaign) and is conveyed in U.S. strategic doctrine (an exclusive reliance on U.S. military power) (Clement 2003, 404).

**Hypothesis 5a: Presidents are more likely to use unilateral force when facing a national security crisis.**

Nations, including the U.S., are reluctant to intervene in humanitarian crises (Helton 2004, 121). The intervention must be inexpensive, offer a quick and easily winnable campaign, and must be publicly supported (Chinkin 2000, 37). Americans, in particular, do not prefer to use the U.S. military for interventions in less than developed countries and outside the Western hemisphere (Russett and Nincic 1976, 430; Duffield and Stork 1994, 20). They do not want long-term or risky operations (e.g., operations with potentially high casualties) (Jakobsen 1996, 213; de Waal and Omaar 1994, 3; Duffield and Prendergast 1994, 9-10; Haass 1994, 36). As such, presidents should be more likely to use multilateral force in a humanitarian crisis to lower the costs and risks.
Hypothesis 5b: Presidents are less likely to use unilateral force when facing a humanitarian crisis.

The Data Sets

The U.S. use of force dyads are derived from two main sources: the Fordham and Sarver (2001) U.S. Uses of Force data set and the Correlates of War (COW) data set (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996; Bennett and Stam 2000). These data sets both identify U.S. international crises and both include incidents where violence occurs as well as incidents where threats were made but no violence occurs. Both data sets are ideal for distinguishing between serious threats of force and routine movements of military forces or diplomatic disagreements. The different definitions and coding rules of the data sets allows for robust findings and increased confidence in the analysis.

The Fordham and Sarver (2001) U.S. Uses of Force Data Set

The Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set details 506 incidents involving U.S. uses of force between 1870 and 1995. The data set follows the coding rules of the Kaplan and Blechman (1978) U.S. Use of Force data set, which defines use of force as “a physical change in the disposition (location, activity, and/or readiness) of some part of the armed forces” (Fordham and Sarver 2001, 457). Fordham and Sarver (2001), like Blechman and Kaplan, do not aggregate incidents into one dispute, but unlike Blechman and Kaplan, they also include “martial” uses of force, incidents where the U.S. was “physically imposing [its] will” and when “decision makers must have sought to avoid a significant contest of violence” (2001, 460, 462-463).
The Correlates of War (COW) Data Set

Perhaps the most extensively used data set in international relations, the COW data set uses wars as its unit of analysis. The COW has the unique advantage of “being exhaustive” and is an invaluable tool with its “content validity” (Biddle 2004, 151; Kadera 2001, 118). While it does not have all of the explicit measures unique to this study (e.g., measures at the operational or tactical level, which are necessary to code unilateral uses of force), the unit of analysis, structured along dyadic wars, and its data contents are ideal given the systemic nature of hegemonic stability theory.

The COW MID list, in particular, quantifies a “militarized interstate dispute” as a series of explicit temporal interactions between states involving the threat, display, or actual use of force (Gochman and Maoz 1984, 587). It uses an ordinal scale (1 = no military response, 2 = threat to use force, 3 = display of force, 4 = use of force, 5 = war) to characterize dyadic conflict behavior. But notably, it excludes measures of cooperation or nonmilitary conflict (e.g., trade barriers), and its ordinal scale uses one unit of conflict to separate each of the conflict steps. An ordinal scale does not allow a researcher to be sure of “how much more severe” each step a nation takes is (Kadera 2001, 122-123).

The Crisis Dyad

The Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set is ideal for first identifying the crisis dyad, given its focus on the U.S. and the nuances of a president’s use of force decision. More specifically, it offers the following advantages: (1) incidents in which “U.S. national authorities” made military decisions; (2) incidents involving exclusively U.S. military
forces; (3) incidents against nonstate actors or intervention in civil wars; (4) incidents of U.S. military action regardless if occurring as the result of treaty provision or at the request of a target state; and (5) military incidents involving covert actions whether or not the targeted state responds (Fordham and Sarver 2001, 458-461).

Its most significant advantage is its adherence to a sequential crisis process, a necessary condition for testing in this dissertation. The Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set classifies wars as a continuation of an ongoing dispute. It records the individual incidents comprising a dispute but does not specify individual incidents within major wars. The COW MID data set, on the other hand, aggregates incidents into one dispute but does not separate a war from the events leading up to the war. This leads to the same war being labeled more than once in the data set. The differences are best exemplified with the 1958 intervention in Lebanon, which is listed as two uses of force in Fordham and Sarver but only as one incident in the MID data (Fordham and Sarver 2001, 462). Based on this, I use the Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set to identify the crisis dyads.

Identifying and Coding the Crisis Dyad

In identifying the crisis dyads, I begin by using the Fordham and Sarver (2001) “U.S. Uses of Force, 1870-1995” descriptive list to label each “major” U.S. use of force from 1937 to 1995.\textsuperscript{32} The “major” uses of force are based on Fordham’s coding of Blechman

\textsuperscript{32} The descriptive list can be obtained from Fordham’s website at http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~bfordham/list.pdf (December 5, 2006). The descriptive list is pulled from the Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set, which is available on-line at http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~bfordham/data.html (December 5, 2006). The Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set is a compilation of the descriptive list, which is based on the research of many authors including the following: Grimmett (2004), Ellsworth (1974), Offutt (1928), Blechman and Kaplan (1978), Zelikow (1987), and Fordham (1998b).
and Kaplan’s (1978) classifications: (1) use of strategic or theater nuclear unit plus at least one major force component, (2) two or three major force components but not strategic nuclear units, and (3) either one major force component or strategic unit used (1998b, 585).

Once I have identified the crisis dyad, I next need to label U.S. action in the crisis dyad as unilateral or multilateral. It is best to start this process using established research. As stated in the introduction, scholars assume unilateralism is undesirable and as such, they focus on types of multilateralism. A president can either act unilaterally or multilaterally, but this is not a dichotomous decision. As detailed in Chapter III, there are four broad categories: (1) unilateralism, (2) UN-sponsored multilateralism, (3) three-or-more-state multilateralism, and (4) two-or-more-state multilateralism (see Keohane 1990; Ikenberry 2003; Ruggie 1992; Corbetta and Dixon 2004; Ashby 2004; Stepanova 2003; Tago 2005). The more minimalist, two-state definition operationalizes multilateralism as procedural or operational (see Tago 2005).

To fully answer my research question and to use the most demanding test possible, I use the minimalist, two-state definition of multilateralism. Using this minimalist definition of multilateralism allows me to consistently define unilateralism as a U.S. use of force action without any military ally (e.g., NATO) or political international support (e.g., UN or OAS). This is a universally accepted definition of unilateralism, and it avoids any research problems as specified in the “Unilateralism is Multilateralism and

33 Using only the top three levels of force allows for the exclusion of routine troop movements and incidents of ambiguous political significance (Fordham 1998a, 426).
Multilateralism is Unilateralism” section of Chapter III. Using such a restricted
definition also permits greater confidence in the findings.

The best method to define an action as unilateral is to develop coding rules to
examine each individual crisis. So, I first develop coding rules based on the Finnemore
(1998), Luck (2002b), and Tago (2005) operational and procedural dimensions. The
operational dimension defines multilateralism as military coalitions with unified
command and control and joint operational coordination and execution of military
operations. The procedural dimension defines multilateralism as the international
community’s political and diplomatic endorsement, including formal authorization of the
U.S. military action. Procedural multilateral events are possible but rare events. The
majority of U.S. uses of force are unilateral or operational multilateralism (Tago 2005,
586-587). Per table 4.1, these dimensions can be illustrated in a 2 x 2 table as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Unilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>Political and Military Unilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Multilateralism and Military Unilateralism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated in figure 4.1, I construct a decision matrix to operationalize these
definitions of operational multilateralism, procedural multilateralism, and unilateralism.
In quantifying each of the three types of force, I use the crisis dyad as the unit of analysis
and examine each incident at the strategic and tactical levels. The decision matrix is as follows:

![Figure 4.1: Decision Matrix for Coding Unilateral/Multilateral Uses of Force](image)

1990” list. I use the answer to these questions – procedural multilateralism, operational multilateralism, or unilateralism – to comprise the *U.S. action* variable.  

Table 4.2 is a frequency count of the three crisis data sets (USUFAD, ICB2, and U.S. Uses of Force data set) from table 1.1 broken into full unilateralism, operational multilateralism, procedural multilateralism, and both operational and procedural multilateralism. Notably, the USUFAD reflects Tago’s (2005) coding rules, while the ICB2 and U.S. Uses of Force data set reflect a frequency using my coding rules. The continued dominance of full unilateralism and the rarity of procedural multilateralism only cases is evident in all three data sets.

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34 The Center for Naval Analyses list can be found at http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/forces_cold.htm.
35 The *U.S. Action* list with description of coding for each crisis is included as Annex A.
Table 4.2: Frequency Count of Full Unilateral, Procedural Multilateral, and Operational Multilateral Uses of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USUFAD</th>
<th>ICB2</th>
<th>U.S. Uses of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Unilateralism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar Period (1937 – 1938)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II (1939 – 1945)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (1946 – 1990)</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War (1991 - )</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Multilateralism Only</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar Period (1937 – 1938)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II (1939 – 1945)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (1946 – 1990)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War (1991 - )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Multilateralism Only</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar Period (1937 – 1938)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II (1939 – 1945)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (1946 – 1990)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War (1991 - )</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural &amp; Operational Multilateralism</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar Period (1937 – 1938)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II (1939 – 1945)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War (1946 – 1990)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War (1991 - )</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Presidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Unilateralism</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Multilateralism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Multilateralism</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural &amp; Operational Multilateralism</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Presidents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Unilateralism</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Multilateralism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Multilateralism</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural &amp; Operational Multilateralism</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Crises/Uses of Force</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable

Using the *U.S. action* variable, I construct the dependent variable in two steps, which is consistent with the sequential decision making assumption of this dissertation. First, I use the COW MID dispute level to code whether military force was used in the crisis.
Second, if force was used, I code unilateral incidents from the *U.S. action* variable as a *unilateral* dependent variable.

**Use of Force**

The Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set and its listing of “major” uses of force is a misnomer, as it follows the coding rules of the Kaplan and Blechman (1978) U.S. use of force data set. The Kaplan and Blechman data set chronicles “U.S. decisions to use military force as a political instrument” and perhaps does not involve an actual military conflict or use of force (Fordham and Sarver 2001, 456). For example, the U.S. sent an additional carrier to Lebanon during its 1976 civil war, and it is coded as a “major” use of force in the Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set. However, in reality, the U.S. was not involved in an actual military conflict.

Fordham and Sarver (2001) are making the correct assumption that when a president threatens to use force, he is willing to use force (see Smith 1998). But, I need a more restrictive post-hoc data that measures the level of conflict. So, I use the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program (*EUGene*) software (Bennett and Stam 2000) to obtain the COW MID data set’s overall hostility level score to code the U.S. involvement.

I code this involvement, *force*, as a dichotomous dependent variable: no force used or force used. I code a one (force used) for a COW MID dispute level (cwhostd) of 2 or higher (2 = threat to use force, 3 = display of force, 4 = use of force, 5 = war). For a COW MID dispute level of 1 or lower (0 = no hostility, 1 = no militarized action), I code it zero as no force used. This construction of the Fordham – Cow MID *force* variable
adequately accounts for the first stage decision of whether a president decides to use force or not.

*Unilateral Use of Force*

If the *force* variable is coded one, I use the coding of each crisis dyad (unilateral, procedural multilateralism, or operational multilateralism) to code the *unilateral* dependent variable. If *U.S. action* was procedural multilateralism, operational multilateralism, or both, I code a zero. If *U.S. action* was unilateral, I code a one.

**Explanatory Variables**


*Military Revolutions*

One of the significant contributions of my dissertation is the idea that a military revolution index serves as an alternative to the traditional measure of military capability, the CINC index. In fact, following Biddle’s (2004) and Corbetta and Dixon’s (2004) concerns about the inadequacies of the CINC index, I test whether the CINC index correlates with a unilateral/multilateral action (Corbetta and Dixon 11; Biddle 20-21).

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36 If the *force* variable is coded zero, I code the *unilateral* dependent variable as zero; the same as if the U.S. action was multilateral. This allows me to exclusively examine only unilateral uses of force.
To construct a military revolution variable, I use Biddle’s (2004) work as a starting point.

Biddle (1996, 1998, 2004) is a leading critic of the current RMA, and his findings warrant further elaboration. As discussed in Chapter II, Biddle proposes force employment, unchanged since 1918, as an explanatory variable of success or failure in military conflict. While he attributes the outcome of the 1991 Gulf War to a “synergistic interaction between a major skill imbalance and new technology,” he does not believe that the technological changes associated with RMA created a new form of warfare (Biddle 1996, 140; 2004, 197). To Biddle, so-called technological innovation (increasing striking range and lethality of precision weapons and better information collection and processing) are simply “extensions of longstanding trends” (2004, 197).

I do not dispute Biddle’s emphasis on force employment. I agree that a modern system entails effectively reducing exposure to increasing lethality, range (or speed), and surveillance (Biddle 2004, 52, 197). I also do not take issue with the fact that success has been positively correlated with effective cover and concealment since 1918. But, I argue that a strict moral, political, and military adherence to all but eliminating casualties is a revolutionary concept that became the operating paradigm with the 1991 Gulf War.

Militaries, the U.S. in particular, have wanted to reduce the exposure of their troops, once generals (and politicians) realized that employing Napoleonic tactics was tantamount to dooming troops to a cannon fodder death. For the U.S., this realization occurred with the land warfare revolution (Krepinevich 1994, 37; Van Creveld 1989, 172-173). But, this reduction in exposure was an expected utility calculation. Losses
occurring from direct assaults (e.g., the D-Day beach landings) were acceptable as long as victory on the battlefield was highly probable.

But, the concept of trying to achieve victory with few, if any, casualties is revolutionary, and a concept that took hold in the 1991 Gulf War. Biddle’s identification of a reduced exposure force employment system is identifiable with the current RMA’s emphasis on disengaged combat. But, disengaged combat means achieving victory with minimal or possibly no casualties. Presidents can make the decision to fight and win a war, while not putting soldiers’ lives at risk. President Clinton’s Kosovo decision serves as an ideal example: no ground troops were used and planes were instructed to fly at altitudes beyond the range of ground fire.

So, in measuring and operationalizing military capability, I agree with Biddle’s three categories – preponderance, technology, and force employment – and that all three are important determinants of battlefield success. But as shown in figure 4.2, I believe that military revolutions are measured using the three components:

![Figure 4.2: Components of Military Revolutions](image)

A nation must be willing to spend ample resources on its military, develop and utilize the latest technological innovations, and employ its forces consistent with the operating
paradigm. The U.S. has been at the forefront of these military revolutions since the Civil War, and its victory in war and battle is empirical evidence of successful incorporation of these three elements (see Krepinevich 1994; Hundley 1999).

*Preponderance Gap.* One of the most popular and simplest single indicator of military power is Gross National Product (GNP). Organski and Kugler (1980), Organski (1958), and Rosen (1972), among other researchers, prefer a single GNP indicator, as there is a high positive correlation between GNP and the six measures of the CINC score. Given one of the fundamental elements of hegemonic stability theory is economic dominance, the U.S. should maintain a significant gap between it and its potential adversary. Gilpin (1981) writes, “It is obvious that there is a generally a positive correlation between the material wealth of a society and its military power; wealthier states tend to be more powerful” (65). So, following Biddle (2004), I account for preponderance, based on the assumption that “economic strength is a necessary precondition for military strength” (14).


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37 Biddle (2004) measures preponderance as force-to-force ratio and as force-to-space ratio (14-15, 71, 155-158), but his analysis involves more of a tactical assessment. As he acknowledges, measuring preponderance as GDP (or GNP) is a traditional method for more strategic assessments (14, 21).
GDP, 1-2003 AD” data set.\footnote{The data set is available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_10-2006.xls.} I first calculate the U.S. percentage of the world’s total GDP:

\[
\% \ \text{GDP}_{US} = \frac{\text{GDP}_{US}}{\sum \text{GDP}_{world}} \quad [4.1]
\]

where:
- $\text{GDP}_{US}$ is U.S. GDP in millions of dollars (1990) and
- $\sum \text{GDP}_{world}$ is the sum of the world’s total GDP in millions of dollars (1990).

I then calculate the target country’s percentage of the world’s percentage total GDP:

\[
\% \ \text{GDP}_{TargetCountry} = \frac{\text{GDP}_{TargetCountry}}{\sum \text{GDP}_{world}} \quad [4.2]
\]

where:
- $\text{GDP}_{TargetCountry}$ is the target country’s GDP in millions of dollars (1990).

I use the $\% \ \text{GDP}_{US}$ and $\% \ \text{GDP}_{TargetCountry}$ scores to calculate the \textit{preponderance gap} variable for each unit of analysis:

\[
\text{Preponderance Gap}_{\text{CrisisDyad}} = \frac{\% \ \text{GDP}_{US}}{\% \ \text{GDP}_{TargetCountry}} \quad [4.3]
\]

Given the lack of GDP data before 1950, I run my model from 1937 to 1995 without a \textit{preponderance gap} variable to determine the significance of the target country force employment, technology gap, and other variables. I then run it from 1950 to 1995 with a \textit{preponderance gap} variable, and the result is a more robust finding.
Technology Gap. In Win, Lose, or Draw, Stam (1999) writes of the indeterminate role technology plays in war and of the confusing nature of whether a particular weapon favors the offense or defense. He writes, “...it is not so much the absolute level of technology present during a war that affects the outcome but rather the relative degree of technical skill and technological investment that the two sides possess” (95). Training and technology are expensive, “approaching the cost of actually fighting a war;” so, a state that spends more on its soldiers should win military victory (94-95).³⁹

Both Stam (1999) and Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi (1992) argue technology can be operationalized as additional spending per soldier, which captures training, equipment, and technology costs. So, I follow their lead and measure technology in the same manner. I use the COW data set to first create a U.S. technology score:

\[
\text{Technology}_{US} = \frac{\text{Military Expenditures}_{US}}{\text{Military Personnel}_{US}} \quad [4.4]
\]

where:
- \(\text{Military Expenditures}_{US}\) is the total military budget in current year U.S. dollars and
- \(\text{Military Personnel}_{US}\) is the number of personnel in thousands.

I then calculate the technology score for the target country in the same manner:

\[
\text{Technology}_{TargetCountry} = \frac{\text{Military Expenditures}_{TargetCountry}}{\text{Military Personnel}_{TargetCountry}} \quad [4.5]
\]

³⁹ Biddle (2004) disagrees with Stam’s military spending per soldier measure, arguing it is biased in favor of capital-intensive air and naval powers (251). He measures a country’s technology score as the introduction date of tanks/aircrafts weighted by the number of each type (24). But, as with the preponderance variable, Biddle’s assessment is more of a tactical nature, and he agrees that Stam’s measure is suitable for a more strategic assessment (251, 306).
Finally, I calculate the technology gap variable based on the technology ratio of the U.S. and the country it is engaged with in a crisis:

\[
\text{Technology Gap}_{\text{Crisis Dyad}} = \frac{\text{Technology}_{\text{US}}}{\text{Technology}_{\text{Target Country}}} \quad [4.6]
\]

**Target Country Force Employment.**\(^{40}\) As stated in the argument for a CIMR index, a military must be employing its force on the correct operating paradigm in order to compete on the global stage. While Biddle (2004) argues that military actions are less about revolution and more about force employment, I believe, at least from a strategic viewpoint that a nation’s military must be prepared to fight a war consistent with the era.\(^{41}\) Based on the literature, presidents will be wary of using force against an opponent that has transformed its military to meet the existing military paradigm but have less reservations about acting unilaterally against a military not using or not possessing the capabilities to use the latest force employment tactics.

From 1914 to 1945, the revolution was the mechanization, aviation, and information; so, I code a one for the target nation if it possessed tanks, aircraft carriers, and/or radar at the start of the crisis (Hundley 1999; Krepinevich 1994; Van Creveld 1989). From 1946 to 1990, the revolution was nuclear; so, I code a one for the target nation if it possessed

---

\(^{40}\) A force employment gap variable would be ideal, but as the variable is a dummy variable and the U.S. has been at the forefront of military revolutions since the Civil War, the U.S. is coded a one throughout the data set. So, I code a dummy variable for the target country based on whether it is capable of employing its force consistent with the appropriate revolution. See the “Target Country Force Employment” subsection in this chapter and Chapter V for further explanation.

\(^{41}\) Biddle (2004) operationalizes force employment using an indirect test involving casualties, duration of troops engaged, and the ground taken (150-180). As with his preponderance and technology measures, his assessment is of a tactical nature.
nuclear weapons at the start of the crisis (Hundley 1999; Krepinevich 1994). The nations, being coded a one, are Russia, China, and Israel. Russia achieved nuclear power status in 1949 (Freedman 1999, 43). China achieved nuclear status in 1964 (Wang 1977, 87). Israel is alleged to have had nuclear weapons in 1967 (Farr 1999). From 1991 to the present, it is the current RMA; so, I code a one for the target nation if its military had global reach capability and it possessed a disengaged combat capability (e.g., cruise missiles or Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles) at the start of the crisis (Van Creveld 1989; Krepinevich 1994; Murray and Knox 2001; Biddle 1996, 1998; Mazaar 1994).

Situational Factors

An international explanation of unilateralism requires operationalizing the following factors: (1) Monroe Doctrine and (2) crisis triggers.

Monroe Doctrine. As discussed in Chapter III, the U.S. should maintain its main sphere of influence, the Western hemisphere, unilaterally. The americas region is an explanatory variable to test the Monroe Doctrine. According to the Doctrine, presidents view the Western hemisphere as America’s exclusive sphere of influence; therefore, they should prefer to use unilateral force in the region (Wiarda and Wylie 2002; Wilson 1966; Gibson and Pastor 1965; McGee 1951; Slechta 1914). A U.S. opponent located in the Americas (or Western hemisphere) is coded as a one and the other regions, Europe, Middle East, Africa, and Asia are coded zero. The Western hemisphere countries tested

\footnote{Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi (1992) find that nuclear weapons do not have an impact on dispute initiation (513). A rival’s possession of nuclear weapons does not deter a challenger from initiating a dispute, possibly because the challenger does not believe the rival has the resolve to use nuclear weapons (513). But, nuclear weapons remain a potent military capability and must be accounted for in this paper.}
in the Statistics Chapter are as follows: Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador.

*Crisis Triggers: National Security, Regime Change, and Humanitarian.* Following James and Oneal’s (1991) finding that the severity of crisis is important, I also account for the type of crisis. Using the same historical and data set sources as used in the Crisis Dyad section, I code a crisis as a national security, regime change, or humanitarian event in figure 4.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 4.3: Decision Matrix for Coding of Crisis Triggers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Analysis: Crisis Dyad</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Was the U.S. facing a Soviet/communist/terrorist threat and/or a threat to its sovereignty, territory, or political autonomy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Was the goal of U.S. action to overthrow the ruling regime of a country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes. Regime Change. No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Was the goal of U.S. action to alleviate suffering or evacuate its citizens from harm’s way?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes. Humanitarian.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Control Variables**

An explanation of unilateralism also requires inclusion of control variables, in particular those that offer a domestic explanation. For my control variables, I include factors that account for domestic, international, and target characteristic explanations.

---

43 I code crises as national security, regime change, and humanitarian to most accurately reflect the empirical world. While I am able to test all three crises in Chapter VII, a lack of regime change observations (22) and a lack of literature support for a determinate directional hypothesis means I do not test a *regime change* variable in Chapter V. For reasons supporting the lack of a directional hypothesis, see the “Public Opinion and Use of Force” section in Chapter II.
For domestic factors, I include the following variables: (1) president’s approval rating, (2) public support for force, (3) misery index, (4) divided government, and (5) Republican or Democrat president. For international factors, I include a Cold War and initiator variable. For target characteristic factors, I include the following variables: (1) relative capabilities, (2) rivalry, (3) regime type, and (4) alliance.

*Domestic Factors.* As stated in the opening paragraphs of this introduction, the ultimate decision for a president is whether or not to use U.S. military force. Recent research discounts a realist black box approach to explaining state behavior; instead, it emphasizes a domestic political influence on the decision to use force or not to use force (see Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; DeRouen 1995, 2000, 2003; Fordham 1998a, 1998b; Mueller 1993; Richman 1993; Mintz 1993). This domestic-based explanation needs to be included as a control, and in including domestic variables, I use the variables of earlier research (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; DeRouen 1995; Fordham 1998a, 1998b; Brule and Mintz 2006).

For a set of domestic controls, I include the following variables: (1) a divided government measure, (2) a misery index score, (3) president’s approval rating, (4) a Republican or Democrat president measure, and (5) public support for force. Presumably, presidents may seek to boost their approval ratings by using force abroad, especially if they are suffering from low ratings and/or a high misery index (see Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; DeRouen 1995; Fordham 1998a, 1998b).
public may “order” a politically weak president (held to follow the whims of the public) to use force (Brule and Mintz 2006; Edwards 1989).

The divided government variable accounts for the possibility that if the opposing party controls congress, a president may have a more difficult time using unilateral force (Fordham 1998a; Tago 2005).\(^{44}\) A divided government is identified with a one and a unified government with a zero. The misery index score, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau, is a summation of unemployment and inflation.\(^{45}\) The president’s approval rating variable, based on Gallup poll data, assumes that a president’s approval rating is directly linked to military intervention, casualties, and U.S. prestige and results abroad.\(^{46}\) The Republican president quantifies possible partisan use of force decisions with Republican presidents coded one and Democrats zero (Fordham 1998a).

The public support variable requires a more complex operationalization in order to reflect the level of American public support for the use of military force in response to an international crisis (Brule and Mintz 2006; Mueller 1971, 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998). I construct the public support variable using Gallup poll data.\(^{47}\) In searching the opinion poll data, I used keyword searches, such as military, force, troops, and the name of the target nation that the U.S. faced in a crisis. I only used polls that preceded a

---

\(^{44}\) This is the only control variable for the unilateral model.


\(^{46}\) The Gallup poll data can be obtained from Fordham (1998b) for the years 1949 to 1994 and from The Roper Center via Lexis-Nexis.com for the years 1937 to 1948 and for 1995.

\(^{47}\) The Gallup poll data can be found through the Roper Center, University of Connecticut.
president’s use of force decisions, and not post hoc evaluations that measure opinion after the president decided to use force.

In using these polls that preceded a president’s decision to use force, I rely on two types of polls questions. First, I use questions that ask respondents about a specific crisis and whether or not force should be used. For example, when Germany invaded France in World War II, the Gallup organization asked the following question in May 1940, “What (should the United States do if Germany defeats England and France)?” Seven percent responded: “U.S. should get into it now, should not let the Allies get defeated, fight, help the Allies” and two percent responded: “Declare war on Germany, go to war with Germany.” So, I code a nine percent approval rating for using U.S. force against the Germans for the 1940 English-U.S. crisis dyad in the Fordham – COW MID data set.

Second, if the former question was not available, I use questions that ask respondents speculative questions about situations that may occur. If the situation occurs within five years of the speculative question, I use the question given that it is the most recent poll. For example, the Gallup organization asked the following question in January 1969, “If a situation like Vietnam were to develop in another part of the world, do you think the U.S. should or should not send troops?” Twenty-five percent of the respondents thought the U.S. “should” send troops; so, I use this 25 percent and generalize to the 1973 Laos-U.S. and Cambodia-U.S. crisis dyads in the Fordham – COW MID data set.

International Factors. The second set of variables accounts for characteristics of the international system. The Cold War variable identifies the period from January 1949 to December 1991 (marking both the banning of the Communist Party in Russia and the
formal independence of the Soviet Republics). The Cold War period is coded with a
one, and the pre- and post-Cold War period is coded with a zero. A president may have
been less likely to use force for fear of a tit-for-tat response from the Soviets.

The *initiator* variable accounts for the fact that a president may be responding to an
opponent’s aggressive act or he may be taking the initiative against an opponent (Bueno
de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). A president responding to a crisis is probably more
likely to use force. The variable, taken from the COW MID data set, codes a one for the
initiator or originator of the crisis and a zero otherwise.

