



# *Proliferation Security Initiative Interdiction Capstone*



# Simulation Modifications

Areas for improvement,  
Concerns for future  
simulations and real-world  
contingencies



# Teams' Jump to Decision

- Premature leap to “What do we do?”
- Need to incentivize policy-makers' considerations of:
  - What do we know and not know?
  - What are our assumptions?
  - What new information would invalidate those assumptions?
- Simulation provides valuable experience
  - Repetition would be useful for U.S. policy-makers

# Legal Basis for Interdiction

- Most teams ignored this aspect.
- Policy-makers should consider:
  - Existing international law
  - Export control laws of individual states
  - UNSC Resolutions
  - Integrating emerging norms of PSI with existing legal structure
  - Legal implications for disposition of seized cargo

# Intelligence Value of Cargo

- What can the cargo tell policy-makers about current capabilities and future programs of proliferators?
- Is intelligence worth risking other factors
  - Russian cooperation
- Future permutations can be used to 'frame' American game play.

# Key International Players

- Would adding players have created greater realism? Over-complicate?
  - China (“Choonguk”)
  - North Korea (“Pulyang”)
  - Iran (“Parthia”)
  - Others (EU, IAEA)

# Interface of Policy/Technology

- Policy-makers need to engage technical experts early in the process
  - Consider technical factors from the outset of a crisis.
- Underscores value of simulations in forcing policy/technical dialogue

# Geopolitics of Interdiction

How did players act under conditions of limited information and time pressure?





# U.S.-Russian Relationship

- Russian assertion in Near Abroad
- U.S. readiness to accept Russian lead
  - Rapid move toward cooperation
- Would this hold for a real crisis in Central Asia?
  - Was it driven by leader personalities?

# Central Asian States

- Caught between two great powers
- Kazakhstan (“Brazoristan”) ready to play both roles
  - Wanted to cooperate with great powers until it felt “ignored” and then it dug in.
  - Sought to impose will on smaller neighbor but failed.
- Kyrgyzstan (“Bevostan”) quickly fell into Blagejovich syndrome.
- Small states can hinder PSI efforts

# Proliferators Strike Back

- Kazakhstan (“Brazoristan”) was unresponsive to North Korean (“Pulyang”) protests
  - Is this realistic?
- What other capabilities do the proliferators have to retaliate?
  - Military, economic, unconventional (influence of terrorist actors), propaganda, etc.

# Conclusions

- A conciliatory US strategy is valuable
  - Achieved interdiction
  - Limited ability to acquire illicit cargoes for analysis
- Integration of technical & legal counsel is critical
- Danger of tunnel vision on actual interdiction
  - Should focus on the dangers and consequences of action
- Emphasized strengths of the PSI
  - Flexibility of guidelines
  - Freedom of action for driving players

# Questions?

