

Cognitive Restructuring in Minority and Majority Influence

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
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Abstract

An experiment was developed to determine (a) the means by which source groups invoke attitude change and (b) the difference in influence between deviant minority source groups and valued majority source groups. The literature supports both pre and post-construal attitude change. The present research supports the former, a cognitive restructuring theory of attitude change. The attitude issue is first reinterpreted in a more favorable way, and then attitude change occurs based upon this reinterpretation. Contrary to some models of minority/majority influence, we have found that majorities as well as minorities use informational pressures to invoke attitude change. We hypothesize that deviant minorities do not immediately have direct public influence because they lack the power to induce reinterpretation. Majorities will have influential power only to the extent that they are valued by the subject.

Influence occurs when a person or group of people cause us to alter our judgments about an object. Psychologists have long assumed that people are influenced by the social groups to which they belong, including political parties and religions and that this effect occurs because of normative pressures (cf. Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). That is, people agree with these majority groups because they want to be like them, be accepted by them, and avoid negative sanctions. Recent research suggests that minority groups may also exert influence on people's opinions (Moscovici, 1985). For example, opinion minorities such as radical environmental organizations and feminist groups appear to affect public views. Minority groups do not exert influence through normative processes because they lack the necessary power and social consensus. Instead, minorities are thought to exert informational pressures. If a minority is insistent and certain, then people "will attempt to see what the minority saw" (Moscovici, 1985). However, people may not publicly admit to agreeing with the minority view because of their fear of "speaking or acting in a deviant fashion in the presence of others" (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellete, Busceme, & Blackstone, in press). Hence, a majority will have a more significant impact on direct public measures of influence than a minority because individuals desire to be associated with them and not with the minority group.

It would be too simple to conclude, however, that majorities exert influence through normative processes and minorities through informational processes. Informational processes may be important in acceptance of majority views as well as minority views. According to Allen and Wilder (1980), acceptance of the opinions of a majority group depends on informational interpretation of their

opinions. That is, we interpret the meaning of an influence appeal given our knowledge of the person or group making the appeal, and then base our attitudes on our interpretation. For example, if a representative of the Environmental Protection Agency stated that drastic measures should be taken by Americans to protect the environment, we will be likely to interpret "drastic measures" as car pooling or recycling aluminum cans. This interpretation would then lead us to accept the message position and align with the source. Similarly, Asch (1948) argued that attitude change does not represent a change in evaluation of the object, but a change in the perception of the object itself. Conformity occurs when the attitude issue is viewed from a new perspective, that held by the group consensus.

This process of interpretation and construction of meaning has been labeled "cognitive restructuring" (Allen & Wilder, 1980). In this view, informational influence occurs in two stages: First, the recipient modifies his or her interpretation of the issue discussed. Second, this new interpretation of the attitude issue makes the source's position seem more reasonable. Essentially, the "meaning attributed to a stimulus is influenced by the context in which it appears" (Allen & Wilder, 1980 p. 1116).

This kind of cognitive restructuring is likely to occur only when there are strong normative pressures to agree with the source. When recipients want to be similar to the source or be a member of the source's social group, they are likely to be motivated to engage in cognitive restructuring of the appeal. Thus, when faced with disagreement from a valued majority group, recipients may interpret the appeal and the attitude topic in the way that makes it easy for them to agree with the source. Indeed, Allen and Wilder (1980) found that subjects cognitively

restructured a message and reinterpreted it so that the sources' opposing position was due to their unusual interpretation of the issue, primarily when the source was presented as a unanimous group of three others. Thus, when told that these others had said they agreed with the statement: "I would never go out of my way to help another person if it meant giving up some personal pleasure," subjects infer that "go out of my way" must mean risk my life. Because subjects adopted this unusual interpretation, they were able to agree with the source. This is due to the normative pressure induced by the unanimous group of three. When the source was supposedly a single other, however, there was no normative pressure and cognitive restructuring did not occur. Subjects accorded the statement the typical, usual interpretation. Because of the lack of normative pressure, there was no change in the meaning of the phrase; hence, no informational influence occurred.