*Target Characteristics.* The third set of variables accounts for characteristics of the
target. I first include the traditional measure of power, the CINC index, based on the
capabilities literature. I use the target capabilities and relative capabilities for one of my
control models (see Maoz 1983; Wayman, Singer, and Goertz 1983; Huth, Bennett,
Gelpi 1992; Lake 1992; Bremer 1992). The *target capabilities* is simply the CINC score
of the target country. The *relative capabilities* of the U.S. and its opponent are derived
from the CINC index as follows:

\[
\text{Relative Capabilities}_{\text{Crisis Dyad}} = \frac{\text{CINC}_{\text{US}}}{\text{CINC}_{\text{Target Country}}}
\]  

[4.7]

For my *rival* variable, I use the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2004) New Rivalry data
set, and I specify the U.S. opponent in the crisis dyad as a rival or not a rival. Goertz
and Diehl (2000) define rivalries as “a relationship in which both sides deal with issues
using the military tools of foreign policy” (222). Conflicts between the rivals must be
understood within a historical context of conflicts and should not be weighed as
independent events. The “interconnection of disputes” explains the initiation of conflict among rivals, and it provides the basis for understanding how a side bargains during a conflict (Goertz and Diehl 1993, 148). If a rival is forced into a bargaining situation with the U.S., then it makes it decision to escalate according to strategic considerations (Smith 1999, 1254). A rival’s strategic choice is based on its anticipation of subsequent U.S. behaviors (Smith 1999, 1255).

Losing a conflict may not shorten a president’s tenure in office, but appeasing a rival does (Colaresi 2004). In an established dyadic rivalry, threats and force are common methods of dealing with the conflict, in which previous crises lead to subsequent crises (Goertz and Diehl 2000, 222, 225; Colaresi and Thompson 2002, 1194). Dovish leaders that the public views as granting unreciprocated concessions to a rival are likely to be punished politically (Colaresi 2004, 566). In these cases, presidents need to understand the “interconnection of disputes” with a rival, how the U.S. military is used as a show of strength and resolve, and then not give the perception of backing down (Goertz and Diehl 1993, 148; Colaresi 2004).

Crises with rivals are more likely to lead to military actions, and so I include rivalry as a control variable in the first stage decision to use force. For the length of this study, I code a one for U.S. rivals (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2004), which are listed in table 4.3 below:

---

48 It should be noted that Gartzke and Simon (1999) find different results when they run a Poisson analysis. Their model, which calculates the probability of a dispute between any pairs of countries being the same year after year, produces as many enduring rivalries as is identified by traditional rival literature (796).
Table 4.3: U.S. Rivalries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rival</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1974 – 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1912 – 1934; 1959 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1952 – 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1955 – 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1953 – 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia/Serbia</td>
<td>1992 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1941 – 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1940 – 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/USSR</td>
<td>1918 – 1920; 1946 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1970 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1979 – 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1987 – 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1956 – 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1970 – 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1926 – 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1950 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>1961 – 1973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The democratic peace theory needs to be taken into account with a *regime type* variable. Democratic peace theory, in which democracies rarely, if at all, fight each other, has become a law-like theory in international relations (see Russett and Starr 2000; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993). In particular, Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter, and Huth (1996) and Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (1999a) find that democracies are more willing to negotiate with one another, rather than fight given the potential high costs. Thus, a *regime target* variable is included as a control, taken from the Polity IV democracy-autocracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) data set. This variable is coded along an ordinal scale with ten being the strongest democracy and negative ten being the strongest autocracy.
Bueno de Mesquita (1981), in *The War Trap*, examines the crucial component of third parties. He concludes it is not a third party’s capabilities that matter to a leader’s risk attitude, rather it is the value of these third parties that matter (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 36-38). In general, a third party needs to be considered as potentially having an impact on a crisis. Thus, an *alliance* variable is included and is coded along an ordinal scale (1=defense pact, 2=neutrality, 3=entente, 4=no agreement). The scores are operationalized as a dummy variable with a defense pact being coded one and zero otherwise.49

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I resolve the conceptual and methodological problems with current unilateral-multilateral research detailed in Chapters II and III. In resolving these problems, I formulate hypotheses, detail the reasons for selecting two prominent data sets, and offer coding rules and sources for my dependent, explanatory, and control variables. In particular, I offer the details of my dissertation’s three most significant contributions: (1) coding rules that allow for a universally valid unilateral definition and dependent variable; (2) construction of a CIRM index based on measures of preponderance, technology, and force employment; and (3) data sets that support a sequential decision model that predicts and explains a president’s unilateral decision.

---

49 Controlling for an alliance is necessary for the first decision of whether to use force or not. But, an *alliance* variable complicates the unilateral model unnecessarily given the following findings: (1) nations that choose to increase their military power are unsure that the allies will choose to assist them in a conflict; (2) the effect of alliances parallels that of internal capabilities; and (3) internal military buildups are long, slow processes, while alliances tend to be short-term and dynamic affairs that are not easily captured in empirical analyses or in a decision maker’s crisis analysis (Kadera 2001, 43-46; Morrow 1993, 208-216; Kim and Morrow 1992, 908). For tests of including an *alliance* variable in the unilateral decision model, see footnote 52 in Chapter V.
In Chapter V, I use a heckman probit model to test a president’s use of force decision and his unilateral use of force decision as a sequential process. I explain why a maximum likelihood procedure is necessary for testing the two decisions, and I offer models of the two decisions. For my results, I detail the marginal impact of each variable on separate probit models (the decision to use force and the decision to use unilateral force) and on the unified model of unilateral use of force decision making. I then focus on the unilateral decision findings and the significance of the military revolution and situational explanations.
CHAPTER V

STATISTICAL TESTS

Introduction

In this chapter, I systematically test the propositions that emerged from the literature review and theory chapters. More specifically, I test the hypotheses detailed in the research design chapter. The premise of this dissertation is straight-forward – the U.S., as hegemon, acts unilaterally given the power disparity between it and the rest of the world. This disparity reduces incentives to act multilaterally (see Ikenberry 2003). Using unilateral force, of course, assumes the decision to use force has been made. The decision to use force and the decision to use unilateral force are two separate but related sequentially determined processes.

This is the core test of this chapter – a sequential decision process – and a key contribution of the dissertation – focusing on the second, unilateral decision, while still accounting for the first, use of force decision. These two processes are related, as the assumption of two, unrelated processes would introduce selection bias into the statistical analysis. To account for potential selection bias, I use a heckman probit model, that accounts for selection and models conflict sequentially (see Reed 2000).50

In this chapter, I first detail the assumptions of a maximum likelihood probit model and the models I will be testing in the chapter. I then test and provide estimates from the two separate probit models of the decision process: the decision to use force and the

50 This is also called a heckman probit model and uses the “heckprob” command in STATA.
decision to use unilateral force. Next, I detail how a heckman probit model combines the two probit models into a unified model of unilateral decision making. I then discuss the positive results associated with using this sequential model. Finally, to determine the robustness of my unified model, I test an alternative model, using a traditional CINC measure, as well as two control models.

From these empirical results, I discuss their significance and how each of the independent variables fare. In discussing the first decision model, whether or not to use force, I determine that a domestic explanation has little empirical support. But, most importantly, I focus on the unilateral decision and the significant findings of the CIMR index variables, the Americas region variables, and the national security and humanitarian crises variables. In sum, I discuss whether or not a large-N statistical test reveals that the president is making an expected utility, power-based decision to act unilaterally.

**The Probit Framework**

Quantitative analysis in political science research often involves linear regression. More specifically, political scientists often use an ordinary least squares (OLS) technique, which assumes the following functional form:

\[ y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_k x_{ik} + \epsilon_i \quad (i = 1, 2, \ldots, n) \]  \[5.1\]

However, given the dichotomous dependent variables utilized in this dissertation, I cannot use a classical linear model. I code a one for a decision to use force (and zero otherwise) for the first stage decision, and I code a one for a unilateral use of force decision (and zero otherwise) for the second stage decision.
So, I must use a nonlinear technique. More specifically, I use a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedure. MLE consists of estimating the parameters so as to increase (or maximize) the probability of observing the dependent variable (Gujarati 2003, 115). In using MLE, I have two available models, logit and probit, that I can use to estimate the probability that a president will choose to act unilaterally, given the hegemonic power of the U.S.

The first is a logit model, which has the following form:

\[
\Pr(\text{unilateral use of force decision}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1)}}
\]  

where:
- \(e\) is the base of the natural logarithm and
- \(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1\) are the independent variables in the equation being estimated.

The second is a probit model, which has the following form:

\[
\Pr(\text{unilateral use of force decision}) = \Phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1)
\]  

where:
- \(\Phi\) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and
- \(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1\) are the independent variables in the equation being estimated.

Both the logit and probit specifications produce “qualitatively similar results” with “no compelling reason” to select one over the other (Gujarati 2003, 614). The conditional probability of reaching a zero or one is slower with logit, and researchers tend to favor it for its mathematical simplicity (Gujarati 2003, 614). But, given that I will be using a heckman probit model, I use a probit model for consistency.
Statistical Models

In examining how a president employs U.S. uses of force from 1937 to 1995, I use the international crisis as the unit of analysis, a design that negates many temporal aggregation and dynamics problems (see Mitchell and Moore 2002). For the first decision, I simply use the variables of Ostrom and Job (1986), James and Oneal (1991), DeRouen (1995), Fordham (1998a, 1998b), and Brule and Mintz (2006) to control for a use of force decision. This decision favors a domestic-based decision, while controlling for other significant findings (e.g., rivalry and democratic peace theory) as explained in Chapters II and IV. The use of force decision model is as follows:

\[ \text{Model: force (force or no force)} = A + B_1 \text{misery index} + B_2 \text{presidential approval} + B_3 \text{republican president} + B_4 \text{public support} + B_5 \text{initiator} + B_6 \text{target regime type} + B_7 \text{rival} + B_8 \text{cold war} + B_9 \text{alliance} + \epsilon_i \]  

[5.4]

As explained in the “Hegemonic Stability Theory and Presidential Decision Strategy” section in Chapter III, I model a president’s decision as a sequential process with emphasis on the second decision of whether to use unilateral or multilateral force. As hypothesized, the technology gap, preponderance gap, Americas region, and national security crisis variables should be positively correlated with unilateral force, while the target force employment, and humanitarian crisis variables should be negatively correlated with unilateral force. The unilateral use of force decision model is as follows:

\[ \text{Model: unilateral (unilateral force or multilateral force)} = A + B_1 \text{target force employment} + B_2 \text{technology gap} + B_3 \text{preponderance gap} + B_4 \text{Americas region} + B_5 \text{national security crisis} + B_6 \text{humanitarian crisis} + B_7 \text{divided government} + \epsilon_i \]  

[5.5]
To test the robustness of the full model, it is necessary to see how some alternative models fare. First, I replace the CIMR index variables with the CINC score, measured with a *relative capabilities* and a *target capabilities* variable. The alternative unilateral use of force decision model is as follows:

\[
\text{Model: unilateral (unilateral force or multilateral force)} = A + \beta_1 \text{relative capabilities/} \\
\quad + \beta_1 \text{target capabilities + } \beta_2 \text{americas region + } \beta_3 \text{national security crisis +} \\
\quad + \beta_4 \text{humanitarian crisis + } \beta_5 \text{divided government + } \epsilon_i \quad \text{[5.6]}
\]

Next, given the possibility of high correlation between GNP and the CINC scores as cited in the “Preponderance gap” subsection of Chapter IV, it is best to run separate models using only the *preponderance gap* variable in one model and only the *technology gap* variable in the other model (see Organski and Kugler 1980, Organski 1958, and Rosen 1972). The control unilateral use of force decision models are as follows:

\[
\text{Model: unilateral (unilateral force or multilateral force)} = A + \beta_1 \text{target force employment + } \beta_2 \text{preponderance gap +} \\
\quad + \beta_3 \text{americas region + } \beta_4 \text{national security crisis +} \\
\quad + \beta_5 \text{humanitarian crisis + } \beta_6 \text{divided government + } \epsilon_i \quad \text{[5.7]}
\]

\[
\text{Model: unilateral (unilateral force or multilateral force)} = A + \beta_1 \text{target force employment + } \beta_2 \text{technology gap +} \\
\quad + \beta_3 \text{americas region + } \beta_4 \text{national security crisis +} \\
\quad + \beta_5 \text{humanitarian crisis + } \beta_6 \text{divided government + } \epsilon_i \quad \text{[5.8]}
\]

---

51 I also test the unilateral model using an *alliance* variable, which is insignificant. In using an *alliance* variable in the unilateral model (equation 5.5 and table 5.1), the likelihood statistics remains the same at -93.4 (1937 to 1995) and at -79.8 (1950 to 1995). For the 1937 to 1995 data, the chi-square increases from 13.94 to 14.13, resulting in a p-value that increases from 0.049 to 0.030. The pseudo R-square remains the same at 0.03. The chi-square for the 1950 to 1995 data increases from 24.18 to 24.73, resulting in a p-value that decreases from 0.001 to 0.002. The pseudo R-square remains the same at 0.06. Based on these results, *alliance* does not seem to make a significant contribution to the model; so, I exclude the variable.

52 Using the capabilities of a target relative to the U.S. and then just the capabilities of the target nation allows for a robust test of the CINC score.

53 I conduct a correlation test of the two variables later in this chapter.
Empirical Results

The results of the statistical tests are illustrated in tables 5.1-5.7. Overall, the results lend strong support to an international, power-based explanation of U.S. unilateralism as detailed in Chapter III.

Predicting Use of Force Decisions

Per table 5.1, I first perform probit regression analyses on the data from 1937 to 1995 and from 1950 to 1995, using the force dependent variable derived from the Fordham – COW MID data sets. This is a test of the use of force model in equation 5.4. For this model (and with all of the other models), I use robust standard errors to correct for “clustering” or inconstant variation across dyad groups (i.e., panel data). The results offer little support for a domestic-based decision to use force and bolster the realist, international explanation of hegemonic stability theory.

In fact, only the target characteristic and international factor variables are significant. An opponent being a rival, an opponent being in a defense pact, and the Cold War is significant for both data sets. Interestingly, the regime type variable is significant for the 1937 to 1995 data (and insignificant but also in the wrong direction for the 1950 to 1995 data).

---

54 I use the STATA statistical software program to run all of the statistical tests.
55 This issue is addressed and analyzed with the unified model (table 5.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1937-1995</th>
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<th>1950-1995</th>
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<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
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<td>(.023)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>†</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>(.697)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.583)</td>
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<td>(.000)</td>
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<td>(.320)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.111</td>
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<td>(.470)</td>
<td>(.498)</td>
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<table>
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<th>107</th>
<th>125</th>
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<td>69.57(8)</td>
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<td>-.32.009596</td>
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<td>0.0312</td>
<td>0.5361</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; Chi-Square</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (one-tailed tests)
† This variable predicts failure perfectly and is dropped (see text).
Given the non-linear nature of MLE coefficients, using the coefficients to determine how the dependent variables changes, as is done with OLS analysis, would be erroneous. Rather, the proper method to determine the strength of the coefficients is to use a technique called marginal effects. Calculating the marginal effect an independent variable has on the dependent variables requires holding all of the independent variables minus one constant at their mean. The marginal impact of each predictor variable can then be determined.

As illustrated in table 5.2, the impact of the rival, alliance, and cold war variables on the decision to use force is dramatic. Moving the rival variable from zero (no rivalry) to one (rivalry) increases the probability of a president using force by 84.9 percent (1937 to 1995) and 82.9 percent (1950 to 1995). The impact of the rival variable supports the findings of Goertz and Diehl (1993, 2000), Colaresi (2004), and Colaresi and Thompson (2002). Presidents are more prone to use force against rivals, perhaps wanting to avoid paying a political price for appearing to appease them.

The probability of a president using force against opponent with an alliance increases by 49.2 percent and 54.6 percent respectively. This is an interesting but not an unexpected finding, given the conclusions of several researchers. A president may make the decision to use force based on the unreliable nature of alliances, as Morrow (1993) and Kim and Morrow (1992) argue. Or, the president may believe the contribution of alliance members will be “irrelevant,” as Malone argues about NATO’s capabilities in the 2001 Afghanistan campaign (2003, 34). Or, as Bueno de Mesquita (1981) concludes, a president may simply not include third party’s capabilities as a significant
factor in his decision making (36-38). Regardless of the reason, presidents do not seem to consider an opponent’s possible increased allied strength as a deterrent.

The probability of a president using force during the Cold War decreases by 47 percent and 39 percent respectively. Presidents seemed less likely to use force during the Cold War, possibly fearing a response from the Soviets. This supports neorealism (Waltz 1979) and the stability of a bipolar world. It contributes to the notion that an international, not domestic (or even state level) analysis explains state behavior and conflict (see Waltz 1979; Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry 1989; Forde 1995). The significance of the Cold War effect is also compatible with the unilateral use of force decision making theory (and hegemonic stability theory) because the U.S., as hegemon, had reached an equilibrium position necessary to maintain its governance of the system. As a result, there was less challenge to its authority and less conflict, but the U.S., if it used force, still tended to use it unilaterally.

The fact that the probability of a president using force against a democratic opponent is only 1.2 percent for the 1937 to 1995 data tempers the significance of the regime type variable. The democratic peace theory is not a focus of this dissertation, but it’s an interesting finding for possible future exploration.
### Table 5.2: Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on Decision to Use Force

<table>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Variable at Minimum Value</td>
<td>Variable at Maximum Value</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>Variable at Minimum Value</td>
<td>Variable at Maximum Value</td>
<td>% Change</td>
</tr>
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<td>.012</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
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<td>Public Support</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Regime Type</td>
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<td>Rival</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Predicting Unilateral Use of Force Decisions**

Per table 5.1, I perform probit regression analyses with correction for clustering on the dyads on the data from 1937 to 1995 and from 1950 to 1995, using the unilateral dependent variable derived from the Fordham – COW MID data sets. The data from 1950 to 1995 is tested using the unilateral use of force model in equation 5.5, but a lack of GDP data precludes using a *preponderance gap* variable in testing the data from 1937 to 1995. The results offer support for a power-based decision to use unilateral force.

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56 Given the lack of a *preponderance gap* variable, I also test the model for consistency reasons with a *target country technology* variable (which is simply the technology score for the target country). The variable is significant (coefficient = 6.717, robust standard error = 3.016, significance at p = .05 level), but it is in the wrong direction.
In the full model for both time periods, *target country force employment* and *Americas region* are significant and in the expected direction. *Technology gap* is significant and in the expected direction for the 1950 to 1995 data and in the expected direction for the 1937 to 1995 data. Interestingly, *preponderance gap* is significant in the wrong direction, and it seems to have little, if any, effect on a president’s unilateral decision.

As illustrated in table 5.3, as an opponent’s force employment moves from low to high, the probability of a president using unilateral force against that opponent decreases by 32.7 percent (1937 to 1995 data) and by 49.5 percent (1950 to 1995 data). This is strong support for Biddle’s (2004) finding and his argument that force employment is a significant, yet overlooked, third measure of military power. The simplicity of the operationalization of force employment in this dissertation, coded a one if a nation possessed the capability to use the latest technological innovations, bridges the gap between Biddle’s (2004) more sophisticated measure and the realist mistake of assuming that force is employed optimally.

If the opponent is in the Western hemisphere, the probability of unilateral force increases by 18.8 percent and 19.8 percent respectively. This is strong support for the Monroe Doctrine. It suggests that realists should follow the Corbetta and Dixon (2004), Stepanova (2003), and James and Oneal (1991) lead and better delve into the details of an international explanation for uses of force. The specifics of the situation are often overlooked in realist doctrine as realists assume a unitary actor model and uniform responses to conflicts (i.e., a use of force response can be calculated based on a
combination of U.S. interests and capabilities) (see Blechman and Kaplan 1978, Zelikow 1987, Gochman and Maoz 1984). Rather, the Meernik and Waterman (1996) finding that “peculiarities” of the crisis is important should be reflected in future realist studies.

As the technology gap increases from low to high, the probability of unilateral force increases by 22.8 percent and 75.9 percent. This is strong support for Stam (1999) and his belief that the dyadic technological balance is what determines the outcome of a conflict. Presidents, perhaps, in deciding to act unilaterally or multilaterally against a technologically weak opponent may use past multilateral campaigns as the reason to act unilaterally, given the problems of burden-sharing, inaction, collaboration and cooperation, and reciprocity. Multilateral arrangements mean increased transaction costs and with technologically ill-prepared allies, a president may simply decide to act unilaterally against an opponent that does not spend resources on its military (North 1984; Caporaso 1992; Brooks and Wohlfforth 2005).

There are two perplexing results, involving the preponderance gap and the crisis trigger variables, that suggest a separate probit model may not be accurately capturing a president’s unilateral decision. A shift in the preponderance gap has zero percent effect on a president’s unilateral decision. The zero percent effect means presidents are not considering the economic strength of an opponent before acting unilaterally. Wealthier states may equate with a stronger military, as Gilpin (1981) believes, but the gap may be so wide between U.S. GDP and an opponent’s GDP that it doesn’t factor into a president’s calculation (65).

57 The results from the unified model confirm that the national security crisis trigger was not recognized correctly with the separate probit estimates.
The crisis trigger also does not seem to matter as presidents are more likely to use unilateral force in the 1937 to 1995 period and less likely to use unilateral force in the 1950 to 1995 period, regardless if it is a national security or humanitarian crisis. This does not entirely discount an international explanation for a unilateral use of force decision (a president may still be making a power-based calculation regardless of the situation), but it is an issue to study further with the unified model.

| Table 5.3: Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on Decision to Use Unilateral Force |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Variable | Variable at Minimum Value | Variable at Maximum Value | % Change | Variable at Minimum Value | Variable at Maximum Value | % Change |
| Target Country Force Employment | 0 | 1 | -.327 | 0 | 1 | -.495 |
| Preponderance Gap | | | 2.349 | 6462.287 | .000 |
| Technology Gap | .000 | 2.696 | .228 | .000 | 1.238 | .759 |
| Americas Region | 0 | 1 | .188 | 0 | 1 | .198 |
| National Security Crisis | 0 | 1 | .027 | 0 | 1 | -.058 |
| Humanitarian Crisis | 0 | 1 | .059 | 0 | 1 | -.086 |
| Divided Government | 0 | 1 | -.060 | 0 | 1 | .014 |
The Heckman Probit Model

The foundation of this dissertation is the assertion that a president’s decision to use unilateral force is a subset of the use of force decision. A unilateral use of force observation cannot be made without first observing a use of force decision. This means the separate probit models (table 5.1) are theoretically incorrect, as they assume two separate, unrelated decisions are being made. The heckman probit model, on the other hand, controls for this interdependent relationship between use of force and how force is used and avoids selection effects (see Reed 2000). In short, it is ideal given the nature of the two-stage, discrete-choice panel data.58

The necessity of a selection model can be understood pragmatically. Presidents do not use force randomly, and they do not blindly select unilateral or multilateral force. They instead use a strategic decision process and choose to use force and how to employ force based on a series of factors. Eisenhower’s decision not to use force at Dien Bien Phu offers a prime example of a decision that is coded a zero for the selection equation (i.e., the use of force decision), and Bush’s decision to use multilateral force in the 1991 Gulf War is coded a one for the selection equation and a zero for the unilateral use of force decision (i.e., the outcome equation).

It is best to illustrate the estimations of heckman probit model by beginning with the two separate bivariate probit models:

\[ y_1^* = X_1 \beta_1 + u_1 \]  
\[ y_2^* = X_2 \beta_2 + u_2 \]  

58 A Heckman (1979) model is another alternative, but it assumes a dichotomous dependent variable for the selection equation and a continuous dependent variable for the outcome equation.
where:  
\( y_1^* \) is the decision to use force,  
\( y_2^* \) is the decision to use unilateral force, and  
\( u \) is the error term.

Normally, the assumption is that the two probit models are independent of one another, so that \( \text{Cov}[u_1, u_2] = 0 \). But, the unilateral use of force decision model assumes the two models are related:

\[
\text{Cov}[u_1, u_2] = \rho \tag{5.11}
\]

where:  
\( \rho \) is the correlation parameter denoting the extent that the error terms covary.

Based on these assumptions, I can estimate the following probabilities:

**Selection equation**

\[
y_1 = 0 \quad \text{Pr}(y_1 = 0) = \Phi(-X_1\beta_1) \tag{5.12}
\]

**Outcome equation**

\[
y_1 = 1, \; y_2 = 0 \quad \text{Pr}(y_1 = 1, \; y_2 = 0) = \Phi(X_1\beta_1) - \Phi_2(X_1\beta_1, X_2\beta_2, \rho) \tag{5.13}
\]

\[
y_1 = 1, \; y_2 = 1 \quad \text{Pr}(y_1 = 1, \; y_2 = 1) = \Phi_2(X_1\beta_1, X_2\beta_2, \rho) \tag{5.14}
\]

where:  
\( \Phi(X_1\beta_1) \) is the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function and  
\( \Phi_2(X_1\beta_1, X_2\beta_2, \rho) \) denotes the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function with correlation coefficient \( \rho \).

The log-likelihood function can then be formulated as follows:

\[
\log L = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \{y_{i1}y_{i2}\log \Phi_2(X_1\beta_1, X_2\beta_2, \rho) \\
+ y_{i1}(1 - y_{i2})\log[\Phi(X_1\beta_1) - \Phi_2(X_1\beta_1, X_2\beta_2, \rho)] \\
+ (1 - y_{i1})\log \Phi(-X_1\beta_1)\} \tag{5.15}
\]
Empirical Results of the Unified Model

First, it is best to see how well a unilateral use of force decision can be associated with a use of force decision. The ancillary parameter rho measures the correlation of the residuals from the two models (equations 5.4 and 5.5). As illustrated in table 5.4, the two equations for the 1937 to 1995 data are strongly associated, rho = 1, which is significant (chi-square = 6.34, df = 1, p =.01). The two equations for the 1950 to 1995 data are also strongly associated, rho = 1, which is significant (chi-square = 13.11, df = 1, p =.00). This suggests a president’s use of force decision is related to his unilateral use of force decision.

So, using a heckman probit model corrects for problems unrecognized in the separate probit models. Notably, the *preponderance gap* and *national security crisis* trigger variables are in the wrong direction or insignificant in the separate models, but both variables are significant and in the expected direction in the unified model. This demonstrates that a president is using preponderance as a measure and is factoring in the type of crisis in his unilateral decision. All of this reinforces the central foundation of this dissertation, that unilateral use of force decision making is a sequential process. Given this, I now examine the unified model results.

---

59 As with the separate probit models, I use estimated robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity across dyad groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1937-1995</th>
<th>1950-1995</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Alliance</td>
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<td>Target Country Force Employment</td>
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<td>Preponderance Gap</td>
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<td>Technology Gap</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.(6)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Wald Test of Ind. Equations:</td>
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<td>Prob &gt; Chi-Square</td>
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<td>0.0003</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (one-tailed tests) † This variable predicts failure perfectly and is dropped (see text).
Predicting Unilateral Use of Force Decisions

Per table 5.4, I perform probit regression analyses with correction for clustering on the dyads on the data from 1937 to 1995 and from 1950 to 1995, using the unilateral dependent variable derived from the Fordham – COW MID data sets. The data from 1950 to 1995 is tested using the unilateral use of force model in equation 5.5. But, as I did in the separate probit unilateral use of force decision analysis, I must exclude using a preponderance gap variable to test the data from 1937 to 1995. The results for both data time periods offer strong support for a power- and international-based unilateral use of force decision.

First, in the force model (equation 5.4), the rival and alliance variables are the only significant variables for both data time periods, signaling that presidents decide to use force based on a target’s characteristics and not necessarily based on domestic factors. Though it should be noted that the initiator variable is significant for the 1937 to 1995 data, indicating presidents are more likely to use force when responding to a dispute initiator. Also, the public support variable is significant for the 1937 to 1995 data, indicating presidents are likely to use force if the public is clamoring for force to be used. The regime type variable is significant in the wrong direction as it was for the 1937 to 1995 probit model.

