

*TENDENCY SEPARATION AMONG BRITISH LABOUR AND  
CONSERVATIVE EUROPEANIST PARTISANS:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTY LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES TOWARD EUROPEAN  
INTEGRATION, 1978-1995*

A Senior Thesis

By

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
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
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## Abstract

### **Tendency Separation Among British Labour and Conservative Europeanist Partisans: Implications for Party Leadership Strategies Toward European Integration, 1978-1995.**

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As Britain's future relationship within the European Union has become increasingly a more salient issue not only among the political elites, but also among the general electorate, it is not very surprising that many students of British politics have sought new, improved theories to explain the dynamics of party politics coloring the debate over Europe. Building on these studies, we offer an alternative model for understanding the degree of tendency separation among the partisan electoral base of Britain's two major parties—the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. We integrate four bodies of literature and devise two different models—the nominal model and the evaluative model—for analyzing the issue of the European Union within the partisan electorate of the Conservative and Labour parties. Using Eurobarometer data drawn from surveys between 1978-1995, our analysis demonstrates that partisan dispositions toward the European union within the British electorate are forged by key values that must also be assumed to bind a voter to a specific party. In particular, we distinguish between two sets of values – core values, or those values that determine one's dispositions to the broader political-economy of both Britain and an emerging European Union, and system values, or those values which orient a person to a specific system-performance values. Our evaluative model focuses on estimated tendency separations among the Europeanists within the electoral base of the Labour and Conservative parties. Concentrating upon segregated Europeanist True-Partisans with the electorate of each of the two major British parties, we specify the spatial locations of three separate Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups along the general issue dimension of the European Union. To better gauge the existing divisions over the issue of Europe, we use two distinct measures of separation – the issue valence and the degree of issue expressiveness. We conclude that the degree of separation among the tendencies has an immediate practical implications on party leadership strategies.

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## Introduction

The response of markets throughout Europe and Britain following the announcement by Gordon Brown in the fall of 1997 that the United Kingdom would not join new European currency unit—the EURO-- during the current parliament vividly highlighted the dilemma that has been confronting British political elites since the later part of 1980s. While the Conservative and Labour Party leadership has been reconciled to the reality that Britain cannot afford, politically or economically, to remain outside of a politically and economically integrated Europe, the general public remains skeptical and ambivalent on the issue. As late as April 1998, a poll commissioned by the British Foreign Office reported that 42 percent of the public could not see Britain's future in Europe, and another 40 percent regard the European Union as a policy failure. None the less the same poll reported that 48 percent of the British public favor Britain's eventual entry into the single currency union, while another 46 percent are opposed to such a policy. (London Times, 1998) This contrasts with business elites who tend to be more favorably disposed to the union and its single currency. In 1994, for instance, a poll of 206 senior industrialists by the Confederation of British Industry reported 56 percent believed a single European currency would be beneficial for European trade, and another 28 percent believed the single currency would be necessary for a single market. (Sowemimo, 1996, p. 92)

As Tony Blair has discovered since his election as the prime minister and John major knew all too well before his defeat, it is not enough to rally party MPs and Britain's financial groups to the aid of a European policy. The real task lies in convincing the core constituents of his party that Britain's inclusion within the a federal Europe is no longer an option that can be

dismissed but rather a reality of tomorrow. The issue and its resolution are of major concern not merely to Britain but also the European Union, which cannot afford to have a single currency and a central monetary policy devoid of the skills and dexterity of the British currency markets, and to the United States, which despite its recent tendencies towards the East, is still strongly associated with the financial and capital markets of its Anglo-Saxon cousin and continental partners across the Atlantic.

Within this context, the purpose of this study is to measure the degree of separation among the principal "Europeanist" tendency groups within the partisan electoral base of the two major British parties – the Labour Party and the Conservative Party – between 1978-1995. To this end, the present study integrates four bodies of literature: (1) British party politics with regard to the European union issue, (2) voting behavior, (3) political leadership, and (4) party factionalism and tendencies. Most studies within the current literature concentrate upon either the general degree of support for Europe among the general electorate (Rasmussen, 1997), or more commonly, the extent of support among party MPs (Gary 1995; Sowemimo, 1996; Webb, 1997). By contrast, our paper concentrates on partisan voters of the Labour and Conservative parties which, we argue, are of much greater long term significance to the strategies of the parties leadership. These partisans are those who express attachment to a party, express a voting preference for that party, and who have developed a positive disposition towards the EU. For we believe that it is these partisans who provide the party leadership with the political anchoring that is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for any successful effort by leaders to forge a lasting pro-European policy for Britain.

The divisions among the parliamentary membership of the two major British parties over

the issue of European Union is well documented phenomenon. (Beloff, 1996; Black, 1994; Butler and Westlake, 1995) What is happening at the parliamentary level of British politics with regard to the issue of the European union can equally be assumed to take place just beneath the surface of each party - within the partisan electorate of the respective major parties. The divisions that occur at this level are defined by those tendencies within the partisan electorate which also adhere to differing attitudinal preferences toward a European policy. Our study stands in contrast to other studies within its genre for yet another reason: rather than focusing on the gap between Europhiles and Europhobes, we focus exclusively on the gap which separates tendencies within the pro-European, or Europeanist wing of the partisan electorate of the two major parties. If these critical tendency groups become even further separated not only from each other, but also from the preference positions of their respective tendency counterparts in the opposition party, the strategies open to the respective party leaderships will certainly be impacted as significantly as when party whips are unable to direct the political convictions of their parliamentary membership.

The difficulty in focusing upon such tendency groups within the electorate of each party is working around sharp data limitations. The tendencies we have identified are based on attitudinal preference locations toward one or more political issues. These data are often more subtle and refined than we may ordinarily accommodate by use of the more nominally based survey categories from which we traditionally work. However, we will propose a means of circumventing these obstacles and offering at least initial estimates of the degree and nature of separation of Europeanist tendency groups within each of the two major parties of Great Britain.

In this study we are guided by the assumption that the leadership of both parties prefers British entry into the inner core of the European Union including the European Monetary System. With this assumption as the background, we begin by specifying the general tendency groups within the electoral base of the two parties. We further limit our analysis by focusing only on the most partisan of the party voters. These are distinguished as the "True-Partisans" while the remaining are considered "Mere-Voters". By using nominal measures of support for a Europeanist policy within each of these four partisan groups across the two parties, we achieve an initial estimate of the broader Europeanist tendencies within each party, as well as across the two parties. This is the nominal model which concentrates on the Nominal Europeanist Tendency Groups. The purpose of this study, however, is to go beyond this model and construct a different more complex model which associates the choices for the specific Europeanist tendencies with the key values that bind the partisan voter to a specific party. To achieve this we construct an evaluative model for estimating the political preferences among the "True-Partisans" who have a positive attitude towards the EU. Having obtained these parameter estimates, we next simulate three crucial tendency groups of the True-Partisan. By empirically specifying the quantitative score of each of the key values for a "strong", "mean", and "weak" Europeanist tendency group, we then estimate the overall political preferences of each of these three tendency groups with respect to the EU.

We argue that it is these three specialized tendency groups which represent the most immediate and important constraint on the party leadership, for it is they which are most likely to view the European policy of each party with a degree of salience, and it is they who are most likely to act in response to the leadership policy. It is these groups which anchors the electoral

viability of each party (at least with respect to a policy stance on the European Union), and it is they which must be most carefully monitored for separation from their party brethren. From the perspective of the British party leader, or from the perspective of a citizen having a stake in Britain's role within the European Union, it is the separation of these three value based tendency groups of the most partisan wings of the Labour and Conservative Party that define the boundaries of British policy toward the European Union.

At the beginning of this study we summarize the changes that the European Union has passed through since late 1970s, distinguishing between three particular periods – Pluralism, Consultation, and Concertation. We also briefly survey the respective policy preferences adopted by the Labour and the Conservative parties during the same time period (1978-1995) towards the EU. We then move on to presentation of the theory, drawing a distinction between the general concepts of factions and tendencies. While ordinarily employed within the context of political party organizations, we suggest these concepts have equally relevant applicability to the descriptions of the respective electoral constituency base of the two major political parties in Great Britain. The central focus of our theory draws on the work of Rose and McAllister (1991) and Stokes (1991) by showing how, through application of the concepts of issue expressiveness and issue valence we may not only distinguish between different attitudinal tendencies across and within the electoral constituencies of the two major parties, but from this framework also draw important distinctions with respect to the implied strategies of the leadership on the issue of a European policy.

From here we proceed to the analysis part of the study, which is divided into three steps. The first phase contains the discussion of a key values and their measurement. These form the

foundation for our evaluative model which examines the degrees of separation between several political preferences within the partisan electorate. The second phase contains a standard OLS regression analysis of the evaluative model, from which the parameter estimates of each of the key values undergirding the various Europeanist tendencies across the electoral base of partisan voters are derived. The third and final phase presents a rather straightforward simulation analysis of the degree of separation among the various Europeanist tendencies of the True-Partisans within the electorate of the two major parties of Great Britain. At the end of the analysis section is the examination of the implications for evaluating the leadership strategies toward Europe employed by the two parties between 1978-1995.

### **Britain and the European Union, 1978-1995**

#### *The European Union Environment Within the Context of British Partisanship*

As we have stated earlier, this study assumes that British partisan orientation towards European Union is formed by linking it to person's core values that are expressed through one's partisanship, a position underscored by the recent studies of Gary (1995) and Rasmussen (1997). A party's position on the European Union, therefore, is expected to be partially influenced by partisan voter attitudes towards Union. However, no party can form a position on any political issue without influence of the external environment. In the case of attitudinal preferences toward the European Union the nature of the European Union itself is a very important factor.

Upon examining the transitions through which the European Union has evolved during the past three decades, we adopt the logic of Hayward (1995) and distinguish between three



periods of development - Pluralism, Consultation, and Concertation. First, there was a period of Pluralism (1978-1983), a time of voluntary association and competitive interaction between the participating nation states. This is the time of the European Economic Community - continuation of enlargement, institutionalization of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the establishment of a European Council, which assumed the main leadership role but was relegated to nothing more than a "regularly scheduled meeting and a rotating presidency with a six-month tenure." McKay (1996, p. 67) notes further that "the interests of the countries of the EC [European Community] appeared to diverge rather than converge during this period". This period came to an end in early 1980s with realization on part of European Community that without further political-economic institutional, and indeed, constitutional adaption, the goals of a unified market would be undermined.

This was followed by a period of Consultation (1984-1989)- mutual accommodation between interests of nation-state and transnational organizations. During this five year span there was an increased effort to lay the foundation for a single European concept, as well as the deepening of European institutional authority. This period witnessed not only increased cooperation among the member -states, but more importantly the stronger cooperation between member -states and supranational institutions of EC. The passage of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 "marked a significant change in the way the European Community operated" (McKay, 1996, p. 67). SEA added to the strength of the European institutions, inspiring member -states toward greater levels of policy cooperation with the supranational institutions of EC. However, McKay emphasizes that the major accomplishment of SEA was "the intention to create a single market in goods, capital, and labour by 1992" rather than giving up of national

independence to European Community institutions, "as far as institutional arrangements were concerned, the SEA did represent some movement towards the federal model, although these were not fundamental in nature" (71.). It was the third period which brought about the most important move towards the federal Europe.

The Concertation period extends across the five years from 1990-1995. The period is characterized by vertically segmented subsystems in which neither national governments nor supranational institutions are able to exert unilateral control over the agenda, timing, scope, and content of the decisions concerning their interactions. (Hayward, 1995, p. 228) Member-state interactions with supranational European Community (EU) institutions have evolved from a voluntary to compulsory nature. If SEA, in particular, and the Consultation Phase, in general, did not achieve the establishment of a federal Europe, the events during the Concertation period seemed to be set on rectifying this 'mistake'. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 set the tone for the whole period - "a rush to union". (McKay, 1996, p. 178) It proposed the creation of European Central Bank, and more importantly made the creation of the monetary union a central issue of negotiations. The membership criteria for inclusion within the single currency union entailed a country's price inflation, budget deficit, national debt, and interest rates. It also drew a clearer distinction between powers of nation -states and 'exclusive' powers of the Community. However, Maastricht's biggest accomplishment was a "shift in a functional allocation of economic policy from the national to the supranational level" (McKay, 1996, p. 19).

In 1993, the European Community was replaced by European Union (EU). The drive towards the greater integration continued. Juliet Lodge (1989) had earlier taken note of this power shift towards the center, by emphasizing that rules were being set with European

orientation rather than intergovernmental aggregative. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 has only further confirmed the drive towards a more integrated - federal Europe.

As the British entry and later exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) clearly shows, the most important implication for the member states in this period of Concertation is the high cost associated with any attempt by nation -states to recapture sovereign powers ceded to the European Union institutions. The laws, agreements, treaties of the European Union are legally binding upon member states. This change in European Union character has crystalized attitudes towards European Union among both political elites and general citizenry.

#### *British Party Policy Change Towards the European Union, 1978-1997*

As we assumed earlier, with the change in European Union character have come the changes in political party position on the question of European integration. The argument can be further supported by examining the recent history of two major British parties - the Conservative Party and the Labour Party - and their changing stance on the issue of Europe. Once again we will survey only the years covered in this study, 1978 - 1995. The period has been characterized by a dramatic reversal of party positions toward the European union. The Conservative Party has become the principal opposition to the Union, while the Labour Party, for so long a staunch anti-federalist, has become under the guidance of Neil Kinnock a strong advocate of the Union. Indeed, as Collin (1998, p. 3) has observed, "The sweeping victory in the general election of 1997 under Tony Blair followed a campaign in which Labour had clearly inherited the label of the "Party of Europe", a label integral to the image of the Conservatives since the early 1960s."

