GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCES ON GERMAN DEVELOPMENT
POLICIES IN AFRICA AND AIDS POLICIES IN KENYA

A Thesis
by
VEIT BACHMANN

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE

August 2006

Major Subject: Geography
ABSTRACT

Geopolitical Influences on German Development Policies in Africa and AIDS Policies in Kenya. (August 2006)
Veit Bachmann, Vordiplom, University of Trier
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Peter J. Hugill

At the beginning of the twenty-first century Germany geopolitics can be characterized by its grand strategy as a civilian power. Germany has come to depend on a civilianized international system based on multilateralism, international institutions and the rule of law, supranational integration, free trade, and the restriction of the use of force as a means for international politics. Such a system requires the players in it to be peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, legitimate and law-abiding. Many African countries do not fulfill those conditions. Extremely high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS in Africa severely undermine social structure, economic development and political stability and thus contribute to state failure. State failure is in fundamental conflict with Germany’s prime geopolitical interest in promoting a civilianized international system, because a failing state is incapable of creating civilianized structures.

After analyzing Germany’s foreign and development policies since World War II, I came to the conclusion that all German foreign policies aim at promoting a civilianized international system. I am arguing that development policies are part of broader foreign policies and thus pursue this goal with respect to developing countries. However, for the system itself it is much more important that the big players in the world are included and committed to it. Therefore, German foreign policy focuses on the major powers in the world and, just as developing countries play a minor role in international politics, development policies play a minor role in Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power. German grand strategy, however, plays a major role in the design and the conduct of German development policies, policies used as tools to pursue Germany’s broader geopolitical interest in promoting a civilianized international system.
DEDICATION

To my father Günther Bachmann
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude and respect to my advisor and mentor, Dr. Peter Hugill, for his great guidance on this project and the very inspiring and enjoyable time as his graduate student.

Many thanks also to Drs. Urs Kreuter and Christian Brannstrom for their helpful contributions in the planning of my fieldwork in Kenya and the process of writing this thesis.

I would also like to thank my fellow graduate student, Mr. Jeremiah Wagstaff, for constantly and critically challenging my work.

Furthermore, I would like to express my thanks to Mrs. Reta Haynes and Dr. Daniel Sui for the financial support of my project through the Reta A. Haynes Chair in Geosciences.

Many thanks also to all the interviewees who provided me with important information for my work.

Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Kosmos Spoetzl for bringing Bavarian traditions to Texas that would relax my stressed mind after long nights of writing.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td></td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMENCLATURE</td>
<td></td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
<td>GERMAN GEOPOLITICS AND INTERESTS IN AFRICA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German Imperialism before 1914</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Origins of Geopolitik and Expansionism in Nazi-Germany</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa and Germany During the Cold War</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changing Geopolitical Conditions in the 1990s and Germany’s Grand Strategy as a Civilian Power</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS AND STATE FAILURE IN AFRICA</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa and Kenya in the Global Context of the Pandemic</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impacts of HIV/AIDS on State and Society</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Failure and Africa in a Civilianized International System</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV</td>
<td>THE ‘CIVILIAN POWER’ GERMANY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT POLICIES FOR A CIVILIANIZED INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN AFRICA</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Foreign Political Behavior of Germany as a Civilian Power</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conception of German Development Policies</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German Programs on Reproductive Health and HIV/AIDS in Kenya</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influence of the Grand Strategy on Development Policies in Africa</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td></td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany’s Mittelafrika plans</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Selected AIDS characteristics for the world and sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Adult HIV prevalence in % in 2003</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The spread of HIV in Africa 1988-2003</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AIDS deaths in sub-Saharan Africa in millions 1988-2005</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>New infections and adult prevalence rates in sub-Saharan Africa 1999-2005</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Adult HIV prevalence in Kenya 1990-2004 (sentinel surveillance)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Adult HIV prevalence in Kenya 2003 (population based survey)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Leading causes of death in Africa 2000</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Life expectancy at birth 1987-2003</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Life expectancy in Botswana and Kenya for 2002 and 2010</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Correlation between statistical indicators and infectious disease proxies</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Net ODA of OECD countries in 2004</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ODA as percentage share of GNI in 2004</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>German ODA as percentage share of GNI 1964-2004</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Destination of German multilateral ODA</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>German development cooperation with Kenya since 1992</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>ODA of all OECD countries (total and to Africa) 2000-2004</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>German ODA (total and to Africa) 2000-2004</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Bi- and multilateral ODA of G7-countries</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Growth in trade of major countries between 1887 and 1912</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Selected AIDS characteristics for the world and sub-Saharan Africa in 2005</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Attributes and statistical indicators for state capacity</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Comparison of the criteria for civilian powers and state failure</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Comparison of the criteria for civilian powers and German development policies</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**NOMENCLATURE**

AA Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs)
AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ARV Antiretroviral Drug
BMWi Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft and Technology (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology)
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
BSR Bundessicherheitsrat (Federal Security Council)
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CSU Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
DED Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service)
DFG Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation)
EC European Community
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDR German Democratic Republic
GNI Gross National Income
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperations)
HDI Human Development Index
HIV Human Immunodeficiency virus
IMF International Monetary Fund
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Financial Cooperation)
LDCs Least Developed Countries
NACC  National AIDS Control Council (in Kenya)
NGO   Non Governmental Organization
ODA   Official Development Assistance
PLWHA People Living With HIV/AIDS
SPD   Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Socialdemocratic Party of Germany)
UN    United Nations
UNAIDS The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

German geopolitics has resulted in devastating consequences for Europe and the World in the first half of the twentieth century. During the second half of the twentieth century Germany abandoned its military aggressiveness and became thoroughly integrated into an international system of liberal capitalism based on American hegemony. Multilateralism, international law and institutions, supranational integration, and the restriction of the use of force became central aspects of German foreign policy. Its main geopolitical interest today is to promote such a ‘civilianized’ international system.

Changing geopolitical conditions in the 1990s have made state failure in sub-Saharan Africa, exacerbated by HIV/AIDS, a threatening factor for such a civilianized international system. Through globalization and increased global interdependencies the situation in a supposedly remote part of the world can have major impacts on the international system. Germany and other Western countries have realized the importance of counteracting the problems in Africa before they become problems for their own national interests. After reunification in 1990, Germany went through a phase of political reorientation to find its place in the post-Cold War world and eventually sought to engage more actively in global politics and on the African continent.

German foreign policy is rooted in its grand strategy as a civilian power, which aims to promote a civilianized international system. With respect to Africa, German foreign policies are mainly development policies. There is vast literature on both Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power and its foreign political behavior with respect to the main actors in the international system. But there is a lack of knowledge about the influence of Germany’s grand strategy on its policies with regard to the developing world. As a consequence, it is unclear to what extent Germany’s broader geopolitical interests, as rooted in the civilian power concept, influence development

This thesis follows the style of the Annals of the Association of American Geographers.
policies in Africa. Hence, the central question of this research is how German development policies are influenced by the geopolitical interest of creating a civilianized international system. German programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya are used as an example to illustrate this connection.

Various factors influence development policies. The most common argument is that the underlying reasons are either idealist, such as humanitarian motives, or realist, such as strategic political interests. Ferguson introduces a third possibility by arguing that development policies are mainly driven by bureaucratic structures and the attempt to justify their own existences (Ferguson 1990). However, the goal of this research is not to precisely assess which motivation is the most influential driver for development policies. Rather, this study focuses on the realist motivation and aims to show how geopolitical interests influence development policies.

The central claim is that broader geopolitical interests are a major underlying factor that determines German development policies and projects. In chapter I I identify 3 phases of German geopolitical interests. First, Wilhelmine Germany. Second, Nazi Germany. Third, the Federal Republic of Germany, mainly in its mature phase after German reunification in 1990. For all three phases there is substantial academic literature with respect to German foreign policies and German interests in Africa. However, the development and the connection of the 3 phases have not been sufficiently addressed. Chapter I discusses the evolution of the three phases of Germany’s geopolitical interests and deals with the historical background of Germany’s current interest in Africa. It starts with the first German outreach to Africa and its acquisition of colonies during the imperial period of the ‘Grab for Africa’ before World War I. This was based on an aggrandizing mind set within both the German population and elites and the perception that Germany needed to import resources and acquire colonies for prestige in order to compete with other great powers (Grumbach 1917; Fischer 1967; Stoecker 1986).

Chapter I continues to discuss German expansionism and plans for world domination during the Nazi period. The geopolitical plans of the Nazi-leadership were
not identical with the academic geopolitics associated with Karl Haushofer. With respect to Africa, German interests were very limited and based mostly on a general opposition to the Treaty of Versailles which ended German colonialism (Haushofer 1934; Whittlesey 1939, 1942, 1943; Dorpalen 1942; Ebeling 1994).

The next section of chapter I deals with German-African relations during the Cold War. In the first decades after the end of World War II, Germany’s prime interest was in being integrated as a trustworthy and respected partner in the American led international system. This was reflected in German Africa policies. The prime interest during that period was to counteract Soviet influence on the African continent and to include African countries in the American world-economy. The underlying motivations were ideological reasons as well as the availability of African resources (Engel 2000; Hofmeier 2002; Mair 2002).

Finally, the last section of chapter I deals with Germany’s interest in Africa after reunification in 1990. After an initial phase of disinterest, Germany developed a rather intense ‘global order’ interest in Africa, when it realized that the situation in Africa could have significant impacts on its own national interest. This ‘global order’ interest refers to the creation of civilianized structures in Africa which are essential for the inclusion of African countries into a civilianized international system Germany needs to act effectively (Maull 1993, 2004; Engel and Olson 2005b; Kühne 1999; Mair 2002; Frenkler et al 1997; Kirste and Maull 1996; Meinig 2004).

Chapter II addresses the problems of HIV/AIDS and state failure in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature reviewed for this chapter covers the problems associated with HIV/AIDS and state failure in Africa. Even though it is well documented how these problems affect international security, no academic work has examined how they relate specifically to Germany’s current geopolitical interest. The goal of chapter II is, thus, to show how the problems associated with HIV/AIDS and state failure in Africa undermine Germany’s vision of a civilianized international system.

In the first section I outline how severely the pandemic has affected sub-Saharan Africa. Only 10 percent of the global population lives in sub-Saharan Africa, but the
region is home to more than two thirds of all people living with HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2000 – 2005)

The second section deals with the effects of the pandemic on state and society. HIV/AIDS has severe impacts on social structure, economic development, and political stability in many countries in Africa. Even though HIV/AIDS affects all sectors of state and society, the ones most impacted are education, agriculture and security forces. As such the disease undermines state capacity and is, therefore, conducive to state failure (Elbe 2002, 2003; Price-Smith 2002; Kalipeni et al 2004).

In the third section of chapter II, I explain the problems associated with state failure. Many countries in Africa are considered as weak states with a high risk of state failure. I outline five characteristics of state failure and contrast them to the ideals of a civilian power in order to show that state failure is in fundamental conflict with Germany’s prime geopolitical interest in a civilianized international system (King and Zeng 2001; Crocker 2003; Rotberg 2003).

The third chapter deals more intensely with Germany’s foreign and development policies. In the first section, the foreign political behavior of Germany as a civilian power is discussed and also contrasted to the foreign political behavior of the United States as a great power. I argue that for most of the period since 1945 Germany has been a free-rider in an international system provided by the United States, and that this has significantly shaped German interests and foreign policy. This system was favorable to Germany to develop into both a civilian power and a classical trading state. As such Germany has no choice but to use its full energy and all its foreign political tools to promote such a global order. Development policies are one of those tools (Maull 1990, 1993; Kirste and Maull 1996; Agnew and Corbridge 1995, Agnew 2005).

The second and third section of chapter III go into more detail on development policies. The second section deals with German development policies in general and how they are conceptualized. After the end of the Cold War there were two major changes in German development policies. The first occurred in 1991 and tied German development cooperation to five conditions. The second was in 1998 when the German
government changed from Kohl’s center-right to Schröder’s center-left administration. Schröder’s government reversed the trend of decreasing official development assistance (ODA) and introduced the concepts of *Schwerpunktbildung* – priority setting of development cooperation - and *Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss* – seamless development cooperation (BMZ 2004 – 2006; OECD 2006).

The third section of chapter III gives an example of German development policies by discussing the German programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya. Kenya is a priority partner country for German development cooperation and reproductive health is one of the three German development priorities in Kenya. Germany has worked in the health sector in Kenya for three decades, and in the AIDS sector in Kenya for almost two. It thus has had a major impact on the design of the Kenyan approach to counteract the pandemic and the programs of the two countries in that field are now largely similar (EFRG 2005; BMZ 2003 – 2006).

Finally, the last section of chapter III examines the influence of German geopolitical interests on its development policies. After having outlined what a civilian power strives for internationally in section 3.1 and how German development policies operate in sections 3.2 and 3.3, the connection between the two is discussed in section 3.4. I introduce six practical examples to show this connection. Furthermore, I compare the five major characteristics of the civilian power concept and of German development policies as they are each theoretically outlined in the literature. Both the practical examples and the comparison of theoretical criteria clearly show that German development policies are deeply embedded in its grand strategy as a civilian power. I am not trying to show that development policies are an important part of German grand strategy, but that the grand strategy is the major influencing factor on German development policies. This means that, despite the increased relevance development policies have experienced within the German foreign political framework since 1998, they are still clearly subordinate to broader German geopolitical interests and are not much more than tools to pursue such interests.
This chapter introduces the relevant literature on Germany’s foreign political behavior as a civilian power and on German development policies. Building on this literature and using the information obtained during field work in Kenya and Germany between June and August 2005, I address the lack of knowledge about how German development policies are influenced by its grand strategy.

Preparation for the fieldwork of this research included acquiring detailed knowledge in three main categories, each reflected in a separate chapter. First, German geopolitics in its historical framework and its current form. Second, the problems of HIV/AIDS and state failure in Africa. Third, German foreign and development policies and the programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya.

The methods used for the first category focused on literature research of the work of American, British, and German geographers, historians and political scientists on that topic. Through the study of the relevant academic work on historical and current German geopolitics, I was able to identify three eras of German geopolitical interests regarding Africa: Wilhelmine acquisition of colonies for resources and prestige; Nazi lack of concern with colonies; and the promotion of a civilianized international system in the second half of the twentieth century.

The information for the second chapter was obtained through the study of the relevant literature on state failure, epidemiology and HIV/AIDS. Publications and data provided by United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) were also an important data source. More detailed knowledge of the impact of HIV/AIDS on society, in Kenya in particular, is also based on semi-structured interviews conducted during my fieldwork in Kenya between June and August 2005. Interviewees with respect to HIV/AIDS included managers or representatives of:

- the Kenyan National AIDS Control Council (NACC), the central agency of the Kenyan government to coordinate all efforts in the fight against HIV/AIDS;
- UNAIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS;
- Crystal Hill, an NGO working towards the creation of a HIV free generation;
- **Strengthening STD/HIV Control Project in Kenya**, a joint project of the University of Nairobi and the University of Manitoba which aims at promoting condom use and controlling the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and HIV;

- **Wakibe HIV/AIDS Community Support Project**, a community based project in Huruma, Nairobi which provides care, counseling and medication for orphans and people living with HIV/AIDS;

- **Extreme Impact**, a community based organization in the slum of Mathara, Nairobi aiming to create AIDS awareness, de-stigmatizing the disease and promoting condom use;

- **Makindu Primary School**. Interview with the head teacher of a primary school in rural Kenya (Kiungani, Kitale), which faces the problem of many AIDS-orphans in the school.

After having identified the problems associated with HIV/AIDS and state failure in Africa, I contrast those problems with the prime German geopolitical interest of promoting a civilianized international system.

Information for the third chapter derives from the study of the academic literature on German foreign and development policies. However, it also includes material dealing with the nature of current geopolitics and the nature of the international system. This academic component mainly builds on the works of American, British, and German geographers and political scientists. It contrasts traditional great power behavior, currently exemplified by the Untied States, with Germany’s behavior as a civilian power. In addition, I studied official German documents of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (AA), the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and other organizations. This review of official documents was added to by the study of speeches of leading international politicians in order to find out what the official policies are with regard to Africa and with respect to HIV/AIDS in Kenya. Information was also obtained through the interviews mentioned in the methodology for chapter II and
additional semi-structured interviews conducted during field work in Kenya between
June and August 2005 and in Germany in August 2005. The interviewees were mostly
sector coordinators of the following institutions:

- German Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya;
- Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the main German
  organization for official technical development cooperation (2 interviewees);
- Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW), a development bank as the main
  German organization for official financial development cooperation;
- Auswärtiges Amt (AA), the German Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Finally, I compared the information gathered about German development
policies in Africa and the HIV/AIDS programs in Kenya with the grand strategy as a
civilian power in order to find out how the latter influences the former. In order to
protect the identity of the interviewees who requested anonymity, I only mention their
affiliation and refer to them as Interviewee A, B, C etc. in the text.
CHAPTER II

GERMAN GEOPOLITICS AND INTERESTS IN AFRICA

This chapter deals with the historical background of Germany’s interest in Africa with respect to the time periods before World War I and II and the Cold War. It further addresses geopolitical changes in the 1990s and explains how Germany developed the grand strategy of a civilian power and the promotion of a civilianized international system as its prime geopolitical interest.

German Imperialism before 1914

May we obtain in that peace a powerful African Colonial Empire and a sufficiently large number of strong bases on the globe for our navy, and for our commerce, for coaling stations and wireless telegraphy. (Duke Johann Albrecht von Mecklenburg, quoted in Grumbach 1917, 9-10)

The unification of Germany in the Kaiserreich in 1871 was the political manifestation of the ambitions of the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) to establish Germany as one of the Great Powers. After three successful wars with Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870/71) he ensured Prussian dominance within Germany and German dominance in Europe. As German chancellor he took the lead to install the Prussian king Wilhelm I as the German emperor and, therefore, the head of a federal state encompassing the political entities of Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Saxony, Hesse, Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck. The Kaiserreich was Bismarck’s creation. His good old friend Wilhelm I played along as the German emperor, but in fact it was Bismarck who determined the politics of the young German Reich.
Africa was not of great concern for German politics at that time. The individual German states had neither the power nor interest in acquiring overseas possessions. In addition, after unification Bismarck had a rather reluctant attitude towards colonialism. Asked for Germany’s colonial ambitions in Africa he replied: “Here is Russia and there is France, and Germany is right in between. This is my map of Africa” (translated and quoted from Mair 1999). However, it became obvious that a Germany striving for world power status had a significant disadvantage compared to European colonial powers when it came to the availability and abundance of resources. Especially Britain, based on its dominance of the oceans and in global trade, could draw on all kinds of resources from its huge formal and informal empire. If Germany sought to rise to the status of world power, it needed to improve its access to resources.

From the middle of the 19th century on Germany universities and research institutions improved impressively with considerable results in producing synthetic materials as substitutes for natural products. This became necessary in the various German states because of the economic disadvantage they faced compared to their European competitors that could draw on colonial resources. For those reasons, Bismarck’s reluctance to acquire colonies intensified research in Germany and contributed heavily to what, in 1896, the British Royal Commission on Technical Instruction called “a noble and intense belief in Wissenschaft (arts and sciences)” within German society (quoted in Pfetsch 1974, 331).

However noble and intense this belief was, it was not intense enough to permanently eliminate German ambitions for overseas possessions. Fischer argues that “Germany was developing more and more into a highly industrialized exporting country, and the problem of finding markets and raw materials to support her population was growing increasingly urgent” (Fischer 1967, 11). Furthermore throughout the 1880s it became obvious that it was not only the availability of resources, but also prestige that made it essential for a great power to have some overseas possessions. So between April 1884 and May 1885 Germany acquired all of its African protectorates: South-West Africa, Togo, Cameroon and Tanganyika. To underline the claim of the freshly unified
German Empire to play a major role in global politics, Bismarck organized the “International Africa Conference” in Berlin between November 15th 1884 and February 26th 1885. By then every nation had at least somewhat of an imagination of the “unfathomed natural resources” the African continent bore, especially the Congo region. The “Berlin Conference” was partly motivated by the German proposal to establish an “international company” whose concern would be the exploitation of resources. It was the “most comprehensive international control attempted prior to the creation of the League of Nations” (Whittlesey 1939, 329-334).

The fourteen participating nations agreed upon the division of Africa amongst European powers, which determined the current borders in Africa to a large extent. For Bismarck, the colonies were primarily trading posts, whereas the Deutscher Kolonialverein – the German Colonial Association – regarded them as a necessary step for German imperial politics (DHM 2004). This represented a general attitude in large parts of the German society, in particular amongst the industrial and political elites, which was embodied in the person of Wilhelm II (1859-1941). When he took the throne as German Kaiser in 1888 and dismissed Bismarck two years later, German foreign and colonial politics became far more aggressive. The new Kaiser represented a generation of Germans who had experienced nothing but a Germany that was growing, thriving, winning wars and gaining more and more political weight.

The men of this generation which grew up in the late Bismarckian era were also convinced devotees of the ‘world policy’ devoted to securing for Germany a ‘place in the sun’, which the young Emperor had been quick to announce as his programme. It was the accession of Wilhelm II in July, 1888, that really unleashed the conservative-dynastic forces at home; those calling for pushful expansion abroad got their heads […] he was a ‘modern’ king who sought contact with savants, merchants and technicians and, like the British Prince of Wales (afterwards King
Edward VII), ‘covered’ the world as ‘the first commercial traveller’ of his people. (Fischer 1967, 7-8)

Fischer points out correctly what made Wilhelm II so powerful: he had the support of the elites, especially the banking sector, but also of German society in general. There was a mindset of expansionism in Germany which called for a ‘world mission’, based not only on economic interest, but also on a ‘will to power’. The symbol for Germany’s elevated role in the world should be a merchant and naval fleet that would be able to compete with the British. If you want to interact with the world and influence large parts of it, you need to be able to get around. This was the first step to place Germany at an elevated level in the global power struggle and to reorganize the colonial status quo (Fischer 1967, 8-9).

However, voices calling for an increased overseas engagement also had to face internal opposition. The internal struggle within Germany whether to be a land-power or a sea-power became apparent. Geographically there is a clear border-line within Germany that divided, and still divides, the country into two sides with contrasting opinions on this topic: the river Elbe. Germany east of the Elbe was traditionally a strongly agricultural region. Far less innovative and far more introvert it focused on its own development and was oriented towards the east and the eastern European landmass. This interest required a strong army, the epitome for German land-power, in order to secure the German eastern border, which did not have any natural borderline, from invasion or in order to expand more towards the east. Drang nach Osten – the Push to the East became the popular slogan. Germany west of the Elbe was far less continentally oriented. Having the powerful Ruhr industrial region, the Rhine valley around Cologne, as well as Hamburg and Bremen as trading and commercial centers, it strongly favored outward orientation towards the world. The industrial areas needed resources and sales markets abroad, the trading cities’ existence was based on global interactions. For both a strong fleet and overseas presence were essential.
The internal divide became clearly obvious, with western Germany favoring sea-power and eastern Germany focusing on land-power (Mackinder 1942). Whittlesey observes as one of three “disclosed undercurrents of German life” an “unabated dichotomy between eastern Germany and western Germany in economic and social structure and in customs and outlook upon life” (Whittlesey 1943, 392). As a result “resumption of the traditional landward movement eastward was the dominant demand, especially in the eastern parts of the country, industrialized and commercial western Germany was vigorously urging the government to support a merchant marine, a navy, and overseas colonies” (Whittlesey 1942, 198). Wilhelm II tried to balance these interests by achieving both objectives, but knew very well that only with a strong international fleet could world power status be achieved. However, the global presence was seen somewhat as a by-product which would eventually come along once dominance on the European continent was achieved.