The wrong direction of the regime type variable is incompatible with the democratic peace theory, and as such, I conduct sensitivity analysis on the rival variable. In 73 out of the 157 crisis dyads (1937 to 1995) and in 65 out of 140 crisis dyads (1950 to 1995),

---

60 The cold war variable is also significant for both time periods, but it is in the negative direction for the years 1937 to 1995 and in the positive direction for the years 1950 to 1995.
the U.S. faced a rival. This seems to have a great impact on the results, and if the rival variable is excluded from the unified model, both the presidential approval and regime type variables are signed in the expected direction. The former is significant and is consistent with the diversionary hypotheses, in which president are more likely to use force as their approval rating declines (see Ostrom and Job 1986; DeRouen 1995, 2000; Fordham 1998a). Though insignificant, the regime type variable is negative, which is consistent with democratic peace theory.

For the model (equation 5.5) using data from 1937 to 1995, the target country force employment, technology gap, americas region, and national security crisis variables are significant and in the expected direction. For the 1950 to 1995 model (equation 5.5), the target country force employment, preponderance gap, technology gap, and national security crisis variables are significant and in the expected direction.\(^6\)

As illustrated in table 5.5, two of the three CIMR index variables have a significant impact on a president’s unilateral decision.\(^6\) As an opponent’s force employment moves from low to high, the probability of a president using unilateral force decreases by 34.1 percent (1937 to 1995) and by 11.7 percent (1950 to 1995). As the technology gap with an opponent increases, the probability of unilateral force increases by 7.6 percent and 92.5 percent respectively. This is a strong indication that allocating more resources to the military and using innovative tactics and technology does correlate positively with unilateral action. As proposed in Chapter III, the fact that the U.S., as

\(^6\) The humanitarian crisis variable fails to attain statistical significance in either data set. It is in the wrong direction for the 1937 to 1995 data and is dropped for predicting failure perfectly for the 1950 to 1995 data.

\(^6\) The preponderance gap variable is significant and in the expected direction, but the probability of a president acting unilaterally increases by zero percent.
hegemon, remains at the forefront of military revolutions should be viewed synonymously with unilateral action. Gilpin (1981) is correct in stating that “a novel military weapon or technique” can be the impetus for unilateral military force (63).

Quite simply, presidents act unilaterally because they have the military power advantage to do so.

But, as the situational factors demonstrate, presidents use quite more discretion in using unilateral force than realists may give them credit. If the opponent is located in the Western hemisphere, the probability of unilateral force being used increases by 30.3 percent and 2.9 percent. If the crisis involves national security, the probability of unilateral force increases by 12.2 percent and 6.9 percent, and if it is a humanitarian crisis, the probability of unilateral force decreases by 57.6 percent for the 1950 to 1995 period. The substantive effects of these explanatory variables does support realist doctrine that presidents will act unilaterally to protect U.S. interests and national security, but it sheds more light on the particulars of their decision. As stated before, the Meernik and Waterman (1996) finding that “peculiarities” of the crisis are important deserves a more prominent place in realist doctrine.
### Table 5.5: Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on Decision to Use Unilateral Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variable at Minimum Value</td>
<td>Variable at Maximum Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided Government</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Country Force Employment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preponderance Gap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Gap</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas Region</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Crisis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Crisis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the alternative model (equation 5.6 and table 5.6), *americas region* and *national security crisis* are the only unilateral decision variables to attain statistical significance and be signed in the expected direction for all of the models. The *target capabilities* variable is also significant for both time periods. Of the force variables, the *rival*, *cold war*, and *alliance* variables are significant for all of the models. A president seems more likely to use force against a rival and an allied opponent and less likely to use force during the Cold War.

---

63 In order to run the 1950 to 1995 relative capabilities model, I needed to drop the *humanitarian crisis* variable, which was predicting failure perfectly.
The relative capabilities variable is in the expected direction for both time periods, but it fails to attain statistical significance. It also has minimal, if any, impact on a president’s decision. This is not good news for international relations researchers that blindly rely on the CINC score as a proxy for military power.

The target capabilities variable does attain statistical significance and is in the expected direction for both time periods. As an opponent’s CINC score moves from low to high, the probability of unilateral force decreases by 173.8 percent (1937 to 1995) and 69.3 percent (1950 to 1995). This finding is compatible with the dissertation’s power calculation: the stronger an opponent, the less likely a president is to use unilateral force against it. But, the inconsistencies with the relative capabilities variable suggests a CINC score may not be a good fit for measuring military power.

The mixed results of the CINC variables gives greater credence to using the CIMR index variables. The table 5.6 results also help to illustrate the conflicting findings of the military capability literature: findings that fail to identify a positive correlation between military power advantage and outcome success (see Wayman, Singer, and Goertz 1983), but identify democracies and “overwhelming preponderance” with equating to conflict success and less conflict in general (see Lake 1992; Bennett and Stam 1998; Bremer 1992).

---

64 As the relative gap capability between the U.S. and an opponent widens, the probability of a president making a unilateral decision increases by zero percent for the years 1937 to 1995 and for the years 1950 to 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1937-1995</th>
<th>1950-1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force Unilateral</td>
<td>Force Unilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misery Index</td>
<td>.047 (.052)</td>
<td>.041 (.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Approval</td>
<td>.011 (.016)</td>
<td>.011 (.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat or Republican Pres.</td>
<td>.228 (.343)</td>
<td>.231 (.336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Support for Force</td>
<td>.012*** (.005)</td>
<td>.010** (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>6.993*** (.569)</td>
<td>9.382*** (.765)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>.043*** (.010)</td>
<td>.040*** (.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>3.127*** (.512)</td>
<td>3.122*** (.524)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-1.267*** (.367)</td>
<td>-1.133*** (.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1.438*** (.500)</td>
<td>1.455*** (.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Military Capabilities</td>
<td>.001 (.002)</td>
<td>.001 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Capabilities</td>
<td>.756*** (.080)</td>
<td>.668** (.310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas Region</td>
<td>.474* (.335)</td>
<td>.420** (.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Crisis</td>
<td>.371 (.985)</td>
<td>.278 (1.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Crisis</td>
<td>.138 (.301)</td>
<td>.087 (.298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided Government</td>
<td>-2.391* - .899*** (.171)</td>
<td>-2.370* - .559*** (.1706)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.391* - .899*** (.171)</td>
<td>-2.370* - .559*** (.1706)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>154</th>
<th>154</th>
<th>138</th>
<th>138</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-Square(df)</td>
<td>. (4)</td>
<td>212.38(5)</td>
<td>16.73 (4)</td>
<td>. (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudo Lik. (full)</td>
<td>-81.84425</td>
<td>-80.35563</td>
<td>-72.42885</td>
<td>-71.11561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Test Ind. Eq.: Chi-Square (df)</td>
<td>1.43(1)</td>
<td>1.38(1)</td>
<td>0.06(1)</td>
<td>0.00(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; Chi-Square</td>
<td>0.2318</td>
<td>0.2407</td>
<td>0.8129</td>
<td>0.9609</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (one-tailed tests)
† This variable predicts failure perfectly and is dropped (see text).
Testing the correlation between the preponderance and technology gap variables reveals that there is some correlation. While the gap and target country preponderance and technology variables are not correlated, the U.S. technology and preponderance variables are highly correlated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology Gap</th>
<th>Target Country Technology Preponderance</th>
<th>U.S. Technology Preponderance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preponderance Gap</td>
<td>-0.1962</td>
<td>-0.0418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the control models (equations 5.7 and 5.8) of table 5.7, the target country force employment and americas region variables are significant and in the expected direction. For the preponderance gap model, the preponderance gap variable is insignificant and in the wrong direction. As the preponderance gap moves from low to high, the probability of unilateral force increases by zero percent. For the technology gap model, the technology gap variable attains statistical significance and is in the expected direction. As the technology gap moves from low to high, the probability of a president using unilateral force increases by 7.6 percent.

These control model results are consistent with the results from the unified model, suggesting that technology and preponderance (i.e., elements of CINC and GDP) should be viewed as separate measures. The technology gap variable in both the unified and control models is capturing the fact that increased spending per soldier matters to a president in his unilateral decision making. The preponderance gap variable, on the other hand, is significant in one of the unified models and thus deserves a place in the
CIMR index, but its non-impact on a president’s unilateral decision deserves further study. The variable may be capturing the fact that the U.S. acts unilaterally against less economically powerful countries, in general, but economic factors do not affect a president’s decision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misery Index</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Approval</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat or Republican President</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Support for Force</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.010***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>7.744</td>
<td>7.328***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>2.907***</td>
<td>2.972***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-1.180*</td>
<td>-1.641*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1.545***</td>
<td>1.216**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Country Force Employment</td>
<td>-.945***</td>
<td>-1.057***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preponderance Gap</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Gap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas Region</td>
<td>.717***</td>
<td>.783***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Crisis</td>
<td>.406</td>
<td>.315***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Crisis</td>
<td>†</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided Government</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>-.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.982</td>
<td>-2.675*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.244)</td>
<td>(.453)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | N | 138 | 150 |
| Wald Chi-Square(df) | | | | (.4) | (.4) |
| Log Pseudo Likelihood (full model) | | | | -70.47202 | -76.73777 |
| Rho | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Wald Test of Ind. Equations: Chi-Square (df) | | | | . (1) | 6.34(1) |
| Prob > Chi-Square | | | | . | 0.0118 |

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (one-tailed tests)
† This variable predicts failure perfectly and is dropped (see text).
Conclusion

A realist-based explanation for U.S. crisis behavior is strongly supported with the statistical tests of this chapter. International factors not only explain a president’s unilateral decision, but they seem also to better explain a president’s initial decision to use force. Domestic political factors, in contrast, do not seem to play a significant role in a president’s use of force decision. As a result, these findings offer strong support to a unified model of unilateral use of force decision making.

All of this is in line with the central tenet of this dissertation – presidents, when deciding to use unilateral force, act unilaterally based on a power calculation. Presidents decide to act unilaterally as the military revolution gap, comprised of force employment and technology, widens between the U.S. and an opponent. While preponderance plays a role in the U.S. unilateralism, its impact seems marginal. Presidents are also inclined to consider the situation, whether an opponent is in the Western hemisphere and whether the crisis is national security.

The use of force decision sets the stage for the unilateral decision. In 77 of 157 (1937 to 1995) and 69 of 140 times (1950 to 1995), the crisis escalated to a use of force situation. As has been stated throughout this dissertation, researchers have largely ignored the unilateral decision, assuming it to be a suboptimal choice, and when they have conducted research on multilateralism, they have failed to model the process sequentially. The result has been to miss the interdependence between a use of force and a unilateral decision.
In Chapter VI, I open up the black box of realism and conduct an experiment to better understand the impact of the crisis trigger on a president’s unilateral decision. The empirical world (and common sense) dictates that presidents do not blindly make a unilateral force calculation based on military capability alone. But, instead the crisis trigger, an international factor, may be implicitly reflecting how much the president (and domestic audience) values the stakes in a crisis. The lower the stakes, the more likely the president is to want to lower the costs and act multilaterally, and his decision may be based on public opinion, as reviewed in the “Public Opinion and the Unilateral-Multilateral Use of Force” section of Chapter III. Given this, I test the extent to which the American public can influence a president trying to determine whether to use unilateral force in responding to a national security threat, bringing about a regime change, or intervening in a humanitarian crisis.
CHAPTER VI

EXPERIMENT

Introduction

For the second method of this three-method dissertation, I conduct an experimental test. Experimentation remains an alternative methodology in political science, as it raises questions of internal and external validity (see Campbell and Stanley 1966; Mook 1983; Sears 1986). But its contribution in reducing the impact of bias, control in testing the research question, and precise measurement of the research question is invaluable (McDermott 2002a, 33, 38-39; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 137). Most importantly for this dissertation, it offers an explanation (i.e., causal analysis) of why a unilateral decision is made (McDermott 2002b, 326).

Though typically applied to case studies, I use Eckstein’s (1975) critical case method and select extreme values of domestic- and international-based explanatory variables for my experiment. In doing so, I create a condition that controls for the Chapter II domestic and military power explanations and allows me to determine how well my theory of unilateral use of decision making performs. My theory specifies an international level explanation for unilateral use of force, and while I focus primarily on military power, I need to determine whether the other significant, international level explanation – situational factor – has explanatory power. So, I expose 360 Texas A&M student subjects to one of the four possible manipulations of public opinion and military power independent variables and to one of three possible international crisis scenarios.
In each crisis, the difficulty of the mission and level of public support varies and the participant has to respond and rate support for either an American unilateral or multilateral force option.

The experiment results confirm the statistical test (and the case study) results. The situational factor, encapsulated in the crisis trigger, significantly affects a president’s unilateral use of force decision. The more severe the crisis, the more likely a president is to make a unilateral decision. I reach this conclusion first by describing the study. Second, I offer a research design. Third, I discuss the results and analyze how important the crisis trigger is to a president’s unilateral use of force decision.

The Study

As presented in Chapter IV, this dissertation tests several hypotheses relating to unilateralism, military power and situational factors. In this chapter, I address two extensions of those hypotheses:

1. How important is the crisis trigger?
2. Why is the crisis trigger important?

My theory of unilateral use of force decision making cites the importance of realism and power-based international factors, and the results of the Statistics chapter confirm a president makes his calculation based on a military power advantage. But, I also find that situational factors are important, and this chapter tests to see just how important the crisis trigger is and why the crisis trigger is important.

More specifically, the experiment offers an explanation for hypothesis 5a (presidents are more likely to use unilateral force when facing a national security crisis) and 5b (presidents are less likely to use unilateral force when facing a humanitarian crisis). The
U.S., as hegemon, has the power to act unilaterally whenever it wishes, but the crisis trigger represents a fundamental variable in Bueno de Mesquita’s (1981) expected utility calculation: how much a president values the policies of his own nation vis-à-vis a potential opponent’s value of his policies (36). The president will make a calculation based on how much he values the stakes involved in a crisis, a calculation based on how vital the crisis is to U.S. security and interests. A diminishing utility to U.S. national security should correspond with fewer decisions to act unilaterally. For crises other than those involving national security, the president is going to seek to lower the casualty and financial costs as much as possible, even if it means increasing transaction costs (i.e., delays, logistic problems, less interoperability, etc…) due to working with multilateral partners.

Hegemonic stability theory states that the hegemon has the power to act unilaterally, but it does not mean the hegemon will act unilaterally all the time. Rather, the hegemon will govern the system, establish the rules based on its values, and it will be willing to enforce the rules (and ensure its dominant position) through a mixture of unilateral and multilateral military actions (Gilpin 1981, 156). The key point is that the hegemon, in this case, the president, decides how to enforce the rules of the system, and for the president, this is an expected utility decision. The crisis, and how the American people view the crisis, will play a large role in a president’s decision.

While Gilpin (1981) views the state as a unitary actor, he does not entirely discount the role a nation’s society plays in its foreign policy. He writes, “Powerful groups set constraints on and may even determine the actions of state authority” (16). To Gilpin,
western values (the right to property, the rules of war, the sanctity of sovereignty), as protected by the U.S., serve as the foundation of the international system (34-37). So, American domestic interests may pressure a president to act militarily to right a humanitarian wrong or to overthrow a brutal dictator that is violating international norms. But, as regime change and humanitarian interventions are outside of “vital interests,” a president may appease domestic constituents (wanting others in other nations to have the same rights and values they have) and lower the costs by acting multilaterally. As Gilpin states, a method to reduce costs is to reduce international commitments (i.e., multilateral partners share the costs), and so, it may be in a president’s interests to act multilaterally in certain types of crises not considered vital to U.S. sovereignty.  

These crises, not vital to U.S. sovereignty and most likely to politically benefit a president through multilateral action, are humanitarian and regime change. As cited in Chapters II and III, humanitarian operations should be negatively correlated with unilateral force. Presidents wanting to avoid the perception of the U.S. acting as a bully, not wanting to unilaterally violate another state’s sovereignty, wanting to respond to the American public’s desire for an international effort, and wanting to lower the costs will act multilaterally (see Kull 2001, 2002; Rabkin 2000; Helton 2004; Chinkin 2000; Cockayne and Malone 2006). Regime change crises should also be correlated negatively with unilateral action. Presidents recognize that the American public does not prefer

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65 When discussing reducing costs, Gilpin is referring to the actions of a declining hegemon, and Gilpin in 1981 believed the U.S., while still a hegemonic power, “retrenched” and reduced its international commitments. Gilpin’s analysis is dated, but his main point that the U.S. assesses its international commitments based on a cost-benefit conclusion serves as the basis for this experiment (232-233).
force to be used for regime change (see Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996). Presidents also want to uphold, not violate, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the sanctity of national sovereignty (see Fonseca 2003). After all, the key to U.S. hegemony is reflecting the “values common to a set of states” (Gilpin 1981, 34). So, when a president acts to change a regime’s leadership to suit U.S. interests, he will seek to act on behalf of an international mandate with a multinational coalition.

However, when it comes to national security, the president will find strong domestic support for unilateralism. Thus, national security threats will correlate positively with unilateral action. American exceptionalism cites a willingness to act unilaterally, as Americans are reluctant to rely on international assistance in guaranteeing national security (see RFD 1969; Haass 1994; Mearsheimer 1994-1995; Kissinger 2001; Nye 2003; Franck and Rodley 1973). The U.S. military is also reluctant to rely on ally militaries for assistance (see Clement 2003). Most importantly, the president may recognize hegemonic “prestige” is on the line and that the U.S. must be willing to enforce its dominance of the international system unilaterally. After all, a state that “retrenches” or makes concessions signals its waning power, which may bring about more conflict (Gilpin 1981, 194).

**Experimental Method**

Using 360 Texas A&M University students, I am able to test whether domestic politics and military power impact a president’s unilateral decision given a set of situational factors (i.e., the crisis trigger). Each crisis scenario assumes a decision to use
force has been made, and each scenario involves one of four possible decisional contexts, ranging from a “most-likely” case for unilateral force with a significant military power gap vis-à-vis an opponent and significant popular support for unilateralism to a “least-likely” scenario with a militarily strong opponent and weak popular support for unilateralism.

Subjects

One hundred and twenty Texas A&M University students participated in each of the three studies. The students were randomly assigned to one of four different experimental conditions for one experimental situation: the humanitarian, regime change, or national security situation.

Design

The study employed a 2 x 2 between groups factorial design. There were two constructions of the dependent measure. In the first construction, subjects chose one of two decision alternatives: act alone (unilateral force) or partner with others (multilateral force). In the second construction, subjects ranked their support from 0 (no support) to 10 (high support) for their choice of unilateral or multilateral force. The main independent measure placed subjects in one of two decision dimensions: domestic political and power or relative military capability. Several additional manipulations were assessed in order to ascertain the internal validity of the experiment.66

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66 I assessed subjects’ perception of the power dimension with questions about the danger and expected casualty count and of the domestic political dimension with a question about the level of public support. Finally, I asked the subjects to recall the main reason for the military operation.
Research Instrument

Subjects assumed the role of the public and were asked how the president should respond to a given crisis. Subjects were presented with a crisis scenario. Subjects were informed that one of the following crises – a humanitarian crisis, a regime change crisis, or a national security threat – had arisen and the U.S. president, after exhausting all possibilities, must choose to use unilateral or multilateral force.

The two independent variables, the domestic political dimension and the “power” or relative military capability dimension, were manipulated as follows. For the domestic political dimension, half of the subjects were told that “over 70 percent of the public supports the president in his decision to act alone and use unilateral force.” The other half of the subjects were told that “less than 30 percent of the public supports the president in his decision to act alone and use unilateral force.” For the power dimension, half of the subjects were told that “the U.S. military, acting alone is facing a poorly trained, poorly equipped, and fragmented militia enemy, which is plagued by low morale.” The other half of the subjects were told that “the U.S. military, acting alone is facing a well-trained, well-equipped, and tenacious enemy, which is considered to be the most powerful in its region.” In meeting the requirements of a between subject design, subjects were introduced to only one out of the three scenarios, and they were introduced to both dimensions in their respective scenario.

67 The 70 percent and 30 percent public support numbers represent the range of poll numbers taken from actual crises. For example, more than 70 percent of Americans supported using troops in Iraq in 1990, in Iraq in 1993-1994, and for humanitarian purposes in early 1993 in Bosnia. However, only about 30 percent of Americans supported using troops in Somalia after the October 1993 killing of American soldiers, prior to the invasion of Haiti in 1994, and for bringing about regime change in Bosnia in early 1993 (Jentleson and Britton 1998, 396, 401, 404-405).
In sum, for each scenario, one quarter of the subjects received high public support and high military capability dimensions, one quarter of the subjects received high public support and low military capability dimensions, one quarter of the subjects received low public support and high military capability dimensions, and the remaining quarter received low public support and low military capability dimensions.

Given this information about the dimensions, subjects were then asked to make their dependent variable selection, use unilateral or multilateral force.

**Procedure**

The instructions and scenario were presented in written form. Subjects were free to take their time reading the introductory materials. The experiment itself took 7-10 minutes. Subjects were debriefed after completing the experiment.

**Humanitarian Crisis Results**

As presented in table 6.1, the experiment shows a strong negative correlation between intervention in a humanitarian crisis and choosing a unilateral force alternative. When subjects were sensitized to dimensions containing either one of the low support or low probability of military success or both conditions, they were unlikely to choose a unilateral force decision. Specifically, among the four conditions, the highest percentage of subjects chose unilateral force given high public support for unilateral action and high probability of success (63.3 percent). Only a minority of subjects favored a unilateral decision if either there was low public support for unilateral action or low probability of unilateral military success (43.3 percent). An even smaller portion of subjects advised

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68 A copy of the instructions and three scenarios is included as Annex B.
using unilateral force, when both dimensions of low public support for unilateral action and low probability of success were present (16.7 percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Dimension</th>
<th>Domestic Political Dimension</th>
<th>Dominate Political Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Public Support for Unilateral Force</td>
<td>Public Opposition for Unilateral Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Probability of Unilateral Military Success</td>
<td>.633</td>
<td>.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Probability of Unilateral Military Success</td>
<td>.433</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N in each cell = 30.

Additional data collected in this experiment offers supplementary information about other questions. For example, subjects that chose the unilateral force option (M = 5.32) believed the humanitarian operation was less dangerous than those who chose the multilateral force option (M = 6.51) t(1,49) = 2.60 p = .0122. Unilateral proponents also believed there would be less casualties (M = 39.6) than multilateralists (M = 49) t(1,49) = 2.12 p = .0396. Finally, those selecting unilateral force (M = 5.8) perceived public support for unilateral force higher than those selecting multilateral force (M = 4.6) t(1,49) = -2.93 p = .0052.69

69 There were no statistical differences in terms of the subjects rating the type of crisis situation (national security threat, regime change, or humanitarian). Both the multilateral and unilateral subjects almost unanimously recalled the scenario as a humanitarian operation. Also, there was no statistical difference in terms of level of confidence in their decision. Both groups were confident in their decision (M > 7.6).
Regime Change Results

As presented in table 6.2, the experiment shows a strong negative correlation between regime change and choosing a unilateral force alternative. Subjects sensitized to dimensions containing low support for unilateral action and low probability of unilateral military success rarely selected a unilateral option (3.3 percent). But, subjects were more attuned to the military capability dimension as only a minority advised using unilateral force given conditions of high unilateral support but low probability of unilateral military success (30 percent). The subjects were evenly divided about making a unilateral decision given high public opposition to unilateral military action success but high probability of success (50 percent). A majority of subjects advised using unilateral force given dimensions of high public support for unilateral action and high probability of success (56.7 percent).

| Table 6.2: For Regime Change, Proportion of Students Choosing the Unilateral Force Alternative * |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Power Dimension | Domestic Political Dimension |                   |                   |
|                   | High Public Support for Unilateral Force | Public Opposition for Unilateral Force |
| High Probability of Unilateral Military Success | .567 | .500 |
| Low Probability of Unilateral Military Success | .300 | .033 |

* N in each cell = 30.
Additional data collected in this experiment offers supplementary information about other questions. For example, subjects that chose the unilateral force option (M = 8.13) were more confident in their decision than those who chose the multilateral force option (M = 7.35) \( t(1,39) = -2.69 \ p = .0105 \). Unilateral proponents believed the regime change operation was less dangerous (M = 5.5) than those who chose the multilateral force option (M = 6.49) \( t(1,41) = 2.22 \ p = .0321 \). Unilateralists also believed there would be less casualties (M = 345.29) than multilateralists (M = 467.95) \( t(1,41) = 2.38 \ p = .0220 \). Finally, those selecting unilateral force (M = 6.0) perceived public support for unilateral force higher than those selecting multilateral force (M = 4.77) \( t(1,41) = -2.20 \ p = .0333 \).

**National Security Results**

As presented in table 6.3, the experiment shows a strong positive correlation between national security threats and choosing a unilateral force alternative. When subjects were sensitized to dimensions containing high support for unilateral action (regardless of the probability of unilateral military success), the majority favored a unilateral force decision. Specifically, among the four conditions, the highest percentage of subjects chose unilateral force given high public support for unilateral action and high probability of success (73.3 percent). Even subjects facing dimensions of high public support for unilateral action but low probability of unilateral military success still advised making a unilateral decision (60 percent). The subjects were evenly divided about making a

---

\(^{70}\) There were no statistical differences in terms of the subjects rating the type of crisis situation (national security threat, regime change, or humanitarian). Both the multilateral and unilateral subjects recalled the scenario as a humanitarian and regime change operation.
unilateral decision, even given the high probability of unilateral military success (50 percent). Some subjects still advised using unilateral force even when facing dimensions of low public support for unilateral action and low probability of success (20 percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Dimension</th>
<th>Domestic Political Dimension</th>
<th>High Public Support for Unilateral Force</th>
<th>Public Opposition for Unilateral Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Probability of Unilateral Military Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>.733</td>
<td>.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Probability of Unilateral Military Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>.600</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N in each cell = 30.

Additional data collected in this experiment offers supplementary information about other questions. For example, subjects that chose the unilateral force option (M = 5.74) perceived public support for unilateral force higher than those selecting multilateral force (M = 4.37) t(1,58) = -3.05 p = .0035. Unilateralists also believed this to be less of a regime change crisis (M = 3.44) than multilateralists (M = 4.95) t(1,58) = 2.79 p = .0072.\(^71\)

\(^71\) There were no statistical differences in terms of perceptions of danger and casualties. Moreover, both the multilateral and unilateral subjects ranked the scenario highly as a national security crisis. Also, there was no statistical difference in terms of level of confidence in their decision. Both groups were confident in their decision (M > 7.5).
Discussion

Per table 6.4, the three studies show that military power and domestic politics seem to have about the same effect on subjects. Specifically, only a minority of subjects with a condition of high probability of unilateral military success favored a unilateral decision (47.8 percent), and about the same percentage facing high support for unilateralism but low probability of success also wanted a unilateral decision (44.4 percent). If both the high public support for unilateral force and high probability of unilateral success dimensions were available, then the majority of subjects did favor a unilateral decision (64.4 percent). A small portion of subjects still favored unilateral action even with low public support and low probability of success (13.3 percent).

Table 6.4: The Proportion of Students Choosing the Unilateral Force Alternative *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power Dimension</th>
<th>Domestic Political Dimension</th>
<th>High Public Support for Unilateral Force</th>
<th>Public Opposition for Unilateral Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Probability of Unilateral Military Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>.644</td>
<td>.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Probability of Unilateral Military Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>.444</td>
<td>.133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N in each cell = 90.

Additional data collected in this experiment offers supplementary information about other questions. For example, subjects that chose the unilateral force option (M = 7.86) were more confident in their decision than those who chose the multilateral force option.
(M = 7.52) t(1,149) = -2.34 p = .0209. Unilateral proponents believed the use of force actions were less dangerous (M = 5.72) than those who chose the multilateral force option (M = 6.59) t(1,152) = 4.36 p < .0001. Finally, those selecting unilateral force (M = 5.83) perceived public support for unilateral force higher than those selecting multilateral force (M = 4.6) t(1,152) = -8.35 p < .0001.72

The subjects acted in the hypothesized direction. Presidents are less likely to act unilaterally in crises, such as in humanitarian operations and regime change, in which there is lower confidence in the mission, more risk, and the public is calling for multilateral action (see Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996; Duffield and Stork 1994). But, presidents will act unilaterally when facing national security threats. The public is supportive of the president using unilateral force to protect the nation, even when facing potentially high casualties (see Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996; RFD 1969; Haass 1994).

The national security results are interesting. The president seems to follow the advice of the public and use unilateral force regardless of military capabilities. The president was willing to use unilateral force 60 percent of the time if the public wanted unilateral force, even though there was low probability of unilateral success. This percentage drops to 50 percent if the public is opposed to unilateral force, even though there was a high probability of unilateral success.