Because recipients are not motivated by normative pressures to align themselves with a minority group, we hypothesize that cognitive restructuring will not occur with minority appeals. For example, if minority groups such as Greenpeace or Earth First advocated drastic measures to protect the environment, we would give "drastic measures" the common interpretation of radical lifestyle changes, and we would not agree publicly with this position. Thus, given the absence of normative pressures, recipients are not likely to reinterpret minority appeals in ways that make them acceptable, and as a consequence this form of informational influence will not occur with minority sources.

Although Allen and Wilder (1980) assumed that cognitive restructuring precedes influence, the reverse order is also plausible (Griffin & Buehler, 1993). According to Griffin and Buehler (1993), people agree with others because of

normative, social pressures and after changing their views reinterpret the influence appeal in order to justify their new opinion. It is unclear, then, whether the reinterpretation of a stimulus is a precondition for influence or whether it represents a post-influence justification process. To examine this question of causal ordering in the present experiment, we presented subjects with an influence appeal from a majority or minority source and we varied the sequence in which subjects' opinions and their interpretations of the appeal were assessed. Some subjects gave their attitude judgments prior to their interpretation and others indicated their attitudes after they interpreted the attitude issue. If reinterpretation of the stimulus is an important part of influence, normative pressures from the majority source should cause the subject to cognitively restructure the influence appeal. This informational change then leads to acceptance of the appeal. However, when subjects indicated their attitudes before they give their interpretations of the attitude issue, little informational change should occur because the subject has not been encouraged to reinterpret the source's position. Thus, if Allen and Wilder (1980) are correct, more attitude change should be obtained by the majority source when subjects indicate their interpretations and then their opinions than when interpretations are given after opinions.

If, however, Griffen and Buehler (1993) are correct and attitude change is not dependent on cognitive restructuring, then order of the attitude and interpretation measures should have little impact on subjects' agreement with the source. Instead, reinterpretation of the majority source's position should be dependent on attitude change. That is, reinterpretation should occur primarily when subjects indicate their attitudes first and then justify these opinions through the subsequent

interpretation measures. Little restructuring should be evident when the interpretation measures precede the attitude ones.

The Present Research

The purpose of the present study is to examine the extent to which influence from a majority group and from a minority group occurs through cognitive restructuring. We hypothesize that restructuring is a central component of majority impact: if a valued majority states a belief that is deviant from what most subjects would expect, subjects will feel threatened by the disagreement and will change how they view the problem so they can agree with the majority. We anticipate that the subjects will change the way they view the influence appeal in order to make the majority's response plausible. However, if a minority states a belief that is deviant from what most subjects would expect, subjects will not feel threatened and will not restructure or distort the minority view. They are also not likely to be influenced by the minority, at least not on the direct items included in our influence assessment. It follows that, in the minority case, the change in the perceived meaning of the critical phrase will occur much less, if at all.

Our study used "American Aggies" as the majority group who took a position opposing subjects' own. Because we hypothesize that normative pressures motivate cognitive restructuring to majority appeals, the value subjects place on this reference group should be an important determinant of how influential they are. We asked our subjects to complete a questionnaire indicating the importance of the Aggie identity to them personally. The questionnaire evaluated the strength of the tie that the subject had with the majority. American Aggies should be influential and generate cognitive restructuring only for those subjects who value

the group, because only these subjects should experience normative pressure to agree with the source and to be similar to them. Our study used "foreign A&M students" as the minority group. For the typical US-born A&M student, this source should generate minimal normative pressure to agree and thus they should not reinterpret or cognitively restructure the message to make it seem plausible. Because little restructuring occurs, minority sources will not be influential.

Method

Subjects

137 students participated in partial fulfillment of a requirement in their introductory psychology classes at Texas A&M University. 3 subjects were not included in the analysis because they did not correctly identify the source and the message position.

Development of Stimulus Materials

Stimulus materials were developed through pretesting with 60 introductory psychology students, who participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Students read and gave their interpretations of the following statements, plus several additional ones that did not meet pretesting requirements:

I would not approve of a friend who took illegal drugs.

Sex of employees should be considered in promotion.

The pretesting questionnaire contained three sections. The first was an open-ended response in which students wrote down what they thought the underlined phrase in each statement meant. This section was placed first so that a genuine measure of subjects' naive interpretations could be obtained.