For other major powers Germany’s reach for dominance on the European continent was not necessarily a new phenomenon. What was new was the strong German push to challenge Britain as a World Power at the end of the 19th century by building up a fleet and supporting the Boers in the second South African Boer War (1899-1902). Germany acted more and more as a global player and became increasingly interwoven with other countries. This became necessary because of its booming industry, which needed the import of raw materials for production and sales markets for exports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Growth in Imports</th>
<th>Growth in Exports</th>
<th>Growth in Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>243 %</td>
<td>185.4 %</td>
<td>214.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>136.9 %</td>
<td>208.6 %</td>
<td>173.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>108.7 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>113.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>95 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>98.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Fischer 1967, 12
Table 1 shows that, in the 25 years preceding World War I, German imports more than tripled from 3.1 million to 10 million Marks, an increase far more than in any other major country. Exports almost tripled from 3.1 billion to 8.9 billion Marks, an increase that was only slightly exceeded by the United States.

Most of this increase in Germany’s trade came from overseas countries. Bankers and traders were increasingly involved in the global financial market and invested in international projects. Industrial production increased and became more diversified from year to year. This development painfully revealed the obstacle Germany faced because of its limited access to global resources (Fischer 1967, 18). Therefore it is hardly surprising that leading German industrials, bankers and politicians called for an expansion of German overseas possessions. At the beginning of World War I Wilhelm Solf (1862-1936), the Secretary of State in the Reich Colonial Office, succeeded in making “the acquisition of a continuous Colonial Empire in Central Africa one of Germany’s official war aims.” His goal was to shift the nation’s ambitions to annex new territory from Europe to Africa by “emphasising the attractions of an autarchic economic area, guaranteed by enlarged colonial possessions, as a basis for world power status” (Fischer 1967, 102-103). As illustrated in figure 1, Solf’s *Mittelafrika* plans included

that Portugal, although neutral, should cede to Germany Angola and the northern part of Mozambique as far as the Primera Islands […] the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa as far north as Lake Chad, Togoland enlarged by Dahomey and in the north by a slice of Senegambia up to Timbuctoo, thus making the course of the Niger the northern frontier. (Fischer 1967, 102-103)

The desire to control *Mittelafrika* was twofold. For one thing it derived from increasing imperial aspirations and the perceived need to establish an extensive system of coaling stations and naval bases around the African coasts and in the Southern hemisphere. Those naval bases were essential for the ambition of the German fleet to
operate globally and to challenge the British fleet on the world’s oceans. The other, at least equally important, drive for Mittelfrika lay in the economic benefits the control of resources in the area would bring. Raw materials from the resource-rich Katanga-region of the Congo and transportation routes to bring those to ocean-ports were at the focus of resource-oriented motives.

Figure 1: Germany’s Mittelfrika plans. Source: Fischer 1967, 596
Even in 1918 the idea of *Mittelafrika* was still very much present as the letter of a German industrialist to Solf illustrates:

> Therewith the final hour of England’s world power and England’s world empire will have struck. In the course of centuries North America and Australia were Anglicised, South America Latinised. The time is at hand when Germany will be granted the power to Germanise virgin Africa. (quoted in Fischer 1967, 588)

During World War I Germany’s *Mittelafrika*-plans were certainly less relevant than the *Mitteleuropa*-plans and despite the fact that they clearly failed they illustrate the “global aspects of Germany’s claim to become and maintain herself as a world power” (Fischer 1967, 590). The important part herein is that it was a general ambition of all parts of German society to expand its overseas possession and to create a German empire in Central Africa. The generation of *Kaiser* Wilhelm II had a strong desire for aggrandizement and to reach a ‘place in the sun’ for Germany. In that context Fischer emphasizes the “radical transformation which had taken place in the social, economic and political structure of Germany” in the decades preceding World War I. It created a “general conviction, which was reinforced by nation-wide propaganda, that Germany’s frontiers had become too narrow for her” (Fischer 1967, 11). These attitudes within society were probably more a driving factor for German expansionism than the strong navy and colonial pressure groups trying to push Wilhelm II to even more aggressive foreign policies.

After the foundation of the *Kaiserreich* Germany went through an unprecedented and very successful phase of progress with respect to population growth, economic and political power, and industrialization, as well as technological, scientific and academic advancement. It was a general attitude that the time had come for Germany to expand. Britain was still the hegemon, but German elites saw British power declining and Germany’s rising. The thought of drawing level with Britain was
appealing and fascinating for Germans at the beginning of the 20th century. Wilhelm gave the population what it wanted: a vision of Germany’s ‘place in the sun’! His imperialism was not a result of the influence of a few megalomaniac military hardliners. Rather, it was rooted within German society and its perception of an ever-growing Germany. Part of that was the aim to acquire a large Colonial Empire in Central Africa and to establish Germany as a major colonial power. After the war the Treaty of Versailles put an end to German colonial possessions.

The Origins of Geopolitik and Expansionism in Nazi-Germany

Germany intends to dominate the world and has a plan for doing so.
(Derwent Whittlesey, 1942)

With the loss of its colonial possessions after World War I the German desire to control parts of the African continent did not completely die. Even the weak Weimar Republic had colonial ambitions and less than twenty years later Germany saw itself again in a situation to become a world power. The German ‘plan’ for world domination that Whittlesey mentions was largely developed by the geopoliticians surrounding Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), not by the German state. Influenced by the writings of the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), the British geopolitician Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), and the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), Haushofer made Geopolitik an academic discipline, with a tremendous influence on the expansionist plans of the Nazi leadership.

In 1904 Mackinder had developed what became known as his Heartland Theory. In the vast and resource-rich Eurasian landmass integrated by a network of railways and having access to both big oceans Mackinder saw “the conditions of a mobiity of military and economic power” and believed that if one power – or an alliance of two powers - were to control this heartland the “empire of the world would […] be in sight” (Mackinder 1904, 434-436). After World War I Mackinder brought it down to the simple
formula "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World Island commands the World” (Mackinder 1942, 150). These thoughts are obvious in Haushofer’s writings. Haushofer regarded control of the territories to the east as the fundamental step for German aggrandizement and a dominant position on the European continent as well as in the world. The leadership of Nazi-Germany was impressed by Haushofer’s ideas, they basically presented a scientific justification for their own radical expansionist visions.

However, Haushofer’s *Geopolitik* was not the same as Nazi expansionist ideology. One of the major motivations for the formulation of Haushofer’s ideas was to overcome the ‘Versailles-order’ of the European state system. The geopoliticians were very much aware that, due to the geographical position of Germany in the center of Europe, a stable and enduring order of states in central Europe would not be possible without the full inclusion and integration of Germany. They saw Germany endangered by being caught between two ideological systems: socialism to the East and capitalist liberalism to the West. Being caught between these radically differing systems posed the danger of falling apart into East and West Germany, each tied to its neighboring system. This problem already arose before World War I when the eastern parts of Germany favored a strong army as a land-power and the western parts called for a powerful navy to establish Germany as a sea-power.

Germany continued to face exactly the same problem before World War II. Western Germany was outward oriented and needed global integration for raw materials and sales markets for its industrial products. Eastern Germany was inward oriented and needed state protection in order to maintain its agricultural production. However, the geopoliticians argued that neither could be allowed to become totally exposed to a free global market – the danger coming from the western model - or collectivized according to the eastern system. Therefore, the only way to preserve central Europe from being overrun by ‘exploitative’ western democratic capitalism or collectivist, eastern communism was to create an area in the middle of Europe, dominated by Germany, which offered a middle way.
Such a unified Europe would be an area where several peoples coexisted with the greatest possible internal freedom and diversity and maximum possible security of existence. The major fallacy in this concept was that the geopoliticians presumed that non-German European peoples had a fundamental interest in such a large central European area dominated by Germany and would, therefore, abandon ties to non-European nations in favor of Germany. The geopoliticians were also fundamentally wrong to expect Germany under Nazi-leadership to act as an organizer for the benefit of all of central Europe so that it would have a bright future as a whole (Ebeling 1994, 145-146). Hitler had no intention whatsoever in providing a bright future for any other peoples but Germans. He might have had an interest in providing a bright future for central Europe as a whole, but only as long as it was exclusively populated by Germanic people.

Here Haushofer’s *Geopolitik* differed. It was similar to that of Hitler to the extent that it did not see a right of existence for the ‘liliput-states’ of middle-eastern Europe that were ‘artificially created’ in the Versailles Treaty. Those states Haushofer envisaged as being integrated into one of the bigger powers, Germany or Russia. A good relation between those was central to his ideas. The striking difference to Nazi ideology was that Haushofer definitely saw a right of existence for other peoples. Politically the area should be controlled by Germany, but the people within that area need not be exclusively German.

This right of existence concept in Haushofer’s ideas can be traced back to the Monroe Doctrine, which he regarded as the legitimate model for his pan-regions. One of the initial intentions of the pan-regional concept was to reduce the number of potential conflict zones between the big powers by the exact determination of spheres of influence on the globe. Next to the British and the American pan-regional politics, Haushofer called for a German conception of space which “has nothing to do with exploitation or suppression, but is justified only by leadership”. This applies to Germany as a potentially leading power, but he also urged the great powers of the time to acknowledge Germany’s right to leadership. Within this context Haushofer leads the discussion to the
“constricted border of our [Germany’s] living space” and calls for a return to Germany’s “former, stolen right to space”. The only way to achieve this is not through “the adoration of violence” but through “politics based on the strict respect for the right of self-determination for both weak and strong peoples. Along with it, based on the motto ‘honour, freedom, and equality’ such enormous opportunities may be created that entire generations will not be able to fully utilise them” (translated from Haushofer 1934, 151-152).

Thus, the striking difference to Nazi-plans was that the geopoliticians acknowledged several peoples in central Europe that should thrive and coexist under German dominance. The Nazi-leadership did not acknowledge this right for non-Germans. Germany should rule the continent and have other peoples either driven out or serve the people of the Germanic race. By 1942 Heinrich Himmler, the commander of the SS, stated:

> Our duty in the East is not Germanisation in its earlier meaning that we impose German language and German law upon the population, but to ensure that only people of pure German blood populate the East. (quoted and translated from Ebeling 1994, 231)

There is no such madness in the plans outlined by the geopoliticians. However, there are plenty of similarities, especially regarding German dominance in central and Eastern Europe. They differed regarding the organization of German dominance. The geopoliticians sought to create a sustainable stable system of big states and various peoples tied together in an area dominated linguistically, culturally, economically and politically by Germany. As outlined above, they falsely presumed that the European peoples wanted such a system and that it therefore could be stable (Ebeling 1994, 146-147). However, the Nazis sought to ensure German dominance on the continent by suppression and the brutal use of force. Geoffrey Parker expresses this difference in the suggested behavior of Haushofer towards the Soviet Union. He favored luring the bear
with honey, contrary to the later Nazi-policy of trying to kill the bear (Parker 1985, 85). Without doubt, the geopoliticians’ plans were no more realistic than the ones of the Nazi’s, but they lacked their brutal insanity with its racial ideology.

Nonetheless, the geopoliticians were certainly not completely free of Nazi-ideology. Geopolitik was very influential on the programs of the Nazis, and vice versa. Haushofer also believed in the purity of blood with respect to natives in overseas protectorates, and argued that especially in Portuguese and Dutch colonies discontented people of mixed blood were causing a lot of problems for the leaders (Haushofer 1934, 151). He argued for the German right to dominate central Europe; he did not see a right of existence for small states, and he was certainly close to the leadership of the Nazi-party at least until 1938. The geopoliticians might not have fully shared the racial policy and the radical ideology of the Nazi party, but they also did not counteract it.

Whatever reservation the Geopolitiker may have had about the methods employed by their Nazi masters, they went along with them and inevitably they were themselves tarnished by the crimes perpetrated in the name of race and Lebensraum. In this respect they were very little different from all the others who had hovered like moths around the Nazi candle when it was shining most brightly (Parker 1985, 82)

Parker is precisely right with this assessment. The ideas of the geopoliticians around Karl Haushofer were certainly not unconnected to Nazi-ideology, however, they were also not identical, as older scholars around Derwent Whittlesey argue.

The geopoliticians drew on a concept of pan-regions. Haushofer envisaged a German pan-region in Europe, a pan-Europe that tied other parts of the world to it in a variety of ways, mainly economic, but also linguistic. Those ties should not have colonial character or exercise direct political or military control over overseas areas. He was very much aware of the problems Britain had with the administration and control of its colonies. Haushofer observed about the British Empire that “its space mastery is not
uncontested … It has become one of the most problematical political structures of our time” (Haushofer 1934, 28-29). Therefore, he clearly rejected extensive German expansion beyond Europe. For most of the 1930s this was also the policy of the Nazi-regime. However, at the beginning of the 1940s the Nazi’s megalomania became increasingly boundless and they developed more specific ideas for world domination.

Hitler was never content with simply repositioning Germany to its earlier power [pre 1914]; in order to realise his world power fantasies he needed the power of control over a much more powerful instrument: Europe. That’s why Hitler necessarily meant World War, because his goal to subdue Europe to his will and to force its peoples into a pan-region dominated by national-socialist Germany had to provoke the acrimonious resistance of the ones under threat and the entire free world. (translated from Ebeling 1994, 223-224)

Nazi Germany sought to control Europe and to use this as a basis to control the world. However, with respect to Africa, this is how far the interests went. There were some strategic posts in Northern Africa it wanted to hold, but unlike before World War I there were no specific plans to create an empire in Africa or to annex certain parts of the continent. The global ambitions of Nazi-Germany included Africa as a part to be dominated, but no such particular intentions as before World War I existed with respect to the African continent, either in the plans of the geopoliticians, or in those of the Nazis.

In addition, the Nazis lacked the broad popular support that Kaiser Wilhelm II had enjoyed with respect to German expansionism twenty-five years earlier. Germans in the Kaiserreich were obsessed with aggrandizement and an ever-growing Germany. Wilhelm’s expansionist politics were to a large extent driven by the society. This was not the case in the 1930s. Many Germans were opposed to the status quo as determined by the Treaty of Versailles and sought a more influential role for Germany. But the aggressive, militaristic, and brutal expansionism of the Nazi-regime was driven by the
Nazi-leadership, not by the broad population. This does not mean that the German population was heavily opposed to it, but it was not the driving factor, as was the case twenty-five years before. This was especially true with respect to German expansions beyond Europe. The population had hardly any interest in overseas possessions, although the German Colonial Society and the Colonial Committee in the Reichstag (the German parliament) kept the demand for the return of Germany’s colonies alive well into the 1930s.

On the whole, however, it was not a great popular movement … The mass of the German people was too much concerned with the problems of unemployment and inflation to care very much about the colonies. The policy of the Nazi party has been to arouse the maximum of public interest in the colonial question. With all the resources of their propaganda technique the present German leaders have stimulated ‘the spontaneous expression of the natural desire for the re-acquisition of colonies’, and the demand for return has of late been given special prominence in the Nazi political programme. (Bullock 1939, 47)

Within the Nazi-party, the demand for the return of the colonies was mainly based in a general opposition to the Treaty of Versailles and the desire to elevate Germany’s role in the world. In that respect the geopoliticians had a similar approach to the Nazi-party: they “never considered the acquisition of overseas colonies an economic necessity for Germany. To them, the restoration of the Reich to the status of a colonial power was solely a matter of national prestige” (Dorpalen 1942, 235). The main initiation of the ambitions to get the colonies back came from the groups mentioned above, not the Nazi-party, which did not have specific plans in Africa, but floated on its megalomaniac illusion of having the power and the right to dominate the entire world.
Africa and Germany During the Cold War

I have to assert unambiguously that the Federal Government will continue to regard the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR through a third country, which it keeps official relations with, as an unfriendly act. (Konrad Adenauer 1955)

After two unsuccessful attempts to be one of the world’s great powers in the first half of the 20th century, Germany’s role in international politics was radically diminished at the beginning of the second half. For the time of the Cold War, when Germany was divided into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the term ‘Germany’ refers to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Thus, “German policies” refers to the policies of Western Germany.

Not only Germany’s role in international affairs, but also its influence on, and its interest in, the African continent were radically diminished. However, Mair outlines four categories of interests over the past 60 years that influenced German Africa policy according to the international situation and the national government. Those four interests are economic, political and strategic, ecological, and global order (Mair 2002, 11-16). In some cases the distinction is less clear than in others, as there are considerable overlaps, especially regarding ‘political and strategic’ and ‘global order’ interests. It is not always easy to clearly distinguish certain interests as one or the other. Nonetheless, Mair’s distinction provides a useful framework to explain the German engagement in Africa and put it in a broader political context.

During the Cold War four distinct phases for German Africa policies can be identified: The first phase spanned the period 1949 through 1959 and was marked by a reintegration of Germany into international relations. During the second phase from 1959 to 1970 German Africa policies were highly instrumentalized for the Cold War and for German-German policies that characterized the rivalry between the two German nations. After the rapprochement of the FRG with the GDR and the Soviet Union the
third phase between 1970 and 1982 was characterized by a stronger promotion of peace policies in Africa. In the fourth phase up to reunification in 1990 there was a strong focus on Southern Africa and classical development aid (Engel 2000, 2005).

The first phase of German Africa policy was what Engel calls an “embryonic” phase. Germany’s colonial ambitions certainly ended with defeat in World War II, the country was busy rebuilding itself, and foreign policies were to a very large extent determined by Konrad Adenauer’s overall goal of Westintegration, the reintegration of Germany into the international community of states on the side of the United States of America. Dealing with the consequences of twelve years of totalitarian rule under the Nazi-regime, six years of war and four years of post-war political vacuum, there were clearly other topics on the political agenda than Africa. In addition, Africa was still almost completely under colonial rule and Germany would not engage in foreign political actions in Africa that might raise suspicions among the European colonial powers with which it was trying to normalize relations.

In 1951 the opening of a Consulate General in Pretoria was the first German diplomatic mission to be established on the African continent and marked the beginning of diplomatic relations with other African countries in the following years. After Germany regained formal sovereignty in foreign policy matters in 1955, there was growing interest to be politically represented in as many countries as possible. In the early 1950s this was rooted to a large extent in economic interests. Being represented in Africa was as much a political desire as it was economic necessity. To establish trade links a political framework had to be created in Africa in the mid-1950s. In fact, it was in this “embryonic” phase of German Africa policy when the trade reached its highest numbers. With 9.1 percent of the total, German imports from Africa peaked in 1950, whereas the relative exports to Africa peaked at 6 percent of the total in 1954 (Hofmeier 2002, 40).

From the middle of the 1950s ‘political and strategic’ interests began to accompany economic interests. At that point, this was less caused by the growing rivalry between the two German states than by expectations of western partners. For the most
part the provision of development aid was the instrument to fulfill those expectations. It is no surprise that the first budget provisions for ODA (Official Development Assistance) were made as a result of political processes in Europe. During the negotiations that led to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958

France insisted on a formal association of its (then still existing) colonies with the EEC and the FRG government did not raise any objections in the interest of its overriding goals of forming the EEC and strengthening Franco-German cooperation. This set a precedent for many more years to come. (Hofmeier 2002, 40-41)

The precedent was that Africa was simply not important enough to risk relationships with western partners. As a result, the German government accepted growing US and European demands for burden-sharing in international issues by 1956/57. In 1959 German diplomats in Africa held their first conference in Addis Ababa to discuss the potential problems that might arise due to diverging interests between African countries seeking German support in their search for independence and Germany’s European partners (Hofmeier 2002, 41).

However, the need for a political framework to deal with Africa was realized. To a large extent this political framework was determined by the Hallstein doctrine. Named after the State Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt (AA – the German Foreign Ministry), Walter Hallstein, it determined German foreign policy for well over a decade. At the Four Power Conference in Geneva in 1955 the victorious allies acknowledged their responsibility in the question of German reunification, but at a follow up meeting a few months later, the foreign ministers of the US, France and the UK realized that Moscow had no specific interest in reunification. The Hallstein doctrine, created at a conference of ambassadors in Bonn in December 1955, was a reaction to this development. It rejected the prevailing territorial status quo, with Germany being reduced to the area of
the three western zones and claimed for the FRG the exclusive right to represent the entire German nation internationally. Diplomatic ties of the Soviet Union to both the FRG and the GDR were considered an exception that was justified by the status of the Soviet Union as an occupying power. However, with respect to any other country, the FRG would regard it as an ‘unfriendly act’ to establish diplomatic relations to the GDR and would, therefore, end its own diplomatic ties to the referring country (Engel 2000, 39).

The reason why the Hallstein doctrine became so important for Germany’s relations to Africa is that more and more African countries became independent during that time. These young nations were floating around in the ocean of international politics and found themselves in the middle of the Cold War struggle of the two superpowers. The Hallstein doctrine was strongly motivated by the interest to catch as many of them as possible and pull them on board the American vessel. Germany started to develop a strategic interest in Africa by trying to include freshly independent African nations into the American sphere of influence and the US-run world economy it was part of itself. By the late 1950s ‘political and strategic’ interests were far more influential for German Africa policies than economic interests, and remained so for most of the Cold War period due to Africa’s marginal share of the world economy.

The second phase of German Africa policy was mainly determined by ‘political and strategic’ interests based on the ideology of the Hallstein doctrine and increased tensions between the superpowers. It was rooted in German-German policies based on counteracting the international presence of the GDR and its patron, the Soviet Union. The main foreign political goals of the FRG were to establish itself internationally as the only legitimate German state and to prevent international recognition of the GDR. As outlined above the policies towards the newly emerging African states were instrumentalized to serve this overall foreign political goal. The FRG engaged on the African continent through formal diplomatic contacts, networks of bilateral agreements in all fields, especially economics, and development aid. As a result of the geopolitical conditions of the Cold War and the division of Germany “West Germany nurtured its
new partners” (Engel 2005b, 109). Tetzlaff correctly points out that foreign policy towards Africa “was an external projection of internal German-German policies shaped by the global framework of East-West rivalry” (translated from Tetzlaff 1978, 28).