The other two scenarios basically show an interactive effect between public support and military capabilities, suggesting the president makes a decision based on an expected

72 There were no statistical differences in terms of the subjects’ expected casualties or in recalling the type of crisis situation (national security threat, regime change, or humanitarian).
utility calculation. In the humanitarian scenario, only 43 percent of respondents wanted a unilateral action, if either there was public opposition to unilateralism or low probability of unilateral military success. In the regime change scenario, only 30 percent of the subjects wanted unilateral action, even when advised that 70 percent of the public supports unilateral action. In both scenarios, the unilateral proponent subjects made a cost-benefit calculation, as evident in the fact that they perceived the missions as less dangerous, having less casualties, and more public support for unilateral action than the multilateral proponent subjects. This generalizes well to expected utility, in which presidents want to increase the “benefit” side by adding allies (see Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Mueller 1993).

The main follow-up question of whether or not the crisis trigger is important can be answered in the positive. The results demonstrate why the president is less inclined to use unilateral force when facing humanitarian and regime change triggers but more inclined to use unilateral force when facing a national security threat. Domestic politics is linked inexorably to the crisis trigger and plays a role in the crisis decision. Unilateral proponent subjects, regardless of the crises, seemed to be more confident in their decision, believed the crises less dangerous, and perceived higher public support for unilateral action than the multilateral-choosing subjects. This suggests a president will likely want to take less risks with less severe crises and will choose to disseminate the costs through allied partners in order to protect himself from domestic political costs.

The results shed some light on the contradictory nature of the unilateral-multilateral literature, as explained in Chapter II. The public, as demonstrated by the subjects in this
experiment, tends to vary its support for unilateral action depending on the situation. For national security threats, the public orders the president to act unilaterally even with potentially high casualties and prolonged conflicts, but it is less supportive of unilateral force whenever the nature of the threat becomes ambiguous or the significance of the conflict less vital to protecting the nation.

Conclusion

This paper specified under what conditions a president makes a decision to use force unilaterally or multilaterally. The evidence sheds light on why the crisis trigger is important. The intention of the experiment was to look inside the black box realist thesis of this dissertation and see why the president may or may not make a unilateral decision. A foreign leader trying to anticipate U.S. actions must not only calculate military capabilities, but he must also calculate how much the U.S. values the stakes of a particular crisis. The higher the stakes, the more severe the crisis, the more the U.S. is willing to act unilaterally.

In each of the three crises, the president is making an expected utility calculation. The crisis trigger is clearly important with the president willing to follow public opinion and act unilaterally in a national security crisis, even when facing a strong opponent. But, in facing other crises (i.e., the humanitarian and regime change operations), the president seems to want to lower the “cost” of the conflict by adding allies. The multilateral option, in general, correlated with the perception that public wasn’t supporting a unilateral action, as well the situations being perceived as more dangerous and having a higher casualty count.
In Chapter VII, I use case study examinations of the 1991 Gulf War, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, and the 1989 Panama invasion to highlight the importance of international and situational factors. In determining the accuracy of the theory of unilateral use of force decision making, I test the hypotheses that a unilateral decision will be positively correlated with a wide gap in military power, an opponent located in the Western hemisphere, and a national security threat. For each case, I summarize the events of the case, review domestic political factors, explain the crisis trigger, detail the military power of involved actors, trace the president’s decision making process, and how assess how well the theory fared.
CHAPTER VII

CASE STUDIES

Introduction

How accurate is the theory of unilateral use of force decision making? To answer this question, I employ a case study method. Case studies, defined as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units,” are often held in “low regard” in scientific research (Gerring 2004, 341, 342). Case studies are criticized on grounds of selection bias and lack of generalizability, but they offer some unique advantages over the statistical and experimental tests conducted in this dissertation (see Achen and Snidal 1989; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Geddes 1990; Gerring 2004; Van Evera 1997).

I use my three selected cases to test my theory of unilateral use of force decision making, as part of an evidence-oriented strategy that describes complex social phenomena (Van Evera 1997, 35; Collier 1991, 23). These case studies offer a trade-off, providing accuracy at the expense of generalizability (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 17). The accuracy amounts to in-depth knowledge of the data, giving a “feel and flavor” of the subject being tested (Brown 1976, 3; McKeown 1999, 174, 178; Ebbinghaus 2005, 134; Mahoney 2000, 395; Munck 1998, 36).

In testing my case studies, I use a process-tracing method, in which I open up the “black box” of factors influencing a president’s decision (Layne 1994, 13). Using this method, I should find evidence of how a president makes his decision. First, a disparity
in military capabilities between the U.S. and its opponent should be correlated with unilateralism, as presidents tend to be realists and will rely exclusively on the U.S. military, if a victory can be assured quickly and with minimal costs (RFD 1969; Haass 1994; Kamienski 2003; Allison 1973). Second, U.S. unilateralism should be especially pronounced in the Western hemisphere, according to the tenets of the Monroe doctrine (Russett and Nincic 1976, 430; Wiarda and Wylie 2002, 16). If these factors have strong explanatory power, then the process-tracing case studies should provide a robust test of my predictions (Van Evera 1997).

Using this process-tracing method, I select three cases based on the extreme values of the dependent variable. The first case is the 1991 Gulf War, which is often represented as the ideal multilateral case. The second case is the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation, which represents a “middle ground” unilateral-multilateral case. The third case is the 1989 Panama invasion, which represents the ideal unilateral case. In all three cases, I demonstrate that the theory of unilateral use of force decision making fares well. Presidents Kennedy and Bush decided to act unilaterally or multilaterally based on a cost calculation of military power, the type of crisis, and the location of the crisis. Both presidents acted unilaterally or multilaterally with little regard to domestic politics.

For each case, I begin with an introduction and summary of the crisis events. Second, I review the domestic politics aspect of the case. Third, I explain the crisis trigger. Fourth, I detail the military power of the U.S. and crisis opponent as well as any other parties involved in the dispute. Fifth, I trace the president’s decision making
process, including the two decisions – using force and using unilateral or multilateral force. Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the case and how well the theory fares.

**1991 Gulf War (Multilateral Case)**

As cited by proponents in the earlier chapters, the 1991 Gulf War represents an ideal case in multilateralism with its legitimacy, burden-sharing, and capability aggregation (see Ruggie 1992; Stepanova 2003). The 1991 Gulf War is coded as a procedural and operational multilateral case, and it represents one of the few times the UN has authorized force. But, this perception of an ideal multilateralism case is wrong. Rather, the U.S., as hegemon, directed a coalition to restore stability in a region that threatened its (and others) national security interests. I examine this perception with a test of the hypotheses.

As hypothesized in this dissertation, the less the gap in military capability between the U.S. and an opponent, the more likely a president is to decide to use multilateral force. However, as also hypothesized, crises involving national security should be correlated with unilateralism. These competing hypotheses are not incompatible with one another. Rather, we should see President Bush decide to use force without regard to the level of coalitional support and strength, take action consistent with a hegemon protecting its interests, and then persuade a coalition to join it to lower the high expected costs without regard to domestic political influences.

For this case, I review the main events of the 1991 Gulf War. Second, I detail the domestic politics surrounding the crisis, including the particulars of public opinion and congressional involvement. Third, I explain why the Gulf War was a national security
type of crisis. Fourth, I detail the military power of the U.S., the coalition nations, and Iraq in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Fifth, I consider the president’s decision in terms of unilateralism and apply the president’s decision process to the sequential model of this dissertation. I trace Bush’s decision making from deciding to use force on August 3rd to deciding to use multilateral force on October 30th.

Summary of the 1991 Gulf War Events

The U.S.-Iraq relationship began to deteriorate in early 1990 with a Voice of America broadcast calling Hussein a “tyrant” and the State Department compiling a list of Hussein’s human rights violations. Hussein, in turn, made matters worse, when he executed a British journalist and threatened Israel with chemical weapons (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 28, 31; Smith 1992, 45-46, 48). Despite giving the perception to U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, 1990 of no impending invasion, Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2nd and quickly seized control of the country (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 53).

On August 6, 1990, President Bush ordered elements of the 82d Airborne Division to defend Saudi Arabia at the request of King Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (Hallion 1992, 135). Bush, while sending U.S. troops to the region, worked with the UN to pass 12 resolutions condemning Iraq’s invasion. UN Security Council Resolution 678, issued on November 29, 1990, was the final and most demanding resolution, authorizing the use of “all necessary means” to force Iraq from Kuwait beginning on January 12, 1991 (Keegan 2004, 76; Sifry and Cerf 1991, 156).
In a last ditch effort to avoid conflict and in a conversation resembling the Melian Dialogue, Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz met in Geneva on January 9th. Aziz, believing the U.S. would not want to pay the price of a protracted war, warned Baker, “You are a power which possesses strong weapons… I sincerely and without pretention tell you that the nineteen million Iraqis, including the Iraqi leadership, are convinced that if war erupts with you, we will win.” To which, Baker reminded Aziz of the futility of fighting the world’s greatest power, “Please do not let your military commanders convince you the strategy used against Iran will succeed here. You will face a completely different force. Midnight of January fifteenth is a very real date” (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 198).

Bush did not wait long after the January 15th deadline: the U.S. began its air and missile attack on Iraq on January 16, 1991. The 39-day air attack, consisting of four phases, was devastating. In the first phase, coalition aircraft quickly disrupted Iraq’s command, control, and communication networks, destroyed its air defenses, targeted nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons centers, knocked out most of Iraq’s electric, water, military, and oil production infrastructure, destroyed its roads, bridges, and railroads, and shot down three dozen poorly flown Iraqi jets. The second and third phases consisted of attacking Iraq’s military forces in Kuwait and interdicting its supplies (Keegan 2004, 78).

Hussein tried to fight back with a less-than-conventional method: firing al-Hussein Scud missiles at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, setting Kuwait’s oil wells on fire,
launching terrorist strikes against the coalition, and sending two Iraqi divisions on a 
surprise attack against coalition Arab units. All of these attempts failed miserably.

By Mid-February, Hussein began to negotiate in order to save his army from 
complete destruction. Morale and logistic problems alone had reduced his force from 
550,000 to 350,000. But, the coalition rejected Hussein’s offers and launched a massive 
ground assault along with the fourth phase of the air assault on February 24th. The U.S. 
sent the Marines on a diversionary attack into southeastern Kuwait and sent its armored 
VII Corps on a vast outflanking maneuver to the extreme west of Iraqi forces. Iraqi 
counterattacks against the Marines and armored formations resulted in total defeat of the 
Iraqi forces.

To prevent being surrounded, Hussein sent five Republican Guard divisions and 
three armored and mechanized divisions to the south and east to provide a “screen” for 
troops to withdraw from Kuwait. The Iraqi troops fought hard on February 25th and 26th, 
but they were simply “outnumbered, outgunned, and outmatched in every way” (Pollack 
2003, 84). Believing that the Republican Guard was destroyed and the exit routes from 
Kuwait cut off, Bush ordered a halt to the ground offensive on the morning of February 
28th (Pollack 2003, 81-85; Keegan 2004, 77-83).73 The 1991 Gulf War was a total 

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73 As it turns out, the Republican Guard had three of its eight divisions destroyed and a fourth lost about 
half its strength. The exits from Kuwait were also not cut off, as at least two Republican Guard divisions 
escaped and an infantry division, an armored division, and the remnants of a Republican Guard division 
moved to defend al-Basrah (Pollack 2003, 84).
Domestic Politics

One of the basic premises of this dissertation is that international considerations, not domestic politics, explain a president’s unilateral-multilateral decision. This should be the case even with a multilateral decision. While Bush had favorable public opinion and a Congress that eventually voted to support using military force, it is clear Bush was going to act without regard to domestic political influences.

In the days following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, U.S. public opinion support for sending U.S. troops to the region increased from six percent (August 3-4, 1990) to 78 percent in favor of sending U.S. troops to defend Saudi Arabia (August 9-12, 1990). Public support for using force remained strong, even though subjects were aware that the war could result in potentially 10,000 American casualties (Pollack 2003, 81). From a domestic standpoint, Bush faced Democratic control of Congress, had an approval rating of 62 percent, had a misery index of 11.3 percent, and was facing a rival in Iraq. But, domestic politics had little, if any, affect on Bush’s decision to use force (Smith 1992, 172, 198, 205).

Since the beginning of the crisis, Bush argued to Congress that he needed the freedom to be able to threaten force in order to deal effectively with Hussein from a diplomatic standpoint. He did inform Congress in writing of his August deployment of U.S. troops, but he purposely avoided triggering the 90-day clock of the War Powers Resolution (Smith 1992, 109). He also used the 12 UN resolutions as a method to

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74 The Gallup poll questions were as follows: (1) In your opinion, what, if anything, should the United States do concerning the current situation involving Iraq and Kuwait? (August 3-4 poll) and (2) Do you approve or disapprove of the United States' decision to send U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia as a defense against Iraq? (August 9-12 poll). Notably, those opposed to sending U.S. troops were 14 percent (August 3-4 poll) and 17 percent (August 9-12 poll).
convey the international legitimacy of his actions and to discount any domestic opposition (Smith 1992, 221).

Throughout the crisis months (August to January), Bush had decided he would use force regardless if Congress voted or how Congress voted. Drew (1991) labeled Congress as “irrelevant” to Bush’s use of force decision making (191-192). Congress did pass a resolution on January 12th authorizing force, but Bush made it clear he would have acted without congressional support (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 205; Smith 1992, 249). Bush wrote in his diary of Congress’s harm to America’s responsibility for defeating Hussein, “Our role as a world leader will once again be reaffirmed, but if we compromise and if we fail, we would be reduced to total impotence, and that is not going to happen. I don’t care if I have one vote in the Congress” (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 418). Bush’s statement is confirmed by the fact he authorized Operation Desert Shield on December 29th, two weeks before the congressional vote. He told allied ambassadors shortly before Christmas, “If I have to go [to war], it’s not going to matter to me if there isn’t one congressman who supports this, or what happens to public opinion. If it’s right, it’s gotta be done” (Smith 1992, 237).

Crisis Trigger

Using the coding rules established in Chapter IV, the 1991 Gulf War would be classified as a national security crisis. Bush viewed Iraq’s invasion as a destabilizing factor in the Gulf, given Hussein’s bullying could affect America’s oil and other interests in the region. In carrying out National Security Directive (NSD) 26 (October 2, 1990),

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75 The vote in the House was 250 to 183 and the vote in the Senate was 52 to 47 (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 205; Hallion 1992, 160).
1989) and NSD 54 (January 15, 1991), Bush made it very clear why Iraq’s invasion would not be tolerated: “Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states are vital to U.S. national security” (Sifry and Cerf 2003, 45). As hegemon, the U.S. needed to act to right the “tilt” toward instability, and its leadership, very simply, was a necessary condition for forcibly removing Hussein from Kuwait (Kissinger 1991, 463).

National Security. As Glaspie informed Hussein at their July 25th meeting, the U.S., as a superpower, was “concerned” about Iraq massing troops on its border with Kuwait (Sifry and Cerf 2003, 69). The U.S. concern in the region was based on a very simple premise: the free flow of oil (Yergin 1991, 24; Friedman 1991, 203-205; Gordon and Trainor 1995, 32; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 438). Hussein’s possession of Kuwait and potential invasion of Saudi Arabia could amount to Hussein controlling about 20 percent of global oil production, a monopolizing of oil prices that the U.S. was not willing to tolerate (Pollack 2003, 76; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 180).

Oil was one problem and Iraq’s destabilizing antagonism was another problem. In the first National Security Council (NSC) meeting after the invasion of Kuwait, Bush focused the meeting on how best to reduce Iraq’s military strength (Drew 1991, 183; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 439). Bush also focused on convincing Saudi Arabia and other Arab allies of the threat Iraq posed to their national security (Smith 1992, 79; Gordon and Trainor 1995, 48-49). The defense of Saudi Arabia was deemed critical to the whole regional balance of power (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 92).

Scowcroft described what was required of the U.S.: (1) contain Iraq, (2) slow its conventional and unconventional military capability developments, and (3) force its
withdrawal from Kuwait (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 321). If the U.S. failed to act, it “would be encouraging a dangerous adversary in the Gulf at a time when the United States had provided a de facto commitment to Gulf stability…” (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 322).

Military Power

The 1991 Gulf War is a simple case of the U.S. estimating the amount of military power necessary to defeat Iraqi forces and then raising the levels of U.S. and coalition power to meet that estimate. Using the CIMR scores, the U.S. clearly had an advantage and in hindsight probably did not need additional military power, but as described in the “Decision to Use Multilateral Force” subsection, Bush and the military commanders were worried about a high casualty rate. As such, Bush made a second decision on October 30th to increase coalition strength, and in the end, non-U.S. forces comprised 37 percent of the troop strength and 24 percent of the aircraft strength (Hallion 1992, 156-158).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Actors</th>
<th>Preponderance (CINC Score)</th>
<th>Preponderance (GDP)</th>
<th>Technology (Spending per Soldier)</th>
<th>Force Employment (Dummy Variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>$5.803 trillion</td>
<td>$133,028</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>$10.915 trillion</td>
<td>$87,107</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>$44.583 billion</td>
<td>$6,194</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76 To give an idea of the level of combat participation of the non-U.S. countries, the UK, France, and Saudi Arabia flew about eight percent of the air campaign’s first 24 hours (Hallion 1992, 166).
**U.S. Military Power.** As shown in table 7.1, the U.S. CINC score in 1990, in terms of preponderance, was 0.141 and its GDP was 5.803 trillion or 21 percent of the world’s GDP. In terms of technology, the U.S. spent an average of $133,028 per soldier. In terms of force employment, the U.S. received a dummy variable of one, given its ability to conduct warfare consistent with the nuclear revolution.

The U.S. would prove it had the most powerful military in the world, and based on a doctrine of “overwhelming strength,” it contributed the following to the Persian Gulf War effort as shown in table 7.2 (Summers 1995, 46-47, 53-54, 65, 76, 89, 131, 202-203, 241; Klare 1991, 470; Hallion 1992, 158):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.2: U.S. Military Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-Wing Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sea Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coalition Military Power. In terms of preponderance, the coalition CINC score in 1990 was 0.308 and its GDP was 10.915 trillion or 40.3 percent of the world’s GDP.\textsuperscript{77} In terms of technology, the coalition countries spent an average of $87,107 per soldier. In terms of force employment, the coalition countries received a dummy variable of one, given its ability to conduct warfare consistent with the nuclear revolution.

While sizable contributions were limited to a handful of countries (notably, the British, French, Canadians, Italians, and Egyptians), the coalition countries contributed about 205,000 troops, more than 60 ships, 750 aircraft, and 1,200 tanks (Keegan 2004, 77-78, 81). Other nations provided financial and logistical support (e.g., Germany and Japan) (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 120, 123). Reports vary on the individual contributions, but table 7.3 is an approximation of the totals (Summers 1995, 52-53, 63-64, 99-100, 200-201; Hallion 1992, 158):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Fighters, Electronic Warfare (EW), Helicopters</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Fighters, Tankers, EW, Helicopters</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Fighters, Transports</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Fighters, Transports, Helicopters</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{77} The coalition countries include Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Fighters, AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems), Tankers, Transports</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates (UAE)</td>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Fighters, Tankers, Transports, Helicopters, Reconnaissance and Patrol Aircraft</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sea Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Destroyer, Frigate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Destroyers, Frigates, Replenishment</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Corvettes, Missile and Patrol Crafts</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Minesweepers, Frigate, Support</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Destroyers, Oiler</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Destroyers, Frigates, Replenishment, Hospital, Minesweepers, Electronic Intelligence</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Frigates, Support, Minesweepers, Helicopter Assault, Destroyer</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Patrol Boats</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Frigates, Minesweepers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Cutter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Missile and Patrol Crafts</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Hospital, Salvage</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Missile and Patrol Crafts</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Frigates, Minesweepers, Missile and Torpedo Crafts</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Frigates, Transport</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Corvettes, Missile and Patrol Crafts</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Destroyers, Frigates, Replenishment, Minesweepers, Survey, Oilers, Submarines</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Land Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>300 Mujahedeen Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2 Surgical Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>3,500 Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>6,000-man Bangladesh Brigade, 1st East Bengal Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>200-man Chemical Defense Unit, 150-man Field Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>40,000-man II Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>20,000-man 6th Light Armored Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.3: Coalition Military Forces (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>150 Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Medical Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Al-Fatah, Haq, and Khulud Brigades, 15th and 35th Mechanized Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6th Mechanized Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Field Hospital, 3 Patriot Missile Batteries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Field Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>480-man Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Omani Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>7th Armored Brigade, Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Field Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>7,000-man Mechanized Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Medical Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5 Armored and Mechanized Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Medical Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Medical Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Field Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>9th Armoured Division, 45th Commando Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Mechanized Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1st Armoured Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraqi Military Power. In terms of preponderance, the Iraqi CINC score in 1990 was 0.013 and its GDP was 44.583 billion or 0.002 percent of the world’s GDP. In terms of technology, Iraq spent an average of $6,194 per soldier. In terms of force employment, Iraq received a dummy variable of zero, given its inability to conduct warfare consistent with the nuclear revolution.

Iraq’s military force was considered formidable, plentifully-equipped, and battle-tested (Keegan 2004, 75; Klare 1991, 470; Gordon and Trainor 1995, 10). Iraq had the fourth largest army and sixth largest air force in the world, and though it was Third
World country, its military was that of a First World nation (Hallion 1992, 146).

Hussein, believing he could deter the U.S. and underestimating the role of air power, took on a defensive strategy, a strategy based on goading the U.S. into a war of attrition. By the start of Operation Desert Storm, Hussein had deployed 51 of his 66 divisions to the Kuwaiti theater. This was a force of about 550,000 men, 3,475 tanks, 3,080 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 2,475 artillery pieces (Pollack 2003, 80). But, as a whole, Hussein could bring far more forces to bear if necessary. Reports on Iraq’s military strength vary, but it was approximately as shown in table 7.4 (Summers 1995, 51-52, 64, 66-67, 202; Keegan 2004, 75; Klare 1991, 470; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 389, 392; Hallion 1992, 128, 146-147):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.4: Iraqi Military Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-Wing Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sea Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol, Minelaying, and Specialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land Forces</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFVs and APCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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78 A 1989 Pentagon report listed Iraq’s military assets as 17 bombers, 280 fighters/bombers, 350 attack helicopters, 1.2 million troops in 45 brigades, and 9 missile boats (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 11).
**Bush’s Decision Making**

The U.S. had failed to deter Iraq, due to not acting as a hegemon should. Deterrence requires credible signaling, and the U.S., with its “policy of inaction,” failed to respond to Iraq’s aggressive stance toward Kuwait (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 63). When Iraq massed troops on Kuwait’s border, the U.S. should have made strong military moves (e.g., sending aircraft carriers to the Gulf), but it failed to act, and Hussein read the inaction as a sign of weakness (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 29; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 435). Believing America suffered from a post Vietnam malaise, Hussein dismissed the U.S. as “impotent” and “afraid of conflict” (Hallion 1992, 133). Bush was then put in a position of “rolling back” the destabilizing effect of Iraq’s invasion and reasserting America’s leadership as a hegemon.

Per figure 7.1, Bush made his initial decision to use force on August 3rd, due in large part to a meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He made a second decision to use multilateral force on October 30th, due to numerous military briefings on the strength of Iraq’s military and the high expected costs of removing Iraq from Kuwait.

By November, Bush and military commanders had decided that 234,000 coalition troops (of which 150,000 were American) were inadequate for a decisive ground offensive. So, on November 8th, Bush announced plans to increase coalition military strength, and by the start of the ground war, there were an estimated 844,650 troops (of which 532,000 were American) and 2,614 aircraft (1,990 were American) to face off against an estimated million Iraqi troops and 750 Iraqi aircraft (Hallion 1992, 156-157).
A Unilateral Use of Force Operation? As stated in the introduction of this case study and in the earlier chapters of this dissertation, the 1991 Gulf War is trumpeted as a multilateral case of legitimacy, burden-sharing, and capability aggregation. The legitimacy argument is valid as the UN passed 12 resolutions and nearly 50 countries participated in military action against Iraq. The legitimacy of the military operation seemed to drive the burden-sharing, though it had little to do with the normative values of restoring sovereignty and more to do with the individual contributing countries’ “self respect” (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 110).

Bush pressed the allies to contribute troops and money, and they contributed based on something akin to peer pressure (see Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994). Freedman and Karsh (1993) describe the non-U.S. military contributions as designed to achieve “the maximum of political profile with the minimum of risk” (112). Freedman and
Karsh (1993) describe the non-U.S. financial contributions as simplistic U.S. demands that allies reach into their wallets (120).

Bush’s decision to use multilateral force was a simple expected utility calculation: the more troops, the better the probability of victory. So, Bush prodded allies to contribute, and in the early precarious stages of Operation Desert Shield, he worked tirelessly (and successfully) to build the coalition up rapidly (Smith 1992, 129, 132, 147, 211). By mid-August, France had ordered its Persian Gulf fleet to cooperate with the U.S. Navy. By August 21st, Egypt announced the deployment of 12,000 troops, Syria sent armored forces, and the nine-state Western European Union agreed to provide support. Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain announced the sending of warships to assist the French and UK ships already in the Gulf (Smith 1992, 134, 137). In fact, the coalition naval fleet was assembled so fact and became so large that some countries, believing it was a wasted effort to send ships, decided against contributing naval power (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 112). In the end, allies contributed $48 billion of the anticipated $54 billion cost, and the UK, in particular, committed almost a quarter of its army to the war effort (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 112, 347, 358).

So, the 1991 Gulf War coalition was a multilateral operation, but it was also an operation that masked American hegemony and American interests (see Chinkin 2000, Krauthammer 1990-1991, Huntington 1993). Bush and the U.S. military made all of the key decisions: (1) orchestrating diplomatic activities through the UN, (2) using force against Iraq, (3) building a coalition to increase military capabilities, (4) pressuring coalition members for military and financial support, (5) drawing up the Operation
Desert Shield and Desert Storm air and land tactical plans, (6) retaining command and control over the operations, and (7) deciding when to end military operations against Iraqi forces. This is consistent with the manner in which a hegemon operates: build and lead coalitions.

The Decision to Use Force. Based on intelligence reports of Iraqi troops massing on Kuwait’s border, Bush initially authorized Operation Ivory Justice and dispatched two KC-135 refueling planes and one C-141 to the UAE on July 24, 1990 to help them defend against a potential air attack. This was an operation, not specifically designed to warn Iraq, but rather to signal to U.S. allies in the Gulf that the U.S. would support them (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 18-19; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 51). Based on the coding rules and if used in the Statistics chapter, this action alone would be coded a multilateral use of force. But, a detailed analysis of the decision allows one to see how Bush systematically asserted U.S. military power, while lowering the anticipated war costs with allies.

The initial reaction to Iraq’s August 2\textsuperscript{nd} invasion of Kuwait was to freeze Iraq’s assets and pass a UN Security Council resolution demanding the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 35-36; Smith 1992, 18-19; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 73). But, no military force was planned. Bush presided over a NSC meeting, in which the consensus was “too bad about Kuwait, but it’s just a gas station” (Smith 1992, 17). Bush told the press that day that he was not “contemplating” using force (Bush and

At the conference, he met with Thatcher who argued that Iraq’s invasion was analogous to the Falkland Islands, and the U.S., as hegemon, must take responsibility to unite the world and defeat Hussein. She urged Bush “not to go wobbly” and that Hussein must be stopped (Smith 1992, 63, 66; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 75). Along with UK support, Thatcher assured Bush that the French would offer military assistance. *This meeting with Thatcher on August 3rd was the defining moment.* Bush emerged from the meeting and told the press, “We’re not ruling any options in, but we’re not ruling any options out” (Smith 1992, 66). In any case, Iraq’s “naked aggression” would not stand (Smith 1992, 67).

With Thatcher’s strong support, Bush took the lead and stated in his memoirs: “It would be up to American leadership…” to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 320; Smith 1992, 68; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 75). At a NSC meeting that day, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney echoed Thatcher’s thoughts and urged a rollback strategy (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 37; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 76). So, essentially from August 3rd forward, removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait was the goal (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 47).

