

DOES GETTING MADD HELP?

by

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ABSTRACT

This project evaluates the impact of local MADD groups on the disposition of driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases in Texas courts. MADD groups are found in many counties in Texas, but there has been little evaluation of their activities and impact. The concern of this project is two-fold. First, quantitative analyses are done in order to determine whether MADD groups have an impact on the number of convictions in county courts. Secondly, qualitative data, obtained through interviews with courtroom actors and MADD representatives, highlight factors that enhance the influence of MADD groups.

The empirical component of this project is based on data drawn from approximately 45 counties. A stratified sample of counties including a mix of those with and without MADD groups is identified. To the extent possible, matched pairs of MADD and Non-MADD counties are used with regard to population characteristics. Data on MADD activities and perceptions of those activities are used from interviews with prosecutors, MADD representatives and local newspaper editors.

The research demonstrates that MADD has no systematic impact on the local court system. Individually, however, when public officials are sensitive to the issue of drunken driving and the general public is concerned about it, then MADD may potentially influence the local courts.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|-------------------------------------|------|
| Introduction | 1 |
| Literature Review..... | 2 |
| Environmental Influences | 2 |
| Resource Manipulation | 5 |
| Judicial Discretion | 8 |
| Data Collection and Methods | 9 |
| Findings | 10 |
| Qualifications and Exceptions | 12 |
| Conclusions | 14 |
| Bibliography | 15 |
| Appendix A | 16 |
| Appendix B | 19 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | Page |
|---|------|
| Table I - Average Conviction Rate Percentages for All Counties | 11a |
| Table II - Changes in DWI Penalties from 1979 to 1980 | 11b |
| Table III - Year-to-Year Changes in Conviction Rate Percentages for All Counties | 11c |
| Table IV - Comparison of Year-to-year Changes in Conviction Rate Percentages Between MADD Counties and Non-MADD Counties | 11d |
| Table V - Extreme Counties | 12b |
| Table VI - Qualitative Data Analysis | 13a |

DOES GETTING MADD HELP?

Numerous factors may account for judicial decisions in trial courts. Existing research demonstrates that lower court decisions may be influenced by personal characteristics of judges, prosecutors or litigants; by workgroup characteristics of those individuals involved in the courtroom; and by environmental factors such as community demands or interest groups that are external to the courthouse. Since Mothers Against Drunk Driving is a highly visible political actor in the external environment of many county courtrooms, this project will determine the impact that MADD groups have on county court decision-making. Although other factors of influence may be just as relevant, MADD and its impact will be studied because of recent publicity involving MADD; because drunken driving is an important public issue; and because judicial scholars have not systematically investigated the impact of interest groups on local courts. Hence, the purpose of this research will be to determine whether highly visible interest groups, such as MADD, have a significant impact on judicial decision-making in local courts.

Courts today are caught in a dilemma of competing demands. On the one hand, courts and judges are expected to carry out justice, to be objective and non-partisan, and to ignore public opinion. This expectation, on the other hand, flies in the face of democratic ideals and ignores the realities associated with elections by which most judges and prosecutors are selected. Though this dilemma is taken into account, the hypothesis will be that as political pressure from

MADD increases, conviction rates in Driving While Intoxicated cases also increase. The independent variable is political pressure from MADD groups, while the dependent variable is the conviction rate percentages in DWI cases.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Prior to testing the hypothesis, several theories will be evaluated through previous scholarly work that has been done. First, environmental influences in general have played a significant role in judicial decision-making in recent years. Secondly, the impact of an interest group depends on its resources and membership. Finally, judicial discretion also plays an important part in how much effect an interest group may have. Therefore these three factors, general environmental influences; characteristics of effective interest groups; and the effects of judicial discretion will be discussed.