The Conservative Party assumed the parliamentary majority in May 1979. Since the end of the Second World War, the Conservative Party had been viewed as the more pro-European of the two major British parties. It was the Conservative Party under Edward Heath which had taken Britain into the European Community in 1973, and it was the Conservative Party which won sixty of the seventy-eight seats in the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. In their examination of party manifestos, Whitten and Bohrer (1997) note the Conservative Party from 1973-1989 reflected "generally positive position on membership in the Union". At the time the only major complaint launched by the Conservatives towards the European Economic Community was directed at the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

The change within the Conservative Party began in 1986 and many have attributed it to the emerging agenda put forth by the European Community after 1986. The drive toward even deeper political integration accelerated with each passing year. As Morris (1996, p. 133) notes "instead of being, as Mrs Thatcher had hoped, the final stage in the construction of a European Economic Community, 1992 became instead the launching pad for a new type of Union in which policy areas that had hitherto been the preserve of domestic high politics risked being annexed by the supranational institutions of Brussels". As seen by many party leaders, the European Community had served its purpose - enhancing of the free market principles - and now was threatening British sovereignty and nationhood by strengthening of Community institutions. (Morris, 1996, p.134.) Unable to disregard the European agenda, Conservatives, especially during the incumbency of John Major (1990-1997), adopted what Preston (1994, p. 4) refers to as strategy of 'dilute and delay', or a policy of distraction and misdirection intended to wear down staunch federalists "in the hope of arriving at what in effect would be merely a free-trade area".

The pressure from Euroskeptics within the Conservative Party placed a strain on intra-party cohesion and by 1995 the disagreements within the party had become so strong that it could be said that European issue was splitting the Conservatives. Indeed, by 1995 Euroskeptics under Bill Cash had created within the House of Commons a formal factional grouping, the European Foundation, which also served as a publishing outlet for the action's major newsletter, the European journal, devoted to educating Conservative MPS on the evils of the EU. (Sowemimo, 1996, p. 78) Indeed, by 1995, the Conservative Party's free market ideology ironically now served to present the European Union as a bureaucratic nightmare, threatening the principles on which the Thatcher revolution was founded. The inconsistency between a Union devoted to free trade, a Conservative Party supposedly committed to the same, yet resistant to the 'acid test', namely unrestricted an open European markets, was not lost to most political observers.

(Sowemimo, 1996, p. 95)

Prior to 1983, the Labour Party consistently opposed Britain's membership in European Community as diligently as it later supported it. Once Britain had joined the European Community in 1973, Labour's focus shifted from outright opposition to the membership in European Community to renegotiating terms of membership. Despite the very definite "Yes" for the continuation of Britain's membership in European Community in 1975 referendum, Labour, pushed hard by its trade union membership, stubbornly held on to its negative position on Europe. The opposition grew from their fear that the European Community would displace the socialist values and welfare preferences that undergird the labour philosophy. (Collin, 1998) This attitude was clearly expressed in the 1979 election manifesto which was not "only very critical of membership, but actually implied that if changes in the European Community were

not made, then withdrawal was a possibility" (Geyer, 26.). In 1981 the anti-European position of the party was strengthened by the dramatic exit of three Labour MPS (Shirley Williams, David Owen, William Rogers) to form a pro-European Community moderate Social Democratic Party. The 1983 Labour's manifesto, "New Hope for Britain" went as far as to call for Britain's immediate withdrawal from the European Community. (Geyer, 28.). The change followed Labour's resounding electoral defeat in 1983. In the wake of this electoral disaster it was obvious the party could no longer afford to remain loyal to its old policies. Labour's changing attitude towards the European Community was also facilitated by change in party's leadership. The anti-EC Michael Foot was replaced by the very pro-Europeanist, Neil Kinnock.

According to Stephen Tindale (1992) there were two specific phases to Labour's pro-European conversion. The 1983-1987 phase was characterized by Labour's recognition that anti-European stance was not electorally feasible, but still a rather low increase in enthusiasm for the EC. The second phase that started in 1987 and culminated in 1992, saw the Labour Party's change from anti-EC party into ardent supporter of European Community principles, especially its social dimension. By 1995 the Labour Party's pro-EU image was strengthened so much more by split within the Conservative Party. As had become clear by 1997 general election, Labour had now assumed the role of leading Britain into the more integrated European Union and thus supporting its claim for being the "New Labour" in the "New Britain", prompting one observer (Lennon, 1997/98) to assert "There is a new spirit about in the UK. Change is in the air." Indeed after the landslide victory in the 1997 general elections, Labour Party seemed to have acquired a fresh attitude toward old policies. The special bond with the unions had been broken, the government was very seriously set on resolving the conflict in the Northern Ireland by inviting

Sinn Fein to the peace talks, Mr. Blair personally advocated for devolution in Scotland and Wales, and most importantly, the new government had reversed its earlier opposition to the single European currency and was now laying the foundations for Britain's entry into the EURO group. Later that autumn when the Blair government announced Britain would not join the EURO during the life of this Parliament, the European policy of the "New Labour" suddenly lost its special hue. Was the vision of the "New Labour" offered to the electorate during the elections and the first months of the government just a mirage, or had the "New Labour" ran into the tricky waters of public opinion?

Despite the centralized nature of the British party system, voter attitudes toward the European Union are of major concern to the party leadership. Preston (1994, p. 193) very poignantly identifies the importance of studying the public opinion on the question of Europe, "the present pattern of complex change is not a matter solely for elite inspection, broad citizen responses will constrain formal political programs, and extant thinking is itself shaped by political struggles, that is, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic idea sets". In a majoritarian electoral system such as that of Great Britain, where new issue parties have little chance of getting influential number of seats in the Parliament, public opinion serves a very important role of guiding and constraining Prime Minister's actions. Even though the European question has become increasingly important to British government, as International Herald Tribune (1998, p.5) notes "Europe is never important enough to sacrifice one vote at home". Therefore, despite the claims made by the "New Labour" on its policies toward European Union in earlier months, it should not be surprising that even such strongly pro-EU leader as Tony Blair would be willing

decelerate Britain's march into the European monetary and economic union when faced with varying demands of public opinion.

Figure 1 displays the ebb and flow of support among the British electorate for the European Union. The chart records the proportion of voters within the British electorate between 1978-1995 who said that Britain's membership in the European Community/Union was a "good thing". The data were drawn from Eurobarometer surveys.

Figure 1 here

Underlying the twists and turns of Conservative and Labour positions on the European Community/Union during the period, 1978-1995 The above survey underscores the role of factions within each party pushing the respective leadership to and fro on the issue. Indeed, whether it was the anti-Maastricht European Foundation of the Conservative Party, or the pro-Maastricht Treaty Action Centre for Europe within the Labour MP contingent, each party increasingly found itself caught in the tug of war between the Europhiles and Europhobes within their ranks. Indeed, Webb (1997, p. 91) reminds us that this factional conflict is often overlooked by those who all too often assume the old Westminster model of politics best conveys the essence of British party politics. British politics, he asserts, "are in a very real sense the politics of coalition, for all parties are to some extent marriages of convenience between different types of political actor." It is to factions, or more appropriately, the tendencies within the partisan electorate of each of the two major parties that we must turn if we are to fully



appreciate the constraints imposed on party leadership confronting the dilemma of Britain's official position vis-a-vis the European Union and its integrated political and economic markets.

## **Theory**

### *Tendencies Within the Partisan Electoral Base*

Since Britain's entry in European Community in 1973 students of British party system have showed increasing interest in political positions of two major parties of Britain on issue of the European Union. In 1990s the apparent policy reversals - the Conservative Party becoming increasingly less enthusiastic about deeper integration of European Union and the Labour taking up the role of leading Britain into Europe - attracted particular attention. As the Labour Party became more determined in their view that Britain's future lays with Europe, especially EURO, the Conservatives struggled even harder to bring to the end the battle between party's Euro "drys" and pro-Europeanist "wets" (Ashford, 1992; Beloff, 1997)

Bulpitt (1996) and Collin (1998) have suggested that we focus more on the issue of rational calculations within the leadership ranks as the key to understanding the constraints imposed on the policy direction of each party during the past two decades. This approach clearly subsumes the more common explanations for the respective policies, but redirects attention from a consideration solely of external assessments motivating the party leadership to the very calculations of the party leadership itself. Of critical importance to the party leadership are the political preferences of their core constituents--specifically those groupings within their partisan

electoral base which offer the opportunity for the development and success of factionalism within the ranks of the broader party leadership (i.e., local party officials, organizational cadre, and members of parliament and government). Traditionally, the Conservative Party has been less afflicted by factional strife than has the Labour Party. (Norton, 1994; Rose, 1980)

In effect, however, the focus on the challenge to party leadership casts political parties not as institutions of policy making, but rather as organizational structures with some degree of discipline and formal leadership, which, consequently, consist of a series of sub-parties intended to compete for the leadership and control over the direction of a political party (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1990). These subparties, to the extent they exist, provide both the challenge and opportunity to political leadership within the party. (Harmel and Tan, 1997).

The two principal forms assumed by subparties are factions and tendencies (Rose, 1980, pp. 268-269). Rose (1980), Zariski (1960) and Nicholas (1965) have variously drawn attention to the critical aspects of a party faction. These include formal organization and discipline, a common sense of purpose and distinct identity, a willingness to act collectively in the pursuit of their policy preferences, a formal goal of conflict and competition with other factions and certainly the party “center”, and/or the collective party leadership, and a distinct leadership organization within the faction, separate from the party’s formal party leadership. Several students of British politics have documented and analyzed the degree of factionalism within the British party system. (Norton 1975; Brand, 1989; Norton and Aughey, 1981; Kogan and Kogan, 1982; Tivey and Wright, 1989; and Seyd, 1980)

However, factions *per se*, are not the principal target of this study. Our focus is on a more fundamental sub-party form and which logically precedes the emergence of party faction,

and therefore must be seen as a separate constraint over time on the policy goals of the party's collective leadership. This sub-party form is referred to by Rose (1980) as the tendency group within the political party. Rose (1980, p. 269) defines a tendency as "a stable set of attitudes rather than a stable set of politicians". The latter are principally factions, the former are tendencies within the broader base of the political party itself. Webb (1997, p. 92), focusing on MPs, asserts that tendencies should be considered "a necessary though not sufficient condition of factionalism proper in British parliamentary parties." He goes on to argue that despite their less structural nature than factions, tendencies permit us to accurately "describe very precisely the variation and location of intra-party groups in attitudinal space." If attitudes precede factions, and if attitudes are more difficult to both monitor as well as manage than are the more concrete organizational demands and needs of a formalized and institutionalized organization, then tendencies within the electoral base of a party pose a distinctly different challenge to the authority and autonomy of political party leadership over a defined time frame. (Crewe and Svarlik, 1980) It is within the electoral base of partisan voters that such tendencies effect the party's electoral viability and constrain the strategies of the leadership with respect to the adoption of a policy toward the European Union.<sup>1</sup> For Webb (1997, p. 90) the issue is clear:

For too long we have tended to live with the residue of the classic but anachronistic, Westminster model of party competition which stressed the defacto dominance of the executive over the legislature and the near-monolithic unity of parliamentary parties. Yet, Britain is no different from most other democratic party systems in sustaining a significant sub-party dimension to its political life, and it was never thus in reality.

If we further assume that such tendencies are distributed across a spatial range of policy

preferences with respect to a particular policy issue, then an assessment of the effect which tendencies may have on the strategies of party leadership must take account of three empirical questions. First, knowing before hand the particular issue or issues around which tendencies may form, how do we estimate these tendencies with respect to a particular issue or set of issues within the partisan electoral base of a party? Second, how salient is the issue or issues for that portion of the partisan electoral base comprising an attitudinal tendency? And finally, to what degree are these attitudinal tendencies within the partisan electoral base of a party separated with respect to their political preferences on the issue or issues in question?

Any theory, therefore, that purports to explain the British major parties orientation to the European Union must incorporate into its framework a reasonable accounting of tendencies within its partisan electoral base. At a minimum, it must provide a reasonable means of identifying these tendencies and measuring their degree of separation. Ideally, salience would have to be included, as well. However, the degree of salience is of secondary concern to the actual measurement of and degree of separation characterizing these attitudinal tendencies with respect to an issue or issues. It is such tendencies with respect to the European Union--their identification and degree of separation--which are the focus of the present study. These attitudinal tendencies within the partisan electoral base of the political party are the central foundations upon which the party leadership cannot hope to forge a policy on such a controversial issue as the European Union and avoid sharp internal conflict and disunity fatal to a party's electoral success in a predominantly two party system with a "first-past-the-post" electoral mechanism.

How then, do we begin to identify and measure the nature and extent of tendency

separation of political preferences over Europeanist policy within the two major parties of Britain? Identifying the tendencies is, we argue, a matter of empirical definition. Once we have an issue, we can estimate a given tendency and attach it to a particular attitudinal position on the issue. It is tendency separation, however, which demands our immediate attention. In order to gauge tendency separation, we suggest one must assess the degree of expressiveness and valence characterizing political preferences of primary constituents with respect to a particular issue. Separation can be effectively established, therefore, once we define a location along a range of political preference positions on an issue (or issues) and by measuring the valence and expressiveness characterizing the issue or issues within the attitudinal tendencies of the two parties.

Finally, any theoretical framework of tendencies must connect the political preference separation among the tendencies to the leadership strategy of the respective political party. Without this logical connection, there is little to verify the immediate import of tendency existence, let alone separation with respect to an issue or issues within the political environment of a party.

