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This volume, the fourth published in the projected eight-volume series, provides (1) new and authoritative texts of nineteen Holy Sonnets and (2) a synopsis of all commentary from the 1600s to the present era. On both counts, this volume, which the MLA has designated “An Approved Edition,” excels beyond our highest expectations.

First and foremost, the volume interrelates textual study and critical commentary in the most effective ways. The editors, in fact, organize their textual study to accord with many of the central critical issues surrounding the Holy Sonnets—dating, sequence, the relationship of “E of D” to the Holy Sonnets, authorial arrangements of the poems, and their relationship to other works by Donne, such as “La Corona.” In doing so, they outline, compare and contrast, and comment on the editorial and critical work of numerous predecessors who have engaged these central issues. While developing this comprehensive and richly detailed historical point of view, the editors also provide their own judgments, which are supported by an unprecedented depth of research, meticulous evaluation of all available evidence, access to manuscripts previously unknown, and scholarly acumen. By “acumen” I mean that the editors astutely frame and employ an editorial philosophy that accommodates the circumstances that surround the composition of texts such as the Divine Poems, texts that were circulated in manuscript and revised during that process. Balancing the ideal aim of discerning authorial intention with the reality of social revisions in the texts, which were supplied by a reader, by a listener to a poem being recited, or by a coterie, the editors have chosen the most judicious readings while preserving others for examination by users of the volume. Informed by principles and criteria outlined by Gary A. Stringer in an Appendix, the editors provide arguments that are well-reasoned, clearly enunciated, and very effective in engaging and resolving textual challenges afforded by the Holy Sonnets.

Emphasized by the textual editors is a salient fact that distinguishes the transmissorial history of the Holy Sonnets: “that none of the poems has a history of individual circulation” (lx). By assessing the various manuscripts in
which the Holy Sonnets appear, diagramming stemma of the seventeenth-century artifacts containing the Holy Sonnets, and charting major variants in the seventeenth-century artifacts, the textual editors, unlike most of their predecessors, value and validate the Group-III collection. While emphasizing distinctive readings that help to qualify these artifacts as a separate family, the editors identify the Group-III collection as Donne's own arrangement of a 12-poem set of the Holy Sonnets. If, therefore, the order and sequence are authorial, the Group-III collection assumes significance not fully acknowledged by most editorial predecessors. In elevating the status of the Group-III collection, the textual editors create an enlarged framework within which to choose the copy-text for their edition.

A most useful element of the textual history derives from the historical review of eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century editions of the Holy Sonnets. In doing so, the editors compare and contrast the various editorial practices, identify and test the assumptions of their numerous predecessors, challenge certain editorial judgments, contest many conclusions, and rectify erroneous decisions, large and small. Moreover, coverage of past work is sufficiently broad so that the editors identify six "bibliographically indefensible and interpretively questionable assertions" (xciii) propounded by numerous prior editors. After each assertion is presented, along with the supporting evidence that predecessors had adduced, the textual editors not only refute the previous findings but also engage anew the challenges that had bedeviled prior editors.

Interrelated with the textual history is the unfolding critical commentary in the volume. Presented chronologically, the commentary, however, is organized around major topics: dating and order, the poet/persona, genre and traditions, language and style, prosody, sacred and profane, themes, the Holy Sonnets and other works. In effect, the commentary editors composed a reception history concerning each of the foregoing topics. They do so by referring to textual history when it has affected the interpretive responses of commentators on the poems. More than other critical commentators, Louis Martz and Helen Gardner merit attention, for the idea of meditative structure in the Holy Sonnets, which are termed Divine Meditations in some 17th Century artifacts, becomes paramount for both of them. Most useful are the various indexes that enable a user to access the commentary in efficient ways: Index of Authors Cited in the Commentary, Index of Writers and Historical
Beyond the excellence of their scholarly achievement, the editors have distinguished themselves in other ways. Their textual history and critical commentary are clearly written and cogently presented. The textual history is less a narrative and more a drama, which unfolds as a scholarly adventure. It is a compelling account, not unlike a detective story at certain crucial moments when the editors recount the investigation of calligraphy, penstrokes, the physical makeup of gatherings, wrinkles in the paper of some artifacts, and the like. The critical commentary identifies, synopsizes, synthesizes, and affords cross-referencing of interpretations so that users may perceive the chain of causation or association that bears on the engagement of particular topics. All things considered, the editors merit our utmost acclaim, and Indiana University Press has earned our deep gratitude and admiration for its commitment to this ongoing project.


Jan Ross has edited the first volume of what promises to be a complete and definitive multivolume edition of the poetry and prose of Thomas Traherne. Since Bertram Dobell’s initial discovery and publication of Traherne’s poetry in 1903, followed by his publication of the Centuries of Meditations in 1908, critical interest in Traherne has gained momentum; this growing critical corpus was greatly facilitated by Gladys I. Wade’s biography of Traherne (Thomas Traherne [Princeton, 1944]) and H. M. Margoliouth’s two volume scholarly edition of Traherne’s work (Centuries, Poems and Thanksgivings, 2 vols. [Oxford, 1958]). However, considering the subsequent discovery of a substantial body of new Traherne work, as well as new critical insights into the originally discovered texts, it is long past due for a new, comprehensive scholarly edition of Traherne to materialize.

To the credit of Ross and D.S. Brewer, this volume (the first of an eight-volume edition, scheduled to be completed in 2017) is comprised of the most recently discovered Traherne texts found at Lambeth Palace. Volume
One contains the four treatises (and one fragment) found in Lambeth MS 1360, discovered by Jeremy Maule in 1997. These works have to this point been generally unavailable to most students and scholars of Traherne, and considering much of Traherne’s other work is available in other places, it makes sense to put these texts out first.

The first of the four treatises, *Inducements to Retirednes*, addresses the necessity of the individual to retire to the simplicities of life in order to better understand divinity. For readers of Traherne, there is much familiar in *Inducements*: the glorification of happiness, the stripping away of worldly distraction, an emphasis on "infinity" and "eternity," and the function of an "Inward Ey" (5). This essay to some degree helps explain the withdrawn nature of his better known *Centuries* and the seemingly isolated world of Traherne’s meditational style. As new works of Traherne have come to light, scholars have generally drifted to the position that Traherne was not just an isolated, hermetic writer and thinker but rather one who was squarely part of his religious, political, and social contexts. *Inducements* serves to reconcile the paradox of Traherne’s persona being both within and outside mainstream social life by offering an explanation of how one who is part of society needs to retire from worldly concerns in order to obtain that state of divine felicity. Upon reading *Inducements*, *Centuries* appears to represent Traherne taking his own advice.

*A Sober View* illustrates explicitly Traherne’s interest in contemporary controversies and the kind of formal religious debates that the retired life advocated in *Inducements* perhaps hoped to illuminate. Addressing three seventeenth-century theological works by William Twisse, Samuel Hoard, and Henry Hammond, Traherne explores particularly the theme of predestination. Again, this work has value in itself, but it should especially shed light on previous critical discussions about Traherne’s portrayal of predestination, Pelagian doctrine, and the elect.

While *Inducements* and *A Sober View* are works that address specific issues or debates, *Seeds of Eternity or The Nature of the Soul* and *The Kingdom of God* (the longest of the four works) show Traherne’s propensity for large, meditative theological explorations into the nature of God, the physical and spiritual worlds, and the soul. However, more so than in the *Centuries* these works illustrate Traherne’s appreciation of and reliance on source material, including the works of Theophilus Gale, Ralph Cudworth, Ovid, scripture, and much
more. One might say that *Seeds of Eternity* and *The Kingdom of God* are a cross between the meditational mode of the *Centuries* and the didactic mode of *Christian Ethicks*. Still, as in all four works in this volume, the well-known images of fountains, the estates, wisdom, harmony, excellency, Adam, childhood, felicity, and joy are intact. The ecstatic joy depicted in a poem in *The Kingdom of God* epitomizes much of Traherne's work:

> Who made it first? Whence did this Lovly Thing
> Arise? O from what fountain did it Spring!
> Joy! Tis the only object of Desires!
> Each Creature in all Worlds to that aspires!
> No Tygre is so fierce, nor Wolf so rude,
> But Joy doth melt as soon as it is viewd.
> Joy is the Recompence and Crown of Lov;
> There is one Law in Heaven and earth abov,
> That by one Inclination all should be
> Led and attracted to felicite.
>
> And this felicite is made by Joy. (471-72)

The volume concludes with a “false start” to *The Kingdom of God* and a fragment on “Love” (Appendices 1 and 2).

There is, arguably, nothing altogether new in what Traherne gives us in these four works; for better or worse, the themes themselves and the uneven quality of the writing are distinctly “Traherne.” However, the sheer volume of this material will prove immensely useful for students and scholars of Traherne, seventeenth-century prose, and seventeenth-century theology. To have available for the first time such a massive amount of text written by a canonical writer is both significant and exciting.

Ross provides a thorough, yet relatively brief, introduction to this volume. After a concise general preface that describes the discovery of several Traherne manuscripts since Dobell and announces the eight-volume edition to come, Ross in the Introduction gives an overview of the four treatises included, an explanation of the various scripts in the manuscript, the issues and problems regarding the dating of these works, an evaluation of the “purpose” of these treatises (specifically, with regards to their being meant to be published rather than circulated privately), Traherne’s use of sources, and finally a description of general editorial principles. Ross tries faithfully to represent the original text in terms of spelling, capitalization, and punctuation, and she includes textual
emendations, notes, and marginal glosses found in the manuscript. She also includes a glossary of unusual words and usages at the end of the volume. Ross seems to cover all her editorial bases without ever “intruding” on the text.

This does appear to be the first volume of a fine edition of Traherne’s work, but still there are a couple of regrettable observations. Ross states in her preface that the final published volume (Volume 8) will consist entirely of critical commentary, and the individual volumes will be “limited to textual notes, biblical references, and immediately essential commentary” (x). While this may be an unavoidable decision, it would be useful to have some critical commentary along the way, but this may ultimately prove to be a testament to the comprehensiveness of Volume 8. Also, this reader would have liked a breakdown of the seven volumes of text to come. Neither the introduction nor the publisher’s website state what we might expect in Volume 2, 3, 4, and so on. In addition, Ross states that Traherne’s various notebooks would not be included in this edition, stating that those notebooks are “primarily extracts from other writers and are not, therefore, Traherne’s ‘works’” (x). While I, of course, cannot argue with Ross’s reasoning here, the notebooks are to date unpublished, and they are quite important for those critics interested in Traherne’s use of sources; there are many parallels between what is found in the notebooks and what is found in Traherne’s own texts. It seems regrettable that an eight-volume edition that includes everything else would not include the notebooks as well. These, however, are small quibbles about an overall fine volume. Ross’s work here is solid, its importance to seventeenth-century studies undeniable. This is a major editorial task and so far, in Volume I, Ross has risen to the occasion.


This shortened version of a full edition that first appeared in 1998 has been attractively produced as the first in a series of Medieval and Renaissance
Texts and Studies for Teaching emerging from Tempe, Arizona. As such it is to be much welcomed. Even though a selection it amply demonstrates the richness in literary output of one of England’s most accomplished early modern writers. Mary Herbert, née Sidney, Countess of Pembroke, is still probably best known to posterity as the sister of Sir Philip Sidney. However, no one has done more to retrieve her in her own identity than the first-named editor, Margaret P. Hannay. In an earlier monograph Hannay, refers to her as “Philip’s Phoenix.” To John Donne, in a poem that survives in just one manuscript copy and extols the virtues of the metrical psalms begun by Sir Philip and completed by his sister, Mary was Miriam to her brother’s Moses. Just under a third, or some 30 or so, of Mary Sidney’s metaphrases are included here. We do not know the dates, but if as I believe Sir Philip was working on them at his death in 1586, it seems likely that Mary would have continued work on them after her two-year period of mourning for her brother, probably thus in the 1590s.

Donne’s reference to Miriam, sister of Aaron (see Exod. 15), and Hannay’s own elegantly alliterative “Philip’s Phoenix,” offer differing perspectives as to how to see the two talented writers in each other’s light. Contemporary rumours of an incestuous relationship between the two was replaced, over the centuries, by a situation in which Sir Philip’s canonic position stood over against a void: Mary Sidney’s achievement, though known of, was largely ignored—except for her work on the Psalms, on which Hannay’s co-editors have published as well—since the past two decades.

The sheer range of Mary Sidney’s work is astonishing. It includes a closet drama, Antonius (1590), a translation of Robert Garnier’s Marc Antoine (1578, 1585), given in full here. Another translation that made it into print in Mary Sidney’s lifetime, Phillip de Mornay’s Excellent discourse de la vie et de la mort (1576), first appeared as A Discourse of Life and Death in 1590, undergoing three reprints in her lifetime. One virtue of this collection is that though the texts are modernized, online links to old-spelling versions are given where possible.

Another virtue is a rich textual collation and a fully state-of-the-art sense of the importance of scribal publication. Thus the contents are divided up into to halves: works that were disseminated in print and works that circulated in manuscript—the latter sometimes, as with the psalm translations, for a couple of centuries (until 1823), while others have remained in manuscript until our own time. Thus another major translation, incomplete and surviving only in
manuscript, and this time made not out of French but out of Italian, Francis Petrarch's *The Triumph of Death* is also included as the final item in the selection.

The introductions to the selection are thoughtful and informative, the glossing unobtrusive but helpful. While I think it likely that Mary Sidney, like her husband Henry Herbert, second earl of Pembroke, spoke Welsh (8), the claim that the Sidney children might also have "picked up" Irish while resident in that country is difficult to entertain one way or the other. One omission, which would not have taken up much space, and is such a useful feature of Hannay's monograph, is a genealogical table, which would ease the complex business of nomenclature. I cannot say I find "Mary Sidney Herbert," the modern American form of the name she is given in this selection, runs off the tongue lightly. The whole point of her identity is surely that, like so many aristocrats, particularly women, it was multiple: after all, William Browne's epitaph on her death in 1621 explicitly refers to her as "Sidney's sister, Pembroke's mother." For, of course, both men were named Philip.


*Translating Investments* puns in multiple ways that Judith H. Anderson explores through her investigation of metaphor's creative employment in early modern England. *Translating* provides the volume's primary focus on the Latin *translatio* of the Greek *metaphor*, carrying across, specifically on the notion of a master trope transforming meaning; moreover it refers to transforming fashions in clothing, to a soul transmigrating to heaven, to the transfer of knowledge or empire westward, of an ecclesiast from one jurisdiction to another, of a tradesman from one guild to another, or of money or property. *Investments* refers etymologically and anachronistically now to clothing, particularly the clothing of priests in worship services; in expansion it covers the conferring of clothing on royalty, nobility, officials, or priests, and as well conferring on them rights and privileges and powers, as in the vesting of property and hence ultimately our customary usage, laying out and risking money for potential gain; and it can refer to enclosing, hemming in, besieging,
occupying. What makes punning possible, of course, is that multiple contexts are available for framing words. Particularly significant for early modern England were etymologies of words, which were being added to our language faster than in any other period. Such held particular attention in an education based on the grammar and rhetoric of double translation between Latin and English, as England forged a national learned language. This cluster of conditions Anderson continues to emphasize for us in a trajectory from her *Words That Matter: Linguistic Perception in Renaissance English*.

So as to understand the operations of creative metaphor in Renaissance England Anderson focuses on a debate over metaphor between Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricoeur founded on Hegel’s sense of metaphor’s *Aufhebung*, “sublation,” the elevation of levels of abstraction until the “originating metaphor” may or may no longer obtain, as viewed from the neocognitivist interest in linguistic “scaffolding.” For Derrida the “trace” of the metaphor’s etymology persists even in obliteration as surplus promising proliferation. For Ricoeur the metaphor is essentially “dead,” its material base essentially wiped out, subsumed under the idea that has become the non-figurative meaning. Anderson’s goal is to design a working position between an infinite proliferation of meanings across history and the constriction that synchronous analysis places on the residue of multiple meanings. What makes her position of general interest is her means of working back and forth between these two poles that implicate other binaries by pitting a fundamentally word-based interpretation system from early modern England against our own primarily sentence-based determinations of meaning. This allows her to negotiate between Ricoeur’s restrictive determinacy of meaning, what she designates metonomy or coded substitution, as opposed to metaphor, her creative additive substitution, without permitting the provocatively inventive but maddeningly arbitrary proliferations of a William Empson, who remains curiously unmentioned. This mode allows her to negotiate as well between overlapping binaries such as synchronicity and diachronicity and theory and history so as to interpret works culturally, that is within multiple domains available in early modern England. She is thus aligned with others interested in the polysemic potential available in defined diction, which seems forever punning, such as Patricia Parker.

Extended arguments for considering “the transformer,” the master trope, appear in the second chapter, which includes enticing examples of the
“metaphoricity of language” from Shakespeare’s plays, and the seventh, an inquiry into the Latin rhetorical tradition adapted by English Renaissance rhetoricians describing and exemplifying catachresis as well as metaphor, into which catachresis ultimately gets taken. This later argument exhibits Anderson’s method of close discrimination of translations in and of her primary materials, her scrutiny of the implications of shifts in meaning through substitutions and the explanations of their operations. She takes as evidence not just the fundamental rhetorical texts from Cicero’s *De Oratore* and Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* through Augustine’s *De Doctrina Christiana*, Erasmus’ *De Copia* and Omer Talon, to Thomas Wilson, George Puttenham, and John Hoskins, to name only primary exhibits. She examines as well the dated translations of the Latin texts most familiar to us now, the chains of understandings, misunderstandings, and extensions from Cicero into early modern English texts, and the similarly transforming translations and consequent interpretations by contemporary critical theorists. Anderson’s exemplars become Cicero’s Crassus, Quintilian, and John Hoskins, all because they repeatedly restrain by reason (ratio) the daring (audacia) they advocate, offering supple transformations into creation rather than abuson. *Abusion* (away from use), or *catachresis* (down use), is similarly qualified by emphasis on the etymological potential of two poles of translation that include extended, transferred, or polysemous use vs misuse or excessive use, and use requisite for lack of a word, extended or tropic use vs misuse or degenerative or improper use. Anderson’s motto counterbalancing one popular deconstructionist pole, the catachrestic rupture supposed to exist at the heart of language, comes from her well-known reading of the House of Busirane at the end of Book III of Spenser’s *Faerie Queene*: “Be bold, be bold, be not too bold teasingly, temptingly, instructively, and perversely encapsulates the etymological contradictions rooted in the conception of catachrestic metaphor itself and suspended (in both sense) in the larger concept of *ratio*” (165).

This rationale and its motto Anderson invests in the clothing metaphors she fashions to read the workings of metaphor in early modern English textual culture, applying her method so as to interpret shifts from the excruciatingly linguistic self-consciousness of the controversies and affirmations in religion to the curiously mixed metaphorical world supplied by the past as an aid to understanding what was to become economic theory in the future. So she uses descriptions of metaphor, language, and etymologies from Estienne
to Benveniste, along with histories, critical works, and contemporary theories to inform her close readings. These offer interpretations of the arguments over “This is my body” in the eucharist that issued in Cranmer’s reforming codification for the English church, the vestiarian controversy during that same period along with Foxe’s presentation of its martyrs, Donne’s affirmation in Station XII of Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, catachrestic figuration of eroticism in Busirane’s palace, and the rhetorical strife between past allegiances and future projections in Gerrard de Malynes’s Lex Mercatoria. She thereby covers many topics scholars are taking to be focal points for our understanding of early modern English textual culture: the nature of symbolism viewed through understandings of the symbol of the eucharist with the slippages these undergo when passing through multiple languages and faiths, the representations, personal and public, of sexual desire, the shift from faith-based knowledge to rational explanation, the relations between the worlds of matter and of ideas. Anderson’s meditations are approached through the mediations of multiple translations, the workings of creative metaphor with its own complex relationship to constricting metonomy.

Other close readers may or may not hear the elevation of register Anderson describes in Donne’s Meditations, may or may not agree to her characterization of the vehicles that carry Malynes’ economic ideas, or the particulars of her explication of some other text. But students need to take her applications into account and attend to her rationale of negotiating between the many overlapping binaries represented by proliferating polysemy and restrictive coded substitutions, theory and history, when we aim at understanding the texts of early modern England and our discipline.

Margo Swiss and David A. Kent, eds. Speaking Grief in English Literary Culture, Shakespeare to Milton. Pittsburgh: Duquesne, 2002. x + 365 pp. $60.00. Review by CAROL BARTON.

As one might intuit from its title, Speaking Grief is a collection of essays on the sufferer’s articulation of, or the condolers’ written response to, bereavement, loss, and the grieving process from the late Renaissance through the early Restoration. As were the points of view of the poets with whom the period under scrutiny begins and ends, the collection’s perspective is Janus-
like, looking backward toward a time when mourning was considered an affront to grace, “a tacit denial of faith in salvation and resurrection,” to use Fred B. Tromly’s term (n3, 307), and forward, to the modern sensibilities that encourage the public expression of sorrow. The latter recognizes, as the former did not, that “God’s grace act[ing] on the soul distressed by bereavement … transformed a loss into a blessing,” so that “[c]hastened, cast down, then lifted up by God’s hand, some felt ultimately strengthened by the losses they had endured” (Houlbrooke, cited by Swiss and Kent, 10-11).

Originating from a special session organized for the Modern Language Association’s annual convention in Toronto, Canada in 1997 (“Grief Expression in Seventeenth-Century English Literary Culture”), the volume consists of an Introduction, twelve essays, and a thoughtfully written and very descriptive interdisciplinary overview in the form of an Afterword by historian Ralph Houlbrooke—365 pages in all (including end matter). Poignantly, Speaking Grief is dedicated “by the unanimous wish of all the contributors” to one of their number, the late Professor Louis L. Martz, who died before the collection could reach print; it is thus a book of mourning, about mourning, written by those whose experience of bereavement is fresh.

Organized in rough chronology (with some necessary overlap) and relying prodigiously on G. W. Pigman’s Grief and English Renaissance Elegy (Cambridge, 1985), Houlbrooke’s Death, Ritual, and Bereavement (Routledge 1989), and Anne Laurence’s “Godly grief: individual responses to death in seventeenth century Britain” (an essay within the latter volume), the analyses in Speaking Grief juxtapose “the stoical counsel to suppress grief…widely disseminated during the sixteenth century” (2), with its tendency to view the effects of bereavement as “a potentially fatal affliction … that could send people mad” (5), to “the greater freedom to express grief in writing in early seventeenth century culture” (8) emanating at least in part from the recognition that “God himself had grieved,” and “that Christ was vir dolorum [a man of sorrows].” In an age in which the challenges to life expectancy included not only widespread privation, improper hygiene and worse sanitation, inept or misguided health care, dysentery, typhoid, and high infant mortality, but bubonic plague, the Great Fire, and three civil wars as well, the experience of bereavement was nearly universal, and the “appeal to emotional rigor” (8) an increasingly ineffectual one. The tears of the Saviour in John 11:35, Luke 19:41, and Hebrews 5:7 provided the counterargument that “served to legitimize the
occasional grieving of Christians themselves”–with the aid of more and more widespread acknowledgment of the fact that “articulating complicated feelings of personal loss could temper the heartache of sorrow and ease the bereaved through a gradual procedure of healing and acceptance of loss” (9).

Nonetheless, the “speaking of grief” was predictably not without its politics: gender- and class-based perceptions of the legitimacy of mourning further complicated the issue, so that “despite the topos that death is a leveler of social differences … the office of consoling [was] usually discharged by a person higher on the social hierarchy than–or at the very least a peer of–the person being comforted” (26). As Tromly suggests, “at the core of the ancient tradition [was] a stoical hierarchy with manliness and rationality at the top and effeminate, slavish grief at the bottom, suggesting that the consoled is to the consoled as reason is to passion, or as man is to woman and child” (25). Likewise, the corollary perception that “a woman’s lament, grievance, or suffering … [was] the ‘everyday’ plight of the common [wo]man, a quotidian event whose collective force [did] not seem to bear the same weight of ‘seriousness’ as a man’s grief” (15) led female elegists like Mary Carey, Lucy Hastings, Alice Thornton, and Gertrude Thimelby to “challenge the stereotypical view of [women’s] emotionally unbalanced nature,” and provoked An Collins to adopt “a prophetical persona and [transform] personal grief into a political lament for England in the 1650s” (18). Such “gendering of grief” may even have led poets like Shakespeare, Milton, and Marvell to speak their grief most eloquently through the lips of female characters (most notably, Cordelia, Eve, and the “complaining” Nymph, all of whom are subjects of the essays in this collection).

A further complication of the relaxation of earlier strictures against the vocalization of sorrow involves challenges to the sincerity of the emotions being expressed: does one offer consolation or write an elegy “to assuage grief,” or “to cheat death” (18), to “overcome the subjectivity of sorrow” (26) or to articulate “a hostility only thinly veiled as comfort” (28)? It is precisely “the problematic nature of writing grief, its solemnity, indeed the sacredness of its subject,” say Swiss and Kent, that “makes it characteristically self-reflexive, often explicitly addressing concerns with its own legitimacy”–a variation on the theme of Herbert’s “Wreath” and Marvell’s “Coronet,” leading to the question “how and why is an authentically sincere lament com-
posed?” (17). Contributors Fred B. Tromly, Robert C. Evans, Marjory E. Lange, Michael McClintock, Louis L. Martz, John T. Shawcross, Donna J. Long, W. Scott Howard, P.G. Stanwood, Paul Parrish, Phillip McCaffrey, and Margo Swiss have worked valiantly to provide an array of carefully considered responses. With respect for the journal’s limitations of space and apologies to the authors of essays thus omitted, this review will address only four of the most representative ones.

In “Grief, Authority, and Resistance to Consolation,” the first of the collection, Tromly deftly lays the infrastructure on which the essays that follow will be based, arguing that “the resistance to solace in Shakespeare”—such as Leonato’s indignant rejection of his brother’s “consoling” words in Act V of Much Ado About Nothing, or Hamlet’s imperviousness to the expressions of “comfort” offered him by his mother and uncle-stepfather—“can be contextualized in broad historical terms as a chapter in the much larger story of how mourning for the dead was gradually legitimated in late Elizabethan England after having been proscribed by man as un-Christian” (21). As Tromly demonstrates, there was considerable precedent in biblical and classical literature for resisting consolation and a good deal more in contemporary fiction and prose (so that, with an interesting twist, Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress would demonstrate that it was only the main character’s repudiation of the “solace” offered by Despair that saved his soul). Though Shakespeare thus did not invent the motif, Tromly posits that the frequency with which “consolation resisted” occurs in his works makes it “central to the tensions between authoritative precept and individual percept that animate his art” (22). Taken out of context, for example, Leonato’s assertion of paternal grief over the attacks on Hero’s honor argues plausibly that “the ability to ‘speak comfort’ is in fact predicated on the absence of true fellow-feeling” (and as such resembles Romeo’s retort to Mercutio that “he jests at scars that never felt a wound” in Romeo and Juliet 2.2):

… ’tis all men’s office to speak patience
To those that wring under the load of sorrow,
But no man’s virtue or sufficiency
To be so moral when he shall endure
The like himself …

Likewise, as Tromly points out, Proteus’ response to Valentine’s grief over his banishment from Verona in Two Gentlemen is an equally potent ex-
ample of “how frequently consolatory discourse involves the deception of the person being comforted” in Shakespeare’s plays—“What Proteus neglects to mention is that he is himself in love with Silvia and has in fact brought about his friend’s banishment.” This double-edged “dark side of consolation’s moon,” on the one hand that which addresses the insincerity of consolation offered by one who does not suffer, and on the other “the dangerous control that the giver of comfort can all too easily wield over the needy person who suffers” (24-25), is at the core of the classic distrust of consolation’s putative healing powers.