General Environmental Influences

Several judicial scholars have demonstrated that on some occasions public opinion appears to be influential at the local and national levels. For example, Beverly Cook (1973) demonstrates that decisions by federal judges in draft evasion cases appear to be influenced by political sentiment in the judges' environment. When Cook examined the choice of sentences in 1,852 draft offenders by 304 federal district judges in 1972, she found that judges apparently treated the sentence choices as policy decisions and that they had wide discretion over those penalties. She used the sentencing

behavior as the dependent variable and features of the environment as one of five independent variables. The features of the environment that she examined were economic/social, demographic, and political variables. By correlating the severity of sentencing by per capita income, by population, and by political environment, Cook found the following:

1. Sentencing behavior varies with the strength of the relevant pressure group in the environment only when the judge lacks other cues to appropriate choices.
2. Judges whose only reference groups are local are more severe than judges with national associations.
3. Trial judges who belong to 'policy specific' groups decide in the direction of the group commitment. (p. 370)

Finally, Cook further emphasizes the influence of public opinion by saying that "public opinion correlates to a high degree with the changing pattern of draft sentences over time ..." (p. 357)

In another investigation of public opinion, Kuklinski and Stanga (1979) demonstrate that California trial judges' behavior on marijuana cases closely correlated with the results of local voting in a referendum on that issue. Kuklinski and Stanga compared support for a marijuana initiative to the sentencing behavior of trial judges in cases involving possession of marijuana. They conducted the study by county and across a time span of three years. The initiative was proposed by the people and voted on in 1972, so the time period studied was from 1971 to 1973.

The referendum was thought to be a valid measure of public preferences on the issue of marijuana because the people brought the issue to ballot and also expressed themselves through the vote. The

sentences given were a good measure of responsiveness because, one again, the judges had broad discretion over sentence severity.

Though Kuklinski and Stanga sought alternative explanations as well, they admitted that their initial findings demonstrated that the "explicit communications of preferences elicited a response from California superior courts." (p. 1093) Several relevant implications which followed from research are that electoral accountability is not the only factor of responsiveness, a voluntary response is also possible; that communication of public preferences may be a central factor of a responsive governmental system; and finally, that appropriate structures through which citizens communicate their preferences must exist.

Finally, research by Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) shows that at least one court system (in Baltimore) was significantly influenced by the attention it received in local newspapers. In their book, Felony Justice, Einstein and Jacob studied felony dispositions in three trial courts in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit. They evaluated the organized workgroups of the courtrooms and the influences upon those workgroups. In their evaluations they measured such things as the total number of dispositions and sentence severities in each courtroom. The research showed that in Baltimore the newspapers took a harsh stance on law enforcement and that the courtroom workgroups acted accordingly. In several interviews courtroom participants said that they had modified their behavior (i.e., decreased plea bargaining, took weaker cases to court) because they feared negative

publicity in the local paper. The newspaper was not the only environmental influence on the courtroom workgroup. As Einstein and Jacob state:

Baltimore was a law-and-order city with few voices raised for defendant's rights. The police, the media, and the general political process combined to articulate these sentiments, which workgroups perceived in vivid terms. The career and political ambitions of many participants made them aware of these public attitudes. (p. 96)

In each of these studies, pressures from a variety of environmental sources were found to be important in accounting for judicial decisions.

Resource Manipulation

As Kiklinski and Stanga mentioned, an appropriate structure must be present to communicate the preferences of the public in order for the officials to be responsive. One type of structure designed to communicate the issues that are important to the public is the interest group. Obviously some interest groups are more effective than others and Schlozman and Tierney (1986) list important organizational resources which make interest groups most effective. Though they are talking about national rather than local interest groups, their criteria of resources for effectiveness can be applied to the local groups as well.

They say that one of the primary political resources is money, especially since it can be transformed into other valued political resources. An example of this would be the ability of a MADD group to buy TV air time or a newspaper ad to publicize its cause. The money usually comes from dues contributed by individual members or monetary

gifts donated by corporations or foundations.

Information, expertise, and skills are other political resources that are considered by Scholzman and Tierney to be valuable to interest groups. They state that the group must understand the government as it exists on paper; that is, who has the authority to do what. The group must also understand the relevant political realities, such as which public officials support higher DWI conviction rates and which ones do not. The group must have technical information like what the current DWI laws are what the penalties consist of. Finally, the group itself must be politically skilled if it wants to gain the respect it needs to make its cause a relevant issue on the public and judicial agendas.

Strong membership is another attribute that Scholzman and Tierney recognize in effective interest groups. The constituency need not be huge in order to be effective, as long as it is attentive and supportive. Cohesiveness of the members is also important because it gives the organization a sense of legitimacy.

All of these characteristics work to make a political interest group powerful and effective, according to Scholzman and Tierney. Applying Scholzman and Tierney's framework to MADD, one finds that this is a potentially strong organization. MADD is a non-profit organization that gets most of its revenues from individual donations and membership dues. They also work with corporations to raise funds, like when Tang sponsored programs like "March Across America for MADD" in the summer of 1985.