#### *Valence and Party Leadership: The Voter's Orientation to Inter-Party Separation*

As is the case with most political terms, political leadership means many different things to many different people. It is, according to Moon (1993, p. 30) "a subject which has [not] lent itself easily to empirical analysis." However, few would disagree with the argumentation of Bulpitt (1986, p.21) in suggesting that we think of political leadership within a party as being

those combinations of behavioral traits and tangible resources which are specifically directed toward winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence in office. Winning elections is the primary agenda of each party and in this context the concept clearly draws attention to four conditions which extend or restrict the abilities of leaders to bring their tools of leadership to bear on political issues central to the electoral success and governing competence of a party: (1) Opportunities for policy innovation, (2) degree of intra-party partisan cohesion, (3) the nature of intra-party compromise, and (4) the possibilities afforded the party leader to forge intra-party issue consensus.

When would such conditions emerge? As far as party leadership is concerned, the choice of issues to pursue, as well as the amount of resources devoted to the task by the party leadership would depend in part upon how the political issue has been perceived by the party's most partisan voter. Generally, these issues are framed by the partisan voters in terms of the voter's spatial orientation to the party system, as well as the voter's strategic orientation to his/her preferred political party. A voter's spatial orientation is determined by the voter's evaluation of his party vis-a-vis the principal political opposition. A voter's strategic orientation to his/her preferred political party is the evaluation of his political preference on an issue relative to other positions staked out across the range of tendencies within the electorate, or within the leadership ranks of the party itself. The voter's spatial orientation to the party implies the cross-party orientation of the voter. The voter assesses his/her party in comparison to the dominant opposition, e.g., is the preferred party more likely to succeed electorally? When considering an issue position the voter is presented with two possible alternatives - (1) he/she can simply follow the party's general position on the issue, believing that the issue is not important enough to oppose the party's policy

(and possibly decrease the party's electoral performance), or (2) he/she may form a position on an issue that differs from that of the preferred party. From the party leadership's position the first choice would be much more desirable since it would grant the leadership with more room to maneuver - to adopt the position which it sees fit for bringing about the greater electoral success.

A very different situation would arise if the voter chose the stance on the particular issue that is closely associated with her key values which ironically may also initially serve to bind the voter to the particular party. In other words, the voter filters her position on the issue through these key values. This would represent the degree of importance attached by the voter to the particular issue. This would signal to the party leadership that such an attitude towards the issue would greatly affect the leadership's discretion in defining party's position on the issue vis-a-vis the principal opposition. If voters are not willing to adopt or follow the party's policy on the issue, they are more likely to look for other alternatives-- alternatives that could be supported by the system opposition. This would make it very hard for the party to separate itself from other parties on the issue bases. The paradox is that the same key values that bind a person to a particular party may also push the voter to a political preference on a primary issue that narrows the gap between his/her party and the opposition.

Such issues are considered by Stokes (1991, p. 143) as valence issues, "on which parties or leaders are differentiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which they are linked in the public's mind with conditions or goals or symbols of which almost everyone approves or disapproves." Low valence on the certain issue suggests that voters are highly indifferent with respect to the separation from their principal cross-party opposition. High valence points to exactly the opposite situation -- the voters have assumed the position of low indifference to inter-

party separation. High valence, according to Stokes (1991, p.146) is present in the environment of a political issue when political leaders evaluate their strategic options with respect to an issue as being one where they must chose "from a large number of potential issues those that will maximize their identification with positive values and their opponents with negative ones, rather than positioning themselves in a space of ordered dimensions." He goes on to add that "the electorate often chooses between alternative leaders primarily by selecting the party or candidate identified with the greater number of symbols that are positively rather than negatively valued, including the symbols of issues." We would only modify this by suggesting that negative or positive, the valence factor determines the extent to which an issue will be afforded low or high indifference by the voter with respect to separation from their principal cross-party opposition.

It is important to draw attention to the fact that there is no numerical value that separates the high valence from low valence. We are concerned with determining the increase or decrease in the degree of valence for the particular issue and the affect it has on strategy of party leadership in formulating the policy on that issue. The higher the valence the smaller the marginal space afforded the respective political leadership within which to maneuver vis-a-vis their cross-party rival on the particular issue. Respectively, as the degree of valence decreases, the leadership is afforded a wider marginal space between the two principal party opponents within which to claim distinctive position on a primary issue, and therefore, affords the leadership greater opportunities for policy innovation.<sup>2</sup> The importance of the cross-party position on an issue for the party leadership is crucial to leadership's strategy. Colin (1998, p. 13) observed that the more important element in shaping Labour's changed position on the European Union was indeed the Conservative Party. This transformation of the Labour's



leadership strategy on Europe “reflects [in part] the increasing inability of the Conservatives to formulate a response to developments in European integration capable of overcoming or even suppressing their internal divisions, and the extent to which Labour policy has been shaped in reaction to the opportunities provided by the prominence of these divisions...”

The key to valence, and in turn, policy innovation, lies in the values that define a voter’s partisan attachment to the political party. It may appear that framing an issue through one’s key values that attach a person to a particular party initially would mean the political preference that was less mutable. However, when a partisan voter does not frame an issue position with immediate reference to the key values of partisanship, indifference to cross-party separation with principal political opposition may well be higher. The leadership would be afforded the ability to define the issue position for the voter in a way that best maximizes the leadership’s electoral strategy vis-a-vis cross-party opposition. This leads to the conclusion that issues which assume high valence, and which therefore serve to minimize the indifference to cross-party separation on a political issue, must be logically associated with a value structure that serves to override the simple partisan calculations of the voter, and in turn, reduce the latitude of the party leadership with respect to framing the issue for the voter solely in terms of the electoral strategy of the party. In assessing the 1997 British general elections and Labour’s strategy toward the European Union in the wake of Labour’s resounding victory, Collin (1998, p. 20) has drawn careful attention to the limiting effects of cross-party issue valence. He writes:

The extent to which Labour’s European policy has been subject to the need to win the 1997 general election was confirmed by its conduct since the ratification of the Treaty on European Union. While the party’s positive attitude to European integration has been maintained, there have been modifications in order to minimize the electoral dangers of the Major government making a populist bid to wrap itself in the Union Jack in order to put a ‘clear blue water’ between parties.

During the course of the 1994 European elections Labour had to distance itself from the joint PES manifesto in the face of Conservative allegations that it would remove the right to veto, as Major identified John Smith as “Monsieur Oui”, the poodle of Brussels.

*Issue Expressiveness and Party Leadership: The Voter's Orientation to Intra-Party Separation*

The voter's strategic orientation to his/her preferred political party implies an intra-party orientation, as opposed to cross-party orientation. The focus here is on intra-party divisions or tendencies which present the voter with several policy positions on a particular issue. As is the case with the degree of valence, the tendencies are very important indicator of freedoms allotted to the party leadership in defining the position on a certain issue. The voter once again is presented with two possible options - (1) she can follow and support the official party position on the issue and that way increase party's electoral success, or (2) she can adopt a very different position. The party leadership would prefer the former over the later since it would present the leadership with circumstances where compromise between tendencies on an issue is less costly, cohesion is higher, and possibilities for intra-party consensus are maximal. The strategy adopted by the leadership would be very different if most partisan constituents would filter their evaluation of the issue through their key values which initially had defined their partisanship. The differences between alterative tendencies would be greater and compromises more costly, the leadership strategy would be constrained by differing attitudes towards the issue, the ability to formulate the position vis-a-vis the opposition would be very low.

In this situation, the voter is influenced by the degree of expressiveness she has attached to a particular issue. Rose and McAllister (1992, p.120) have defined expressiveness as political act (such as voting) that serves to give expression "to an individual's subjective identification and

taste". Low expressiveness would signify that voters are quite indifferent to the intra-party tendency separation. The high expressiveness, on the other hand, would suggest that voters are more concerned with the tendency separation within the party, their level of indifference is much lower. Once again we are concerned only with the change in the degree of expressiveness. The higher the degree of expressiveness across attitudinal tendencies, the higher the costs of negotiations and the more frequent the use, as well as greater the amount of side payments required to ensure compliance, which in turn decreases the intra-party cohesion and poses more difficulties for the party leadership in formulating its policy on a particular issue. As the degree of expressiveness declines, the compromises between factions are more likely and as the result intra-party cohesion increases, the party leadership is afforded more room to formulate its position on an issue as dictated by the leadership's assessment of the party's electoral needs. A high degree of expressiveness, of course, does not assure that such restrictive conditions to be placed on party leadership. However, with lower degree of expressiveness these conditions of constrain would be much less likely to develop. Table 1 summarizes the logic behind the valence and expressiveness arguments.

Table 1 about here

#### *Implied Party Leadership Strategies With Respect to Issue Valence and Expressiveness*

Different combinations of issue valence and expressiveness suggest at least four distinct strategies of party leadership. These strategies imply the degree of constraint imposed upon the degree of policy innovation available to the party leadership in pursuing strategies toward

Britain's role within the European Union. While other combinations are conceivable, these four seem to be the most likely.

The transactional leadership strategy would be adopted when the degree of valence on particular issue is low and the degree of issue expressiveness is high. Burns (1978, p. 19) describes transactional leadership as occurring when "one person takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things." In this situation the low degree of valence would facilitate such an exchange across internal party tendencies. It follows that there would be numerous opportunities for policy innovation. However, the high degree of expressiveness would mean that the degree of intra-party partisan cohesion would be low, the nature of intra-party compromise costly and possibilities for intra-party issue consensus minimal. The Transactional Strategy implies that party leaders must be careful at negotiating a balance to intra-party competition between contending tendency groups, while at the same time doing all possible to exploit (through transactional initiation) the differences between the party and its principal opponent. The transactional strategy presents a situation where a leader is faced with difficult intra-party environment balanced by a more manageable cross-party conditions, wherein a compromise to the contentious issue is brokered through, to some extent, policy innovation afforded the leadership as a consequences of the low issue valence among the cross-party constituents.

The trustee leadership strategy would be adopted when leadership is presented with exactly opposite set of conditions – the high degree of valence on particular issue and low degree of expressiveness. The high degree of valence would signal to leadership that there are very few opportunities for policy innovation. At the same time, however, the low degree of expressiveness

would mean that there is a high degree of intra-party cohesion and issue consensus. Under such circumstances, the party leadership would have the support of cohesive intra-party constituency to adopt the position on the issue as perceived to maximize party's electoral performance (by discrediting the opposition's claims to the faithful representation of the issue), even if such position is not entirely reflective of the general partisan attitude. In fact, as the high level of valence suggests, the partisans are rather close in their views on the particular issue to the partisans of the opposition party, which renders party leadership with very narrow chances for policy innovation. Leadership discretion with respect to the policy issue is restricted to negotiating competing claims among tendency groups within the party all the while ensuring the brokering remains within the limits imposed by the high valence defining the cross-party rivalry on the issue.

The delegate leadership strategy is to be followed by the party leadership when both the degree of valence on the particular issue and the degree of expressiveness are high. In this situation, the party leadership has neither the opportunity to greatly innovate the policy towards the particular issue, nor negotiate a consensus among intra-partisan tendencies. The party leadership is, therefore, faced with a most difficult situation, where any position adopted on the issue is likely to disappoint some number of party's loyal constituents, as well as decrease the party's electoral success. The party leadership must find some way of separating from their principal political opposition, presumably through some very limited policy innovation proposals, while not offending and alarming their intra-party partisan tendencies. If confronted with such situation, it seems logical that the leadership is more likely to forego some degree of party's electoral success, rather than adopt the position that would even further increase the

separation between intra-party tendencies.

The transformational leadership strategy is adopted when the party leadership is faced with exactly opposite set of conditions – a low degree of valence on the particular issue and the low degree of expressiveness. Burns (1978, p. 20) describes transformational leadership as occurring when "one or more persons *engage* with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality." While our concern is not with the moral content of the issue, the combination of low valence and low expressiveness certainly affords the leader an extensive opportunity to define the issue in such a way as to maximize the leadership's desire to win elections and govern capably. Clearly, the transformational strategy allows the party leadership its greatest degree of discretion in pursuing policy innovation. The transformational leadership strategy is the style most commonly associated with Westminster parliamentary democracies, and it is the strategy most frequently assumed to exist within the British party system.

Table 2 summarizes these four leadership strategies and their relationship to the expressiveness and valence. Figure 2 shows the spatial configurations of intra-party and cross-party alignments associated with each of the four leadership strategies. In Figure 2, the principal intra-party tendencies are assumed to be represented by w (weak), m (mean), and s (strong) partisan tendency groups within each of the two major British parties. A "weak" partisan voter, we assume, is someone whose partisan value framework exerts less influence over political preference on a particular issue than someone who is either a "mean" or "strong" partisan voter. The "mean" partisan voter is someone whose value attachment to the party attaches less political preference to the issue than a "strong" partisan voter, but more than a "weak" partisan voter. And,

the "strong" partisan voter is one whose partisan value framework attaches more political preference to the issue than either the "weak" partisan voter, or the "mean" partisan voter. We shall develop these categories (weak, mean, strong) in more detail below.

Table 2 here

Figure 2 here

### *Identifying Relevant Tendency Groups*

Before proceeding to the discussion of the specific models to be employed in analyzing the separation of tendencies among partisan voters of the two major British political parties, we must first sort out the relevant intra-partisan tendency groups that constitute the basis for potential separation. Figure 3 presents a "family tree" for the partisan-based European preference groups across Britain's two major parties. There are three levels to this partisan tendency separation. The first level (General Tendency Groups) shows the initial separation that we have identified within the two parties with respect to the issue of the European Union. Essentially, within each party there exist two general tendency groups with respect to attitudes toward the European Union. The Europeanists or those who are very positively disposed towards the European Union, and Non-Europeanists or those who hold a rather jaded attitude toward the European Union. While the public remains divided on the issue, most polls continue to report a clear preference for the European option among financial and commercial sectors of the British society. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume at this point that both the Labour and the Conservative parties have realized that Britain's future lays within Europe and therefore are

searching for the adequate ways for taking Britain into European Union. It is, therefore, only natural that the party leadership would focus first and foremost on those constituents which have the Europeanist orientation as the pillar of support for party policy on European Union. Our focus, therefore, lies only with those partisans who are favorable towards the Union and the separations that occur among the voters who share this particular political preference.