In the second section, subjects gave their interpretations in a multiple choice format. Subjects read the issue statements, each of which was followed by four possible interpretations of the underlined phrase. Subjects placed a number from 0-100 next to each choice to represent the percentage of Texas A&M students they believed would respond with that particular choice. Hence, upon completing each issue statement, the subject had assigned four percentages to the choices that collectively summed to 100%. In developing the choices, we sought to provide a normative choice that a majority of people would likely select as well as a deviant choice that only a few people would likely select. Average percentages that the students assigned for each issue are: drugs ("Would continue to interact, but personally not condone the habit" 68.8%, "Would confront the individual verbally" 18.8%, "Would end the friendship" 6.3%, "Would turn the person in to the authorities" 6.1%), sex based promotion ("promote the most qualified person regardless of sex unless the job requires certain physical skills (i.e. strength)" 29.29%, "Only promote women when you are forced to" 18.24%, "Due to affirmative action, hire qualified women over qualified men" 27.65%, "promote only men" 24.82%). From these ratings and subjects' open ended responses, we identified a common and a deviant interpretation for each attitude statement.

The third section assessed students' attitudes toward the four statements. Subjects rated their attitudes toward each issue on an 11-point scale that assessed how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement. They also indicated their favorability toward each issue on a series of three 9-point semantic differential scales with endpoints labeled fair/unfair, good/bad, and positive/negative. The attitude scales were highly correlated (correlations were .633 and .872 for drugs,

and sex based hiring respectively). The means of the initial pretest opinions, collapsed across the four scales, were 4.112 for the drug issue and 1.165 for sex based promotion.

Procedure

Subjects were told that an earlier study had assessed student attitudes on various social issues. They were told that we were now interested in what the earlier students' responses meant -- we wanted their evaluation of what the underlined phrase meant. They were to give their judgments of the original students' interpretations as well as their own personal interpretations of the phrase.

The influence appeal consisted of the source group's opinion on an eleven-point attitude scale on one of the two critical opinion topics. Thus, for the sex based promotion issue, the attitude statement read: "Sex of employees should be considered in promotion." Both the majority and the minority were said to have strongly agreed with the statement and to have indicated a mean judgment between 10 and 11 on the 11-point agreement scale¹ On the drugs issue, the attitude statement read, "I would not approve of a friend who took illegal drugs." Both the majority and the minority were said to have strongly disagreed with the statement and to have indicated a mean judgment between 10 and 11 on the 11-point agreement scale. In addition to reporting the source groups' opinion on the critical attitude topic, the first page also identified the source. When the group was

¹ In actuality, subjects saw a response between 1 and 2 on the scale, but we reversed it in the analysis so that we could collapse across issue.

supposed to be a majority, it was labeled "American Aggies" and when a minority group, it was labeled "Foreign Students". This constituted the source type manipulation.

To ensure that subjects understood the group's position, subjects then completed a questionnaire in which they listed in a free response format the identity of the group expressing the position (i.e., American Aggies or foreign students) and what that position was. All but 3 subjects correctly completed this assessment. The third page of the questionnaire then restated the issue, assessed subjects' interpretations of the issue, and recorded their own, personal opinions on the issue. The attitude measures consisted of an 11-point agreement scale as well as three 9-point semantic differentials (similar to the pretesting). The two interpretation measures assessed what subjects thought the original source group had believed the underlined phrase to mean and, then, what subjects personally thought it meant. These interpretations were marked on 9-point scales. The two ends of each scale were anchored with a deviant interpretation and a common interpretation of the attitude issue. For example, for the drug issue, the ends of the scale were "Would continue to interact but personally not condone the habit" for the common choice and "Would take extreme measures -- ending the friendship or turning the person in to the authorities" for the deviant interpretation. The sex based promotion issue had "Promote the most qualified person regardless of sex unless the job requires certain physical skills like strength" for the common interpretation and "Sex of employees should be an important determinant of who gets promoted" for the deviant interpretation.

The order of the attitude and interpretation measures varied across condition, so that half of the subjects completed the attitude measure first and half completed the interpretation measure first. This constituted a questionnaire order manipulation.

To assess the likely normative pressure exerted by the various sources, the students were next asked about the strength of their ties with the traditions, interests, and attitudes of the university, their race (optional), and their geographical hometown. The three questions assessing strength of tie to the traditions, interests, and attitudes of the university were:

1. Do you usually agree with the attitudes and values of most students at Texas A&M University?
2. How important is it that you personify the values and attitudes of students at Texas A&M University?
3. To what extent is being an Aggie an important part of who you are?