MADD also scores high in the information, skills and technical expertise category. Not only are MADD members familiar with the laws they often lobby for changes in them.

Finally, MADD has a very intense following. Though the membership may not be large in numbers, it is very dedicated and cohesive. Thus, MADD, as a nationwide organization, seems to be well equipped with the political resources that should make it successful. Local chapters of MADD may vary from the nationwide norm however.

Some scholars such as James Gibson doubt the effects of interest groups in the courts, even if the groups have the best resources available. In his study, he cites earlier work that suggests that judges do not listen to public opinion but instead they base their opinions on their own attitudes and values; they change their attitudes simultaneously with the public because of similar experiences, not because of the influence of the public itself; and the consequential change in their behavior comes from the change in their attitude. (p. 345) Gibson looks at several models of decision-making and controls for different variables in the process of that decision making. Gibson concludes that how much judges are influenced by public opinion is determined by their own personal characteristics. He says that if judges have greater contact with their constituencies, if they have experienced electoral defeat, and if they have assumed a "delegate" role orientation, then they are much more likely to be influenced by public opinion or interest groups. (p. 363)

Judicial Discretion

Even if an interest group is a powerful political force in a certain area, the privilege of judicial discretion may nullify the power of the group in the courtroom. Judicial discretion can be defined as either the privilege of the prosecutor to screen and plea-bargain cases or the privilege of the judge to not administer the harshest sentence proposed for the offense by the legislature.

Plea-bargaining plays an important role in misdemeanor offenses such as first-offense DWI's. The prosecutor is able, many times, to determine the conviction rates in DWI cases simply by monitoring the flow of cases that make it to court. As Cole (1970) points out in his study, "the prosecuting attorney works within the context of an exchange system of clientele relationships that influence decision-making." (p. 143) He interviewed former deputy prosecutors from Seattle, Washington in order to link the politics of the system and the allocation of justice. He found that the decisions of the judges work as cues to the prosecutor as to how often he will plea-bargain cases and what types of cases he will plea-bargain. (p.147) If the prosecutor feels the judge is sentencing too severely on a certain type of case, he may try to plea-bargain that case out of court. Cole concludes, as a result of the interviews, that the prosecutor is able to exercise his discretion privilege within the courtroom exchange relationship and that court congestion and community pressures are among the many factors that affect prosecutorial behavior. (p. 152)

As stated earlier, judges may also exercise a certain discretionary power. They may carry a sentence out to the full letter

of the law, or they may probate the entire sentence. A great deal depends on this power of the judge because his behavior obviously dictates the conviction rate of his courtroom. However, because of the power of the prosecutor, the judge does not have absolute control over the conviction rate. If he convicts a great many offenders, it is likely that fewer cases will be brought to his court.

The elements of influence on judicial decision-making relevant to the theory studied here are the environment of the courtroom, resource manipulation by the interest group, and judicial discretion of the court participants. Though all of these are important, the influence of the environment is the object of study in this hypothesis that as political pressure from MADD increases, conviction rates in DWI cases also increase.

DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS

This project will empirically evaluate the impact of MADD pressures on county courts by assessing the conviction rates of Texas counties with MADD groups and comparing them to the conviction rates of Texas counties without MADD groups. The survey of conviction rates will be taken across time, during the period from 1975 to 1984. As of 1985, there were approximately 23 counties in Texas that had active MADD chapters. For the purposes of this project, 21 of these counties were examined. A stratified sample was taken of the remaining counties without MADD groups. A total of 45 counties, MADD and Non-MADD combined, were used in the analysis.

The judicial statistics were gathered from the Texas Annual Report of Judicial Statistics for the years 1975 to 1984. The variables taken to compute the average conviction rates included:

- Year
- Pleas of Guilty / No Lo Contendre
- Found Guilty by Judge
- Found Guilty by Jury
- Total Dispositions

In addition to the quantitative analysis, prosecutors, MADD representatives and newspaper editors from various counties were interviewed in order to add a qualitative element to the research. There were four categories of counties, in each of which three counties were selected. The categories were MADD counties that experienced an extreme change in conviction rates, MADD counties that experienced no change, Non-MADD counties that experienced an extreme change, and Non-MADD counties that experienced no change.