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79 Bush and Scowcroft (1998) make it clear that the initial NSC meeting and Bush’s public statements give the wrong impression of their intentions. Bush stated he had kept an “open mind” but he was determined to have “Kuwait’s sovereignty restored” (315). Scowcroft was “appalled” by the NSC discussion and didn’t believe it reflected Bush’s thinking or plans (317).
Bush summed up the transition from doing nothing militarily on August 2\textsuperscript{nd} to embracing a rollback strategy on August 3\textsuperscript{rd}.

I had decided in my own mind in the first hours that the Iraqi aggression could not be tolerated. During my press remarks at the outset of the first NSC meeting [August 2\textsuperscript{nd}], I did say that I was not contemplating intervention that perhaps inadvertently led to some confusion about my intent. I did not intend to rule out the use of force. At that juncture I did not wish explicitly to rule it in. But following the series of meetings [August 3\textsuperscript{rd} meetings with Thatcher and NSC], I came to the conclusion that some public comment was needed to make clear my determination that the United States must do whatever might be necessary to reverse the Iraqi aggression (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 49).

By August 4\textsuperscript{th}, the Pentagon had begun deployment of three aircraft carrier groups, the battleship \textit{Wisconsin}, two F-15 squadrons, two Army divisions, the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne, the 24\textsuperscript{th} Mechanized Infantry Division, and the 7\textsuperscript{th} Marine Amphibious Force. In total, 125,000 troops were ready for deployment (Smith 1992, 88). U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Norman Schwarzkopf suggested that the U.S. quickly deploy the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne to Saudi Arabia as a signal of resolve. Their deployment on August 7\textsuperscript{th} marked the start of Operation Desert Shield (this is officially termed C-Day) (Summers 1995, 91; Gordon and Trainor 1995, 47; Smith 1992, 90; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 94; Sifry and Cerf 1991, 197).

Once Bush made the decision to use force, there is no evidence that he ever doubted his decision. Drew (1991) and Hitchens (1991) regard Bush’s August 5\textsuperscript{th} press conference and late September White House meeting with exiled Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah as realpolitik moments of signaling (Drew 180; Hitchens 107-

\footnote{Technically, the Air Force was the first to defend Saudi Arabia. A C-141 and 24 F-15 fighters arrived on August 7\textsuperscript{th}. The 82\textsuperscript{nd} deployed on the 7\textsuperscript{th} but didn’t arrive in Saudi Arabia until the 8\textsuperscript{th} (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 54-55).}
Bush was not going to compromise with Hussein. He and Scowcroft made it clear that the U.S. was prepared to use military force to restore the balance in the Persian Gulf in a manner that protected the U.S. interests. The U.S. may have failed to deter Hussein from invading Kuwait, but it was now set on a course to restore its power and influence in the region (Cerf and Navasky 2003, 47-49; Drew 1991, 186).

The Decision to Use Multilateral Force. If the goal was to use military force to remove Iraq from Kuwait, the U.S. would need massive amounts of troops, aircraft, and ships (i.e., military power) (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 47; Smith 1992, 77). The operation remained essentially a U.S. operation throughout August and September. The Air Force devised an air campaign, termed Instant Thunder, that would quickly “decapitate” Iraq’s leadership. The campaign would destroy Iraq’s leadership and military infrastructure before destroying its forces on the ground. It was an “outside-in” strategy and would be a revolution in itself (providing a blueprint for the “shock and awe” air campaign of the 2003 Gulf War) (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 86-98; Hallion 1992, 150-156).81

If the air campaign had been decided in early September, the ground campaign would be predicated on the expectation (and fear) of heavy losses. The initial option called for an attack directly against the center of Iraqi forces, and in briefing Bush on October 11th, the plan was dismissed as a non-starter, given the high expected casualty rate. Scowcroft compared the CENTCOM plan to the bloody attrition battles of the Civil War (Freedman and Karsh 1993, 204-206). Cheney, in vetoing the plan, told JCS

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81 Schwarkopf approved the air campaign plan on September 3rd (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 98).
Chairman Colin Powell, “I can’t let Norman [Schwarkopf] do this high diddle diddle up-the-middle plan. I just can’t let him do it” (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 140-141).

Instead, a variation of Cheney’s original left hook plan, which was designed to outflank the Iraqis far further to the west than the JCS had ever envisioned, was accepted in November (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 158).

*The fear of high casualties was the defining moment for Bush’s second decision on October 30th, when he authorized a doubling of coalition forces to assure victory and disperse costs.* No matter the land campaign plan; the losses were anticipated to be high. Schwarkopf believed dislodging Iraqi forces would be “costly and bloody” with as many as 20,000 casualties (Smith 1992, 191; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 285). The Marines, charged with an attack into Kuwait, would be outnumbered by three to one and by more than five to one in tanks (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 164). A total of 150 planes were expected to be lost during the air campaign (Smith 1992, 224). Civilian think tanks predicted possibly over 15,000 American casualties with up to 10,000 killed. Statistical models predicted casualties as high as 40,000 (Hallion 1992, 2; Freedman and Karsh 1993, 286, 391, 468).

The U.S. clearly had military superiority, but President Bush, military experts, and even Hussein expected a large number of U.S. casualties. In what was to be the “Mother of All Battles,” Hussein had warned Glaspie that the U.S. was “a society that cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle” (Sifry and Cerf 1991, 316; 2003, 64; Hallion 1992, 133). On the domestic front, Senator Edward Kennedy cited the impending high costs,
“[T]he 45,000 body bags the Pentagon sent to the region are all the evidence we need of the high price in lives and blood we will have to pay” (Cerf and Navasky 2003, 74).82

With 250,000 troops in place, Powell advised Bush on October 30th that the U.S. was at “a fork in the road” (394). It could either build troops up for an offensive or rotate troops out. Based on a doctrine of overwhelming force, Powell requested that the VII Corps be deployed from Europe, three carrier battle groups deploy to the theater, the amount of Air Force planes and Marines be doubled, and the reserve be activated. He concluded by informing Bush that if he chose the build up option, the forces would not be in place before January 15th. Bush responded, “Defense should go ahead and move its forces” (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 395). But, the administration waited until after the November 7th elections to make the announcement of the reinforcement decision (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 153-155; Smith 1992, 201-203, 224). Scowcroft summed up the reasoning for the delayed announcement, “The timing of the decision to reinforce the troops was determined by practical military considerations, but the timing of the announcement of the increase was driven by political ones” (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 395).

82 The fear of casualties would prove unfounded, as the U.S. launched its current Revolution in Military Affairs. But before the invasion, few were confident the U.S. would launch a new revolution in warfare (Hallion 1992, 1). As noted in the “Current Revolution in Military Affairs” subsection of Chapter III and the “Military Revolutions” section and “Target Country Force Employment” subsection of Chapter IV, the 1991 Gulf War was the first war in which the U.S. used a disengaged combat strategy. Its forces were able to destroy Iraqi forces from a safe distance. Its forces used high-precision weapons for the first time, using on-board computers and laser-guided bombs to destroy Iraqi forces with a high rate of accuracy (with a margin of error measured in inches) (Keegan 2004, 79).
With a total force of 844,650 troops in place and having authorized Operation Desert Storm on December 29th, the attack began, as scheduled, at 3:00 am on January 17th (Hallion 1992, 157; Gordon and Trainor 1995, 209; Smith 1992, 237).

Assessment

The 1991 Gulf War, an unlikely case for unilateral action, is consistent with the theory of unilateral use of force decision making. While the Gulf War was a remarkable and quick victory with minimal casualties for the U.S. and its coalition, Bush’s decision making follows pre-war planning and analysis that estimated Iraq to have a strong military. Bush decided to use force on August 3rd, but after consultations with this advisers, he decided to lower the estimated costs by doubling the number of U.S. and coalition troops on October 30th. Throughout the decision making process, as Bush has acknowledged, Congress (and its vote) played a marginal role.

The national security nature of the crisis and the predicted correlation with unilateralism did not happen, but we did see Bush decide to act as consistent with a hegemon. Iraq threatened U.S. access to oil and represented a threat to the stability of the region; so, Bush was going to act with or without coalition support. The U.S. did have an advantage with the CIMR scores (force employment, technology, and preponderance), but a fear of a tenacious Iraqi military caused Bush to significantly increase military strength. Bush worked to assemble a coalition, which constituted about a third of the fighting force and had a CINC and CIMR score higher than that of the U.S.!
Bay of Pigs (Unilateral case)

If ever there was a case, that presents a “most likely” case for the unilateral use of force decision making, it is Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs. Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs decision was almost entirely devoid of a domestic political influence and almost entirely based on American hegemonic prestige. The Bay of Pigs would be coded as full unilateralism, but the “most likely” case become less obvious when Kennedy’s decision making is examined in the context of the Cold War. The seemingly straight forward regime change crisis with unilateral force becomes a national security crisis with attempts to make the overthrow of Castro look multilateral.

As hypothesized, the more the gap in military capability between the U.S. and an opponent, the more likely a president is to decide to use unilateral force. Crises in the Western hemisphere and those involving national security should also be correlated with unilateralism. So, then why did Kennedy try to make the overthrow of Castro look multilateral (i.e., having Cubans use the force)? Kennedy’s decision is especially surprising, given the administration believed it had military superiority and a high probability of success. The answer rests with the Soviets and Kennedy’s fear of their possible intervention. We should see Kennedy decide to use unilateral force without regard to domestic politics, take action consistent with a hegemon protecting its sphere of influence, and act unilaterally but try to give the perception of multilateralism to lower the probability (and resultant high costs) of Soviet military intervention.

I examine this case in the same manner as the 1991 Gulf War. First, I review the main events of the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation. Second, I detail the domestic politics
surrounding the crisis, including the particulars of public opinion and congressional involvement. Third, I explain why the Bay of Pigs was a regime change and national security type of crisis. Fourth, I detail the military power of the U.S., the Cuban Brigade (the exiles), Cuba, and the Soviet Union in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Fifth, I consider the president’s decision in terms of unilateralism and apply the president's decision process to the sequential model of this dissertation. I trace Kennedy’s decision making from deciding to use force on April 14th to deciding to use unilateral force on April 19th.

**Summary of the Bay of Pigs Events**

The Bay of Pigs is a remarkable case in failure (see Vandenbroucke 1984). Advised by outgoing President Eisenhower not to allow the Castro government to survive, President-elect Kennedy approved plans on November 29, 1960 to continue Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) training of Cuban exiles in Guatemala with the intention of using the exiles to invade Cuba (Schlesinger 1965, 233). The plan from the outset was not to use the U.S. military, but CIA personnel (i.e., U.S. citizens) were actively involved and participated in the operation (Wyden 1979, 30, 235-237, 278; Kornbluh 1998, 307, 317).

The Bay of Pigs operation began on April 15, 1961 when B-26 bombers disguised as the Revolutionary Air Force (FAR) bombed three Cuban airports in an attempt to knock

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83 Information on the Bay of Pigs operation can be found on the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum website at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/JFK+and+the+Bay+of+Pigs.htm.  
84 The plan to use the CIA to train Cuban exiles for use against Castro was agreed to on March 17, 1960 by President Eisenhower. President Eisenhower, on the whole, seemed uninterested in invading Cuba. He event testified a "program" was in place to train Cuban exiles, but that he knew of no "plan" to attack Cuba (Wyden 1979, 24-25; Schlesinger 1965, 222).
out Castro’s air force. After intelligence photos showed that only five Cuban aircraft had been destroyed in the April 15th bombings and that Castro still had several T-33s and Sea Furies operational, CIA Deputy Director General C.P. Cabell and CIA Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell pleaded through Secretary of State Dean Rusk to have Kennedy approve air strikes to cover the April 17th Monday morning beach landings. Kennedy rejected the request believing it would be politically bad for the U.S. in terms of reputation (Wyden 1979, 193, 198-200; Schlesinger 1965, 270-273; Kornbluh 1998, 3; Beschloss 1991, 116).

At about 1:00 am on April 17th, an invasion force of some 1,400 anti-Castro Cuban fighters (known as the Cuban Brigade 2506) began to land at two beaches: Blue Beach at Giron and Red Beach at Playa Larga.85 The U.S. Navy coordinated the launching of the invasion force. It provided destroyer escorts, a landing ship dock (LSD) San Marcos, two landing craft infantry (LCIs), three landing craft utility (LCUs), four landing craft vehicles and personnel (LCVPs), and a landing craft mechanized (LCM). CIA and U.S. Navy crews launched the vessels at sea, got off, and Cuban crews got on to take the crafts to the two-targeted beaches (Wyden 1979, 210-216; Kornbluh 1998, 38).86

At 4 a.m. on the 17th, Cabell made a second request to use U.S. jets from the Essex to cover the loading and withdrawal of the beach landing vessels. Kennedy not only rejected the request, but he ordered the carrier to move further out to sea (Wyden 1979, 303, 316).

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85 In total, 1,511 men comprised the Brigade but the number is reduced by about 150 men due to men not participating (Wyden 1979, 303; Kornbluh 1998, 38).
86 Notably, CIA agent Gray Lynch led one of the invasion parties. Lynch later testified that he did not have Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s permission to land with the invasion force (Wyden 1979, 217-219).
205-206; Schlesinger 1965, 273). The denial would prove to be costly. Cuban jets strafed the landing parties throughout the morning of the 17th. By the end of the day, the Cuban air force had shot down three Brigade B-26s, and sank two ships (the Houston and Rio Escondido) and one landing craft. A 20,000 man Cuban army had also advanced to the beach to meet the invaders.

The attacking Cuban planes were so effective that ships in the landing area were ordered back out to sea past the twelve-mile limit and to resupply under Navy protection. CIA agent Gray Lynch, on one of the landing ships, recalled passing the twelve-mile mark, being under attack, requesting protection from the Navy ships Eaton and Murray, and having his request denied (Wyden 1979, 231). Kennedy had ordered that no carrier ship operate closer than 50 miles from the Cuban shore, no aircraft closer than 15 miles, and no more than four aircraft could be “on station” at one time (Kornbluh 1998, 312-313).

Throughout the invasion, Kennedy repeatedly denied requests to use U.S. aircraft, but under pressure at an impromptu meeting in the early morning hours of April 19th, Kennedy authorized six unmarked jets from the Essex to provide air cover from 6:30 to 7:30 am for Brigade B-26s. The jets were not to seek air combat or attack ground targets. Through a mix-up, the jets arrive too late to protect the B-26s and two B-26s were shot down (Wyden 1979, 136, 272; Schlesinger 1965, 278; Kornbluh 1998, 318).

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87 Brigade B-26s did fly during the beach landings, but they were badly outmatched by the T-33s and Sea Furies. The CIA and Kennedy reinstated an earlier cancellation of a Brigade bombing run to destroy Cuban airfields during the night of April 17-18, but the three B-26s launched failed to find their target (San Antonio de los Baos) (Kornbluh 1988, 314).
88 Bissell authorized American pilots to fly combat missions beginning at 2 pm on April 18th. By the end of the operation, four U.S. pilots died at the Bay of Pigs but President Kennedy insisted he did not know of active U.S. participation (Wyden 1979, 278; Kornbluh 1998, 317).
The Cuban Brigade was effectively abandoned, and the operation was over by the afternoon of the 19th. In the end, 114 Brigade fighters were killed and 1,189 fighters taken prisoner. The failure not only emboldened Castro, who declared Cuba “socialist” (i.e., communist), but it also emboldened Khrushchev to provide “all necessary help” to defend Cuba (Frankel 2004, 69).

Domestic Politics

Newly elected president, Kennedy was intent on proving himself a Cold Warrior the equal of his predecessor (Paterson 1988, 137-138; Schlesinger 1988, 3-4). The Bay of Pigs was his first test, and as he believed, he wasn’t typical of his fellow liberal Democrats, that as he often chided, lacked “balls” or were likely to be “grabbing their nuts” on an operation like the Bay of Pigs (Wyden 1979, 120, 165). Kennedy favored a *mano a mano* style and did not back down to challenges. In fact, he enjoyed them and often sought out opponents to defeat (White 1961, 326).

From a domestic standpoint, Kennedy had Democratic control of Congress, had an approval rating of 80.5 percent, had a misery index of 8.02 percent, and was facing a rival in both the Cubans and Soviets. Given this favorable domestic standing, Kennedy was not to be deterred.

His first task was to overcome any bureaucratic inefficiencies. Special Assistant for National Security McGeorge Bundy once commented that the president told him, “By gosh, I don’t care what it is, but if I need some material fast or an idea fast, CIA is the place I have to go” (Wyden 1979, 95). The operation planning laid on his desk by the CIA, an agency he admired, was so secretive and so efficient that the president made the
decision to plan and carry out the operation without fully consulting with Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the UN (even the U.S. ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson was not fully consulted), or the Cuban Brigade fighters (Wyden 1979, 78-79, 86, 152, 187, 190-191; Zoellick 1999-2000, 32).

The operation was also remarkable in how uninvolved the public was in having any influence on the decision process. Kennedy did not inform the public of his intentions, but he did assume the public would be against using the U.S. military. A July 16-21, 1960 Gallup poll, in which only three percent of Americans supported sending U.S. troops to Cuba, seems to confirm Kennedy’s assumptions.89 The New York Times regularly reported on the operation planning, and while Kennedy grew angry about the leaks, the public response was mild to say the least (Wyden 1979, 154-155; Frankel 2004, 108).90

Kennedy’s fellow Democrats also had little influence on his decision. Senator William Fulbright delivered a memo to Kennedy on March 30th, urging him to not invade Cuba. Fulbright argued against the legitimacy of a unilateral attack, saying it violated the OAS charter and hemispheric treaties and would be denounced at the UN as imperialism. The memo either had no effect. In fact, it probably had a negative effect because Kennedy was “more militant” after reading the memo (Schlesinger 1965, 251).

89 The Gallup poll question was as follows: What do you think should be done in the present situation in Cuba? (July 16-21 poll). The public seemed indifferent as only two percent opposed sending troops.
90 The New York Times reported on the training of the exiles in Guatemala, the intention of removing Castro from power, and of the plans to have Cuban exiles invade the island (Wyden 1979, 46, 67, 153-155).
Crisis Trigger

Using the coding rules established in Chapter IV, the Bay of Pigs operation would be classified as a regime change crisis. This makes sense given the removal of Castro was the primary objective, even if national security was the end goal. But, the case study method allows the benefit of studying the nuances of a not-so-easily defined empirical world. Regime change was the objective of the operation, but national security was an overarching (and powerful) influence on Kennedy’s decision making. In a sense, the crisis trigger parallels Kennedy’s sequential decision with regime change influencing his decision to use force and national security influencing his decision to use unilateral force.

Regime Change. Both presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were intent on not allowing communist expansion into the Americas. This was a strong 20th century interpretation and unilateral enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine (Frankel 2004, 11; Wilson 1966, 322). Kennedy partisans suggest that Kennedy was goaded into the Bay of Pigs operation out of fear of Republicans potentially capitalizing on the situation, if he did not use Eisenhower’s trained fighters to overthrow Castro (Schlesinger 1988, 5; Beschloss 1991, 64, 106). But, Kennedy had always been clear, that he would not allow the Soviets (or Communists) to “push” where U.S. prestige was involved (Beschloss 1991, 87).\(^9\)

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\(^9\) Kennedy informed Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, during a March 27, 1961 visit to the White House that he would not allow Communists to take Laos (or Southeast Asia) and Cuba (Beschloss 1991, 87).
The Bay of Pigs operation can be traced back to March 17, 1960 and was based on the “Guatemala model,” in which the CIA overthrew the Guatemalan government in the course of one week in 1954 (Wyden 1979, 25). The Guatemalan operation succeeded based on a combination of untraditional methods: CIA propaganda, a force of 150 exiles, Americans flying P-47 fighters, a drunk Guatemalan fighter pilot encouraging his colleagues to defect, and CIA-chosen President Castillo Armas driving across the border from Honduras in a station wagon to assume control of the government (Wyden 1979, 20-21).

Even as the Bay of Pigs operation turned into a disaster, Kennedy had Rusk warn the Soviets not to intervene on behalf of Castro, as the U.S. would protect the Western hemisphere from “external aggression” (Beschloss 1991, 122).

National Security. To understand his decision making process, one must understand that the Bay of Pigs was both a regional issue (U.S.-Cuba hostilities) and a global issue (U.S.-Soviet competition) (Paterson 1988, 135-136; Wyden 1979, 65). The protection of America’s sphere of influence (i.e., keeping a communist regime from ruling in the Western hemisphere) was Kennedy’s overt problem and one that drove his Bay of Pigs planning. But, the Soviet threat was a strategic problem, and it drove Kennedy’s decision making before and during the Bay of Pigs operation.

Kennedy did not understand Khrushchev and was intimidated by him. But at the same time, Kennedy wanted to prove he was not weak, and as such, he took a dual track approach to Khrushchev. Kennedy ordered military officials to remove anti-Soviet language from their speeches, and he sent Khrushchev a letter appealing for a
“harmonious relationship” (Beschloss 1991, 59-60, 78). But, in a January 30, 1961 speech, Kennedy declared an “hour of maximum danger,” in which the Communists were expanding into Latin America, the Soviets were determined to dominate the world, and domestic problems paled in comparison to the strategic threats (Beschloss 1991, 62-63).

Khrushchev, facing his own domestic pressures, responded to Kennedy’s militancy with a threat against Berlin. He charged Bonn on February 17th with making military preparations and threatened that the Soviets were determined to achieve a German peace treaty (Beschloss 1991, 79). The Soviet threat against Berlin limited Kennedy’s use of military power against Cuba. If Kennedy used the U.S. military to invade Cuba, Khrushchev may do the same thing in Berlin. If the Soviets attacked Berlin, Kennedy, who was compelled to defend Berlin (through NATO), would either have to decide on superpower confrontation or appeasement (Beschloss 1991, 105).

Seeing this choice, Kennedy believed it necessary to remove Castro, but he did not want to risk a confrontation with Castro’s ally, the Soviet Union. Kennedy, in meeting with Brigade members after the invasion, informed them that he believed the mission could have succeeded without U.S. help. More importantly, he told them that the U.S., as hegemon, had many responsibilities in its struggle against Communism, and that using U.S. troops would have had negative ramifications (Wyden 1979, 292; Beschloss 1991, 121).

The Soviets understood the strategic implications as well. Khrushchev was livid upon hearing about the invasion. He informed Kennedy that the invasion was at the
“backing of the Americans,” and he would provide Castro “all necessary assistance” unless Kennedy called off the operation (Wyden 1979, 209). More privately, Khrushchev was surprised that Kennedy did not use U.S. troops to invade Cuba. The Soviets would not have allowed an unfavorable dictator to remain in their sphere of influence, but there was little Khrushchev could have done to save Castro (Beschloss 1991, 88, 109, 117). Given this failing, Khrushchev decided that Kennedy was weak, and he tested Kennedy in Berlin and at the Vienna Summit (Schlesinger 1988, 5; Beschloss 1991, 131).

Soon after the invasion, Kennedy met separately with former President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon to discuss the failure of the operation. Kennedy told Eisenhower he did not provide air cover for fear of the Soviets taking Berlin. Eisenhower admonished him, “That is exactly the opposite of what should really happen. The Soviets follow their own plans, and if they see us show any weakness, then is when they press us the hardest…” (Beschloss 1991, 145). Nixon advised Kennedy to press hard, to find a legal justification to use U.S. troops to invade the country. Kennedy responded, “There is a good chance that, if we move on Cuba, Khrushchev will move on Berlin. I just don’t think we can take the risk” (Wyden 1979, 294). Nixon left the meeting believing Kennedy was a “chicken” for canceling the air strikes and for not wanting to attack Cuba with U.S. troops (Wyden 1979, 295).

The Bay of Pigs disaster did not deter Kennedy from trying to remove Castro; Kennedy actually increased efforts to remove the “thorn” in his side. Attorney General Robert Kennedy declared the toppling of Castro as the administration’s “top priority”
and started “Operation Mongoose,” which included assassination schemes (Frankel 2004, 68-70; Paterson 1988, 136; Beschloss 1991, 125).  

**Military Power**

Military Power between the U.S. and Soviets dictated Kennedy’s decision making during the Bay of Pigs. The U.S. had a superior military advantage vis-à-vis Castro, but the Soviets had a superior military advantage vis-à-vis NATO troops in Berlin (Beschloss 1991, 105). Given this, it is necessary to examine all four of the actors involved in the Bay of Pigs operation: (1) the Cuban Brigade, (2) Castro’s Cubans, (3) the U.S., and (4) the Soviets.

Once again the case study method offers an advantage over the statistical method. Military power can be defined using components of the CIMR, and it can be defined using a more qualitative tactical measure of the aircraft, soldiers, tanks, and weapons used. For each crisis actor, I first list the CIMR components and then I list the actual military power each actor could have brought or did bring to bear in the crisis.

**Cuban Brigade Military Power.** The Cuban Brigade does not have preponderance, technology, or force employment scores, given that the crisis dyad fails to meet the use of force standard in the Fordham – COW MID data set. However, the operation as a whole cost $46 million and about 1,511 fighters were trained, meaning the average spending per soldier was $30,443 (Kornbluh 1998, 11). The Cuban Brigade CINC score would have been zero, and the force employment would have had a dummy of zero.

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92 In fact, Beschloss (1991) suggests that Kennedy may have believed that Castro’s assassination would have been coordinated with the invasion (139).

93 In the ICB data set, the U.S. and Cuba are listed in the crisis dyad.
The Brigade fighters stormed the beach aboard two LCIs, three LCUs, four LCVPs, and seven commercial freighters.\textsuperscript{94} With the exception of three of the freighters, each vessel had 50-caliber machine guns, and the LCIs also included two 75-mm rifles. Each Brigade soldier carried their personal weapon, and as a whole, the invasion force was armed with a large number of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There were also five M-41 tanks, 12 heavy trucks, an aviation fuel tank truck, a tractor cane, a bulldozer, two large water trailers, and numerous small trucks and tractors. Eleven B-26s were available for close air support and interdiction during the beach landings (Kornbluh 1998, 38-39).

\textit{U.S. Military Power}. Per table 7.5, the U.S. CINC score in 1961, in terms of preponderance, was 0.211 and its GDP was 2.094 trillion or 24 percent of the world’s GDP. In terms of technology, the U.S. spent an average of $20,723 per soldier. In terms of force employment, the U.S. received a dummy variable of one, given its ability to conduct warfare consistent with the nuclear revolution.

The massive U.S. military advantage led Kennedy to assume that the operation would be successful (Sorensen 1969, 183). But, Kennedy was insistent that U.S. combat forces not be used. He believed U.S. forces to be under strength, and if some reason, the troops became bogged down in Cuba, he was sure the Soviets would try to take Berlin (Wyden 1979, 308).

\textit{Cuban Military Power}. In terms of preponderance, the Cuban CINC score in 1961 was 0.004 and its GDP was 14.625 billion or 0.002 percent of the world’s GDP. In

\textsuperscript{94}Three of the commercial freighters were loaded with supplies and did not participate in the assault phase (Kornbluh 1998, 38).
terms of technology, Cuba spent an average of $648 per soldier. In terms of force employment, Cuba received a dummy variable of zero, given its inability to conduct warfare consistent with the nuclear revolution.

The Kennedy administration tended to underestimate the strength of Castro’s military in the short term, but it was concerned that in the long term, Cuba could become a “significant military power” with Soviet aid (Schlesinger 1965, 293; Beschloss 1991, 104). By January 1961, the Soviets were shipping large quantities of arms to Cuba and were preparing to train Cuban pilots to fly Soviet-provided MiG jets (Beschloss 1991, 104).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the invasion plan had “a fair chance of ultimate success” (Kornbluh 1998, 113). The isolated Bay of Pigs region was accessible by only three roads, which the Kennedy administration believed could be defended with a minimal number of Brigade members (Kornbluh 1998, 169).

The Cuban air force was estimated to have had a total of 36 aircraft: (1) 17 B-26s, (2) 13 Sea Furies, (3) five T-33s, and (4) one F-51. An after-action report estimates that the Cubans launched seven aircraft against the invasion force: (1) two B-26s, (2) two Sea Furies, and (3) three T-33s (Kornbluh 1998, 168). Armed with Soviet Bloc-furnished weapons, the Cuban Revolutionary Army was estimated to have had 32,000 men and the militia was estimated to have had 200,000 men (Kornbluh 1998, 52).