The most compelling aspect of Tromly’s argument is his treatment of King Lear, which is to his mind “Shakespeare’s most powerful representation of grief and also his most probing study of the methods and motives of consolation” (32). In this play, “recognizing how hard true sorrow hits, the comforters”—and there are many of them—“seem to sense that verbal formulas are not adequate, that such enormous grief cannot be patched with proverbs. As a consequence, they forfeit their privilege and enter the storm of suffering in an attempt to convey a comfort that is substantial rather than merely verbal,” agonizingly empathetic rather than superficially sympathetic. “In an attempt to console Lear,” for example, “Gloucester risks and very nearly loses his life” (33), and the Fool huddles amid the “cataracts and hurricanoes” with his “Nuncle” on the heath (3.2.2). By contrast, “what is most remarkable” about the reunion between Lear and his youngest daughter (4.7) “is how few words Cordelia speaks” (39): “Indeed, the sense of shared grief is so strong in the scene that the roles of comforter and comforted become fused and the conventional hierarchies dissolved” (40).

Marjory Lange’s informative treatment of “Humorous Grief” has nothing to do with humor and everything to do with melancholia, “a disease of madness characterized by delusion, inner disorder, even despair, and manifesting symptoms across the entire spectrum of human behavior . . . a kind of dotage without a fever” (in Robert Burton’s words) “having for his ordinary companions fear and sadness, without any apparent occasion” (70). Reinforcing the class-based perception of mourning, Lange observes that “Lawrence Babb refers to melancholy as a disease ‘fashionable’ in the Renaissance, not only as a posture in literature, but as an ailment among the gentry”—“The same symptoms of illness would likely be called ‘melancholy’ in a person of nobility, and ‘mopishness’ in a person without rank” (75):
One of the most challenging cruxes in sorting out Renaissance melancholy lies in assessing the man of melancholic complexion—was he insane, or a genius? The controversy explains the eagerness with which many claimed to be melancholy, something that otherwise seems unaccountable. (79)

Continuing the dialogue concerning the potential for disingenuousness in matters consolatory, John T. Shawcross' essay on William Hammond (1614-?), possibly matriculated at St. John's College, Cambridge at Easter in 1627, is characteristically erudite and provocative, while at the same time providing merited acknowledgment of a minor Caroline poet whose work was (regrettably) dismissed by Douglas Bush in 1962 as “not distinctive” (n3, 326)—and by the New DNB as having “little sparkle.” In a poetic sequence written to console his elder sister Margaret on the occasion of the drowning of her young husband, Henry (1604-1640)—eldest son of Sir Edwin Sandys of Northbourne, and nephew of the poet, George Sandys—Hammond neither denies nor diminishes the grief she feels, but gently and movingly urges constrained acceptance of the inevitable. Tangentially echoing Hamlet, he observes that “one should not wish for ‘a longer flame’ than that of ‘the grand example,’ Jesus,” and that therefore to mourn her husband’s untimely death would mean to “ curse” him with the prolonged suffering that is the recompense of the aged. In the penultimate poem that Shawcross cites in full text (“To my dear Sister, Mrs. S / The Chamber”), the language of resurrection and rebirth are implicit in the darkness of the tomb: Mrs. Sandys in her widow’s weeds has cut herself off temporarily from all that is life-affirming and vibrant in mourning the man she loves, but like “a fair taper hid / In a dark lanthorn” or “an eye shut in its lid,” she is only temporarily “buried,” and must ultimately leave her “artificial darksome den” and rejoin the living, so that the “better part of [her] nature” can once again light the lives of the living around her. Hammond’s own grief—for his dead brother-in-law as well as for the sister whose sorrow has driven her into self-imposed “entombment”—is clearly part and parcel of his offer of comfort, which makes no pretense of altruism. Indeed, if Hammond can succeed in consoling Margaret, he will perhaps induce “fortune...at last, [to] see to recompense her pain” (152), and thereby reduce his own in her behalf. His Occasional Poems, first published in 1655 and reprinted by Sir Samuel Egerton Brydges in 1816, are well worth reading and so is the essay that brings them to light.
That is likewise true of Margo Swiss’ entry on Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, the last in the collection and the *locus terminus* of its focus. Viewing the epic from the perspective of seventeenth-century definitions of grief, Swiss argues that Eve’s tears are represented not only as healthy but as restorative—it is her grief in “the first emotional weeping in history” (269), “a continuum of weeping that begins with [her] tears in book 5” and ends as she and Adam leave the Garden forever, that represents not only her “progressive individuation from Adam” (279), but an “agony in a postlapsarian Eden [that] is a feminine, human version of Christ’s agony in the Garden of Gethsemane. As Christ will endure *Deus Absconditus*, during the process of his Crucifixion, she also experiences the excruciating sense of her own abandonment by both God and husband” (280-281). Nonetheless, the “reconciliatory work that ensures between Adam and Eve in union with God’s grace replicates the cooperative work of redemption itself,” and their “liturgy of love … ‘repairs’ their fractured androgyny” (282).

Ralph Houlbrooke’s comprehensive summary in the Afterword suggests a number of avenues of investigation that the essays in this collection have not explored, among them “the ways in which different religious beliefs or standpoints influenced the literary expression of grief” (300)—and particularly the influence of the Protestant Reformation on the articulation of “agonist attitudes to grief” (301)—as well as “the relationship between the written word and the visual arts [and the expression of sorrow] in this period” (300). Even so, the collection is a valuable contribution to the study of human bereavement and should be a welcome addition to the libraries of literary scholars of the early modern era and historians alike.


This large-folio, profusely illustrated, and beautifully designed work has always wanted to be a coffee table book. But its sheer excellence as a resource both for teaching and stimulating research has, in this reviewer’s experience, put paid to that idea. Now, after a quarter century, *The Cosmographical Glass* has
been reprinted in paperback and still at a bargain price.

Taking his title from William Cuningham’s 1559 treatise, Heninger has produced no mere history of cosmographies but rather a graphic display of nearly all knowledge of the universe thought relevant for man’s understanding of his God, of the macrocosm, and of his microcosmic self. Some 117 woodcuts and engravings published before 1700 illustrate what was once believed to be real and what that reality meant. They demonstrate the conception that Creation proceeds from a providential God down through the intelligible realm of the angels to the sensible world of matter and man. God is knowable through his handiwork in the Book of Nature, a process of ascent from the physical to the conceptual. The Huntington Library has given us a handsome book, its design pleasing in typography and layout, its figures and plates, some of them exemplifying the best of the Renaissance engraver’s art, sharply and admirably reproduced. The diagrams, which because of their often arcane nature are difficult enough, would not be well served by poor reproduction, but in this volume even minor details and small print are clear.

Heninger has organized his according by two subject areas which, while providing broad coverage to the topic, are sometimes limited by the author’s secular perspective, resulting in a scanting of the impact of Christian thought on the world views there presented. The first half of the book presents the universe as perceptible to the senses: Chapter I features images of the Creation, emphasizing iconography and the hexameral tradition; Chapter II presents the geocentric universe as conceived by such ancients as Aristotle, Sacrobosco, Finé, and Proclus, followed by Chapter III with the revolutionary models of Copernicus and successors such as Galileo, Brahe, Gassendi, Riccioli, Kircher, and, most fascinating, the first “infinite” model of the universe proposed by Thomas Digges in 1576. Although these illustrate the great scientific rejection of a geocentric universe, they are conceptions that can still be presented schematically and grasped conceptually. The book’s second section consists of three chapters presenting diagrams which reflect the influence of premodern “scientific” thought on various branches of human intellectual activity. Chapter IV features the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition manifested in the *Timaeus* and reflected, for example, in the schematic systems of Robert Fludd, the ten sephiroth, and Isidore of Seville. Chapter V explores the human microcosm, with its biological and medical implications. The final
chapter gathers contingent systems, such as, for example, the Work of alchemy and the multiple schemes of correspondences that underlay premodern physics. The book's one lacuna is its neglect of the tradition of schematic mappa mundi that had given way to modern charting by the Renaissance.

The diagrams would be merely mystifying were it not for their meticulous explication. Drawing on an extensive and detailed knowledge of Renaissance science and philosophy, Heninger provides explanations of often bewildering schemata. Many of these were designed to be perceived through a cloud of metonymy or to be read from multiple perspectives, as in the case of the elaborate tables of numerological and spatial correspondences depicted in Charles de Bolelles' *Liber de duodecim numeris* (1510). Few details go unexplained (although this reviewer has puzzled for years on the meaning of the buildings within the *hortus conclusus* of Figure 99). Fewer explications are erroneous, perhaps one only: a supposed depiction of the Trinity in Figure 23 which Heninger explains as Christ enthroned beneath the dove of the Holy Spirit and flanked on either side by a dual representation of God the Father. This good Catholic girl wishes to point out that the illustration in question depicts the Coronation of the Virgin. The central figure is female, flanked by God the Father and her Son, to whom she turns her gaze. One wonders whether the author would have corrected this little bit of heresy had this been a new edition rather than a reprint: there are no changes other than a new cover design and author's preface. A new edition, or perhaps a more retrospective preface, might have solved the perplexity raised by the 1977 printing that no diagram of the Chain of Being so popular with modern scholars has been found.

These are mere quibbles, and they certainly do not detract from the beauty and usefulness of this book. While the world-view studies of Lewis, Craig, and Tillyard, as well as Heninger's own *Touches of Sweet Harmony* (1974), have provided worthy foundations for study of the premodern mindset, *The Cosmographical Glass* provides an essential visual aid. As Heninger has pointed out, what emerges from this book is no one monolithic conception of the cosmos but rather a rich discourse arising from varying opinions among cosmologists, resulting in a multiplicity of systems. In the words of Cunningham, Heninger has "devised this mirrour, or Cosmographical Glasse, in which men may behold ... the heavens with her planets and stars, the Earthe with her beautifull Regions, and the Seas with her marveilous increse."
It is always difficult to do justice to a collection of essays on diverse themes, and it becomes especially difficult when the collection is also in diverse modes, as it is in *A Search for Meaning: Critical Essays on Early Modern Literature*, edited by Paula Harms Payne in honor of Albert W. Fields. Mirroring Professor Fields’ versatility and interdisciplinarity, this *festschrift* includes nine essays and, surprisingly, three poems. The essays are on Elizabethan prose fiction, Sidney, Shakespeare, Jonson, Massinger, and Milton; and the poems, on Albrecht Dürer.

Among the most interesting of the essays are Christopher Baker’s “Ovid, Othello, and the Pontic Scythians” and David Boocker’s “Milton and the Woman Controversy.” In the first of these, Baker begins with Othello’s comparison of his “bloody thoughts” to the Pontic Sea and convincingly links this Pontic (or Black Sea) region to the “barbarous Scythian” invoked by King Lear and to Marlowe’s famous “Scythian shepherd,” Tamburlaine, as a likely association in the minds of Shakespeare’s audience; from there, it is an equally plausible step, as Baker develops it, to Ovid: “Elizabethans who had read a frequent grammar school text, the *Tristia*, Ovid’s account of his exile on the Black Sea, would have recalled the account of his last years among these people of the steppes” (62-63). But in associating Othello with these barbarous Scythians, Baker claims, not only does Shakespeare establish Othello’s character at the moment of his rage as “more savage than noble,” but he also “evok[es] the more contemporary English problem of related ‘barbarians’ closer to home—the Irish” (63). Although one may occasionally question whether *all* Othello’s shouts of rage should be seen as Ovidian/Scythian rather than, say, Senecan, and although one may wish for a few more acknowledgments of the more obvious references to Moors and Turks, Baker argues his case cogently and opens up new vistas of exploration in ways to approach the play.

David Boocker, too, adds important considerations to ongoing critical discussions in his “Milton and the Woman Controversy.” Focusing on *Paradise Lost*, and analyzing the arguments of both seventeenth-century and con-
temporary “feminist” critics—I use the quotation marks because, as Boocker reminds us, seventeenth-century defenders of women were very much unlike our contemporary feminists (125, 138)—Boocker carefully sorts out the threads of the various gender discourses used by the feminists of both eras and by Milton himself, being careful to distinguish between the terms “patriarchal” and “misogynist,” a procedure one might wish to see in more discussions of this kind. Milton, Boocker claims, is no misogynist, and if he is patriarchal, so too were such female controversialists of the time as Lanyer, Speght, and Sowernam, who saw in the relationship of Adam and Eve a complementarity inclusive of Eve’s subordination, but who, like Milton, defended Eve by placing greater blame on Adam (128-30). Boocker also notes that “[t]he real danger for Adam and Eve, then, is that the Fall will eradicate the possibility of their being able to maintain the feminist discourse, characterized by mutual respect, that shapes the prelapsarian dialogue. However, thanks to Eve, some feminist outlook remains in postlapsarian Eden; indeed, it is Eve’s feminist discourse in Book X which begins their reconciliation” (134). Boocker, admirably, does not attempt to settle the “woman controversy” in Milton forever, although he does conclude that “Milton was no misogynist” (138). What he does accomplish is a long-needed definition of terms to work with in the future and a level-headed way to use them.

Among the other interesting essays in the collection, George Klawitter’s “Hearing People Talk in Elizabethan Prose Fiction” links much of this fiction to dialogic manipulation in jest-books of the time and traces the development of both narrative and dialogue through analyses of Baldwin’s Beware the Cat, Gascoigne’s Master F.J., Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveler, and Deloney’s Thomas of Reading. Paula Harms Payne, too, analyzes rhetorical strategies in her “Sidney’s Poet-Reader Dialectic: Theory and Practice,” focusing primarily on Sidney’s Defense of Poesie. The collection then moves to a consideration of Shakespeare: Christopher Baker’s essay on Othello and Ovid, already discussed, as well as James H. Sims’ “Shakespeare and the Christian Reader: A Consideration of Shakespeare’s Faith and Moral Vision As Communicated Through the Text of His Plays,” and John M. Mercer’s “Ben De Bar as Falstaff, 1872-1877: St. Louis’s Gift to Shakespearean Performance in America,” the latter essay accompanied by photographs of Ben de Bar in costume, both live and on the Shakespeare Statue in Tower Grove Park, St. Louis, Missouri. In other essays, Jean MacIntyre meticulously explores “Prince
Henry’s Satyrs: Topicality in Jonson’s Oberon and Clayuton Delery does an Aristotelian and mimetic approach to the metadrama of a too-often neglected Massinger play: “Dramatic Instruction and Misinstruction in Philip Massinger’s The Roman Actor.” We then move on to the Milton section, where Sung-Kyun Yim presents a well-argued claim about Harapha as a pivotal figure in Samson Agonistes (“Samson and Harapha: Milton’s Anti-Heroism in Samson Agonistes”). There follows David Boooker’s essay on Milton, and, finally, Darrell Bourque’s poems, “Dürer’s Hare,” “Courtyard at Innsbruch Castle, after Dürer,” and “Dürer’s Apollo.”

If there is any flaw to be noted in this collection, it may be its principle of selection or perhaps its indeterminacy about who the audience is supposed to be. Some essays seem meant for a general audience, while others seem meant for experts. For example, the Sims essay, originally delivered as public lectures, includes elaborately detailed plot summaries of plays with which most Renaissance students (let alone scholars) are probably quite familiar, and at times it seems more focused on the reader’s Christianity than on Shakespeare’s. However, this essay is surrounded by two others, the Payne and Baker essays, which expect a great deal of expertise in the reader and which certainly expect the reader to be well acquainted with the text under discussion, including at least one of the plays so carefully described in the Sims essay. The poems, too, although interesting in their own right and displaying a high degree of craftsmanship, seem almost tacked on at the end; we move from primarily English texts, except for a foray into American theatre history, directly to Dürer, with no indication of how we have arrived there or what connection we are supposed to make with the preceding essays. Even the editor’s normally helpful introduction is not of much help here.

All in all, though, this is an interesting—if at times quirky—collection of essays and poems, almost uniformly well-written, and any scholar of the seventeenth century will certainly be able to pick out a few gems from the collection that match his or her tastes and needs.

Adam Smyth's collection of essays, A Pleasing Sinne, has its origin in a short conference on early-modern English “drink and conviviality” (xi) held at the University of Reading in July of 2001; of the twelve pieces in this volume seven began as papers delivered at that event. What has emerged is a useful set of considerations—from various angles—of the use (and abuse) of drink (largely in the 17th century) and its place in the social hierarchy. Indeed, the type of alcohol consumed (from humble beer, to English ale, to imported wine) was an indicator of status and, therefore, often of political stance, as was, on occasion, the degree of indulgence. While these essays frequently engage and comment upon literature, treatises, etc., to illustrate and support their central tenets (and such observations are valuable to students of early-modern poetry and prose), this is not, ultimately, a book of literary criticism; its thrust, rather, given the fairly wide range of topics addressed, is towards social history, and thus its appeal is as much directed to those with an interest in history, politics, and the pleasures and frailties of the human condition as to those more focused on the arts and culture of the age. Smyth’s well-chosen title, A Pleasing Sinne (derived from A looking glasse for drunkards: or, The hunting of drunkennesse [1627]) points clearly to a central motif: drink, for some, may be a source of pleasure, but the result of consumption beyond moderation has clear dangers, as every age has known. The references at various points to the story of Circe are not misplaced: elevation or inspiration found in a pleasant glass can potentially give way to incoherence and improper behaviour, and humans can be reduced to the level of beasts.

Following Smyth’s cogent introduction, containing a clear précis of each essay, are five well-defined sections, although the reader who takes this text from start to finish will be aware of some repetition of crucial issues from time to time—there can be nothing entirely water-tight in a collection such as this. And, by way of general comment, one must note that the strength of each paper (none is weak) rests not only in the level and, to the extent that constraints of length that such contributions necessarily impose, thoroughness of each study but in the quality of documentation and bibliographic detail evident in the footnotes (no formal bibliography being appended to the book as a whole). Thus, the researcher is well served: doors to further enquiry are opened, not closed.

The first section, “Identity and Community,” contains three essays. The
first is Cedric C. Brown’s “Sons of Beer and Sons of Ben: Drink as a Social Marker in Seventeenth-Century England,” offering particular attention to Robert Herrick’s *Hesperides* (advocating the pleasures of wine for the cultivated and Royalist elite) and Leonard Wheatcroft (the “Black Poet,” rural promoter of the social benefits of beer or ale). Then follows Stella Achilleas’s “The *Anacreonta* and a Tradition of Refined Male Sociability,” dealing with “tavern dubbing” (31) and providing further links to Herrick and the Sons of Ben, and Michelle O’Callaghan’s “Tavern Societies, the Inns of Court, and the Culture of Conviviality in Early Seventeenth-Century London”—the comments on the Mermaid, Mitre, and Inns of Court circles are illuminating.

The second section, “Politicised Drink,” also contains three pieces: Marika Kublesek’s “Wine for Comfort: Drinking and the Royalist Exile Experience, 1642-1660”—wine is again seen as the elite quaff of choice, and as a compliment to the royal exiles and a source of sociability and solace; Angela McShane Jones’ “Roaring Royalists and Ranting Brewers: The Politicisation of Drink and Drunkenness in Political Broadside Ballads from 1640 to 1689”—the habits of the Tories and Whigs (consider Oliver Cromwell’s links with beer and Anthony Ashley Cooper’s [i.e., Shaftesbury’s] wine barrels) come clearly to the fore; and Charles C. Ludington’s “‘Be sometimes to your country true’: The Politics of Wine in England, 1660-1714”—the details regarding the history of the importation of various spirits are particularly revealing.

“Drink and Gender,” the third section, proffers two essays, Karen Britland’s “Circe’s Cup: Wine and Women in Early Modern Drama”—Shakespeare’s *Antony and Cleopatra* and John Marston’s *The Wonder of Women or The Tragedie of Sophonisba*, in particular, both receive insightful comments, and both have clear links to Circean attractions and perils, and Susan J. Owens’s “Drink, Sex and Power in Restoration Comedy”—figuring here in detail are “royalist” Aphra Behn’s *The Rover* (wine is once more attractive and dangerous and Willmore is both a predator and victim of his own desires [130]) and William Wycherley’s *The Country Wife*. As in preceding sections, such literary examples serve to illuminate social issues, values, political stances and put the flesh (albeit frequently frail) on the bones of historical/political record.

“Improvement,” the fourth section, takes a different though intriguing path. The first of two pieces is Louise Hill Curth and Tanya M. Cassidy’s “‘Health, Strength and Happiness’: Medical Constructions of Wine and Beer in Early Modern England”—here is, for instance, a discussion of the locales
and social levels of wine, beer, and ale (143), importation of wine (145), the
debate over the virtues of English ale and hopped beer (148), the rise of
English medical literature in the 17th century, and the preventative and curative
effects of alcohol. The second is Vittoria di Palma’s “Drinking Cider in
Paradise: Science, Improvement, and the Politics of Fruit Trees”—this is, for
example, an attractive introduction to the cultivation and use of fruit trees, the
production of cider, and the growing importance of such cultivation as the
17th century wears on (including such encouragement as provided by John
Evelyn’s *Sylva* (1664), articles in the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Soci-
ey, etc. [165 ff.]), and the documentation here is generous and impressive.

Smyth’s volume concludes with a section titled “Excess.” Charlotte
McBride’s “A Natural Drink for an English Man: National Stereotyping in
Early Modern Culture” suggests that the traveling Englishman (and, by impli-
cation, the one at home) drinks beer to excess. McBride notes the shift from
earlier (mediaeval) local/home-brewed ale to commercial (hopped) beer
and the argument for growing hops in England (184-185), treatises criticizing
drunkenness, the social split between ale-house (lower class) and tavern (more
elite). The ale-house was run by the poor for the poor who, because of their
patronage, continued to be poor, drawing people away from domestic life
and relative innocence (187). Here are references to Shakespeare’s famous
tavern scenes in 1 *Henry IV*, 2 *Henry IV*, and *Measure for Measure* as well as to
John Fletcher’s *The Pilgrim* (1621), along with details of attacks on drunken-
ness. Smyth’s own “It were far better to be a Toad, or a Serpent, then a
Drunkard: Writing About Drunkenness,” the final piece in the book, looks at
the seventeenth-century English depiction of insobriety and its effects in the
myth of Circe comes into play again: drink can be seen as insidious in its allure,
despite arguments in its favour. It is, to cite *A Looking Glass* again, sometimes
seen as attractive, but beyond moderation, the result is, for many then and
now, a “sinne.” The “glasse,” in a sense, is both a container and a mirror, of
distortion and the first is key to the inebriated reflection of the second. An
Index concludes the volume.

*A Pleasing Sinne* is a useful and well-researched collection of thoughtful
essays which, although at first glance may seem to deal with matters some-
what peripheral to central issues of early modern scholarship, manages well to
fill in and to solidify one’s curiosity and sometimes lurking impressions of
parts of the seventeenth-century English social world. The issues it raises and
settles are not new—a haunting note of contemporaneity sounds throughout the volume if only to remind the reader that, though details and political specifics may have changed, the problems and discourses are part of the present world.


The Restoration theater allowed for a much greater openness than English audiences had experienced in earlier periods of public drama. Most significantly, women joined the casts of plays, but in numerous other ways the scope and interests of the theater changed radically after 1660. Cynthia Lowenthal attempts to explain some of these new interests in Performing Identities on the Restoration Stage. Arguing that the later seventeenth century was a period in which different forms of identity had to be reconstituted, Lowenthal shows that the theater allowed both for the violation of previous categories of identity and for their policing and confirmation. In this view, theater serves an ultimately conservative function, bringing to the stage the visual cues of identity that help to naturalize and inscribe notions of gender, status (rather than class), and national identity in a turbulent period of English expansion and consolidation. Each of her chapters focuses on a key play from the period 1656 to 1707 complemented by readings of several other plays, including in each instance a work of Aphra Behn's. A few of the points in Lowenthal's study are certainly interesting, but this poorly executed book undermines these few good points, making Performing Identities a frustrating and disappointing read.

Lowenthal argues that the Restoration stage explores and remakes English imperial, national, status, and gender identities. She begins with two chapters devoted to defining English identity in this key period of imperial and mercantile expansion. In the first, focusing on Dryden's Indian Emperour, Lowenthal suggests that England's emergence as a belated colonial power required an engagement with Spain's successful but declining legacy in the Americas. Reading Dryden's representation of the Spanish victory over Montezuma as a way of imagining the ideal English imperial project—Cortés
is made to stand in as the coolly rational English model, displacing stereotypical Spanish excesses onto his underlings—Lowenthal finds in this heroic play an effort to marginalize the “excessive and hypermasculine” Spanish failures in favor of self-discipline when confronting the wonders of the New World (55). In this play, and in Behn’s *Widow Ranter*, the possibilities created by female characters allow for a legitimating transfer of the colonial mantle, passing over the uncomfortable fact of conquest as a *fait accompli*. Turning in the next chapter to national identity, Lowenthal finds that mercantile figures in the drama have to be appropriately disciplined and their foreign tastes contained. The buffoonish Dutch figure in Behn’s *The Dutch Lover* and the low-born but wealthy English merchants addicted to Spanish and French fashions in Wycherley’s *The Gentleman Dancing-Master* suffer humiliation and exclusion, while in Mary Pix’s *Adventures in Madrid* the English adventurers learn the “manly” lessons of “self-control . . . [and] delayed gratification” (109). These two chapters then, while focusing on the formation of English identity in the imperial and international arenas, simultaneously suggest the drama’s role in establishing appropriate notions of masculine, bourgeois identity.

In the final two chapters of *Performing Identities*, Lowenthal focuses primarily on the ways in which the period’s drama works to shape feminine identity. Here we find some of her best work in the book, as well as some of the indicators of the book’s flaws. In a chapter on “discursive identities,” Lowenthal traces efforts to represent female desire, to make the interior visible on the Restoration stage. Focusing on readings of Behn’s *The Rover* and Manley’s *Royal Mischief*, Lowenthal brings these two plays into a context of a kind of Restoration celebrity culture—the period’s fascination with the lives of its actresses when not performing on stage, concluding that there was a great deal of performing off the stage as well. The female characters in these plays and the women who acted these roles point to the possibility “that spectatorial relations are such that there is no possibility of a woman’s ever transcending her representation” (123). The representations of desiring women—the painted portraits, mirrors, and verbal depictions at the heart of Behn’s and Manley’s plays—ultimately mediate and circumscribe women’s desire and in turn stories of actresses’ behavior with aristocratic patrons outside of the theaters then serves to reinforce aristocratic notions of status. In her subsequent chapter, Lowenthal turns to the drama’s recurrent interest in sexual assaults. She associates this fixation with the mercantile culture’s search for novelty, complicated
by the transformation of the notion of “monsters” in the later seventeenth century from prodigies to pathologies. The works of Pix and Manley, Lowenthal argues, transform the previous treatments of rape on the Restoration stage and create a space for a female heroic in which a woman can claim a value distinct from “her unbreached body” and residing instead in “her strong and unsullied mind” (175). The book ends with an extended and uneven epilogue testing Lowenthal’s conclusions against five plays of the period.