In the MADD counties, prosecutors and MADD representatives were interviewed to discover which programs were effective and what circumstances enhanced the influence of the MADD group. In the Non-MADD counties, the prosecutors and the newspaper editors were interviewed to discover the sentiment of the general public and the degree of sensitivity of the public officials to the issue.

FINDINGS

The first set of statistics generated were the average conviction rate percentages over time among all of the counties, MADD and Non-MADD combined.

As Table I indicates, the percentages declined dramatically during the years 1980-1981. This decline can possibly be attributed to the fact that harsher DWI offenses took effect September 1, 1979. As shown in Table II, the DWI offender faced more days in jail and higher fines in 1980 than he had in early 1979. It is a possibility that prosecutors were less willing to prosecute under the harsher laws, which resulted in the decrease of conviction rate percentages.


By looking at the standard deviations, one can note that the conviction rate percentages varied about 20% on the average. Some rural, less-populated counties had 100% conviction rates in the mid-70's, even though that number decreased over time. The larger, urban counties never had 100% conviction rates and some counties went as low as 20%. Thus demographics and court workload may also be factors of influence on decision-making, in addition to environmental influences.

Like Table I, the variation in average conviction rates over time is also shown in Table III. In this display of year-to-year changes in conviction rate percentages, the variation is more clearly seen. The standard deviations are less uniform by year and the direction of the changes are depicted.

Table IV displays the findings of the comparisons of average conviction rate percentages between the MADD and Non-MADD counties. Though the MADD counties show consistently higher percentages than the Non-MADD counties, both types of counties vary in the same directions over time. Again, decline during the years 1980-81 can be noted. Another interesting fact to note about this period is that the

TABLE I

Average Conviction Rate Percentages



| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| $\bar{x} =$ | 79.8 | 77.2 | 79.3 | 75.4 | 76.8 | 54.6 | 38.8 | 44.8 | 55.7 | 68.6 |
| sd = | 21.9 | 23.5 | 18.4 | 21.3 | 19.9 | 21.5 | 22.9 | 22.7 | 21.6 | 19.1 |


TABLE II

DWI LAW : ARTICLE 67011

| Pre-1979 | Post-1979 |
|---|---|
| <p>No</p> <p>Definitions</p> | <p>Definitions:</p> <p>Alcohol = Amt. / 100 MILLILITERS of blood</p> <p>Intoxicated = Not having normal use of faculties -Alcohol content of .10%</p> |
| <p>1st Offense Penalties</p> <p>Jail: 3 days to 2 years</p> <p>Fine: \$50.00 to \$500.00</p> <p>May be Probated</p> | <p>1st Offense Penalties</p> <p>Jail: 3 days to 2 years</p> <p>Fine: \$100.00 to \$2000.00</p> <p>No Probation</p> |
| <p>2nd Offense Penalties</p> <p>Jail: 10 days to 2 years or 5 years</p> <p>Fine: \$100.00 to \$5000.00</p> | <p>2nd Offense Penalties</p> <p>Jail: 15 days to 2 years</p> <p>Fine: \$300.00 to \$2000.00</p> |
| <p>Subsequent Offenses</p> <p>Same</p> <p>Penalties</p> | <p>Subsequent Offenses</p> <p>Jail: 30 days to 2 years or 60 days to 5 years</p> <p>Fine: \$500.00 to \$2000.00</p> <p>Forfeiture of Vehicle</p> |

TABLE III


Year-to-Year Changes in Conviction Rates



| | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|
| $\bar{X} =$ | -2.3 | 2.2 | -3.9 | 1.4 | -22.2 | -15.8 | 6.1 | 10.8 | 8.8 |
| SD = | 30.8 | 25.6 | 13.2 | 17.2 | 26.5 | 19.2 | 20.4 | 19.1 | 13.1 |

TABLE IV
MADD/NONMADD Counties:

Year-to-Year Changes in Conviction Rates



| | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|------|-----|------|-----|-------|-------|-----|------|------|
| \bar{X}_{MADD} | -1 | .76 | -2.6 | 2.0 | -22.6 | -16.7 | 7.0 | 8.2 | 7.5 |
| $\bar{X}_{NONMADD}$ | -3.4 | 3.5 | -5.1 | .75 | -21.6 | -15.0 | 5.3 | 13.2 | 10.0 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sd_{MADD} | 26.6 | 18.8 | 24.2 | 11.7 | 20.8 | 17.6 | 22.3 | 18.0 | 12.5 |
| $Sd_{NONMADD}$ | 31.3 | 30.6 | 22.7 | 20.9 | 31.0 | 20.7 | 20.2 | 20.1 | 23.7 |

Year: MADD - NONMADD

standard deviations are greater in the Non-MADD counties until 1980, when that situation is significantly reversed. The Non-MADD counties even overtake the MADD counties for the year 1984.