The FRG quickly and abundantly opened diplomatic missions in African states in order to show its diplomatic presence on the continent. In 1959 Germany had only 6 embassies in Africa, but in the following four years 26 more were opened in the big wave of decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. The main instrument Germany used to tie African countries to the Western sphere of influence was the provision of substantial development aid. Germany’s economy had regained considerable strength throughout the 1950s. The ‘social market economy’ concept of Ludwig Erhard, Minister for Economic Affairs, was an unprecedented success for recovery. It was largely responsible for the ‘economic miracle’ which boosted Germany’s economy to be one of the most powerful in the world in less than ten years.

For the most part this German presence was welcomed by the young African nations, which saw the chance to establish ties with a country that was one of the leading economic powers, but hardly had a colonial past. As in most cases Germany had supported liberation movements, it became regarded as a mediator between African interests and the former colonial powers. Senior German civil servants remarked on the big advantage Germany had in African affairs: the loss of colonies more than 40 years ago (Engel 2000, 40). The lack of a significant colonial past, its support of liberation movements, and economic strength made Germany an attractive partner for African nations. Especially its economic wealth paid off fairly well for them in the form of ODA and was an advantage for the FRG in outdoing its rival to the East.

How seriously the German government pursued its strategic interests shows in the application of the Hallstein doctrine to Tanzania in 1964-65. When the revolutionary government of independent Zanzibar recognized the GDR, the FRG threatened the United Republic of Tanzania with the break-off of relations and a halt to ODA. It took several months to settle the dispute. Eventually the GDR embassy to Zanzibar was downgraded to a Consulate General in Dar es Salaam (Hofmeier 2002, 43). This crisis
was, however, the beginning of the end for the *Hallstein* doctrine. From the middle of the 1960s onwards the German government increasingly realized the very limited usefulness and practical relevance of the concept. When Willy Brandt was elected chancellor of the first social-democrat/liberal coalition in 1969, his new *Ostpolitik* – policy to the East - favored *Wandel durch Annäherung* – change through rapprochement and appeasement – with regard to the relations with the GDR. This new policy concept was more or less contradictory to the *Hallstein* doctrine and marked the end of its relevance in German foreign politics.

‘Political and strategic’ interests continued to have a significant impact in the third phase of German Africa policy. It started in 1969 when the center-right government was replaced by a center-left, but ‘global order’ interests began to emerge as an additional motivation of the new government. According to Mair those are easier to preserve if

the partners were peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, democratic and law-abiding. Global order interests aim at the creation of such conditions. That means that Germany has a great interest in promoting peace, human rights, democracy, rule of law, market economies and socio-economic development as well as in taking decisive action against military rule, dictatorships, warmongers, poverty and corruption. (Mair 2002, 14)

The single most influential topics for the 1970s in Mair’s definition were the promotion of peace and socio-economic development. The first decade of African independence was a disaster for the continent. With the end of colonialism the euphoria in and the expectations of African nations for their freshly gained independence were extremely high. After decades - in some cases centuries - of inequality and exploitation it was expected that national sovereignty would end the continent’s problems. That political independence did not necessarily mean the end of violence and dependence on
industrialized nations was a painful lesson most young African nations had to learn. The continent was in a mess and influential voices within the Brandt-government, mainly that of the BMZ-minister Erhard Eppler, called for more engagement in Africa based on humanitarian reasons and the needs of recipient countries. Eppler demanded foresighted and active development policies in the framework of global social and peace policy. He lost! His vision of ‘world interior policy’ reached the limits of financing and political will, partly because of successful lobbying by German industry which claimed to be under enormous international pressure. The budget of the BMZ was significantly reduced and Eppler resigned in 1974 (Engel 2000, 62-63).

When both German states joined the United Nations in 1973, the East-West rivalry was restored. Although the FRG now officially accepted that other states could recognize the GDR, it still tried to pull potentially indecisive countries on board the American instead of the Soviet vessel of the Cold War. What counted was to get as many countries as possible supporting the Western side in international institutions, mainly the General Assembly of the United Nations (Engel 2000, 56).

Nonetheless, even in the hot phase of the Cold War, when the United States and its western allies had a strong strategic interest in preventing Africa from falling to the Eastern Bloc, Germany still had – contrary to America – some economic interests in Africa, mainly in the availability of resources. Shortly after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, the European Development Funds (EDF) were established and along with them the inclusion of Germany into European Africa politics. The social-democrat/liberal government of Brandt’s successor Helmut Schmidt pushed for the integration of German Africa policies into an European approach from 1974 onwards (Engel 2000, 59).

The development of common European Africa politics resulted in the Lomé Convention of 1975 between the European Community (EC) and ACP-countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) with the aim of providing and regulating trade, development cooperation and political partnership. Trade regulations were very much in favor of the European countries as they ensured the flow of African agricultural and mineral
resources to Europe, but excluded customs exemption for African manufactured goods. The German interest in this convention was considerable. After enjoying the economic miracle of the 1960s the German economy now largely depended on exports and relatively easy access to resources. The oil crisis in 1973 painfully revealed this dependence on foreign resources. The Lomé Convention was seen as a means to tie resource-rich countries economically and politically to the European Community (Mair 1999c). In Europe this dependence was stronger than it was in the United States, since the latter not only had a greater variety and quantity of resources, but also imported many non-fuel minerals from Canada and South America (Hahn and Cottrell 1976, 26-27).

The fourth phase of German Africa policy started in 1982 when the social-democrat/liberal government of Helmut Schmidt ended with a motion of no confidence and was replaced by Helmut Kohl’s conservative/liberal coalition. Even though strategic interests considering East-West rivalry were still present, ‘global order’ interests increasingly determined German engagement in Africa. Those were mainly humanitarian reasons to abolish the Apartheid regime in South Africa and to assist Namibia on its way to independence. Relations with South Africa continuously challenged the policy makers of the Kohl administration because it needed to balance “diplomatic pressure from the EC’s majority, which wanted to impose mandatory economic sanctions on South Africa, on the one hand, and its own interest in unhindered relations with South Africa on the other” (Engel 2005, 111).

Within the German government, this balancing act caused tensions between the AA and the BMZ. Hans-Dietrich Genscher retained his position as Foreign Minister because his party, the liberal FDP (Free Democratic Party), was part of the government under Schmidt as well as under Kohl. He continued his policy motivated by the promotion of human rights and liberation movements, and was therefore much more willing to support the EC’s call for sanctions against South Africa’s Apartheid-regime. The BMZ, however, was run by the conservative CSU (Christian Social Union). Paradoxically it was more concerned with maintaining unhindered relations with the
South African government and was, therefore, a lot more reluctant to impose sanctions than the AA. In the end, chancellor Helmut Kohl determined the policy more according to the AA’s concept and joined in multilateral sanctions by the EC against South Africa (Hofmeier 2002, 49-50). Kohl’s choice marks a clear upgrade of ‘global order interest’ based on moral considerations and a strong commitment to multilateralism as the foundation for the rule of international law and institutions.

**Changing Geopolitical Conditions in the 1990s and Germany’s Grand Strategy as a Civilian Power**

It used to be possible to ignore distant and misgoverned parts of the world. That is no longer so. In the world without borders, chaos is now our neighbour whether it is in Africa, Asia or in Afghanistan. (British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 2001)

The end of the Cold War meant not only major changes for Germany, but also for its relations to Africa. The long-term strategic interest that characterized the three decades before the fall of the Berlin wall to prevent Africa from falling to the Eastern bloc was no longer relevant. Even though the availability of African resources still played a role, Western countries ceased to have an interest in tying African nations to their side. This meant a relative weakening of African nations. During the Cold War they could play a tactical game, considering which side they would establish cooperation with and usually receiving considerable support from whichever side they chose. The end of the Soviet Union and the dominance of global capitalism made such tactical games impossible for the future. The communist experiment failed with the collapse of a terribly bankrupt Soviet Union.

Rich Western nations knew that African countries could no longer count on Soviet support and would have to sell their resources to the highest bidders. Market forces instead of strategic interest increasingly dominated the flow of resources around
the globe. The bargaining position of African countries was significantly downgraded because the West did not need to worry anymore about them joining the Eastern bloc. Engel and Olsen correctly point out that the “disappearance of the bipolar contest for power and influence on the continent meant that Africa more or less lost what was left of its limited importance to global security” (Engel and Olsen 2005b, 7). Africa had no choice but to cooperate with Western nations if it wanted foreign aid and investments or to sell its commodities. Colonialism as the old form of African dependence was replaced by neo-colonialism as the new form, meaning economic dependence on core nations and corporations. The results were fundamental political changes. The West saw the chance to further spread democracy and Western values and therefore stopped supporting formerly loyal dictatorships or authoritarian regimes.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and German unification contributed largely to increased European integration. With the disappearance of the menace to the east and no need to stop the spread of Soviet influence in Africa, European integration became more and more important to German foreign policies. Instead of caring about development in Africa it was more important to take care of Eastern European countries that were suddenly knocking on the door of the European Community (Khadiagala 2000, 84).

The German disinterest in Africa at the beginning of the 1990s can thus be expressed very well by a simple cost-benefit calculation. The benefits of a rather intense engagement with Africa during the Cold War had been a secure flow of resources and a strategic stronghold against the Eastern Bloc. The latter was not relevant anymore after the Cold War ended and the costs of the former were radically reduced. On the domestic front, European integration became the focus of German foreign policies at the same time as the costs of engagement in Africa increased due to the difficult political situation there. More engagement with Africa was not, in any case, necessary because, despite all its problems, Africa still fulfilled the role of a periphery, supplying Germany with mineral and agricultural raw materials. It was simply not rational to increasing
engagement in Africa, since it would have meant increasing costs without increasing benefits.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War Germany therefore focused on reunification and European integration. The result for its Africa policies was a further retreat of active engagement and presence in Africa and an increase in the support of regional African initiatives for conflict resolution. Germany and other European countries tried to balance their withdrawal from Africa with increased rhetoric and assistance in the creation of independent African capacities and forces (Kühne 1999). A different way to say this is that Europeans did not want to bother with the mess on the African continent and bought their way out of direct involvement. However, this calculation changed significantly as soon as Germany realized there were other potential benefits of engagement on the African continent and that the costs of non-engagement were beginning to ratchet up.

When the Red-Green government of Gerhard Schröder came to power in 1998 with Joschka Fischer of the environmentalist-protest Green Party as Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor, German Africa policy began to change. Germany entered a phase of increasing interest in Africa with an apparently serious intent to help the continent solve its problems and create better living standards for its impoverished population. The reasons for this new engagement are, however, less altruistic than they might seem at first glance. At one level attempts to help the African people are serious, however, not because Germany has developed into a selfless benefactor but because it has a vital self-interest in generating sustained development on the world’s poorest continent. In today’s highly interlinked and interdependent world the situation in one part – even if it is the periphery – can easily develop dynamics that can have major effects on other parts of the world. This includes the security of core nations, especially if these two parts are located as close to each other as Europe and Africa.

In 1998 the Red-Green government considered “development policies as global structural policies” in its first coalition agreement (SPD/Grüne 1998). It understands that
development policies can be used as a means to pursue broader geopolitical interests. Those interests are outlined by Mair who argues that

Germany has an economic interest in accessible markets, in reliable trading partners with purchasing power; [...] it has political and strategic interests in stable, peaceful and cooperative neighbors and also in the robust protection of its citizens at home and abroad if necessary, and [...] it has an ecological interest in slowing down global warming, in preserving bio-diversity and in managing exhaustible resources. These direct and immediate interests are supplemented by a more abstract, indirect interest in establishing an international order favorable to immediate interests. In such a global order, decisive action to preserve immediate interests is needed less and less because the world’s players are peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, democratic and law-abiding. Directly related to this interest in shaping global order conducive to civilian power is the interest in having like-minded and powerful partners or at least in influencing the action of powerful players on the world stage. (Mair 2002, 11)

The interests dealt with in this section are first ecological, second economic, and third ‘global order’ combined with ‘political and strategic’ interests since the two overlap considerably.

First, ecological interests: It is obvious that large-scale environmental problems such as global warming cannot be solved at the national level but must be treated in a global context. When the Green Party joined the government in 1998, Germany began to push this issue hard in international institutions. Africa’s abundance in ecosystems and in plant and animal species plays a key role in global ecological diversity and balance. Even though not as important as those of South America, Africa’s tropical rainforests have a major impact on the global climate and air pollution. Furthermore, the
preservation of African soils for agriculture is essential in order for Germany to maintain the import of agricultural goods from the region and to deal with the problem of food shortages in Africa. It is in Germany’s interest that Africa can feed as much of its own population as possible so that possible shortages based on natural catastrophes can be dealt with and balanced out locally before they become a major problem with broader political implications (Mair 1999, 2002).

Second, economic interests: Sub-Saharan Africa has a population of 725 million people (UNFPA 2005) and, therefore, has the potential of becoming a market for German industrial products. This is not yet the case due to economic marginalization and high levels of poverty, but if this changes and Africa reaches economic relevance on the global stage it could be an important export market for Germany. However, even if Africa enjoys sustained economic growth over several years, it is unlikely that any manufactured goods it can produce will compete with German ones. Africa will probably remain in its peripheral economic role producing largely primary products, but as national incomes rise the demand for more sophisticated, products will also rise produced in the diversified economies of the core, will also rise.

The availability of African resources remains a central concern in Germany’s economic interest in Africa. In the past decade precious minerals in particular gained importance. For example coltan which is necessary for the production of mobile phones and other high tech wireless devices (Mair 2002, 11-12). As outlined above, with Germany in the core and Africa in the periphery of the world economy, the economic interest in cheap, secure, and continuous access to Africa’s resources has been the same ever since Germany acquired its first colonies in 1884: for cotton then read coltan now. However, African resources have never been totally irreplaceable and they are certainly not decisive for Germany’s economic wellbeing. With respect to German exports, Africa plays an even smaller role. From a peak of 6 percent in 1954, German exports to Africa have fallen to less than 2 percent of total exports in 2004 (Engel 2005, 121).

Third, ‘global order’ and ‘political and strategic’ interests: Germany seeks to maintain and promote a civilianized international system (see Chapter III). This refers to
a global order based on Germany’s foreign policy identity as a civilian power and creates conditions favorable for a civilian power to operate effectively. Those ‘global order’ interests are the prime interest Germany has in Africa nowadays. They are rooted in Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power, which guides not only Germany’s interaction with Africa, but also its broader foreign policies. In fact, as we will see, despite the geopolitical changes described above, Africa only plays a minor role in German grand strategy. However, German grand strategy plays a major role in Germany’s Africa policies.

In order to understand the current geopolitical interests of the Federal Republic of Germany it is essential to understand its ‘grand strategy’ as a civilian power. An exact definition of the term ‘grand strategy’ varies amongst scholars. In this paper it is understood as a concept which guides political behavior, especially foreign political behavior, of a given country for a long period of time. In Germany’s case grand strategy is based on the role concept of civilian power. Role concepts are theoretical conceptions used to explain the political behavior of a nation-state. The development of such foreign political role concepts is the result of self-perceptions as well as interaction, adaptation and conditioning of a society with its environment. Historical experience and socialization processes also play an important role in this context (Frenkler et al. 1997, 19).

With respect to Germany, the historical experience was World War II, the environment was the bipolar system of the Cold War, and the adaptation was the strong will to be integrated into the Western hemisphere alongside the United States of America. The experiences of World War II as well as the American strategy to rebuild Western Europe and create an international system of liberal capitalism were decisive for Germany to develop into a civilian power.

Academically, the role concept ‘civilian power’ was first introduced by Hanns Maull in 1990. In practice, however, it has of course existed for some time before. Maull modeled his concept on the behavior of Germany and Japan during the Cold War. The concept is an ideal type that has never been fully met, neither by Germany nor Japan. It
is a theoretical framework intended to explain the foreign political behavior of countries such as Germany and Japan, resulting from the deficiency of existing theories of international relations to do so. This ideal type was not supposed to fit one specific example, but to test congruence between actual and ideal typical behavior of certain countries (Frenkler et al 1997, 21). The concept was not academically developed first and later adopted by countries to shape their foreign policies, it had been practiced by some countries, such as Germany, for a long time before Maull formalized the theory to explain their behavior (Kirste and Maull 1996, 297).

A civilian power influences the international system through “the ability and intent to shape international relations in line with objectives. […] Civilian powers are, in other words, states which are willing and able to advance the civilianization of the international system” (Maull 1993, 126). The basic principles of the foreign policy identity of a civilian power are

- The limitation of nationally organized use of force as a means to settle national or transnational conflicts
- Rule of law and regulations in international relations
- Intensification of multilateral cooperation and creation of participatory decision making processes for legitimizing an international system based on freedom, democracy and market economy
- Promotion of social balance and fairness on a global level
- Institution building to control and implement general norms and willingness to partial transfer of sovereignty
- Special regulations and principals for the use of military force. (Kirste and Maull 1996, 300-301)

During the Cold War, Germany successfully developed into a civilian power. The setting of the international system and the American strategy to rebuild Western Europe according to the Marshall plan laid the foundations for Germany to become a civilian power. The United States showed impressive commitment towards the
reconstruction of Europe, especially in Germany. American efforts for economic and political reconstruction in Europe were highly successful. Furthermore, the massive American military presence in Europe was in the interest of all countries involved. First, it was highly appreciated by Britain and France, which sought to be protected against the resurgence of another aggressive Germany. Second, it was the cornerstone for the success of American economic hegemony, which was threatened by the alternative international system embraced by the Soviet Union and that it had imposed onto Eastern Europe. Third, it was very much in the German interests because the United States basically paid Germany’s military and defense bills by protecting it from the Soviet menace. Meinig points out that “Western Europe was in effect an American protectorate” and that “it was clearly to Western Europe’s advantage to be able to focus on economic rehabilitation and political cooperation without the burdens or fears of heavy military development” (Meinig 2004, 356). Protected by the American military umbrella, Germany could focus on regaining economic strength and become part of the American world economy based on liberal capitalism.

After World War II the United States created an international system based on international agreements, institutions, regimes, rule of law and free trade. The Bretton Woods Agreement, the United Nations, GATT, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), etc. were multilateral institutions, membership in which allowed Germany to re-integrate into the international community and to prove itself a reliable partner. Germany could focus on economic recovery without having to worry about military threats, because the United States took care of that. The economic recovery showed impressive pace, not surprisingly because when one starts at zero after complete destruction, profit margins are enormous. The know-how for industrial production was present in Germany, as were land and labor, and capital was to a large extent provided by the United States. Germany quickly returned to its former role as a major exporter of high quality manufactured goods and, due to the fixed exchange rate, German products were cheap on the world market. The liberal world order based on American hegemony
allowed Germany to take full advantage of that and export its goods all over the American sphere of influence.

Especially economically Germany very soon became a central part of the American-run international system based on liberal capitalism, which Germany needed to thrive economically. There was no way for the war-torn German population to create sufficient domestic demand for such an economic boom. It was exports that boosted Germany’s economy as well as the security America guaranteed with respect to the national integrity of Germany and the free flow of commodities around the world, be it German industrial goods for export, or raw materials and resources for imports. The inclusion of Germany was in the interests of all partners involved. For Germany it guaranteed both access to markets and a legitimate voice in the international community, which it had lost after World War II. For other countries, especially France, it was a safeguard to have Germany under control in case there were signs of increasing aggressiveness as had been the case three times since 1870.

In a nutshell, the political settings in Europe and the American world order from the 1950s on clearly favored Germany acting in a multilateral context, abiding by the rule of law and transferring sovereignty in favor of supranational institutions. In fact, the commitment to supranational integration was easier for Germany than it was for other European countries. Germany regained its formal sovereignty over foreign political affairs only in 1955. With no sovereignty, it was no big commitment to agree to have sovereignty handed back tied into a supranational context. Considering Germany’s central position in Europe, it was clear that Germany would have a significant say in the setting of this supranational context, which would start with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and eventually move into the European Union (EU) in 1992. These supranational settings were no loss of sovereignty for Germany after the war, they rather were a way to regain it.

As argued above, the development of Germany towards a civilian power was clearly in the interest of the Allies as well as in the interest of the German political and economic elites. However, it was also very much in the interest of the ordinary
population. The German people were tired of war; after more than a decade of totalitarian Nazi-rule and rough years in the immediate aftermath of the war, expectations were low and willingness to work hard for a decent life in peace was high. After Germany had realized what horrendous suffering it had caused on the European continent under Nazi-leadership, in the following decades a ‘never again’ mentality with respect to militarism and nationalism became thoroughly entrenched in the society.

The rejection of a German *Sonderweg* – ‘do it alone policies’ – and the political directive of Konrad Adenauer of ‘*Westintegration*’ – full integration into the international system under American leadership – was broadly supported by the German population. International institution building, binding international laws and supranational integration became accepted as an integral part of the integration into that system (Maull 2004, 90-92). When the economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s revealed the enormous benefits of the American world order to the German population, Germany’s role in this system became internalized by the people. In this regard the current third period of German geopolitical development is remarkably like the first one preceding World War I. Its strength is its complete support throughout German society, from the masses through the political and economic elites.

To sum up, the character of the Federal Republic of Germany as a civilian actor in today’s international system is the result of three factors. First, the agenda of the Allies, especially the United States, as to what direction Germany ought to take in future. Second, the strong commitment of the German leadership to become part of the international system under American hegemony. Third, the lesson learnt from the destruction of World War II that this was in fact the only way for Germany to thrive and become a respected partner in the international system. This was as much the desire of the ordinary population as it was the desire of the elites.

After acting according to those civilian power principles for more than 50 years, a civilianized international system is the only way Germany can exist and prosper at the beginning of the 21st century. Such a civilianized international system is similar to the
‘hegemony’ type of geopolitical system Agnew and Corbridge propose in their 1995 work *Mastering Spaces*. Agnew and Corbridge suggest a type of hegemony which is exercised increasingly through international institutions and by a growing transnational class of business people and bureaucrats. [...] In this construction, hegemony has become increasingly reliant on soft power – the active assent to and agreement with international standards of conduct governing economic and political transactions. (Agnew 2003, 878-879)

For Germany as a typical trading state transnationalism and reliable international standards are essential for its prosperity. Germany needs such international networks and the free flow of commodities. It is the world’s largest exporter, accounting for 10 percent of the world’s exports (CIA 2005). *Deutsche Post* is the world’s biggest logistics and freight corporation, and with *DHL* and *Deutsche Bahn* there are two more German companies amongst the world’s top five logistics corporations (Plunkett 2006). Germany needs global interdependencies and the environment described above in order to operate the way it does. It depends on a free, integrated world economy and a system that ensures free trade through international regulations, laws, norms and institutions. A precondition for such a system to work is that the countries in it are “peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, democratic and law-abiding” (Mair 2002, 11). Therefore, Germany’s prime interests in Africa are ‘global order’ interests, which aim at creating such conditions in African countries and thus are the major underlying motivation for German Africa policies.

**Summary**

Germany imperialism before World War I sought to create a large empire in central Africa, a German *Mittelafrika*. The ambition to become a leading colonial power was rooted in the desire to secure resources and gain prestige in the increasing
competition of great powers preceding World War I. Germany’s geopolitical ambitions peaked during the Nazi-period, however, the interest in Africa at that time was limited to a general rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, which had ended German colonialism. The efforts to reclaim former colonies remained very low and were always superseded by more immediate interests in Eurasia.