If some of Lowenthal’s best work is to be found in the final portion of Performing Identities, some of the book’s weaknesses are most apparent here as well. Perhaps the dozens of typographical errors, reference inconsistencies, and awkward turns of phrase can be attributed to ineffective copy-editing. But muddled use of dates (the beginning of the Third Anglo-Dutch War in 1672 [p. 87] or 1673 [p. 76], for instance, or the misdating of Behn’s death [p. 66]) or references to figures from a previous period (Brubage [p. 115] or Frances Bacon [p. 145]) might be said to speak to larger problems. One of the strengths of Performing Identities, according to the publisher, is its engagement with the secondary literature. In fact, the excessive and inconsistent reliance on such sources ultimately undoes the book. Passing over numerous difficulties in this regard, two examples are illustrative. In one instance, the author relies on Lawrence Stone’s excellent study, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, in order to generalize about Restoration aristocratic attitudes, despite the fact that Stone’s study runs only through 1641. Elsewhere, in a chapter on national identity, Lowenthal relies on a single book by Michael Duffy in order to explain English attitudes towards various other European nations throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Drawing on a single historian’s work to understand English stereotypes of the Dutch, for instance, Lowenthal incorrectly explains that the English considered the Dutch to be “cowardly when drunk” (85) and a few pages later correctly describes a stereotypical Dutch character as aggressive when drunk (90). No comment is made about her own contradictory claims, just as in other parts of the book similarly unremarked contradictions arise. These inconsistencies and lack of self-awareness point to the limitations of Performing Identities on the Restoration Stage; it can offer suggestive readings, but it does not instill much confidence in its conclusions.

Milton and the Idea of the Fall is a postmodern intellectual history which examines primarily seventeenth-century theology and literature to recover doctrinal disputes which accompanied both narrative and exegetical treatments of the Fall. As Poole illustrates, such disputes problematized the Fall to an extent unrealized by most readers of Paradise Lost. Poole illustrates in satisfactory detail competing Augustinian, Irenaen, and Gnostic explanations of the Fall, all of them complicated by ideological overlap and the internal tensions sometimes found between narrative accounts of the Fall and theological dogmas about it (16). The Reformed theology influential in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century England incorporated an Augustinian version of the Fall, a reading which posited at least two falls, one mental and private and the other public. Intense controversy over the Fall, often turning on nuance and fine detail, flared up in the middle of the seventeenth century in England and on the continent. Prominent divines such as Jeremy Taylor departed from prevailing Augustinian doctrines on the Fall, questioning conventional models of original sin and the nature of the unfallen state as well as the kinds of knowledge that could be had about it (53). Skeptical accounts of original sin by German reformers (Spirituals and Anabaptists), for example, Balthasar Hubmaier and Sebastian Franck, are representative specimens of the types of radical thought which permeated mid-century England. The Digger Gerard Winstanley’s Fire in the Bush (1650) illustrates the revision of the Genesis text of the Fall into a political fable. Other contemporary theories, such as that of the Muggletonians, offered exotic allegorical and verisimilistic accounts of the Fall (80). Chapter Five, “Heresiographers, Messiahs, and Ranters,” makes the important claim that heretical accounts of the Fall were often caught up in basic paradoxes of discourse, the first being that refutations of heresy could easily double as calls to conversion; equally problematic is that heresiography (accounts of heresy) is the product of both unorthodox ideas and the mutations of those who record and denounce them—the “paparazzi.”

Chapter Six reviews early literary treatments of the Fall: Hugo Grotius’ Adamus exul (1601), Samuel Pordage’s Mundorum explicatio (1661) and John
Dryden’s *The State of Innocence* (1677). Grotius follows Augustinian assumptions, carrying over the narrative complications inherent in such assumptions. Pordage’s *Mundorum explicatio*, probably authored with his father, treats two falls, the initial Fall of Adam in his mind and the public Fall in the garden. Dryden, of course, turned *Paradise Lost* into a rhymed epic. His Adam becomes more intellectually agile than Milton’s Adam, while Dryden’s Eve becomes more predisposed to sin than Milton’s.

Chapters Seven to Eleven, the second part of *Milton and the Idea of the Fall*, map the evolution of Milton’s treatment of the Genesis narrative. Early Miltonic poetry, especially “At a Solemn Musick,” records his interest in the Fall and its metaphysical implications. The polemical prose of the 1640s and 1650s seems to reveal a new emphasis on human freedom, but Milton’s thought on the Fall becomes “original” only in 1643-44, in the divorce tracts (133). In *De Doctrina Christiana* he endorses both the “punitive and legalistic consequences” of the Fall, a broadly Calvinist, somewhat Arminian position. *Paradise Lost* acts out the dualism posited by earlier thinkers—a Fall-in-the-will and an actual act of evil. Poole’s reading stresses Milton’s Augustinian concern with both foregrounding and concealing the phenomenon of causality, particularly the causality of evil. Milton sets epistemological barriers in Eden between Adam and Eve and the reader’s understanding of them; between Adam’s reported creation and our certainty about it; and between the ways in which Adam and Eve perceive Raphael’s narrative about the war in heaven and the reader’s perception of the war as comic or even ludicrous. Poole’s motif of advancing and retreating, with its narrative and ontological implications, not only organizes his treatment of the epic’s central episodes very effectively but also justifies his eventual conclusion—that Milton’s “estimate of the Fall and of fallen man clouds his apprehension of truth-in-itself, and so the causality of evil, as in the thought of Augustine, is enshrouded in narrative circularities and rhetorical loops” (189). When Milton presents the Fall in Book IX, it is unequivocally catastrophic for both sexes and even for nature. Eve’s departure from Adam to garden alone represents Milton’s endorsement of the Augustinian position that Eve’s decision to become evil occurred before the actual temptation (184). Moreover, after the Fall, Adam and Eve clearly experience the Augustinian condition of “perturbation” (187). Poole supports the view of Leonard, Ricks, and others that there was indeed a paradise to be lost, that a Fall actually occurred, and that its dark consequences
are a limiting condition of postlapsarian moral identity.

Poole’s conclusion separates his argument from both reader response theory and from the received “Christian Tradition” as defined by Patrides and other intellectual historians. Poole reminds us that the Milton presented in *Milton and the Idea of the Fall* is dynamic and “potentially dangerous,” even when “located against a background of countless other dynamic, potentially dangerous projects” (195). In measuring Milton against his primarily sectarian religious contemporaries, the book’s thesis complicates itself unnecessarily. On the one hand, radical theologies and narrative versions of the Fall frame Milton’s own rendering, yet they are also disconnected from it. As Poole notes, “Milton is in general very suspicious of all the types of thinking we earlier surveyed emanating from the ‘radical’ milieu” (190). That said, *Milton and the Idea of the Fall* tries to press into one space what could easily be considered two separate topics, each worthy of book-length study and dependent upon one another only to a limited extent. On the other hand, Poole’s position that the “reading of Genesis 1-3 was one of the defining acts of early-modernity” (195) justifies the linking of Milton and his contemporaries yet shifts the argumentative axis of the book as a whole. Structural issues aside, readers will appreciate Poole’s sensitivity to radical theologies and to the “paparazzi” which documented these positions, as well as his acute demonstration of Milton’s construction of the elusive causality of evil.


Philip Schwyzer’s fascinating account of British nationalism in early modern England offers historians and literary critics a range of insights about how English identity is predicated on the legacy of a deeply embedded cultural relationship with Wales. Arguing that Englishness is not self-generated but relational instead (3), Schwyzer describes national consciousness in Tudor England as “British” as opposed to “English” in order to expand the parameters of what counts as nationalism during the early modern period. While serving English interests, “Britishness” (6), or British nationalism, “took most
of its facts, many of its tropes, and even much of its tone from Welsh
sources” (6).

While a sense of English national identity may have served the needs of
the Tudor political and religious establishments during the sixteenth and sev-
tenenteenth centuries, the desire to define what counted as English was, at its
core, more psychological, according to Schwyzer: the desire that “the past
may be recaptured, that what is forever lost may be found, that the dead may
in some sense live again” (10). This longing for the English to re-animate the
past was made more difficult, however, because they had no self-evident link
to the ancient people of pre-Anglo-Saxon-Britain, while the Welsh were “still
speaking the same language, practicing the same customs, and inhabiting the
same land” (7). Schwyzer’s book, then, is an account of how English intellec-
tuals ranging from Edmund Spenser to James I, from Robert Aske to John
Bale, and from William Baldwin to William Shakespeare bridged that gap.

While Literature, Nationalism, and Memory examines major English authors
in its interrogation of the difficult process of shaping a British national con-
sciousness, Schwyzer suggests in chapter three that the challenge for the Welsh
to forge its own link with its ancient past was daunting. To sixteenth-century
Welsh scholars, their country’s history had suffered “a succession of bibliocausts”
(81) that made reassembling the nation’s bibliographic heritage more difficult
“than that facing the English after the Reformation” (80). Chapter three
concerns itself with the efforts of antiquarian John Prise and Bishop Richard
Davies to recover the lost records of ancient Welsh history. Without written
accounts of an authentic Welsh past—particularly in the form of the vernacular
British Bible and the ancient account of British history vetustissimus liber—“the
Welsh past would remain irrecoverable” (84) and the “nostalgic longing con-
stitutive of nationalism” (84) would persist. According to Schwyzer, the lost
books “facilitated the English appropriation of British antiquity” (84), as men
such as Prise and Davies provided the “raw materials” (84) for the construc-
tion of a Britishness “hostile to a separate sense of Welshness” (84). Schwyzer’s
insight into this act of appropriation is that within the hostile rewriting of
Welsh history, however, a uniquely Welsh identity survived and resisted appro-
priation.

Edmund Spenser is a central figure in Schwyzer’s account of the develop-
ment of a unified Britishness that served English interests more than the
Welsh. The book’s first chapter argues that Spenser was the inheritor of the
spirit that animated Welsh prophetic poetry. By tracing images of fire and blood that appear in Welsh verse that celebrates ancient bloodlines, Schwyzer shows how an anti-English sentiment in Welsh prophetic poetry became by the fifteenth century a link between English kingship and ancient Welsh history that legitimized Tudor claims to the throne. By the time Henry VIII broke with Rome, what was a vague espousal of a link to ancient British history "took on an aggressive ideological form" (31). Schwyzer contends that the violent upheavals in the 1530s and 1540s—the Reformation, the union of Wales and England, and the battles for Scotland—"were represented as a restoration of ancient (British) rights and privileges" (31). Book III, canto iii of Spenser's *Faerie Queene* poetically re-imagines the Welsh prophetic flame promising a British ascendency, turning it into a "spark of fire" (l. 48) that, although coming from a Welsh source, is "quintessentially English" (43). In Spenser's vision of ancient history and national identity, England and Britain "turn out to be coextensive and coterminous" (44). Schwyzer claims that Spenser's insistence that ethnic difference be subsumed under an English-centered Britishness is what motivates *View of the Present State of Ireland*.

Spenser appears again in chapter four, which argues that Britain became haunted by ghosts that were essential to its development. Ghosts that lingered as part of religious tradition before the Reformation were relocated after the Chantry Act of 1547 and "re-infiltrated Tudor literature and life ... in the guise of distinctively national spirits" (99) emanating from the "long-vanished nation of Britain" (99). Schwyzer details the psychological and social ramifications of eliminating Purgatory and claims that the authors of *A Mirror for Magistrates*, John Bale, and Edmund Spenser provided new space for the banished ghosts to exert their influence. In the case of Spenser, for example, his *Ruins of Time* explicitly links ghostly possession and possession of the British past. The chapter's striking observation about the shifting status of the literary spirits after the Reformation is that they "grow ever more ancient, more British, and more nationally-minded," as Purgatory is "reconceived as the space of the nation" (125).

John Bale is another prominent figure who, according to Schwyzer, shaped how the English related to its British past. Chapter two sets Bale's representations of British nationalism against those of Robert Aske, a lawyer, military figure, and ideological leader of the Pilgrimage of Grace. Bale, an advocate of post-Reformation British nationalism, praised the nation in texts such as
The Laboryouse Journey in Petrarchan terms. The British nation that Bale encouraged his readers to love “was not a land anyone could inhabit in the sixteenth century” (51). Instead, it belonged to the distant “pre-Saxon past” (51) that was “founded in the unfulfillable longing for the irrevocably object” (75). According to Schwyzer, Bale’s sense of British history most resembles modern forms of national nostalgia. Aske, on the other hand, was the first “English patriot” (50) to mourn the loss of medieval England. Chapter two claims that because of Aske’s intense affiliation with Yorkshire regionalism, his vision of the British nation—though glancing and often unfavorable—was nonetheless “unmistakably and quintessentially English” (51).

A major strength of Literature, Nationalism, and Memory is that it combines literary history with incisive literary criticism. Two chapters on Shakespeare demonstrate most vividly Schwyzer’s abilities as a literary critic. Both chapters—one on the various forms of nostalgia in Henry V and the other on the rapid disappearance of British nationalism from King Lear to Cymbeline—are significant achievements, offering new insights into the plays and their relationship to a dynamic and evolving English identity. According to Schwyzer, “the move from Henry V to Lear is the move from a community united by longing for what has been lost to a communion within the moment of loss itself” (169). By the time of Cymbeline, however, Shakespeare had rejected the idea of the nation—its poetic appeal diminished by the very real sense of “national consummation” (174) taking place under James I. The threat that Britain was “in danger of becoming a place on the modern map” (174) caused Shakespeare to make England strange again, setting two of his late plays in ancient Britain almost completely disregard his historical sources.

Literature, Nationalism, and Memory will appeal to early modern historians and literary critics alike. For a book that accomplishes so much, its slender size—under two-hundred pages—belie its complexity and nuance. With his detailed literary history of the Welsh contribution to English national identity, Schwyzer compels us to reconsider what counts as English nationalism during the Renaissance.

In *John Bunyan and the Language of Conviction*, Beth Lynch's objective is to reassess how this nonconformist author's works have been studied. She claims that “the relationship between Bunyan's writings and his discursive milieu is more dynamic and more constitutive” than previously recognized (5). Bunyan's narrative and pastoral works are not only “mutually dependent” but also “less rhetorically and generically distinct than scholars of diverse persuasions have held” (141, 6). It is precisely that “complex rhetorical relationship” between Bunyan's pastoral and narrative works that Lynch wants to explore (9).

The Introduction contains Lynch's review of and commentary on trends in Bunyan criticism from 1988 through 2003. Although she explicitly identifies her work with Michael Davies, author of *Graceful Reading: Theology and Narrative in the Works of John Bunyan* (Oxford, 2002), Lynch wishes to challenge Davies’s concept of the reader's “‘Comfortable,’ reading experience” (7). Her work contends “that, whether [a Reformed preacher like Bunyan] is preaching or writing, the rhetorical imperatives of godly conviction–belief and persuasion–harbour an instinct for certainty and control” (9).

The book's five chapters include a chronological examination of Bunyan's works as Lynch illustrates how the concept of conviction is utilized in his writings. Chapter 1, “Belief, Persuasion, Judgement 1656-65,” begins by considering the etymology of *conviction* and emphasizes its legalistic connotation which was vital to the Reformed faithful's language of spiritual examination. In this chapter which includes attention to Bunyan's pamphlet dispute with Quaker Edward Burrough, we also encounter the term *godly author* which is frequently employed by Lynch throughout the book. Lynch explains that in his earliest extant work, *Gospel-truths*, Bunyan constructs a rhetorical relationship between an implied reader and godly author. The attempt “at faithful persuasion” is problematic because the godly author argues for “a belief which cannot be proven conclusively in this life” (16-17).

Chapter 2 contextualizes Bunyan's pastoral writings by briefly reviewing the “arts of conviction” found in preaching manuals by authors such as William Perkins and John Wilkins. Lynch offers in Chapter 3, “The Godly Self, and Others: Prison Narrative,” her analysis of rhetorical devices detected in *Grace Abounding*, *The Pilgrim's Progress*, and *The Heavenly Footman*. A decisive point that Lynch repeatedly presents is the epistemological uncertainties that
Bunyan and other Reformed preachers wrestled with. This ethical tension reaches its zenith for Bunyan when he writes *The Life and Death of Mr. Badman*. Siding with Davies and Roger Pooley, Lynch focuses on the “narrative awkwardness” of *Mr. Badman*, but she asserts that there are epistemological and moral anxieties which “threaten to derail the 1680 text as it evolves” (98).

Unlike the previous chapters which typically provide brief commentary on miscellaneous works, the second-half of Chapter 4 (its final fourteen pages) offers a close reading focused on *Mr. Badman*, a text which is exceptionally suitable for Lynch’s argument. Suggesting that *Mr. Badman* can be perceived “as an extended indictment,” Lynch emphasizes the “hermeneutic paradox” that forms this narrative:

Badman must *a priori* be identified—created—as if his life and death are to be interpreted in providential terms. In contrast to Bunyan’s other narratives, the very purpose of *Mr. Badman*—to achieve a convincing characterization of the reprobate—presents the author with a superhuman challenge and, by the same token, a huge ethical risk; since the case of the hopefully elect is strengthened by proof of the reprobate’s identity—his damnation—the narrative tests the godly author’s reasoning and integrity to the full. (112-113)

Although by the very act of labeling the protagonist eponymously Badman is apparently convicted from the outset, Lynch identifies textual evidence of the godly author’s unease and reluctance “to convict the very person of Badman” (121). While anxiously identifying the reprobate, Bunyan must “play God” in a text that is both pastoral in function and yet narrative in form. Notwithstanding the godly author’s “judgemental voice,” Lynch concludes that the narrative of *Mr. Badman* ultimately reveals a “diminishing epistemological and spiritual confidence” which “entails a questioning of the very foundations of its author’s faith and teaching” (127).

The primary work evaluated in Chapter 5, “Evil-Questioning, Godly Violence 1678-84,” is *The Holy War*, a text that Lynch believes merits greater credit from critics: “the failures associated with *The Holy War* are on the part not of the text, but of its readers” (140). Those who attempt to contain “this slippery text” by either ignoring or delimiting Bunyan’s Reformed soteriology will misread it since “the narrative and the theological might be mutually dependent” (141). Crediting its “experimental honesty,” Lynch values *The
Holy War as an allegory that “transcribes a spiritual and ontological experience which offers no closure or certainty beyond the sheer fact, or otherwise, of faith” (143). John Bunyan and the Language of Conviction concludes with an Afterword that briefly summarizes the author’s objectives.

Lynch deserves credit for her attentive readings of an impressive number of Bunyan’s writings; considering the relative brevity of this book, there is remarkable breadth of coverage. According to the Works Cited section, 32 of Bunyan’s 60 published titles are listed. The chapter summaries above only give a meager sampling of the dense, detailed analyses provided. Furthermore, Bunyan scholars will likely appreciate several interesting tangential questions that invite further attention. For example, Lynch proposes that Philip Stubbes’s Anatomie of Abuses (1583) is a pastoral dialogue that influenced Bunyan’s allegorical narratives, noting specifically that its “dialogic form and profoundly judgemental tone ... anticipate Mr. Badman in too many ways for a coincidental connection” (108). Another intriguing problem that Lynch presents is whether or not Mr. Badman belongs in the category of judgment literature; she concludes that “it would be misleading to suggest that the work is composed within this genre” (107). Finally, the topic in Chapter 5 and statements like “spiritual violence, at some unspecified level, is not just admirable but desirable” (148) remind this reader of Sharon Achinstein’s chapter on violence in Literature and Dissent in Milton’s England (Cambridge, 2003), a book that most likely was either inaccessible or appeared during the final stages of Lynch’s research. Most notably, Achinstein observes that “the persistent strain of violence that bleeds through [Bunyan’s] writings” (102) has received little critical attention, and Lynch’s essay on “Godly Violence” is an opportunistic effort toward filling that gap.


Geoffrey Vaughan’s work on Thomas Hobbes’s Behemoth, or The Long Parliament is concise, rich and provocative. The topic of political education is an area of growing contemporary concern. Thinkers as diverse as John Rawls, Amy Gutmann, William Galston, and Peter Berkowtiz each recognize
that a liberal or democratic society must be held together by some commonly held opinions, a shared public ethos. Vaughan’s book brings to our attention one of the founders of our modern politics and succeeds in reminding us that Hobbes is a challenging thinker for our time. The work is well conceived and comprehensive in its use of the scholarly literature (though the harshness of his criticisms of other scholars is sometimes off-putting). Vaughan makes good use of Hobbes’s multiple texts and demonstrates sensitivity to changes in Hobbes’s presentation over time. The central chapter offers clear and helpful accounts of Hobbes’s negative version of the golden rule, the proper place of fear in the state of nature and in civil society, and a precise account of Hobbes’s minimalist public Christianity. The conclusion—in which Vaughan suggests comparisons of Hobbes’s political education to twentieth century proposals for democratic education in America—is very good for raising questions about the nature and limits of our liberalism. Hobbes may understand the limits of political culture better than we do.

Vaughan contends that most previous scholarship has failed to recognize the extent of Hobbes’s concern with political action. Given his attention to the practical political problem of his time it is odd that Hobbes is not more open about explicitly political or constitutional solutions, as Vaughan notes. Instead, Vaughan argues, Hobbes proposes a political education to produce peace, stability, and loyalty. Vaughan goes even further, arguing that Hobbes subordinates philosophy to these political ends. Philosophy is justified by its utility and not by the activity of study for its own sake (13, 32).

*Behemoth* is about the education of the character known as “B,” who is turned toward a specifically political concern and an acceptance of the Hobbesian view of human nature (82, 95-6, 99, 116, 125-6, 132-3). Vaughan is quite insistent on this approach to the text, and properly so. Readers who do not pay close attention to the education of Glaucon in Plato’s *Republic* will really miss the point of that dialogue, and Vaughan demonstrates that Hobbes’s work must be approached with the same care. What does the reader gain from reading Hobbes’s book? Vaughan’s work is selective and focused; he does not attempt a comprehensive commentary. Instead, he suggests that the reader witnesses the “process of education” (117). Hobbes offers *Behemoth* as a model of a “method of instruction” through dialogue, an example of “consensus without violence,” and a case of “someone being instructed towards Loyalty and Justice” (117, 115, 122).
Vaughan emphasizes the need to develop in citizens proper political opinions, opinions that contribute to stability. This project of shaping public opinion requires rather an admittedly constrained view of political education. This is certainly not a liberal education; it is not an education in science and philosophy, or cause and effect (38). It is rather an education more like indoctrination. Vaughan is aware that such political education is a form of persuasion, not learning (41, 86).

The political education is necessary because of a particular failure of philosophic reason. The problem Vaughan's Hobbes finds with reason is itself unusual. The difficulty Vaughan identifies is the “problem, or even the impossibility” that people will all reason to the same conclusion (39). Describing the problem in this way suggests not only that science and philosophy have trouble communicating their understanding to the masses (a prominent theme in *Leviathan*) but that philosophy itself is subject to considerable error, that reason itself is an uncertain guide. If reason fails in the way Vaughan describes then Hobbes faces a much larger challenge than readers typically recognize.

Hobbes's solution to this problem is to employ historical lessons, or more precisely poetized or fictionalized historical lessons, as the means to shape stable and useful political opinions. Hobbesian history is a kind of fable and an exercise in political rhetoric (83-5). Perhaps the paradigmatic example is Hobbes's own history of the state of nature (54-7). What Hobbes found valuable in history was “its power to instruct without the reader knowing that he or she is being instructed” (81). History's “secret influence” comes through its inclusion of “an interpretive assumption,” an implicit account of cause and effect, or of human nature (90). For example, *Behemoth* includes an implicit teaching that humans are motivated by private interests, and that therefore public actions should be suspect. The chief lesson is to distrust the motives of others and especially of the ambitious who threaten political stability. (Why this lesson of distrust does not also extend to the monarch or sovereign is not clear.) History thus serves as a palatable introduction to human nature, one that does not require deep reflection or self-knowledge to grasp (128-9). Because it is apparently removed from present circumstances and present passions, historical stories may receive a hearing that more overtly political speeches could not.

Several suggestions emerge for Vaughan's analysis. It is strange that Hobbes
seems so little concerned for the shaping of customs and habits, a topic that has occupied political educators since Aristotle. Given the comparative oddity of Hobbes’s emphasis on history as an instrument of political instruction, more extended comparisons to thinkers like Locke and Rousseau with their emphasis on breeding and deliberately regulated experiences would be very helpful. Similarly, given Hobbes’s emphasis on the proper use of a fabulous history it would be of much interest to read a more extended comparison to the similar approaches of Machiavelli and Francis Bacon. Some comparison of Hobbes’s use of dialogue to that of Plato—for example, as Socrates describes the ethic of dialogue in *Gorgias*—would also be a benefit to readers.

It is odd, too, given the critique of reason that Vaughan finds in Hobbes that the teaching of a poetic or fabulous history does not suffer from the same dangers. Are the lessons of Thucydides’ history, or the lessons of poetry, really so clear? Vaughan himself notes that Hobbes’s “interpretation of history” is not “straightforward” but rather contains “ambiguity” (118). As Vaughan points out, Hobbes recognized a certain danger in using history in this way (83). Moreover, readers may wish Vaughan had been a little more direct about just how someone who chooses to employ Hobbes’s program might tell good fictional history from bad. Truth, understood as getting the facts right, is clearly not the test of a good history. A good history will make a true presentation of human nature (91). But Vaughan also suggests that we do not really attain knowledge of human nature through the reading of history (83). In *Leviathan* Hobbes’s method involves a kind of self-reflection; the picture of human nature is derived from one’s knowledge of oneself (33). So the way to knowledge still lies through natural investigations, a kind of natural philosophy. Now that topic lies beyond the scope of Vaughan’s work, and yet it seems an unavoidable issue. How else does one know what to teach?

Vaughan’s single-minded emphasis on political education, to the exclusion of philosophic education, brings us finally to a very large question about the relative weight that Hobbes puts on political life and activity over the philosophic life. Vaughan claims that politics became Hobbes’s chief concern. Vaughan is aware that the “political education” he finds in Hobbes is not education properly understood (86). One wonders what place is left for philosophy. Vaughan acknowledges that “[p]hilosophic education may be appropriate for some” though on its own terms it is not an effective gover-
nor of political opinion (90). A fuller account of the place of that philosophic education and its relation to politics seems quite important. Vaughan quotes De Cive at length, in which Hobbes remarks that he “took up Philosophy for intellectual enjoyment,” until the political turmoil of his country became too threatening. At that point he put aside philosophy and turned his attention to the pressing practical needs of politics (14). But is peace an end in itself? It is at least plausible that Hobbes addresses those pressing political concerns so that he can reestablish an environment in which philosophers may pursue their intellectual enjoyments.

*Behemoth Teaches Leviathan* will be of special interest to scholars interested in Hobbes and to those willing to reassess the necessity of political education, of the preservation of proper political opinion, even in a free society. Vaughan’s analysis is very suggestive, too, for other readers whose interests lie not directly with political education but with the way the stories we tell about our history shape our public political ethos.


Sarah Hutton’s *Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher* traces the life, philosophy, and intellectual development of Anne Conway using Conway’s own works and the relationships she had with leading intellectuals of her day. Hutton endeavors to use history and biography to understand Conway’s philosophy. While Hutton’s methodologies reveal significant information about Conway’s life, philosophy, and intellectual milieu, her employment of history and biography as analytical tools ultimately undermines her efforts to craft a full and successful story of Conway as a woman philosopher.