Subjects responses to each item were aggregated into a mean and a three-way split was conducted on these aggregate scores. The lower third identified subjects whose identity would not be closely tied to "American Aggies" (indicating responses on the low ends of the three scales), and the upper third represented those whose identity would be closely tied to "American Aggies" (representing responses on the high ends of the three scales). The middle third of subjects was not included in the reported analysis. This classification of subjects represented our variation of subjects self-concept.

Results

Because the findings were highly comparable for the drug use and sex discrimination issues, the primary analyses reported below collapse across issue type. Thus, the data were analyzed using a Source Identity (majority vs. minority) X Subjects' Self-Concept (majority group valued vs. not valued) X Question Order (attitude scale administered prior to interpretation scales vs. attitude scale administered after interpretation) analysis of variance design. The few differences that emerged between the issues will also be noted.

Sources' Interpretation

We had anticipated that there would be strong normative pressures to agree with the majority source, especially for the subjects who placed high value on the majority group of American Aggies. These subjects were expected to try to generate some explanation for the source's deviant views. The most plausible account is likely to be that the source was using an unusual interpretation of the issue. We also anticipated that there would be little normative pressure for subjects to agree with the minority source and thus we did not anticipate that they would distort the minority position by assuming the source was using an unusual interpretation of the issue.

A main effect for subjects' self concept, $F(1,91) = 4.62, p < .05$, reflected the attribution of more typical interpretation to the source by subjects who did not especially value American Aggies ($M = 4.31$) than by subjects who strongly valued this majority source ($M = 5.56$). As can be seen in Table 1, the effect of subjects' self-concepts on their judgments of the source's position emerged most strongly in relation to the majority source. Although the predicted interaction between source

Table 1

**Mean Interpretation Attributed to Source and Mean Subjects' Interpretation
as a Function of Source's Identity and Subjects' Self-Concept**

	<u>Majority Source</u>		<u>Minority Source</u>	
	Subjects value majority	Subjects don't value majority	Subjects value majority	Subjects don't value majority
Attributed source interpretation	6.03	4.44	4.89	3.88
Subjects' personal interpretation	6.37	4.11	3.96	3.94

Note. Higher numbers represent greater endorsement of an atypical interpretation of the attitude issues instead of a common interpretation. Ratings were obtained on a 9-point scale. Cell ns range from 17 to 30.

type and subjects' self-concept was not significant, $F(1,91) = 1.13$, ns, subjects who valued the majority source attributed a more unusual interpretation of the attitude issue than subjects who did not value the source ($p < .05$) and a slightly more unusual interpretation than subjects who did value the majority but were presented with a minority source ($p < .15$). In addition, the analyses yielded an unexpected effect for questionnaire order, $F(1,91) = 3.93$, $p = .05$, indicating that subjects selected a more typical interpretation for the source when their attitudes were measured before the interpretation measures ($M = 4.47$) than when attitudes were assessed after subjects indicated their interpretations ($M = 5.73$). Note that this finding runs directly counter to Griffen and Buehler's (1993) prediction that

interpretations given after attitudes will be especially distorted to justify the attitude judgment.

Subjects' Personal Interpretations

The normative pressures to agree with the majority source's discrepant opinion should also affect subjects' own, personal interpretation of the issue. We anticipated that subjects who valued the majority group would adopt an unusual interpretation so that they would be able to align their attitudes on the topic with that held by the majority group. Subjects who did not value the majority and subjects who were exposed to a minority source were not expected to experience much normative pressure to agree and thus were not expected to distort their own interpretations.

The predicted interaction between source identity and subjects' self-concepts was obtained, $F(1,91) = 3.79$, $p = .055$. As can be seen in Table 1, subjects who valued the majority source were more likely to advocate unusual interpretations of the attitude issue than subjects in any other experimental condition ($ps < .05$). In addition, main effects were obtained for source identity, $F(1,91) = 6.80$, $p < .05$, indicating that more unusual interpretations of the issue were adopted for majority ($M = 5.36$) than minority sources ($M = 3.95$). Furthermore, the effect for subjects' self-concept, $F(1,91) = 4.28$, $p < .05$, stemmed from the more unusual interpretations given by subjects who valued the majority group ($M = 5.23$) than by those who did not ($M = 4.07$).