Figure 3 here

The second level (Nominal Europeanist Tendency Groups) shows even further separation among the partisans of the each of the two parties. We have divided the Europeanists into those who are True-Partisans and those that are Mere-Voters. The True-Partisans have been identified through nominal classification as voters who express not only a *voting preference* for one of the two parties, but who also express a *closeness* to a political party. Even though we cannot be sure that a person who votes for the Labour party is not close to another party, the likelihood in a single-member plurality electoral system is limited. The Mere-Voters have been identified as those partisans who express only a voting preference for one of the two parties, but express no degree of closeness to any party.<sup>3</sup>

However, even at this level of specification, we have not adequately accounted for the most important partisan tendency groups which are critical to the political calculations of the party leadership. Further refinement would suggest that each party is anchored by the True-Partisans, for they constitute the most important tendency group within the electoral constituency of the party leaders. However, this group must be further parsed into “weak”,



“mean” and “strong” partisans. Operationally, this cannot be readily achieved in the standard survey data sets available over any length of time. The specific questions needed to assess this degree of partisan group refinement are not asked on a regular basis. We may however, estimate the value ranges of such groups by using the key values that bind partisan voters to the respective major party.

The resulting third level (Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups) presents the final classification of tendency groups to be analyzed within our sample of partisan voters.

Therefore, our strategy is to identify from our sample those partisan voters who fall into one of the four second level partisan tendency groups (Nominal Europeanist Tendency Groups), assigning a value of 1 to those whom we label as “Labour True-Partisan, Europeanist”, and a value of 4 to those whom we label “Conservative True-Partisan, Europeanist”.<sup>4</sup>

Once each respondent in our sample has been assigned their respective membership in the four Nominal Europeanist Tendency Groups, we regress these values on our selected key values which we argue both bind the partisan voter generally to both the political party of her choice, and orient the partisan voters attitude toward the European Union. A separate regression is performed for each of the three time periods that divide the time series of samples between 1978 and 1995.<sup>5</sup> These time periods correspond to the three periods which generally reflect key transitions in the evolution of the European Union as a transnational, political-economic authority structure. From these separate period regression equations, we derive parameter estimates for each of the respective key values shaping the partisan voter’s political preferences with respect to Europe. From these period-specific parameter estimates, we are then in a position to estimate respective degree of separation among the “weak”, “mean” and “strong” tendency

groups of the True-Partisans. Inserting values for each of the key values which define the relative spatial location of that group for the respective key value, we may in effect simulate the degree of political preference separation both within and across the various tendency sub-groups within the partisan electoral base of of the two respective parties.

We distinguish this approach from a more common nominal approach by its explicit reliance on key values from which we may simulate degrees of cross- and intra-party separation on political preferences, and which allow us to achieve the necessary estimates of issue expressiveness and valence upon which such separation of preferences is based. Figure 4 displays the comparative logic of the more common nominal model of specifying political preferences with that of our proposed evaluative model. While the evaluative model suggests a more complex two stage least squares analysis, we believe a more prudent and cautious approach is warranted given the limited variance and robustness of the data and measures required for this analysis. Before proceeding to the evaluative model our estimates of evaluation-based political preferences regarding Europe among British partisan voters, we must first specify the key values which form the crucial foundation for these assessments.<sup>6</sup>

### **Measurement of Key Values Underlying Attitudinal Tendencies**

#### *The Role of Key Values in Discriminating Principal Partisan Europeanist Tendencies*

As noted earlier a principal proposition of our study is that voters' attitudes toward the European Union are conditioned by the person's key values. These values also bind the voter to a specific party. This logic is underscored with respect to the Labour Party by Collin (1998, p. 7)

who notes that "The debate as to the compatibility of membership with the attainment of socialist goals has been situated at the core of a wider debate about the nature and direction of Labourism."

We proceed to distinguish between two types of values – the core values, or those values which are at the basis of one's socio-economic identity, and the system values or those that help to shape a voter's political orientation amidst the great array of contending political issues. The core values form the bases for one's perception of the political and economic system, and in this respect guide selection of the preferable political party. (Zaller, 1992; Hayes, 1995; Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1992) The system values have less direct influence on one's partisanship, instead they are more transient, and indeed more pliable within the context of the policy record of the political leadership. Combined, these two subsets of values fashion the overarching key values which are responsible for developing the preference for one political party over the other and which also serve to filter the voter's interpretation and evaluation of the European Union as a trans-national institutional authority.

We do not expect these key values to have the same affect on a voter's attitude toward the European Union as they have on one's partisanship. However, since we choose to focus only on partisan voters rather than the general electorate, we must also assume that there is some common interaction between these key values which demarcate the boundaries between these partisan categories in forming the bases for the attitudinal tendencies of the partisan electorate of the party. Nevertheless, it must also be assumed that core values and partisanship always come before tendency formation. For indeed, one's political preference will be formed by first examining the options available within the bounds of one's partisanship before settling for a

political alternative. Together, we expect one's partisanship and policy preferences to be a product of key values, which in turn color a person's orientation to the political and economic system. For the partisan voter in particular, the attitude toward a European political-economy is almost certainly shaped by their partisanship, which filters the necessary information and symbols before forming a positive or negative attitude toward EU.<sup>7</sup>

It is not the aim of this study, however, to indulge in detailed discussions of the more complex political-psychological dimensions of British partisanship or attitudes toward the European Union. Rather, it is to assess the degree of the separation between the Europeanist tendencies of partisan voters of the two major British parties. For the present, we hold the traditional argument that the proposed Europeanist tendencies are the result of more complex matrix of one's partisanship as well as separate, but linked, attitudes toward the more specific and immediate goal of the partisan policy maker, in our case, the European Union's broader political-economic authority.

Despite the great attractiveness within the scholarly circles, the question of why one does or does not support the European Union is of little interest from the party leadership's point of view. It is of crucial importance to be familiar with the political preferences of those voters who have formed a closer attachment to the party, and in that sense to recognize the key values that are at the base of this attachment, as well as to ascertain their Europeanist disposition. Together, these two components, the voter's partisanship and her Europeanist predilection constitute the context of one's Europeanist tendency, which in return conditions the leadership's strategy in formulating Britain's policy toward the European Union.<sup>8</sup>

### *Measures of Core Values: Capacity and Scope*

Table 3 summarizes the five separate measures that represent the core values of a British partisan voter's attitudinal identity within the political-economy. Each of these variables have been used extensively in various designs to explore individual or collective behavior within democracies.<sup>9</sup> We have hypothesized that underlying these five separate values lie two distinct and fundamental dimensions through which the core values serve to define the partisan voter's identity within the political-economy. One subset of core values reflects the person's socio-economic status, and in a broader sense, together constitutes the voter's political-economic *capacity*. In essence, the capacity of the voter to accumulate, preserve and expand her property and personal security needs is determined first and foremost by her occupational situation, her educational background, and her family income. (Zaller, 1992; Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1996; Rose, 1980) Distinct from this capacity, however, are those values which define for the voter their disposition to political authority. These values are rooted in one's traditional (left-right) political ideology (Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1996; Butler and Stokes, 1976) and in one's general perception of the primary objectives of the political-economy, represented by one's degree of post-materialist value orientation (Inglehart, 1997; Kitschelt, 1995; Janssen, 1991). These are distinct from the capacity values in that they do not correspond to a particular demographic attribute that distinguishes the voter from others within their political-economy. Rather, these values reflect a set of normative assessments held by the voter and which define for the partisan voter the role and extent of political authority in the broader political-economy. In this sense, these normative values represent the voter's preferred *scope* of political authority, and

in effect capture the partisan voter's tolerance for extended public authority within the political-economic environment.

In order to verify this assumption of a segregated set of core values, and to obtain weighted index measures of each of the presumed dimensions--capacity and scope--a principal component factor analysis was executed (with quartimax rotation) on the pooled sample of respondents across the 16 Eurobarometers, 1978-1995. The analysis and individual factor loadings are reported in Table 4 and confirm our prediction: the five variables discriminate two separate dimensions to the core value structures of partisan voters. The first dimension from which core values emerge is represented by the socio-economic status of respondents, reflecting their general political-economic capacity. These core values associated with one's political-economic capacity are defined by the nature of one's principal occupation (i.e., taxed supported occupations, or a profit supported occupations), education, and income. Capacity expands with a profit supported occupation, higher education, and higher family income. We expect that one's partisanship and Europeanist disposition are conditioned by the capacity of the individual to create and preserve a degree of socio-economic autonomy within their broader political-economic environment. Consistent with traditional research on the socio-economic bases of partisanship, we expect Europeanist partisan voters with high capacity to be more likely to be have a attitudinal tendency indicative of a Conservative Europeanist preference. A lower capacity should be associated with a attitudinal tendency indicative of a Labour Europeanist preference.

Table 4 here

Distinct from capacity is the tolerance and indeed, preference for the scope of authority within the political-economy. The core values which we believe shape a voter's attachment to a political party and their disposition to a preferred political solution to the European policy of Britain are shaped by one's political ideology and degree of post-materialism. As reflected by the individual factor loading in Table 4, the Eurobarometer data confirm that those voter's with a left-orientation to the political-economy and who also hold a distinct preference for post-material values as opposed to material values are positively associated with increasing scope. Because a left ideology generally favors an active role of public authority in the general political-economy, and because traditionally post-material values have been associated with a more active role of public authority in shaping the quality of life for the individual, we conclude that a high value of scope for a partisan voter reflects both a preference and tolerance for extended public authority in society. Given the implications for extended authority accompanying a trans-national political-economic body such as the European Union, and given the traditional relationship between political ideology and the two major political parties in Britain, we expect that higher values of scope within our sample will be associated with an attitudinal tendency reflecting a Labour Europeanist preference, while lower scores on scope will be associated with a partisan voter's attitudinal tendency reflecting a Conservative Europeanist preference.<sup>10</sup> Factor scores for Capacity and Scope were computed for each respondent in the pooled sample.<sup>11</sup>

*Measuring System Values: Cohort and Satisfaction with Democracy*

Two variables represent our measure of system values: the age cohort of the voter and the satisfaction with democracy. The importance of the age cohort lies in the fact that person's attitudes are greatly influenced by the initial and political socialization. (Janssen, 1991) One's socialization, in return, is greatly impacted by the events and changes taking place at that time within one's political-economy in particular and the world in general. The attitudinal tendency of a partisan voter toward a particular issue is assumed therefore to be dependent in part on the voter's evaluative assessment of the issue within the context of that voter's overall preferences acquired through a particular period of history. We also assume that these cohort effects are independent of the core values, capacity and scope.

Of particular importance to this study is the cohort that has reached at least the minimum age of 14 during the Consultative Phase of the European Union's development (1984-1989). We have identified three cohort groups within each of the Eurobarometer samples employed in this study. The first group or cohort consists of those voters who were born up to 1946. These are the voters whose socialization process took place during the war and the devastation immediately after it, as well as the declining might of the British empire. In the second group are the people who were born between 1947 and 1964, and were socialized during the time when ties between Britain and USA were particularly strong. The third group consists of all of the voters born after 1964. Their socialization took place during the Consultative Phase of the European Union, the mid-1980's to 1989. Due to this familiarity with EU, we expect the most recent cohorts to be drawn closer to a Labour Europeanist tendency, while those of earlier cohorts will favor an attitudinal tendency reflecting a Conservative Europeanist preference.



Satisfaction with democracy reflects the voters overall attitude toward the existing governmental authority. We cannot know or be sure if the respondent is referring specifically to British democracy, or democratic principles in general. However, taking into account how much of person's life is impacted by the decision made by the actual governing bodies we assume that such a disposition reflects the voter's assessment of the performance of democracy within Britain. Of greater importance is the close association between democracy, sovereignty and the role of the European Union. For Labour in particular, the values of Labour have always been seen as prior to both sovereignty and a version of national democracy. Indeed, as Collin (1998, p. 5) has argued that labour's defense of British sovereignty and the opposition to the European Union has stemmed more from its belief that the European Community/Union represented a threat to Labourism as a philosophy than sovereign British democracy. "In understanding their constitutional conservatism is therefore important to recognize that the defense of sovereignty does not exist independently of the core values of Labourism, but rather is seen as a facilitator of their promotion." In other words, once the principle of British democratic sovereignty was no longer a facilitator of Labourism, the European Union would be a potential viable alternative to the promotion of Labour values. For the Conservatives, we expect the staunch defense of British sovereign democracy to remain *ipso facto* a defining principle of the Conservative cause. In general, we expect the satisfaction with democracy to be a defining element within the system values which attach a voter to both a party and ultimately to the European Union.<sup>12</sup>

## **Analysis**

### *Nominal-Based Analysis*

Table 5 presents the results of analysis on the nature and degree of separation between the voter's with Europeanist and Non-Europeanist tendencies within the two major British parties. The analysis employs a Nominal model, introduced in Figure 3. The analysis covers all three time periods between 1978-1995. As shown by Table 5, the percent of Labour True-Partisans that hold Europeanist tendencies has increased from 25.5 percent in the first time period (1978-1983) to 43.3 percent in the second time period (1984-1989), to 56.6 percent by the third time period (1990-1995). At the same time, the percent of Labour True-Partisans holding Non-Europeanist tendencies has declined from 74.5 percent in the Pluralist Phase to 56.7 percent by the Consultation Phase, to 43.3 percent in the Concertation Phase. During the same time period, the Conservative True-Partisans have followed an opposite path in their attitudinal expression. The percentage of the Conservative True-Partisans favoring Europeanist tendency has declined from 56.2 percent in the first time period to 55 percent in the second time period, and to the 50 percent in the third time period. The number of the Conservative True-Partisans supporting the Non-Europeanist tendency has risen from 43.4 percent in the first time period to 45 percent in the second and finally has matched their Europeanist counterparts in the third time period by rising to the 50 percent. So by the Concertation period the Conservative Party's True-Partisans were evenly split in their preference for one or the other Europeanist tendency (50%-50%).