Hutton applies both biography and history in her quest to understand Anne Conway’s life and philosophy. Via biography, Hutton hopes to place Conway at the center of a circle of great thinkers. Hutton claims that Conway led this group and set its agenda. Hutton also utilizes “reconstructive archaeology,” which Hutton defines as “the history of her [Conway’s] philosophical activities … pieced together … from the intellectual circle she was fortunate enough to inhabit” (10). Thus, she considers Conway in relation to Henry
More, Francis Mercury Van Helmont, Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, Robert Boyle, and many others. She also explores Conway’s philosophical ventures into medicine, kabbalism, Quakerism, and numerous other topics. An especially interesting aspect of Conway’s philosophical development concerned the effects that Conway’s chronic illness had on her philosophy and her association with leading medical philosophers of her day. For instance, Hutton points out that Conway was drawn to Quakerism because she equated their persecution and suffering with the physical and psychological torment she endured as a result of her medical condition.

However, Hutton’s use of biography and history results in mixed success. Virginia Woolf’s statement, “Women have served all these centuries as looking glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size,” fits Hutton’s discussion of Conway and her intellectual associates. Due to the tremendous amount of information that Hutton provides about Conway’s largely male intellectual companions, Conway gets lost in the text. When Hutton remembers to bring Conway back into the analysis and shows the reader how Conway directly influenced a particular philosopher, her book shines.

The historical approach that Hutton employed also led to limited success. Hutton rightly acknowledges that “my study perhaps has more in common with recent work in the history of science than with the history of philosophy” (13). In her conclusion, Hutton compares her own analysis of Conway with Carolyn Merchant’s own examination. This comparison is a good start, but Hutton needed to do more to situate her work within the history of women in science and the history of gender and science. The reader of Anne Conway: A Female Philosopher will find a good, traditional history of Anne Conway’s intellectual world. The scholar looking for an analysis of Anne Conway and her philosophy in relation to the latest trends in the history of women in science and the history of gender and science will have to look elsewhere.

The subject of *Fashioning Adultery*, changing representations of adultery in England from 1660 through 1740, should be of interest to scholars from a variety of disciplines. The title, of course, alludes to the Stephen Greenblatt's *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* and as such would seem to be situating itself in the field of early modern cultural studies that it inaugurated. Curiously, then, Turner refuses to enter into dialogue with a number of fields: literary criticism, cultural criticism, and the field of history of sexuality. Perhaps in part because he does not engage with their theory, Turner embraces a reductive late modern materialism that becomes the standard by which all cultural texts are implicitly measured.

Turner sometimes seems to want to develop a very different argument, one that is more constructionist in nature. He urges that “we [historians] need to revise our understanding of ‘representation’ and ‘reality’ as a dichotomous relationship” (204). He would seem to be turning away from the assumption that there is some underlying reality that that we use to ground our readings of cultural texts. Unfortunately, Turner cannot seem to follow through on this assertion, primarily because his language and methodology betrays him. Overall, his use of the language of social science asserts the existence of an external reality that can be uncovered with the correct tools. He thinks in terms of “evidence,” “case studies,” and “data.” The term “representation” used above, taken from literary criticism, asserts the existence of an external reality that must be represented. Finally, for Turner cultural texts are only a different type of evidence that can help the historian understand a more complex cultural reality: “What we are analyzing is a complex and interacting set of codes and meanings from which a cultural reality of infidelity is forged” (19, italics added).

Turner falls back on privileging a materialist reality, despite statements to the contrary. The book itself is seen as moving towards a “material actuality” (19); thus, he sees the first three chapters as offering analysis of “printed sources,” the last three of “descriptive material” (21-2). The first three do, indeed, focus on cultural representations of adultery in a number of genres, whereas the last three focus on accounts of murders of unfaithful spouses, accounts of church court trials for adultery, and accounts for criminal court proceedings. Turner considers the final two chapters as “more firmly grounded in material actuality and lived experience than the printed materials examined in previous chapters” (143).
My summary suggests a neat division, but in practice, Turner often privileges an objective material reality even in his readings of literary and cultural texts. In chapter two, he clearly values the advice columns in serial publications like the *Athenian Mercury* more than fictional texts because they are said to provide a glimpse into the real lives of a cross-section of the population. After he presents the value of this evidence, Turner revealingly worries, “Of course, given the anonymity of correspondents and the paucity of general data about readership, it is impossible to verify the authenticity of the queries, whether they were products of the editors’ imagination or genuinely sent in by readers” (65). For Turner, texts prove to be more valuable if they are “genuine” or “authentic,” where those qualities are judged by how closely the text may be taken to revealing the lived experiences of the population at large. Such a view, however, is odd coming from a scholar who elsewhere claims that historians need to pay more attention to literary texts.

Similarly, crime literature is seen to be valuable insofar as it offers us a glimpse into this underlying material reality. Turner is unable to consider the way that such texts create a specific cultural reality often in ways that underscore tensions in the culture because he is so committed to privileging an objective materialist reality. He takes issue with Frances Dolan’s perspicacious interpretation of the criminal literature of this period precisely because he sees it as abstracting itself from this reductively conceived material reality. To Dolan’s suggestion that such literature focuses on husbands murdering their wives because it explores the anxiety over patriarchal authority, heightened with the recent events of the Civil War and the Restoration, Turner asserts only that “The late seventeenth-century proliferation of crime writing, and the increasing pressure it placed on publishers to bring out more factually accurate and representative accounts of murder, may provide an alternative explanation. The fact that there were more pamphlets concerned with husbands murdering their wives may reflect, with a greater degree of accuracy, the ‘reality’ of spouse murder” (132). His response underscores some of the problems with a cultural criticism that is so wedded to a social science epistemology. Turner may be correct that this is all that is going on, but then, I believe that he would have to establish this, not with bald assertions, but with a closer consideration of the language of the text itself. This would involve, of course, a greater emphasis on interpretation and a greater self-consciousness about the interpretative assumptions made.
To conclude, I would simply add that his epistemology leads him to deny agency to historical actors, as the above quotation suggests. Actors are seen as caught up in larger and more important sociopolitical systems. Turner speaks in terms of “value systems” (14), “sexual systems” (14), or “systems of labeling” (29). In his reading of the first chapter, he argues that the pre-1660 church developed “a system of labeling that was deliberately inflexible and limited in scope, making no conceptual or linguistic distinction between different types of offence, or between casual sexual encounters and longer-term affairs” (28). Turner comes to this conclusion because he has arbitrarily limited his interpretation. He could have benefited from reading and engaging with literary and cultural criticism of the 1990s which discussed in depth issues of agency. Similarly, he could have benefited from engaging more directly with historians like Christopher Hill, David Underdown, and David Cressy, to name just three. Having limited himself to the consideration of (written) language and having conceived of language as abstract, dehumanizing “systems,” Turner need not consider the way that immorality could be defined by individuals within local communities. Through gossip, general opprobrium, and social rituals like charivari, the community could define for itself what it considered immoral and what behavior it might find excusable.


This carefully crafted and meticulously-written book assembles a wealth of visual and documentary evidence in support of its thesis that the Chigi Pope Alexander VII between 1655 and 1667 “opting to refashion Rome according to the architectural formulae of Eastern capital cities in antiquity . . . hoped through his building program to reclaim the heritage of the Church as an institution and of Rome as an idea” (5). Habel’s visual evidence for the coordinated nature of Alexander’s building program comes from the putative resemblance of three major sites—the Quirinale, the Corso, and S. Pietro—to the palace, hippodrome, and temple of urban planning and development in the eastern Roman empire during late antiquity. Despite the documentary wealth, much of it from the Vatican Library and the Archivio di Stato of
Rome, the historian looking for conclusive written evidence to support Habel’s major hypothesis looks mostly (but not entirely) in vain. The case, as the author is careful to point out, is mainly circumstantial, and hinges on the interests of two Vatican librarians: Lucas Holstenius (1596-1661), who became Vatican librarian two years before Alexander VII began his pontificate, and Leone Allacci (1586-1669). Both appear to have worked closely with Alexander VII on building plans; both had intellectual interests in the geography of Greece and of the Near East. Holstenius, in particular wrote descriptions of journeys across Greece and the Middle East, and had hoped to compile an anthology of writings about the city and empire of Constantinople. The connection between Constantinople and Allacci is less clear, apart from his conversion from Greek Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism, but Alexander VII at least had access to other sources concerning Constantinople, including Pierre Gilles The Antiquities of Constantinople. Thus the case for Habel’s thesis is compelling, even though the evidence offers few direct statements by Alexander VII concerning his antiquarian interests, and even though the author evaluates the pope’s own vision as “fugitive” (324).

The value of this book is in any case not in the concrete documentary proof of its major thesis but consists rather in the wealth of information and lavish illustrations Habel provides about the realities of planning building programs so complex as to seem inchoate. Habel brings genuine order to Alexander’s “fugitive” vision by organizing the book by site (in the case of the Corso, the author devotes a chapter to each end of it), and within each site, exploring as much as is known about its pre-Alexandrine topographical and building history. The author explores as well how the Chigi became interested in a particular location, what alternative visions their architects and builders imagined, and how and why final decisions about design and execution reflected the balance of aesthetic, familial, financial, and ideological considerations that governed the Chigi pope’s planning of the New Rome. In the case of the Quirinale, Habel leaves little doubt that Alexander’s interest in using this Palazzo as his personal residence had to do with its commanding view of Rome, a statement, therefore, of papal supremacy in the secular city. Certainly the Quirinal Hill abounds in antiquities placed there by Constantine himself, but the latent symbolism seems to have escaped the Venetian ambassador Correr, who wrote that Alexander “has in mind to embellish [the Quirinal Palace] in the manner of which the Roman emperors Augustus, Domitian,
and the other were so fond” (11). It also seemed to have escaped the notice of the anonymous commentator on Alexander’s intention to smooth out the irregularities in the Via del Corso: this commentator, too, read the emperor Augustus as the classical precedent, despite the happy coincidence of two Byzantine institutions along the Corso, the church of SS. Apostoli and the monastic foundation of S. Silvestro in Capite (67).

At the southern end of the Via del Corso, where Piazza Venezia now stands, was the Piazza S. Marco. Here, Alexander VII’s intention appears to have been both to advertise the generosity of private patronage and to cement the alliance between city and church. As in other phases of the overall building strategy, Alexander VII personally issued directives to the urban planning commission, or maestri delle strade, to facilitate the removal of blocks of palaces that extruded into the Corso, even undertaking an expensive buyout to accomplish the task.

Private concerns also drove the Chigi search for suitable accomodations, since the Chigi family, having sold the Villa Farnesina to the Farnese family in 1579, had only re-established a residence in the city four years before Alexander VII’s election to the papacy. Although committed to a policy of discouraging nepotism, and conveniently installed in the Quirinale himself, the new Pope soon found himself at the mercy of his kinsmen, whose burgeoning presence in Rome drove the search for a new family palace, a search that involved numerous obstacles, extensive plans, and that was not ultimately resolved until after Alexander VII’s death. Thus, Habel argues, Alexander VII’s legacy to the Via del Corso was not suitably spacious accommodations for the Chigi family but rather the elegant new palace facades that took shape according to his vision by ultimately being undertaken by other families.

By far the strongest evidence that Alexander deliberately refashioned the city of Rome in the Eastern tradition is the inscription placed in 1665 at the corner of the Corso with the via delle Vite, an inscription that makes specific reference to the Corso, or Via Lata, as Alexander’s restoration of the hippodrome. Here the point of Alexander’s obsession with straightening the Corso becomes clear—that it was for “racing, public convenience, and beauty.” In particular, when Alexander VII employed Pietro da Cortona to design the façade of S. Maria in via Lata, the pope oversaw the plans for a fastigium to adorn the upper story of the church. The fastigium, Habel argues, carried multiple meanings involving not only the fusion of papal and imperial power,
but also the deliberate reminiscence of such Eastern classical examples as Hadrian's temple at Ephesus, the Marble Court from Sardis, Diocletian's palace in Spalato, and several other important examples, most tellingly the missorium of Theodosius I. Similarly direct references, mostly to Constantine, abound also in Bernini's design for the colonnade in Piazza San Pietro, buttressed by the Vatican Library Prefect Holstenius's citation of Greek sources for porticoed buildings.

Both the conception of the Corso as Hippodrome and Bernini's design of the Piazza San Pietro make the strongest possible circumstantial case for Habel's thesis. The resulting intricacy of the argument makes for very dense reading indeed, and this reviewer exhorts the book's readers to savor every detail. For Habel makes the book's argument architectonically, and the reader who takes the trouble to understand the book's structure, and how each chapter makes part of the larger whole, will be amply repaid by the rhetorical effectiveness of the author's argument. This was no mean feat, for in addition to attempting to capture Alexander VII's elusive vision, the author had to juggle parallel narratives involving Alexander's relationship with the patrons and with the municipality of Rome itself, the occupational demands and kinship networks involved in transplanting an entire papal family, and last but not least, Richard Krautheimer's monumental work on seventeenth-century Roman architecture. Merely to engage Krautheimer's work would be a formidable task for any art historian, but to do so in the carefully crafted fashion that Habel has done bespeaks great ambition and an enormous labor of love.


What relevance does a martial ethos have for modern civil society? Public officials in America swear to uphold a civil constitution which leads few charges, yet military experience has been a significant electoral factor since the days of George Washington. Indeed, one can hardly imagine Grant or Eisenhower being taken seriously as politicians in the absence of their military record. A martial pedigree, however, is not a one-way ticket to political
office: MacArthur’s vaunting political ambitions hobbled his military career; the presidential contests of 1996 and 2004 saw decorated war veterans bested by men who had never heard a shot fired in anger; and in the most bizarre twist of all, Governor Schwarzenegger’s political career has been founded on an impressive but entirely fictitious military career.

If modern America values martial prowess as an indicator of leadership ability, the same was true of early modern Britain, where the nobility was not only born to command but inculcated with basic combat skills from an early age and motivated by chivalric assumptions which pervaded many aspects of elite culture. Roger Manning chronicles a number of the disparate ramifications of this martial ethos in a wide-ranging survey of both contemporary memoirs and literature and also of modern historiography. First, he establishes that the titled nobility of England, Scotland, and Ireland were by no means completely demilitarised during the 16th century, and that the level of combat experience increased dramatically, not only during the Civil Wars of the 1640s and 1690s (as one might expect) but in the 1590s, the 1620s and the Restoration period as well. Some may argue that his definition of combat experience (see p.19) is too broad, covering everything from formal war to cattle-rustling, but in a study of the impact of martial values on wider civil society, this is perhaps a justifiable elision of boundaries. In fact, David Trim’s painstaking work on English mercenaries during 1562-1610 suggests that Manning’s narrow statistical focus on the peerage underestimates the extent of English involvement in foreign wars during the Elizabethan peace of 1562-85.

Why did the martial ethos remain so alluring? Manning touches upon several themes: a classical education which stressed the importance of personal courage; a culture of chivalry which remained potent (although the relative importance of lineage and personal courage remained open to question); the large number of noblemen and gentlemen who rounded off their education by “trailing a pike” on the continent; and the continuance of clan culture in upland areas of Britain (here he omits to mention Wales, which shared many economic and cultural characteristics with the Gaeldom of Scotland and Ireland). He also suggests that the rise of the rapier and the continental fashion of duelling was a key factor in the re-militarization of elite society. Duelling was (naturally) most common among military officers, where an accusation of cowardice, if unchecked, could have lethal consequences on
the battlefield, but it quickly spread throughout gentry society in the later 16th century. Any study of the practice is necessarily impressionistic, as duellists took pains to avoid prosecution for murder or affray, but scholars will shortly benefit from a comprehensive calendar of the records of the Earl Marshal’s court (housed at the College of Arms in London and are being calendared by Richard Cust and Andrew Hopper), established in 1623 specifically to check the spiralling problem of duelling in London and at Court.

The most interesting idea Manning touches upon is the thesis that the revival of a martial culture based upon edged weapons at a time when guns came to dominate the battlefield was a way in which elites validated their continuing claims to pre-eminence in civil society. In a nice piece of product placement, he suggests that this will receive more systematic coverage in his next book, but some of the strands of his argument can be discerned in this work: personal courage in the face of mortal danger, either on the battlefield or in a duel, served as an indicator of leadership ability (as true for Oliver Cromwell as it was for Theodore Roosevelt); and an honour code underpinned by a martial ethos was, to some extent, an aristocratic reaction against the centralizing tendencies of the early modern state (this is probably more true of France than England, although the 2nd Earl of Essex was a natural-born frondeur). On the basis of these assumptions, he speculates that the martial ethos, when combined with classical republicanism and antiquarian scholarship, inspired resistance to Stuart absolutism. Well, perhaps. John Adamson makes a persuasive case for the political impact of such influences on several of the ancient nobility who sought to dominate the parliamentarian cause in the mid-1640s (see “The Baronial Context of the English Civil War,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th series XL [London, 1990], 93-120). However, most of the Court gallants and continental veterans who flocked to Charles’s colours in the north of England in 1639-40 ended up among the Cavaliers at Oxford during the Civil War, while Cromwell’s Ironsides were motivated not by classical republicanism but by Biblical providentialism.

In this study of early modern manuscripts and printed books and their readers, Heidi Brayman Hackel shifts the parameters of reader-response criticism to include the material artifacts of book production. Her discussion of what constitutes literacy in the period is especially illuminating, as she identifies a spectrum of reading competency that ranges from abecedarian reading (someone with rudimentary reading skills but unable to write, a status that is often statistically overlooked) to academic fluency. Her study group of “readers” in the period thus extends to include not only academics and gentlemen but also gentlewomen, servants, and an emerging class of casual readers. This range of what constitutes literate then renders her considerations of reading material as nuanced and wide-ranging. Similarly, she includes discussion of manuscript practices alongside printed books and offers interesting and detailed comparative examinations of each kind of book production. Again, this strategy has the effect of expanding the implications of her study beyond the consideration of early modern readership to include current technological transitions from print to electronic reading practices.

A brief introductory chapter is followed by four relatively substantial chapters. The first chapter, “Towards a material history of reading,” establishes the nature of books as material objects in terms of the shifting technologies of manuscript and print in the period. Her focus here is on what actual readers do, rather than, as in reader-response theory, what readers can do. This distinction is a careful one: though her “study of reading belongs to the larger framework of literary inquiry from which it emerged” (5), Hackel shifts “attention from men of letters to men and women of leisure” (3). In other words, she focuses her analysis of reading on the materiality of the text and of readers themselves as opposed to the “theoretical constructs, variously described as ‘mock,’ ‘ideal,’ ‘model,’ ‘implied,’ ‘encoded,’ ‘informed,’ and ‘super’ readers” (6). Her two main questions throughout are “What did books tell readers to do?” and “What did readers do with their books?” (9). Her return to the archives, then, motivated by a theoretical set of questions, is therefore both a way to provide substantial answers as well as to promote further discussion in new directions.

Chapter Two, “Impressions from a ‘scribbling age’: Gestures and habits of reading,” dismantles the categorical notions of literate/illiterate, private/public space, reading/writing/discourse, and manuscript/print. Instead, Hackel
describes these categories as matters of degree rather than kind. For instance, she cites the example of Anne Clifford hearing her books read to her by her servants in her bedchamber, instructing them to write out “sentences and sayings [and pin them] onto her Walls, her Bed, her Hangings, and Furniture.” This scene involves a range of actors and activities that overlap and disrupt several categorical distinctions: “The image of servants circulating around a bed both writing and reading is a powerful reminder of the communal use of bedchambers so common even in aristocratic households” (38), not to mention the collaborative and variable practice of composing a manuscript commonplace “book” from a printed one. Tracing these kinds of reading patterns seems to derive from contemporary practices that blur the aural and visual senses, which is perhaps also a way to sensualize the act of reading—as when Sidney allegorizes a kiss as a rudimentary step, like spelling, toward sex, which is like reading, in *Astrophel and Stella* (“Yet those lippes so sweetly swelling, / do invite a stealing kisse; / Now but venture will I this, / Who will read must first leaerne spelling”; qtd 63).

In the third chapter, “Framing ‘gentle readers’ in preliminaries and margins,” Hackel turns to the ways that prefaces and marginalia both direct reading and support ambiguities, very much like modern footnotes (91-92). Citing a number of illuminating examples, she points to the anxieties of early modern writers to elucidate meaning through addressing and clarifying the nature of their readers. Both “gentle readers” and “vulgar” readers are addressed as such in prefatory material, and each are given direction as to what to do with the book in hand: “early modern readers need both reliable guides and sound judgment to escape the reading process unscathed” (78), because “who one was and how one read were considered one and the same: identity, that is, determined interpretation” (83), and presumably vice versa too. And because “preliminaries and marginalia are the most explicitly collaborative parts of a printed book . . . often of indeterminate or suppressed provenance” (92-93), they strategically model the kinds of collaboration that take place in reading practices (as in Clifford’s bedchamber). Hackel also addresses the business element of patronage, pointing out that “the patron is often not figured as a reader” (114). And yet, books need “protection” as well as “a careful, complete reading” (118), and often re-reading too (120), in order to be fully and properly understood.

The fourth chapter, “Noting readers of the *Arcadia* in marginalia and
commonplace books,” treats samples of extant hand-annotated copies of Sidney’s *Arcadia* to analyse the things that “readers do with their books.” Hackel focuses on three kinds of annotation: marks of active reading such as deictics, underlining, summaries, cross-references, queries); marks of ownership, including proprietary verses; and marks of recording such as debts, marriages, births, etc. (138). Each, she establishes, “suggest that the book has physical value … [because] they convey that the book is a site of information … as intellectual process, as valued object, and as available paper” (138). (I couldn’t help being struck by this analysis of personal annotation, as I was at that moment pursuing the same task while reading her book.) What emerges from these analyses is the particularly early modern emphasis on reading in order to be “studied for action”: “to read widely is not enough; one must ‘marke’ what one reads and prepare it for use” (145). In fact, the “radical decontextualization performed by the commonplace book” (146) is a literal re-writing, in the reader’s hand, of another’s words—often shifting the recording to reflect a very different context or point of view (for instance shifting third person pronouns to first-person). Thus, “By taking up a pen, a reader transforms both the text and the activity of reading” (182), applying the text to her own life through writing it in her own script.

Chapter Five considers the libraries of two gentlewomen. “Consuming readers: Ladies, lapdogs, and libraries” challenges the “central archive for the history of reading in early modern England” and its focus “on goal-oriented, professional, and contestatory readings” which neglect female readers (196). (It would have been interesting, here, to see what Hackel might have said about Anne Askew, Lady Jane Grey, and other accomplished women speaker/writers from Foxe’s *Book of Martyrs*, about whom much has been written.) The two sample libraries here, Anne Clifford’s (the Countess of Pembroke) and Frances Egerton’s (the Countess of Bridgewater), afford fascinating glimpses into the history of bibliophilia, though I am less persuaded that the issue of gender is significant here. Certainly, if Hackel’s book has a flaw, it is in the titular assumption of the importance of gender to her subject matter. This chapter in particular spends half its time twisting itself around established arguments that are not entirely consistent with the material nor with her analysis of these gentlewomen’s libraries. For instance, Hackel describes Clifford and Egerton as constrained gentlewomen who yet managed to assemble their own libraries, revealing “both resistance and conformity to the ideals of
feminine literacy.” Yet this seems not to fit with the assertion that women’s reading is “circumscribed by legal and cultural injunctions for… female readerly silence—restraint from public reading, limitations on linguistic proficiency, and abstention from vocal criticism” (197). Unfortunately, after previous enlightening discussions about the slipperiness of the public/private distinction, the widespread variability of literacy and literate proficiency, and the profound overlap between verbal or vocal discourses and the collaborative dialogue of reading, such discussion seems out of place at best and contradictory at worst. Undoubtedly it compromises the discussions of the remarkable reading material of Clifford and Egerton, and their promotion of reading among their own servants who were, if not “men and women of leisure,” at least men and women both.

Hackel’s book offers a considerable contribution to the emerging fields of New Textualism and the more established theories of reader-response criticism. Her analysis is thoughtful and often inclined to original insights with regard to reading evidence as a genre of literature in itself. Indeed, though exegesis has long been considered a medieval genre of scriptural import, Hackel points to ways in which growing literacy rates in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries contribute to the dissemination of this kind of practice beyond the exclusively monastic or learned arena. At several points in the book, she alludes to “the discourse that sexualized women’s reading” (153 and elsewhere, especially in the fifth chapter), without fully explaining what she means by this and not fully integrating this discussion of gendered reading into the rest of her otherwise cohesive argument. Nevertheless, Hackel’s attention to the traces of “regular” or “ordinary” readers, as well as to non-religious exegesis as with Sidney’s and Greene’s *Arcadia*, opens the consideration of reading as an active engagement beyond previously established boundaries.


By expressing their ideas in print, Quaker leaders in seventeenth-century England engaged with contemporary political and religious affairs in a way
that challenged those outside the movement, while simultaneously creating a successful national network of contacts that ultimately united and sustained the growing movement. Such is the premise of Kate Peters in her assiduous and well-researched study of several thousand Quaker tracts published in the early 1650s.

Peters divides her work into three parts. In the first section, she focuses on the process of political pamphleteering, emphasizing how the persistent and widespread publication of tracts not only helped spread Quaker ideas to the marketplaces, taverns, churches, courts, and other places where people gathered, but also made the movement seem and actually be more organized. Quaker leaders wrote deliberately, making tracts relevant to their readers by referring to specific audiences and locations. Moreover, the publication of Quaker tracts was carefully orchestrated and controlled by a handful of radical publishers who devoted their time, money, and resources to the movement. To great effect, Peters uses the case of pamphleteering in East Anglia to demonstrate how print “contributed towards the creation of a nationally homogenous and coherent movement” (73), as Quaker leaders like Richard Hubberthorne helped transform the image of Quakers in Cambridge from “passing troublemakers to part of a sustained attack on the town” (79). More debatable is Peters’ contention that the readership of the Quaker tracts was controlled “effectively” by ministers who read the tracts like sermons and passed them out in meetings. While one can agree that ministers were instrumental in disseminating, publicizing, and probably interpreting the content of Quaker tracts, the actual readership can never be ascertained with the accuracy that Peters seems to suggest.

Publication of the tracts not only gave the Quakers coherence and unity but also underscored core ideas of identity and discipline. In the second section, Peter explores how the Quakers deliberately embraced—even exploited—the derisive collective “Quaker” title in order to summarize and make immediately recognizable key Quaker beliefs for far-flung readers. Such active pamphleteering, Peters asserts, enabled Quakers to signify themselves as a “cohesive and elect group of people,” (11) that in turn helped them “assert group authority” (113). In particular, Quaker leaders used the press to justify women preaching publicly, a phenomenon that ran contrary to prevailing patriarchal assumptions of womanhood. Peters treads very carefully here, alluding to the ambivalence displayed towards female Quakers promi-
ment in the early movement but dismissing the larger issues of gender raised by the Quaker doctrine of spiritual equality between the sexes. Nevertheless, her point is still fair: in print, the doctrine of women’s public preaching was supported and even endorsed by Quaker leaders, thus demonstrating unity in the sect’s beliefs, even though manuscript evidence reveals a great dichotomy in Quaker opinion on this subject.