In addition, several effects for issue were obtained. A main effect revealed that more unusual interpretations were given to the sex discrimination than illegal drugs issue ($p > .05$). Furthermore, a significant interaction between questionnaire order

and issue ($p < .05$) revealed that this issue effect was obtained when the interpretation questionnaire was given prior to the attitude measure but no differences emerged between issue when the attitude questionnaire was given first.

Subjects' Attitudes

The normative pressure exerted by the majority source should have affected subjects' opinions so that those who valued the majority source showed the greatest attitude change. For subjects who did not value the majority or who were exposed to a minority source, little attitude change was expected. In addition, subjects' attitude judgments may be affected by the order in which the attitude and interpretation questionnaires were administered. According to Griffen and Buehler (1993), subjects change their opinions for normative reasons and then use the interpretation scales to justify their opinion change. In this view, the order of questionnaire delivery should have little impact. However, if Allen and Wilder (1980) are correct and subjects adopt the source's deviant attitudes because they have distorted the source's position, the greatest change should be obtained when the interpretation questionnaires are administered prior to the attitude scale. That is, the initial assessment of interpretation should cue subjects to bias their interpretation of the issue and the source's position, and subjects can then agree with the source's position. In this view, little attitude change should emerge when the attitude questionnaire was given prior to the interpretation measure.

Analyses on the standardized attitude index yielded an interaction between source type and questionnaire order, $F(1,89) = 3.41$, $p < .07$. Supporting Allen and Wilder (1980) and the notion that influence depended on informational reinterpretation of the source's position and the issue itself, majority sources

generated greater agreement when the interpretation measure was given prior to the attitude measure ($\underline{M} = .31$) than when the attitude measure was given first ($\underline{M} = -.22, p < .05$) and somewhat greater than when interpretation first subjects were exposed to a minority source ($\underline{M} = -.16, p < .10$); when subjects' attitudes were assessed first and they were exposed to a minority source ($\underline{M} = .07$) their attitudes did not vary significantly from the remaining conditions.

It is surprising that these attitude effects did not depend on subjects' self-concept. That is, the 3-way interaction among source identity, questionnaire order, and subjects' self-concept was not significant ($F < 1$). Consistent with our predictions, however, simple effects tests revealed no significant differences between minority and majority sources for the conditions in which attitudes were assessed prior to interpretations or for the condition in which interpretations were assessed first but subjects did not value the majority group; the anticipated greater agreement with the majority ($\underline{M} = .35$) than minority ($\underline{M} = -.22, p < .05$) did emerge when subjects valued the majority group and interpretations were assessed first.

Finally, an effect for issue ($p < .05$) revealed that subjects changed their opinions more on the illegal drugs issue ($\underline{M} = .25$) than on the sex discrimination issue ($\underline{M} = -.17$).

Relations Between Interpretations and Attitude Change

To examine how the relations among interpretations and attitude change varied across conditions, correlations were calculated for each condition between subjects' ratings of the source's interpretation, their own personal interpretations,

and their attitudes on the issues. These were conducted collapsed across the two issues.

If subjects' attitudes are based on their interpretations, then subjects who gave the most distorted interpretations should have demonstrated the most agreement with the source. This association between interpretation and attitudes should emerge primarily when subjects experienced the normative pressure that instigated informational distortion-- that is, when subjects were exposed to the majority source and when subjects valued the source identity. Furthermore, the association should emerge primarily when attitudes were in fact based on informational processes, that is, when attitudes were assessed following the interpretational measures.

The data provide impressive support for this notion that normative pressures to agree with the majority generated informational distortion among those subjects who valued the majority group identity and that this informational distortion allowed subjects to align with the majority source's position when their attitudes were assessed following the interpretation measures. In the critical condition of majority source, high self-concept value, and interpretation measure first, attitudes were correlated with rated source interpretation ($r = .61, p < .05, n = 15$) and with subjects' personal interpretations ($r = .54, p < .05, n = 15$). In no other condition were these correlations significant. Inspection of the standard deviations of the interpretation and attitude measures across condition indicated that they did not vary significantly. Thus, the obtained relations were not an artifact of differential variability in the measures across the experimental conditions.