Table 5 here

By comparing the True-Partisan category to Mere-Voter category within the Labour

Party, there is an obvious change in spread of the scores over the three time periods with regard to the Europeanist and Non-Europeanist tendencies. In the Pluralist Phase the split between True-Partisan Europeanists and Mere-Voter Europeanists is relatively even (25.5% and 23.7%) signaling a low degree of expressiveness among Labour partisans. During the same time period the spread among the Conservative partisans holding Europeanist tendencies is much less balanced (41.% and 56.2%), indicating a slightly higher degree of expressiveness between the Conservative True-Partisans and the Conservative Mere-Voters. The degree of valence is clearly low, since the Labour True-Partisans are less than half as likely to hold a Europeanist tendency than their Conservative True-Partisan counterparts (25.5% and 56.2%). For Labour leadership during the Pluralist Phase, the low degree of expressiveness and valence suggest that the transformational leadership strategy would be the implied option. This suggests the Labour leadership was enjoying the support of relatively coherent voter base and, therefore, was able to define its position on the European Community as it saw necessary relative to the goal of increasing party's electoral success. Such success could only be increased by distancing the Labour Party's position on Europe from the Conservative stance on Europe, a strategy employed overall by Labour during the 1980s. (Collin, 1998)

The situation was different for the leadership of the Conservative Party, as it faced a relatively high degree of expressiveness among its partisans. The high level of expressiveness and low level of valence during Pluralist Phase presented the Conservative leadership with a transformational leadership strategy. The high expressiveness requires the leadership to be cautious in defining the policy that would not alienate any particular tendency of the voters, while the lack of inter-party valence allows the leadership to mitigate internal party tension on

the issue of Conservative European policy by pursuing an aggressive policy innovation vis-a-vis their Labour counterparts.

By the third time period and the Concertation Phase of EU development, the leadership strategy for both parties seems to have evolved to a delegate strategy--at least based on our initial nominal-based analysis of Nominal Europeanist Tendency Groups. Both parties leadership find themselves confronted by moderate expressiveness (differing attitudinal tendencies across the partisan categories), while facing a political opposition within their cross-party counterparts that have relatively equal proportions of Europeanist tendencies. The degree of tendency separation across the nominal partisan categories has therefore changed between 1978-1995, posing new challenges and implying different strategies of leadership for both the Labour and Conservative Party leaders. Yet, a fuller picture of the challenges confronting the respective party readerships cannot be fully known until we move beyond a mere nominal based analysis.

#### *Evaluative-Based Analysis*

While the nominal model certainly shows some change in the degree of separation between the Europeanist tendencies and as expected the transition in the leadership strategies presented to the two major British parties, it does not take into the account the impact of key values on voter attitude formation toward EU. As such the nominal model does not allow for account of the relative pressure that exists within the two parties as they traverse 18 years during which the value base that binds a person to a particular party and colors one's position toward European Union has changed, and during which time the very nature of the European Union has

undergone some serious changes soliciting different responses from Britain as certain events take place.

The evaluative model consists of three stages. We begin by employing the key values defined earlier to estimate the respective Europeanist tendencies of partisan voters. In the second stage we compute simulation values for the three crucial partisan tendency sub-groups (Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups, as in Figure 3)-- weak, mean, strong-- for each of the four key value variables, per time period. In the third and final stage, we use the computed simulated values and the parameter estimates derived in the first stage from the OLS regression analysis to compute estimated Europeanist tendency scores for each of the three Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups. We use this simulation analysis to estimate the nature and degree of tendency separation across the three time periods between 1978-1995. This allows us to assess anew the implications for leadership strategies for the leaders of the Labour and Conservative parties.

#### *Estimating Europeanist Tendencies, 1978-1995*

Table 6 presents the results of our OLS regression analysis of Europeanist political tendencies, by time period (1978-1983, 1984-1989, 1990-1995). From these findings we conclude that (1) the evaluative model, based on our specified key values, provides a moderately effective estimation of the Europeanist tendencies for partisan voters of the two major political parties in Britain between 1978-1995; (2) Cohort has only a limited role in defining one's Europeanist tendencies, while the remaining three key values each contribute significantly to the Europeanist tendency of partisan votes, and (3) the direction of each variable with respect to its

correlation with the Europeanist tendency is consistent with our expectations. The evaluative model clearly works better in the latter time periods, especially the second time period ( $R^2 = .184, .362$  and  $.290$ , respectively). Capacity, Scope and Satisfaction with Democracy are each statistically significant in each of the three period models, while Cohort shows a statistical significance only in the first time period. During the first time period, the only two cohorts in existence among the sample were Cohorts One and Two--only a few respondents were of the minimum age of 14 to be included in the first time period. While political preferences were distinguished by the first two cohorts, at least during the first time period, the addition of the third time period eliminated the shared variance. Europeanist tendencies of partisan voters would seem to be roughly evenly divided during the third Cohort. Finally, as expected, the profile of a voter holding a Conservative Europeanist tendency is one of high capacity, low tolerance and preference for scope, and a greater satisfaction with democracy (and during the first time period, an earlier cohort); while the profile of a partisan voter adhering to a Labour Europeanist tendency is that of lower capacity, higher scope, and greater dissatisfaction with democracy (and, during the first time period, a more recent cohort).

Table 6 here

### *Simulation Analysis of Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups*

The principal purpose of Table 6 is to provide the weighed parameter estimates from which we may next simulate the political preferences for the Weighted Tendency Groups across

the two parties. First, however, we must obtain some reasonable estimate of the respective scores for each of the four key values in our evaluative model for each of the three weighted-Europeanist tendency groups: weak, mean and strong. We begin by computing the mean value for each of the four key values, by time period, for the Labour and Conservative True-Partisans, respectively. Table 7 reports these descriptive statistics for Labour True-Partisans, and Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics for the key values for Conservative True-Partisans. The mean values are the scores which will be used to simulate the respective levels of capacity, scope, satisfaction with democracy, and Cohort for the mean tendency group within the True-Partisan nominal categories. Thus, we assign a value of 1.68 for the score of the mean tendency group within the Labour True-Partisan category of partisan voters during the first time period, 1978-1983; a value of 1.90 is assigned score more the mean tendency group within the Labour True-Partisan category during the period 1984-1989, etc..

What of the weak and strong tendency groups within the True-Partisan categories within each time period? We have chosen a value of  $\pm 1$  standard deviation beyond the mean as the value to assign the respective weak and strong tendency group within True-Partisans. Thus, the value assigned a weak tendency group within the Labour True-Partisan category for the first time period is 2.46, or  $1.68 + .78$ . We know from Table 6 that capacity is *inversely* associated with our nominal measures of Labour Europeanist tendencies, thus we know that capacity is in effect low for Labour True-Partisans; it is higher for Conservative True-Partisans. Thus, a weak tendency group within the Labour True-Partisan category would have less of the values associated with a strong tendency group of Labour True-Partisans, or, a *larger* value on the attribute of capacity. Specifically, we have defined it as being +1 standard deviation from the

mean value of a nominal Labour True-Partisan, or 2.46. In comparison, the value assigned to a strong tendency group within the Labour True-Partisan category for capacity during the first time period is .90, or 1.68 - .78. These computations are repeated for each tendency group within the Labour and Conservative True-Partisan nominal categories across each of the three time periods. The last three columns of Tables 7 and 8 report the defining values for the respective tendency groups of the Labour and Conservative True-Partisan categories, respectively.

Table 7 and Table 8 here

With these simulation scores now computed, we apply the scores in combination with the parameter estimates for each time period reported in Table 6 to compute estimated values for each of the three Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups within the True-Partisan nominal categories for the Labour and Conservative Party. Table 9 reports these estimates.

Table 9 here

Two sets of estimates were computed. The basic computations are reported as longitudinal estimates, or, estimates for each of the three Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups within each time period. For instance, the estimated value of weak tendency group with the Conservative True-Partisan category during the three time periods are 2.395, 2.355 and 2.067. The equations for these Europeanist tendency estimates are detailed below:



Computation of Estimated Score for Weak Tendency Group in Conservative Party  
Longitudinal Estimates

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Period 1: } \hat{Y}[2.395] &= 3.874 + .19(1.34) + -.459(2.16) + -.127(2.95) + -.209(1.76) \\ \text{Period 2: } \hat{Y}[2.355] &= 4.431 + .12(1.39) + -.481(2.15) + -.423(2.64) + -.044(2.1) \\ \text{Period 3: } \hat{Y}[2.067] &= 4.186 + .101(1.36) + -.572(2.28) + -.301(2.89) + -.035(2.35) \end{aligned}$$

Each of the estimates for the Europeanist tendency scores, for each time period, are computed in this manner, with the respective weak, mean and strong simulation scores for each key value inserted and weighted by the respective time period parameter estimate drawn from Table 7. Tracking these estimates across each time period allows one to make the necessary longitudinal comparisons from which we may subsequently assess the nature and degree of expressiveness and valance characterizing the Europeanist tendencies within and across the two major parties.

Following these estimates longitudinally across the three periods reveals a distinct pattern of the Europeanist tendencies for both Labour and Conservative True-Partisans. A slight curvilinear shape is evident in the progression from 1978-1983 through 1990-1995. Labour weak True-Partisans, for instance, begin at a rather Non-Labour Europeanist tendency level in the first time period ( $\hat{Y} = 3.301$ ), come closer to at least a moderate Labour Europeanist tendency position by the second period ( $\hat{Y} = 2.987$ ), and retreat again by the final time period to nearly a tendency preference level equal to where they began in the first period ( $\hat{Y} = 3.131$ ). The curvilinear pattern is absent within Labour's mean True-Partisan tendency group. This tendency group rose steadily toward a stronger Labour Europeanist tendency from 2.557 during the first period to 2.175 in the second period to 2.047 in the most recent period.

For Conservatives, the patterns are slightly different. Weak Conservatives during the three periods increasingly tend toward a less Conservative Europeanist preference (moving from 2.395 during the first period to 2.067 in the third time period). However, both the mean and strong Conservative groups reflect a curvilinear pattern, moving toward a Conservative Europeanist tendency in the second period from the first, then dropping back by the third time period.

A second set of estimates are reported in Table 9: simulated panel estimates of Europeanist tendencies. While the data do not allow an actual panel analysis of the respondents across the 18 years between 1978 and 1995, we may simulate panel estimates for the political tendencies of the three True-Partisan groups. The panel simulation allows a comparative assessment of the degree to which the value base of the two parties have changed over time, with expected consequences for the estimated Europeanist tendencies across the three groups within each party.

The simulation panel estimates are based on a constant scores for each tendency group across the three time periods. For instance, in the box below, the simulated panel estimates for the political preference scores for Conservative weak tendency groups are detailed. Note that while the parameter estimates change across each panel (or, time period), the simulated scores for each of the four key values remain constant at their first time period level (the panel base).

Computation of Estimated Weak Tendency Group in Conservative Party  
Simulated Panel Analysis

Panel 1:  $\hat{Y}[2.395] = 3.874 + .19(1.34) + -.459(2.16) + -.127(2.95) + -.209(1.76)$   
 Panel 2:  $\hat{Y}[2.228] = 4.431 + .12(1.34) + -.481(2.16) + -.423(2.95) + -.044(1.76)$   
 Panel 3:  $\hat{Y}[2.136] = 4.186 + .101(1.34) + -.572(2.16) + -.301(2.95) + -.035(1.76)$

From the simulated panel analysis, we are able to see that while the simulated weak tendency within the Conservative Party in 1978-1983 had an estimated political preference score of 2.395, by the second time period that same True-Partisan voter (assuming her key value scores remained constant) would have moved to a weaker Conservative Europeanist tendency ( $\hat{Y} = 2.2228$ ), falling further from a Conservative Europeanist tendency by the third time period ( $\hat{Y} = 2.136$ ). However, comparing these Europeanist tendency estimates to the longitudinal values (period estimates), we see that the weak Conservative in 1978-1995 was by the second period slightly out of alignment with her weak Conservative True-Partisan by the standards of the estimated tendencies of the Conservative True-Partisans as of 1984-1989 ( $\hat{Y} = 2.355$ ). This degree of separation closed somewhat by the third time period, where the new weak Conservative True-Partisan ( $\hat{Y} = 2.067$ ) was now much closer to the original-weak True-Partisan ( $\hat{Y} = 2.136$ ).

*Valence and Expressiveness: Assessing Our Estimates of Separation*

What does this say about the degree of expressiveness and valence among the True-Partisans of the two parties? Table 10 presents an analysis of the valence characterizing tendencies among the True-Partisans. The critical single measure is the ratio of Weighted

Europeanist Tendency Group score across each party, by time period. Thus, we see that the ratio of the tendency position for the Conservative weak True-Partisan voter in the first period to her Labour counterpart during the same period is .726 ( $\hat{Y}=2.395$  and  $\hat{Y}=3.301$ , as reported in Table 9, respectively). The ratio is much larger for the strong sub-group tendency of the two parties for the first time period 2.056 ( $\hat{Y}=3.730$  and  $\hat{Y}=1.814$ ) The separation between the weak sub-group tendency between the two parties has decreased ever so slightly .660 by the Concertation Phase, but it has increased between the strong sub-group tendency of two parties (2.227) in the same time period. The variance of separation degree (Standard Deviation of Ratios, Cross-Period) has been the smallest for weak sub-group tendency (.052) and largest for strong sub-group tendency (.345). The separation between cross-partisan tendency groups has increased from .551 in the first period to .640 in the third period, or by 16.15 percent. The magnitude of separation or the difference between the strong tendency group cross-party ratio to the weak tendency group cross-party ratio has increased from 2.834 in Pluralist Phase to 3.37 in Concertation Phase, or an increase of 19.02 percent.