In the third section, Peters analyzes how Quaker pamphleteers used print to deliberately construct “a national, successful movement and maintain a coherent and effective dialogue with the body politic” (12). According to Peters, Quaker tracts helped stimulate religious debate and universal participation in their repeated challenges to the church and professional ministry, as Quaker leaders published both the virulent attacks from their critics and their own responses. Publishing the tracts added legitimacy to Quaker ideas and promoted greater public engagement, particularly as readers were encouraged to judge the issues—and the ministers—for themselves. Similarly, the tracts served to highlight the problems of the English republic’s religious settlement, first at a very local level, later at a more broad national level. Local trials became the impetus to broader challenges to government and calls for significant legislative reform. These challenges were not intended to persuade the government directly, but to direct their readers to consider the implementation of godly rule and the role of the people of England in sustaining the godly reformation. Peters uses the well-documented case of James Nayler, the early Quaker leader accused and convicted of blasphemy, to illustrate how the Quakers wielded an “impressive command of the press” in order to keep the sect together in spite of a very significant internal blow to the movement (234).

Although Peters draws from a considerable breadth of tracts, woodcuts, pamphlets and other contemporary materials, she does not engage with any scholarship published after the mid-1990s, a surprising finding given the vast amount of literature on Quakers and early modern England that has emerged in the last decade. This omission notwithstanding, the book offers a useful and systematic history of how the earliest Quakers used print to sustain their cause. For general scholars and graduate students, this installment in the Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History series will offer a deeper and more nuanced understanding of political and religious participation in mid-seventeenth-century England.
During recent decades the focus of colonial American studies has dramatically shifted from writings commonly understood to be artistic endeavors to discourses explicitly designed to perform practical or political functions. Interest in aesthetic design has been almost entirely displaced by attention to implicit cultural undercurrents and influences. In recent years, as a result, colonial poets have received precious little analytical attention. Even the brilliant verse meditations of Edward Taylor, the most outstanding of colonial American poets, has virtually vanished from critical interest. Taylor’s complex poems, which cannot be appreciated without attentive close reading, endure now chiefly though meager samples obligatorily included in American literature anthologies.

Concern with Puritan aesthetics has never been a favored investigative pursuit. At best such studies formed a small, easily ignored patch in a vast grassland of historical commentary. Early critics of colonial American literature often seemed to be historians at heart rather than literary scholars, and it is easy to see how today their historical sensibility, presently garbed as cultural studies, continues to define this field of study. To remark this perennial pattern is not to deny the importance of historical context when trying to appreciate Puritan artistic efforts, but something special and particularly close to the human heart has been disfranchised.

The multifarious performance of language and form evidences more than history or culture. It expresses the human spirit in exuberant pursuit of its own expansive potentialities within any given historical context. How many people commence reading a literary creation in the reductive expectation of experiencing that work’s historical or cultural properties? On the other hand, how many read a poem or story in the hope of encountering something quintessentially human that stirs and delights their sense of wonder?

In *Popular Measures* Amy M. E. Morris delves into the performative nature of several Puritan poems. She aims to elucidate at least one major mutual
feature behind their capacity to stir and delight the readers of their time. Her thesis is straightforward: in refashioning poetic English models Puritan poets developed an art that replicated their New England religious culture's peculiar and inconsistent effort to balance conformity and non-conformity, ritualistic liturgical practice and unmediated individual spirituality.

In featuring the Bay Psalm Book, Michael Wigglesworth's *Day of Doom*, and Edward Taylor's *Gods Determinations*, Morris selects writings that have notoriously resisted present-day appreciation as aesthetic undertakings. All three are usually approached in relation to theological or historical considerations. Two, however, were extraordinarily admired in their time as popular art, a contemporary appeal that by and large has baffled critics. That these works were emphatically designed for and well received by an audience becomes Morris's starting point. In undertaking to fathom the relationship between their contemporary allure and their aesthetic design Morris has assigned herself a difficult mission.

The key element in Morris's investigation is a fundamental dilemma that was common to non-conformist churches. On the one hand, non-conformists defined themselves as opposed to fixed liturgical prototypes, including prescribed patterns of prayer which (they believed) encouraged spiritual passivity. On the other hand, their emphasis on active experiential piety, on spontaneous personal encounters with divinity, opened the way to uncivil antinomian impulses. To maintain church authority a variety of conformity-measures (including the halfway covenant) were implemented to restrain these potentially disruptive impulses. This persistent problematical binary, Morris contends, also informed Puritan verse, which inclined toward liturgical forms even as it simultaneously retreated from them.

By insisting on their translation's fidelity to Scripture, the creators of the Bay Psalm Book drew attention to their departure from the elegant example of others. They invited expectations of a more open divine encounter than they believed was customarily provided by human artifice. But, Morris finds, beneath this guise of a deliberate sacrificial imperfection the Bay Psalm Book evinced various kinds of conformity that effectively reinstated liturgy.

*The Day of Doom*, influenced by the Bay Psalm Book, likewise contains narrative self-referential instances questioning the success of its or any other poem's performance as a spiritual mediator. The work's popular ballad form, Morris observes, is tellingly unsuitable to its urgent pious message
about the mysterious process of personal salvation. This disparity, among other clues, underscores the inadequacy of art even as *The Day of Doom* identifies itself as an artistic spiritual agency.

*Gods Determinations*, which was never published but was apparently designed for an audience, similarly departs from expected patterns. Although this long poem withdraws from such models as hymn, prayer, and antiphon, it nonetheless echoes these very forms within a common language akin to personal spiritual relations. In effect, then, Edward Taylor’s poem expresses a facilitating tension between formulaic prototype and personal piety that enables the poet to offer an acceptable verse version of a spiritually comforting liturgical aid.

While not every phase of Morris’s argument is equally convincing, her investigation into the Puritan aesthetics informing these three audience-oriented poems is deeply informed, generally persuasive and productively suggestive. Especially impressive is her conscientious regard for what others have already observed about Puritan poetry. In the course of writing her book Morris not only undertook the difficult mission of making a case for three critically-resistant works but also the equally daunting task of identifying coherent patterns within the current welter of critical discourse pertinent to her thesis. It is heartening to see this rare sort of scholarly integrity, and Morris has indeed earned her entry into the early Americanist community.


For far too long (since 1789) we have awaited a new biography of Marshal Schomberg. Glozier has responded with one in this third book dealing with seventeenth century military history. The account (derived from published primary sources in addition to secondary ones) follows a largely chronological path (with a few diversions such as an account of the general’s death on p. 2). Schomberg was not only a product of his age, but also a double victim of it. His parents rose to prominence in the aftermath of the
marriage of Princess Elizabeth of Great Britain and Frederick the elector Palatine in 1615. They died within eight months of each other, leaving Schomberg an orphan before his first birthday. He was educated at the Huguenot academy in Sedan and Leiden University, which allowed him to polish his linguistic skills. (The field marshal eventually spoke German, Latin, French, Dutch, English and Portuguese.) His military career began in 1633 and persisted almost unbroken until his death.

Schomberg found following the path of professional officer as the means to success anything save easy. His initial activities were as a volunteer with the duke of Hamilton's expedition to Germany, and then as an officer with the Swedes, French and with Frederick William Prince of Orange. Schomberg's Dutch service (1639-50) saw him rise to the inner circle of the prince, who was the overall military commander of the republic. His loyalty to the prince and acceptance of the principles of absolutism led him to play a key role in Frederick William's 1650 coup against the pro-peace and Republican party in Amsterdam. The prince's unexpected death followed quickly on the heels of his coup's failure. Schomberg found himself not only bereft of a patron but also considered an enemy of the political powers. Lacking sufficient income to retire, Schomberg found new employment in France. In that country's campaigns against the Spanish, he rose in rank and established his reputation as an excellent commander. The Treaty of the Pyrennes in 1659 curtailed his French career, when peace brought demobilization. However, French foreign policy aims remained hostile to Spain, which led Louis XIV and Marshal Turenne to suggest Schomberg as a commander of English troops (veterans of the New Model Army) to the Portuguese government. Glozier explains that these appeared in the army before Charles II's marriage to the Portuguese princess in 1662. Schomberg's professional and linguistic abilities earned him the command of both English and French auxiliaries. His qualities as an officer led to his promotion as effective commander of the army, which led to the victories that persuaded the Spanish to accept Portugal's independence. Peace again brought unemployment, but this time Schomberg settled in France as a naturalized citizen. The Dutch War of the 1670s led to his employment first with the English (with whom he closely identified due to his English mother), then with the French in the attempts to conquer the United Provinces. The early 1680s saw him continue in France's efforts to increase its territory, this time at Spain's expense in the southern Netherlands. The Revo-
cation of the Edict of Nantes broke Schomberg's service with Louis XIV's army, because the marshal refused to convert to Catholicism. After a brief residence in Portugal a more distinguished exile to the electorate of Brandenburg as general-in-chief followed. Brandenburg's realignment into William of Orange's anti-French alliance in May 1688 paved the way for Schomberg transferring his services to that prince. Consequently, he was second-in-command for the invasion of England and commander-in-chief in Ireland in 1689. Once Schomberg had liberated Ulster, he performed in lackluster manner, which led William to take command the following year. When one of the Huguenot infantry colonels died, the proud and honorable Schomberg ran to the front, inspiring the men with the battle cry, "Forward, sirs, there are your persecutors." It was the last act of a military career that had spanned six decades.

The author has delivered a biography, although he promised a "life in context" (viii, 186). Given Schomberg's importance in European history, having a scholarly biography is worthwhile. Contextualizing his life would have been better but would have required some changes in emphasis. For instance, the genealogy and reproduction of all or some of three contemporary pamphlets (187-231) would need to be eliminated. That would allow the book to retain its current length but would provide the space for additional matter. Then the author could indicate the expected behavior pattern of a "sword for hire" by referring to the Austrian Habsburgs use of professional soldiers in establishing absolutist and Roman Catholic policies in Bohemia-Moravia. He could also develop the antagonism between the Prince of Orange and the Dutch estates and how it played out in the Franco-Spanish war after 1648. The author should address why Schomberg seems so enamored with arbitrary government. The 1650 coup was just one episode. In 1673 he counseled Charles II to use the army to establish arbitrary rule. After 1668 in France how did he square his Protestant beliefs with service in an army which was actively persecuting Huguenots? His religious sensibilities seem only to have been awoken when his own bull was gored with the Revocation, which meant a loss of office.

Despite the subtitle the transformation of European armies in the 1600s is a consistently undeveloped theme. Army structure, recruitment, training/drill, tactics, and technical developments receive hardly any attention from the author. Certainly, John Lynn's Giant of the Grand Siecle should have been con-
sulted. In reference to Schomberg’s Portuguese campaigns one is left wonder-
ning what model the army followed before he arrived and whether and to
what degree he had transformed it. Glozier, as he demonstrated in Scottish
Soldiers in France, is well aware of the dynamics that occurred in Western
Europe between the 1630s and 1680s. His omission of these discussions in
a contextual life study is puzzling.

The idea of revenge against the Spanish Habsburgs, which would explain
Schomberg’s motivation in serving some of his employers, is never addressed
in the book. His service (34 of 57 years) with the Dutch, French, Portuguese
and Swedes could be accounted for by a desire to take vengeance on those
Habsburgs for their defeat and occupation of his homeland and their role in
Frederick’s and Elizabeth’s (his parents’ employers) loss of Bohemia. Since
hundreds of Scotsmen, lacking close ties to the electoral family, entered mil-
tary service in the 1620s and 1630s to restore Elizabeth, the idea has merit.
Likewise, Glozier should have more thoroughly addressed Schomberg’s trans-
fer to William of Orange’s service. Did it originate from a desire to satisfy
affronted honor (having to chose between conversion and exile, although he
had loyally served French interests for over thirty years), or was it to gain
revenge for Louis’ persecution of the Huguenots, or were the economic
incentives offered by William too alluring?

The book has some technical unevenness. In addition to footnotes there
is a bibliography. However, there is a typesetting problem with some of the
former. Sometimes (for instance pages 9, 22, 58, 77, 90, 100, 111-12, and
142), an entire note appears on the page after the citation in the text. There are
illustrations of Schomberg, but none of his battles, sieges, fortifications, or
types of troops he led. The total absence of maps is particularly annoying
regarding the Palatine, Roussillon, and Portuguese campaigns.

The general lack of contextual explanation and analysis regarding
Schomberg’s political and military decisions points to areas where further
research could occur. As Glozier showed in Scottish Soldiers, a military career
like Schomberg’s after 1648 was becoming increasingly rare as national gov-
ernments took more control over their armies. The marshal went from
being an exemplar of the European officers corps to an exception. Still we
should Glozier for producing a biography of one of seventeenth-century
Europe’s most well-known soldiers.

The main point of Paul Olson's book is a stark indictment of Western science and education, ascribing to the particular forms and trajectories of these the causes of a multitude of modern ills. These ills range from the distortions of the individual caused by a competitive and coercive educational ethos, through the dissociation of sensibility caused by over-emphasis in schooling on empirical, quantitative reasoning, to looming global catastrophe as our species, inspired by core Western attitudes to nature and science, exploits its environment ruthlessly, recklessly, and relentlessly.

This book seeks to locate the origins of this destructive Western scientific and educational mentality in a rather broadly defined "literary utopianism," particularly that created in England from the sixteenth century onwards. Professor Olson begins with More's *Utopia* and Shakespeare's *The Tempest,* also glancing at Montaigne's essay "Of Cannibals," seeing both main texts as representing something of a lost age of innocence, a time when man could envisage the amelioration of society without radical intervention in the natural world. He then moves to the foundation, as he sees it, of the modern scientific worldview in the work of Francis Bacon. Bacon’s attitude to the natural world is essentially imperialist, "the gradual realization of a human empire over a nonhuman nature" (41). Bacon’s scientific method is seen as a decisive turn away from earlier natural science that dwelt on the perception of divine harmonies; for all the millenarian tendencies Professor Olson detects, Bacon emphasizes "the privileging of the isolation and manipulation of the particular variable" (55), an atomization that opens the door to all manner of evils. Bacon’s heirs among the scientific groups of mid-seventeenth-century England and Europe are seen as effecting the essential translation of the generalities and parables of *The New Atlantis* into forms that could be the basis for real-world political and social programmes, particularly in the field of education, "creating the institutions of collaborative, normal scientific research and of education at the elementary and secondary level that would support ... research centers" (86; italics added). Professor Olson is cautious
about the origins of the Royal Society in the correspondence circle of Samuel Hartlib, but he sees in the intersection of religious, political, scientific, and educational developments of the 1650s and early 1660s the conditions for the growth of the dissenting academies, for him an essential conduit for the communication of this Baconian aspiration, “the creation of a better life through technological innovation” (88).

Chapter Four turns with some relief and admiration to the conservative critics of “the extension of human empire through research and education,” a collection of British Worthies that includes Swift, Pope, Gay, John Arbuthnot, and Thomas Pamell, all of whom look back beyond what, for Professor Olson, are the disastrous misdirections of the seventeenth century to the world of classical epic, particularly Homer, and epic’s asserted moral of the limits of the possible, the need to acknowledge those limits, and the right uses of reason. Swift’s Gulliver is seen as the ultimate product of Baconian dissociation, his revulsion on his return at the end of the voyage to the land of the Houyhnhnms contrasted with the humane response of Odysseus’ embrace of Penelope. But these conservative writers represent a road not taken by England and the West. In the next three chapters Professor Olson shows how the dull and dismal world decried in The Dunciad triumphs in the work of Adam Smith and the Utilitarians of the nineteenth century, despite the pungent criticisms of the Romantics and, the subject of the final chapter, Charles Dickens in Hard Times. Dickens’s representation of the “massive violation of nature that is Gradgrind’s school and Bounderby’s Coketown” provides the coda: “The massacre of the innocents in the school is mirrored itself in the murder of the green world of innocence inside the children and in the environment of Coketown” (248). Baconian science’s eldest child, exploitative capitalism, combines with coercive, repressive education to pervert humanity and despoil the planet.

As we see ever more the alarming evidence of climate change and environmental destruction, and lament the state of western society, it would take a brave reader to discount Professor Olson’s conclusions out-of-hand. So why is this reader so unsatisfied by the book? Partly, no doubt, it is the unrelievedness of the jeremiad: the book makes grim reading. Professor Olson attacks his targets—and they are legion—on every page, and one ends up with a sense that nothing in the present world can escape his outrage and disapprobation. In part, too, this is because he turns his gaze on his own
experience as a school student, with a sense of deep woundedness. My summary of the argument cannot communicate the fact that this book, which ranges widely in time and topic, is also, paradoxically, profoundly personal, shot through with Professor Olson's implied reflection on his own life as a scholar, educator, citizen, father, and husband, and his frustration with humanity's continuing follies in a world that has disappointed him.

But there are other reasons why the book seems unsatisfactory. Professor Olson can paint with a very broad brush indeed, and the result often reads more as polemic than as a contribution to scholarship, despite the plentiful notes and supporting quotations. From the first pages this reader wanted to see Professor Olson consider alternative viewpoints, in order to achieve a recognition of the greater complexity that is at the heart of so many of his chosen texts. When Professor Olson asserts that “More’s Utopian subjects need only to obey the natural law and reason that their nature has given them to create their benign social world” (19), one immediately objects: from the founder Utopos to the structure of penalties and control Raphael describes, no-one seems to think that benign social order comes naturally. When he claims that “The Tempest [depicts a] static-state utopia,” one wonders which play Professor Olson has been reading—everything changes in the course of that play. Reading Bacon and his heirs from our historically-distant vantage-point (“the power of nineteenth- and twentieth-century science and its capacity for domination are witnessed here” [50]) can be interesting, but the student of seventeenth-century culture constantly chafes at the misalignment of modern and contemporary boundaries of meaning, gaps through which meaning often seems to drain away. What did Bacon mean by “science”? What did Bacon mean by “industry”? Professor Olson reproves Bacon for “the absence of a cost-benefit agenda or analysis … in the treatment of gunpowder” (51). But where does Bacon give an in-depth treatment of gunpowder, lacking the cost-benefit analysis? If Bacon really had betrayed a giddy, morally-irresponsible delight in the ancestor of our weapons of mass destruction, the argument would be powerful. But this reader cannot locate it.

Other scholars have addressed some of the same issues and acknowledged complexities that Professor Olson does not. Consider one of the conclusions of Richard H. Grove's *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860* (1995): “It may seem prudent to question some of the simplistic assumptions that have been
made about the degree to which science itself has genuinely been subordinated to the interests of capital and the colonial state” (485-6). Unfortunately, the subtle and cautious questioning of that sentence is not matched in The Kingdom of Science. Professor Olson explains that the first idea for this book was as a collection of essays, and perhaps that is the best way of reading it: more a series of extensive, historically and culturally-informed, polemical op-ed pieces than a contribution to the academic understanding of utopias and science in the origin of the modern world.


Of the 200,000 Huguenots forced to flee France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries some 10,000 settled in Ireland. The story of how and why these fervent Protestants chose to dwell in this most Catholic of islands is at the heart of Raymond Hylton’s *Ireland’s Huguenots and Their Refuge, 1662-1745, An Unlikely Haven.*

While the persecutions Huguenots endured in their native France are well documented, the reasons so many sought asylum in Ireland and the fate of those who subsequently settled there has been woefully neglected. In Ireland Huguenot ancestry is prized and respected even to this day, but sadly misconceptions and embellishments, which for centuries remained unchallenged, have taken the place of historical accuracy, with the result that the true story of Ireland’s Huguenots has remained untold.

In an attempt to dispel the myths and correct the wealth of misinformation that surrounds this subject, Raymond Hylton has trawled through the archives and produced an account of Ireland’s Huguenots that is both exhaustive and enlightening. The background to their enforced flight from France, their initial reception in what would become their adopted country, the unique contribution they would make to Irish society, and their gradual assimilation into the Irish population are all recounted in great detail. The exploits of some of the more colourful and high profile Huguenot characters are explored.

Taking as his starting point the complexities, which by 1662 made Catho-
lic Ireland a less than unlikely haven for Protestant refugees, Hylton notes that while “individual Huguenots may have been present in Ireland as early as 1569 … the existence of a Huguenot community simply did not occur until well into the Restoration period” (4). Having been “rendered all the less alluring” because of her well-publicized political turbulence and confessional strife, Ireland “largely lost out on the first two major periods of Huguenot dispersion experienced by England and other continental Protestant-dominated states” (5-6). But by 1662, with the innovative James Butler, Duke of Ormond at the helm as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, all that was about to change.

Hylton reveals Ormond’s admiration for the Huguenot qualities of “energy, integrity, competence, skills and business acumen” (20), virtues which the Duke rather patronisingly believed would “inspire the general Irish population to habits of hard work, sobriety and thrift” (20). This admiration along with his certainty that, having shown themselves staunchly opposed to Parliamentary and Protectorate policies they would prove loyal defenders of the newly restored crown, first led to his scheme for the French Protestant colonization of Ireland, as evidenced in his 1662 Irish parliamentary Act For Encouraging Protestant Strangers and Others to Establish Themselves in Ireland.

Colonization was one of the cornerstones of Ormond’s modernisation program, and in 1665, in an effort to ease matters for the Huguenots he petitioned the Archbishop of Dublin, “that a specific meeting place be established for conducting services in French” adding that “it could be assured that the worshippers would act in conformity with the Anglican communion, and thus not pose a potential threat” (24). The Chapel of St Mary’s, (known as the Lady Chapel) in St Patrick’s Cathedral was chosen and on 23 December 1665 was formally granted to “the newly constituted French Conformist congregation” (25) known colloquially as “The French Patrick’s.” While the records are sparse, despite official support, of these “Ormondtite Refugees,” Hylton depicts “a steady unspectacular population growth from 1662-8; a sharp but short-lived influx from 1669-70 and a very drastic dwindling between the period 1671-9” (25).

The infamous 1681 Dragonnades of Poitou saw an upsurge in violence against the Huguenots; something which we are told had “an immediate, traceable effect” (35) in Dublin, where the French population increased dramatically. Later Dragonnades coupled with Louis XIV’s Revocation of the
Edict of Nantes led to the arrival of a “flood-tide of Protestant families” (36). “In 1685, new arrivals and births had bolstered the Huguenot element in Dublin itself to some 600 by year’s end and, in 1686, up to 650 odd” (37).

While the accession of the Catholic James II had at first, “no appreciable effect on the Huguenots who settled in Ireland” (44), their new monarch’s ambivalent policies and the appointment of the fervently Catholic Earl of Tyrconnel as Lord Deputy, certainly gave cause for concern. While “the events of 1688 unfolded,” we are told that resident Huguenots lay low “or in certain cases” provided “discreet intelligence to adversaries of the government” (46).

Huguenots certainly played a part in the Williamite armies, which would eventually force James II into exile, with one Frenchman in particular soon coming to the fore. The colourful Huguenot Henri Massue de Ruvigny distinguished himself at the Battle of Aughrim, subsequently rose high in King William’s favour, and was eventually granted the title Earl of Galway. He would serve two terms as Lord Justice of Ireland (1697-1701 and 1715-1717) and would lend his name to Ireland’s next wave of Huguenot refugees. And it was these refugees who Hylton believes “defined what the Huguenot presence in and impact on Ireland would be” (81).

It was during the period 1692-1722 that most of the estimated 10,000 French Protestant immigrants arrived in Ireland and “substantive plans for settling Huguenots in an Irish Haven of exile took place” (87). The 1692 Parliamentary Act “went leagues further than Ormond’s prior enactment” offering official toleration for Protestant worship outside the Anglican Communion (88). During this time the powerful Ruvigny drew up his ambitious plans for a “Huguenot bastion” (90) with colonies strategically positioned around the country in a variety of locations including Belfast, Lisburn, Youghal, Dundalk, Dublin, Kilkenny, Cork. Of these the settlement in Portarlington would prove the most successful.

Yet as with Ormond before him, Ruvigny’s schemes and visions for the French Protestant colonization of Ireland went unrealised. “Before the turn of the nineteenth century every single Huguenot community in Ireland was well on the road to absorption; and in many instances had already arrived there and become the stuff of regional folklore” (173).

For the author “the most compelling purpose behind this book lies in making the attempt to touch the humanity of those elusive French exiles” (xi).
And whether describing the lonely death of the unknown Thomas Missal, “a newly arrived refugee who must have undergone great hardship to arrive in Ireland, only to die suddenly, possibly alone” (77) or recounting the illustrious careers of David Digues Latouche (118-22) or Ruvigny (113-117), Hylton’s compassion and admiration for these refugees shines through on every page. Although not without its flaws, namely a tendency towards repetition and digression, these are minor quibbles. In chronicling these events Hylton has done more than simply provide a much-needed overview of a people, time, and place. Written in an engaging and accessible style this meticulously researched volume is insightful and informative, goes some way towards restoring this oft-forgotten group to their rightful place in history, and should prove a compelling read for seventeenth-century scholars and enthusiasts alike.


Carla Gardina Pestana offers in this book a comprehensive survey of England’s Atlantic colonies during the turbulent middle decades of the seventeenth century. By emphasizing that the Interregnum government was far more impossibly ambitious than that of the early Stuarts, Pestana’s research has important implications for scholars who specialize in the history of either colonial America or early modern England. Displaying a command of sources and historiographies dealing with Trinidad in the south, Newfoundland in the north, and all of the other colonies in between, Pestana ably reveals the ways in which the breakdown of authority in England had profound consequences across the Atlantic.

The emergence of crisis in England inspired colonists who had been calling for further religious reform, although their achievements often fell short of their expectations. One example of this occurred in Bermuda, whose governor endorsed a move away from a parochial system and toward a New England-style congregationalism. The policy proved unpopular with many of the residents, who resented being excluded from the sacraments and being told that they needed additional religious instruction. The
result was not the transplantation of the New England model to a new soil as
much as it was the sowing of the seeds of dissension and controversy on the
island. In other colonies, governors took steps to limit the ability of religious
reformers to establish themselves. Virginia’s governor expelled a group of
ministers who had arrived from New England in response to the call from a
Virginia parish dominated by puritans. While civil war raged in England,
news of New England’s persecution of dissent, publicized by Roger Will-
tiams among others, alienated the affection of many in England who favored
toleration.

Those in England who favored the independence of congregations had
hailed New England churches as models of godliness at the outset of the
decade, but from around 1645 they largely ceased to pay attention to religious
developments across the sea. By contrast, it was the English Presbyterians,
entirely marginalized within their own polity by the end of the decade, who
continued to hold the New England congregations in high regard. As a
result, the English Civil War increased religious polarization throughout the
Atlantic world. The three years following the execution of Charles I resolved
many of the issues that arose during the Civil War. After the regicide, six
colonies (Antigua, Barbados, Bermuda, Maryland, Newfoundland, and Vir-
ginia) remained loyal to the Stuart line in defiance of the ambitious imperial
agenda of the Commonwealth government, but by 1652 the revolutionary
government had brought all of the recalcitrant colonies under its control.

The religious policies of the English government of the 1650s sought a
balance between toleration for Protestant denominations and the promotion
of godliness. As was the case in England and Wales, throughout the Atlantic
colonies these two goals often seemed contradictory. The rise of Quakerism
was perhaps the most noteworthy development of the later Interregnum.
By the early 1660s, Quakers had introduced their movement into every Atlan-
tic colony, thereby contributing to the increase of religious diversity through-
out the Atlantic world, while at the same time attracting hostility from the
authorities in New England. For Pestana, “In confronting Quakers, the de-
fenders of New England orthodoxy faced their own failure to reform
England, in the flesh. In killing Quakers, they vindicated their own former
hopes for a better England and ensured their own infamy” (155).

