

about the mysterious process of personal salvation. This disparity, among other clues, underscores the inadequacy of art even as *The Day of Doom* identifies itself as an artistic spiritual agency.

Gods Determinations, which was never published but was apparently designed for an audience, similarly departs from expected patterns. Although this long poem withdraws from such models as hymn, prayer, and antiphon, it nonetheless echoes these very forms within a common language akin to personal spiritual relations. In effect, then, Edward Taylor's poem expresses a facilitating tension between formulaic prototype and personal piety that enables the poet to offer an acceptable verse version of a spiritually comforting liturgical aid.

While not every phase of Morris's argument is equally convincing, her investigation into the Puritan aesthetics informing these three audience-oriented poems is deeply informed, generally persuasive and productively suggestive. Especially impressive is her conscientious regard for what others have already observed about Puritan poetry. In the course of writing her book Morris not only undertook the difficult mission of making a case for three critically-resistant works but also the equally daunting task of identifying coherent patterns within the current welter of critical discourse pertinent to her thesis. It is heartening to see this rare sort of scholarly integrity, and Morris has indeed earned her entry into the early Americanist community.

Matthew Glozier. *Marshal Schomberg (1615-1690), "The Ablest Soldier of His Age": International Soldiering and the Formation of State Armies in Seventeenth-Century Europe*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. xxviii + 250 pp. + 3 illus. Paper \$35.00. Review by EDWARD M. FURGOL, NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER.

For far too long (since 1789) we have awaited a new biography of Marshal Schomberg. Glozier has responded with one in this third book dealing with seventeenth century military history. The account (derived from published primary sources in addition to secondary ones) follows a largely chronological path (with a few diversions such as an account of the general's death on p. 2). Schomberg was not only a product of his age, but also a double victim of it. His parents rose to prominence in the aftermath of the

marriage of Princess Elizabeth of Great Britain and Frederick the elector Palatine in 1615. They died within eight months of each other, leaving Schomberg an orphan before his first birthday. He was educated at the Huguenot academy in Sedan and Leiden University, which allowed him to polish his linguistic skills. (The field marshal eventually spoke German, Latin, French, Dutch, English and Portuguese.) His military career began in 1633 and persisted almost unbroken until his death.

Schomberg found following the path of professional officer as the means to success anything save easy. His initial activities were as a volunteer with the duke of Hamilton's expedition to Germany, and then as an officer with the Swedes, French and with Frederick William Prince of Orange. Schomberg's Dutch service (1639-50) saw him rise to the inner circle of the prince, who was the overall military commander of the republic. His loyalty to the prince and acceptance of the principles of absolutism led him to play a key role in Frederick William's 1650 coup against the pro-peace and Republican party in Amsterdam. The prince's unexpected death followed quickly on the heels of his coup's failure. Schomberg found himself not only bereft of a patron but also considered an enemy of the political powers. Lacking sufficient income to retire, Schomberg found new employment in France. In that country's campaigns against the Spanish, he rose in rank and established his reputation as an excellent commander. The Treaty of the Pyrennes in 1659 curtailed his French career, when peace brought demobilization. However, French foreign policy aims remained hostile to Spain, which led Louis XIV and Marshal Turenne to suggest Schomberg as a commander of English troops (veterans of the New Model Army) to the Portuguese government. Glozier explains that these appeared in the army before Charles II's marriage to the Portuguese princess in 1662. Schomberg's professional and linguistic abilities earned him the command of both English and French auxiliaries. His qualities as an officer led to his promotion as effective commander of the army, which led to the victories that persuaded the Spanish to accept Portugal's independence. Peace again brought unemployment, but this time Schomberg settled in France as a naturalized citizen. The Dutch War of the 1670s led to his employment first with the English (with whom he closely identified due to his English mother), then with the French in the attempts to conquer the United Provinces. The early 1680s saw him continue in France's efforts to increase its territory, this time at Spain's expense in the southern Netherlands. The Revo-