Table 10 here

The analysis in Table 10 also underscores the dynamic affects of value change which has characterized the two parties within Britain between 1978-1995, at least with respect to the Europeanist tendencies of True-Partisans. The respective indicators of valence are notably smaller for the simulated panel comparisons. In each case, the variance in separation degrees for the simulated panel analysis (.020, .032 and .223) is smaller than their period counterparts. This

pattern is somewhat different for the cross-partisan tendency group separations across the three different True-Partisan categories in the simulated panel analysis (.551, .767, and .772), with the gap between the first panel and the third panel only 40.11 percent. Finally, the magnitude of separation across the three panels has increased sharply, by 29.57 percent (from 2.834 to 3.672). This increase in degree and magnitude of separation of tendency groups over the period of 1978-1995 suggests that the original true partisans of the Pluralist period (1978-1983) have become increasingly separated in their Europeanist preference from those prevailing among the True-Partisans by the third period in Britain's two major parties.

Table 11 reports the analysis of the degree of expressiveness among the three Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups. Turning first to the variance among tendency groups within each party over the three time period (Standard Deviations, Tendency Group Estimates, Longitudinal Estimates), we see that for Conservatives, expressiveness has grown from .545 (the standard deviation of 2.395, 3.062 and 3.730 for the three tendency groups during the first time period shown in Table 9) to .619 during the third time period (the standard deviation of 2.067, 2.825 and 3.583), an increase of 13.58 percent. This compares with a 5.47 percent (from .607 to .640) increase in cross-group estimates for the Labour Party over the three time period between 1978-1995.

The respective magnitudes of separation in expressiveness show a much starker difference across the two parties. These magnitudes (defined as ratio of political preference estimates for strong tendency True-Partisans to weak tendency True-Partisans within each time period) are two to three times as large for the Conservative Party than for the Labour Party. In the Pluralist stage, for example, the difference in ratio or magnitudes between the Conservative

Party to Labour Party is 3.372 (1.73 : .514). For the Conservative Party the magnitude of separation in expressiveness has increased by 11.304 percent (1.557 and 1.733) from the first period to the third period. For the Labour Party, the change over the same time period in magnitude of separation in expressiveness has been -6.545 percent (.550 and .514), nearly half of that of Conservatives.

Turning to the panel analysis, we see from Table 11 that the variance among tendency groups within the Conservative Party over the three time periods has increased from .545 (standard deviation of 2.395, 3.062 and 3.730) in the first period to .595 (standard deviation of 2.136, 2.865 and 3.594) in the third period, or a change (decrease) of -40.5 percent. For the Labour Party this change has been smaller, -31.7 percent. The increase in Conservative Party's magnitude of separation in expressiveness from the first time period to the third time period is 8.09 percent (from 1.557 and 1.683), while that of the Labour Party's over the same time period was 39.82 percent (.550 and .769). However, the magnitude of separation across all three time periods remains two to three times larger for the Conservative than Labour Party.

Finally, an estimate of the total expressiveness across both parties, within each period, has been computed and is reported in Table 11 as the Aggregate Expressiveness value. This value represents the standard deviation of all Europeanist tendency estimates across both parties, within each time period. For the longitudinal analysis, the value has increased from .630 in Pluralist Phase to .689 in Concertation stage, or an increase of 9.365 percent. The respective degrees of change in the panel analysis has been from .630 in the Pluralist Phase to .710 in the Concertation Phase, an increase of 12.7 percent. As is evident, the change in panel analysis is higher than the change in period analysis. Unlike valence, however, the changes in the respective

value base of both parties has not resulted in sharp shifts between original and new tendency groups within the True-Partisan category.

Table 11 here

Comparing the simulated panel estimated with those of the period estimates results in much smaller differences than were recorded in the valence measures. This indicates the changes in the value base for the respective parties have had a much larger cross-party effect, pushing the parties further apart in their respective Europeanist tendencies than a within-party effect.

#### *Implications for Party Leadership Strategies*

Table 12 summarizes the implications of these findings within the context of the various leadership strategies suggested by the general patterns of change in expressiveness and valence of tendency groups across and within the True-Partisans of the two parties over the period 1978-1995. The table compares the implied leadership strategies suggested by the nominal analysis and the evaluative analysis. It is clear from the table and from the findings upon which the patterns are based that for both the Conservative and Labour Party leaderships, the implied strategies toward the broader party (reflected in the nominal based analysis) are somewhat different from that implied toward the True-Partisan voters of the party. During the most recent time period (1990-1995), our analysis indicates both the Conservative and Labour leadership may

have more room to maneuver with its most partisan base of voters (underscored by an implied transactional strategy revealed from the evaluative model), while among the broader party, such discretion is more severely restricted (underscored by an implied delegate strategy revealed from the nominal based model).

While we do not have a simple, neat single statistic that will allow a standardized measure of expressiveness and valence, and therefore summarize separation in the context of Europeanist tendencies across and within parties, we can draw initial assessments based on the analysis presented in Tables 10 and 11, and compare these to the logical alignments suggested in Figure 3. The data suggest that for both the Labour and Conservative Party leadership, the prevailing strategy, at least with respect to the party's most partisan supporters and those who already hold a pre-disposition to proceed with a British Europeanist policy, has moved from an implied transformational strategy in 1978-1983 to a delegate strategy during the second time period, and to a transactional strategy by the final period, 1990-1995. While we have no baseline to assess an absolute level of expressiveness or valence, we can compare the relative degrees of these two conditions over the three time periods. For both parties, valence has moved in a curvilinear fashion across the three period, moving from an initial lower level to a higher level in the Consultation Phase of EU development, back to a lower level of valence by the 1990s. This can be gauged in a general sense by tracking the standard deviation of ratios in cross-partisan groups reported in Table 10 (.551, .865, and .640, respectively).

Table 12 here



Of course, the content of these strategies have changed for each party. Thus, the leadership strategy for the most partisan electorate of the Labour Party may have dictated a transformational approach, but as Table 5 reports, the level of support shown among the most partisan voters of the party precluded directing this transformational style toward any serious pro-European policy. By the 1990s, Labour leadership was now within a transactional strategy vis-a-vis its most partisan tendency groups, yet the party overall had now shifted toward a pro-European stance, thus affording the leadership a more realistic opportunity to open up a dialog with the various tendencies (and factions) about Britain's more active integration into the European Union. This was almost the exact opposite of what characterized the Conservative Party over the same time frame.

This further highlights an important point in our consideration of party leadership strategies. Even transformational strategies which seem feasible within the context of managing the tendency differences within the most partisan electoral wings of the party does not eliminate restrictions which define the parameters within which transformational styles may be effective and preferable. A party on the whole which is overwhelming opposed to the European Union dictates the limits of transformational strategies directed at the most partisan wing of the party. Basically, such an alignment of expressiveness and valence degrees in this wing offer the party leadership various strategies of leading this wing. The leadership cannot simply ignore the broader reality within the party itself which may stand apart from the most pro-Europeanist True-Partisans. A transformational style may be the best hope the party leadership has of keeping these tendency wings among their True-Partisans in line and compliant in the face of a party far apart overall on the issue of the European Union.

As for the pattern of expressiveness it too follows the same pattern across both parties. Table 11 shows that the Labour True-Partisans have moved from relatively low level of expressiveness in the first period (.607) to a relatively high level of expressiveness in the second period (.665), and have remained in a high level in the third period (.640). The Conservatives have followed the same path of expressiveness, from very low (.545) to relatively higher level (.624), and have remained in a relatively high level of expressiveness (.619).

Across the time span from 1978 to 1995, the leadership of both major parties has been presented with the very similar situation, even if the magnitude of the separation among the three tendency groups in the Conservative Party is not as great as it is within the True-Partisan category of Labour voters, it is still high enough to suggest a sharp degree of constraint on policy innovation for the party's leadership. In the Pluralist stage both parties leadership were free to pursue the policy they see as most beneficial to their party's electoral success. By the Consultation Phase both leaderships were confronted with opposite situations, where high valence and high degree of expressiveness have greatly constrained the leadership's ability to define the policy toward European Union by negotiating a consensus among the three tendency groups or by positioning their party in opposition to the other party's policy toward European Union. By the third time period, the lower valence gave more freedom to leadership of Labour and Conservative parties. The high degree of discord among the True-Partisans could be balanced by formulating the European Union position by exploiting the differences between the own party and its principal political opposition. As the 1997 general elections were approaching, the Labour Party had clearly decided to support Britain's involvement in the 'federal Europe'. The Conservative Party was more overtaken by the increasing internal divisions, it was struggling

hard to define a clear position on European Union, nevertheless the Conservatives were very much opposed to Labour's policy of Britain's deeper integration in the European Union. Even in 1998, the opportunities for Labour Party remain open for skillful negotiating to fashion a British European policy. Certainly Mr. Blair's promise to move Britain into the inner core of the Union's monetary group by the next election would seem to reflect a willingness by Labour leadership to move on the opportunity which history and fate have delivered to their doorstep - for better or worse.

### **Conclusion**

Integrating four bodies of literature, this paper has explored two simple but important questions: to what degree has the separation of Europeanist tendencies within the most partisan electorate of Britain's two major parties changed over time, and what implications for the party leadership strategies toward the European Union are implied by these patterns of tendency separation? Unlike most studies within its genre, this paper has focused not on MP factions within the British House of Commons, nor has it sought to survey the broad ranges of attitudes toward the European Union expressed across the general British electorate. Rather, following the example suggested by Rose (1980) and others, this paper has concentrated upon that segment of the party leadership's most important constituency, with respect to the matter of the European Union. Namely, those most partisan voters within their electorate who share a distinct predilection to support a policy of British membership within the European Union and a British role within the larger political and economic institutions of the single market. It has been argued

that logically, this segment of the party leadership's constituency within the electorate is the most critical front line in fashioning and devising a lasting and effective coalition base from which to move Britain into its inevitable role within the single currency union. As such, we have argued that it is essential to begin to map out the contours of cohesion or discord that might characterize over time this critical domain of the party leadership natural political base. Despite the common opinion that the issue of the European Union has little resonance within Whitehall, the Commons or the public in general, many have come to realize that the pressure of the European Union weighs heavily on British political leadership. As Gary (1995, p. 181) notes with regard to Conservatives, "the European policy dimension within Conservatism is the most important in determining MPs attitudes to leading figures". If, as we and others suggest, cross-party pressures are crucial in shaping the leadership strategy of parties, then we must also conclude that such constraints as exist in the Conservative Party work to constrain Labour's strategy as well.

Our method has been to rely on estimates from which to demarcate, or simulate, the boundaries between the relevant tendency groups within the True-Partisan wing of the two major parties electorate. The findings reported in this paper confirm what others have shown in different settings and with different methods: the leadership of Labour and Conservative parties have navigated a twisted course on the way to their present policy positions over the past two decades. Both parties have followed similar pathways along the way: moving from implied transformational leadership strategies toward their most partisan Europeanist tendencies, to delegate strategies, and finally during recent years to a transactional leadership style. However, as our nominal analysis has shown, the content of these strategies has been quite different: Labour has evolved from a transformational strategy within an broader party environment quite

opposed to the Union and its implied federalist logic, to a transactional leadership strategy within a much more favorable environment for Europeanists. The Conservatives, on the other hand, have found themselves becoming the party of Euroskeptics, presenting the Conservative leadership of Mr. William Hague with a much different set of parameters from which to broker a deal on the issue of Europe than his Labour counterpart, Mr. Tony Blair.

The tendency separation approach to the analysis of party politics within Britain, or any advanced industrial democracy, offers what we believe is an important alternative to more traditional though fruitful strategies of analysis. By focusing on distinct elements of the party leadership's key political environment, the strategy allows one to gauge the deeper level pressures which may be moving the more visible factional tensions within the House of Commons or the rank and file membership itself. The method directs attention to the very core of the party wherein lies the grist for both party realignment as well as party leadership innovation. Without a proper accounting or estimation of the possible degree of such tendency separation within the leadership's electoral base, accurate assessment and evaluation of factional pressures and conflict can be greatly exaggerated or indeed underestimated. Mrs. Thatcher's own demise as Prime Minister in 1990 would not have been possible had her policy legacy toward the European Union not had such ephemeral support among the critical core constituents, as suggested by Rasmussen's (1997) analysis.