Although some of the leading figures in the English Revolution claimed
that their objective was to end tyranny and restore liberty, the policies of the
Interregnum governments instead promoted unfreedom throughout the Atlantic. The Navigation Act of 1651 and the campaign launched in 1654 against the Spanish West Indies reflected the imperial ambitions of the English government, which proved itself far more willing to direct colonial affairs than had been Charles I. During that time, several colonies experienced labor shortages, which they addressed through a variety of means including the importation of growing numbers of indentured servants, prisoners of the British civil wars, and African slaves. Despite the best efforts of the Restoration government to turn the clock back to 1641, the English Atlantic world in 1660 bore the stamp of the revolutionary decades. Unlike his father, "Charles II ruled an empire of plantation economies and commercial networks, an empire of landowners conscious of their rights and ready to defend them, an empire of slaves, and an empire in which religious dissenters were better organized and more numerous than his own Church of England adherents" (226).

This book will be welcomed by research specialists and students alike. It contains an appendix discussing population estimates for colonies in 1640 and another listing pamphlets about New England published in England during the 1640s. The endnotes fill eighty-nine pages of close type; the only thing missing is a bibliography. There is a detailed map of the English Atlantic World at the outset, and throughout the book Pestana does not assume that her reader has a command of the narrative details of either the English Revolution or the early phases of English colonialism. The book would therefore lend itself to courses dealing with early modern England, colonial America, or the Atlantic world. For the latter, the seventeenth century has tended to be overshadowed by its neighbors, with the bulk of scholarly attention being paid to the first sustained contact between Europeans and the native peoples of the Americas during the sixteenth century, and the eighteenth-century era of mercantilist wars and revolution. Pestana's book is therefore a most welcome addition to the field.
There are historical problems, which scholars have been able to research, present, and evaluate in a relatively precise and unquestionable manner. They very often refer to political, diplomatic, sometimes military history and, as long as solely “what has happened” is being asked, they do not result in controversy and historical debates. On the contrary historical processes, which demand an answer to the questions “why” and “how” certain things happened often bring new interpretations and suggestions and we do not seem to come closer to definite answers.

Among the latter we can name the problem of the formation of the state in the early modern period in Europe. Numerous authors have taken up the challenge, and we are in possession of many interesting and important works, including P. Anderson, I. Wallerstein, Ch. Tilly, J.R. Streuer, and D. Nichols, to name but a few. Yet with this numerous library of books and articles, we can always point to a period and a country, which evades the proposed model and is an exception to the general process presented. Recently one more analysis of the process of formation of modern European states was proposed by Philip Gorski in his excellent work on the disciplinary revolution and its consequences for the emergence of modern state structures in seventeenth-century Europe. Gorski starts off with the setbacks mentioned above in mind. Analyzing the Marxist and Bellicist models of state formation, he argues that many European states do not fit these models and should be treated and researched differently.

Gorski sets out to explore and analyze the role of the Protestant religion in the forming of modern states. More precisely, he takes into account Calvinism and argues that it was the Calvinist disciplinary revolution, which influenced people’s behaviours and souls and made them work towards a different, well-ordered, and disciplined state. “The building blocks for a comprehensive theory of social discipline can be found in the works of Foucault, Oestereich, Elias, and Weber,” claims the author (31). Taking their work into consideration, he suggests four types of discipline distinguished by differing levels and modes of discipline. In effect we get self-discipline,
corrective discipline, communal discipline, and judicial or institutional discipline (32). They are, Gorski claims, rarely found in pure form, but often found together and in various relations to each other.

The definition and analysis of discipline allows the Author to take a closer look at the disciplinary revolution, which he sees as an important factor of state formation in Protestant countries. In particular the book stresses the strong links between social discipline, state power, and confessionalization. Furnished with such a workshop, Gorski sets out to discover and discuss the disciplinary revolutions in two Protestant states— the Dutch Republic and Brandenburg-Prussia. In the first case he examines the said revolution from below, in the latter being introduced from above.

All these undertakings allow Gorski to propose a new approach to the problem of state theory and the analysis of state forming processes. The discussed work in a convincing and very elegant way points to those social processes which were very often overlooked by historians but were extremely important for the formation of modern bureaucratic communities in some Protestant states in Europe. Results of the analysis allow the author to put forth several conclusions and suggest changes in the theory of state formation in early modern Europe. In particular we should note the arguments put forth by the author. First of all, he argues that a state should not be looked at as only administrative, political or indeed military organisation. They are also pedagogical, corrective, and ideological entities (165). State power, he continues, does not solely operate through coercion but also through co-optation (166). State power is not only a function of structure, resources, and organisational autonomy but also of its infrastructure, its human resources and organisational entwining. Finally, Gorski argues that the process of the formation of state does not always proceed from top to bottom as a process of material interest but sometimes a bottom-top process through ideal interests.

Gorski’s analysis of the disciplinary revolution in European Calvinist states is very interesting and thought provoking. He uncovers for us the neglected and/or forgotten elements of the reformation and their effects on contemporary states through the disciplining of the citizens of those states. Thus the model of modern state formation needs to be enriched with new elements on top of or along with those proposed by Marxist and Bellicist models. This book is very valuable and should find its way to all early modern semi-
nars discussing various social and political processes changing the face of Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries.


“Catullan consciousness” could mean very different things. For readers of Celia and Louis Zukofsky’s translation of the Latin poet (1969) it would evoke a close imitation of the very phonic shape of the author—so that, for example, the opening phrase of Catullus 69 (“Noli admirari”) becomes “No lift odd mere horror” and of poem 70 (“Nulli se dicit mulier”) “Newly say dickered my love.” Altogether different is the sense assumed by the phrase in Jacob Blevins’ monograph. For this critic Catullan consciousness does not entail even having read Catullus; Blevins is quite explicit on this point. Rather, the argument is that an awareness of the stances assumed by Catullus in his love poetry, however indirectly derived, helps characterize key poets of the English Renaissance, especially Wyatt, Shakespeare, and Donne, with some attention to other canonical figures (Sidney, Spenser, Herrick and Jonson).

Key terms for Blevins are *disillusionment* and *realism*. He contends that Catullan themes and motifs offered a counterpoint to the idealizing doctrines of Petrarchanism and neo-Platonism. Catullus in his view is a bruised flower of a poet, forever voicing his disillusion at the failure of a beloved to live up to a Roman code of fidelity. The same biographical account is provided for each of the English masters: the failure of the real to live up to the ideal generates verse.

The difficulties here are twofold. None of the readings breaks new interpretive ground. Little is gained from page after page of assertions like (in connection with Wyatt’s “They fle from me”) “Catullus’ lover is also thrown aside by his mistress, and he eventually attempts to overcome his lady’s rejection of him,” and “Catullus’ lover is suggesting that Lesbia will suffer in the manner in which he has been physically and emotionally suffering, and in essence Wyatt’s poet-lover is hoping for the same thing when he says ‘I wold fain knoue what she hath deserved’” (36). No surprises here for students of English literature, and no illumination of the familiar texts discussed. At the
level of generality assumed by such concerns as illusion and reality, duty and
disillusion, we are talking novelistically and not about the language and form
of poetry.

The second problem is a related one. Blevins's Catullus is not the edgy,
cocky, and linguistically experimental master that readers of poetry have long
cherished—not least (one may suppose) Renaissance authors whose Latinity
generally exceeds ours. Not everything in the amatory verse of the English
Renaissance is neo-Platonic idealization or a presumed Petrarchan supineness
before the beloved. But who ever thought it was? So to evoke Catullus as the
extra factor involved is nugatory—especially when (as Blevins admits) we don’t
know whether Wyatt or Shakespeare read the Latin master.

Blevins correctly notes that seventeenth-century imitations of Catullus
prove most effective precisely in their divergences from the original—in the
Jonsonian or Herrickian quality of the English poem. But who doubted this?
Readers wanting to get at Catullus but without much Latin should turn to
George Goold's version (1983) or Peter Green's very recent rendering—then,
of course, to the quirky but immensely instructive volume of the Zukofskys,
a little course of aesthetics in its own right.

Johanna Eleonora Petersen. The Life of Lady Johanna Eleonora Petersen Written by
Herself. Edited and translated by Barbara Becker-Cantarino. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2005. xxix + 140 pp. + 1 illus. $18.00. Review by
JONATHAN STROM, EMORY UNIVERSITY.

Johanna Eleonora Petersen (1644-1728) was one of the most prominent
voices in early Pietism and its most important female figure. Her published
exegetical and devotional books won her admiration as well as notoriety for
her visions, heterodox ideas, and challenges to gender norms. Her autobiog-
raphy is one of the earliest of its kind by a German woman and became a
model for Pietist autobiography in the eighteenth century. Barbara Becker-
Cantarino’s fine translation of her Life is a welcome addition to the sources on
German autobiography and Pietism available in English.

Daughter of an impoverished noble family, von und zu Merlau, Petersen
had little formal education and at twelve was sent to serve at court. She
found the opulent lifestyle of the higher nobility increasingly at odds with her
Pious disposition. In the early 1670s she came into contact with Philipp Jakob Spener and Johann Jakob Schütz, leaders of the Pietist movement in Frankfurt am Main, and in 1675 she moved to the city where she became an active and outspoken member in the Pietist movement. In 1680 she married Johann Wilhelm Petersen, a Pietist clergyman. Her marriage to a commoner scandalized some and remained a point of controversy throughout her life, but the two established a remarkably productive relationship. Around 1685, divine visions began to play an important role in Petersen’s understanding of Biblical texts and Christian doctrine. By no means did marriage and motherhood dampen her religious activity. In 1689 she published her first devotional work, to which she appended a version of her Life. After her husband lost his clerical position for voicing heterodox ideas in the pulpit, the couple dedicated themselves to furthering their radical Pietist goals. Altogether Petersen published fifteen of her own works and collaborated with her husband on numerous others.

Petersen’s Life is an early example of spiritual autobiography in German. It is relatively concise and describes Petersen’s religious development from the age of four. It is not a typical conversion narrative, and there is no single turning point around which the story revolves. Rather it depicts a series of decisive events throughout her life that became critical for her spiritual development, establishing her authority to speak on theological issues. In the first part of the Life completed in 1689, Petersen draws on biographical details and episodes, if selectively, making it a valuable record of the early Pietist movement. In the second part, added in 1718, such biographical information is almost entirely missing, and Petersen concentrates on her revelations and theological insights to the exclusion of key events in her life including her husband’s dismissal, the death of children, and their contact to other radical Pietists.

Becker-Cantarino provides a lengthy introduction to Petersen and her Life, a helpful bibliography, and annotations throughout the translation. In addition, she includes two appendices: a letter by Petersen defending her religious activities to the Frankfurt city council and an early devotional tract that had previously been published in English. The strength of this volume is the remarkably smooth translation that Becker-Cantarino achieves in rendering Petersen’s baroque style into English. Only partial translations of Petersen’s life had been published previously, and by making the entire autobiography with
annotations available in a compelling translation, Becker-Cantarino gives students and teachers of early modern Germany an excellent new resource.

The introduction is very good at placing Petersen’s *Life* within the broader literary tradition of autobiographical writing and raises important questions for scholarship on women in Pietism. But in other respects the introduction disappoints. The treatment of theological issues can be superficial, especially on questions of justification and eschatology. At one point Becker-Cantarino dismisses the theological explications of Petersen and Jane Lead, a contemporary English visionary whose writings influenced Petersen, as uninteresting to anyone but “theologians.” Given how central such “explications” and theological writing were to Petersen’s self-identity, Becker-Cantarino’s lack of interest in this aspect of Petersen’s character is puzzling and appears to devalue what Petersen herself thought was most important.

To a certain extent, this reflects the dearth of research on Petersen and other women in Pietism, which only in the last few years has gained momentum. For instance, Becker-Cantarino would have benefited substantially from Ruth Albrecht’s intellectual biography of Petersen, which appeared almost at the same time as this volume. But other recent works on Pietism could have aided Becker-Cantarino, especially Andreas Deppermann’s work on Schütz and the circle of radical Pietists in Frankfurt to which Petersen belonged. The numerous inaccuracies in dates and names are particularly troubling in an introductory text. Especially confounding are Spener’s first names, which throughout the introduction, notes, and index are cited erroneously. Many dates are inexplicably off by a century; others are cited inconsistently. Careful copy-editing could have easily avoided these typographical errors.

Taken as a whole, this is by far the best introduction to Petersen in English. Alongside other volumes by Anna Maria van Schurman, Marie Dentière, and Katharina Schütz Zell (forthcoming), Chicago’s *Other Voice* series has contributed substantially to understanding the religious thought of women in early modern Protestantism. The lively translation of Petersen’s *Life* will be particularly welcome in the classroom and go a long way in conveying the dynamism and character of the Pietist movement to students of history, religion, and literature.

This interesting, immense book is comprised of revised articles and papers previously published by Jacques Le Brun, whose works are well-known to seventeenth-century specialists. In his foreword, the critic states that he writes from a historian’s viewpoint with methodology inspired by both Freud and Benveniste. The period he examines is mostly the reign of Louis XIV.

In Chapter I, the author explains that Catholicism as an institution is a new notion, born at the time of the Council of Trent and still meaning “universal” in the seventeenth century. It will not be completely established before the nineteenth century. The main point is that Catholicism is a religious system with different approaches to it, as is Protestantism. Chapter II is on religious and literary experiences. Le Brun states that with the decline of scholasticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, two theologies develop: a positive theology, which is the work of the Humanists, based on the Bible, the Fathers and ecclesiastical history, and a mystic theology based on other documents and on experience. Loyola and Theresa of Avila are famous examples of the second kind. Le Brun points out that almost all important religious authors of the era took “mystic science” seriously, and he admires Brémond’s psychological approach in *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux* and Baruzi’s textually-focused methodology. The mystic experience is first of all a writing one.

In Chapter III, on moral dilemmas, Le Brun reminds the reader of the importance Freud attached to Catholic “directeurs de conscience” and compares the collections of cases published in the seventeenth century with contemporary novels like *La Princesse de Clèves* and *Les Lettres de la religieuse portugaise*. The historian believes novels come to assume the role played by those collections, presenting similar cases, but in a fictional manner. Another path to the invention of the modern novel is the account of medical and religious cases, more popular in Protestant regions. With Charcot in psychiatric literature in the nineteenth century, Le Brun avers, the case account assumes almost a canonical form with Freud simply continuing this tradition.

Chapter IV is on devoutness in modern times. Le Brun starts with an etymological analysis of the notion of “voeu” as *votum*. He contends that it is Thomas Aquinas’s conception of *devotio* that most influences seventeenth-
century religious writers such as François de Sales and Surin. Thus, one can observe the rise of a variety of writings on individual devotional experiences coinciding with criticisms of false devoutness throughout the century. Chapter V concerns Jerome Cardan's “Interpretation of Dreams,” an important, yet neglected commentary on Synesius. Le Brun's emphasis is on Cardan's “methodus” and his “ratio interpretandi.” A dream is a useful sign with a number of meanings which can be “rationally” interpreted. Cardan's work proves to be an important landmark situated between Artemidorus and Freud. In Chapter VI, on the famous controversy between Leibnitz and Bossuet concerning “heresy,” Le Brun traces the history of this term from Augustine to Melchior Cano to contextualize the era's debates on the notion. Bossuet and Leibnitz both define “heresy” from a psychological standpoint. The former seems more conservative and less tolerant than the latter, but it is his view, nevertheless, that eventually prevails in the Catholic Church.

Chapter VII examines Henry Holden's contribution to the era's debates on faith in his *Divinae Fidei Analysis, seu De Fidei Christianae Resolutione* and his rationalist method and anti-Protestant approach. The main part of Holden's book consists in the discussion of different means to communicate divine truths by attaching greater importance to the Church's institutions and traditions rather than to Scripture or individual experience. In Chapter VIII, Le Brun shows how denominational controversies in the Renaissance prompt the development of universal principles to interpret Scripture. Thus is born the new “science” of Hermeneutics, thanks to the Lutheran theologian J. C. Dannhauer. It will be developed as a part of Logic by Descartes' German disciple, J. Clauberg, who applies it not only to interpreting sacred texts but also profane ones, a tradition later continued by Schleiermacher.

Chapter IX is on Richard Simon, his historical search for “religious truth,” and his reflections on the obscurity of the Scriptures, as well as the meaning of the “original” text and the task of the critic. In conclusion, the latter must mostly rely on the tradition and the Church. Chapter X deals with the reception of Grotius' theology among Catholics in the second half of the century, especially with respect to his conception of the double meaning of prophecies. Those who defended or criticized the Dutch theologian for being a Socinian are well discussed.

Both Chapters XI and XII concern Madame Guyon. In the former, Le Brun first introduces the mystic author's biblical commentaries, reminds in
what circumstances she wrote them, and shows what the very act of writing about the Scripture meant to her. Afterwards, he expounds on her original method of interpretation, as well as her conception of the Bible as an “allégorie de l’intérieur.” The latter chapter concerns her idea of the power and knowledge of women. First, the author reminds the reader of Guyon’s considerable influence in Europe throughout the eighteenth-century. He then discusses her interpretations concerning female, Biblical characters. These fascinating women, she believed, had a special, mystical knowledge, which gave them power and authority. Le Brun concludes by pointing to Mme. Guyon’s apocalyptic and millennialist thought, drawing a parallel between her and Joachim of Flora.

Chapter XIII, “Preventive Censure and Religious Literature in France at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century,” briefly relates the history of censorship beginning in 1563 through its increasing organization especially during the last two decades of Louis XIV’s reign under the leadership of the Abbé Bignon. Presenting quantitative data, Le Brun introduces some of the censors, usually doctors in theology. In the last part, the historian cites examples of censored books on religion and spirituality and the censors’ often conservative or political criteria, whereby Quietism, Jansenism, and Protestantism are condemned along with popular spirituality and superstition.

Chapter XIV et XV concern two Protestants. In the former, Le Brun introduces Pierre Juenè’s spiritual works, discussing the famous pastor’s Traité de la dévotion (1675, 1678), which was well received by Protestants and Catholics alike and emphasizing Juenè’s anti-mysticism. Although Juenè disagrees with Quietism and Fénelon, he does not fail in his Traité historique to criticize Bossuet’s harsh attitude towards the latter. Discussing Juenè’s other works, Le Brun concludes that the pastor’s criticism of mysticism was rather mitigated, hinting at a secret sympathy for persecuted mystics. Chapter XV describes the spirituality of another Protestant controversialist, theologian, and moralist, Jean Claude (1619-1687). In the first section, a reading of Claude’s posthumous works reveals a man who strongly believed in “knowledge,” the “acts,” and human reason. His thought “paradoxically” makes way for the religion of the “Lumières.” In the next section, Le Brun introduces Claude’s Traité du péché contre le Saint-Esprit and compares it with the works of other theologians from Augustine to Calvin. Le Brun then analyzes the theologian’s original interpretation of the “sin against the Holy Spirit,” his conception of faith
(“true” and “temporary”), and a belief that salvation should be sought without expectation of reward.

Chapter XVI is on Bossuet as a controversialist before he became the bishop of Meaux. Le Brun examines his method of converting “heretics,” as exemplified in the *Réfutation du Catéchisme du sieur Paul Ferry* (1655) and the *Exposition de la doctrine de l’Église catholique* (1668). Bossuet believed that a “simple exposition” of Catholicism was the best way to convert Protestants. This article also discusses the controversy between the Catholic theologian and Claude, as well as the *Traité de la communion sous les deux espèces* (1682), which is a kind of supplement to the *Exposition*.

Chapter XVII concerns the Lutheran mathematician and philosopher Leibnitz who was not only pious but had an immense religious culture, too. He believed that, in every church, denomination, or mystical movement, there were sincere people in pursuit of “pure love,” even though he criticized some for going astray or being superstitious. The critic contends that Leibnitz was somewhat prejudiced against the mystics and disliked the sects. He also mentions the philosopher’s affinity with the Jesuits and Bossuet and examines his rationalist conceptions of love, hope, charity, and piety.

In Chapter XVIII, with P. G. Antoine, we enter eighteenth-century spirituality. Le Brun briefly recounts the theologian’s life and main works and exposes his spirituality influenced by Ignatius Loyola. Father Antoine was the representative of the most rigorous trend among the Jesuits. Chapter XIX is on Quietism. Le Brun proposes first to examine the two kinds of criticism leveled at it: Quietism is considered by some as a “novelty” and by others as an “ancient” heresy. Now the Quietists believed themselves to be the heirs to an old spiritual tradition extending from Dionysius the Areopagite and Clement of Alexandria all the way to John of the Cross and François de Sales. Le Brun contends that whatever the seventeenth-century critics or apologists said, this mystic movement should be considered a “modern” phenomenon directed towards the future. Thus, one can notice its influence in the eighteenth century on German Pietists, English Methodists, and the Romantics.

Chapters XX, XXI, and XXII all concern Fénelon, the Quietist to whom the last part of the previous chapter was already devoted. In the first essay, Le Brun discusses the *Explication des Maximes des Saints* and Fénelon’s mysticism, especially with regard to the “soul’s two parts” and the notion of *culpa*. The title of the book *La Jouissance et le Trouble* is here explained as the “soul’s upper
and lower parts.” Regarding Jesus’ question, “Why have You forsaken me?” the critic pens a Freudian interpretation of Fénelon’s commentary—the “faute involontaire” being a lapsus. The second and third essays, taking again the theme of the “Son” and his death willed by the Father, concern Telemachus. Based on the manuscript’s variant versions and eliminated terms and passages, Le Brun offers another psychoanalytic interpretation of Fénelon’s masterpiece. In the following essay, the author discusses first the Correspondence between Fénelon and Mme. Guyon, and shows the progressive influence of the latter’s mysticism on the archbishop. “Trouble” is caused by reason and “desire,” Fénelon contends, and a spiritual life leading to peace consists in a progressive elimination of “desire.” Le Brun here looks into Telemachus as an educational work. As a duke’s private tutor, the moralist teaches his student how to live a spiritual Christian life and how to conceive of it as an “itinerary” to reach purification. Also, “paternity,” from a mythological/religious standpoint, is an important theme elaborated on by the critic. Ultimately, the novel is qualified as a mystical/mythical “fable” in which “image” plays a fundamental pedagogical role.

The final chapter is about the formation of a branch of history. At the end of the seventeenth century, one can observe the development of two kinds of religious literature: one focused around piety and the other interested in the establishment of history. In the first part, Le Brun examines how seventeenth-century authors deal with pagan myths and fables. He demonstrates how apologetic books on the origin of these “fables” by J. Selden, Vossius, and Huet, but also works by Le Clerc and Fontenelle, unintentionally laid the foundations of a new science, namely the history of religions. In the second part, the historian examines the gap that has been formed since the seventeenth century between the “origin” and the “originator.” Indeed, the origin of a text and authorship have proven to be difficult, complex issues. Le Brun concludes with Freud that the “originaire” is each time “eine Sache der Konstruktion.”

La Jouissance et le trouble is a rich, erudite, thought-provoking book replete with informative, scholarly footnotes. While helpful, the name index is incomplete and lacks such important names as Benveniste, de Certeau, Brémond, and Orcibal. Also, it would have been more convenient for the reader to have a bibliography at the back of the volume. All things considered, it is a pleasure to read.

For those with an interest in early modern philosophy, this book by Michael Moriarty is a welcome addition to the field. Unlike what is characteristic of many texts dealing with philosophy of the period, Moriarty’s prose is a delight to read, and the arguments are compelling, enticing us to adopt a new attitude towards well-worn accounts of the three figures he treats: Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche. That new attitude amounts to a rethinking of the way that both the body and a deep suspicion of everyday experience figure in these philosophers’ work. Moriarty deftly traces the roots and trajectory of early modern French thinking about these issues, placing them squarely within a cultural milieu dominated by belief in a transcendent God, drawing liberally on both historical, primary texts and contemporary sources (from Aristotle to Charles Taylor)—demonstrating an admirable breadth of knowledge with respect to the field. In that sense, the text will be a valuable resource for both historians and philosophers interested in the period. Moriarty’s careful scholarship and accessible style should also make it a good read for advanced students of early modern thought.

The stated aim of the book is to articulate how contradictory tendencies of the early modern period, in particular a deep mistrust of the body and a profound sense of the inevitable misery of human existence, juxtaposed with the scientific and cultural achievements of the Renaissance, prompted Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche to develop “certain habits of analysis, a disposition to scrutinize the taken-for-granted of everyday experience” (6). Moriarty also attempts to determine how their outlook of suspicion towards the quotidian is informed by commitment to belief in a transcendent God. Chapter two provides a brief, but effective, overview of the influence of the Church on intellectual developments during the period. He traces, in particular, the effect Jansenist treatments of Augustinian themes had on Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche. The upshot of the chapter is that all three were inheritors of an Augustinian understanding of the self on which “our knowledge of ourselves … is hopelessly compromised by self-love and the passions. We are condemned to opacity and illusion” (46).

In the chapter on Descartes, Moriarty places emphasis not so much on
what we already tend to accept about Descartes (i.e., that he rejected the
deliverances of the senses as the domain of proper and certain knowledge in
favour of an inward-looking subject who can be certain only of her own
cogitations); instead, Moriarty focuses on what Descartes’ rejection of the
body tells us about the grounding and pervasive role the body and the senses
play with respect to our understanding of ourselves as imperfect, embodied
agents with an unshakeable dependence on God. His targets, in this re-
reading of Descartes, are ideological objections to Descartes as the author of
a too thin conception of the self as disembodied thinking thing, transparent
to itself in doubting (55). According to Moriarty, in rejecting the body and
proclaiming the certainty of its own thoughts Descartes does not, in the end,
“erect the self, or subject, into a secure position of self-mastery” (99), as is
often claimed. This is so because the fundamental achievement of the doub-
ing self, for Descartes, the apparently self-transparent cogito certain of its
own existence, cannot in fact deliver itself from uncertainty, for in the con-
summatory act of the cogitating self there is the disquieting residue of a self-
undermining doubt. As Moriarty notes, “[d]oubt has assured me of my
eexistence but what it gives, so to speak, with one hand, it takes away with the
other, for it assures me equally infallibly of my imperfection” (98). Though
the self-reflecting cogito may achieve a kind of certainty, it can only do so at
the price of acknowledging, at the same time, its imperfection—its fundamen-
tal posture of doubt. Mistrust of the body and the deliverances of the senses,
then, for Descartes, result ultimately not in a wholehearted commitment to the
claim that the only thing of which the self can be certain is its own existence,
but rather, an acknowledgment that whatever achievements the self may
make in coming to know itself, it can never escape the grip of doubt, or its
dependence on God. The Cartesian self is not a bloodless, disembodied,
cogitating mind, but an embodied, doubting, fractured agent, alienated from
itself, and utterly dependent.