The differences between the two types of counties, MADD and Non-MADD, are not great enough to be significant. The largest difference between the means of each type of county is only 7.6% in 1979.


The year-to-year changes are shown in Table V. This table further demonstrates the insignificant differences in conviction rates between MADD and Non-MADD counties. The counties changed in the same directions over time and the greatest difference between the mean percentages in this comparison was only 5.2% in the years from 1982-1983.

The major conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that MADD has no significant impact on counties in Texas. Though there are slight differences on the average which favor MADD counties, this may possibly be attributed to the fact that there was already a latent concern in the counties that formed the MADD groups.

QUALIFICATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS

Though the MADD groups did not have a systematic impact overall, they did influence conviction rate percentages in a few counties. Table VI shows some examples of MADD and Non-MADD counties which either had profound changes in conviction rates over time or had no change at all. Thus these counties offer an opportunity to explore the facts that influence the relationship between the disposition of DWI cases and MADD groups.

MADD/^{TABLE V}NONMADD Counties:
Average Conviction Rate Percentages



| $\bar{X} =$ | MADD | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----|
| | 82.6 | 80.7 | 81.4 | 78.8 | 80.8 | 58.2 | 41.5 | 48.4 | 56.6 | 64.1 | |
| | 77.5 | 74.1 | 77.5 | 72.4 | 73.2 | 51.4 | 36.4 | 41.8 | 54.9 | 65.0 | |

| sd = | MADD | 16.8 | 18.3 | 14.2 | 16.0 | 16.1 | 23.4 | 23.6 | 20.3 | 21.4 | 20.6 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 25.6 | 27.2 | 21.6 | 25.1 | 20.4 | 19.5 | 22.6 | 24.5 | 22.1 | 18.1 | |

Key: MADD = [hatched pattern] NONMADD = [solid pattern]

Extreme Counties

MADD

NONMADD

Change

Ft. Bend
Lubbock
Travis

Bell
Blanco
Cameron

No Effect

Grayson
Potter
Taylor

Harrison
Limestone
Wichita

Interviews were done by telephone with representatives from each county and Table VII shows the results from these interviews. The counties in which there were changes seemed to have similar characteristics whether or not there was a MADD group, and these characteristics are in contrast to the counties with no changes.

The major factors of change seem to be the sensitivity of public officials and the concern of the general public. There is a great contrast in these factors between the counties that experienced a change over time and the counties that did not. All but three of the counties utilized the media, although the media was much more cooperative in the counties that experienced change. The instigation of public programs about drunken driving was another important factor of change. Those counties which experienced change had some sort of program (i.e., Contracts for Life between students and parents, awareness programs for the schools and community, petitions, and DWI task forces), while the majority of no-change counties did not.

The interviews demonstrated that if circumstances are right for the creation of a MADD group, that is, if there is a high degree of sensitivity to the issue by public officials and if there is a great concern among the general public, then the group will be effective upon its creation. The interviews also revealed that counties without MADD groups can have high conviction rates if they are under the same circumstances. The data also show a lack of concern both by the public officials and by the general public in the counties with no change. Though these two elements are the most influential, concern

TABLE VII

Perceptions of Selected County Interviews

| Counties | Media Use | Sensitivity of Public Officials | Programs | Concern of General Public |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|
| <u>MADD/CHANGE</u> | | | | |
| Ft. Bend | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Travis | 1 | 2 | 1&2 | 1 |
| Lubbock | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>NON-MADD/CHANGE</u> | | | | |
| Blanco | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Bell | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Cameron | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| <u>MADD/NO CHANGE</u> | | | | |
| Grayson | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Potter | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Taylor | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| <u>NON-MADD/NO CHANGE</u> | | | | |
| Harrison | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Wichita | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Limestone | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |

Key:

| | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| 1 = Cooperative | 1 = Very Sensitive | 1 = Awareness Political | 1 = Very Concerned |
| 2 = Used | 2 = Sensitive | 2 = Task Forces | 2 = Concerned |
| 3 = Not Used | 3 = Not Sensitive | 3 = None | 3 = Not Concerned |

among the general public seems to be the most important element of change because it leads to the organization of action and communication of public opinion.