However, the refinement and extension of this approach is certainly required before we can begin to construct a complete framework within which tendency separation analysis can achieve its full potential as a valuable tool of analysis for party politics within Britain or any other advanced industrial democracy. This study has focused upon only the two major parties,

and within these, the two most salient wings of the respective parties. We believe that this is a logical and promising initial starting point for the eventual extension and elaboration of this approach. Later studies must expand this scope of analysis to include not only other parties within Britain, but to explore alternative models from which estimates of tendencies within differently structured contexts can be derived. Tendency groups within the Mere-Voters surely offer a promising comparison to their True-Partisan counterparts, and would provide yet a different and expanded picture of the pressure imposed on the leadership strategies of the major parties. Our regression models themselves should be expanded to include separate equations for both of the two major (or, indeed, minor) parties, extending the range from Labour/Conservative Europeanist True-Partisans to Labour Non-Europeanist True-Partisans. Finally, of course this study has relied on data drawn from the Eurobarometer surveys. These are a logical and useful starting point because they offer continuous wording of key questions drawn from a British sample of voters over an extended time period. Their convenience and reliability have been repeatedly reconfirmed within the extant literature. However, other sources of data must be harvested for replication and corroboration, as well as necessary refinement of survey items. Rasmussen (1997) has shown the importance of using Gallop polls to explore over time the British electorate's position on Europe. This approach offers promising opportunities for tendency separation analysis, as well. At a minimum, tendency separation analysis, especially with regard to such critical issues as the European Union, requires our further attention if for no other reason than the fact that all politics is ultimately the contest of tendencies and factions, locked in struggle, implicit or explicit, over values that define both a nation's and a citizen's character. At the conclusion of his insightful analysis of party alignments in the House of

Commons, Webb (1997, p. 105) reminds the reader of Giovanni Sartori's great dictum, "throughout the record of history, factions emerge as the despair of politics." We would add only that we must be mindful of Alfred North Whitehead's warning "to seek out the simple, and distrust it". Behind the passion and tumult of the ever present and consuming factional strife lies the fallow fields of attitudinal tendencies which refresh and nourish the weary.

## Endnotes

1. Webb (1997, p. 104) draws particular attention to the importance of specifying tendencies and factions as a prerequisite of clearly understanding and fully comprehending the possible fissures underlying party realignment in Britain. “Factions based on attitudinal clusters,” he writes, “are virtually a precondition for of realignment, which is why a clear vision of intra-party politics is crucial to our ability to comprehend fully the game of party competition.”

2. Webb (1997, p. 101) offers an example of the constraints imposed on party leadership as a function of the valence factor we are discussing above. Exploring the value clusters defining MPs during the 1980s, he notes the dilemma facing those who might prefer to find a more compatible home on the issue of the European Union. “Having already effectively lost the battle over economic policy in the 1980s, remaining members of the libertarian centre are likely to feel distinctly uncomfortable in the overtly Europhobic party. Under such circumstances, the probability of further defections to Labour or the Liberal Democrats would surely be greater. By contrast, were the party leadership to move to a significantly more sympathetic portion with respect to European integration, there is no obvious prospect for similar defections among anti-European Tories. In part this is because the readerships of Labour and the Liberal democrats seem even less likely to adopt more hostile policies towards the EU...very few Conservative Europhobes would share common ground with other parties in terms of their basic core beliefs. *Ceteris paribus*, other than continuing to voice their opposition from within the Conservative Party, the only way out of such a situation for right-wing Europhiles would be to exit the party and form a new organization of the nationalist right”.

3. The data for the classification are drawn from the Eurobarometers (10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42), conducted between 1978 and 1995. The specific question on “closeness to party” from which our classification of True-Partisans and Mere-Voters is constructed reads: “Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? [If yes], Do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, fairly close or merely a sympathizer?” The values were 1 (Very close) 2 (Fairly close) 3 (Merely a sympathizer) and 4 (Close to no particular party).

The voting preference question reads: “If there were a “General Election” tomorrow... which party would you vote for?” The British sample from the Eurobarometer was restricted to those responding either Conservative Party or Labour Party. To identify Europeanists from non-Europeanists, we relied upon two additional questions asked consistently across the 18 Eurobarometers. The addresses the issue of European unification. The question reads: In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? Are you...(1) For - very much, (2) For- to some extent, (3) Against - to some extent, or (4) Against - very much? The second question focuses on the issue of membership within the European Union. It reads: “Generally speaking, do you think that [our country’s] membership in the European Union is... (1) A good thing, (2) Neither good nor bad or, (3) A bad thing” . Europeanists were defined as those respondents who selected “For - very much” and “For- to some extent” on the question of



European unification, as well as “A good thing” on the matter of the respondent’s country membership within the European Community/Union. All others were coded as “non-Europeanists”, and dropped from the analysis of Europeanist tendency separation.

4. A Labour Europeanist True-Partisan is someone who expresses a closeness to a party, as well as reveals an intention to vote for the Labour Party, and who is a Europeanist. A Labour Europeanist Mere-Voter is someone who claims an intention to vote for the Labour Party at the next general election, but who has no closeness to any party, and who is a Europeanist. The Conservative Europeanist True-Partisan and Mere-Voter are similarly coded.

5. Each Eurobarometer represents an annual sample. Thus, the data for years 1978-1983 are drawn from Eurobarometers 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18, and 19, pooled as one sample.

6. Extensive research has identified tendency groupings (if not technically factions) within the British House of Commons. With respect to the European Union, Sowemimo (1996) has identified Thatcherite Nationalists”, “Neo-Liberal Integrationists”, and “Interventionist-Integrationists” among Conservative MPs. Garry (1995) has classified faction-tendencies into anti-European/pro-European “drys” and “wets” and Webb (1997) has clustered the factions-tendencies of a pooled sample of MPs into Libertarian/Conventional, Right/Left and pro-Europe/anti-Europe groups.

7. Rasmussen (1997, p. 113) has suggested a complex relationship between partisan attitudes and one’s attitudes toward the European Union in his study of British public opinion during the Thatcher era. He notes that, “Given partisan differences on Europe many people may simply have adopted the view that they attributed to the party they supported. Furthermore, in so far as people distinguished between Thatcher and the Conservative government, the popularity of the latter may have affected the public’s view on Europe.” The power of the values which bind one to the party, and subsequently to the European Union may be more powerful than we assume. Gary (1995, p. 181-82) suggests for instance, that the “apparent relationship between membership of moral-economic opinion groups and attitudes to leading figures [within the Conservative Party] is thereby shown to be spurious. The apparent differences between the moral-economic groups are to a large extent a product of the E.C. divide.”

8. See Webb (1997) for a compelling illustration of the importance and utility of linking core beliefs with partisan policy perspectives, with particular regard to the issue of the European Union and the British Conservative Party.

9. The values for the variable, Market in Table 3 were assigned according to the example shown by Kitschelt (1995). Tax supported occupations, or, those jobs most likely to be based on public expenditures and included within the service sector of the economy, include the categories of housewife, student (and military service), unemployed, retired, farmer/fisherman, and manual workers. These categories are more likely to be insulated from the market competitiveness of the single currency union, insulated, at least during the short term, from the vagaries of the market.

Those respondents within the profit supported sector of the British economy and primarily dependent upon the success of private industries for their livelihood include the categories for professionals, business, white collar employees, executives. These are most likely to feel the immediate pressures of the single currency union, at least during the short term. The variable Post-Materialism has been designed by Inglehart (1997) and is an index of a respondent's answers to the following question: "There is a lot of talk these days about what this country's goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority: (1) Maintaining order in the nation; (2) Giving the people more say in important government decisions; (3) Fighting rising prices; (4) Protecting Freedom of speech. Would you please say which of them you yourself consider most important in the long run? And what would be your second choice?" Respondents combining item (1) and (3) are coded by Inglehart as "materialist"; respondents combining items (2) and (4) are coded as "post-materialist", and all others are coded as "mixed".

10. See Webb (1997, pp. 92-93) for a similar interpretation of the dimensions underlying the core beliefs of MPs within the British House of Commons. Webb suggests in his analysis that "It would seem most appropriate to start by placing primary emphasis on the two dimensions of 'core belief' which have become increasingly familiar to scholars of public opinion in both Europe and the USA; these dimensions relate to the tensions between socialism and capitalism [similar to our measure of capacity], on the one hand, and moral libertarianism and authoritarianism [similar to our measure of scope], on the other. The two dimensions are independent of each other both theoretically and empirically. See also, Palmer, 1995.

11. The factor scores (standardized measures of a respondents value on the respective dimensions identifies in the analysis) were reset to an ordinal scale to make the measure consistent with both the other variables in the analysis, and to return the values to their "original" level of measurement. Thus, the values for capacity are (1) Low (factor scores, -1.7878 - -.56234), (2) Moderate (factor scores, -.56233 - .41743), and (3) High (factor scores, .41744 - 2.03516); while the values for Scope are (1) Low (factor scores, -2.4549 - -.29976), (2) Moderate (factor scores, -.29975 - .23295), and (3) .23296 - 2.66248). The mean values for Capacity by period are 1.92, 1.99 and 2.00, respectively; while the corresponding period scores for Scope are 1.92, 2.00 and 2.09.

12. The variable Satisfaction with Democracy is drawn from the question in the Eurobarometers which reads: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [you country]? Would you say you are (1) Very satisfied, (2) Fairly satisfied, (3) Not very satisfied, or (4) Not at all satisfied?"

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**Table 1: The Logic of Issue Valence and Issue Expressiveness**

<p><b>Low Issue Valence:</b></p> <p>Issue (e.g., voter's political preference with respect to European Union) differentiated and evaluated on basis of party's advocacy. Voter oriented toward preferred party against principal opposition, issue position follows; <i>indifferent to inter-party separation (inter-party orientation) on issue.</i></p> <p>Logic:</p> <p>Without EU issue attached or evaluated through key values, the issue shows no particular difference across the various tendency ranges within major parties (i.e., weak, mean and strong partisan groups within Conservative and Labour parties with respect to preference position on EU).</p> <p>Measure (See Tables 9, 10):</p> <p>Issue shows no connection to values which underlie partisanship:</p> <p>ratios of estimated support for EU position among similar tendency groups of the two major parties are relatively small and constant or declining over time; the magnitude of separation between the cross-party ratios of strong partisans and weak partisans are relatively small and constant or declining over time; and the standard deviations of cross-partisan tendency group ratios are relatively small and constant or declining over time.</p>	<p><b>High Issue Valence:</b></p> <p>EU issue differentiated and evaluated in terms of values. Voter oriented to values of which issue and partisanship is attached; <i>not indifferent to inter-party orientation.</i></p> <p>Logic:</p> <p>With EU issue attached or evaluated through key values, the issue shows no distinct pattern of difference across the various ranges of tendency groups within major parties (i.e., weak, mean and strong partisan reference groups within Conservative and Labour parties with respect to preference position on EU).</p> <p>Measure (See Tables 9, 10):</p> <p>With EU issue attached or evaluated through key values, the issue is weighted by the degree of partisanship</p> <p>ratios of estimated support for EU position among similar tendency groups of the two major parties are relatively large and increasing over time; the magnitude of separation between the cross-party ratios of strong partisans and weak partisans are relatively large and increasing over time; and, the standard deviations of cross-partisan tendency group ratios are relatively large and increasing over time</p>
<p><b>Low Issue Expressiveness:</b></p> <p>EU issue differentiated and evaluated on basis of voter's party preference. Voter's strategy is to evaluate issue in context of partisan contest, giving evaluative weight to that issue which best maximizes preferred party's electoral victory and denial of victory to preferred party's main political opposition. <i>Voter indifferent to possible separation between intra-party reference groups.</i></p> <p>Logic:</p> <p>Without EU issue attached to values, there is a distinct lack of a pattern of differences across tendency groups within a political party (e.g., weak, mean or strong partisan groups) with respect to preference position on EU.</p> <p>Measure (See Tables 9, 11):</p> <p>EU issue shows no connection to values which underlie partisanship.</p> <p>the magnitude of separation between the partisan groups estimates of support for EU position within respective major parties are relatively small and constant or declining over time; the standard deviations of tendency group estimates of support for EU position within respective major parties are relatively small and constant or declining over time; and standard deviation of cross-party partisan group estimates of support for EU position are relatively small and constant or declining over time.</p>	<p><b>High Issue Expressiveness:</b></p> <p>EU issue differentiated and evaluated in terms of values through which partisanship is defined. Voter's strategy is to express preference for issue and partisanship as an expression of core value. Expressiveness serves to orient party to an issue, and in turn, orient the voter to that party supporting the issue. <i>Not indifferent to separation between intra-party reference groups.</i></p> <p>Logic:</p> <p>With EU issue attached to values, there is a distinct pattern of differences across tendency groups within a political party (e.g., weak, mean or strong partisan groups) with respect to partisan preference position on EU.</p> <p>Measure (See Tables 9, 11):</p> <p>EU issue shows a distinct connection to values which underlie partisanship.</p> <p>the magnitude of separation between the tendency groups estimates of support for EU position within respective major parties are relatively large and increasing over time; the standard deviations of tendency group estimates of support for EU position within respective major parties are relatively large and increasing over time; and standard deviation of cross-party tendency group estimates of support for EU position are relatively large and increasing over time.</p>

**Table 2: Strategic Implications of Issue Valence and Issue Expressiveness for Party Leadership**

		Issue Valence	
		Spatial Orientation of Voter to Party System	
		Low	High
Issue Expressiveness	High	<p><i>Major Considerations:</i></p> <p>Opportunities for Policy Innovation: Numerous            Degree of Intra-Party Partisan Cohesion: Low            Nature of Intra-Party Compromise: Costly            Possibilities for Intra-Party Issue Consensus: Minimal</p> <p><i>Implied Leadership Strategy:</i></p> <p><b>Transactional: Leaders must carefully negotiate a balance to intra-party competition between contending tendency groups, while striving to exploit differences between the party and its principal political opposition.</b></p>	<p><i>Major Considerations:</i></p> <p>Opportunities for Policy Innovation: Few            Degree of Intra-Party Partisan Cohesion: Low            Nature of Intra-Party Compromise: Costly            Possibilities for Intra-Party Issue Consensus: Minimal</p> <p><i>Implied Leadership Strategy:</i></p> <p><b>Delegate: Leaders are constrained in their opportunities to negotiate a consensus among intra-party tendency groups while delegated to remain within restricted domains of expressed preferences; principal leadership effort is directed at breaking bonds between inter-party tendency group valance in order to open opportunities for policy innovation and bargaining consensus within party.</b></p>
	Low	<p><i>Major Considerations:</i></p> <p>Opportunities for Policy Innovation: Numerous            Degree of Intra-Party Partisan Cohesion: High            Nature of Intra-Party Compromise: Efficient            Possibilities for Intra-Party Issue Consensus: Maximal</p> <p><i>Implied Leadership Strategy:</i></p> <p><b>Transformational: Leaders are free to pursue electoral/policy strategies designed to exploit differences between major political opponent without worry about fracturing intra-party cohesiveness.</b></p>	<p><i>Major Considerations:</i></p> <p>Opportunities for Policy Innovation: Few            Degree of Intra-Party Partisan Cohesion: High            Nature of Intra-Party Compromise: Efficient            Possibilities for Intra-Party Issue Consensus: Maximal</p> <p><i>Implied Leadership Strategy:</i></p> <p><b>Trustee: Leaders are entrusted by a cohesive party to define party's distinctiveness vis-a-vis their primary inter-party opposition and thereby gain maximum electoral advantage over principal political opposition.</b></p>
Strategic Orientation of Voter to Party			