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95 Ironically, after the Bay of Pigs operation, Robert Kennedy remarked that his brother would never have approved the operation, if he had known that the Cuban “forces were as good as they were and would fight” (Beschloss 1991, 133).
Soviet Military Power. In terms of preponderance, the Soviet CINC score in 1961 was 0.174 and its GDP was 891.763 billion or 10.2 percent of the world’s GDP. In terms of technology, the Soviets spent an average of $14,554 per soldier. In terms of force employment, the Soviets received a dummy variable of one, given its ability to conduct warfare consistent with the nuclear revolution.

Table 7.5: Military Power in 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Actors</th>
<th>Preponderance (CINC Score)</th>
<th>Preponderance (GDP)</th>
<th>Technology (Spending per Soldier)</th>
<th>Force Employment (Dummy Variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>$2.094 trillion</td>
<td>$20,723</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Brigade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$30,443</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>$14.625 billion</td>
<td>$648</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviets</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>$891.763 billion</td>
<td>$14,554</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kennedy’s Decision Making

Kennedy’s decision making follows the theory of this dissertation. He was a realist committed to using his leadership to protect national interests, and as Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy described, he believed the U.S. “was the locomotive at the head of mankind, and the rest of the world the caboose” (Schlesinger 1988, 6-7; Paterson 1988, 128).

Kennedy also made an expected utility calculation. While he believed the U.S. had a superior military advantage, he did not want to risk a prolonged war. In an April 12th meeting, he stated, “The minute I land one Marine, we’re in this thing up to our necks. I
can’t get the United States into a war and then lose it, no matter what it takes. I’m not going to risk an American Hungary” (Beschloss 1991, 114). Instead, he would rely on the Cuban Brigade, and even if they failed initially, they could escape to the hills and carry out a guerrilla campaign (Schlesinger 1965, 256-257; Beschloss 1991, 107, 114).

Kennedy’s use of force decision and unilateral use of force decision followed a sequential process as illustrated in figure 7.2. Though confusion reigned throughout the operation, Kennedy made all of the crucial decisions. In his first decision on using force, Kennedy made a series of tactical decisions with the intention of not explicitly using U.S. force. These were as follows: (1) the decision to weaken the first airstrike on the Cuban airbases; (2) the decision to cancel the second strike for the beach landings; and (3) the decision to have the Brigade land on Apr. 17th. Kennedy eventually made the decision to use U.S. unilateral force (though he tried minimize U.S. visibility) (Wyden 1979, 316).

In sum, Kennedy made the decision to use force in order to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, to reverse a communist inroad in the Western hemisphere. Once the operation was underway, Kennedy resisted the use of U.S. troops due to concerns about a Soviet response. Avoiding losing Berlin was Kennedy’s main priority, and it drove his decisions throughout the operation (Schlesinger 1965, 287; Beschloss 1991, 105, 150). When Kennedy did commit U.S. forces, he did so in a way as not to be threatening.
Kennedy made the decision to use force on April 14th when he formally authorized the operation. However, the world, the American people, and even Brigade members believed it was a unilateral American operation (Kornbluh 1998, 73). In fact, Brigade members, upon landing on the beaches, declared themselves as coming from the U.S. (Wyden 1979, 225). Castro called the invasion one in which the U.S. “delivered the planes, the bombs, and trained the mercenaries.” He was clear to refer to the Cuban brigade as U.S. mercenaries and not as Cuban citizens (Wyden 1979, 185).

The Decision to Use Force. While Kennedy had approved plans to continue training Cuban exiles soon after being elected (November 29, 1960), he continued to ponder
whether to go forward with the operation (i.e., decide to use force) throughout the early months of his presidency. Adviser Arthur Schlesinger believed that as late as April 4th, the president was against using force. Kennedy began to see problems with the CIA plans, but more importantly, he was worried that an invasion of Cuba would set back his attempts to gain agreement with the Soviets over Laos. Khrushchev was obsessed with Cuba, and an invasion would have strong negative implications on the U.S.-Soviet relationship (Schlesinger 1965, 249; Beschloss 1991, 106).

In meetings on April 4th and 6th, Schlesinger saw the president’s reluctance begin to fade, as the CIA convinced him that the Brigade could escape from the beaches into the hills. The costs, both in military and political terms, would be minimal: if the operation failed, the exiles could fight as guerrillas along with other anti-Castro guerrillas already on the island. Kennedy believed it better to have the Cuban exiles fighting in Cuba, than running around the U.S. saying how Kennedy had failed them (Schlesinger 1965, 256-257; Beschloss 1991, 107, 114).

Kennedy is believed to have authorized the invasion on Saturday, April 8th, and on the 11th, Attorney General Robert Kennedy informed Schlesinger that his brother had made up his mind and expected everyone’s support (Schlesinger 1965, 233, 259; Wyden 1979, 159). As the invasion date approached, Kennedy felt compelled to move forward with the operation. He did not want to appear weak or to give the perception that Castro was popular (Wyden 1979, 308).

On April 13th, Kennedy requested an appraisal of the Brigade’s capability, and receiving a strong positive appraisal in response, Kennedy was confident in formally
authorizing the operation on April 14th (Schlesinger 1965, 267-268). On the 14th, Kennedy called Bissell and informed him to go ahead with the airstrikes on the 15th. Bissell informed him 16 planes would conduct the operation. But, Kennedy, in authorizing only eight planes, responded, “Well, I don’t want it on that scale. I want it minimal” (Kornbluh 1998, 303). The operation was set to begin.

The Decision to Use Unilateral Force. From the start of the operation, confusion was the modus operandi. The Cuban Brigade was not up to the task, and the president contemplated direct U.S. involvement. For a couple days, Kennedy steadfastly refused to allow U.S. participation, but by the 17th, he began to have second thoughts. In fact, Robert Kennedy believed that his brother would have authorized U.S. involvement as early as the evening of Apr. 17th. Upon hearing that ammunition supply ships were needed to ensure the beachhead’s survival, Kennedy remarked, “I’d rather be an aggressor than a bum” (Wyden 1979, 264).

But, the president was receiving information five to seven hours after the battle incidents were occurring. By 9 pm on Apr. 17th, the reports of a disastrous operation were being received, but it was too late to try to save the operation (Wyden 1979, 264-265). By the morning of the 18th, Kennedy was trying to minimize the damage to U.S. prestige and still trying to minimize U.S. visibility in the operation (Wyden 1979, 266-267). By the evening of the 18th, he had concluded that it was useless to continue the operation, even with U.S. aircrews and resupplies (Wyden 1979, 268). To all around him, Kennedy had accepted the failure and went about his presidential duties, including hosting the annual Congressional Reception that night at the White House.
Deputy National Security Adviser Walt Rostow and Bissell were anything but relaxed. To them, the operation needed to be saved. Rostow shared the sentiments of the CIA and the military, “It was inconceivable to them that the President would let it openly fail when he had all this American power” (Wyden 1979, 270). Rostow scheduled a meeting for midnight at the White House. At 11:58 pm, he and Bissell would meet the president, Rusk, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, all of whom were in formal attire from the reception.96 Bissell made a case for using jets from the Essex to save the operation. Burke readily agreed with Bissell, suggesting that with two jets and one destroyer, the U.S. could defeat Castro’s forces. Kennedy was not to be persuaded, “Burke, I don’t want the United States involved in this.” Burke reminded the president that the U.S. was involved (Wyden 1979, 270; Beschloss 1991, 122).

*Finally, Kennedy was persuaded, he authorized six unmarked jets from the Essex to fly from 6:30 to 7:30 am on Wednesday morning to cover a B-26 attack.* The jets could not engage enemy aircraft nor attack ground targets; they could only defend the B-26s. Rusk reminded the president that his decision meant active U.S. involvement. To which, Kennedy responded, “We’re already in it…” (Wyden 1979, 271). Through a massive communication breakdown, four American-piloted B-26s, including pilots from the Alabama National Guard, arrived over the beachhead before the Essex received its authorization to protect the bombers. The B-26s were attacked and four of the American

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96 Schlesinger would join the group around 1 am (Wyden 1979, 271).
pilots were killed (Schlesinger 1965, 278; Wyden 1979, 235-243; Kornbluh 1998, 318; Beschloss 1991, 123).  

Assessment  

The Bay of Pigs operation, a likely case for unilateral action, is consistent with the theory of unilateral use of force decision making. While the Bay of Pigs was a complete failure and a complete defeat of unilaterally applied American military action, Kennedy’s decision making followed the theory of this dissertation. Kennedy believed the Cuban Brigade could topple Castro’s regime and convinced of probable success, he decided to use force on April 14th. Then, in an attempt to save the operation (and perhaps still have success), he ordered the American military to become overtly involved. Throughout the decision making process, Congress and the public played almost no role at all.  

The location of the crisis in the Western hemisphere is consistent with the theory’s predicted unilateralism, but the regime change and national security nature of the crisis complicate the case. National security should be consistent with unilateralism. But, the national security trigger was premised on fear of Soviet involvement and fear of a high cost conflict against the superpower with high CIMR scores. So, it is understandable to see why Kennedy wished to conceal U.S. involvement. But, when faced with defeat, Kennedy resorted to dramatically increasing military power through direct U.S. military intervention. This case, while consistent with the theory, serves to enrich the theory as well.

97 The jets from the Essex did not take off until an hour after they were supposed to rendezvous.
1989 Panama Invasion (Unilateral Case)

The 1989 Panama invasion represents an ideal case in unilateralism. With a dictator threatening U.S. interests (and its citizens) in the Western hemisphere, Bush acted without trying to overcome the obstacles of multilateralism. The invasion is coded as full unilateralism, and it represents the clearest case of how a hegemon should act. Examining the case in detail, though, illustrates the sequential nature of a president’s decision, even if it’s made in a short span of time. Bush decided to use force and then he asked his advisers on how best to achieve his main objective of removing Noriega from power. Assured of a probable unilateral military success, Bush acted without regard to public opinion or congressional involvement.

As hypothesized, a large military gap and a crisis in the Western hemisphere should correlate positively with unilateralism. The Panama invasion is the “most likely” case, in which Bush’s decision to act unilaterally should be made unconditionally. Bush’s decision should reflect that of a hegemon protecting its sphere of influence. Bush’s decision should also involve estimating the costs of toppling the Noriega regime and acting unilaterally if military superiority is assured. The unilateral decision should also be made without regard to domestic political influences.

I examine this case in the same manner as the prior two cases. First, I review the main events of the 1989 Panama invasion (Operation Just Cause). Second, I detail the domestic politics surrounding the crisis, including the particulars of public opinion and congressional involvement. Third, I explain why the Panama invasion was a regime change type of crisis. Fourth, I detail the military power of the U.S. and Panama in both
quantitative and qualitative terms. Fifth, I consider the president’s decision in terms of unilateralism and apply the president’s decision process to the sequential model of this dissertation. I trace Bush’s decision making from deciding to use force in the late morning of December 17th to deciding to use unilateral force by the afternoon of the 17th.

Summary of the 1989 Panama Invasion Events

Once an intelligence source for the U.S., Dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega lost favor with the U.S., turned to support Cuba and Nicaragua in the summer of 1987, and was indicted in Florida in February 1988 on drug charges (Koster and Sanchez 1990, 274-275, 355, 359; Dinges 1991, 51, 295). Noriega was a violent dictator and the Bush administration began to plan and prepare for a military intervention in the event Noriega threatened U.S. interests. These threats to U.S. interests began in March 1988 with a series of hostile Panama Defense Force (PDF) actions toward U.S. forces in Panama. In March, the PDF wounded a Marine corporal’s wife with a shotgun blast. In August, an Air Force sergeant and his father were beaten. In November, a Navy petty officer was forced to beg for his life. On March 3, 1989, the PDF detained six American school buses, two loaded with children for several hours (Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 43; Koster and Sanchez 1990, 359).

When Noriega’s candidate Carlos Duque lost an election, wrought by fraud and violence, Noriega still declared Duque the winner and had president-elect Guillermo Endara beat with tire irons in front of television cameras on May 10, 1989 (Koster and Sanchez 1990, 366; Dinges 1991, 305). In mid-December 1989, Noriega crossed the line, when he declared Panama “at war” with the U.S., murdered a U.S. Marine

At 12:45 am on December 20th, Operation Just Cause commenced. U.S. military forces descended upon Panama in the largest military action since Vietnam and the largest air-drop since D-Day. The Army Rangers and 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division seized Torrijos and Tocumen airfields. The Navy SEALs seized Noriega’s personal jet at Paitilla airfield. A C-130 Spectre gunship attacked the PDF’s crown jewel, the Comandancia, and two F-117s dropped two 2,000 pound bombs near the PDF barracks in Rio Hato to “scare” the barracks occupants. Army Rangers then seized the PDF barracks. The Rangers, along with Mechanized Infantry and Airborne Infantry, also seized the Comandancia. Delta Force commandos seized Noriega’s Radio Nacional broadcast station. The Marines secured the Bridge of the Americas and protected areas around Howard Air Force Base. U.S. forces also secured the Canal and Colon.

The military campaign was intense but brief. The PDF was a non-factor, ceasing to exist by December 24th, and Noriega’s \textit{battallones de la dignidad} fought for a couple days and even held out in a mined tunnel at Tinjaita but the U.S. campaign was overwhelming (Koster and Sanchez 1990, 375, 377; Dinges 1991, 308, 312; Buckley 1991, 238-240; Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 77, 114, 126, 135, 189, 203, 236-237; McConnell 1991, 38, 47, 74, 80, 99, 130, 132-133, 145-149, 219, 224, 233, 267-268). The quick victory resulted in a manhunt for Noriega, and he was detained on January 3, 1990, when he left the Papal Nunciature (the Vatican Embassy) in Panama (Hallion
1992, 113). Though 23 U.S. troops were killed, the end result was considered a complete success (Hallion 1992, 114-115; Dinges 1991, 312).

Domestic Politics

Domestic politics had little, if any, influence on Bush’s decision to use force. U.S. public opinion support for sending U.S. troops to Panama decreased from 58 percent (May 11-12, 1989) to 26 percent (October 5-6, 1989). From a domestic standpoint, Bush faced Democratic control of Congress, had an approval rating of 71 percent, had a misery index of 10.1 percent, and was not facing a rival in Panama.


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98 The Gallup poll questions were as follows: (1) Do you favor or oppose the following options for U.S. policy toward Panama now? (May 11-12 poll) and (2) Do you favor or oppose the following options for U.S. policy toward Panama at this time? (October 5-6 poll). The amount opposed to sending troops increased from 36 percent (May 11-12 poll) to 74 percent (October 5-6 poll).
But generally, Bush did not consult with Congress or ask for its permission to use force. His consultation consisted of calling congressional leaders from 6:00 pm to 6:30 pm on December 19th to inform them of his planned invasion (Buckley 1991, 232).

Crisis Trigger

Using the Chapter IV coding rules, the Panama invasion would be classified as a regime change crisis. This makes sense given the removal of Noriega was the primary objective. But, also in a sense, Bush’s desire to protect the Americans living in Panama could represent a national security goal.

Regime Change. Bush, in deciding to remove Noriega from power, justified his decision as self-defense, given Noriega’s declaration of war and the murder of a U.S. Marine. According to Bush, the U.S. toppled the Noriega regime for three explicit reasons: (1) to save American lives, (2) to bring indicted Noriega to trial and (3) to restore democracy in Panama (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 23; Dinges 1991, 308). Noriega was a fugitive from U.S. justice, and it was up to the U.S. to remove him from power and put in place the rightfully and democratically elected president.99

The post-invasion reaction to the regime change was strong. In general, the Latin American response to the invasion was “muted and quite inconsequential,” due to the fact Bush had talked to nearly every Latin American leader and informed them of why the U.S. was using military force (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 61-62). But, the UN General Assembly denounced the U.S. action as a “flagrant violation of international law” and the Vatican described U.S. troops surrounding the Papal Nunciature as an

99 Moments before the invasion, Guillermo Endara was sworn in as president (Dinges 1991, 308; McConnell 1991, 92-93).
“occupying army” (Ehrenreich 1991, 299; Dinges 1991, 313-314). Various world leaders criticized Bush for taking unilateral action. But, Bush cared very little about world opinion, as his response to criticism from Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev demonstrates: “If they kill an American Marine, that’s real bad. And if they threaten and brutalize the wife of an American citizen, sexually threatening the lieutenant’s wife while kicking him in the groin over and over again – then, Mr. Gorbachev, please understand, this president is going to do something about it” (Dinges 1991, 313).

Military Power

The decision to act unilaterally seems to have been a rather easy decision for Bush. Powell would later call the Panama invasion a “scrimmage” as opposed to the “NFL” game of the Iraq invasion (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 324).100

U.S. Military Power. Per table 7.6, the U.S. CINC score in 1989, in terms of preponderance, was 0.150 and its GDP was 5.704 trillion or 21 percent of the world’s GDP. In terms of technology, the U.S. spent an average of $131,696 per soldier. In terms of force employment, the U.S. received a dummy variable of one, given its ability to conduct warfare consistent with the nuclear revolution.

As in the 1991 Gulf War, Bush would order the doubling of forces in an effort to have military superiority to carry out an offensive campaign. On December 19th, transports landed troops, doubling the number of U.S. troops in Panama from 13,000 to

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100 If one reads through Bush and Scowcroft’s (1998) A World Transformed, one will see that Bush dedicates about half of a page to explaining the Panama invasion (as opposed to over 175 pages for the Persian Gulf War). This is probably due to the fact that it became an afterthought (even the invasion date is wrongly listed as December 26th in A World Transformed), given the ease and success of the operation (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 166).
more than 26,000 (Dinges 1991, 308; Klare 1991, 470). All four services participated in the invasion and a special emphasis was given to special forces, which accounted for 4,150 troops of the 26,000 troops (Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 113).

Panamanian Military Power. In terms of preponderance, the Panamanian CINC score in 1989 was 0.0003 and its GDP was 10.215 billion or zero percent of the world’s GDP. In terms of technology, Panama spent an average of $10,071 per soldier. In terms of force employment, Panama received a dummy variable of zero, given its inability to conduct warfare consistent with the nuclear revolution.

Panama, in essence, did not have military but a “glorified police force” with 10,000 men and four poor quality, propeller-driven combat planes. It had no tanks and no missiles (Klare 1991, 470). Noriega’s main power came from the battallones de la dignidad, an “armed rabble” that wore no uniforms and was undisciplined. Koster and Sanchez (1990) describe the battlioneers as “barbarian nomads of some new dark age, but when it came to a fight, they fought better than the regular PDF units” (362).

<table>
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<th>Table 7.6: Military Power in 1989</th>
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<td>Crisis Actors</td>
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Bush’s Decision Making

Noriega, like Hussein after him, did not believe Bush would resort to military force. When the reinforcements landed at Howard Air Base in Panama, Noriega wasn’t worried. Bush had twice sent reinforcements and nothing happened. The State Department had even labeled the murder of the U.S. Marine an “isolated incident” (Koster and Sanchez 1990, 372-373, 379; Buckley 1991, 224). But, Bush had made the decision to remove Noriega, and it was a decision, like his 1991 Gulf War decision, that he did not have second thoughts about (Buckley 1991, 229). Dinges (1991) describes Bush’s order to remove Noriega as being personal, based on the evilness of Noriega, and not a decision driven by ideological differences (316).

As illustrated in figure 7.3, Bush made the decision to use force during a brunch with Vice President Dan Quayle on December 17th. In an afternoon meeting with his advisers, Bush asked for the best military plan to accomplish his military decision to remove Noriega. Powell advised him to use overwhelming unilateral strength. In a matter of hours, Bush had made his two decisions – to use force and to use unilateral force. A multilateral force option was not even discussed.
A Unilateral Use of Force Operation? After the fraud of the 1989 elections, the OAS passed a couple of resolutions deploiring Noriega to “respect” the will of the Panamanian people (Koster and Sanchez 1990, 367-368). But, the OAS and the U.S. worked at cross purposes. Both entities wanted Noriega out of office, but the OAS wanted to resolve the situation diplomatically while the U.S. was prepared to act militarily. The OAS sent five delegations to Panama from May 23rd to August to report on how a transfer of power could be achieved. Noriega, not only ignored the OAS resolutions, but he openly referred to the OAS delegations as “idiots.” The U.S. was not to be deterred by international inaction. It sent armored vehicle convoys through the streets of Panama and conducted military exercises as a show of strength. Noriega, not believing the threat, simply denounced the U.S. actions as well (Buckley 1991, 186-187, 191; Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 63-64).
Using the 1983 Grenada invasion as a model, the U.S. simply took action to topple a leader it saw as a threat to its citizens living there (Dinges 1991, 318-319). Unlike Grenada, Bush concluded that multilateral diplomacy and military action was useless and a waste of time and effort (Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 64). In short, Bush never seriously contemplated using multilateral force.

*The Decision to Use Force.* After the May 10th election fiasco, Bush sent 2,000 troops to Panama as a signal to Noriega. He also sought international assistance and openly appealed on May 13th to the PDF for a coup (Buckley 1991, 183). But Bush, unlike Kennedy with the Bay of Pigs operation, was not willing to rely on indigenous forces. Major Moises Giroldi had approached the CIA and U.S. military about coordinating a coup. The Bush administration, while wanting to overthrow Noriega, was “wary” of Giroldi’s plan and decided not to actively support him (Buckley 1991, 200; Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 69). Powell commented, “A great power doesn’t throw the weight of its prestige and authority behind some guy who walks in…When the time comes and there is believed to be a requirement to do this, we do it on our agenda for our purposes” (Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 68-69). Giroldi’s October 3rd coup ended in disaster with Noriega executing Giroldi and ten other coup participants (Dinges 1991, 305-306; Buckley 1991, 197-206).

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101 Noriega, in a televised address, compared the American involvement in the Giroldi coup to the American involvement in the Bay of Pigs operation (Buckley 1991, 209).

102 Powell did authorize U.S. troops to go to the Comandancia to seize Noriega, but Bush wanted the action to be covert and non-confrontational. The U.S. also set up a couple of roadblocks. But, the U.S. actions were all too late and all for naught. Noriega’s Mountain Men and Battalion 2000 arrived unimpeded to rescue Noriega at the Comandancia (Buckley 1991, 206-207; McConnell 1991, 10-11).
But in the aftermath of the October coup, Bush decided to take action. Under the cover of routine supply shipments to its Panamanian bases, the U.S. transported equipment for a military offensive, consisting of Apache helicopters and at least four tanks (Dinges 1991, 306). With planning dating back to Operation Blue Spoon in 1988, the military was prepared for a massive invasion (Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 18-19).

Noriega’s declaration of war on the U.S. on December 15th and the beating of a Navy officer and his wife on December 16th were too much for Bush. This latter incident, in particular, seemed to have a strong effect on Bush, causing him to authorize Operation Just Cause on December 17th (McConnell 1991, 19). On December 17th, Bush met Quayle for a brunch and informed him that he had decided to use military force. In authorizing the invasion of Panama, Bush set into motion a doctrine of overwhelming strength that would foreshadow his Operation Desert Storm decision making (Koster and Sanchez 1990, 372; Dinges 1991, 308; Buckley 1991, 225-227).

The Decision to Use Unilateral Force. After the brunch, at a 2 pm meeting with his advisers, Bush outlined his three objectives: (1) remove Noriega from power, (2) secure the safety of Americans in Panama, and (3) restore democracy to Panama. Then, he stated he wanted to use military force and he asked his team, “How can I do that?” (Buckley 1991, 230; Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 98).

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103 In late October, Bush authorized a three million dollar CIA plan, called Panama 5, which was designed to remove Noriega from power (either though capturing or killing him). By mid-November, the press revealed the plan, and the plans gave way to a massive military invasion (Buckley 1991, 220-223).
104 The advisers included Quayle, Baker, Cheney, Powell, Scowcroft, Scowcroft’s deputy Robert Gates, Chief of Staff John Sununu, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Operations Lt. General Thomas Kelly, and Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater.
Powell advised Bush to use massive force, consisting of 25,000 troops and Stealth fighter-bombers. Bush asked if a smaller force could accomplish the same objective. Powell responded that Noriega would hide, and in order to prevent Noriega from commanding troops if he emerged from hiding, the PDF would need to be destroyed (Buckley 1991, 230-231). A larger force would also reduce the probability of high casualties. *After learning of an estimated 70 U.S. soldiers killed, Bush signed off on the operation, “Let’s do it”* (Buckley 1991, 231; Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991, 97-99). 

**Assessment**

The Panama invasion, a likely case for unilateral action, is consistent with the theory of unilateral use of force decision making. In fact, the Panama invasion case is the strongest evidence in support of the theory. With a weak military and being located in the Western hemisphere, Panama was an easy target for American military power. The rapidity and ease of Bush’s use of force and unilateral use of force decision seems to confirm this notion. After the brutal beating of a Navy officer, Bush made his decision to use force after brunch on December 17th. In a follow-up meeting with advisers, he asked how best to remove Noriega and advised to use overwhelming unilateral strength, he authorized the operation on the afternoon of the 17th. As with the other cases, Congress and the public played almost no role in Bush’s decision making process.

The location of the crisis in the Western hemisphere and Panama’s weak military is consistent with the theory’s predicted unilateralism. Moreover, the case study evidence demonstrates that Bush entirely ignored the possibility of multilateral action. The OAS proved ineffective at diplomacy, and there is little doubt that establishing a multilateral
operation would have been plagued by the multilateral problems listed in Chapter II. This case was selected as an “extreme” example of unilateralism and upon examination, it adds considerable weight in support of the theory.

**Conclusion**

The case studies, the last of the three methods of this dissertation, were intended to determine the accuracy of the theory of unilateral use of force decision making. Taking cases with extreme values of the dependent variable (the 1991 Gulf War and Panama invasion), along with a more complicated case (the Bay of Pigs operation) was designed to test the hypotheses of this dissertation: unilateral military action is positively correlated with a wide gap in military power, an opponent located in the Western hemisphere, and a national security threat.

The three variables performed well in the Statistics chapter, and the variables in this chapter performed well with the case study method. Though notably, the case study method has an advantage over the statistics method. It allows a detailed examination (e.g., the 1991 Gulf War was a national security threat and against a strong opponent) of historical events that cannot neatly be generalized to a theory. The other test of this dissertation – that a unilateral decision is premised on international, not domestic factors – was supported in the Experiment chapter and reinforced with the case studies of this chapter. The common theme for all three cases was for a president to meet with his advisers and make a unilateral-multilateral decision without regard to domestic pressures.
I, now, turn to the Conclusion chapter. First, I discuss the implications from the statistical, experimental, and case study analyses. For each of the methods, I explain the results and assess the performance of the explanatory variables and the unilateral use of force decision making theory. I then offer potential areas for future research, which includes expanding the data set and constructing more robust operationalizations of the dependent variables. I finish with concluding thoughts about why presidents are deciding to act alone.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Introduction

I began this dissertation with a question, “Why do presidents make such an “unwise” decision as using unilateral force in the first place?” Scholars, policymakers, and even presidents, themselves, believe that unilateralism is the “wrong” choice, but regardless, presidents have acted and continue to act unilaterally a majority of the time. Organizing the research question into international and domestic approaches, I find that presidents act unilaterally based on hegemonic power. I have used statistics, an experiment, and case studies to argue that presidents decide to act unilaterally based on a sequential model determined by international-based factors – military power, the location of the crisis, and the nature of the crisis.

In this chapter, I explain the implications from the statistical, experimental, and case study analyses. In particular, I focus on how well the unilateral use of force decision making theory fares with each of the methods. I then offer directions for future research, which includes expanding the data set and constructing more robust operationalizations of the dependent variables. I finish with some concluding thoughts about why presidents are deciding to act alone.

Implications from the Statistical Analysis

As explained in Chapter III, as designed in Chapter IV, and as tested in Chapter V, I find that presidents, as consistent with the unilateral use of force decision making theory,
act unilaterally given the power disparity between the U.S. and a crisis opponent. The statistical analysis conducted in this dissertation serves to answer two of the proposed questions in the introductory chapter: (1) Why does a president make a unilateral use of force decision? and (2) Should a president’s unilateral decision be viewed as a separate and distinct decision from his use of force decision? The statistical test answers these questions in a generalizable and parsimonious fashion, and it allows me to establish a causal relationship from the onset of a crisis to a president’s unilateral decision over a long time period (1937 to 1995).