During the Cold War there were four phases of German Africa policy, motivated by a variety of interests. In the 1950s the young German nation had hardly any interest in Africa. The second phase in the 1960s was strongly motivated by ‘political and strategic’ interests caused by overall policies of the Cold War. Those were still dominant during the 1970s, however, this period also saw an increase of ‘global order interests’ motivated by peace policy and humanitarian concerns. In the last decade before reunification this trend intensified, but was accompanied by a stronger integration into multilateral institutions and a focus on Southern Africa. Besides those interests, economic interests existed throughout the entire 40 years. They were never dominating and, due to the minor role African countries play in the global economy, relatively marginal for the design of German Africa policies, but they were certainly present and part of German-African relations.

After reunification, the German interest in Africa first significantly decreased because of internal and European integration. However, in an increasingly interlinked and interdependent world, Africa moved higher on the political agenda of most Western countries in the late 1990. Germany is now more interested in Africa than ten years ago because it has realized the relevance of Africa for its broader foreign political interest. Those are rooted in Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power. This grand strategy favors a civilianized international system characterized by multilateralism, supranational integration, strong international institutions, rule of law, free trade, human rights, good governance and restrictions on the use of force. Germany depends on the functioning of such a system because otherwise it can not exercise significant influence on global politics. Its prime interest in Africa after the Cold War has been to promote such a civilianized international system and to include as many African countries as possible.
CHAPTER III

HIV/AIDS AND STATE FAILURE IN AFRICA

The previous chapter has shown how Germany’s interest in Africa evolved during the 20th century and that Germany’s prime geopolitical interest nowadays is the promotion of a civilianized international system. This chapter argues that the problem of state failure in Africa, exacerbated by HIV/AIDS, is in fundamental contrast to such a civilianized international system and, therefore, of central concern to German Africa policies.

Africa and Kenya in the Global Context of the Pandemic

After the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) was first detected in the early 1980s, the disease has spread with incredible speed and devastating impact through sub-Saharan Africa and, to a much lesser extent, throughout the rest of the world. Based on the acquisition of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), AIDS depletes the human immune system, so that opportunistic infections which would not pose a danger to healthy people can become life-threatening to individuals infected with AIDS (NIAID 2005). The most common mode of transmission of the virus is sexual encounter, however, also mother-to-child and direct blood transmission, mainly through the sharing of needles by intravenous drug users, are routes through which the virus spreads (WHO 1998). Even though in recent years there has been substantial progress in the development of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), which improve and prolong the lives of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), there is no known cure for the disease. As many scholars have argued, the spread of AIDS is closely related to bad socio-economic conditions as well as times of war and social unrest (Kalipeni et al. 2004; Patterson 2005; Hope 1999; Elbe 2003; Price-Smith 2002). Considering this and that the virus first
emerged in central Africa\textsuperscript{1}, it is not surprising that the hardest hit region in the world by 2005 was sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, as table 2 and figure 2 show it is far more affected than any other part of the globe.

Table 2: Selected AIDS characteristics for the world and sub-Saharan Africa in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population millions</th>
<th>People living with HIV/AIDS Millions</th>
<th>AIDS deaths millions</th>
<th>New Infections millions</th>
<th>Adult Prevalence %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>6,464.7</td>
<td>40.3 (36.7 - 45.4)</td>
<td>3.1 (2.8 - 3.6)</td>
<td>4.9 (4.3 - 6.6)</td>
<td>1.1 (1.0 - 1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>725.0</td>
<td>25.8 (23.8 - 28.9)</td>
<td>2.4 (2.1 - 2.7)</td>
<td>3.2 (2.8 - 3.9)</td>
<td>7.2 (6.6 - 8.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNFPA 2005, UNAIDS 2005

Figure 2: Selected AIDS characteristics for the world and sub-Saharan Africa. Source: UNFPA 2005, UNAIDS 2005

\textsuperscript{1} McNeil argues that the first confirmed case of infection of HIV was found in a blood sample of an African man from the Belgian Congo from 1959, but that the killer virus most likely came into existence as early as the late 1940s or early 1950s (McNeil, 1998)
Only slightly over 10 percent of the global population lives in sub-Saharan Africa, however, the region is home to almost two thirds of all PLWHA. In 2005, almost two and a half million people died of the consequences of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, and more than three million became infected in the same year. The average prevalence rate for adults aged 15 to 49 in the region is almost seven times the global average.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of prevalence rates around the globe. According to UNAIDS, no developed country has AIDS-prevalence rates higher than 1%. Even in the developing world, with the exception of Haiti (5.6%), no country outside Africa has rates of more than 3%, but in sub-Saharan Africa prevalence rates go up to almost 40%. Currently the most affected country is Botswana with an estimated prevalence rate of 37.3% (UNAIDS 2004a)

Figure 3: Adult HIV prevalence in % in 2003. Source: UNAIDS 2004a

Figure 4 illustrates how the pandemic spread across sub-Saharan Africa over the past two decades. In 1988 only Uganda and to a lesser extent Rwanda and Burundi were
seriously affected. By 2003 almost every country in Eastern and Southern Africa and also many countries in Western Africa had prevalence rates of more than 5%.

![Figure 4: The spread of HIV in Africa 1988-2003. Source: UNAIDS 2004a](image)

No doubt, the quality of the data is more than questionable. At the onset of AIDS, most countries were far from having effective surveillance of prevalence rates. It might well be possible that prevalence rates in many countries were similar and the differences in the official data occur simply because some countries engaged in more active and efficient data acquisition.

Even though almost all the data used in this chapter is taken from UNAIDS, the quality must still be questioned. Although UNAIDS is a serious data source, the agency has to rely on national monitoring institutions of the individual countries for its data. Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa use sentinel surveillance to identify their prevalence rates. This method anonymously tests pregnant women attending ante-natal clinics without their knowledge. Although sentinel surveillance gives an approximate estimation of real prevalence rates it causes several serious statistical flaws. First, only pregnant women who attend the clinics get tested. In Kenya, for example, only 71 percent of pregnant women attended antenatal clinics which are part of the national sentinel surveillance system. The 2003 Kenya National Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) also shows that pregnant women in rural areas or with low education levels are less likely to receive antenatal care than pregnant women in urban areas or with higher
education levels (CBS 2004, 124). Second, no data from this source is available on prevalence rates of men. Since women in general are more vulnerable to HIV, omission of men will distort the results. However, the data seems to be reliable enough to identify general trends of rapidly increasing HIV prevalence in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa up to approximately 2000.

This trend is further supported by looking at the number of people dying of the consequences of AIDS and the number of new infections. The data for AIDS-deaths seems to be most reliable, since it is taken from absolute numbers, not estimates. As Figure 5 shows, the number of AIDS-deaths increased dramatically from 1988 to 1998. In 1998 more than eight times as many people died of the consequences of AIDS than in 1988. In the late 1990s, however, the increase in the numbers of AIDS-deaths began to slow, most likely because of the effects of AIDS programs of African countries.

\[ \text{Figure 5: AIDS deaths in sub-Saharan Africa in millions 1988-2005. Source: Fleshman 2001; UNAIDS 2004a, 2005} \]

Furthermore, there are other signs which indicate that in recent years the pace with which the pandemic spreads has been slowed from a peak around the turn of the millennium.

Figure 6 shows that adult prevalence rates across sub-Saharan Africa dropped from a peak of 9.0% in 2001 to 7.2% in 2005. Even more significant is the continuous reduction of new infections since the late 1990s. Despite ongoing high fertility rates and
substantial population growth in the region, the absolute number of new infections decreased from an estimated 4 million in 1999 to 3.1m and 3.2m in 2004 and 2005 respectively.

![Graph showing new infections and adult prevalence rates in sub-Saharan Africa 1999-2005](image)


Nonetheless, despite these slight signs of hope in recent years, the extent to which the pandemic has hit - and continues to hit - sub-Saharan Africa, is unmatched in any other part of the world. The second most affected region in the world, the Caribbean, has managed to stabilize its adult HIV prevalence at 1.6% and to avert increasing numbers of new infections (UNAIDS 2005). However, in other regions, such as Eastern Europe, India, Central and Southeast Asia, the numbers of PLWHA is rising rapidly (UNAIDS 2005, 3).

Figure 4 shows that initially Eastern and Southern Africa had the highest HIV prevalence rates. In Eastern Africa, where the virus supposedly had its origins, it has not spread to the same extent as in the southern part of the continent. Early and active policies of the region’s governments and behavioral change by the population have helped prevent new infections and fight the spread of the virus. The most notable example is Uganda, where the estimated rates dropped from over 15% in the early 1990s to around 6.5% by the end of 2003. In general, Eastern Africa has showed a slow, but
steady decline of prevalence rates over the past years, whereas the rates are still rising in Southern Africa, with the exception of Zimbabwe. Prevalence in Western Africa, which has traditionally been less affected than the eastern and southern part of the continent, has remained more or less stable at slightly below the rates for Eastern Africa (UNAIDS 2005).

The general trend of declining prevalence rates in Eastern Africa is mirrored in Kenya. In fact, the most recent UNAIDS AIDS epidemic update outlines Kenya next to Uganda as an example of a country effectively fighting the pandemic. The report argues that “This is only the second time in more than two decades that a sustained decline in national HIV infection levels has been seen in a sub-Saharan African country. The most dramatic drops in prevalence have been among pregnant women in urban Kenya” (UNAIDS 2005, 27). Figure 7 illustrates that adult prevalence in Kenya was more than halved from a peak of 15.8% in 1999 to 7.4% in 2004.

![Figure 7: Adult HIV prevalence in Kenya 1990-2004 (sentinel surveillance). Source: NACC 2005](image)

Considering this, Kenya certainly represents success in fighting the virus. In 1999, the National Aids Control Council (NACC) was established with the support of the World Bank in order to coordinate the various sectors and to expand the fight against AIDS from the health sector to all sectors of society. It was clearly realized that HIV/AIDS was not only a health issue, but that the pandemic has major implications for all parts of state and society. The NACC is the central agency of the Kenyan government
for monitoring, evaluating and coordinating the efforts to fight AIDS of the private sector, and the Ministries of Planning, Health, Agriculture and Education (Author Interview with Cheluget). Merely looking at the decline of prevalence rates since 1999, it seems to have worked very efficiently. However, other factors are clearly also at work: increased awareness within the population; behavioral change; and previous policies have all caused the rates to drop. With the election of Mwai Kibaki as president in December 2002, the fight against HIV/AIDS became prioritized at the highest level of the state. The role of the NACC as the central agency was reinforced and President Kibaki made it a personal priority to get the problem under control.

Kibaki’s role was central. He required everyone in his government to make the defeat of HIV/AIDS their number one priority. A very broad campaign was formed to create awareness, reduce stigmatization and to discourage risky behavior. The most prominent figures of the country such as President Kibaki and his wife Mama Lucy Kibaki, all ministers, the national football team, which enjoys extraordinarily high social status, and many others joined in extensive promotion initiatives to popularize the four catch phrases of the NACC: 1. Abstain; 2. Be Faithful; 3. Use a condom; 4. Know your status. It is not possible to identify exactly which factors had the most impact on the reduction of the prevalence rate, however, from looking at the data it has obviously been a successful campaign.

The data shown for Kenya in figure 7 is an unweighted average based on sentinel surveillance in 42 ante-natal clinics around the country. Looking at the data, some antenatal clinics show enormous variations of prevalence rates in certain surveillance sites. It is highly unlikely that such high variations would occur in the actual prevalence rates of the area. For example, Thika District Hospital in Kenya’s Central Province reports a drop in the prevalence rate from 39% in 1994 to 12% in 1996 and a rise back up to 31% in 1998 (NACC 2005). Although it is possible that such changes might have occurred for the women tested in these four years, it is highly unlikely that these changes would occur in the overall prevalence rate of the area. Being aware of the flaws of sentinel surveillance, the KDHS has begun to use population based surveys using
statistical sampling methods to identify prevalence rates. The sample size for the test in 2003 was 3,151 women and 2,851 men (6001 total) from the eight provinces of Kenya. The results are shown in figure 8.

For the first time, social, demographic, and behavioral factors were taken into account to achieve more precision by choosing a sample which is as representative for the entire population as possible. Compared to the sentinel surveillance, the data of the KDHS reveals two significant aspects. First, the overall rate based on sentinel surveillance for 2003 was 9.8 percent; significantly higher than the 6.7 percent according to the KDHS for the same year. Second, the rate for women is almost double the rate for men. Considering the fact that men have a lower prevalence rate than women it is not surprising that the results of population based survey, which includes men, are notably lower than the ones of the sentinel surveillance, which does not include men. However, even the rate for women (8.7 percent) in the KDHS is lower than the rate calculated using sentinel surveillance (9.8 percent). The reason for this might be that the KDHS uses sampled data which is supposed to represent the entire population, whereas sentinel surveillance is restricted to pregnant women, who - for obvious reasons - are part of the sexually active population, which has a higher vulnerability than the sexually non-active population.
Impacts of HIV/AIDS on State and Society

For the nations of sub-Saharan Africa, AIDS is not just a humanitarian crisis. It is a security crisis -- because it threatens not just individual citizens, but the very institutions that define and defend the character of a society. This disease weakens workforces and saps economic strength. AIDS strikes at teachers, and denies education to their students. It strikes at the military, and subverts the forces of order and peacekeeping. [...] AIDS is one of the most devastating threats ever to confront the world community. Many have called the battle against it a sacred crusade. The United Nations was created to stop wars. Now, we must wage and win a great and peaceful war of our time -- the war against AIDS. (US Vice President Al Gore 2000)

Considering the dimension of the disease in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to look at the effect the disease has on social, economic and political life on the continent. From a historical epidemiological perspective, HIV/AIDS is a very young phenomenon. Therefore, this section will examine the effects of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa in the context of other epidemics and pandemics. There is extensive research by such well-known scholars as William H. McNeill and Jared Diamond on the immense role of infectious disease on the development of states and societies (McNeill 1963 and 1976; Diamond 1997). As figure 9 shows, HIV/AIDS is by far the leading cause of death in Africa. On average it is estimated that the disease kills ten times more people on the continent than all the armed conflicts combined (Thurman 2001, 192; Elbe 2002, 174).

Taking into account that HIV/AIDS causes several million deaths each year in sub-Saharan Africa, it certainly needs to be treated in the context of past disastrous diseases such as the bubonic plague, the Black Death, the Spanish flu, etc. What makes AIDS even more severe is that it takes the most productive part out of the population. Contrary to its pandemic predecessors, it is not the elderly, the children, the weak, or the
poor who are affected most. It is the sexually active part of the population, young adults, who are affected most. This is the part of the population every country depends on most. Nelson Mandela argued that

AIDS kills those on whom society relies to grow the crops, work in the mines and factories, run the schools and hospitals and govern nations and countries, thus increasing the number of dependent persons. It creates new pockets of poverty when parents and breadwinners die and children leave school earlier to support the remaining children. (Quoted in Price-Smith 2002, 91)

Figure 9: Leading causes of death in Africa 2000. Source: WHO 2001

Several studies have shown that there is no significant difference among victims between social classes or levels of education (Patterson and Cieminis 2005; Hope 1999; CBS 2004; Price-Smith 2002, Elbe 2003). AIDS has severe impacts on all spheres of social structure, economic growth, and development of a country. Progress in a country’s development is not exclusively measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) anymore. Other indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI) include life expectancy and education levels, and express the real dimension of the pandemic for developing countries better than the GDP. In almost every sub-Saharan African country, life expectancy has been heavily reduced due to HIV/AIDS. Figure 10 illustrates that, even though countries classified by the UN as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) show a
slight increase in life expectancy from 49.4 years in 1987 to 51.1 years in 2003, countries with high AIDS rates show just the opposite trend. In Botswana, the hardest hit country, life expectancy at birth dropped from 60.8 years to 38.0 years for the same time period. In Kenya the situation is similar, life expectancy decreased from 57.6 years to 45.4 years.

![Figure 10: Life expectancy at birth 1987-2003. Source: World Bank 2005](image)

The U.S. Census Bureau has published a study which compares actual 2002 growth rates and life expectancies of various countries with estimates for those factors if there would be no AIDS. Figure 11 shows the results for life expectancies in Botswana and Kenya for 2002 and the estimates for 2010.

It is obvious how dramatically the pandemic affects life expectancy. As mentioned above, AIDS kills young adults, who are not only the most important part of the population for the economy, but also for private family life. In many countries they traditionally care for elderly relatives as well as raise and educate their children. It is not exactly clear what this will mean for society as a whole,

but there is one certainty: a small number of young adults – the group that has traditionally provided care for both children and the elderly –
will have to support large numbers of young and old people. Many of these young adults will themselves be debilitated by AIDS and may even require care from their children or elderly parents rather than providing it. (UNAIDS 2000a, 23)

Figure 11: Life Expectancy in Botswana and Kenya for 2002 and 2010. Source: USCB 2004

Such a distortion in the demography has profound impacts on the economy. In most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture is the core sector of the economy, but in many cases there is still no security of food supply for the population. In an increasingly globalized and neo-liberal world-economy, the only sector where African countries have a slight chance to compete is labor-intensive agriculture. Such production is severely threatened by the increasing lack of productive labor caused by high HIV prevalence. The pandemic causes a shortage of young adults to produce food, and puts additional constraints on the left-over population to care for the sick. The result is not only a reduced inflow of foreign currency in the case of cash crops, but also internal food insecurity. In such cases, when the risk of starvation increases, the potential for state failure also increases, thus demanding additional external aid and engagement.

The problem commonly identified as the single biggest dilemma caused by HIV/AIDS, is the high number of orphans (Gosh and Kalipeni 2004; Hope 1999; Brown
2004; Author interviews with Cheluget; Kalweo; Kiarie; and Wainaina). In 1997, USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood predicted that eventually a third of the population under 15 will be orphans in some countries. He warned of a “lost generation – a sea of youth who are disadvantaged, vulnerable, undereducated and lacking both hope and opportunity” (Atwood 1997). At the end of 2003, there were approximately 12.1 million orphans due to AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2004a). These children usually grow up with grandparents, friends or without any guardian. Either way, it is less likely that they receive an education equal to growing up in stable family conditions. It is no exaggeration to argue that “orphans constitute one of the worst catastrophes faced by sub-Saharan African countries as millions of children lose one parent or both to AIDS” (Ghosh and Kalipeni 2004, 304).

Many orphans have no choice but to drop out of school and join the labor force in order to survive. This has devastating short-term and long term impacts on the economy, because the quality and the productivity of the labor force is reduced. If relatively highly skilled workers die of the consequences of HIV/AIDS and are replaced by inexperienced children, productivity is reduced in the short-term. In the long term it is reduced because high numbers of children dropping out of school destroys future human capital. These orphans will not receive the education necessary to become a highly skilled and productive part of the work force. It shows how the demand for education is reduced in societies with large numbers of AIDS-orphans.

The consequences of large numbers of orphans on the supply side are even more severe. It is bad enough when an orphan drops out of school to make a living, but if a teacher dies, the consequences are a lot more severe. Schoolchildren are stuck without their teacher and are no longer educated. In addition, teachers represent highly skilled human capital, it takes awhile to train them; they are not easily replaced (Wobst and Arndt 2004, 1835).

The destruction of human capital at all levels is precisely what makes AIDS so devastating. First, it destroys current human capital by killing large parts of the work force, including the highly skilled components of society that are extremely hard to
replace, especially in countries with ramshackle education systems. Second, it destroys future human capital by forcing high numbers of orphans into the work force, depriving them of education and diminishing or destroying future opportunities and perspectives.

In the U.S., the National Intelligence Council predicts a reduction of economic growth of up to 1 percent of GDP due to AIDS for the hardest-hit countries (NIC 2000, 25). Brown argues that in some sub-Saharan African countries, AIDS might decrease the annual GDP growth as much as 1.4 percent (Brown 2004, 300). All these numbers are estimates and vary from study to study, however, considering that during the 1990s GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 2.2 percent (World Bank 2005), a drop of 1 or even 1.4 percent expresses a significant decline.

The problems outlined above can lead to situations where a disrupted social structure and poor economic performance undermine state capacity and causes major problems for national governments and the international system. A major part of the statistical evidence for this claim is taken from Price-Smith’s 2002 study, which examines the impact of infectious disease on state capacity. The analysis looks at infectious disease in general, not only at AIDS. The proxies used are infant mortality (IM) and life expectancy (LX), not the HIV prevalence rate. Nonetheless, the results provide a helpful illustration how a pandemic such as HIV/AIDS influences state capacity. Price-Smith defines state capacity as

the capability of government […] its level determines the state’s ability to satisfy its most important needs: survival, protection of its citizens from physical harm as a result of internal and external predation, economic prosperity and stability, effective governance, territorial integrity, power projection, and ideological projection. State capacity includes the concept that states are entities that evolve over time. This evolution occurs because of the changing factors that affect state power: land, resources, population, health, technology, human capital, prosperity and so on. (Price-Smith 2002, 25-26)
Table 3 shows the attributes considered by Price-Smith to be decisive for state capacity ranked in order of decreasing importance, and the statistical indicators expressing those attributes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes for State Capacity</th>
<th>Statistical Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fiscal resources</td>
<td>Gross National Product (current prices, 1980 US dollars, per capita)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human capital</td>
<td>Government Expenditure (standardized currency, per capita)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reach and responsiveness</td>
<td>Secondary School Enrollment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resilience</td>
<td>Net long-term capital inflow (standardized currency, per capita)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legitimacy</td>
<td>Military Spending per soldier (standardized currency, per capita)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coherence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instrumental rationality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Price Smith 2002, 26-28*

Price-Smith analyzes five statistical indicators from 1950 to 1990 for 20 countries. As shown in table 3 those indicators are GNP, government expenditure, military spending, secondary school enrollment, net long-term capital inflow. The proxies used to express the level of infectious diseases are infant mortality and life expectancy. He calculated the correlation between each of the indicators and the two proxies. State capacity is an aggregate of those indicators, thus, Price-Smith also calculated the correlation between state capacity and the proxies. The results are shown in figure 12.
It becomes obvious that for all indicators, except for capital inflow, there is a strong or very strong positive correlation with life expectancy. This means that as life expectancy increases there is a statistical correlation of 0.639 that state capacity also increases. Similarly strong is the negative correlation for infant mortality. Again for all indicators except capital inflow, there is a strong or very strong negative correlation with infant mortality. This shows that as infant mortality decreases, state capacity would increase with a statistical correlation of 0.629. Considering that low life expectancy and high infant mortality were the proxies to express high levels of infectious diseases in a country, these correlations demonstrate that as levels of infectious disease increase, state capacity decreases.