**Table 3: Variables Defining Core Values**

Variable	Definition	Measurement Scale
Market	Market Orientation of Respondent's Occupation	1 = Tax Supported (public market orientation) 2 = Profit Supported (private market orientation)
Education	Respondent's age when formal education ended	1 = Up to 14 years 2 = 15-16 Years 3 = 17 Years, or more
Income	Respondent's reported income, by quartile	1 = First Quartile 2 = Second Quartile 3 = Third Quartile 4 = Fourth Quartile
Political Ideology	Respondent's self-placement on left-right scale	1 = Left 2 = Center 3 = Right
Post-Materialism	Inferred value orientation of respondent	1 = Material 2 = Mixed 3 = Post-Materialism

**Table 4: Quartimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Core Values Among British Electorate, Pooled Sample, 1978-1995.**

Core Value Variables	Identified Dimensions of Core Values		
	<b>Capacity</b>	<b>Scope</b>	Communality (h <sup>2</sup> )
	Factor Loadings (Defining Factor Loadings in Bold Face)	Factor Loadings (Defining Factor Loadings in Bold Face)	
Income	<b>.775</b>	-.039	.602
Market	<b>.741</b>	-.054	.5623
Education	<b>.731</b>	.178	.611
Political Ideology	.082	<b>-.778</b>	.611
Post-Materialism	.155	<b>.733</b>	.562
KMO Statistic	.		.636
Eigenvalue	1.737	1.157	
Variance Explained (%)	34.734	23.139	
Cumulative Variance Explained			57.874
N			12,642

**Table 5: Crosstabulation, Tendency Groups,  
by Period, 1978-1995**

Nominal Analysis

		Partisanship Category (Nominal)				Marginals	
		Labour True-Partisan	Labour Mere-Voter	Conservative Mere-Voter	Conservative True-Partisan	Total	
Period 1	Europeanist		145 25.5%	175 23.7%	369 41.0%	360 56.2%	1049 36.9%
	Non-Europeanist		423 74.5%	563 76.3%	530 59.0%	281 43.8%	1797 63.1%
	Marginals	Total	568 100.0%	738 100.0%	899 100.0%	641 100.0%	2846 100.0%
Period 2	Europeanist		305 43.3%	396 38.8%	576 49.7%	537 55.0%	1816 47.0%
	Non-Europeanist		399 56.7%	625 61.2%	584 50.3%	440 45.0%	2048 53.0%
	Marginals	Total	704 100.0%	1021 100.0%	1162 100.0%	977 100.0%	3864 100.0%
Period 3	Europeanist		484 56.6%	472 47.5%	357 48.4%	381 50.0%	1653 49.4%
	Non-Europeanist		371 43.4%	521 52.5%	380 51.6%	381 50.0%	1653 49.4%
	Marginals	Total	855 100.0%	993 100.0%	737 100.0%	762 100.0%	3347 100.0%

**Table 6: OLS Regression Analysis of Evaluation Model, Estimating Attitudinal Tendencies Among British Partisan Voters, by Period, 1978-1995**

Dependent Variable: <i>Nominal Europeanist Tendency Group</i> Independent Variables:	Period 1		Period 2		Period 3	
	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient (b) (t-statistic)	Standardized Regression Coefficient ( $\beta$ )	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient (b) (t-statistic)	Standardized Regression Coefficient ( $\beta$ )	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient (b) (t-statistic)	Standardized Regression Coefficient ( $\beta$ )
Intercept	3.874 (24.086)		4.431 (41.120)		4.186 (28.271)	
Capacity	.190 (4.421)	.153**	.120 (4.060)	.090**	.101 (2.609)	.071**
Scope	-.459 (-10.671)	-.301**	-.481 (-16.073)	-.376**	-.572 (-15.354)	-.428**
Satis. w/Demo	-.127 (-2.806)	-.093**	-.423 (-14.581)	-.340**	-.301 (-7.694)	-.216**
Cohort	-.209 (-2.884)	-.102**	-.044 (-1.290)	-.028	-.035 (-.855)	-.023
<b>Model Summary</b>						
R <sup>2</sup>	.184		.362		.290	
F	42.337		191.682		101.815	
DF	4,750		4,1351		4,999	
N	754		1355		1003	

\*\* = p = .000

**Table 7: Summary Statistics for Partisan Groups: Labour True-Partisans (Nominal Definition)**

**Evaluation Model Variables by Periods, 1978-1995**

Evaluation Model Variables	Summary Statistics					Defining Value for Tendency Groups Among Conservative True-Partisans		
	Mean	95%ci Lower	95%ci Upper	Standard Deviation		Weak ( $\pm 1$ Std)	Mean	Strong ( $\pm 1$ Std)
<b>Period 1 (1978-1983)</b>								
Capacity	1.68	1.61	1.75	.78		2.46	1.68	.90
Scope	2.23	2.16	2.31	.82		1.41	2.23	3.05
Satis. w/Demo.	2.60	2.52	2.68	.90		1.7	2.6	3.5
Cohort	1.35	1.31	1.40	.50		.85	1.35	1.85
<b>Period 2 (1984-1989)</b>								
Capacity	1.90	1.83	1.96	.83		2.73	1.9	1.07
Scope	2.50	2.44	2.55	.70		1.80	2.5	3.2
Satis. w/Demo.	2.87	2.80	2.94	.85		2.05	2.9	3.7
Cohort	1.54	1.49	1.59	.66		.88	1.54	2.2
<b>Period 3 (1990-1995)</b>								
Capacity	1.87	1.81	1.83	.81		2.71	1.87	1.09
Scope	2.50	2.44	2.56	.71		1.79	2.5	3.21
Satis. w/Demo.	2.78	2.71	2.84	.82		.92	1.74	2.56
Cohort	1.74	1.68	1.80	.75		.79	1.74	2.29

**Table 8: Summary Statistics for Partisan Groups: Conservative True-Partisans (Nominal Definition)**

**Evaluation Model Variables by Periods, 1978-1995**

Evaluation Model Variables	Summary Statistics					Defining Value for Tendency Groups Among Labour True-Partisans		
	Mean	95%ci Lower	95%ci Upper	Standard Deviation		Weak ( $\pm 1$ Std)	Mean	Strong ( $\pm 1$ Std)
<b>Period 1</b>								
Capacity	2.16	2.09	2.23	.82		1.34	2.16	2.98
Scope	1.48	1.42	1.54	.68		2.16	1.48	.8
Satis. w/Demo.	2.15	2.08	2.22	.8		2.95	2.15	1.35
Cohort	1.29	1.24	1.33	.47		.82	1.29	1.76
<b>Period 2</b>								
Capacity	2.18	2.12	2.23	.79		1.39	2.18	2.97
Scope	1.45	1.40	1.50	.70		2.15	1.45	.75
Satis. w/Demo.	1.92	1.87	1.97	.72		2.64	1.92	1.2
Cohort	1.46	1.42	1.51	.64		.82	1.46	2.1
<b>Period 3</b>								
Capacity	2.16	2.09	2.22	.80		1.36	2.16	2.96
Scope	1.53	1.47	1.60	.75		2.28	1.53	.78
Satis. w/Demo.	2.15	1.09	2.22	.74		2.89	2.15	1.41
Cohort	1.62	1.56	1.68	.73		.89	1.62	2.35

**Table 9: Estimated Europeanist Tendencies of True-Partisans Within Conservative and Labour Party, by Period, 1978-1995.**

Simulated Panel Analysis of Estimates				Longitudinal Analysis of Estimates			
Major Party	Tendency Groups			Major Party	Tendency Groups		
	Weak (At Panel 1) $\hat{Y}$	Mean (At Panel 1) $\hat{Y}$	Strong (At Panel 1) $\hat{Y}$		Weak (At Period) $\hat{Y}$	Mean (At Period) $\hat{Y}$	Strong (At Period) $\hat{Y}$
Panel 1				Period 1			
Estimates based on Evaluation Model for Period 1 with Panel 1 values for respective partisan reference group weighted by parameter coefficients for each independent variable				Estimates based on Evaluation Model for Period 1 with Period 1 values for respective partisan reference group weighted by parameter coefficients for each independent variable			
Conservative	2.395	3.062	3.730	Conservative	2.395	3.062	3.730
Labour	3.301	2.557	1.814	Labour	3.301	2.557	1.814
Panel 2				Period 2			
Estimates based on Evaluation Model for Period 2 with Panel 1 values for respective partisan reference group weighted by parameter coefficients for each independent variable				Estimates based on Evaluation Model for Period 2 with Period 2 values for respective partisan reference group weighted by parameter coefficients for each independent variable			
Conservative	2.228	3.012	3.797	Conservative	2.355	3.119	3.883
Labour	3.291	2.401	1.510	Labour	2.987	2.175	1.358
Panel 3				Period 3			
Estimates based on Evaluation Model for Period 3 with Panel 1 values for respective partisan reference group weighted by parameter coefficients for each independent variable				Estimates based on Evaluation Model for Period 3 with Period 3 values for respective partisan reference group weighted by parameter coefficients for each independent variable			
Conservative	2.136	2.865	3.594	Conservative	2.067	2.825	3.583
Labour	3.086	2.25	1.414	Labour	3.131	2.047	1.609

Estimates are derived from values for each variable in the model per partisan reference group reported in Tables 8 and 9, weighted by parameter estimates, derived from separate time-period evaluative models, reported in Table 7.

**Table 10: Measures of Issue Valence Based on Estimated Europeanist Tendencies of True-Partisans Within Conservative and Labour Party, by Period, 1978-1995**

Measures of Issue Valence, based on Simulated Panel Analysis					
	Cross-Partisan Tendency Group Comparisons				
	Ratios				
	Tendency Group Estimates				
Panel/Period	Weak (Conservative Party: Labour Party)	Mean (Conservative Party: Labour Party)	Strong (Conservative Party: Labour Party)	Magnitude of Separation,  Ratio of Partisan Tendency Group Estimates  Strong:Weak	Standard Deviation  Ratios  Cross-Partisan Tendency Group
Panel 1	.726	1.197	2.056	2.834	.551
Panel 2	.667	1.254	2.515	3.714	.767
Panel 3	.692	1.273	2.542	3.672	.772
Standard Deviation of Ratios, Cross- Panel	.020	.032	.223		
Measures of Issue Valence, based on Longitudinal Analysis					
Period 1	.726	1.197	2.056	2.834	.551
Period 2	.788	1.434	2.859	3.627	.865
Period 3	.660	1.380	2.227	3.373	.640
Standard Deviation of Ratios, Cross- Period	.052	.101	.345		



**Table 11: Measures of Issue Expressiveness Based on Estimated Europeanist Tendencies of True-Partisans Within Conservative and Labour Party, by Period, 1978-1995**



Measures of Issue Expressiveness, based on Simulated Panel Analysis		
Major Parties	Magnitude of Separation Ratio of Partisan Tendency Group Estimates  Strong:Weak	Standard Deviation  Partisan Tendency Group Estimates
<b>Panel 1</b>		
Conservative	1.557	.545
Labour	.550	.607
Aggregate Expressiveness:		.630
<b>Panel 2</b>		
Conservative	1.704	.641
Labour	.459	.722
Aggregate Expressiveness:		.750
<b>Panel 3</b>		
Conservative	1.683	.595
Labour	.769	.683
Aggregate Expressiveness:		.710
Measures of Issue Expressiveness, based on Longitudinal Analysis		
<b>Period 1</b>		
Conservative	1.557	.545
Labour	.550	.607
Aggregate Expressiveness:		.630
<b>Period 2</b>		
Conservative	1.649	.624
Labour	.455	.665
Aggregate Expressiveness:		.800
<b>Period 3</b>		
Conservative	1.733	.619
Labour	.514	.640
Aggregate Expressiveness:		.689

**Table 12: Summary of Implied Leadership Strategies Based on Nominal and Evaluative Models**

<i>Based on Nominal Analysis</i>		
Time Period	Implied Strategy for Labour Leadership	Implied Strategy for Conservative Leadership
Pluralist Phase 1978-1983	Transformational	Transactional
Consultative Phase 1984-1989	Delegate	Delegate
Concertation Phase 1990-1995	Delegate	Delegate
<i>Based on Evaluative Analysis</i>		
Pluralist Phase 1978-1983	Transformational	Transformational
Consultative Phase 1984-1989	Delegate	Delegate
Concertation Phase 1990-1995	Transactional	Transactional

# Figure 1: Attitudes on EC Membership


British Electorate, 1978-1995



**Figure 2: Symmetrical Alignments of Intra-Party and Inter-Party Weighted Europeanist Tendency Groups**



Figure 3: Family Tree, Europeanist Tendency Groups, Nominal and Weighted, Across Britain's Two Major Political Parties



**Figure 4: Comparative Models Explaining Voter's Europeanist Tendency**