CONCLUSIONS

The hypothesis that as political pressure from MADD increases, the conviction rate increases was not systematically demonstrated among the counties in Texas. Although there was specific instances in which a very active MADD group did have a significant impact on DWI conviction rates, this was not the case in general.

It was found through the qualitative data, however, that the environment in which the interest group and courts work is very important. In the specific instances of change, the public was very concerned about drunken driving and the public officials were very sensitive to the issue.

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APPENDIX A

Example of Questionnaire Used for
Qualitative Analysis of the
MADD Counties

SURVEY OF MADD REPRESENTATIVES

1. Is your local chapter involved in any of the following activities
 - Picketing you local law enforcement agencies or courthouses.
 - Contracts for Life between students and parents.
 - The Home Free Program: Free taxis for inoxicated patrons of restaurants and bars.
 - Citizen Awareness and Education Programs.
2. If so, which of the programs are most effective or have you tried others that have been more effective?
3. Which of the following public officials have you contacted in the course of your strategy to decrease the occurence of DWI's?
 - State legislators
 - US Congressmen
 - Local Judges
 - City Council Members / Mayor
4. How many members does your chapter have?
 - 0-20
 - 21-40
 - 41-60
 - 61+
5. How often does your group appear in you local paper or other publications distributed in your area?
 - Once per week
 - Once every two weeks
 - Once per month
 - Once every six months
6. Do you ever join with other organizations to participate in any of the following activities? If so, how often?
 - Picketing or other peaceful demonstrations.
 - Backing sympathetic candidates for public office.
 - Gaining support through petitions and other political devices.
7. How long has your group been in existence?
 - 0-2 years
 - 3-4 years
 - 5+

SURVEY OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS

1. How often do you notice MADD activities or publicity in your area?
 - Once per week
 - Once every two weeks
 - Once per month
 - Once every six months
2. How often do you have business contact with your local MADD group?
 - Once per week (+)
 - Once every two weeks
 - Once per month
 - Once every six months
3. How influential does the group seem to be on local courts?
 - Very influential
 - Not influential
4. Is drunken driving an important political issue in your area?
 - Yes
 - No
5. What percentage of DWI cases make it to court?
 - 0-25%
 - 26-50%
 - 51-75%
 - 76%+
6. Has that percentage drastically increased in the past five years?
 - Yes
 - No

APPENDIX B

Example of Questionnaire Used for
Qualitative Analysis of the
Non-MADD Counties

SUVEY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

1. Is drunken driving an important political issue in your area?
 - Yes
 - No
2. Do you sense a public concern in your area about drunken driving?
 - Yes
 - No
3. Is there another group in your area that has adopted drunken driving as its cause, since you don't have a MADD group? If so, what group?
 - Yes
 - No
4. How often do drunken driving stories appear in your paper?
How often on the front page?
 - Once per week
 - Once every two weeks
 - Once per month
 - Once every six months
5. How often do you receive letters to the editor about drunken driving?
 - Once per week
 - Once every two weeks
 - Once per month
 - Once every six months
6. How sensitive are public officials to the issue?
 - Very sensitive
 - Sensitive
 - Not sensitive

SURVEY OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS

1. Is drunken driving an important political issue in your area?
 - Yes
 - No
2. Do you sense a public concern about the issue?
 - Yes
 - No
3. Is there another group in your area that has adopted drunken driving as its cause, since you don't have a MADD group? If so, have you had much business contact with them?
 - Yes
 - No
4. How sensitive are other public officials to the issue?
 - Very sensitive
 - Sensitive
 - Not sensitive
5. How often do you notice drunken driving stories in your local newspaper?
 - Once per week
 - Once every two weeks
 - Once per month
 - Once every six months
6. What percentage of DWI cases make it to court?
 - 0-25%
 - 26-50%
 - 51-75%
 - 76%+
7. Has that percentage increased drastically in the past five years?
 - Yes
 - No