There is, however, no statistical analysis of how closely state capacity and state failure are linked. King and Zeng define state failure as “the complete or partial collapse of state authority, such as occurred in Somalia and Bosnia. Failed states have governments with little political authority or ability to impose the rule of law” (King and Zeng 2001, 623). Using this definition for state failure, one would expect a very strong negative correlation with state capacity. Therefore, we can infer that high levels of
infectious diseases contribute to creating conditions favorable to state failure. If state capacity is undermined, state failure becomes more likely. Price-Smith argues that

as state capacity declines, and as pathogen-induced deprivation and increasing demands upon the state increase, we may see an attendant increase in the incidence of chronic sub-state violence and state failure. (Price-Smith 2002, 14-15)

The disruption of family structures and educational systems through HIV/AIDS leaves children with less or even no paternal guidance and protection, and academic education. For many orphans it destroys future prospects because at a very young age they are forced into making a living in poverty-ridden Africa countries. Orphaned or despairing children without any hope for the future are much more likely to engage in risky behavior than someone who grew up in a stable family and social conditions. For girls this usually means a life of prostitution, for boys it can mean any type of illegal activity such as drug trafficking, robbery, or joining a military group, raiding gang, or terrorist organization. Child soldiers and desperate people are a major threat to security, simply because they do not have anything to lose and are easy recruits for terror organizations.

Children orphaned by AIDS will have no role models in the future and they will resort to crime to survive. […] Militias and organised bands can thus provide an attractive combination of shelter, food and self-esteem for young people with unstable social backgrounds and few education and employment prospects. (Elbe 2003, 53)

This can result in a short-term life span mentality, which creates a mindset of lawlessness and lack of respect for social or ethical norms caused by the belief that one will not live long enough to face the consequences or be punished for such behavior.
Elbe calls HIV/AIDS a “politically destabilizing force” (Elbe 2003, 8) as he outlines the impact of the disease on militaries and security forces. Using Price-Smith’s concept of state capacity it is essential for the state to be in a position where it can exercise power and ensure security for its population by having the potential to fight internal and external threats. This is not possible if the military and security apparatus is not effectively deployable due to high AIDS rates. Elbe argues that in heavily war-torn countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Angola, up to 60 percent of the military might be HIV positive (Elbe 2003, 29).

Kenya’s most important daily newspaper reported in 2000 that AIDS accounted for 75 percent of all police officer deaths (Daily Nation 2000). Being a police officer in Kenya is not a safe job in the first place, but that three quarters of police officer deaths are caused by AIDS shows a devastating impact on the security forces. The reasons for such high death rates among soldiers and police are not exactly clear. It may well be related to the spatial mobility of such groups. Militaries are highly mobile, being away from home often for several weeks or months. During those periods many soldiers engage in commercial or casual sex. The numerous wars and conflicts in Africa create a situation of lawlessness in many parts of the continent and increase poverty and risky behavior: rape and violations are common practices in such situations. This favors the spread of AIDS, resulting in an even more traumatized civil society and even less effective security forces. The military and police become ineffective because high numbers of security personnel dying of AIDS can not be easily replaced. Military forces need more recruits, need to replace the higher ranked staff with less qualified officers and need to deal with their sick members. In many cases militaries can not fully perform their duties.

It is hard enough for an African government to get the military to follow its orders and accept executive commands in the first place. However, if in addition to those problems military forces are not effectively deployable because of prevailing diseases, governments are stuck without a power projection apparatus. This not only affects the maintenance of internal order, but also peacekeeping operations in neighboring
countries. With respect to peacekeeping operations there are several severe problems. First, peacekeepers can act as vectors of HIV and spread or contract the virus into or from the areas they are deployed. Second, a country might be unwilling to contribute to peacekeeping operation because it fears that large numbers of its military personnel may become infected with HIV. Third, a country might be unwilling to host peacekeeping operations because it fears that the peacekeepers will spread HIV throughout the country (Elbe 2003, 39). This creates a vicious cycle. Peacekeepers are needed in unstable, fragile areas for the maintenance of order and the creation of a framework in which state and society can develop.

As outlined above it is precisely those conditions: poverty, instability, lawlessness, lack of future prospects, which promote risky behavior and, therefore, contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS. If peacekeeping missions are in danger because of the problems caused by HIV/AIDS, the situation in fragile areas is likely to become worse and worse. The two major problems in the vicious cycle are warfare and HIV/AIDS. Both are mutually reinforcing and if one is removed, the other one will be easier to fight. Elbe argues that

the growing influence of HIV/AIDS in conflicts in Africa may present the same stark choice that Western Europe faced half a century ago, albeit for different reasons: Abolish war as an instrument for addressing political differences or gradually be abolished yourself. Whatever the short-term gains produced by armed conflict, the presence of HIV/AIDS is rendering them increasingly irrational and counterproductive in the long term. (Elbe 2002, 175)

It becomes obvious that there is an indirect but very strong reciprocal relation between HIV/AIDS and poor economic, social and political conditions. Therefore, in order to effectively counteract such poor conditions and avoid state failure, it is absolutely essential to fight HIV/AIDS, and - of course - vice versa. The former
American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, was very much aware of the destructive effects of HIV/AIDS. In 2001 he expressed that

No war on the face of the earth is more destructive than the AIDS pandemic. I was a soldier. But I know of no enemy in war more insidious or vicious than AIDS. An enemy that poses a clear and present danger to the world. [...] We are all vulnerable -- big nations and small, the wealthy and the poor. (Colin Powell 2001)

He correctly emphasized that fighting AIDS must not only be in the interest of the affected African countries, but equally in the interest of Western countries. Reduced levels of state capacity create conditions in which terrorist and criminal networks can operate and train. In October 2001 Powell’s British counterpart, Foreign Minister Jack Straw, pointed out that in the twenty-first century the real threat is not from states with too much power, as is was in the twentieth century, but from states with too little, because “terrorists are strongest where states are weakest” (Straw 2001).

These arguments assume that African governments are legitimate, fair, respect human rights and the rule of law, and act for the benefit of their population. This is certainly not always the case! Nonetheless, history has shown that countries where these conditions are fulfilled and the government acts as an effective service deliverer for the population are more prosperous and peaceful than countries with continuous unrest and low state capacity. Elbe argues convincingly that state collapse involves at least three interrelated processes. First, the economy is transformed or destroyed and violence increases. Second, political institutions dissolve. Third, social institutions like the family or the health and education sector are damaged. As outlined in this chapter, HIV/AIDS massively affects all three of them and therefore has to be regarded as an immense security concern with respect to state failure and political stability, especially in states that are already weak or face complex emergencies (Elbe 2003, 46).
State Failure and Africa in a Civilianized International System

When Washington made the global ‘war on terrorism’ its primary goal in international politics, almost from day one Africa became an important theatre in this new security framework. (Engel and Olson 2005b, 15)

In Chapter I I pointed out that Germany’s prime interest in Africa is the establishment of civilianized structures in order to include African countries into a civilianized international system. In section 2.2 I argue that high levels of HIV/AIDS create conditions favorable to state failure. In this section I will show that state failure is in direct conflict with Germany’s prime geopolitical interest. The problems that come along with state failure are fundamental problems for the creation of civilianized structures which Germany as a civilian power needs to operate effectively. Crocker defines state failure as a process where

Corrupt elites might ally themselves with criminal networks. [...] State authority might be undermined and replaced in particular regions, paving the way for illegal trading operations. [...] state security services might lose their monopoly on the instruments of violence, leading to a downward spiral of lawlessness [and] the collapse of state power in large sections of the country. [...] State failure, inextricably linked with internal strife and humanitarian crisis, can spread from localized unrest to national collapse and then regional destabilization. [...] Invariably, state failure is accompanied by the victory of guns over normal politics, the rise of corrupt autocrats who thrive on conflict and deny freedom to their people. (Crocker 2003, 34-35)
Another definition, fairly similar to Crocker’s, is based on the CIA-sponsored State Failure Task Force, which was established in 1994 at the behest of Vice President Al Gore. King and Zeng define state failure as

the complete or partial collapse of state authority, such as occurred in Somalia and Bosnia. Failed states have governments with little political authority or ability to impose the rule of law. They are usually associated with widespread crime, violent conflict, or severe humanitarian crises, and they may threaten the stability of neighboring countries. States that sponsor international terrorism or allow it to be organized from within their borders are all failed states. (King and Zeng 2001, 623)

Taking into account both definitions of state failure, we can identify five major problems linked to state failure.

1. Complete or partial collapse of state authority and state power in large parts of the country;
2. Lawlessness and increasing anarchy;
3. Corrupt elites as well as criminal or terrorist networks become influential in the state;
4. Rising levels of crime and violence in the country;
5. Humanitarian crisis.

Germany wants none of the above in the international system it needs to prosper. This is the basis of the German interest in preventing state failure and has an enormous impact on German Africa policies.

In Africa the problems commonly associated with state failure have been present almost immediately after independence. With the recent emergence of international terrorism it has also become a major problem for international security. Western
countries have realized that national security is a lot more than having secure borders. Neglecting weak states and excluding them from the international community of states can have severe consequences for international security, since those nations can become social and territorial breeding grounds for criminal networks and activity. The examples of Sudan and Afghanistan illustrate such a development. The danger that “Africa might become the global catalyst for failing states, crime and chaos or the centre for anti-globalization activists” (translated from Öhm and Weiland 2002) cannot be denied. Failing states are more likely to be informally controlled by criminal organizations since they simply lack the power to exercise effective control over their full national territory or are more tempted to cooperate with criminals and terrorists if such groups support the official government financially and/or politically. Kühne points out that the weakness of national and regional structure is a reason for the fact that Africa is still a romping ground for global and regional players despite its relative economic and strategic irrelevance (Kühne 1999). Those global players are usually the ones that only go to places where leaders either do not know about them or can be persuaded not to care.

The process of state failure is gradual and usually expresses itself in such a way that the central government increasingly loses the capability to act as effective service deliverer for the population. Rotberg argues that the primary function of any state is to provide the political good of security. This refers both to classical security issues, such as prevention of external invasion or internal attacks on the national order or the social structure, and also to human security issues, such as avoidance of diseases or epidemics. The state’s responsibility is to provide both such security and a framework in which various actors of the society and its economy have the chance to perform reasonably effectively. Differences amongst various actors within the state should be resolved without the use of violence. Only if such security is guaranteed can other political goods, such as infrastructure, education, health care be delivered. State failure counteracts the provision of such goods, especially security, by the state (Rotberg 2003, 5).

In a case of state failure, non-state actors gain increasing influence. Such actors have little interest in the provision of political goods to the population, only in
maximizing their own benefits. Rotberg points out that they can take “opportunistic advantage of a deteriorating internal security situation to mobilize adherents, train insurgents, gain control of resources, launder funds, purchase arms, and ready themselves for assault on world order” (Rotberg 2003, 1). Rotberg’s argument targeted American policy makers in the framework of the Project 2020 of the *National Intelligence Council*, but it applies no less to Germany. With respect to the problems Rotberg outlines, there is no disagreement between American and German policy makers that it is essential to counteract such situations. There are substantial differences on how to do this, but the fact that those conditions are incompatible with the visions of most Western countries on how the world should operate, is not the point of discussion. Talking about the United States, Rotberg continues to argue that

A global superpower cannot prosper at home if its attention and energies are endlessly distracted by threats from and instability abroad. From a cost-benefit analysis, too, it is much less expensive to prevent state failing and failure than it is to provide post-conflict humanitarian relief and/or funds for post-conflict reconstruction. Afghanistan and Iraq are only the latest examples of how costly intervention can be, followed by an even more expensive process of societal rebuilding. It is in the U. S. interest to recognize the obvious tocsins of deterioration in weak nation-states so that it can help avert the slide toward failure and the enormous costs and consequences of such a slide. (Rotberg 2003, 8)

Certainly Germany is not a global superpower. Nonetheless state failure is in fundamental contrast to German foreign political interest, because it is in fundamental contrast to the role concept of a civilian power. Table 4 compares the key criteria of the civilian power concept and the key criteria for the classification of state failure.
Table 4: Comparison of the criteria for civilian powers and state failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Power</th>
<th>State Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>multilateralism and supranational integration</td>
<td>collapse of state authority and power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rule of law and institution-building</td>
<td>lawlessness and increasing anarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free trade and social and economic balance</td>
<td>rise of criminal and terrorist networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejection of the use of force</td>
<td>crime and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human rights and binding norms</td>
<td>humanitarian crisis and suppression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No civilian power can have an interest in state failure. In fact, no nation-state seeking to act as a global power has an interest in state failure, however, a civilian power has even less capabilities to deal with the problems associated with state failure than a great power. If a state fails and can not be included in a broader international system, the possibilities for a civilian power to interact with such a state become very limited. In general, states prefer to deal with states compared to non-state actors. States need other states which are representative for and in control of their population in order to interact in the international system. If various underground groups control a country and the government has no control of the population or the territory, there is no point for another country to interact with such a government. Thus as a general tendency in international relations, functioning states prefer to interact with other functioning states, either on a bilateral level or within an institutional framework, because it is easier to interact as such than it is to interact with various different interest groups or organizations.

It is extremely difficult to interact with or exercise power over underground groups, simply because such groups have little to lose. By contrast a nation-state has a lot to lose: trade networks, bi- and multilateral relations, ODA, inclusion in the international system etc.. A strong, rich state can fairly easily put economic or political pressure on a small, weak state, but not on a terrorist group: there it must use military action. Civilian powers in particular are very reluctant to use military action, and terrorist groups know that. Civilian powers have hardly any ability to exercise pressure on underground or terrorist groups that are widely dispersed in many countries, and that are difficult to localize and deal with. They do not stick to rules or laws, and they come
to no negotiation table. They do not receive any ODA and cannot be excluded from any international framework. They are outlawed already and do not have to fear any consequences if they do not act as a civilian power wants them to. That is precisely what makes them so dangerous and such a serious international threat.

Ever since the prime threat to the West has moved from the Soviet Union to international terrorism, the situation has changed significantly and elevated Africa’s role in international security affairs.

After September 11th, it is possible to argue that sub-Saharan Africa is more important to global security than it was during the Cold War simply because the main threat to the US now comes from terrorists that hide in weak and failed states all over the world, including sub-Saharan Africa. During the Cold War, the main enemy to the ‘free world’ was clearly located geographically outside Africa. Compared with the 1990s, i.e. the post Cold War years when Africa was more or less insignificant in global security politics, today the region no doubt is much more important in security terms because it is important in the American strategy to fight terrorism globally. (Engel and Olsen 2005b, 8-9)

Terrorist activity is certainly less a reason for concern in Kenya than it is in other, mainly Islamic countries, however, the bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and a hotel in Mombasa in 2002 alerted Western countries. After the 9/11 terror attacks on the US, the German foreign ministry ordered a special investigator to its Nairobi embassy for several months to evaluate possible threats from terrorist activity in Kenya (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).

In fragile regions it is important to have strong, legitimate governments, which are included into the international system and have the capabilities to exercise control over their territory to prevent it from being occupied by such networks. Governments need to be strong in order to effectively control their territory, subdue or destroy such
groups and to take away their territorial breeding ground. They need to be legitimate in order to reduce internal unrest, the likelihood of driving people in the arms of such networks and to take away their social breeding ground. In that context, the civilian power aspects of human rights and economic and social balance are highly relevant. They are part of the broader interest in having stable states with legitimate governments. Gray argues that governments derive their legitimacy from acting as service deliverers to their population.

Governments are legitimate in so far as they meet the needs of their citizens. Those that fail will be judged by their citizens to be illegitimate whether or not they are democracies. People everywhere demand from their governments security against the worst evils: war and civil disorder, criminal violence, and lack of the mean of decent subsistence. How a state performs this protective role is the core test of its legitimacy. […] Thus it is not whether a state is a liberal democracy that most fundamentally determines its legitimacy; it is how well it secures its citizens against the worst evils. (Gray 1998, 149-150)

Only if those conditions are fulfilled and governments have the capabilities to exercise effective control over all of their territory, can states be stable and focus on development and inclusion into an international system without continuously having to worry about the costs of staying in power due to internal unrest.

Certainly, not all governments of fairly stable states act according to the Western countries’ vision of civilianized international system, but legitimate, stable governments are more likely to. In failing states, governments are hardly ever legitimate because they fail to deliver basic services, such as security, to the population, and they are certainly not stable, as levels of anarchy are increasing. As delivery of services largely fails, the chances for internal instability and state failure increase and the likelihood of peaceful and effective integration in a civilianized international system decreases.
The prime security concern of Western countries has thus moved from too strong states locked in a vicious rivalry to too weak states in the developing world excluded from a civilianized international system and posing incalculable risks (Straw 2001). Mair warns of the possibility of an ever widening gap between the developed and the developing world because it might replace the old East-West conflict with a North-South conflict, which “will certainly not be conducted in a similar all-embracing way but no less violently” (Mair 2002, 13-14).

Summary

The following three trends can be identified from looking at the AIDS-data presented in this chapter. First, sub-Saharan Africa is by far the most AIDS affected region of the world, the Southern part of the continent even more so than the Western and the Eastern. Second, Eastern Africa has shown hopeful signs of slowing the spread of the pandemic in recent years. Third, Kenya seems to follow Uganda as a successful example of a country which is effectively fighting the disease and seeing a sustained decline of prevalence rates across the country.

High levels of HIV/AIDS hinder economic growth, disrupt the social structure and undermine political stability. Such levels drive young people into illegal activities, destabilize internal order and the rule of law, and reduce state capacity. AIDS contributes to violent conflicts, underdevelopment, political instability and state failure. Through increasing globalization and global interdependencies, Germany and other western countries have realized that state failure not only causes major problems in Africa but can also be a major problem for their own broader foreign political interests. As outlined in chapter I, Germany needs a civilianized international system in order to operate effectively. This requires the players in it to be “peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, democratic and law-abiding” (Mair 2002, 11). Failing states do not fulfill any of those criteria. Therefore, state failure is a major obstacle for Germany on the way to achieve its prime geopolitical interest in the promotion of such a system.
CHAPTER IV
THE ‘CIVILIAN POWER’ GERMANY AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES FOR A CIVILIANIZED
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN AFRICA

Chapter II outlined how the problem of HIV/AIDS is conducive to state failure and how state failure is in fundamental contrast to the international system which Germany needs to act successfully as a civilian power. This chapter will explain how Germany as a civilian power acts internationally and how that differs from a classical great power. Placing development policies in the broader context of foreign policies, it will then discuss in more detail the conception of German development policies and the German programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya. Finally, this chapter illustrates that development policies play only a minor role for German grand strategy, but that German grand strategy is the major influence on development policies. I argue that German development policies are used as tools to pursue the broader geopolitical interest of the promotion of a civilianized international system.

The Foreign Political Behavior of Germany as a Civilian Power

Between 1994 and 1997 the ‘Civilian Powers’ project of the German Research Foundation (DFG) examined the foreign political behavior of Germany, Japan and the United States in order to evaluate to what extent these countries fit the criteria of a civilian power. Kirste and Maull created six categories of analysis, which represent the ideal type of civilian power behavior. These ideal behavior patterns were then compared to the actual foreign political behavior of the three countries in order to determine the congruence between actual policy and the ideal type of the role concept. The six categories are:
- Influence in the international system: civilian powers are powers. They aim to participate in the shaping of the international system and take responsibility, not by way of exclusive leadership, but rather by seeking influence through collective action and by setting examples of how to act;

- National goals: security, welfare, social balance, democratic stability. Foreign policy aims to transfer the interior level of civilianized structures to the international system;

- International goals (organization): civilianizing international politics, partial transfer of sovereignty and acceptance of binding international norms, institutionalization of international relations and rule of law, also in the context of conflict settlement;

- International goals (contents): human rights, good governance, participatory democracy, rule of law, pluralism, market economy, and sustainable development for social, ecological and economic balance. Inclusion of countries into the international system is also tied to conditions with the possibility of multilateral interference in the affairs of a sovereign state if it does not comply with the rules;

- Foreign political practices: no do-it-alone practices, instead focus on multilateral action, international cooperation institutionalized through the transfer of sovereignty, especially in the security sector, problem solving through negotiation and compromises, rejection of the use of force except for cases of self-defense or collectively legitimized measures;

- Foreign political instruments: political instruments, negotiations, sanctions, conditions, etc. Acceptance of the use of force in collectively legitimized cases, counteract aggressors through a system of collective security. (Kirste and Maull 1996, 301-303)

The authors of the project came to the conclusion that in the late 20th century German foreign policy has been that of a civilian power. It does not exactly fit the ideal
typical role model developed by Maull and advanced in the DFG-project but it has high congruence. Indeed, of the three countries studied - Germany, Japan and the United States – Germany shows the highest congruence to the ideal role concept of a civilian power.

For Germany and Japan 21 cases of foreign political behavior in significant international situations were examined, for the United States 24 cases. In 81 percent of the cases Germany’s foreign political behavior complied with the ideal typical behavior of the role concept civilian power; Japan followed with 66 percent. With only 46 percent the United States’ foreign political behavior differed quite significantly from the ideal type civilian power (Frenkler et al 1997, 102-106). To a large extent the United States thus, predictably, acts more as the classical great power it is than as a civilian power.

The greatest differences between American foreign policy and the civilian power concept are in the categories of multilateralism, supranational integration and the restriction of the use of force as a means for international politics. The transfer of national sovereignty to a supranational institution is in fundamental contrast to current American foreign policy. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States clearly states that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) “does not extend to Americans” and will not be accepted (White House 2002, 31).

Multilateralism is generally regarded as preferable; however, the United States shows a much higher willingness for unilateral action than a civilian power. O’Loughlin was right in foreseeing that “the US will continue to pursue its political interests unilaterally at the costs of international co-operation” (O’Loughlin 1993, 109). Nine years later the NSS stated that “In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and interest of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require” (White House 2002. 31).

Similar differences to civilian power ideals become evident in the perception of the use of force. The United States strongly favors restricting the use of force by all other actors in international politics, but with respect to its own foreign political interests, it is generally willing to use its military might. The United States government believes that
“it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength” (White House 2002, 29). Even though an ideal typical civilian power does not completely reject the use of force, it would usually only employ military action multilaterally, as a result of a severe violation of one of its fundamental principals, as the last resort, and in the context of collective security (Maull 1993, 119-122).