Discussion

When the source was a group that the subject closely identified with, subjects experienced normative pressure to agree with this source. This desire to associate with the majority group (i.e. American Aggies) led our subjects to consider different interpretations of the influence appeal, in order to account for the source's divergent views. Thus, normative pressure led to informational change as subjects rethought their interpretation of the attitude issue. Since people based their attitudes upon the way that they interpreted a situation, once subjects considered different interpretations of the appeal, they could then accept the source's attitudes as their own and majority influence occurred.

In contrast, if the source was a group that the subjects did not closely identify with, normative pressure was not present. Subjects were not threatened by the divergent attitude held by the minority group (i.e. foreign A&M students). Because of the lack of normative pressure, subjects did not rethink the issue or construct alternate interpretations. Hence, informational change did not occur. Given this lack of both normative and informational bases for change, deviant minorities had little direct, public influence.

We were able to provide direct evidence of both normative and informational bases of change in the present study. Normative pressures were apparent in the effects of subjects' self concepts. That is, those who valued the Aggie identity were more responsive to pressure from the majority group than those who did not value Aggies. In addition, our measures of source interpretation and personal interpretation tapped the informative processes of attitude change.

This experiment also documented the sequence of events leading to attitude change. Our manipulation of questionnaire order was designed to identify whether changes in interpretation of the attitude issue led to attitude change or whether attitude change led to reinterpretation to justify the new attitudes. Allen and Wilder (1980) support the former, stating that while normative pressures motivate the reinterpretation of the attitude issue, it is the cognitive restructuring of the issue (informational pressure) that actually causes the attitude change. They argue that normative pressure alone will not induce attitude change, but only when normative pressure leads to cognitive restructuring. Griffin and Buehler (1993) support the latter. They state that attitude change occurs first, and reinterpretation occurs only as a means of justifying the attitude change.

The present findings supported Allen and Wilder's (1980) notion that informational pressure and cognitive restructuring must be present for change to occur. This is contrary to the position of Griffin and Buehler (1993). When we asked subjects for their attitude before they had been exposed to the alternative interpretations of the statement, there was no change from attitudes measured in the pretesting. This lack of change occurred even though the subjects had already been exposed to the normative pressure of the majority. However, when attitudes toward the issue were measured after the alternative interpretations were presented, subjects who valued the Aggie identity changed their attitudes to the majority source. Thus, after subjects were aware that alternate interpretations of the influence appeal were possible, change could occur.

In explanation of the disagreement between the present research (as well as Allen & Wilder (1980)) and that of Griffen and Buehler (1993), we propose that

the strength of the source influence is the essential part. Griffen and Buehler (1993), in their second experiment, identified their source group as "university students" (Griffen & Buehler, 1993 p. 662). If the strength of the source group is of vital importance, then the results of this group will be different from a live, unanimous appeal (Allen & Wilder (1980)) or the "American Aggies" in the present research. Subjects are apt to experience stronger identification with "American Aggies" or a live, unanimous appeal than with "university students". Our premise is that if the source group has a strong enough appeal, subjects will not attempt to hold to their previous beliefs and justify the change later, but will reinterpret the attitude issue immediately.

The present findings have important implications for our understanding of the ways majority and minority groups exert influence. First, our results contradict Moscovici's (1985) dual-process model of influence in which majority sources exert influence through normative routes and minorities through informational routes. Both normative and informational processes proved important in generating agreement with majority sources. It is also important to note that the normative pressures with majority sources led subjects to bias their perceptions and interpretations of the majority position. Because subjects engaged in cognitive restructuring of the majority appeal, they did not perceive the majority position as very discrepant from their own views. Thus, the majority position was distorted as subjects attempted to reconcile their own attitudes with the majority view. In contrast, the minority position was evaluated with minimal distortion. Subjects' judgments of the meaning of the minority appeal were highly similar to the judgments given by pretest subjects who evaluated the attitude issues without

knowledge of the source or the exact position advocated. It appears, then, that subjects perceived the minority position with greater veridicality than the majority one. That is, they recognized that it was discrepant from their own views. It may be that this more veridical perception of the minority appeal is the key to minority impact. We did not expect much evidence of minority influence on the kinds of direct measures of opinion that we used in this study because normative pressures lead subjects to avoid any direct agreement with a minority source. However, if minorities advocate their positions consistently and with confidence, then recipients may recognize the discrepancy with their own positions, over time re-evaluate their own views, and perhaps change toward the minority on latent, indirect measures of influence (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, in press).

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