In Moriarty’s reading, Pascal’s recognition that the experience of our every-
day lives as embodied agents is shot through with error and illusion even-
tuates not in attempts, as in the case of Descartes, to root out the sources of
this error in order to gain philosophical certainty, but in acknowledgement of
the loneliness, misery, and hopelessness of the human condition—a condition
that can be ameliorated only by embracing the saving grace of God. Pascal
is not, however, entirely anti-Cartesian, as he shares with Descartes “a sense of
radical solitude,” which culminates in the claim that “[w]e are ridiculous to fall back on the society of our fellow-creatures, wretched like ourselves; they will not help us: we shall die alone. We must therefore act as if we were alone” (25). For Pascal, in the end, the recognition of the fragility and precariousness of our epistemic condition and the futility of attempts to gain philosophical certainty must lead us to reject as suspect at best any knowledge we may gain of ourselves: the true self is always hidden and unknowable. Rooting out sources of error, withdrawing from the everyday world and the deliverances of the senses bring us closer to the truth (i.e., God), but they are not enough: “Only by divine grace’s reordering our affections, subordinating our love of self to the love of god, can we ever hope to enter into possession of a selfhood purified of illusion” (150). So, like Descartes, Moriarty argues, the retreat into the self is a necessary response to the recognition of our epistemic situation, but for Pascal, unlike Descartes, this is not a philosophical movement. It is rather the initiating gesture of a search for enlightenment about our essential nature that can only come from the illuminating light of grace.

Descartes provided the impetus for Malebranche to take up philosophy, and the latter adopted from Descartes a commitment to the idea that “the spontaneous promptings of everyday consciousness are a source of error: the quest for knowledge takes the form of a resistance” (151). Unlike Descartes, however, the goal of this resistance for Malebranche, Moriarty writes, was not only to better grasp the nature of truth and certainty but to understand the soul’s essential closeness to God. What is to be understood as the achievement of Descartes’ philosophical work for Malebranche is not simply that “the soul, and God, are more easily known than the body,” but that “the soul is actually more essentially united to God than to the body” (152). The importance of this claim is that suspicion of the body and the deliverances of the senses make us aware not only of the sources of error with respect to knowledge, but also, and more importantly, make us aware of the ways in which these sources of error misinform us about the true nature of ourselves, which in turn “impacts our existential attitudes, evaluations, and behaviour-patterns” (152). The goal of philosophical suspicion, then, is more adequately to understand our relationship to others and to God. Failing to understand the essential connection of the soul to God, we fail to understand the true nature of error—that it is not simply an epistemic matter—and thereby
condemn ourselves to ignorance. “The vivid babbling presence of the body, and of bodies, drowns the Master's voice with its message of truth. So true is it that for Malebranche any philosophy that ignores theology cannot hope to diagnose, or even correctly to describe, the obstacles besetting the search for truth” (248).

Michael Moriarty's *Early Modern French Thought: the Age of Suspicion* is an exemplary work of scholarship. It deals deftly with complex philosophical issues and draws on a wide range of sources, from history and theology to critical theory and psychoanalysis. In the midst of all the erudition, though, the central theme of the book is never lost, nor does the reader ever come to feel that the forest is missed for the trees. The development of the attitude of suspicion in early modern French thought is carefully charted in the works of Descartes, Pascal, and Malebranche, in a way that will not fail to encourage among its readers a rethinking of the significance of this attitude and its enduring philosophical legacy.


This is a well-researched and amply documented book with numerous illustrations on a fascinating topic, namely the representation of the figure of Pan and the satyr in the early modern period from the end of the 15th century to the first third of the 17th in several European countries, especially France and Italy, with some scant remarks about England. Although several studies have already been devoted to the subject, none is as wide-ranging and intellectually ambitious, since it addresses the treatment of a ubiquitous theme in a variety of cultural media, including lyric poetry, narrative, essay, drama, dance, opera, and iconography. It purports to trace a two-century long evolution in the representation of mythical figures associated with the Pan legend (i.e., Marsyas, Midas, Faunus, Silenus, Sylvan, and the satyrs), as artists, dancers, poets, medical doctors, philosophers, and theologians debated about their symbolic meaning and significance through the Renaissance and Baroque Age.

The title translates rather convolutedly as “Pan’s pipes burnt at the stake.”
It refers to the myth of Syrinx, an Arcadian river-nymph who was pursued by Pan and escaped him by fleeing into a river where she pleaded the gods for help, and they changed her into a reed. Disappointed, Pan cut the reed into pieces of gradually decreasing lengths, fastened them together with wax and thus produced the shepherd’s flute, or “pipes of Pan,” upon which he played. Throughout the book, the metaphoric sense of the title is elucidated as the satyr’s seductive appeal is gradually reduced, transformed or eliminated as the Reformation and Counter-Reformation develop, and pagan imagery becomes censured, or displaced by parody, mockery, and fiction. One wishes that, at the outset of such a fully illustrated book, Theocritus’ famous poem shaped in the form of the pipes of Pan (c. 270 B.C.) had been reproduced for the reader’s benefit. As a textual object representing the birth of music, it became a paradigmatic example of the Greek technopaegnia, an art imitated in the medieval and early modern periods in the form of carmina figurata, and more specifically, an emblematic sign of pictorial and musical creation as sublimation of sexual desire.

The book begins with a study of the allegorizing process of Pan-like figures in Renaissance writings. One recalls that Erasmus borrowed the “silenus” image from Plato’s Symposium and developed his own interpretation in his Adages (“Sileni Alcibiades”) and to a lesser extent in the Praise of Folly. Rabelais, who followed his mentor’s example in the Prologue to Gargantua, turned the silenus into a little box “painted on the outside with comical figures like satyrs” but containing “rare drugs and other precious things inside.” This ironic device came to further problematize an aesthetic and ethical project based on reversals of meaning. Departing from Plato’s Urtext, Renaissance writers made this Platonic feature an emblematic sign and an ambiguous key to the whole hermeneutic process. The dismemberment of the allegorical process can also be observed in Italian impresse and, more dramatically, at the end of the 16th century in Giordano Bruno’s La Cena delle Ceneri [The Banquet of Ashes] with its systematic blurring of binary oppositions. Obviously, this chapter owes much to Michel Jeanneret’s Le Défi des signes (Paradigmes, 1994), a book devoted to the so-called “crisis of interpretation” at the end of the Renaissance.

Next to the transformation of Plato’s sileni, related mythical figures like Midas and Marsyas are given some attention. Midas, the king of Phrygia, to whom Dionysus granted the fateful power of turning everything into gold, is
also the incompetent judge who grew ears of ass for preferring Pan’s music to Apollo’s. Giuliano Romano portrayed him attending the punishment of Marsyas, an arrogant satyr who was flayed alive for engaging in a musical contest with Apollo. Skimpy analyses of a large sampling of early 17th-century works of art give credit to the idea of a gradual demonizing of the satyr figure, occasionally on a derisive mode, in Catholic and Protestant exegetical readings of the period. The satyr comes to represent the subversive threat of sexual excess: it is either criminalized or used to reflect the anthropological interest in a newly discovered world.

For 17th-century specialists, the pages devoted to pastoral literature will be of particular interest, including the paradoxical function of satyrs in Fletcher’s *The Faithful Shepherdess* (1608), the fictional rewriting of Plutarch’s “Death of Pan” episode in Gomberville’s *Carithée* (1621), and the dogmatic reading of the myth in Calderón’s *auto alégorico, El verdadero Dios Pan* (1670). Do satyrs increasingly become burlesque figures for decorative purposes, especially in masques and courtly entertainments (280)? Is the disappearance of fauns responsible for bringing about the decline of pastorals (369)? Can one trace a gradual humanizing process of hybrids with moralizing or parodistic overtones (*passim*)? The corpus is so vast, the subject matter so diverse, the thesis so multifaceted that sweeping conclusions will be met with a whiff of faintness.

The author builds on earlier studies to examine the etymological confusion made by early modern humanists between the Greek mythical hybrid (*satyros*) and the Latin diatribe against vices (*satura*). This connection, however, cannot be isolated from other driving influences, in particular the rise of sarcastic modes of writing influenced by cynicism and lucianism (see Michèle Clément’s *Le Cynisme à la Renaissance d’Érasme à Montaigne, suivi de Les Épistres de Diogenes*, Geneva: Droz, 2005). In our own time when theoretical concepts like “otherness” and “hybridity” have become common currency, the cultural representation of satyrs can significantly contribute to a deeper understanding of marginalized characters such as fools, monkeys, barbarians, and monsters of all sorts in early modern thought. Combined with the decline of allegory, the gradual displacement of goat-legged hybrids, along with the disappearance of bestiaries and the rise of radical Cartesian dualism, constitutes a significant subject of inquiry for early modern cultural studies. Interestingly enough, no mention is made here of the “scapegoat” as an increasingly problematic category, as it gradually moves away from its biblical origins: “bouc émissaire”
The book ends with rather wild speculations on the birth of the 17th-century fictional hero as an end-point in the transformative series of the satyr family. Cervantes’s Sancho or Croce’s Bertoldo, Tasso’s Aminta or D’Urfé’s Céladon are recast as sublimated fauns who shed nothing but their goat-like physiques. As for the libertine hero, one could mistake him for the ultimate manifestation of an “internalized” silenic figure. The reader is naturally led to Enlightenment fictions with Voltaire (the “monkey” episode in *Candide* XVI), Rousseau (his divagations on the state of nature), and Diderot (his extravagant speculations on the mixing of species). In sum, from the 16th to the 18th century, the satyr has moved around from a despicable creature to the redeemed kin of the “noble savage.” Yes, but just wait: Hugo’s romanticized “Satyre” and Mallarmé’s re-allegorized “Faune” are waiting in the wings for their glorified stage entrance.


To review a lengthy annual containing a dozen articles is a daunting assignment. Like most anthologies, the articles are sometimes haphazardly coordinated around a central topic, and in this case the topic itself seems unusually protean. But for any scholars who have cultural interests in Dutch art, this journal annually provides must reading. By policy, each issue responds to a theme proposed by an editor, in this case Joanna Woodall, who provides the introductory essay. Contributors range from Germany and Holland to England and America, and they offer consistently fine essays.

Woodall’s overview sets out the issue(s). The core topic is “virtue” but used as in its root Latin origin, *virtus*, meaning strength and achievement (virtuosity) as well as the more conventional English understanding of the word, righteous behavior. Of course, these several aspects—strength, virtuosity, and virtue—converge in the prepossessing achievements of certain visual artists, often associated with courts, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
She notes that certain works of art were deemed to carry potency, to embody "social intellectual, and spiritual qualities shared or claimed by their makers and users." Consequently the art community of patrons, art-lovers (lijfhebbers, who also enrolled in the painters' guild of Antwerp) could share in a common aura and set of values, akin to cultural nobility. Woodall locates some of these values in ancient philosophy, particularly as transmitted to the Netherlands of the neo-Stoic philosopher Justus Lipsius (1547-1606). At times the virtuoso naturalism of Netherlandish art is too easily equated with the virtues inherent to the "mirror of princes" tradition, and this fluid slippage of conceptual and metaphorical terms remains a characteristic temptation in a volume like this. Yet there can be no denying the power of virtue and its embodiment in art as a unifying goal for artists and patrons alike over the course of these two centuries, as the subsequent essays confirm.

Caecilie Weissert opens the symposium with a discussion of sixteenth-century Netherlandish artists, starting with Jan Gossaert and Bernard van Orley, two painters who epitomized both virtuosity and courtly patrons as well as a variety of artistic styles. That kind of protean virtuosity, exemplified by Hendrick Goltzius, formed the central touchstone of Karel van Mander's 1604 Schilderboek, and Weissert adduces the element of artistic invention as a final virtue. Later linkage of painting to the liberal arts also led to a novel fascination with rhetoric and other learning by artists like Frans Floris. Weissert concludes with van Mander's association of good art with personal virtue on the part of the artist himself as exemplum virtutis. In many ways her material is familiar, but Weissert's approach is synthetic and fresh.

In complementary fashion, Celeste Brusati discusses virtuous artisanship in the Dutch Republic, building upon her important book about Samuel van Hoogstraten as both virtuoso artist and virtuous courtly painter. She focuses on both texts and images that conflate the two qualities under a guiding martial metaphor of "Pictura’s Excellent Trophies," thus clarifying why Hoogstraten’s 1678 painting treatise shows a frontispiece with the artist-hero being clad in armor by the muses. While her pictorial allusions, e.g. to artists’ portraits with allegories or Goltzius’s images of Roman heroes, are powerful, Brusati chiefly focuses on still-life images. These works equate pen or brush and the acquisition of knowledge with martial imagery, again evoking neo-Stoic values. This essay not only offers in new outlooks through less familiar images but also speaks directly to the larger theme of the volume, justifying its
conceptual fusion of virtuosity, especially in luxury still lifes, with virtue and general artistic accomplishment.

The virtuoso essay of the volume is Tristan Weddigen’s discussion of Hendrick Goltzius’s realization of one of the most elaborate Renaissance programs of personal progress, the *Tabula Cebetis*. He begins with visual representation of virtues as part of the mnemonic program of the Counter Reformation, using the memorable phrase about a Goltzius religious allegory that *virtus imitationis* is the leading instrument of Christian *imitatio virtutis*. Another German essay by Martin Raspe focuses on one artistic verdict, the Judgment of Midas, and related themes located in landscape painting around 1600, particularly by Gillis Coninxloo (figures by Kaarel van Mander). This kind of imagery addresses moral virtue in the conventional sense but also artistic virtuosity on the part of the musical contestants as well as the painter of the scene, particularly in the landscape tradition of Holland. Lisa Rosenthal offers a contemporary case study as she discusses Cornelis van Haarlem’s *Wedding of Peleus and Thetis*, commissioned in 1589 by the city burgomasters for Maurits of Nassau’s Prinsenhof in Haarlem. She argues that this massive mythology fuses civic and painterly virtue, extolling good government via artistic excellence around a Golden Age theme of peace, plenty, and love. And her wide-ranging discussion of themes and references greatly enriches our appreciation of Cornelis in his historical moment.

A pair of essays considers the relationship of court artists to their sophisticated patrons. L. C. Cutler discusses Jan Brueghel and his sensitive patron, Federico Borromeo, building upon the foundations laid down by Pamela Jones. This cordial relationship uses pictorial virtuosity (“diligence”) of the courtly artist to extend the models of Apelles as well as Jan van Eyck as a tribute to both his pious patron and divine Creator. Fine but visible brushwork combines with accuracy of representation to capture in paint the richness of creation itself as a mutual act of devotion.

In the focused analysis by Anastassia Novikova, the genteel virtue of art-loving patrons and collectors is conveyed by Daniel Mytens’s pendants of Thomas Arundel and Aletheia Talbot with supporting evidence from the treatise by his librarian, Franciscus Junius. She notes that for a public man like Arundel an art gallery was both a celebration of nobility as well as an assertion of that rank. As a result, she distinguishes the English noble *virtuoso* from the Dutch burgher *liebhebber*. 
Painterly virtuosity of execution is also the subject of two more studies. Maria-Isabel Pousão-Smith discusses the commonly understood tension between fineness of execution (nettigheid) and bravura ease (sprezzatura). Using careful reading of van Hoogstraten as well as Philips Angel and Junius as evidence, she argues instead that the Dutch did not prize painterly looseness of brushwork as dexterity but rather esteemed refinements and variety by fiijnmalers, especially Dou. By contrast, Christopher Atkins considers Frans Hals’s virtuoso “rough” brushwork, particularly in his later works, as asserting his mastery through method. Since even contemporaries compared Hals to Titian in his preparatory directness, appreciation of his painterly qualities is not anachronistic.

Kate Bomford considers Rubens’s self-representations among his friends as epitomes of the virtue of friendship itself, making learned humanist connections between friendship and virtue. Once more Justus Lipsius occupies center stage as role model, as the learned artist practices the proverb that “love begets art.” In the final essay of the volume, Michael Zell sensitively situates Rembrandt’s countryside landscapes in relation to the practice of several amateur artists (Jan de Bisschop, Constantijn Huygens the Younger) in seventeenth-century Holland. This practice parallels the vogue for outdoor paintings by gentlemen in England and reminds us about Rembrandt’s social aspirations as well as his informal, non-commercial practice of landscape artistry.

While no annual, even with a guiding theme, ever presumes to pull papers together like a coordinated conference, this volume manages to bring most of the changes called forth by Woodall’s stimulating and provocative topic. If they sometimes stray into various shadings of the terms “virtue” and “virtuosity,” such emphases are due to the rich range of meanings implied by the subject(s) and the ambitions of both artists and patrons.


Reading Albert Blankert’s Selected Writings on Dutch Paintings: Rembrandt, Van Beke, Vermeer and Others, one gets the sense that it was a rich experience for Blankert to revisit not only the essays spanning his thirty-year career but also the
problems he tackled in them. It is a rich experience for his readers, too. The essays selected for this book cover a wide range of painters and art-historical topics mostly relating but not exclusive to seventeenth-century Netherlands. They range from introductions to major exhibition catalogues (“Gods, Saints and Heroes: Dutch History Painting”) to three-page pieces attempting to reattribute a single painting (“A Rediscovered Annunciation of the Shepherds by Pieter van Laer”), each powerful on its own merits and integral to the book as a whole. Despite the breadth of topics and scope of the essays, the book itself has a clear purpose and direction; so much so that it is hard to consider that the essays were written over decades, as opposed to years. The essays amount to an appreciation and endorsement of the careful viewing of Dutch painting. As for the paintings themselves, Blankert presents his readers with old favorites and also introduces some more obscure works. It is a pleasure to have his essays as a guide for both.

The book opens with a seemingly highly specific essay on the practices of the father and son, Caspar and Constantyn Netscher. These portraitists placed the faces of their clients onto bodies with preconceived poses in preconceived settings. Blankert notes that these paintings had been disparaged as lazy, even as signals of the decline of Dutch painting. These paintings, it was once thought, were poorly executed since the insert method would not fit the sitter with a personalized body or background. Blankert, however, points out that the insert method in fact gave precedence to the painter’s invention, which is precisely what is at work in these previously maligned backgrounds, whereas the painter could not, of course, invent the sitter’s face. In this short essay, what Blankert really does, in addition to illuminating a specific portrait-painting practice, is reorient his reader’s notion of originality. If one shifts his point of view only slightly, one gains a new understanding not only of a specific painter’s methods but of one’s own preconceptions when looking at painting. It is the graduation from being a passive spectator to an active one.

It seems that Blankert has a special love for such brief, esoteric writings, which comes through in his introduction to the first issue of the journal, *Mercury*, a publication devoted to collecting articles by amateurs and scholars alike that are either too short or too isolated for other scholarly journals. This desire to reach out to several audiences also comes through in *Selected Writings*. Blankert’s book holds insights and arguments helpful to experienced scholars and amateurs, a skill probably honed acutely during his decades of organizing
museum exhibitions. Everyone's eye can become more critical; everyone's self-awareness when regarding art can become more nuanced and precise. Blankert encourages these tendencies in all of his readers no matter what their previous exposure to Dutch painting or painting in general.

Such a compilation of essays spanning thirty years has the potential to seem unfocused, a "cabinet of curiosities" rather than a focused work with a clear point of view. This is not so of Blankert's work. Although Blankert addresses a myriad of themes and ideas, several major points of focus emerge. First, Blankert clearly enjoys introducing or reintroducing little-known Dutch painters such as Daniel van Beke and Caspar Netscher and giving them their due. He rightly points out that too many of these masters remain the interests of only a small number of scholars and connoisseurs, and sometimes are ignored altogether. He does not merely lament their obscurity, however, but adds to the understanding of these men and their oeuvres. For instance, in his essay on van Beke, Blankert not only discusses the artist's work but reconstructs his social milieu comprising eclectic group of Dutch painters, poets, and musicians.

This is not to say that Blankert shies away from tackling the more august figures of Rembrandt and Vermeer. These essays, too, follow Blankert's preferred format of the compact, one could even say tidy, statement. In his essay on a particularly enigmatic Rembrandt self-portrait of the artist laughing, Blankert argues that the painting was cut down from a larger work depicting the artist painting an old woman from life. Blankert concludes that the original painting was intended as Rembrandt's response to his critics who asserted that he did not transcend the earthly beauty of the human figure in his art in the manner of Zeuxis, the legendary ancient painter. In response to this critique, Rembrandt created the above picture, a reference to another Zeuxis anecdote: that of the Greek painter laughing while painting an old woman. In doing so, Rembrandt not only confronted his critics but also undermined their argument by showing another side of Zeuxis himself. Blankert addresses all this as well as previous interpretations of the painting in a mere thirteen pages, including the images.

The acknowledgement, appreciation, and exploration of previous interpretations and scholarship of Dutch paintings is a preoccupation of Blankert's that emerges in many of these essays. Blankert does not merely cite previous research but ponders how scholars came to their various conclusions and
tracks the changing interpretations of Dutch artwork. As an extension of his historiography, Blankert also includes “Addenda 2003” sections following many of the essays to acknowledge more recent scholarship on the issues they cover. These additions are not only helpful but done in the spirit of scholarly camaraderie that pervades the book.

Another of Blankert’s “causes” is bringing to light the almost airy use of artificial labels such as “genre painting” and “history painting” by scholars and amateurs alike. Although this problem is attacked head on in two of the essays, it returns in many others in the book, revealing Blankert’s unwavering attention to intellectual clarity. Blankert does not call for the banishment of such terms but wants those who look at paintings to be thoughtful in using them. He wants connoisseurs to have a clear set of parameters in mind when they categorize a painting in such a way. In one essay, “What Is Dutch Seventeenth-Century Genre Painting? A Definition and Its Limitations,” he defines the term genre painting as it will apply to the essay and indeed to the rest of the book. The purpose of such an essay is to prompt one to come away from it asking, “What really do I mean when I call something a history [or genre, etc.] painting?” It is an important question to ponder both in front of a painting and alone. Blankert maintains such precision in defining his terms and, as the title of the above essay indicates, acknowledging their flaws. Thus, each time Blankert confronts us with the phrases “history painting” or “genre painting” we take notice. Noticing and questioning these terms and categorizations are practices that will be well-served when reading other art historical literature.

Throughout the book it becomes clear that what Blankert really wants is to encourage his readers to look carefully at Dutch paintings. If we have somehow missed the point, Blankert quite literally insists that his readers do at least one exercise in careful looking. Towards the end of the book, in an essay, “A Controversial Still Life” originally published in 1993, Blankert presents his readers with illustrations of a painting by Jan Brueghel the Elder, Flowers in a Wooden Tub, and two copies after it. The three illustrations are unlabeled, and it is up to the reader to discern which of the three is the original Brueghel and which of the copies is of better quality. The answers are buried later in the book. If, during this process of careful looking, we question previously held conceptions of originality, categorization, or one particular painter’s oeuvre, so much the better.

Is still life the most philosophical genre of painting? So some art historians have opined, and still-life painting has engaged many philosophers. *The Rhetoric of Perspective* begins by invoking Martin Heidegger’s ruminations, deploys arguments taken from Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida, and relies on the theories of Roland Barthes, Paul de Man, Jacques Lacan, and Walter Benjamin, among others, to argue that Dutch seventeenth-century still life presents philosophical reflections on vision. Hanneke Grootenboer analyzes paintings by Pieter Claesz., Willem Claesz. Heda, Cornelius Norbertus Gijsbrechts, and Samuel van Hoogstraten in order to claim that perspective in Dutch seventeenth-century still-life painting “points to a truth in painting that falls beyond the picture’s frame, perhaps even beyond our perception” (18). Still life raises “issues concerning the nature of its own representation” that are said to call for “a different way of looking” that (also recalling Heidegger) is literally thought-provoking.

In treating still life, Grootenboer acknowledges inspiration from Svetlana Alpers, Mieke Bal, and Norman Bryson in expressing dissatisfaction with interpretative methods that search for meaning. Her sympathies are instead more with French art historians who have been informed by post-structuralism. In contrast, contemporary debates in art history over realism and description in Dutch seventeenth-century still-life painting are treated with greater dispatch.

The introduction summarizes how Grootenboer will deal with seventeenth-century trompe l’oeil painting, defined as pictures in which the distinction between reality and representation is beyond our perception, and with the so-called Dutch breakfast still life, paintings displaying foods on a table. The two represent “truth in painting” but are said to differ, in that the former stands for illusionism, the latter for realism. Her approach is informed by Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the reversibility of perception, Hubert Damisch’s notion of the “thought of painting,” and Barthes’s and De Man’s ideas about the rhetoric of images (and reading). This leads to reading paint-
ing as “a philosophical treatise whose rhetoric is perspective” (13), understood in terms suggested by Walter Benjamin as a form of allegory.

The first chapter dissects still-life paintings by Pieter Claesz. to demonstrate “The Invisibility of Depth.” While acknowledging the importance of previous readings which have been informed by historical research, Grootenboer argues that they cannot do justice to such works, because they leave a residue of pictorial elements which call for a fundamentally different mode of looking than that designed for other genres. In a discussion ranging from Schopenhauer to Diderot to E. H. Gombrich, she attempts to found this mode of looking on an understanding of the discrepancy between perception and vision based on Merleau-Ponty and Lacan: perspectival notions of vision, on which painting depends, supposedly collapse. Whereas realism seen in Dutch breakfast pieces like those by Claesz. developed in line with Albertian perspective, trompe l’oeil has pursued a different direction by eliminating any suggestion of pictorial depth. Cornelius Gisbrechts’s trompe l’oeil representation of the reverse side of a picture thus reaches the ultimate limit of painting, revealing itself as anti-painting.

The second chapter, “Truth in Breakfast Painting,” takes off from a breakfast still life by Willem Heda to discuss the role of empty backgrounds. Though Grootenboer offers good descriptions of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Flemish and Dutch paintings, her argument is grounded on a distinction between *horror vacui* and the void made by Blaise Pascal. These are exemplified by the contrast between Heda’s work and a banquet piece by Jan Davidz. de Heem, the one possessing a void, the other’s rich display resulting form *horror vacui*. Hence breakfast still lifes supposedly stand out as unique phenomena in which the void takes over and rules pictorial design as a form of “structured emptiness” which reveals the rhetorical structure of perspective.

The third chapter, “The Rhetoric of Perspective,” presents a critique of what Grootenboer deems the two most important twentieth-century treatments of perspective, Panofsky’s theory of perspective as symbolic form, and Damisch’s account of the *Origins of Perspective*. Although it is discussed by neither of them, anamorphosis, a form of projection which depends on perspective which relies on the margins of the visual field, is said to provide a corrective to their views by offering an alternative to orthodox perspective. Lacan’s discussion of anamorphosis and his notion of the gaze inspire
Grootenboer to suggest that Gisbrechts’s trompe l’oeil’s allow us to “see” the operation of perspective, hence its rhetorical aspect.

The last chapter, “Perspective as Allegorical Form,” applies Benjamin’s notion of allegory to vanitas still-life paintings, pictures with a skull or other objects suggesting the vanity of life. Grootenboer argues that perspective’s structure is similar to that of allegory, and that Gisbrechts’s “self-aware image” indicates perspective is deployed as allegory when it employs two perspectival systems in the same image. Following Benjamin, Grootenboer turns Panofsky’s notion of perspective as symbolic form into a conception of perspective as allegorical form; she asserts that through it painting represents truth. Finally, Grootenboer criticizes “traditional” Anglo-Saxon (and especially Dutch) art historical methods and interpretations as shaped by a model of thought based on orthodox perspective and determined by an (outmoded) symbolic instead of allegorical mode.

A brief conclusion presents favorably but takes issue with Alpers’s argument in Art of Describing, Paul Claudel, and Barthes’s interpretation of how still life represents the dissection of objects. Grootenboer proposes that still life points to another sort of gaze than the scientific one that answers our gaze. Painting offers its own perspective in picturing us looking.