Kagan contrasts the differences in the European and American perceptions of power in the international system. Even though Kagan does not use the term civilian power, the political behavior he attributes to Europe is largely coherent with civilian power ideals. His distinction is helpful to illustrate Europe’s differences to the United States as a great power. Kagan argues that

Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”. The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. (Kagan 2002, 3)

However, the distinction between great power and civilian power is different than the distinction between hard power and soft power. When Nye discusses hard power and soft power, he outlines three ways of exercising power with respect to affecting the behavior of others. First, coercing with threats (sticks). Second, inducing with payments (carrots). Third, attracting or co-opting so that a power’s own goals are appealing to others and considered legitimate (Nye 1990). Soft power refers to the third option and tries to make others act in a certain way by convincing them of the attraction of one’s own goals.
Hard power and soft power are mechanisms and ways to exercise power in the international system. Even though the term ‘civilian power’ can also fall into that category and refer to a path to certain international goals, it describes more than that. It mainly refers to an actor or a specific role concept which encompasses the entire foreign political behavior of a nation state (Kirste and Mau 1996, 297). Great powers and civilian powers are either actors in the international system or concepts that describe their behavior. Hard power and soft power are the instruments of their behavior. Certainly, great powers and civilian powers employ different means to achieve their goals, but they need to be understood as actors, not just as ways of power projection. Usually, great powers have the tendency to employ more hard power than civilian powers and civilian powers tend to work more through soft power than great powers. Nonetheless, both great powers and civilian powers employ both hard power and soft power. Khanna expresses the tendencies by arguing that

the United States conceives of power primarily in military terms […] By contrast, Europeans understand power as overall leverage. […] Through massive deployments of “soft power” (such as economic clout and cultural appeal) Europe has made hard power less necessary. (Khanna 2004, 67)

Classifying a great power as hard power and a civilian power as soft power is thus insufficient, because hard power and soft power are only techniques of power projection within the broader foreign political frameworks of either great powers or civilian powers.

Acting as a civilian power proved so successful for Germany that as early as the late 1960s Germany had developed the world’s second largest economy (World Bank 2006). Germany moved from being a civilian actor in the international system to becoming a civilian power in the later decades of the Cold War, developing considerable influence on the way the global economy operated. It developed into a classical trading
state, whose wealth was not rooted in resources but in trade. There are two ways for trading states to operate successfully. One way is for the trading state to ensure itself an international environment in which it can trade: similar to the British Imperial model of the late 19th century. Alternatively, the trading state relies on international institutions as the framework for trade: the modern American model (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 20). However, as the world’s most powerful nation the United States still needs to back up the international system based on institutions and the rule of law. The difference to the British model of the late 19th century is that the American model also allows other states to benefit from the system to the same extent, because it creates a framework generally open to any player acting according to rules of the system (Agnew 2005, 220).

Germany has never been in a powerful enough position to enforce an international environment favorable to trade by itself. The second case is exactly what is essential to Germany’s role as a trading state. It has been a free rider in the global American system of liberal capitalism. As such Germany might have benefited from the system even more than the United States itself, because Germany was allowed to take full advantage of system, mainly with respect to free trade, without having to bear the costs to secure these functioning of the system. The stronger the system becomes in itself and the less the United States is needed to safeguard it, the better it is for Germany. This case is very much congruent with the role concept of a civilian power.

This grand strategy has prevailed through German reunification and also through the change of the government in 1998, although it has been modified by German domestic politics. Germany’s foreign policy identity matured in the late 1990s. In the immediate aftermath of reunification, it was clear that Helmut Kohl would not radically alter German foreign policies. Kohl built his political career when German foreign policy was determined by the close alliance with the United States and inclusion in the American international system. Gerhard Schröder, on the other hand, was from a different generation of German politicians. When he came to power European integration was well underway and Europe had left the status of an American protectorate and was on its way to becoming the largest integrated economy in the world
and a counterweight to American dominance. Germany was the largest country in Europe and its political, and especially economic, weight was clearly a different one than when Kohl took power in 1982.

Schröder and his foreign minister Joschka Fischer pushed for a more active role for Germany in global politics. However, just as Kohl, Schröder acted within the role concept of a civilian power. Kohl did because that was how Germany gained strength and influence during his political career. Schröder did because it was the only way reunified Germany could thrive internationally and be a politically important global actor. Having very limited military strength, Germany needed – and still needs - an international system in which it can operate effectively as a civilian power. Any other version of an international system would render Germany a minor player. Schröder realized that his goal of establishing Germany as a more influential player in global politics could only be achieved within the framework of its traditional foreign policy identity and grand strategy as a civilian power.

In more recent work Mauell has argued that despite the German military involvement in the Kosovo war and Operation Enduring Freedom, Germany still largely acts as a civilian power. German use of force in those conflicts did not mark a radical departure from German foreign policy identity: it was justified by humanitarian reasons and took place in the context of multilateral action within the institutional context of NATO. Especially in the case of the Kosovo war, non-participation of Germany would have severely undermined the credibility and acting power of the European Union as well as of NATO (Mauell 2000, 2004). As such it would have been contradictory to the civilian power ideal of powerful institutions and effective rule of international law. For a civilian power to thrive, it can not accept such violations of its basic principles as were perpetrated by the Milosevic regime in its own backyard.

Despite their generally pacifist character, civilian powers are powers that seek to influence the international system to conform to their interests. If those interests are seriously threatened it is within the ideal typical role concept of a civilian power to employ severe measures to safeguard its version of the international system. This way of
thinking has been deeply embedded in German politics ever since World War II ended. When the German Basic Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic was created in 1948, it called the form of government a ‘defensive democracy’. It purposely omitted any constitutional possibility to abolish democracy as the form of government as was the case when Hitler legally transformed the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich. The Weimar Republic was simply too democratic for a democratically inexperienced Germany and had left open the possibility of abolishing democracy based on a popular vote.

After World War II, the makers of the Basic Constitutional Law, under intense supervision and pressure by the Allies, anchored certain principals in the German constitution which can not be changed. Any threat to those principles legitimizes the use of measures otherwise ousted in order to defend those principles (Rudzio 1999, 48-52). The notion that certain principles are central and need to be defended with all possible means, is also apparent in the role concept of civilian powers. Accordingly, to protect a civilianized international system, force can be legitimately used under certain conditions, such as a within strong multilateral coalition and for humanitarian reasons.

Just as the use of force in the case of the Kosovo war in 1999 is within the civilian power framework, the rejection of the use of force in the case of the Iraq war in 2003 is also within the framework. On the one hand Schröder’s behavior was clearly motivated by the upcoming elections. He fully exploited the strong popular opposition towards a possible military engagement in Iraq in his re-election campaign in 2002 to distract from his poor performance in domestic policies and present himself as the ‘peace-chancellor."

On the other hand Schröder’s behavior reflects civilian power behavior. Even though there were certainly humanitarian reasons to forcefully end Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship and Iraq was not the ‘model’ state for a civilianized international system, the German government did not perceive it as an immediate threat to such a system. The more severe threat to the civilianized international system was the upcoming American invasion of Iraq, because it was not based on institutional legitimization, was not in a
strong multilateral context, and was not the last resort for counteracting a possible immediate threat to Germany’s national interests. The United States as the guarantor of international law has put itself above the law by illegitimately invading a sovereign country and has thus set a precedent for other countries to use military force regardless of international law and regulations. Such behavior of the world’s most powerful nation moved international politics clearly away from a civilianized international system, which is in contrast to Germany’s national interest because it elevates the importance of a powerful military, which Germany does not have.

In fact, such a protection and promotion of a civilianized international system is at the heart of Germany’s grand strategy. The geopolitical changes of the 1990s and modern technology have transformed the world into a ‘global village’ where national boundaries are far less relevant. As a consequence, domestic and international policies can not be treated separately, but need to be integrated. Mauull argues that

We must either successfully export and extrapolate the mechanisms of taming social violence which we have developed at home, thus ‘domesticating’ international relations, or suffer the intrusion of traditional patterns of international relations (anarchy, self-help and the resort to force) into our societies and polities. (Mauull 1993, 118)

Mauull sees the major problem of a return to an international system based on the balance of power and containment as its inability to address security threats intensified by an increasingly interlinked and interdependent world. The best example of such a security threat is the substantial intensification of international terrorism. During the Cold War, the West knew exactly who the enemy was, and where the enemy was, and could threaten it with severe consequences if it misbehaved (nuclear retaliation). This is not the case with terrorism which is why it is not only so difficult to fight for a civilian power, but also for a great power (Engel and Olsen 2005b, 15). Even though a great power has the capabilities and might have the political will for military action against the
enemy, it still would not know exactly who and where the enemy is. Terrorist enemies are so widely dispersed that even if one cell is taken out it does not mean total victory, because there are many more in many more different places who are able to operate independently.

Gray argues that Al Qaeda is an “essentially modern organisation” and was the “the first practitioner of unconventional warfare to be truly worldwide in its operations” (Gray 2003, 76). This globalization of the main adversary in an increasingly interlinked world made a modification of the conventional security paradigm necessary. Agnew correctly points out that

> the United States is now more on the receiving rather than the delivering end of the forces liberated by globalization […] The United States today is undoubtedly the world’s most significant military power. But what this adds up to in a world of asymmetric warfare is unclear. (Agnew 2005, 223)

The global reach of terrorist and criminal networks has shown that military power alone is not enough to ensure national security or to act successfully on an international level. Flint emphasizes that

> Instead of a realist fixation upon military strength, the ability to exert power across the globe requires the political vision to construct a geopolitical project that will gain international support as well as the political will to carry it out. […] It will also require belief in the need and the value of a global civilizing mission. (Flint 2004, 366)

According to Boulding such international support comes from integrative power, which he considers the most influential form of power. The concept is similar to Nye’s concept of soft power and refers to power deriving from legitimacy, respect and
consensual integration into a system portrayed as beneficial for all. Boulding argues that, without integrative power, the other two faces of power, coercive power and exchange power, will become ineffective, which causes a decline in overall power (Boulding 1990). As a consequence, to be effective the foreign and security policy of a country has to focus increasingly on integrative power because

Efforts to keep social violence and destruction at arms’ length, to create in effect a world divided along the lines between wealth and poverty through policies of containment, are also unlikely to work; in their frustration and desperation, the poor will find ways to cross our borders and tap our wealth, or – failing that – to destroy the foundations of our well-being. (Maull 1993, 118)

Kupchan saw precisely this happening in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center because it was “made clear just how vengeful the backlash against globalization can be. […] Osama bin Laden was not just fighting against globalization, he was also exploiting it” (Kupchan 2003, 108). The point Gray, Maull and Kupchan are all making is that globalization is not exclusive to western societies and that they need a strategy to deal with its negative side effects.

For a civilian power the strategy is to prevent such negative side effects by creating a civilianized international system which, ideally, would include all international players. Such a system is a lot more important for Germany as a civilian power than it is for the US as great power, because Germany is much more dependent on its structures in order to operate effectively. As mentioned above the United States acts both as a great power and a civilian power. If America can not achieve the international order it seeks by acting as a civilian power it can do so by acting as a great power, because it possesses the power projection tools of a great power. Those are unequally larger than the means of power projection of a civilian power, especially with respect to the effective deployment of military forces, or at least the threat to do so. Germany does
not have that option. It is not a great power and neither has effective means for the projection of military power nor the means to force through its interests beyond the limits of a civilianized international system. Therefore, for Germany the maintenance of such a world order is even more essential than for the United States, simply because it has no choice. Either the world order works, or Germany’s influence in it is very limited. For the United States it is favorable if the world order works, however, if it does not, America has the means to force the world order to work. Germany does not! That is why it is essential for Germany to conduct foreign policy towards the promotion of a civilianized international system.

As part of such foreign politics, German development policies will be discussed in the following section

**Conception of German Development Policies**

Only in cooperation with others can we find solutions, open chances in future and promote peace, security and prosperity in our ‘One World’. Our understanding of development policies is based on the principles: fight against poverty, secure peace, shape globalization in a social and ecological way. (German Minister for Development Cooperation Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, quoted in BMZ 2002, 4)

As outlined in chapter I, German development policy after World War II was primarily intended to re-integrate Germany into the international community of states alongside the United States of America. It was a chance for the young Federal Republic to fulfil expectations of European and American partners for burden sharing in the Third World and to prove itself a reliable partner in international politics. From the very beginning German development policy had a strong multilateral character. When the first budget provisions for development assistance were made in the late 1950s, they were part of the European Development Funds (EDF). Adenauer wanted to act as an
equal partner in the newly established European Economic Community (EEC) and contributed increasingly to common actions such as the EDF. Development policies at that point were less a means to assist African development than a means to regain the trust of Western partners. Consequently, actions depended heavily on the interests of the partners. Germany would largely do what it was asked to do and not risk disagreements with its partners over such issues (Hofmeier 2002, 40-41).

Especially in the early phase of German development policies during the late 1950s and 1960s, even the design of bilateral programs reflected a political agenda shared by most Western countries on what ought to happen in Africa. Amongst European countries this agenda was expressed in the conventions of Lomé (1975-2000) and Cotonou (2000-2020), which regulate the funds of the EDF towards the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) countries. Even though these conventions present a more or less common vision of European countries with respect to their relation with Africa, the financial scope has always been fairly limited in comparison with total ODA. The ninth round of EDF has a volume of $16.74 bn (€13.5 bn) for the years 2000 to 2007, whereas the combined total ODA of the three largest contributors, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, was valued at $23.82 bn (€19.20 bn) for 2004 alone (Schmidt 2002; BMZ 2006a).

As shown in figure 13, in the international comparison, Germany is the fifth largest donor worldwide behind the United States, Japan, France and the United Kingdom. At the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1970 donor countries agreed to spend at least 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA. In that respect, Germany’s limited commitment becomes even more obvious. Figure 14 illustrates that of the 24 member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) only five, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the Netherlands, fulfill the commitment to spend at least 0.7 percent of their GNI on ODA.
Figure 13: Net ODA of OECD countries in 2004. Source: OECD 2006a

Figure 14: ODA as percentage share of GNI in 2004. Source: OECD 2006a
At 13th position the German ODA is, however, only slightly above the total ODA of 0.26 percent of GNI of DAC-countries. Figure 15 illustrates that as a share of GNI German ODA share has decreased steadily and dramatically since the peak of the early 1980s, reaching its nadir in 1998. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union the interest in tying developing countries to the Western bloc was drastically reduced after 1990 and, in the case of Germany, funds were increasingly diverted to finance German reunification. As outlined in chapter I, Africa and the rest of the developing world simply moved lower and lower on the political agenda. This trend was somewhat reversed after the election of Schröder’s Red-Green government in 1998. However, even then the increase was marginal, from 0.26 percent in 1998 to 0.28 percent in 2004. Germany thus clearly lags seriously behind the 0.7 % commitment made in 1970.

Figure 15: German ODA as percentage share of GNI 1964-2004. Source: BMZ 2006b

Schröder’s government made a first step by aiming at 0.33 percent of the GNI for ODA for the year 2006 (BMZ 2006c). In November 2005, Angela Merkel, the leader of the conservative Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU), became chancellor heading a so called Grand Coalition of her CDU and Schröder’s Socialdemocrats (SPD). Even though it marked the end of Schröder’s chancellorship, his party stayed in the ruling
coalition as junior partner. Considering that Federal Minister for Economic Co-operation and Development under Schröder, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, remained in office, a radical change in German development policy is unlikely. In fact Merkel’s rhetoric with respect to development policies is remarkably similar to Schröder’s. Not too different from Schröder’s 1998 redefinition of development policies as ‘global structural policies’, Merkel stated in her inaugural government declaration that “Global problems will reach us at home if we do not manage to solve them abroad” (Merkel 2005).

Her grand coalition government seems to be continuing to increase ODA and has committed to reach 0.51% of GNI by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015 (OECD 2006b). However, similar commitments have been made before and not fulfilled. Following an old English proverb, the late Sudanese Vice President, John Garang, stated: “The proof of the pudding is in the eating -- the proof of the pledge is in the cash” (quoted in Swissinfo 2005). It remains to be seen whether Merkel’s government will live up to its promises.

In Germany, the central agency to coordinate development cooperation is the Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) – the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Roughly half of total German ODA is multilateral. In 2004, German multilateral ODA had a volume of $ 3.71 bn (€ 2.99 bn), 49 percent of the total of $ 7.53 bn (€ 6.08 bn).

![Figure 16: Destination of German multilateral ODA. Source: OECD 2006c](image-url)
Figure 16 shows that the largest part of German multilateral development cooperation is channeled through the European Union and the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA); various UN agencies and regional banks receive those funds to a lesser extent.

On the bilateral level, German ODA was € 3.08 bn ($ 3.82 bn) in 2004. The single largest share, roughly one third, goes to sub-Saharan Africa. Bilateral Cooperation is split into hardware and software components. Hugill argues that hardware refers to the provision of necessary tools, whereas software describes the knowledge and expertise to apply those tools (Hugill 1993, 11). With respect to development cooperation, hardware can be understood as Financial Cooperation (FC), which provides the funds for development cooperation as directly channeled through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). By volume, FC marks the most significant part of German development cooperation. FC is strongly tied to the general conditions for German development cooperation. It seeks to support the partner countries in reform processes aiming at more sustainable development and investments in economic and social infrastructure. Based on a constant review process with respect to the conformity with the general conditions for German development cooperation, FC also provides funds directly to partner countries. However, it is always conducted in close coordination with other German or international development measures (EFRG 2005, 4 and BMZ 2006f).

The software component is Technical Cooperation (TC). It refers to the organization and actual carrying out of projects and programs in close collaboration with the partner governments, NGOs or the private sector (EFRG 2005, 4). The main German agency for TC is the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) – the German Organisation for Technical Cooperation, it provides the four main services of TC

1. The seconding of consultants, trainers and instructors, experts, appraisers and other specialists;
2. The establishment of, and capacity building for, project executing organizations;
3. The provision of materials and equipment to fit out the facilities receiving assistance;
4. Training and upgrading for local specialists and executives.

These services are provided as grants and aim at transferring technical, economic, and organizational knowledge and skills as support for projects and programs of the partner countries (BMZ 2006e). The GTZ tries to diversify its engagement and cooperate with actors on three different levels: macro (national government), meso (provincial governments, civic society organizations) and micro (grassroots) (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).

As outlined above, the BMZ is the central German institution responsible for development policies. However, they are part of broader foreign policy set in the Chancellor’s Office and the *Auswärtige Amt* (AA) – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, within this broader foreign political framework, the BMZ and its on-the-ground organizations, mainly the GTZ and KfW, are able to develop policies fairly independently. Since the end of the Cold War, German development policies have experienced two significant changes. First, when it became obvious that the Soviet Union was collapsing, tying African nations to the American led world economy became irrelevant. The criteria for providing German aid assistance required modification. In the fall of 1991, BMZ Minister Carl-Dieter Spranger tied German development cooperation to five conditions:

1. Compliance with human rights;
2. Participation of the population in the political process;
3. Validity of the rule of law;
4. Creation of a market-friendly system;
This conditionalization of development policies clearly revealed the intention of the German government to be much more selective about recipient countries and to critically assess their political and socio-economic performance and conditions (Hofmeier 2002, 54).

The second major change in German post Cold War development policy occurred after the change from Kohl’s conservative to Schröder’s Red-Green government in 1998. The role of the BMZ, with respect to its budget and position within the cabinet, was upgraded and an increased focus was put on

- Human rights;
- Crisis prevention and peaceful conflict resolution;
- Civilianization and the rule of law in international relations. (Engel 2000, 113-114)

Shortly after Schröder took power, the responsibility for the development policies of the European Union was transferred from the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (BMWi) – the Federal Ministry of Economics - to the BMZ. It was the last branch of German development politics administered outside the BMZ at that point. Furthermore, the competences for consulting and technical assistance to Eastern Europe and newly independent countries were also transferred from the BMWi to the BMZ (BMZ 2004b, 32-33). Development policies moved from development ‘aid’ to ‘global structural policies’. The practical effects of these changes were the Schwerpunktbildung – priority setting - in German development politics and the focus on Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss – seamless development cooperation. Both aimed to make development cooperation more effective and to counteract problems such as inefficient projects, bureaucratic red-tape and overlaps of donor practices.

_Schwerpunktbildung_ made German development cooperation more focused on fewer countries and fewer sectors. The Red-Green government changed the policy from running a lot of small projects in many countries to engaging in a few specific sectors in
fewer countries. For Africa this meant that 16 countries were classified as priority partner countries, 10 as partner countries, 6 as potential cooperation countries and 17 were not listed anymore (BMZ 2006d). On the one hand, in the 23 countries classified as potential partner countries or not listed anymore, development cooperation was radically cut or completely shut down. On the other hand, in priority partner countries development cooperation was extended and Germany would employ all its official development cooperation agencies\(^2\) to intensify development cooperation in three sectors. Those sectors were, officially, identified in bilateral negotiations between the governments. However, to a large extent the feedback of GTZ and KfW as well as the coordination with other donors determined development priorities for each country.

For the practical level of development cooperation, *Schwerpunktbildung* marked an immense change. The decisions about which countries would be upgraded to priority partner countries or downgraded to anything less, was largely beyond the influence of GTZ and KfW. They were political decisions made in the Chancellor’s Office, the AA, or the BMZ and within the framework of Germany’s broader foreign political directives. Certainly, the criteria mentioned above, success of previous programs and the coordination with other donors were important factors which influenced decisions. The role of GTZ and KfW was thus restricted to presenting and evaluating past engagement in cooperation with the embassies of the referring countries to the decision makers (Author interview with Interviewee C, German diplomat).

Once the countries to intensify cooperation with were identified, each individual sector had to prove that it would be worth continuing. Individual sector coordinators had to demonstrate that their programs were more efficient and show better results than the programs of other sectors and other countries and would therefore be continued. In this process the influence of the on-the-ground agencies was more significant. As stated

\(^2\) Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) – German Technical Cooperation
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) – Development Bank
Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED) – German Development Service
Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung (CIM) – Centre for International Migration and Development
Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (InWent) – Capacity Building International, Germany
above, within the broader foreign policy directives, the BMZ is largely free with regard to which sectors it engages in and what programs it runs. According to most interviewees the cooperation of the ministry with the embassies and the on-the-ground agencies is both productive and good. GTZ and KfW had a significant say in determining development priorities. Various sector coordinators were invited to the BMZ in Bonn to present their projects and contribute to the decision making process (Author interviews with Interviewee B, GTZ; and Interviewee D, KfW).

Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss mainly aims at avoiding overlaps with projects of other donors through a more inclusive and comprehensive engagement approach. It is characterized not only by frequent consultation and cooperation between the various German agencies but also with other donors and their host countries. Assistance should be provided as a whole from the donor community, and not as individual and independent programs of various institutions. Especially amongst member countries of the European Union, this coordination and cooperation has made impressive progress in the last years, however, it has improved also with other donors (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).

In order to determine which sectors Germany would engage in, the relative success of the German projects in one sector to the success of projects of other donors was an important criterion. For example, even if there were good German efforts to improve access to fresh water in one specific country, they were unlikely to continue if another donor could work more efficiently and successfully in the same sector. The feedback of embassies and German agencies in the countries was a major part of the decision making process, however, the final say was with the BMZ. The on-the-ground organizations were certainly not in the political position to start an entirely new sector of cooperation without the BMZ’s approval. However, the BMZ would also not offer engagement to the host country or other donors in a sector where there would be no capabilities to conduct it successfully through its on-the-ground organizations (Author interview with Interviewee B, GTZ).
Considering that the countries for cooperation are chosen within the broader foreign political framework, it is unlikely that sectors or programs approved by the BMZ would be opposed by the AA. However, if it does happen, differences are first to be sorted out between the respective departments of the AA and the BMZ, then on the level of senior officials such as state secretaries, then on cabinet level between the ministers. If all of the above fail to reach an agreement, the final say is with the chancellor, who sets the overall political directives (Author interview with Interviewee C, German diplomat).