cation of the Edict of Nantes broke Schomberg's service with Louis XIV's army, because the marshal refused to convert to Catholicism. After a brief residence in Portugal a more distinguished exile to the electorate of Brandenburg as general-in-chief followed. Brandenburg's realignment into William of Orange's anti-French alliance in May 1688 paved the way for Schomberg transferring his services to that prince. Consequently, he was second-in-command for the invasion of England and commander-in-chief in Ireland in 1689. Once Schomberg had liberated Ulster, he performed in lackluster manner, which led William to take command the following year. When one of the Huguenot infantry colonels died, the proud and honorable Schomberg ran to the front, inspiring the men with the battle cry, "Forward, sirs, there are your persecutors." It was the last act of a military career that had spanned six decades.

The author has delivered a biography, although he promised a "life in context" (viii, 186). Given Schomberg's importance in European history, having a scholarly biography is worthwhile. Contextualizing his life would have been better but would have required some changes in emphasis. For instance, the genealogy and reproduction of all or some of three contemporary pamphlets (187-231) would need to be eliminated. That would allow the book to retain its current length but would provide the space for additional matter. Then the author could indicate the expected behavior pattern of a "sword for hire" by referring to the Austrian Habsburgs use of professional soldiers in establishing absolutist and Roman Catholic policies in Bohemia-Moravia. He could also develop the antagonism between the Prince of Orange and the Dutch estates and how it played out in the Franco-Spanish war after 1648. The author should address why Schomberg seems so enamored with arbitrary government. The 1650 coup was just one episode. In 1673 he counseled Charles II to use the army to establish arbitrary rule. After 1668 in France how did he square his Protestant beliefs with service in an army which was actively persecuting Huguenots? His religious sensibilities seem only to have been awoken when his own bull was gored with the Revocation, which meant a loss of office.

Despite the subtitle the transformation of European armies in the 1600s is a consistently undeveloped theme. Army structure, recruitment, training/drill, tactics, and technical developments receive hardly any attention from the author. Certainly, John Lynn's *Giant of the Grand Siecle* should have been con-

sulted. In reference to Schomberg's Portuguese campaigns one is left wondering what model the army followed before he arrived and whether and to what degree he had transformed it. Glozier, as he demonstrated in *Scottish Soldiers in France*, is well aware of the dynamics that occurred in Western Europe between the 1630s and 1680s. His omission of these discussions in a contextual life study is puzzling.

The idea of revenge against the Spanish Habsburgs, which would explain Schomberg's motivation in serving some of his employers, is never addressed in the book. His service (34 of 57 years) with the Dutch, French, Portuguese and Swedes could be accounted for by a desire to take vengeance on those Habsburgs for their defeat and occupation of his homeland and their role in Frederick's and Elizabeth's (his parents' employers) loss of Bohemia. Since hundreds of Scotsmen, lacking close ties to the electoral family, entered military service in the 1620s and 1630s to restore Elizabeth, the idea has merit. Likewise, Glozier should have more thoroughly addressed Schomberg's transfer to William of Orange's service. Did it originate from a desire to satisfy affronted honor (having to choose between conversion and exile, although he had loyally served French interests for over thirty years), or was it to gain revenge for Louis' persecution of the Huguenots, or were the economic incentives offered by William too alluring?

The book has some technical unevenness. In addition to footnotes there is a bibliography. However, there is a typesetting problem with some of the former. Sometimes (for instance pages 9, 22, 58, 77, 90, 100, 111-12, and 142), an entire note appears on the page after the citation in the text. There are illustrations of Schomberg, but none of his battles, sieges, fortifications, or types of troops he led. The total absence of maps is particularly annoying regarding the Palatine, Roussillon, and Portuguese campaigns.

The general lack of contextual explanation and analysis regarding Schomberg's political and military decisions points to areas where further research could occur. As Glozier showed in *Scottish Soldiers*, a military career like Schomberg's after 1648 was becoming increasingly rare as national governments took more control over their armies. The marshal went from being an exemplar of the European officers corps to an exception. Still we should Glozier for producing a biography of one of seventeenth-century Europe's most well-known soldiers.