In order to conduct the statistical test, I needed to overcome the shortcomings of unilateral research and devise a new operational definition and coding rules for unilateralism, establish a new sequential model of a president’s crisis decisions, and use a new score of military power. Using these new data and methodological techniques, I conduct the empirical tests and find evidence of a realist-based explanation for U.S. crisis behavior.

*Data and Methodological Contributions: Coding Rules, A Sequential Model, and the CIMR Score*

Traditional studies of conflict behavior include a *use of force* dependent variable but not a *type of force used* dependent variable. Also, as argued, policy experts, legal scholars, and academics offer widely varying definitions of multilateralism and almost entirely ignore the study of unilateralism. This is a serious shortcoming in conflict and decision making research, and in order to fill this gap, I offer a definition of unilateral use of force – the U.S. acting alone without any military ally or international political
support. Next, I construct a *force* variable using the Fordham and Sarver (2001) and COW MID data sets, and then using the coding rules derived from the operational definition of unilateralism, I construct a *unilateral use of force* dependent variable.

Related to the lack of research on unilateralism is the failure to model a president’s as a sequential process consistent with the “series of steps” findings that explains crisis escalation rising from security issues to war (Vasquez 1993, 2000, 2004; Singer 1980; Reed 2000; Ruggie 1992). I test the decisions with separate probit models and find that the assumption of two unrelated processes is theoretically incorrect. To fill this research void, I theorize the use of force decision as a two-step process, and while controlling for the first decision, I use a heckman probit model to test the second decision.

Finally, I test and conclude that the traditional measure of military power, the CINC score, does not necessarily correlate with a unilateral-multilateral action. In its place, I offer a CIMR score, based on scores of preponderance, technology, and force employment (Biddle 2004). This alternative measure fares reasonably well when tested on the crisis dyads. The significance of the situational factors in the models reinforces the Meernik and Waterman (1996) finding that the “peculiarities” of the crisis are important, and thus deserves a more prominent place in realist doctrine.

*Empirical Findings*

Using the heckman probit model, I first find that the unilateral decision is strongly associated with the use of force decisions for the years 1937 to 1995 and for the years 1950 to 1995. The results of the explanatory factors then suggest an international- and power-based explanation for a president’s unilateral use of force decision.
**CIMR.** The *force employment* variable attains statistical significance, is in the expected direction for both data models, and has a significant impact on a president’s unilateral use of force decision (1937 to 1995, 1950 to 1995). The *technology gap* variable attains statistical significance, is in the expected direction for both data models, and has a significant impact on a president’s unilateral use of force decision. The *preponderance gap* variable attains statistical significance for the 1950 to 1995 model, is in the expected direction, but it has minimal impact on a president’s decision. Its significance justifies its inclusion as a CIMR score, but future researchers may want to further examine it.

**Americas Region.** The *americas region* variable for the 1937 to 1995 model attains statistical significance, is in the expected direction, and has a significant impact on a president’s unilateral use of force decision. The variable for the 1950 to 1995 model fails to attain statistical significance, but it is in expected direction and has some impact on a president’s unilateral decision. This result and the evidence from the case studies demonstrates empirical evidence for enforcing the Monroe Doctrine unilaterally.

**Crisis Trigger.** The *national security crisis* variable attains statistical significance, is in the expected direction, and has a significant impact on a president’s unilateral use of force decision (1937 to 1995, 1950 to 1995). The *humanitarian crisis* fails to attain statistical significance, is in the wrong direction for the 1937 to 1995 model, and it predicts failure perfectly for the 1950 to 1995 model. It is a variable that needs further testing (these tests were conducted in the experiment and case studies chapters).
Implications from the Experimental Analysis

The experiment conducted in this dissertation serves to answer two of the proposed questions in the introductory chapter: (1) Why does a president make a unilateral use of force decision? and (2) Do international factors, such as U.S. military power vis-à-vis an adversary, offer the greatest explanatory power for a unilateral decision? It answers these questions and allows me to determine whether my theoretical model has been correctly specified. Though, perhaps most importantly, I am better able to test the crisis trigger than I was able to in the Statistics chapter. Selecting extreme values of domestic- and international-based variables, I am able to look inside the black box of realism and see why the crisis situation matters to a president.

The experiment sheds light on the expected utility calculation the president makes for each type of crisis. For national security threats, the president will act unilaterally, regardless of the size of the relative military gap. For humanitarian and regime change crises, the president will act unilaterally \( if \) (and only if) the perceived costs are low.

National Security Threats

The results are consistent with the hypothesis proposed in Chapter IV: a national security threat is positively correlated with unilateralism. But, the experiment reveals two interesting findings. First, president will act unilaterally, given a national security threat, even when facing a low probability of unilateral military success. Second, a public clamoring for unilateralism and a high probability of unilateral military support creates a “perfect storm” – presidents, with rare exception, will act unilaterally.
**Humanitarian and Regime Change Crises**

When facing a humanitarian crisis, a president is likely to choose a multilateral path if either there is low probability of unilateral military success or low public support for unilateralism. Given the majority of the public favors multilateralism in humanitarian situations, it is not difficult to see why a president tends to act multilaterally. The regime change crisis results are consistent with the humanitarian results, but military power played a more significant role in the decision process. Presidents, rarely, will choose to act unilaterally, if there is a low military gap between the U.S. and the target of the regime change.

**Implications from the Case Study Analysis**

The case studies examined in this dissertation serve to answer two of the proposed questions in the introductory chapter: (1) Should a president’s unilateral decision be viewed as a separate and distinct decision from his use of force decision? and (2) Do international factors offer the greatest explanatory power for a unilateral decision?. It answers these questions, and it allows me to determine the accuracy of my theoretical model. I am better able to delve into the particulars of the statistical data set in offering a detailed explanation of a president’s unilateral decision. An explanation that moves beyond the CIMR scores and the coding rules of the crisis situation and into the Oval Office as the president makes the crucial decisions.

Selecting extreme values of the dependent variable, I use a process tracing-method to find that the theory of unilateral use of force decision making fares well. For the 1991 Gulf War case, President Bush made a decision to use force and then made a multilateral
decision, given the estimate of high casualties and the necessity of increasing military power to overwhelming strength. For the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation, President Kennedy made a decision to use force without overt U.S. involvement, but then made a decision to use the U.S. military when facing defeat by a less powerful adversary. For the 1989 Panama invasion, President Bush made the second decision to act unilaterally after being reassured of quick military victory and low casualties.

1991 Gulf War

President Bush’s October 30th decision to double the number of U.S. and coalition forces is consistent with the proposed theory that a president will act multilaterally to increase the military gap between the U.S. and an opponent. While the national security threat and correlation with unilateralism did not happen, Bush acted consistent with how a hegemon should act. Iraq represented a threat to U.S. oil interests and a threat to Middle East stability; so, Bush was going to act to reverse Iraq’s illicit invasion of Kuwait. Fear of a strong Iraqi military and potentially high casualties led Bush to decide to increase military strength with a coalition that eventually accounted for nearly a third of the fighting force.

1961 Bay of Pigs

The Bay of Pigs case represents the necessity of including case studies to complement statistical studies. For coding purposes, the Bay of Pigs was full unilateralism, and Kennedy did act consistent with the hypotheses – a wide military gap and an adversary in the Western hemisphere is positively correlated with unilateralism. But, Kennedy’s calculation of potential Soviet involvement led him to try to present the
invasion as a multilateral effort. It was only upon facing defeat that Kennedy decided to
drastically increase military power by ordering air cover from U.S. carriers.

1989 Panama Invasion

The Panama invasion represents the ideal unilateralism case. Bush seems to have
made the decision to use force and then the decision to use unilateral force in rapid
succession and with little hesitation. Like Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, Panama
was located in the Western hemisphere and the U.S. had overwhelming military strength
vis-à-vis Panama. With no strategic threat (i.e., the Soviets), Bush made his unilateral
decision without consulting with Congress, without waiting for public opinion polls, and
after being assured of success with minimal casualties. Bush almost entirely disregarded
the OAS, and the OAS, itself, proved ineffective at diplomacy. The minimization of
domestic influences, the ineffectiveness of a multilateral organization, a Western
hemisphere adversary with a weak military all offer strong evidence in support of the
unilateral use of force decision making theory.

Directions for Future Research

This dissertation contributes to the work on hegemonic stability theory,
unilateralism, and military revolutions with its examination of crisis actions: using force
or not using force and using unilateral force or using multilateral force. Its results
highlight areas for future research.

Expanding the Data Set

In terms of generalizability, the first area would be to extend the data set ideally back
to the British hegemony and see if the theory holds. The lack of data (e.g., pre-1950 for
GDP data and pre-1937 for Gallup poll data) precludes testing from before 1937 and the Fordham and Sarver (2001) data set ending at 1995 precludes testing after 1995. In terms of robustness, it would be ideal to test other data sets as well. I applied the coding rules to the ICB data set for a frequency count of full unilateralism, operational multilateralism, and procedural multilateralism (see Chapter I), but a lack of sufficient observations precluded a statistical test. The Tago (2005) USUFAD data set could be tested as well. Also, the crises have been exemplified as three triggers, but future research can better define these crises and specify other crises as well.

Future research may also expand the data set to include the opponent leader’s decision making from crisis onset to type of force used against the U.S. Are crisis opponents seeking to lower the costs and adding coalitional partners in the same manner as U.S. presidents? A more detailed operationalization, to include a type of force used variable, would answer this question and allow for more robust and generalizable results.

More Robust Operationalizations of the Dependent Variables

A new area may be to better dissect the no force used variable to see if a president’s political or economic advantage was correlated with outcome success. This would include expanding the options available to a president to include unilateral or multilateral economic or diplomatic sanctions. Perhaps, presidents do not need to resort to force, but can simply make a political or economic threat unilaterally or multilaterally with other partners. Expanding the operationalization of the dependent variables could also include the decision to initiate a crisis or not initiate a crisis. This would reflect the
possibility that presidents may choose not to “select themselves” into a crisis in the first place, if they perceive the potential military operation as too difficult.

A second area would be a more precise, reliable, and accurate reflection of full unilateralism, procedural multilateralism, and operational multilateralism. The coding rules for this dissertation are designed to operationalize full unilateralism at the strategic and tactical levels, but the coding rules do not specify how effective and strong a coalitional partner’s military is. While I do include coalitional strength, in terms of the CINC and CIMR score in the Case Study chapter, future research may want to measure and account for whether presidents add coalitional strength to truly increase military power or whether it’s designed to appease domestic and international political audiences.

A Different Methodological Approach

In this dissertation, I have simply added the “next” step to existing research on use of force decisions. An alternative methodological approach would be to run the model in reverse. Perhaps, a president first decides to use unilateral or multilateral force, and then he decides to use force if and only if the first decision has been satisfied. For example, a president, facing a humanitarian crisis requiring military intervention, may only want to act multilaterally to lower the costs. If he can assemble a coalition, he may then decide to use force. If he can’t assemble a coalition, he may decide to use a non-force alternative (e.g., economic sanctions).

Conclusion

This dissertation is a scientific study of U.S. unilateral uses of force, a study that is badly needed given the lack of testing, the abundance of unsubstantiated statements, and
the fact that presidents are making the “wrong” choice to act unilaterally a majority of the time. I have found that presidents act unilaterally, as is consistent with a power-based realist theory – hegemonic stability theory. With overwhelming military strength, the necessity of protecting U.S. interests (and the stability of the international system), and the problems of acting multilaterally, it becomes clear that presidents act unilaterally when facing a weak military opponent, when facing a threat in the Western hemisphere, and when facing a national security threat.

This dissertation is also a test of realism. This dissertation organizes the literature along traditional lines – international and domestic explanations – in testing the theory of unilateral use of force decision making. Recent studies tend to favor a domestic approach to explaining uses of force decision, but as demonstrated, researchers seem to be missing the crucial type of force decision, and when it is taken into account, one can see that presidents are realists.

So, the answer to the question of “why do presidents act unilaterally?” can be answered with a simple refrain: Because the U.S. is a hegemonic power. The U.S., as other hegemons before it, is acting unilaterally to serve its interests, global interests…and because it has the power to do so. While this may be an unpopular answer, it is an answer grounded in scientific fact and an answer that can serve as the foundation for future testing of unilateralism. It is also an answer that gives understanding to presidential decisions and to why the U.S. is “acting alone.”
REFERENCES


Kennan, George. 1947. “George Kennan to Cecil B. Lyon, 13 October 1947.” Department of State Policy Planning Staff Records, Chronological File, Box 33, Diplomatic Branch, National Archives.


Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.