As a more specific example of how German development policies work the next section illustrates German programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya.

**German Programs on Reproductive Health and HIV/AIDS in Kenya**

Germany was the first state to recognize Kenya after independence in 1963 and the two countries have traditionally had good diplomatic relations. Because of its important status in Eastern Africa, Kenya is a priority partner country for German development cooperation. However, in comparison with other countries receiving German ODA, the bilateral cooperation with Kenya is rather limited. It ranks 9<sup>th</sup> in sub-Saharan Africa and only 24<sup>th</sup> globally with respect to the volume of the German assistance (OECD 2006c). Currently, Germany is the fourth largest bilateral donor to Kenya after the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Germany was the second largest donor, but after German development cooperation was increasingly conditionalized in the early 1990s, bilateral commitments to Kenya were radically cut because of extensive corruption and bad governance (AA 2006).

Not only did Germany cut commitments to Kenya in the 1990s, but so did other bilateral donors as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). After severe pressure by the international community to fight corruption and commit to better and more transparent governance, the Kenyan government rather reluctantly implemented some of the changes asked for as a condition of donor assistance. As
Figure 17 shows, after severe cuts in the middle of the 1990s German bilateral ODA to Kenya slowly picked up again from 1997 onwards. When Kenya’s government changed in 2002, the international expectations for further progress in good governance and the fight against corruption in Kenya increased. The German government provided € 14.3 m ($ 17.7 m) of immediate additional assistance to support the democratic shift. When Chancellor Schröder visited Kenya in 2004 he doubled bilateral ODA to a combined commitment of € 55 m ($ 68.2 m) for FC and TC in 2004/2005.

These € 27.5 m are annual bilateral commitments of ODA, however, in 2004 the approved funding for all official German development efforts in Kenya valued a total of € 293.6 m ($ 364.1 m) in 2004. This refers to all currently ongoing projects over a time-span of several years and includes technical and financial cooperation of foundations, ecclesiastic organizations, semi-governmental and full governmental agencies (BMZ 2004a). In Kenya, the three development priorities are private sector development in
agriculture, water sector development, and reproductive health. Approved funding of reproductive health projects in 2004 was € 42.05 m, 14% of the total of € 293.6 m. Those projects, which mainly deal with HIV/AIDS, account for the second largest single share of German development efforts in Kenya (BMZ 2004a).

The overall German strategy of “seamless development cooperation” is of course also applied to German engagement in Kenya. As mentioned above, as priority partner country, all German state-run development agencies work in Kenya, and in addition also almost all German political foundations, ecclesiastical organizations, and NGOs. In order to avoid overlaps of the programs, all of the German institutions meet regularly in Nairobi and in Bonn. The state-run organizations active in Kenya have a compulsory meeting every other week in Nairobi. The non-state actors are not bound to coordination, however, it is in their own interest to work efficiently, so they also meet on a regular basis every 6 to 8 weeks. In addition to the meetings in Kenya, representatives of the head offices in Germany also meet twice a year in the BMZ in Bonn to coordinate their programs on the upper level (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).

According to various German officials the exchange between the institutions in Kenya, and their head offices in Germany as well as with other state-run institutions is frequent and good (Author interviews with Interviewee A, German diplomat; Interviewee B, GTZ; and Interviewee D, KfW). There are two means of communication, usually employed at the same time. The central agency responsible for all development cooperation is the BMZ in Bonn, which often interacts directly with its on-the-ground agencies in Kenya. Nonetheless, for routine exchange or special requests, communication would occur either through the head office of the on-the-ground agency in Germany, or the German embassy in Nairobi.

It was no surprise that reproductive health was chosen as one of the German development priorities for Kenya. Germany has been active in the health sector in Kenya for about 30 years. In the past 15 years it has focused on the sub-sectors reproductive and sexual health and hence contributed significantly to national policies and strategies (BMZ 2003). The major cooperation partner has always been the Kenyan Ministry of
Health (MoH) and since its creation in 1999 also the National AIDS Control Council (NACC). It was not until 1999 that President Daniel arap Moi officially declared HIV/AIDS a national disaster and began actively to fight against the pandemic. The NACC was established to coordinate the efforts of all institutions, international and domestic, in a multisectoral approach. However, the real breakthrough in government efforts came in 2002 with Kibaki’s election.

German activities have usually been developed through the joint efforts of the German organizations GTZ, KfW, DED, InWEnt and Malteser Germany as well as with representatives of various official Kenyan institutions and local NGOs. For the most part they have focused on ‘high potential areas’, the most densely populated regions of Western, Eastern and Nyanza Provinces (EFRG 2005, 11). German engagement operates on three levels. First, on the macro level cooperation provides mainly policy advising and concept development through ministries, national associations, and civil society organizations. For example, the GTZ provided a permanent technical assistant for advising and coordination to the Kenyan Ministry of Health. Second, the meso level focuses on institutional capacity building as well as on supervision and coordination of various programs of provincial administrations, civil society organizations and associations in the provinces. Third, cooperation on the micro level is strongly directed at community based approaches, education counseling and the promotion of self-help groups in districts, communities, as well as public and private service providers (BMZ 2003, 7-8).

To a very large extent, the German efforts are coherent with the Kenyan strategy to fight AIDS. The Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategy Plan 2005/6 – 2009/10 outlines three priority areas in the fight against HIV/AIDS: Prevention of new infections; Improvement of the quality of life of people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS; and Mitigation of the socio-economic impacts of HIV/AIDS (NACC 2005). The three priorities of German AIDS policies in Africa are: Prevention; Treatment; and Care and Support of HIV-positive people and their social environment (BMZ 2004c, 11-13). It becomes obvious that both governments pursue very similar strategies in the fight
against HIV/AIDS, which is not surprising since the long German engagement in this sector has had significant influence on Kenyan policies.

Almost all interviewees describe the cooperation of German organizations with Kenyan institutions and local agencies as good and open. The claim of German officials that German development cooperation seeks to understand a problem as a whole by including and consulting locals as well as NGOs and other organizations was confirmed by the interviewees from NGOs and official Kenyan institutions (Author interviews with Cheluget; Kalweo; Kiari; Odhiambo). This consulting process takes place mainly on the micro and meso levels of cooperation, but is channeled via the embassy, the GTZ and the KfW to the BMZ in Bonn and contributes to the decision making process in the ministry (Author interviews with Interviewee A, German diplomat; Interviewee B, GTZ; and Interviewee C, German diplomat). As a result of these processes, German projects over the past years have largely focused on:

- community-based distribution of condoms and oral contraceptives as well as social marketing of condoms;
- supply of contraceptives, drugs and medical equipment to reduce the birth rate, maternal mortality and the incidence of HIV;
- prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT);
- development of concepts to combat female genital mutilation and on youth sexuality (peer counseling);
- development and implementation of a multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS control strategy;
- concept development and capacity building for quality management in the Ministry of Health;
- advisory assistance (with WHO) in developing and introducing a socially equitable health insurance scheme and a National Social Health Insurance Fund. (BMZ 2003, 4-5)
The main target groups to be reached with immediate on-the-ground programs are those Kenyans who have no access to adequate services for reproductive and sexual health. Furthermore, people who face increased poverty due to high payment for health services or those who are unable to afford health services are intended to benefit most from the German programs. Those happen to be mostly adolescents, women and girls, as well as commercial sex workers (CSW) (BMZ 2003, 9). There has been a heavy focus on mainstreaming HIV/AIDS by creating awareness that it is not merely a health issue, but needs to be treated at all sectors of the society and the state. There are AIDS programs in all efforts of German development cooperation, not only in the development priority of Reproductive Health. Funds for fighting HIV/AIDS are not only channeled into the framework of health cooperation, but also into other projects, seemingly unrelated to health issues (BMZ 2003, 7 and DED 2004, 10).

Considering the massive implications of the pandemic for the entire society and the state, it has become obvious that the only effective way to fight it is an approach which is also present in the entire society and the state. This multi-sectoral approach of mainstreaming HIV/AIDS has proved to be a very successful strategy in the past for linking all the efforts in the fight against HIV/AIDS from one particular donor. Germany is not the only actor who has realized this. All Kenyan ministries and governmental institutions are required to deal with AIDS. By 2007 all selected districts are required to integrate HIV/AIDS control activities in their annual work plans (BMZ 2003, 9). Even on the level of rural primary schools, education on AIDS is a top priority. It is included in all subjects from grade 1 (Author interview with Ndungu).

At the international level the donor community has also increasingly mainstreamed the problem of HIV/AIDS. Cooperation and coordination has improved considerably in recent years. Major donors, bilateral and multilateral, meet monthly in the Health Donor Working Group and the Inter Agency Coordination Committee to improve networking, coordination and strategic orientation amongst each other (Author interview with Interviewee B, GTZ). With respect to HIV/AIDS the different donors seems to have a strong common interest in coordinating their efforts in an efficient way
to avoid overlaps. Most participating donors are quite flexible within the broader political directives of the governments.

The comparison of American and German programs to fight AIDS in Kenya is a very good example of how a great power and a civilian power differ in their development policies. According to several interviewees, German efforts to fight HIV/AIDS are based on high levels of consultation and cooperation with local agencies and other donors. The experiences of past programs and other institutions are taken into account and have an effect on the design of future projects. Such consultations occur on the local level, as the GTZ cooperates with other donors, NGOs or local organization to get a broader understanding of the problem (Author interview with Cheluget; Kalweo; and Kiarie). Furthermore, they also occur within the structure of German development bureaucracy as the BMZ is regularly consulting the GTZ on the programs. Thus, the feedback which is locally obtained by the GTZ is taken seriously in both the agency and the BMZ. However, I do not intent to overestimate the actual influence such feedback has on decisions made at the ministerial level in the BMZ. But, according to the interviewees the GTZ stresses the importance of consultation and cooperation, and the feedback from other actors in the field is reflected in German programs (Author interviews with Ferguson; and Interviewee B, GTZ).

Jane Kalweo from UNAIDS points out that the coordination of donors in the health sector has improved in recent years. Especially, the countries of the European Union are focusing increasingly on a better coordination of their AIDS programs in Kenya (Author interview with Kalweo). Germany pushed strongly towards more collective efforts to fight AIDS in Kenya and its role in the creation and establishment of coordinating institutions such the Health Donors Working Group and the Interagency Coordination Committee was central. The monthly meetings of these donor groups underline the ambition of donors to coordinate their efforts in order to provide more efficient assistance.

These aspects of German AIDS programs in Kenya clearly reflect the foreign policy behavior of a civilian power. Even though what is described above is bilateral
development cooperation, it clearly reveals the civilian power characteristics of multilateral action, institution building and participatory decision making. It is a strong example of basing development policies on the commitment to cooperation and collective action in order to maximize the impact of the efforts and reach the intended outcome.

American programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya, on the other hand, clearly reflect the foreign political behavior of a great power. Since George W. Bush launched the *Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief* (PEPFAR) in 2003, American funds for the fight against HIV/AIDS have increased tremendously, but their usage is bound by the ideological and religious directives of the socially conservative Bush administration. Most of the money is used for the distribution of *Anti Retroviral Drugs* (ARVs), which significantly improve the lives of people living with HIV/AIDS. PEPFAR is, however, very restrictive with respect to promoting condom use and the inclusion of commercial sex workers (CSW) and drug users, which represent to most affected groups.

American AIDS-programs were described by most interviewees as fairly inflexible and rigid in the use of the funds. Even though cooperation with other donors has improved in more recent years, there is little consultation with locals or other organizations. Where interaction with other donors or local agencies does occur it seems to have little impact on the American strategy to fight the disease (Author interviews with Ferguson; Kalweo; and Kiarie).

Overall, American efforts to fight HIV/AIDS are less flexible and more unilateral than the ones of other donors. American aid workers in Kenya have very clear instructions on what the funds are to be used for and what needs to be done. They are well aware of the difficulties this causes and try to work closely with other donors in Kenya, so that areas where they are restricted are covered by others. The monthly meetings of the donor groups have proved effective in coordinating such efforts in the sense that the various donors complement each other geographically and in terms of contents (Author interview with Interviewee B, GTZ).
The previous sections have shown why Germany uses its foreign policies to promote an international system and how German development policies work. The next section examines how German development policies are influenced by its grand strategy as a civilian power.

**Influence of the Grand Strategy on Development Policies in Africa**

Preventive security politics means to conduct development policies which prevent conflicts by counteracting the problems where they are created. Hence, development policies are always security policies. (Richard von Weizsäcker 2000)

As a civilian power, Germany sees its part in the promotion of a civilianized international system not in military terms, but in specific foreign policies that aim to prevent certain situations from reaching a level where the use of force is inevitable. Having a very weak military, but being the world’s leading exporter, Germany needs an international system where military power clearly comes well after the rule of international law and institutions, as well as interdependencies and free trade. German power is economic, not military. International economic interactions work better in a secure, stable, law-abiding and organized environment. Germany needs an international system where economic power translates into political power and where military power is not needed to force through a country’s own national interest.

Because Germany cannot use military power as a means to pursue its global interests, it needs to use its economic strength, such as sanctions or exclusion of markets, or laws of international agreements and institutions. The emphasis on using development policies for the pursuit of broader geopolitical interests became more relevant after Schröder took office in 1998. The BMZ received a permanent seat in the *Bundessicherheitsrat* (BSR) – the Federal Security Council, which consists of the Chancellor and the Ministers for the Office of the Chancellor, Foreign Affairs, Defense,
Finance, Interior Affairs, Justice, Economy, and, since 1998, the Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development. The BSR meets in closed sessions on the cabinet minister level and is the highest and most important organ for the setting of German foreign and security policies. Granting the BMZ a permanent seat is a clear sign of Germany’s realization that developing countries and the policies towards them became increasingly important with respect to broader international politics (Engel 2000, 112-123).

Germany has realized that it can no longer be a free rider in the American world-economic system, but that it actively needs to promote a civilianized international system itself. Military engagement is not an option. Germany does not have the necessary capabilities, the political will, or the popular support at home. In fact, the strong opposition towards military engagement among the German population favors pre-emptive measures, as long as they are civilian. Schröder took a firmer and more independent approach to position “Germany abroad as a middle-sized power for peace” (Schröder 2005). The rhetoric has changed. Whereas Kohl previously offered an American president German capabilities and willingness to take international responsibility, Schröder tells Bush about Germany’s right to a more important voice (Author interview with Interviewee C, German diplomat).

It was the coalition agreement of Schröder’s first government in 1998 that abandoned development policies as development aid and started to consider them as global structural politics (SPD/Grüne 1998). As a result, development policies became far more politicized and integrated into the broader foreign policy context of the federal government (Author interview with Interviewee D, KfW).

For example, after the beginning of operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001, some €80 m ($99.2 m) were cut out of the budget of the BMZ and transferred to the AA to be channeled to Afghanistan as ODA (Author interview with Interviewee E, GTZ). As the BMZ was required to act more forcefully according to the foreign political directives set in the AA and the chancellor’s office, it also in turn took firmer control over its on-the-ground agencies. The work of GTZ and KfW has become increasingly
politically controlled either through the BMZ or the German embassies in the partner countries. There is still a good amount of flexibility for the agencies, but the programs are now more tightly integrated into the political directives between Germany and the partner countries, which are set at senior diplomatic levels (Author interview with Interviewee E, GTZ).

In 1998 development policies started to be regarded as “policies for a secure future” and the “development cooperation with Africa as an expression of responsibility to reduce global risks in future and to increase security” (translated from BMZ 2001, 8). As a result of the changing geopolitical conditions and the realization of how much the situation in the developing world can affect Western countries, the provision of ODA significantly increased in most recent years. Figure 18 shows that the total ODA of all OECD countries went up from $ 53.8 bn (€ 43.4 bn) to $ 79.5 bn (€ 64.1 bn) between 2000 and 2004, its share to Africa also increased from $ 10.4 bn (€ 8.4 bn) to $ 19.3 bn (€ 15.6 bn) during the same period.

![Graph showing ODA of all OECD countries (total and to Africa) 2000-2004.](source)

**Figure 18:** ODA of all OECD countries (total and to Africa) 2000-2004. *Source:* OECD 2006c
German ODA (total and to Africa) 2000-2004. Source: OECD 2006c

Figure 19 shows very similar trends for Germany. Its total ODA increased from $5.03 bn (€ 4.06 bn) in 2000 to $7.53 bn (€ 6.06 bn) in 2004, the share of ODA to Africa from $0.87 bn (€ 0.7 bn) to $1.4 bn (€ 1.13 bn). The peak in 2003 is a result of special commitments which were made as a reaction to the crisis and the formation of a transitional government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003. With the increased spending, development policies were supposed to become more efficient as a tool for the promotion of a civilianized international system.

The terror attacks of September 11th 2001 painfully revealed the negative side effects of globalization. Not only the economies of G8-countries enjoy the benefits of the ‘global village’, of interdependencies, of the relatively free movements of goods and services: international terrorism also takes advantage of such freedom. Furthermore, the increased transcontinental spread of diseases, such as HIV/AIDS or the avian flu, global environmental degradation, and millions of refugees moving from war-torn regions into Western countries have shown that it is essential for the West to assist the developing world in preventing such problems. In 1993 John O’Loughlin emphasized that “the levels of suffering in many parts of the world demand our constant concern, and not just when the television pictures of some atrociously violent act or devastating famine
command our brief attention” (O’Loughlin 1993, 109). Africa takes a central position in these concerns. It is the epicenter of global underdevelopment.

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), half of the population of sub-Saharan Africa lives on less than one US-dollar per day and about one third suffers from malnutrition (UNDP 2006). It is also the continent with the most warfare and the highest risks for state failure. The *Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research* identified 54 violent conflicts in Africa in 2004, 13 of which were classified as ‘highly intensive violent conflicts’ (HIIK 2005, 15). Such severe underdevelopment and high conflict intensity make it impossible or extremely difficult to create civilianized structures in Africa. As a consequence, Germany seeks to counteract underdevelopment and forces of state failure in order to create the conditions favorable to the inclusion of African countries into a civilianized international system. Its goal is to “transfer the interior level of civilianized structures to the international system” (Kirste and Maull 1996, 301) and to African countries.

Germany seeks to avoid situations where a country can not be included into the international system or at least in bilateral diplomatic conduct. Such a situation can be caused by two scenarios. In the first scenario, a specific state is domestically fairly stable and delivers services to the population, but does not want to act according to the rules of a civilianized international system or does not want to be included in such a system. Those are usually rather powerful developing or transitional states, such as China, Indonesia or various Middle Eastern states. The main issues of concern with respect to civilian power ideas are its insistence on human rights, good governance, or social and economic balance. In this case, it is difficult for Germany to act because the key actors, the German government and the government of the other country, pursue different goals. Germany as a civilian power can only exercise political and economic pressure or create incentives for the other government to change its policies.

The second scenario refers to countries where the government is simply too weak to act as effective service deliverer. This usually applies to German engagement in Africa. If internal unrest and the forces of state failure are rising, the capabilities of the
government to become more civilianized and work towards an inclusion into a civilianized international system drops. In this case, the goals of Germany and the recipient state are more similar than in the first case. There is a certain coherence of interest with respect to creating stable economic, social and political conditions. It is in Germany’s interest to provide assistance to increase the capabilities of the partner government to deliver essential services, create more stability, avoid state failure and shape their country in a way more favorable to inclusion in a civilianized international system.

In the first scenario development policies play a very minor role in the interaction between the governments. Development policies are clearly overshadowed by broader foreign policies and economic policies when it comes to relations with powerful developing or transitional countries, such as China, Brazil, India, etc. Violations against the conditions for German development cooperation do not necessarily cause severe consequences regarding the provision of ODA.

In the second scenario, however, development policies are more independent. They are used to create civilianized structures in weaker countries, either through the support of the government to act as effective service deliverers or through the support of other agencies like NGOs. Deficiencies in political performance, especially with respect to good governance and human rights, are pointed out a lot more rigorously in this scenario than they are in the first one (Author interview with Interviewee D, KfW).

It is important to note that, even in the second scenario where development policies are somewhat independent from foreign policies, they are still used as tools to reach the broader foreign political interest in creating civilianized structures in Africa. Those realpolitikal interests become clearly evident in the Afrika-Konzept of the BMZ in 2001 as it emphasizes the security aspect of its development politics as mentioned above. Announcing their own national security as one of the pillars of development politics clearly illustrates that those are conducted by rationality and broader foreign political interests. Through increasing global interdependencies and changing geopolitical conditions, such realpolitikal interests experienced an entirely new
motivation in the late 1990s, because it became obvious that state failure in Africa can be a serious concern to European security interests.

The common interest in avoiding state failure and in creating stable social, economic and political conditions led to a more intense engagement with Africa. Germany and other Western countries are acting according to the rationale that increased engagement now to improve living conditions helps to prevent severe long-term costs which might arise in future if the situation severely deteriorates. Such long-term costs can all be factors threatening the civilianized international system which is essential for Germany. If we also take into account indirect linkages, it becomes very obvious that the major underlying motivation for development cooperation is driven by geopolitical interests (Author interviews with Interviewee C, German diplomat; and Interviewee E, GTZ).

However, development policies are certainly not exclusively motivated by ‘hard’ geopolitical interest. Civilian powers have a humanitarian component: the terms ‘human rights’, ‘social and economic balance’, and ‘universal norms’ are central to the concept. With regard to Africa, those components have a larger influence on development cooperation than with countries such as China.

The purpose of this research is not to prove or disprove the humanitarian character of German development policies. Nor is it to show that development policies are a decisive component in German grand strategy. They are not! Even though the official statements and documents try to communicate that point, the data on funding for ODA clearly shows that this is not the case. Despite the increased awareness of the importance of developing countries, development policies are still very much subordinate to broader foreign policies. The purpose of this study is not to show the relevance of development policies to German grand strategy as a civilian power, but to show the relevance of the grand strategy to German development policies. This character will be illustrated in the following six examples. The first three are specific to the German engagement in Kenya. The last three examples show the more general civilian power aspects of German development policies.
First, with respect to regional security and stability in Eastern Africa Kenya holds the central position. In December 2002, Kenya set an example for other African states by holding free and fair elections. An authoritarian regime that had lasted for almost 40 years, first under the founder of the nation, Jomo Kenyatta, and from 1978 onwards under Daniel Arap Moi, was replaced in democratic elections by the opposition party. Mwai Kibaki, the head of the National Rainbow Coalition, a multiethnic group formed out of various opposition parties, became president. As legitimacy increased, resistance against the former regime declined, and the risk for state failure also decreased. The new democratically elected government based on a consensual coalition of various ethnic and political groups conforms much more to civilianized structures as envisioned by Germany. In order to support the democratic shift and the new government, Germany provided € 14.3 m ($ 17.7 m) of special commitments as a reaction to the democratic elections. In the following year those commitments were made permanent, so that the German government more than doubled its bilateral commitments from € 13 m ($ 16.12 m) to € 27.5 m ($ 34.1 m) (AA 2005).

Second, the GTZ provides significant support for the Peace Support and Training Centre (PSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya on a financial, technical and know-how level. The PSTC is one of five regional African training facilities to enhance the quality of peacekeeping missions and to train peacekeepers with respect to civilian aspects in military operations, peace keeping and the post-war reconstruction of civilian structures (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat).

Third, on behalf of the UNHCR, the GTZ manages the large refugee camps of Dadaab and Kakuma in the northern part of Kenya. The camps host a total of 240,000 refugees, mainly from the surrounding fragile countries, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, the northern part of Uganda, and the Congo. This engagement is a central part of the strategy to avoid a worsening of the situation in already unstable areas. Conflict intensity around the Great Lakes is a humanitarian disaster and a severe threat to political stability as refugees can be easy recruits for criminal organizations. Refugee camps are supposed to ease some of the human suffering and counteract some of the
problems associated with refugees caused by conflicts (Author interview with Interviewee B, GTZ).

Fourth, German development cooperation focuses on ‘high potential areas’. It tries to counteract situations considered as specifically problematic in order to avoid an aggravation of circumstances to a level where problems spread out with more severe consequences (Author interview with Interviewee A, German diplomat). For instance, in Kenya the German efforts to fight HIV/AIDS focus on the provinces with the highest prevalence rates and the goal to reduce prevalence there. Choosing ‘high potential areas’ for intense engagement was a result of the policy of *Schwerpunktbildung* begun in 2000. The focus on fewer countries and sectors expresses the more politicized nature of development cooperation with respect to the goal to use it more precisely where it is considered as specifically important.

Fifth, German development policies are conflict averse with regard to its partners. Development Policies are subordinate to the other central civilian power aspects of foreign policy, such as effective institutions and good relations with partners. Germany usually does not risk a serious disagreement with its key partners in the EU or NATO over issues like development projects in Africa. The overall goal of credible and effective alliances and institutions is regarded as far more important than a specific development issue. Germany’s development policies are conflict averse because they are supposed to support broader foreign policy goals and not create additional problems (Mair 2002, 16). For instance, France’s ongoing insistence on primacy in francophone Africa continuously caused disagreements with Germany and other European partners. In order to avoid problems arising from those disagreements, Germany eventually focused its engagement in Africa on the Anglophone part (Mair 1999). This conflict aversion applies to Germany’s OECD partner countries as well as to powerful developing and transitional countries, such as China or Indonesia.

Sixth, *Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss* has its roots in the civilian power character of German foreign policy. As illustrated in figure 20 German development policies are strongly multilateral and integrated into international
institutions. In 2004, Germany provided $3.71 bn (€2.99 bn) of multilateral ODA. In absolute terms this was the highest number of all OECD donor countries. In relative terms it accounted for 49% of total German ODA and was second only to Italy.

The fact that Germany spends almost half of its total ODA multilaterally is clearly congruent with the civilian power ideas of multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration. Even the bilateral share of German ODA is for the most part spent after intense multilateral exchange and coordination. With the changes in 2000 (Schwerpunktbildung and Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss), the goal was set to make assistance more efficient through intensified coordination of all development efforts in respective countries. This is based on frequent and close cooperation of all the actors involved, such as the local authorities, NGOs, bi- and multilateral donors (Author interviews with Interviewee B, GTZ; and Interviewee D, KfW). Such an approach is very different to the development policies of a great power. As argued in section 3.3, those are a lot more unilateral and less based on cooperation and consultation. Figure 20 also clearly shows this distinction, with the high multilateral share of German ODA, compared to the United States which only spends 18 percent of its ODA multilaterally.
Table 5 compares the characteristics for civilian power as seen in table 4 with the characteristics of German development policies based on the conditions from 1991 and the foci outlined in 1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Power</th>
<th>Development Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>multilateralism and supranational integration</td>
<td>multilateralism and conflict aversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rule of law and institution-building</td>
<td>rule of law and legal certainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free trade and social and economic balance</td>
<td>social market economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejection of the use of force</td>
<td>crisis prevention and peaceful conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human rights and binding norms</td>
<td>human rights and participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of the criteria on either side illustrates that German development policies are clearly influenced by its grand strategy as a civilian power. In 1993 Maull argued that “Civilian powers are states which are willing and able to advance the civilianization of the international system [and] the rule of law” (Maull 1993). Schröder’s first coalition agreement in 1998 stated with respect to development policies that “they are guided by the commitment to further civilianization and the rule of law in international relations” (translated from SPD/Grüne 1998).

The phrasing of the coalition agreement copies the academic work on the civilian power concept almost word for word. Germany developed into a civilian power during the Cold War because within this framework it regained wealth and influence in the international system. The name ‘civilian power’ was developed in context with an ideal typical role concept intended to explain the foreign political behavior of Germany during that time. Hence, it is certainly not surprising that foreign policies, and development policies, followed fairly closely the ideal typical role concept. However, major changes have occurred since the role concept was first formulated in 1990. When Germany developed into a civilian power during the Cold War, it did so unconsciously. Policy makers acted the way they did not because they were guided by a grand strategy, but because of underlying norms and values resulting from the historical experiences of
World War II and because of a desire to rebuild Germany and become re-integrated into the Western world-economy. This was as much a choice of German elites and the German people as it was a force of circumstances and of the international system provided by American hegemony.

German foreign political behavior since reunification has become more independent and less a result of the forces of circumstances. With reunification and European integration Germany became bigger and in certain ways also more influential. Its foreign political behavior aimed less at adapting to a certain international system and more at shaping that international system. The international system in question has largely been provided by the United States in the second half of the twentieth century, with Germany creating its foreign policy in order to adapt to that international system and thus enjoying the benefits of it as a free rider. It did so successfully, became an integral part of the system, and depends on its continued functioning to maintain an influential role in international relations.

The academic conceptualization of the civilian power concept helped policy makers to realize the importance of promoting such an international system. It could no longer be taken for granted and if Germany sought to increase its role in the world it could no longer benefit from the American system as a free rider. Instead it needed to engage independently in order to create an international environment favorable to its internalized foreign policy identity. German policy makers realized that the academic conceptualization of civilian power in fact explained past foreign policy reasonably well and provided useful suggestions for future foreign policies. The way Germany had acted unconsciously in the past became recognized as the most promising way for Germany to consciously conduct foreign policy in future in order to act successfully on the international stage.

Such a realization had an impact on foreign policies much earlier than on development policies. Changing geopolitical conditions in the 1990s meant it was only logical for Schröder’s administration to consider development policies as ‘global structural policies’ in 1998. As soon as it became clear that through globalization and
global interdependencies the situation in the developing world could severely impact Germany’s national interests, it was only a matter of time until development policies would be more strongly embedded into Germany’s grand strategy and its broader foreign political considerations. This is precisely the case with respect to current German development cooperation.

Summary

The foreign political behavior of Germany as a civilian power differs quite significantly from that of the United States as a great power. Multilateralism, the restriction of the use of force, and supranational integration are central to Germany’s foreign policies. The United States is a lot less or, in the case of supranational integration, not at all, committed to those attributes. Even though both the United States as a great power and Germany as a civilian power employ both hard power and soft power to reach their international goals, there is a clear tendency for a civilian power to focus on soft and integrative power, whereas hard power is more relevant to the foreign policies of a great power. This is as much a matter of political choice as it is a matter of capabilities. A great power simply possesses more hard power means of power projection, above all a strong military, and is also willing to use those means. The strength of a civilian power lies in the effective deployment of soft power. It can usually build on high levels of integrative power created by a commitment to cooperative and collective decision making, which is central to the civilian power concept.

Those trends are clearly obvious in German development policies. After reunification in 1990, such policies underwent two major changes. In 1991, five conditions for the provision of development cooperation were outlined. In 1998, development policies became far more politicized and tied into the broader foreign political framework. In the international comparison, Germany is the fifth largest donor of development assistance, but lags severely behind the goal of spending 0.7% of its GNI on development cooperation.
Reproductive Health and the fight against HIV/AIDS is one of three German development priorities in Kenya as a priority partner country for German development cooperation. German efforts are very closely related to the Kenyan strategy to fight the disease and conducted in cooperation with other donors and local organizations. The main goal is to reach a comprehensive and integrative approach, not only with respect to the donor community, but also with respect to actions taken locally. HIV/AIDS is not only supposed to be fought as a health problem, but as a problem for social, economic and political development. Therefore the projects to fight the epidemic should be included in all spheres of Kenyan state action and the donor’s development cooperation.

These strongly multilateral and cooperative programs to fight HIV/AIDS in Kenya are a clear example of how German development politics in general reflect civilian power ideals. With spending roughly half its total ODA multilaterally, mainly through the EU, German development cooperation is much more multilateral than that of other OECD countries. This is a result of Germany’s foreign policy identity as a civilian power, which strongly favors multilateralism. The major changes in development policies after reunification show strong coherence with the ideal typical role concept of a civilian power. German development policies are embedded in its broader foreign political interests rooted in the grand strategy. They are a tool to pursue the interest of promoting a civilianized international system which Germany needs to operate effectively in the international system.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Germany’s interest in Africa during the 20th century has gone through several different phases. There has always been an economic interest with respect to the extraction of African resources. In addition there has also almost always been a certain strategic interest. This has shifted for different reasons depending on the role Germany was playing in the international system at the time.

During Germany’s imperialist period before World War I, the economic interest was stronger than in any other period. Germany’s increasing ambition to become a great power and maybe succeed Britain as the global hegemon led to the German ‘Grab for Africa’. Even though Wilhelmine Germany pursued a policy of substituting tropical and subtropical imports through a focus on science and the goal to produce artificial replacements, this did not mean that it would not strive for colonies in Africa (Hugill and Bachmann 2005, 162-163).

Germany believed that resources were necessary to compete economically with other great powers, however, to a large extent German colonialism in Africa was also a matter of prestige if it was to be considered ‘equal’ to those other powers. It became an official war aim for Germany in the World War I to acquire a large colonial empire in central Africa – Mittelafrika. This expansionism was rooted in both the attitude of German economic and political elites and in the attitude of the general population. Germany had been growing and thriving for two generations before World War I and people strongly believed that it was time for Germany to acquire a ‘place in the sun’ (Fischer 1967, 7).

There was no specific plan with regard to Africa in Nazi-Germany. Those who called for the re-acquisition of the former colonies did so based on a general opposition to the Treaty of Versailles. Even more so than in Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi-Germany focused on science as a substitute for tropical imports. Some economic interest in the availability of African resources was still present, but it was of no major relevance. The
only real interest in Africa was that it would become part of a German pan-region. This concept was based on the geopolitical visions of Karl Haushofer and was different from the classical concept of colonial control. It did not call for total political control, rather for the inclusion of Africa in Germany’s sphere of influence. Official Nazi-policy, however, differed to some extent because it was more radical and sought to dominate the entire world. Nonetheless, with respect to Africa and unlike before World War I there was no specific plan.

During the Cold War, Germany’s interest in Africa was motivated by other foreign political considerations, mainly the integration into the Western world under American hegemony. Economic interests were limited and the strategic interest of integration determined Germany’s Africa policy. Germany tried to fulfill the expectations of its European partners with respect to burden sharing on the continent that was about to decolonize. Germany also very quickly became a part of the American led economic and political international system. As such, one of its main interests in Africa was to counteract the spread of Soviet influence on the continent. The Hallstein-doctrine determined German Africa policy throughout most of the 1960s. It denied diplomatic contact to any country which would officially recognize the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

After the Cold War, Germany’s interest in Africa was substantially reduced. There was still a limited economic interest in the availability of resources, but strategic interest almost completely ceased to exist in the early 1990s due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Germany focused on its own reunification and European integration, and African resources continued to flow. There was no need for Germany to engage heavily on the African continent. However, German reunification and geopolitical changes in the 1990s changed the rules of the game. Reunification was followed by a political reorientation which resulted in Germany’s realization that it could no longer enjoy the benefits of an American international system as a free rider, but needed to engage more actively on an international level. Germany had become dependent on a civilianized international system by adapting to and co-operating in an international system America
established after World War II and which had allowed Germany to rebuild and reintegrate. Mauell points out that

During the post-war period (West) German foreign policy settled into the mould of a ‘civilian power’ – a particular foreign policy identity or ‘role concept’ which promotes multilateralism, institution-building, and supranational integration and tries to constrain the use of force in international relations through national and international norms. (Mauell 2004, 89)

Germany grand strategy is now based on this role concept and Germany’s prime geopolitical interest is the promotion of a civilianized international system, because it needs such structures to operate effectively on the international level.

Global interdependencies and globalization have shown that the situation in Africa can have major impacts on the overall functioning of such a system. Therefore, during the 1990s Germany once again developed a strategic interest in Africa: the creation of civilianized structures in order to include African countries in a civilianized international system.

This is the first time in German history that it has developed an independent strategic interest in Africa. If we assume that economic interests in the availability of African resources have remained largely unchanged during the past century, we can point out three phases of strategic interest. First, Imperial Germany and its desire to acquire colonies for prestige in order to be ‘equal’ to the other great powers. Second, Germany during the Cold War and its engagement in Africa in order to re-integrate into the Western community and to counteract Soviet influence. Third, a reunified Germany and the need to promote civilianized structures for a civilianized international system to work. Only in the third case is the German interest not a result of external political constellations. In the first case Germany perceived itself in a ‘second rank’ – position if it did not possess colonies as other major powers did. In the second case Germany
wished to be seen by the Western partners as a reliable partner. In the third case, the German interest is not influenced by such external forces, but derives from its own national interest in promoting the specific international system Germany needs to operate effectively.

The functioning of such a system requires the actors in it to be “peaceful and civilian, developed and cooperative, democratic and law-abiding” (Mair 2002, 11). State failure in Africa counteracts such conditions. Failing states do not fulfill any of those criteria. They are characterized by the collapse of state authority and state power, lawlessness and increasing anarchy, the rise of criminal and terrorist networks, crime and violence, and humanitarian crisis and suppression. This is in fundamental contrast to the civilian structures needed for a civilianized international system. State failure, thus, is in fundamental conflict with Germany’s prime geopolitical interest.

The problems associated with high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS are conducive to state failure. The extent with which HIV/AIDS has impacted sub-Saharan African is unmatched in any other part of the world. Even though the spread of the pandemic has slowed recently, more and more people become infected each year. HIV/AIDS is a serious obstacle to development in sub-Saharan Africa. It severely cuts into family and social structures by killing the part of the population needed most in the society and economy: young adults. This causes massive destruction of current as well as future human capital. AIDS leaves behind millions of orphans who are unlikely to receive adequate education because they are forced to make a living for themselves. The effects on productivity and the economy are enormous, especially on agriculture, education, and security.

First, food security and the income from foreign exchange from cash crop production are severely threatened if a country is not capable of maintaining a productive agricultural sector. Second, education systems suffer severely from the loss of teachers due to AIDS and the burden of educating millions of young people in order to replace the human capital killed by AIDS. Third, AIDS severely undercuts state capacity and leaves many African security forces extremely weakened or not deployable.
This means that, for African states, the maintenance of internal law and order, as well as external peacekeeping operations, becomes extremely difficult, because AIDS leaves their power projection tools ineffective.

Those problems are conducive to state failure and are thus serious obstacles to the establishment of civilian structures. This is not to say that high AIDS prevalence rates automatically cause state failure. Botswana, the world’s most affected country, shows that is not necessarily the case. However, high prevalence rates are likely to create conditions favorable to state failure. Hence, there are strong indirect links between high prevalence rates, sustainable development, state failure, and civilian structures: the higher the prevalence rates, the more difficult sustainable development; the more likely state failure, the harder the establishment of civilian structures.

The German vision of how the world should operate is rooted in the liberal world order that the United States provided after World War II, an order that allowed Germany to recover from the war. This vision has determined German foreign policy for more than five decades now. Several years after Germany became reunified and hence one of the bigger ‘middle-sized powers’ it emerged with a clearly stated grand strategy based on its foreign policy identity as a civilian power and rooted in all its post-1945 experience. Germany has now no choice but to use its foreign policies to maintain this civilianized international system where it is in danger and to establish it where it is not in place.

The overall goal of promoting a civilianized international system is also apparent in German development policies and was exemplified in two major changes during the 1990s. First, in 1991 compliance with human rights, participation of the population in the political process, validity of the rule of law, creation of a market-friendly system, and development-orientation of state organs were outlined as conditions for the provision of German development cooperation. Second, in 1998 an additional focus was put on human rights, crisis prevention, and peaceful conflict resolution, as well as on civilianization and the rule of law in international relations. On the practical side these changes meant a ‘priority setting’ (Schwerpunktbildung) and a more ‘seamless
development cooperation’ (Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aus einem Guss). Through Schwerpunktbildung German development cooperation became more selective and, thus, focused on certain countries and sectors. Kenya was chosen as a priority partner country for German development cooperation, and reproductive health as one of three development priorities in Kenya.

Germany has been active in the HIV/AIDS sector in Kenya for almost twenty years, resulting in a significant influence on the Kenyan strategy to fight the disease. German and Kenyan policies are largely similar. German programs are characterized by cooperation and consultation with other donors and organizations working in the field. They aim at being inclusive and integrative with respect to both the provision of ODA from the donor community and mainstreaming the problem in all spheres of society and state. As such German programs differ radically from the American AIDS policies, which are more unilateral and show a much less cooperative and consultative character. The civilian power character, thus, comes out clearly in the conduct of German development policies.

Germany’s prime interest, however, is in the overall functioning of the civilianized international system. In these efforts developing countries only play a fairly small role, because despite the increased attention they have received in recent years, developing countries are still minor players in global politics. Germany’s main foreign political focus is still on the major players. Certainly, Germany is more concerned with developing countries now than it was a decade ago and development policies have become more important in its broader foreign political framework. German official documents and statements of politicians presented in this work prove that point. However, there is a serious gap between such statements and the actual policies. German ODA seriously lags behind the commitments made in both absolute and relative terms. Development policies are far from playing the role in Germany’s international engagement officials and documents claim they play. Just as developing countries are minor players in international relations, German development policies are a minor part of Germany’s geopolitical strategy.
On the other hand, however, the geopolitical strategy drives German development policies. The changes in 1998 clearly reflect the civilian power orientation of development policies. They reflect exactly the foreign political behavior of a civilian power, with respect to their conception, their conduct, and their relevance within the broader foreign political framework.

First, civilian power ideals are reflected in the conception of development policies because the characteristics for a civilian power are clearly outlined as goals for development policies.

Second, civilian power ideals are reflected in the conduct of development policies because Germany acts in a highly multilateral, as well as consensual, consultative, and cooperative fashion with other donors and local agencies.

Third, civilian power ideals are reflected in the relevance of development policies within the broader foreign political framework because they are conflict averse. The main foreign political goal of a civilian power is the overall peaceful functioning of a civilianized international system. Even though development policies fully aim at this goal, they only remain independent as long as they do not cause frictions with any of the main players in world politics. It is more important to have those players, be it OECD partners or powerful developing or transitional countries, included in the system than to insist on a specific development issue. German development policies are highly conflict averse and clearly subordinate to other foreign political interests. Development policies are supposed to assist the main geopolitical goal of an inclusive civilianized international system, instead of creating frictions between its major players.

The long-term maintenance and promotion of the civilianized international system is associated with costs which Germany naturally tries to keep as low as possible. Such costs include the immediate costs of development cooperation or future costs such as having to deal with state failure and the associated broader international implications. Germany and other western countries have realized that it is cheaper to fight the causes of state failure and other problems in Africa than it is to deal with the consequences when they spill out of Africa. It is a simple cost-benefit calculation, with Germany
acting the way it does in order to keep its version of the international system going at relatively low costs. I believe Germany has a strong and serious interest in creating better living conditions in Africa, but I also believe that to do so is in the German national interest. Non-engagement would mean potentially very unpleasant consequences.

German development policies aim at preventing such unpleasant consequences and are, thus, part of Germany’s grand strategy as a civilian power. This grand strategy includes a humanitarian component based on values and norms resulting from the historical experience of World War II and the period of rebuilding and re-integrating Germany. This humanitarian component spills over into German development policies, but within the overall framework of geopolitical interests rooted in the civilian power concept. However much development policies are motivated by humanitarian reasons, for the most part they are used as tools to promote Germany’s broader geopolitical interest of a civilianized international system.
REFERENCES


    [10/26/05].
Craddock, Susan. 2004. Beyond Epidemiology: Locating AIDS in Africa. In HIV and
    AIDS in Africa: Beyond Epidemiology, ed. Ezekiel Kalipeni et al, 1-10. Malden,
    MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Daily Nation. 2000. AIDS accounts for 75 Per Cent of Police Officers Deaths. 27
DED – Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst. 2004. Reproductive Health/HIV and AIDS in
    Kenya; Working Concept prepared by Andrea Milkowski in August 2004.
    Nairobi, Kenya: DED Kenya.
    [11/26/04].
    York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
    New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.
Earle, Edward Mead, ed. 1943. Makers of Modern Strategy – Military Thought from
    Berlin, Germany: Akademie Verlag.
    Development Cooperation. Nairobi, Kenya: EFRG.
    International Security 27 (2): 159-177.
    Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.


http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,2340,en_2649_34485_1893129_1_1_1_1,00.html [01/15/06].

________. 2006b. OECD reviews Germany’s development aid.
http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,2340,en_2649_201185_35887341_1_1_1_1,00.html [01/16/06].

________. 2006c. Database: Development Assistant Committee.
http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/DACAuthenticate.asp [01/22/06].


http://www.swissinfo.org/sen/swissinfo.html?siteSect=143&sid=5674641&cKey=1113241828000 [01/16/06].


Bonn, Germany: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung


**Interviews**

   Nairobi, Kenya on June 20th and 21st 2005


Interviewees A-E. 2005. Interviewees requested to stay anonymous. Interviews were conducted between June and August 2005 in Kenya and Germany.


Ndungu, Ezekiel. 2005. Interview with Ezekiel Ndungu, Head Teacher of Makindu Primary School in Kitale, Kenya on June 24th 2005


VITA

Veit Bachmann was born on December 6, 1979 in Aschaffenburg, Germany. From 2001 to 2004, he studied Geography, Political Science/International Relations, and Economics at the University of Trier, Germany, where he completed his undergraduate studies with a Vordiplom in 2003. In 2004, he joined the Department of Geography at Texas A&M University to pursue a M.S. degree under the direction of Professor Peter Hugill. His research interests are political and development geography, geopolitics, Africa, international relations, transatlantic relations and the interaction between the developed and the developing world.

Veit Bachmann can be reached at: Bozerei 5, 63875 Mespelbrunn, Germany. His email address is veitbachmann@web.de.