# APPENDIX A

## CODING OF CRISIS DYADS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>OM</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td>Dec 1937</td>
<td>Japanese Invasion of China. 12/37 Japanese attack U.S. oil tanker convoy being escorted by USS Panay. Panay was sunk and Japanese fired on survivors. FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Sep 1940</td>
<td>Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement with UK. 9/2/40 FDR signs executive order trading destroyers for 99-year leases of UK bases. FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>390</td>
<td>Apr 1941</td>
<td>Occupation of Greenland. 4/19/41 agreement with Denmark to protect Greenland. Grimmett</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>395</td>
<td>Jul 1941</td>
<td>Occupation of Iceland. 7/7/41 executive agreement to have U.S. troops occupy Iceland. Relieves UK garrison. Grimmett</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>Jul 1941</td>
<td>German Submarines. 3/27/41 US, UK, and Canada staff discussions end with agreement for US Atlantic Fleet to help UK navy convoy ships. 7/1/41 naval Coastal Frontiers are established. Commanders are tasked with local patrol, convoy escorts, and antisubmarine operations. Grimmett</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>Nov 1941</td>
<td>Occupation of Dutch Guiana. 11/23/41 U.S. occupies Dutch Guiana by agreement with Dutch government to protect bauxite mines. Grimmett</td>
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<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td>Apr 1946</td>
<td>China Civil War. 4/46 truce between Communists and Nationalists breaks down. U.S. transports Nationalists troops within China. CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>345</td>
<td>Jul 1946</td>
<td>Security of Trieste. US and UK protest Yugoslavian obstruction of Allied Military Government in Trieste. Late June, as many as 10 US and UK ships lay off the coast. In July, USN cruiser Fargo makes a port call. CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>Nov 1946</td>
<td>Chilean Inauguration. After Leftist victory in September and tensions over the following month, US announces a 5-ship squadron would visit Chile for the inauguration. CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>345</td>
<td>Nov 1946</td>
<td>Shooting Down of U.S. Aircraft. 11/46 US army transport plane shot down by Yugoslavia. US troops along zonal occupation line and air forces in northern Italy reinforced as a result. FS; Grimmett</td>
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<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>Feb 1947</td>
<td>Uruguayan Inauguration. 2/23/47 US navy and army air contingents sent to Uruguay for 3/1/47 inauguration to emphasize support for new government. CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>345</td>
<td>Aug 1947</td>
<td>Security of Trieste. 8/47 questions about division of Trieste remain. 9/3/47 withdrawal accord was signed; 5,000 US troops remain with equal contingents of UK and Yugoslav troops. 9/16/47 12 US troops blocked 2,000 Yugoslavian troops from western zone of city. Throughout, combatant from sixth fleet stationed off Trieste. CNA</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>365</td>
<td>Apr 1948</td>
<td>Security of Berlin. 4/1/48 USSR temporarily restricted access to Berlin, termed a “baby blockade.” IDV.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1949</td>
<td>710 CHN</td>
<td>Evacuation of Shanghai. 11-12/49 Marines sent to Shanghai to aid in evacuation of Americans. 12/8/49 Nationalist forces withdraw to Taiwan. FS; CNA; Grimmett</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 1950</td>
<td>365 RUS</td>
<td>Korean War: Security of Europe. Heightened concern about Soviet action in Europe. Over 2 years, US forces were built up in Europe. Mid-July, Sixth Fleet was augmented with one carrier (Midway) and one destroyer division. Marine force was reinforced. Mid-August, 2 destroyers visited Iceland to deter &quot;large&quot; Soviet fishing boats. Major US army divisions were reintroduced into Europe in this period. FS; CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 1950</td>
<td>660 LEB</td>
<td>Political Developments in Lebanon. 8/50 US legation was bombed and Lebanese Prime Minister assassinated. Lebanese government requested USS Midway, Leyte, Salem, Columbus, and destroyers visit Beirut and give aircraft carrier demonstration. Demonstrates US commitment to region, despite presence in Korean War. FS; CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 1951</td>
<td>345 YUG</td>
<td>Security of Yugoslavia. 3/51 Tito announces that Soviet forces were massing along Yugoslav border. Mid-March reinforced Marine battalion arrives in area and Mediterranean relief force arrives ahead of schedule to cover &quot;politically critical spring period.&quot; Troops may have been involved in a search for plane shot down by Soviets. CNA; FS; IDV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 1953</td>
<td>710 CHN</td>
<td>Korean War: Nuclear Threat. US nuclear threat against China as part of efforts to force an agreement. 7/27/53 Armistice Agreement signed. US and South Korea sign Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954. FS; IDV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 1953</td>
<td>731 PRK</td>
<td>Security of South Korea. Series of disputes repatriating prisoners from Korean War between 8/6-9/6/53. 7/27/53 Armistice Agreement established Military Armistice Committee to supervise DMZ and troop withdrawals. FS; IDV</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1954</td>
<td>90 GUA</td>
<td>Guatemala Accepts USSR Aid. 1/54 leftist government in Guatemala requests Soviet bloc aid. 5/20/54 Soviet aid from Poland arrives and on same day, Caribbean Sea Frontier established air-sea patrols to protect Honduras from invasion and to control arms shipments to Guatemala. 5/21/54 US signs bilateral defense agreement with Honduras. 6/3/54 US airlifts arms to Honduras. 3 B-36 bombers sent to Nicaragua. 6/7/54 carrier and marines sent to area for evacuation. 6/18/54 complete arms embargo against Guatemala announced. 6/29/54 coup leads to anti-communist government in Guatemala. FS; CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 1954</td>
<td>325 ITA</td>
<td>Accord on Trieste: Withdrawal of Troops. 10/5/54 settlement reached on Trieste. Sixth Fleet moves into Adriatic as 3,000 US army occupation troops were withdrawn. Withdrawal completed on 10/26/54. CNA; FS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 1954</td>
<td>710 CHN</td>
<td>PRC Shootdown of UK Airliner. 7/23/54 PRC aircraft shot down UK Cathay Pacific airliner, killing 10 people (including 6 Americans). US navy aircraft from carriers, Philippine Sea and Hornet, provided air cover for rescue operations. 7/26/54 US aircraft shot down 2 PRC fighters that had fired on them. CNA; FS</td>
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<td>651</td>
<td>Jul 1956</td>
<td>Egypt Nationalizes Suez Canal. 7/26/56 Egypt nationalizes Suez Canal. France and UK begin preparations for military operation. US sends two carriers, Coral Sea and Randolph, and amphibious force to Eastern Mediterranean. CNA; FS; IDV.</td>
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<td>663</td>
<td>Apr 1956</td>
<td>Jordan: UK General Glubb Ousted. King Hussein was alarmed with leftist parliament’s dismissal of UK General Glubb as commander of Jordanian Arab Legion. US responds by sending 2 carriers (Coral Sea and Randolph) and amphibious force to Eastern Mediterranean. Formation of new cabinet ends crisis. Can; IDV; FS</td>
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<td>652</td>
<td>Aug 1957</td>
<td>Political Developments in Syria. 8/18/57 appointment of high ranking pro-Soviet military official led to fears in Turkey of invasion. 8/21/57 Turkey reinforces its border. 9/8/57 US expresses support for Turkey as part of Eisenhower doctrine, Deploys Sixth Fleet to Eastern Mediterranean and aircraft sent to Ankara, Turkey. 10/7/57 Turkish troops partake in NATO exercises. CNA; IDV; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>663</td>
<td>Apr 1957</td>
<td>Jordan Political-Military Unrest. 4/10/57 King Hussein dismissed leftist cabinet, which led to urban demonstrations from 4/22-24/57. 4/25/57 martial law declared and Sixth Fleet deployed to Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate US support for Hussein. Marines were readied for deployment as well. CNA; IDV; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td>Jul 1957</td>
<td>China-Taiwan Tension. 6/57 buildup of PRC forces across from Taiwan. 7/57 4 carriers sent following the shelling of Kinmen island.</td>
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<tr>
<td>850</td>
<td>Feb 1957</td>
<td>Indonesia Political-Military Crisis. 2/14/57 3rd Marine division prepared for deployment to Sumatra following revolt. US involved in covert effort to overthrow Indonesia government at the time. US is upset with Sukarno’s neutrality and his allowance of Communist Party. CIA conducted paramilitary operations with rebels on islands. FS; IDV</td>
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<td>850</td>
<td>Dec 1957</td>
<td>Indonesia-Netherlands Crisis. 12/3/57 Labor groups begin seizing Dutch businesses in Indonesia. 46,000 Dutch nationals were repatriated. FS; IDV</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEB</td>
<td>May 1958</td>
<td>Lebanon Political Crisis. 5/8/58 rioting occurs after pro-communist editor is killed. 5/12/58 Lebanese army takes over security. 5/15/58 Lebanese President Chamoun believes Syrian partisans had entered country and may need US assistance. Three aircraft carriers and contingent of marines deployed off coast. US and UK had developed contingency plans, beginning in 11/57, for military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in event of actual or imminent coup d’état in either country. BK; CNA; IDV; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEB</td>
<td>Jul 1958</td>
<td>Lebanon Political Crisis. 7/14/58 Lebanese President Chamoun requests US assistance following rioting. Coup in Iraq on same day overthrows pro-Western government. 5,790 marines deployed to Lebanon. US army troops arrive on 7/19/58. More than 60 navy vessels supported the operation, including 3 carriers. US troops departed by 10/25/58. US and UK had developed contingency plans, beginning in 11/57, for military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in event of actual or imminent coup d’état in either country. IDV; BK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOR</td>
<td>Jul 1958</td>
<td>Jordan Political Crisis. 7/17/58 Following coup in Iraq against pro-Western government, Jordan’s King Hussein requests and receives contingent of UK paratroopers. US surface vessels redeployed in conjunction with UK operation. US and UK had developed contingency plans, beginning in 11/57, for military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in event of actual or imminent coup d’état in either country. IDV; CNA; FS; BK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHN</td>
<td>Jul 1958</td>
<td>China-Taiwan: Quemoy Islands. 9/8/54 SEATO formed. 12/2/54 US-Taiwan Defense Pact signed. 7/17/58 PRC masses troops on mainland near islands. 8/23/58 PRC bombards Quemoy and Matsu. Taiwan responds with fire. US sends marines and Seventh Fleet on 8/27/58. US suggests it would intervene if Quemoy was invaded. Crisis ends with 9/14/58 PRC-US talks. Ceasefire announced on 10/16/58. CNA; IDV; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Feb 1958</td>
<td>Indonesia Political-Military Crisis. Revolts against authority of Sukarno regime from 12/57-6/58. 3/58 US navy and marines, as part of South China Sea Force, operated north of Sumatra over concern of evacuating US nationals and their property. CNA; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Feb 1959</td>
<td>Security of Berlin. 11/10/58 Moscow announces its intention to turn over Berlin and access routes to East Germany. Sets 5/27/59 deadline. 12/31/59 NATO rejects Moscow demand for a “free city” and control to East Germany. 2/16/59 NATO suggests foreign ministers meeting to deal with crisis. 3/30/59 Moscow agrees to May conference. US continued to reinforce its combat forces in Europe and put nuclear weapons on its aircraft. IDV; CNA; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>May 1959</td>
<td>Security of Berlin. 4-9/59 Soviets interfered with supply trains to Berlin. US navy put on advanced state of alert; Second Fleet conducted exercised in the Western Atlantic to display US resolve. Marines put on alert for deployment. 9/30/59 Soviet harassment ends and ends crisis. FS; CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHN</td>
<td>Jul 1959</td>
<td>China-Taiwan Conflict. In relation to growing China-Taiwan tension, two carrier battle groups (Ranger and Lexington) conduct operations in vicinity of Taiwan. CNA; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1960</td>
<td>Cuba Supports Insurgents</td>
<td>11/9/60 Cuba-supported rebels invaded Nicaragua. 11/13/60 dissident Guatemalan army units captured a port. Both Nicaragua and Guatemala appeal to US for support. 11/17/61 Eisenhower responds that US navy will deploy to region. IDV; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 1961</td>
<td>Trujillo Assassinated in Dominican Republic</td>
<td>5/31/61 General Trujillo was assassinated. Balaguer takes power and JFK pressures him to hold elections. US troops and ships deployed off coast 5/2-11/25/61. US was prepared to deploy marines in 11/61 to support Balaguer regime against Trujillo's brothers. IDV; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 1961</td>
<td>Security of Berlin</td>
<td>6/61 20,000 East German refugees to West. 7/61 30,000 refugees. 6/3-4/61 Vienna Summit between JFK and Khrushchev made no progress on Berlin. USSR threatened to sign separate treaty with East German, which would restrict access to Berlin. Three powers objected. On returning to Moscow after the summit, Khrushchev repeated his ultimatum, while Kennedy announced to the American people that the U.S. would fight to defend its rights in Berlin and the freedom of West Berliners. He also called up military reserve units. 7/25-10/28/61 mobilization involving several European countries. FS; IDV; CNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 1961</td>
<td>Security of Kuwait</td>
<td>6/19/61 mutual defense treaty with UK. Iraq threatens Kuwait and UK send troops to protect Kuwait on 7/1/61. Pan-Arab force organized to defend Kuwait. U.S. was not involved in crisis. IDV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 1962</td>
<td>Cuban Missile Crisis</td>
<td>OAS resolution 10/23/62 authorized member states use of force. IDV.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1962</td>
<td>Civil War in Laos</td>
<td>Protection of Thai border. 5/16/62 SEATO agreement to send member state forces to Thailand. IDV.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 1963</td>
<td>Withdraw Missiles from Turkey</td>
<td>4/25/63 McNamara informs JFK that last of Jupiter missiles in Turkey will be dismantled as part of Cuban Missile Crisis agreement. IDV; FS; <a href="http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hbf/missile.htm">http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hbf/missile.htm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 1963</td>
<td>Political Crisis in Jordan</td>
<td>Jordan feared Israeli control of West Bank. 4/20-26/63 pro-Egypt demonstrations break out in West Bank. Army put down riot and killed 13 demonstrators; curfew was lifted on 4/26. US worked to convince Jordan that a pro-Egypt proxy in West Bank would bring Israeli intervention. US wanted stability. US and UK worked together during crisis, shared intelligence and coordinated moves. <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/israel_studies/v007/7.1shemesh.html">http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/israel_studies/v007/7.1shemesh.html</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 1963</td>
<td>Civil War in Yemen</td>
<td>9/62 following outbreak of civil war in Yemen, number of US destroyers assigned to Middle East force increased from 3 to 4. Patrol established in Red Sea to protect US interests and nationals. Patrols lasted until 3/63. CNA; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>817</td>
<td>Nov 1963</td>
<td>Assassination of Diem. 8/25/63 US naval forces stationed off South Vietnam in preparation to evacuate Americans. 9/11/63 navy returns to normal operations. 11/1/63 military coup d'etat. U.S. approves it but is surprised Diem is killed. Creates a power vacuum. Viet Cong use vacuum to increase power over rural population to 40 percent. Two aircraft carriers, Hancock and Oriskany, and amphibious force operated off coast. 11/7/63 returned to normal operations. <a href="http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1961.html">http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1961.html</a>; FS</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>Jan 1964</td>
<td>Security of Panama Canal. 1/9/64 US student raise US flag at Balboa High School. Massive rioting follows. US troops fire on demonstrators and kill 26. 1/9/64 Panama broke diplomatic relations with US. Amphibious force kept in region until week after 4/3/64 U.S.-Panamanian agreement restored diplomatic relations. IDV; CNA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>352</td>
<td>Jan 1964</td>
<td>Cyprus-Greece-Turkey Crisis. 1/21/64 conflict between Greek and Turkish forces on Cyprus. Sixth Fleet deploys to vicinity of Cyprus. Aircraft carriers deployed off Cyprus for most of March, early June, and from 8/8/64-9/2/64. US, UK, UN, and NATO acted as mediators during crisis. CNA; FS; IDV</td>
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<tr>
<td>352</td>
<td>Aug 1964</td>
<td>Cyprus-Greece-Turkey Crisis. 1/21/64 conflict between Greek and Turkish forces on Cyprus. Sixth Fleet deploys to vicinity of Cyprus. Aircraft carriers deployed off Cyprus for most of March, early June, and from 8/8/64-9/2/64. US, UK, UN, and NATO acted as mediators during crisis. CNA; FS; IDV</td>
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<tr>
<td>816</td>
<td>Aug 1964</td>
<td>Tonkin Gulf Incident. 7/31-8/3/64 South Vietnamese commandos in speed boats harass North Vietnamese defense. 8/2/64 North Vietnam attack on Maddox. 8/4/64 attack on 2 destroyers. IDV.</td>
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<tr>
<td>817</td>
<td>Jan 1964</td>
<td>Coup in South Vietnam. 11/2/63 Diem is assassinated. Creates a power vacuum. Viet Cong use vacuum to increase power over rural population to 40 percent. 1/30/64 General Minh is ousted from power in a bloodless coup by General Nguyen Khanh. <a href="http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1961.html">http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1961.html</a>; FS</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Apr 1965</td>
<td>Civil War in Dominican Republic (Evacuation). 4/24/65 civil war breaks out and American embassy cables Americans may be in danger. 4/27-30/65 2,400 evacuees removed by amphibious forces. 4/28 marines arrive. 4/30 army troops arrive by air. By 5/17 over 22,000 US troops on island. CNA; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Sep 1965</td>
<td>Civil War in Dominican Republic (OAS force). 5/14/65 OAS troops arrive, eventually includes contingents from Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. 5/26 US marines begin to withdraw from country. 8/31/65 OAS resolution reached, called “Act of Dominican Reconciliation. US army troops withdrawn on 9/21/66. CNA; FS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>352</td>
<td>Jul 1965</td>
<td>Political Developments in Cyprus. 8/3/65 growing tension in Cyprus centered on electoral system, carrier and marines operated off the island. CNA; FS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>666</td>
<td>Jun 1967</td>
<td>Arab-Israel: Six Day War. 6/5/67 Israel launches preemptive strike on Egypt. 6/6/67 Soviets signal intervention. 6/10/67 LBJ orders 6th Fleet to move 50 miles off Syrian coast to signal that US was prepared to resist Soviet intervention. IDV.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>365</td>
<td>Sep 1968</td>
<td>Invasion of Czechoslovakia. 8/20/68 Warsaw Pact invades Czechoslovakia. 10/18/68 Moscow Protocol signed, which legalized USSR troops in Czechoslovakia. 10/8/68 NATO help discussions but reached no decisions. LBJ cancelled future SALT I talks. IDV.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>731</td>
<td>Jan 1968</td>
<td>USS Pueblo Incident. 1/22/68 DPRK seizes ship. LBJ calls up reserves and orders ships to the region. IDV.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>731</td>
<td>Apr 1969</td>
<td>North Korea: Shooting Down of EC-121. 4/15/69 DPRK shoots down EC-121. Nixon orders ships to Sea of Japan along with armed escorts for flights. IDV.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>663</td>
<td>Sep 1970</td>
<td>Civil War in Jordan. 9/19/70 Syria invades Jordan. 9/21/70 US and Israel work out joint military plan to prevent Palestinian victory in Jordan. US airborne forces in Germany placed on alert and sixth fleet moves toward Lebanon. IDV.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>731</td>
<td>Feb 1971</td>
<td>Withdraw Troops from South Korea. 7/8/70 The US State Department announces that it has officially informed the South Korean government of the US plan to gradually withdraw US troops staring in July 1971. The decision to slowly decrease US troops in South Korea is part of the Nixon Doctrine to reduce American presence overseas. NYT (7/8/70); <a href="http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kp0117)">http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kp0117)</a></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>816</td>
<td>Dec 1972</td>
<td>Break Down of Peace Talks: North Vietnam. 12/14/72 Nixon orders bombings of North Vietnam to bring them back to peace table. IDV.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>811</td>
<td>Feb 1973</td>
<td>Civil War in Cambodia. 1/23/73 Paris Agreement on Vietnam effectively ends support for anti-communist forces.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Additional Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAO</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Civil War in Laos. 1/23/73 Paris Agreement on Vietnam effectively ends support for anti-communist forces.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYP</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Cyprus-Greece-Turkey Crisis. 7/15/74 coup in Cyprus by Athens. UN Security Council passes cease-fire resolutions and UN force supervised cease-fire on 8/16/74. U.S. naval forces evacuated Americans from Cyprus during crisis. IDV; Grimmert</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Security of South Korea. 5/18/75 US announces it would “strike back harder than it did in Vietnam” if North Korea attacked South Korea. US states it will use nukes or increase its ground troop strength. US relocates nukes from DMZ to rear areas. 9/75 2 Nk infiltrators were intercepted; 2 SK troops were killed in the exchange. Vanderbilt television archives; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>USS Mayaguez Incident. 5/14/75 Ford orders force to be used after Cambodia seizes cargo ship. IDV.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LEB</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Civil War in Lebanon. 3/76 additional US carrier sent to Lebanon during civil war. Zelikow</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Korea Tree-Cutting Incident. 8/19/76 U.S. and ROK troops enter DMZ to cut down tree after 8/17/76 incident. IDV.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Safety of Americans in Uganda. 2/23/77 US aircraft carrier task force sent off coast of Kenya because Americans were not allowed to leave Uganda. 3/277 Amin lifts ban on American departures from Uganda. Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Invasion of Shaba Province, Zaire. 5/16/78 U.S. decides to airlift French and Belgian troops to Zaire. IDV; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUB</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Soviet Troops in Cuba. US is only listed actor. US did not want Soviets to escalate its troop presence in Cuba. Marines conducted maneuvers and fired artillery in Guantanamo. Zelikow; NYT.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Park Chung Hee Assassinated. 10/29/79 US deploys carrier and planes to deter action by NK. NYT; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Gulf of Sidra Dispute. 8/12/81 Sixth Fleet holds maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra. 8/19/81 shoots down two Libyan fighters. IDV; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUD</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Sadat Assassinated/ Security of Sudan. 10/11/81 U.S. efforts to protect Sudan from Libyan threats and fear of Libyan involvement in assassination. IDV; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGY</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Security of Middle East and Persian Gulf. 10/10/81 Bright Star war games with Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, and Oman. Zelikow; NYT</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYR</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Syrian Missiles to Lebanon. U.S. mediates and sends ships to the region. No apparent connection between diplomatic and military moves. IDV; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 1982</td>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Israeli Invasion of Lebanon. 6/9/82 invasion of Lebanon. U.S. mediated to prevent escalation of Israel-Syria crisis and sends ships if evacuation is needed. IDV; NYT; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 1983</td>
<td>LEB</td>
<td>Invasion of Grenada. 10/21/83 OECS request to “take appropriate action.” IDV.</td>
<td>X X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 1983</td>
<td>SYR</td>
<td>Civil War in Lebanon. Frequent gun battles and attacks on Marines in Lebanon. 8/28/83 marines retaliate. 8/29/83 carrier Eisenhower ordered to return to Eastern Mediterranean. 9/8/83 Bowen provides naval gunfire support. 9/25/83 New Jersey provides naval gunfire support. 10/23/83 suicide bomber strikes marine barracks in Beirut. CNA; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 1983</td>
<td>LEB</td>
<td>Attacks on U.S Forces in Lebanon. 12/3/83 2 F-14s fired on by antiaircraft artillery. 12/4/83 US aircraft from carriers launched to strike antiaircraft positions. 2 US navy planes were shot down and a US airman was taken prisoner by Syrian forces. CNA; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 1984</td>
<td>SAL</td>
<td>Elections in El Salvador. 3/13/84 carrier America left for operations off the east coast of Central America to coincide with 3/25/84 Salvadoran elections. CNA; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 1984</td>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Security of Central America. US plans and conducts military exercises in Honduras from 1-6/84 to deter Nicaragua. NYT; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 1984</td>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Cut in U.S. Aid to Nicaraguan Insurgents. Congress votes to cut off funding for Contras. 5/84 Congress finds out Boland Amendment was ignored. Passed second Boland Amendment in 10/84. NYT; WP; Heritage Foundation; Zelikow.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1984</td>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Security of Central America. 11/84 US conducts military exercises in Honduras to deter Nicaragua. NYT; Zelikow</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEB</td>
<td>Sep 1984</td>
<td>Bomb Attack on U.S. Embassy in Lebanon. 9/20/84 bomb attack on US embassy kills 23 people. US sends 3 ships off Lebanon to provide contingency response capability. CNA; Zelikow.</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEB</td>
<td>Jun 1985</td>
<td>TWA Hijacking: Naval Presence near Lebanon. 6/14/85 TWA Flight 847 was hijacked. Carrier Nimitz and 1,800 marines sent to Eastern Mediterranean. CNA</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Jan 1986</td>
<td>Honduras: Military Exercises and Construction. 6/86 Congress approves Contra aid. The Defense Department has used a variety of methods to establish a small American military presence in Honduras without obtaining explicit approval from Congress, according to Congressional sources and the General Accounting Office. The methods include military exercises during which airstrips, roads, barracks, radar stations and the like have been built. Helicopters, weapons and other equipment, brought in during the maneuvers, have been left behind in American hands. NYT (7/14/86)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>Jan 1986</td>
<td>Gulf of Syrte Operations. 1/23-30 and 2/11-14/86 naval exercises in Gulf of Syrte. 3/20 U.S. planes destroyed threatening Libyan ships, planes, and missile sites. IDV; FS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>Apr 1986</td>
<td>Airstrikes on Libya. 4/15/86 air raids on Tripoli and Benghazi after 4/5 discotheque bombing. IDV</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>Jan 1986</td>
<td>Military Exercises with South Korea. 1/86 North Korea suspends talks with South Korea after annual “Team Spirit” U.S.-South Korea military exercise. FS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPN</td>
<td>Oct 1986</td>
<td>Military Exercises in Japan. 10/86 Keen Edge 87-1 U.S.-Japan joint military exercise. FS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Jan 1987</td>
<td>Military Exercises with Honduras. 12/29/86-5/8/7 involves up to 50,000 U.S. troops. FS</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRN</td>
<td>Jan 1987</td>
<td>Naval Presence Near Iran. 1-2/87 hostages taken in Lebanon. 3 carrier groups and marines head towards Lebanon and Iran. CNA; FS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRN</td>
<td>Jun 1987</td>
<td>Protection of Persian Gulf Shipping. 6/30/87 battleship and 2 carrier groups in Persian Gulf to protect shipping. UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands sent minesweepers after Panamanian tanker struck in 8/87. Remain there through end of Iran-Iraq War on 8/20/88.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGY</td>
<td>Aug 1987</td>
<td>Military Exercises in Egypt and Somalia. 8/15-20/87 Bright Star 87 military exercises, a JCS-directed, USCENTCOM- held in Egypt and Somalia. FS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEB</td>
<td>Jan 1987</td>
<td>Hostages in Lebanon. 1-2/87 hostages taken in Lebanon. 3 carrier groups and marines head towards Lebanon and Iran. CNA; FS</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>Mar 1988</td>
<td>Troop Deployment and Exercises in Honduras. 3/16/88 3,200 troops sent to Honduras after Nicaraguan offensive against Contra camps in Honduras. IDV</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Mar 1988</td>
<td>Troop Deployment to Panama. 3/14-4/8/88 Marine and army forces, as well as a carrier group sent to Panama. CNA; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>May 1989</td>
<td>Brigade-Sized Troop Deployment to Panama. 5/11/89 More army and marine forces sent to Panama. Conduct exercises. Occurs after violent election campaign and annulment of election by Noriega. CNA; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Oct 1989</td>
<td>Military Alert in Panama. Unsuccessful coup attempt on Noriega. 12,000 troops put on alert. FS</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Dec 1989</td>
<td>Invasion of Panama. 12/20/89 27,684 U.S. troops, over 300 aircraft invade Panama to remove Noriega from power. IDV</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>630</td>
<td>Aug 1989</td>
<td>Hostages in Lebanon. 8/1/89 Col. William Higgins is killed in Lebanon. Navy ships, America, Coral Sea, IowA, and Belknap head towards Lebanon and Iran. CNA; FS</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>645</td>
<td>Aug 1990</td>
<td>Persian Gulf War. 8/2/90 Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. UN Security adopted Resolution 660. 8/7/90 US announces it will deploy troops to Saudi Arabia. 11/29/90 UN Security Council adopts Resolution 678 authorizing force. 1/17/91 air campaign begins. 2/24/91 land campaign begins. 4/12/91 end of crisis. IDV.</td>
<td>X X</td>
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<tr>
<td>645</td>
<td>Apr 1991</td>
<td>U.S. Troops in Northern Iraq. 4/91 up to 10,000 US troops enter Northern Iraq, withdrawn by 7/15/91. 4/5/91 UN Resolution 688 calls on states to assist Kurds. 4/7/91 US, UK, and France conduct Provide Comfort operation. 4/10/91 US, UK, and France establish “no-fly” zone. 4/17/91 US forces enter northern Iraq. FS; globalsecurity.org.</td>
<td>X X</td>
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<tr>
<td>731</td>
<td>Nov 1991</td>
<td>Troop Withdrawal from South Korea Canceled. 11/21/91 Planned withdrawal of 6,000 U.S. troops canceled in response to North Korean nuclear weapons development. In order to maintain pressure on North Korea, however, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney took other steps to ensure a strong military posture in the South, including delaying the planned withdrawal of 6,000 U.S. troops from the peninsula and enlarging other military exercises. NYT; FS; <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/chapter_1goingcritical.pdf">http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/chapter_1goingcritical.pdf</a></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>645</td>
<td>Jul 1992</td>
<td>Military Exercises in Kuwait and Persian Gulf. 8/3/92 US holds military exercises in Kuwait, following Iraqi refusal to recognize new UN border and refusal to cooperate with UN inspection teams. Grimmett; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>645</td>
<td>Aug 1992</td>
<td>Enforcement of “No-Fly Zone”. 8/18/92 US, UK, and France announce “air exclusion zone” over Iraq. UK sent 6 Tornadoes, France 10 Mirages, and US had 200 planes to enforce the ban. 8/26/92 southern no fly zone ban announced by US, UK, France, and Russia. IDV; FS; Grimmett</td>
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<tr>
<td>645</td>
<td>Jan 1993</td>
<td>Attack on Iraqi Installations. 1/21/93 US planes fired at targets in Iraq after pilots sensed Iraqi radar or anti-aircraft fire directed at them. U.S. aircraft fired a missile and dropped cluster bombs on an Iraqi ground radar in the northern no-fly zone when the radar beam search was directed at them while they were escorting a French reconnaissance airplane. 1/22/93 a U.S. F-4G fired two missiles at an air defense battery in the northern no-fly zone after the battery's radar actively tracked U.S. aircraft patrolling the zone. Iraq denied it had tracked the aircraft and claimed there were no air defense batteries at that location. A U.S. A-6 Intruder aircraft fired a laser-guided bomb at an Iraqi anti-aircraft position in the southern no-fly zone after the pilot thought he saw anti-aircraft fire directed at his and other U.S. aircraft patrolling that zone. Iraq denied firing on any U.S. aircraft. U.S. Defense Department officials subsequently said that the U.S. aircraft were not being tracked by Iraqi radar and that they were trying to establish whether or not Iraq had fired on the U.S. planes. Grimmett; FS; <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/94-049.htm">http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/crs/94-049.htm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Jul 1994</td>
<td>Military Simulation of Haiti Invasion. 7/7/94 military exercises in Caribbean simulate an invasion of Haiti. 2,000 marines and 4 ships stationed off of Haiti. 7/15/94 US army paratrooper step up night exercises. 7/31/94 UN Security Council Resolution 940 authorizes force to be used to depose military leadership. IDV; FS; NYT</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Sep 1994</td>
<td>Intervention in Haiti. 7/31/94 UN Security Council Resolution 940 authorizes force to be used to depose military leadership. 9/18/94 military junta agrees to leave Haiti. 9/21/94 1,500 US troops deployed (and later increased to 20,000) to enforce the agreement. Aristide returned to power on 10/15/94. IDV; Grimmett; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>517</td>
<td>Apr 1994</td>
<td>Refugee Relief in Zaire and Rwanda. 4/12/94 Clinton announces US forces deployed to Burundi to conduct evacuation operations (Operation Distant Runner) of US citizens and foreign nationals from Rwanda. Grimmett; FS</td>
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<tr>
<td>645</td>
<td>Oct 1994</td>
<td>Iraqi Threat to Kuwait. 10/7/94 Iraqi deployed troops near Kuwaiti border. Clinton sent aircraft carrier Eisenhower and 4,000 troops to Kuwait. 10/9/94 36,000 more troops sent. 10/10/94 UK, France, Russia, Egypt, and Turkey agreed to defend Kuwait. 10/10/94 UN Security Council Resolution condemns Iraq's deployment. 10/12/94 Gulf States, UK, and France sent forces to defend Kuwait. IDV; FS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>346</td>
<td>May 1995</td>
<td>Hostage Crisis in Bosnia. 2/92-1/96 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR); 5/29-30/95 Hundreds of UN observes taken hostage by Serbs in Bosnia. Carrier task force, marine contingent, and attack submarine moved into Adriatic. 5/26/95, UN twice bombed a Bosnian Serb ammunitions dump after the Serbs ignored UN ultimatums to abandon certain heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone. The Serbs retaliated by taking hostage hundreds of poorly armed UN peacekeepers, some of whom were then chained to key military targets as human shields against further air strikes. The Serbs made clear that they no longer viewed the UN forces as impartial peacekeepers and accused UNPROFOR of &quot;flagrant interference in the conflict&quot; and &quot;siding with one party&quot;; they also declared all UN and NATO resolutions null and void. The UN, for its part, accused the Serbs of &quot;terrorist&quot; acts and barely bothered to feign impartiality. FS; NYT; <a href="http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-034.html">http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-034.html</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>346</td>
<td>BOS</td>
<td>Dec 1995</td>
<td>Troop Deployment to Bosnia. 12/95 8,000 US troops sent to Bosnia as part of Dayton Agreement. Implementation Force (IFOR), authorized by UN, under the command of NATO, monitored compliance with the agreement. Following the Dayton Peace Agreement, the U.S. took even a greater stand trying to maintain peace and stability in the Balkans. In December 1995 the transfer of authority from the United Nations to NATO has begun. The UN. Security Council voted unanimously to authorize NATO to send 60,000 troops to relieve 20,000 UN solders in Bosnia, therefore shutting down a UN. mission that failed to restore the peace in the war-torn Balkans. The United States sent some 20,000 troops as part of NATO forces, in order to maintain stability. FS; Grimmett; <a href="http://www.earlham.edu/~pols/globalprobs/bosnia/role.html">http://www.earlham.edu/~pols/globalprobs/bosnia/role.html</a></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520</td>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>Jan 1995</td>
<td>Withdrawal from Somalia. 2/27/95 Clinton reported that 1,800 US troops deployed to Mogadishu to assist in withdrawal of UN forces assigned there as part of UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). Mission completed by 3/1/95. FS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>645</td>
<td>IRQ</td>
<td>Aug 1995</td>
<td>Troops, Ships Deployed to Persian Gulf. 7/95 Iraq threatens to end cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA, if sanctions are not lifted. 8/95 US troops, ships deployed to Persian Gulf in response to Iraqi threats. 8/17/95 two carriers sent as part of Operation Vigilant Sentinel. FS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations of Sources:**

- BK: Blechman and Kaplan (1978)
- CNA: Center for Naval Analyses (1991)
- IDV: ICB Data Viewer (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/)
- NYT: New York Times
- Zelikow: Zelikow (1987)
APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS AND CRISIS SCENARIOS

Instructions

*Foreign Policy Decision Making*

In this study, I am interested in learning about decision making in various U.S. foreign policy events. Specifically, I am interested in your ability to comprehend and advocate a decision at the national level. Comprehension of national level decisions is based on the quality of the decision you make in the context of a simulated international crisis.

In the next pages, you’ll face a hypothetical international crisis. The case will contain a brief background on the crisis, and the information available to a president as he prepares to make a decision. Read the information carefully, and then respond to the situation, *assuming the president will be influenced based on the option you advise*.

Following the case is a questionnaire in which you’ll record your decision. Please respond to all the questions.

Thank you for your cooperation, Brad Podliska
The Juneria Humanitarian Crisis

During the past several months, the civil war in Juneria has crippled that country’s infrastructure and destroyed its food supply. Warlords have confiscated crops and food supplies and use it as payment in exchange for military service in their private armies. The result is widespread famine with innocent women and children starving to death. The famine in Juneria becomes a fixture on the nightly news.

The U.S. President has expressed his concerns for the innocent victims of Juneria’s civil war, and he wants to do something. After exhausting all non-force alternatives, the president has decided to get rid of the warlords with military force. The president has to make a decision to act unilaterally with only a U.S. military force or to partner with other nations and form a multinational military force. The American people understand the costs and benefits of acting unilaterally or multilaterally, and the following polls numbers reflect their support of the president in his decision to act unilaterally.

[Over 70 percent of the public supports the president in his decision to act alone and use unilateral force.]

[Less than 30 percent of the public supports the president in his decision to act alone and use unilateral force.]

The Combatant Commander for the region advises the President that in the mission to separate the warlords,

[the U.S. military, acting alone is facing a poorly trained, poorly equipped, and fragmented militia enemy, which is plagued by low morale.]
[the U.S. military, acting alone is facing a well-trained, well-equipped, and tenacious enemy, which is considered to be the most powerful in its region.]

The President has to make a decision, and you are his close confidant and adviser. He must decide from one of the following two alternatives: act unilaterally with only a U.S. military force or partner with other nations and form a multinational military force.

*Please go to the next page to answer several questions.*
Please do not go back to the read the scenario.

The choice I think the U.S. President should make is: (mark only one choice)

1. Act unilaterally with only a U.S. military force to get rid of the warlords: ____. (If you select this option, answer question #3 and skip question #4.)

   Or

2. Partner with other nations and form a multinational military force to get rid of the warlords: ____. (If you select this option, answer question #4 and skip question #3.)

3. How much do you support using unilateral force: (circle a number on the scale)
   
   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A great deal

4. How much do you support using multilateral force: (circle a number on the scale)
   
   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A great deal

Answer all of these remaining questions:

How dangerous is the military mission: (circle a number on the scale)

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very dangerous

How many casualties may the U.S. receive in this operation: (circle a number on the scale)

   None 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 A high amount

How supportive is the American public for unilateral operations: (circle a number on the scale)

   Not supportive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very supportive

The main reason for this military operation is: (circle a number on the scale)

   a. U.S. national security
Not at all the reason 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much the reason

b. Regime change in Juneria

Not at all the reason 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much the reason

c. Humanitarian hardship in Juneria

Not at all the reason 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much the reason
Regime Change in Evilaen

During the past year, the Evilaenese dictator, a bitter enemy of the U.S., has continued to violate international law and defy the civilized world with his actions. The dictator has brutalized his own people, committing atrocities against minority populations. In his latest action, the dictator is working to destabilize the newly emerging democracies of his neighboring countries, Katiana and Cona Mai.

The U.S. President has expressed his concerns in the past for the Evilaenese dictator's actions and tried unsuccessfully to remove the dictator from power with such non-force actions as economic and diplomatic sanctions. The president has decided the only remaining option is to invade Evilaen and remove the dictator from power. The president has to make a decision to act unilaterally with only a U.S. military force or to partner with other nations and form a multinational military force for the invasion. The American people understand the costs and benefits of acting unilaterally or multilaterally, and the following polls numbers reflect their support of the president in his decision to act unilaterally.

[Over 70 percent of the public supports the president in his decision to act alone and use unilateral force.]

[Less than 30 percent of the public supports the president in his decision to act alone and use unilateral force.]

The Combatant Commander for the region advises the President that in the regime change mission,
[the U.S. military, acting alone is facing a poorly trained, poorly equipped, and
fragmented militia enemy, which is plagued by low morale.]

[the U.S. military, acting alone is facing a well-trained, well-equipped, and tenacious
enemy, which is considered to be the most powerful in its region.]  

The President has to make a decision, and you are his close confidant and adviser.

He must decide from one of the following two alternatives: act unilaterally with only a
U.S. military force or partner with other nations and form a multinational military force.

Please go to the next page to answer several questions.
Please do not go back to the read the scenario.

The choice I think the U.S. President should make is: (mark only one choice)

1. Act unilaterally with only a U.S. military force to remove the Evilaenese dictator from power: _____. (If you select this option, answer question #3 and skip question #4.)

   Or

2. Partner with other nations and form a multinational military force to remove the Evilaenese dictator from power: ____. (If you select this option, answer question #4 and skip question #3.)

3. How much do you support using unilateral force: (circle a number on the scale)

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A great deal

4. How much do you support using multilateral force: (circle a number on the scale)

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A great deal

Answer all of these remaining questions:

How dangerous is the military mission: (circle a number on the scale)

   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very dangerous

How many casualties may the U.S. receive in this operation: (circle a number on the scale)

   None 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 A high amount

How supportive is the American public for unilateral operations: (circle a number on the scale)

   Not supportive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very supportive

The main reason for this military operation is: (circle a number on the scale)

   a. U.S. national security
b. Regime change in Evilaen

Not at all the reason 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much the reason

c. Humanitarian hardship in Evilaen

Not at all the reason 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much the reason
The Sugabaneria National Security Threat

For the past several months, a narco-terrorist group, Sugabaneria, has been waging an unconventional war on the U.S. Sugabaneria, which is located in several countries unfriendly to the U.S., supports its terrorist campaign against the U.S. by growing and selling cocaine, a significant amount of which is sold in America. In the past month, Sugabaneria organized a truck bomb to explode outside a U.S. embassy, killing 100 Americans. Sugabaneria has also purchased high technology military weapons that give them the capability to threaten U.S. interests in the region.

The U.S. President has labeled Sugabaneria’s actions as a threat to national security, and he tried unsuccessfully to stop Sugabaneria’s actions with such non-force measures as threats and highly publicized arrests. However, these measures have not worked and Sugabaneria’s power continues to grow as its war on America continues. The president has decided the only remaining option is to attack Sugabaneria group members in the countries where they reside. The president has to make a decision to act unilaterally with only a U.S. military force or to partner with other nations and form a multinational military force. The American people understand the costs and benefits of acting unilaterally or multilaterally, and the following polls numbers reflect their support of the president in his decision to act unilaterally.

[Over 70 percent of the public supports the president in his decision to act alone and use unilateral force.]

[Less than 30 percent of the public supports the president in his decision to act alone and use unilateral force.]
The Combatant Commander for the region advises the President that in the mission to wipe out Sugabaneria,

[the U.S. military, acting alone is facing a poorly trained, poorly equipped, and fragmented militia enemy, which is plagued by low morale.]

[the U.S. military, acting alone is facing a well-trained, well-equipped, and tenacious enemy, which is considered to be the most powerful in its region.]

The President has to make a decision, and you are his close confidant and adviser. He must decide from one of the following two alternatives: act unilaterally with only a U.S. military force or partner with other nations and form a multinational military force.

Please go to the next page to answer several questions.
Please do not go back to the read the scenario.

The choice I think the U.S. President should make is: (mark only one choice)

1. Act unilaterally with only a U.S. military force to wipe out Sugabaneria: ____. (If you select this option, answer question #3 and skip question #4.)

   Or

2. Partner with other nations and form a multinational military force to wipe out Sugabaneria: ____. (If you select this option, answer question #4 and skip question #3.)

3. How much do you support using unilateral force: (circle a number on the scale)
   
   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A great deal

4. How much do you support using multilateral force: (circle a number on the scale)
   
   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A great deal

Answer all of these remaining questions:

How dangerous is the military mission: (circle a number on the scale)
   
   Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very dangerous

How many casualties may the U.S. receive in this operation: (circle a number on the scale)
   
   None 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 A high amount

How supportive is the American public for unilateral operations: (circle a number on the scale)
   
   Not supportive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very supportive

The main reason for this military operation is: (circle a number on the scale)

   a. U.S. national security
   
   Not at all the reason 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much the reason
b. Regime change in the countries where Sugabaneria is located
   Not at all the reason 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much the reason

c. Humanitarian hardship brought on by Sugabaneria
   Not at all the reason 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much the reason
VITA

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