Like many another post-structural olla podrida, Grootenboer’s text tries to insulate itself against critique. Grootenboer eschews historical method in art history as seeking to find the conditions under which a work of art “came into being, the conditions, the contemporary meaning it is supposed to contain, the underlying motivation for its creation, and/or the historical context of which it is a result,” since these supposedly express “a longing to return to the time when the artwork was produced, as if its original context would provide the background into which the artwork would perfectly fit” (164). She also argues that “clinging to coherence is itself an allegory of the fact that historical truth cannot be found where we have been looking for it” (165).

Serious questions may still be raised. While Grootenboer rails against the historical method, she is not hesitant to avail herself of secondary literature, including notably Alpers on Dutch painting, and Michael Holly on historiography. That such views are in particular debatable at best should have given pause before they were used to supply the bases for arguments which claim to have some kind of historical purchase. In general, greater awareness of art historical literature, especially but not only in the Germanophone tradition
(other than Heidegger as filtered through French and subsequently Anglo-Saxon writers) would have undermined Grootenboer's claims not only about history writing but also more specifically on her arguments about trompe l'oeil. Many art historians in recent years have been informed by reception aesthetics and hermeneutics, which hardly seek to understand artworks solely in their original contexts. For example, Wolfgang Kemp has treated Rembrandt's painting of the *Holy Family* in which a prominent trompe l'oeil curtain and frame appear. This picture serves as just one reminder that trompe l'oeil is not reserved to still life but plays a role in many genres: flies, frames, and curtains appear in portraits, "genre," and "history" painting (including as with the Rembrandt of religious subjects), not to mention pictures of saints. Like trompe l'oeil in still lifes, its appearance in these genres provokes thought, yet obviously requires different readings than those offered by Grootenboer: it is unlikely, for instance, that a trompe l'oeil seventeenth-century *Holy Family* suggests the nothingness of being.

Many differing accounts have also been offered for the role of depth in painting that do not correspond to Grootenboer's view of a standard story of perspective. Otto Pächt has, for instance, argued that the representation of space was only one of the formative principles involved in the organization of the picture surface, and that the suggestion of depth was not its sole or main goal; Pächt long ago criticized Panofsky's views of perspective and hidden symbolism (and in English). Although Grootenboer makes much of James Elkins's tracings showing where perspective has not been accurately employed, in *The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space* (first published in 1957!), which treats Lorenzetti (also discussed by Grootenboer) and the origins of artificial perspective in painting, John White already demonstrated that painters may deliberately choose not to employ it "correctly." Anamorphosis has also hardly been neglected even by art historians of a post-structuralist disposition (Lyle Massey).

Still-life painting does indeed present paradoxes, is allegorical, and may be philosophical, but not in the ways that Grootenboer finds either in Pascal, nor, more importantly, through post-modern discourse. Paradoxes were very much a part of the culture of early modern Europe, as an extensive secondary literature on them, ignored by Grootenboer, has demonstrated. Paradox may be related to the often symbolic as well as allegorical uses of trompe l’oeil and still life (as exemplified by Arcimboldo’s reversible heads, and Georg
Hoefnagel’s emblematic images). In his landmark book on still life Charles Sterling already evoked Epicureanism, and works such as Georg Hoefnagel’s and Arcimboldo’s variations on still life may now be shown to have had philosophical underpinnings in contemporary Neostoicism and Erasmianism. Four decades before the book under review, in Paradoxa Epidemica Rosalie Colic already pointed out how still life invited the beholder to “see through” the subject of the painting, to the ontological truth residing beyond the painted objects, beyond the painting itself” (274) and also explicitly noted the self-reflective, thought-provoking aspects of the genre. However, where post-Heideggerian arguments may discover merely the provocation of thought or nothingness, Colic found the paradox resolved in copiousness and plenitude.


Beginning in the 1980s, Nanette Salomon has been a major figure in the study of Dutch seventeenth-century genre painting. This book, a collection of both previously published and unpublished but newly revised essays written by Salomon between 1983 and 1998, not only assembles some of her most interesting work in a single volume but also illustrates the evolution of some aspects of the field of Dutch art history by juxtaposing studies that reveal the author’s own “shifting priorities.” As Salomon discusses in her introductory essay, during the two decades spanned in this book, her work first participated in and then moved away from the traditional art-historical method of iconographic study that long dominated the field. This is the approach that was used since the 1950s by Erwin Panofsky and his students, who interpreted realistically portrayed everyday objects in fifteenth-century Northern religious art as “disguised symbols” to explain an image as a whole and was continued, explains Salomon, by scholars such as Eddy de Jongh in the 1970s and 1980s, who analyzed in a similar way what was called “schijnrealism” (“apparent realism”) in seventeenth-century Dutch art of secular subjects. Salomon credits in particular the work of Mieke Bal and Griselda Pollock for
stimulating her shift of interests. The later articles collected in this book show how her orientation became more assertively informed by feminist, political, and semiotic perspectives, and more attuned to images as unstable signs rather than as stable symbols. As Salomon notes, this methodical shift in her own work finds parallels in the larger discipline of art history, and for this reason her book will also be of great interest to readers outside the field of Dutch art history as well as to those in it.

The book consists of nine essays, all but one focused primarily on one or two works of art. The paintings of Jan Vermeer and Jan Steen receive the lion's share of attention, while several chapters explore the images of other artists including Adriaen van Ostade, Jan Miense Molenaer, and Gerard ter Borch. The essays serve as commentary on each other's method. Thus, a more traditional study written in 1984 on Jan Steen's Dissolute Household theme concerns itself with identifying specific sources for the painting *In Weelde Siet Toe* in Vienna. Salomon relates this painting of a topsy-turvy home life to older traditions such as the Ages of Man and understands the painting through Steen's abundant quotations, even self-quotations, from other works of art. This article is followed by Salomon's later essay that considers the sociological dimensions of the theme of domesticity itself as expressed in Steen's home scenes. This essay examines domesticity as a cultural fabrication, as an ideology, and juxtaposes it with its binary, itinerancy, an important and tantalizing subject in Northern art to which more attention should be paid. Particularly interesting is Salomon's consideration of the feelings of nostalgia that these domestic scenes would have evoked for the contemporary viewer.

The book begins with Salomon's earliest published essay (in the 1983 Festschrift honoring her dissertation advisor, Egbert Haverkamp Begemann) on Vermeer's *Woman with a balance* (National Gallery, Washington) in which she interprets the woman's actions in the context of Catholic theology. The book concludes also with the subject of Vermeer's women, in a fascinating study that defines their evolution from images of salacious sexuality to images of a more decorous civility.

Salomon is a highly original and insightful thinker. The essays in this book offer particularly sensitive analyses of issues such as the meaning of space in Dutch painting, addressing for instance the private space of Jan Steen's rowdy households in the context of the public space depicted in tavern scenes, and examining the roles of Steen's divided space and its relationship to sixteenth-
century art (a study that now complements Martha Hollander’s book on the doorkijkje: An Entrance for the Eyes: space and meaning in Dutch seventeenth-century art, University of California Press, 2002). In an essay on Ter Borch’s paintings that juxtapose drinking young women and sleeping soldiers, she explores how such companion pieces could convey levels of meanings that have less to do with a moralizing admonition than with a witty conceit. She addresses neglected themes which still need more attention. One example is her treatment of old age in Dutch art, particularly in her essay on the role of the father and of old men in Adriaen van Ostade’s prints of domestic scenes.

Throughout the past twenty or so years, as Salomon notes in her Introduction, some of her ideas have attracted controversy, especially among some Dutch and English scholars. There were objections, for instance, when she described Vermeer’s Woman with a balance as pregnant, and when she challenged the accepted idea that Steen’s topsy-turvy households were entirely moralizing (see pp. 5 and 7). The minor uproars that issued from some scholars on such points only proves the excitement generated by Salomon’s ideas, especially in the case of well-known and much-loved paintings. This book of essays will remain an important and lasting contribution, both for students of Dutch art and for students of methodology.


Even though this book does not really offer a new interpretation of seventeenth-century Dutch genre painting, it provides an outstanding synthesis of the best art historical scholarship on the subject over the past three decades. In addition, it has an excellent bibliography and is lavishly illustrated, with over a hundred color plates. Consequently, the book should prove to be helpful for general readers and specialists alike.

In line with much of contemporary scholarship, Franits argues against the notion that genre paintings are simply naturalistic scenes of everyday life. Instead, he advocates the view that these works are highly conventional representations in pictorial traditions established centuries earlier. Franits pays close attention to the complexity of Dutch genre paintings, analyzing their style and
their meaning in relation to their historical context. As he notes, these pictures are frequently not direct or straightforward, but multivalent and ambiguous in meaning. Revealing even greater complexity, Franits reminds us that the term “genre” is itself problematic. Not only is the word French in origin, but it was not employed by seventeenth-century Dutch viewers, who referred to *gezelschappen* (merry companies), *kortegarden* (guardroom pieces) and tavern scenes without the overarching category called genre painting. Despite the apparent lowliness of subject matter, such pictures were quite popular in the Netherlands and could demand high prices.

Franits divides the book into three parts. The first section concentrates on genre painting produced between 1609 and 1648, marking the transition from the beginning of the Twelve-Year Truce with Spain, the *de facto* independence of the seven northern provinces later identified as the Dutch Republic, and the signing of the Treaty of Münster, indicating official recognition of the sovereignty of the United Provinces. Part Two concentrates on the period between 1648 and 1672, the *rampjaar* or year of disaster, when the Netherlands was attacked on multiple sides by a coalition of English, French, and Rhenish forces. Finally, the third piece addresses the development of genre painting during the reign of Prince Willem III as Stadhouder, from 1672 to 1702. Each of these three sections opens up with a brief chapter providing a historical overview of the setting. Subsequent chapters within each part are organized primarily by city, highlighting local circumstances and expectations. This arrangement also enables Franits to highlight the economic competition between cities in close geographical proximity to one another. Only three of the book’s eighteen chapters concentrate on particular artists; Gerard ter Borch, Caspar Netscher, and Jan Steen are credited as artistic innovators, definitively transcending the limitation of local conventions of style and motif.

In Part One, Franits discusses both traditional continuities and innovative changes in genre painting. Despite the political and religious turmoil during the first half of the century, the Dutch economy, fueled by great successes in international trade and finance, flourished. Many highly skilled immigrants, including numerous painters and patrons, from the southern provinces fled north, providing an environment conducive for new artistic developments. In Haarlem, Esaias van de Velde modified the Flemish painting of love gardens, depicting stocky individuals in neatly cultivated settings to suit the sophisticated tastes of a Dutch audience. Other artists, such as Willem
Buytewech and Adriaen Brouwer, employed satirical wit to represent the folly of others. Later, the irony of such ruddy representations would be lost, as they were posthumously deemed vulgar and uncouth, like those depicted within their frames. At the close of the Amsterdam chapter, Franits reminds readers that the tonal style of the early seventeenth century, associated with the work of Pieter Coedde and Willem Duyster, was not simply the result of economic recession but an appropriation of a Flemish technique. Meanwhile, in Utrecht, a Catholic city with tight limits on immigration, Caravaggisti and wealthy patrons account for the local prominence given to genre painting. Although relatively small in population, The Hague served as the Republic’s administrative and courtly center, giving it the highest ratio of painters per capita. Even though there was a local market for genre painting, portraiture took precedence within the city.

Part Two addresses genre painting during a period of unprecedented prosperity and increased social mobility. As Franits argues, this was a pivotal time in shaping a new understanding of civility. New themes such as domestic virtues and courtly manners were reintroduced into genre painting. Iconographical subtlety and stylistic refinement became the standard, as traditional social hierarchies were reasserted. The high quality of these images can be readily seen in the work of Gerard ter Borch and his pupil, Caspar Netscher. The technical virtuosity of these artists and the pictorial nuances of their paintings reinforce the preoccupation with social elegance and grace. The highly ambiguous character of these tantalizing pictures encouraged sophisticated viewers to delight in the inherent value of such paintings as they imagine ways to unravel their implicit meaning. In the university city of Leiden, Gerrit Dou and Frans van Mieris gained prestige as fijnschilders, artists capable of representing nature in meticulous detail, without revealing the handiwork of their brushstroke. Although economically debilitated, Haarlem persevered at an art center. Comelis Bega and others revised the work of Adriaen Brouwer, representing coarse subjects, but in an elegant manner. In Dortdrecht, Samuel van Hoogstraten and Nicolas Maes produced clever paintings aimed to fascinate savvy viewers. Meanwhile, Delft’s social elite enjoyed the domestic imagery of Pieter de Hooch and Johannes Vermeer. The “civilizing process” can also be seen in Amsterdam paintings. The merry companies of Jacob van Loo Gerbrand van den Eeckhout evoke notions of gallantry and sweet conversation, reinforcing the call for noble conduit and nonchalance. Wealthy
collectors also took pleasure in seeing the gentility and charm of Gabriel Metsu’s figures set in lavishly decorated interiors. While in Rotterdam, Hendrick Sorgh and Jacob Ochtervelt diminish the unsavory qualities of taverns and brothels, preferring to sanitize the represented scene with splendid refinement. Franits saves the final chapter of this section to examine the work of Jan Steen, who bucked the trend by reintroducing risqué frivolity into the tradition of Dutch genre painting.

In the final and most provocative section of the book, Franits challenges earlier dismissals of late seventeenth-century genre paintings as succumbing to French influence. As Franits rightfully notes, Arnold Houbraken and other writers often praised the work of their contemporaries above that of preceding generations. To their minds, the “golden age of painting” was not waning but being harvested. Despite economic hardship and persistence of military conflict, the upper strata of Dutch society persevered. They were able to accumulate greater wealth, separating themselves from the lower classes. In response to growing economic inequality, codes of civility intensified, separating the “haves” from the “have-nots.” The appropriation of French pictoral devices was motivated by sophisticated desire for honnêteté. The enthusiasm of art critics such as Gerard de Lairesse and Jan de Bisschop for lofty subjects and classical motifs may have fostered suppression of bawdy representation and diminished the range of themes depicted. However, their remarks were not directed against genre painting per se. Undeterred by economic downturn, affluent patrons, although smaller in number, continued to buy genre paintings. In Leiden, Willem van Mieris and others avoided crude display, preferring apparently more noble subjects. The smooth polished contours of their painted figures, cast in dazzling naturalistic light, evoke notions of a renewal of a classical past, while maintaining the fijnschilder technique of the previous generation. By contrast, genre painting in late seventeenth-century Delft, profoundly decimated by catastrophes following the rampjaar, catered to the conservative tastes of local patrons, who expected strict adherence to earlier stylistic conventions. Taste for the antique did not come into play. Franits closes the book with a discussion of the work of Godfried Schalcken, Eglon van der Neer, and Adriaen van der Werff, three artists who were internationally acclaimed by their contemporaries for their artistic merit. The quantity of genre paintings may have diminished at the close of the century; however, this did not take away from their quality or
reduce their price.

Although this is an excellent survey of seventeenth-century painting, it would have been better had the author included more material on sixteenth-century Netherlandish market and kitchen scenes, especially those produced in Antwerp. This would have strengthened his point that this imagery is rooted in traditional artistic conventions. Franits also seems to hold the bond between economic and artistic development too tight. Nonetheless, this does not undermine his general point that seventeenth-century genre painting was market driven. In addition and admittedly more distracting, Franits occasionally forecloses the elusive character of genre paintings by curtailing the subtle ambiguity of their meaning. While recognizing multivalent possibilities, the tone of his interpretations of particular works can seem quite didactic and straightforward, emblematic of the desire for civility. Despite these minor criticisms, this book provides the most comprehensive study of seventeenth-century Dutch genre painting and deserves high praise for its reassessment of work produced after the devastations of the rampjaar.


One basic truism about Dutch painting is its deep engagement with society, but inevitably the complex issue arises of interpreting these works as cultural images rather than documentary illustrations. Rarely does a historian venture into such a big topic with the necessary sensitivity to the visual. Conversely, art historians have frequently taken up interpretive issues about Dutch genre pictures but usually for conventional art works, featuring decadent behavior by imagined social extremes, whether lower classes in taverns or indulgent, rich “merry companies” (Wayne Franits, 2004). Some specialized aspects of Dutch social representation have already been addressed by economic historians (Basil Yamey on financial images, 1989) or art historians (Linda Stone-Ferrier on textiles, 1985), and Simon Schama’s Embarrassment of Riches (1991) made art a fulcrum for assessing Dutch culture more generally. Only one short illustrated catalogue by Gary Schwartz, The Dutch World of Painting (1986), attempted a similar task to what Annette de Vries achieves in
Framed Work. Breaking new ground, she assesses varied types of “imagery of work and profession in the early modern Netherlands.”

De Vries starts her analysis in the sixteenth century but basically follows Dutch images into the Golden Age of the seventeenth century, when both painting and the Dutch economy reached their apogee together. Conceptually material even encompasses intellectual work, as she begins with chapters on “the Document” (about notaries) as well as “the Word” (religious preachers). Thereafter in turn de Vries considers banking and finance (“Money”), manual craftsmanship (“Last,” on shoemakers), “Freight,” and women spinning (“Thread”). Her materials include prints and printed books as well as paintings, including portraits of individuals and groups as well as generic activities and the stereotypes of genre scenes. Throughout this study she also subtly balances the interpretive difficulty of balancing pictorial interpretation with cultural conclusions (“picture and meaning,” 9-17).

If one wishes to cavil, the book does promote one confusion—mixing two different kinds of pictures, genre images and portraits, as equally valid representations of vocations. In fact, she makes the implicit claim that the larger trajectory of imagery moves from more socially critical genre pictures in the sixteenth century to more favorable or neutral portrait presentations in the seventeenth, though there are instances of each kind in the opposite century. But surely these images in either century appealed to different audiences and incorporated different social assumptions, which are not always made explicit in the individual analyses.

De Vries begins by noting that toil on the land was imposed upon Adam and Eve after the Fall, the moment taken as the originating moment of work for humanity and often illustrated in prints at the turn of the seventeenth century. Farming, especially abundant harvests, had formed a staple of aristocratic imagery from French luxury manuscripts of the early fifteenth century through Bruegel’s legacy. Later sixteenth-century allegories distinguish more generally between such labor as a virtue with a spade and its opposite, the vice of idleness. But, of course, farming is not a subject that called forth portraiture at all, and since most pictures were produced for urban consumers these genre images remained essentially stereotypes.

A surprising initial topic considers notaries as a major profession for images, although professional portraits of these public practitioners (sometimes in their combined roles as city secretaries) begins early in the sixteenth
century and marks a shift away from church vocations to secular clerks in cities. Such figures also held particular importance for painters in their roles of making official list of inventories. Individual portraits of identified notaries became far more prevalent in the seventeenth century as their profession became more specialized, even devising its own handbooks (first 1583). In this chapter de Vries also considers biblical subjects and allegories, and she assimilates the profession of lawyers onto that of notaries, adducing contemporary prints, particularly emblems and genre images (including negative examples). One regular source for her material remains Jan and Casper Luyken’s Het Menselyk Bedryf (“Human Trades,” 1694), which clarifies the social associations with each profession (for lawyers, “the stuff and slime of earth / and for a quarrel without worth”).

Preachers, too, seem an unlikely subject for a book about work, but their images held wider public interest around their galvanizing role as leaders of communities, for example, in the three cases of preacher portraits by Rembrandt (Mennonite Anslo, Remonstrant Wtenbogaert, Reformed Sylvius), as was the case for Lutheran leaders in sixteenth-century Germany. Learned as well as professional, these portrait subjects conventionally appeared either sitting behind his books or delivering a sermon from the chancel, which links these latter images up with contemporary representations of populated white-washed Dutch church interiors (though Catholic images also show preachers, including a Rubens drawing of a country church on view in the recent New York exhibition [2005, no. 107]).

The chapter on money more freely mixes satirical genre images with portraits (and overlaps in uncanny, if independent fashion with this reviewer’s recent chapter, “Money Matters,” in a book on sixteenth-century pictorial genres in Antwerp). While some sixteenth-century merchant-banker portraits display confident men of commerce in their workplaces, de Vries makes a larger point that money-handling became increasingly submerged (“hidden bankers”), rather than acknowledged, in portraits of rich men on display in seventeenth-century Holland. Despite the absence of title or markers of nobility in Holland, such sitters still insisted on avoiding reference to their sources of wealth in trade, in contrast to those portraits of learned professionals.

Lower in the social hierarchy portraits were not commissioned except on a corporate group level by guilds, but professions of freight haulers and
shoemakers still had their own representations. Sometimes craftsman’s pride seems to be a motivation, but there is also an emblematic significance of diligence and honorable industriousness, usually conveyed through depiction of busy workshop interiors. This fusion of virtue with craftsmanship also extends to the one representation of women’s work, the unorganized cottage industry of spinning and weaving. This activity became the epitome of female domestic virtue.

This useful and subtle study by de Vries deserves an English edition but only includes a short English translation of its Conclusions. Its imagery is generous and generally well produced. Its basic point holds lasting significance for art historians and social historians alike—for an urban visual culture Dutch imagery featured (“framed”) positive, often idealized depictions (or their opposite, idle caricatures) of various specialized professions in the celebration of diligent work itself.


With the advent of the religious controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Christians were forced to make tough choices when faced with secular authorities they perceived as acting against theological and doctrinal truth. Given the long-standing consensus surrounding the need for order, strong governmental authority, and a rigid social hierarchy, active resistance raised many dilemmas. It exercised the minds of intellectuals and commoners alike in both Germany and the British Isles in the early modern period. Open resistance to secular authority might easily be regarded as deliberately wrecking social and political stability and thus called for intellectual justification. Robert von Friedeburg demonstrates that such rationalizations for resistance in the early modern period increasingly made use of the language of self-defense. He endeavors to show how in the religio-political quarrels of England and Scotland from the Marian period through the seventeenth century, writers on the topic looked to the historical example of Germany, drawing upon the political and legal justifications for resistance to political authority composed there. He demonstrates that these Anglo-Scottish interpreters did
so with their own particular political and confessional circumstances in mind. The result was a borrowing that was both derivative and distinctive.

In undertaking this project, Friedeburg is exemplifying two prominent strands in the current historiography of the early modern period: the use of comparative history and the emphasis on reconnecting Anglo-Scottish history to events on the continent. His scope here is ambitious. The book is divided into two parts. The first examines the evolution of thought on the justification of resistance to imperial authority, and especially on the changing definition of self-defense. His analysis actually commences outside the chronological boundaries indicated by the title, taking in pre-Reformation precedents. Because resistance and rebellion were deemed seditious by all sides of the religious divides in the Empire, Protestants utilized the vocabulary of self-defense from an early date in the Reformation. Throughout the book, Friedeburg is primarily concerned with casuistry of legitimizing violence. The right of individuals to defend themselves and their families, the right of a community to defend its faith, and the right of magistrates to defend their own citizens—all of these came to be enveloped into such reasoning. Arguing for the right to resist secular authority was clearly a delicate matter, and German theorists did so carefully, wary of giving license to populations to engage in rebellion. Friedeburg shows how this thought was leavened by political events that revealed the vulnerability of the Protestant position within the Empire: the Diets of Speyer, the Smalcaldic Wars, the Peace of Augsburg, and finally the Thirty Years War.

In the second portion of the book, the scene shifts to England and Scotland. Friedeburg convincingly shows how influential German political thought was on the Islands (though perhaps not as influential as that from France). Although English and Scottish Protestants were “solicitous to know what passed weekly in Germany” (231), given the differing political, constitutional and religious realities in the Anglo-Scottish context, German precedents could not be applied unmodified. The fragmented and diffused sovereignty of the Holy Roman Emperor clearly offered considerable contrasts with, for example, the monarchies of Mary or Charles I. Marian exiles and Scottish Presbyterians nonetheless sought to apply German examples to Anglo-Scottish circumstances. The writings of David Pareus, Johannes Althusius and Henning Amisaus, in particular, were mined by English writers; Friedeburg’s discussion of Sir John Eliot’s selective translation and application of Amisaus’
De Jure Maiestatis is highly interesting. In sum, the sequential and sometimes overlapping layers of authority in Germany made the appeal to self-defense somewhat easier to make on the continent. The argument of self-defense in England was also constrained by the stipulations of common law. By the time of the Civil War on the British Isles, the debate had become highly polarized, with one side asserting the right to resist monarchical “tyranny” and the other denying the right to do so altogether.

This is an intensely scholarly work, drawing on an admirable array of published and unpublished material. Perhaps because the author seeks to cover such a large expanse of time in two separate contexts, there are some notable omissions. This reviewer would have liked to see the rarified discussions of resistance to monarchs and magistrates connected to the question of popular rebellion and revolt in this period. And while Friedeburg does from time to time give examples of how these debates impinged on events on the ground (especially during the Thirty Years War), this history of ideas seems somewhat detached from choices made for and against resistance by actual historical individuals and communities.

It should be noted that this text is a slightly modified English language version of Friedeburg’s 1999 work, Wilderstandrecht und Konfessionkonflikt: Gemeiner Mann und Notwehr im deutsch-britischen Vergleich, 1530-1669. The translation, or more precisely the author’s rendering into English of this book (no translator is indicated), is uneven, and occasionally clunky. This is especially unfortunate when faced with abstruse discussions of difficult legal technicalities that would already present a tough read. This said, Friedeburg has ably showed how theories of self-defense developed during an era when ideas about the relationship between individuals and confessional communities and the states that ruled over them were fluid, even if order, authority and hierarchy remained the primary concerns of nearly all political thinkers.

Alan Wharam’s books are excellent sources on the history of English law. Even the appendices to his books are fascinating reading. For *Treason: Famous English Treason Trials,* originally published in 1997 and now appearing as a revised edition in paperback, Wharam culled through transcripts of court proceedings to offer accounts ranging from the 1601 treason trial of the Earl of Essex to the 1916 trial of Sir Roger Casement and the 1945 trial of William Joyce, “Lord Haw-Haw.” In doing so, Wharam demonstrates the way in which treason was addressed in the English courts and explains the logic behind the laws applied to these crimes. As with his work, *Murder in the Tower: And Other Tales from the State Trials* (2001), Wharam provides clear, common-sense explanations to the reader, thus elucidating the workings of English jurisprudence while offering the next-best thing to a seat in these historical courtrooms. The thirty-three volumes of Howell’s *State Trials* (1816-1826) provided much of the material for Wharam’s current work, as well as the four volumes of Sir William Blackstone’s *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765-17769); Sir Edward Coke’s four-volume *Institutes* (1628-1644); and Sir Michael Frost’s *Discourse on Treason: Crown Cases* (1762).

As an infringement of the duty a subject owes to his monarch, High Treason was punishable in England by death until the passage of the 1998 Law and Disorder Act. As recently as the eighteenth century, Wharam explains, a convicted traitor also forfeited all possessions to the Crown, which penalized his family, as well.

In the case of Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, the case for treason began in his repeated failure to obey the orders of Queen Elizabeth I. He had been sent to Ireland to put down a rebellion and, instead, opened negotiations with the rebellious Earl of Tyrone. On February 8, 1601, Essex led a failed attempt at a coup against the queen, apparently assuming that he would be supported by a number of lords and others. When this support did not materialize, he took refuge in his own house, where he was captured. His treason trial began on February 19 in Westminster Hall, under the prosecution of Sir Edward Coke, Attorney-General.
Interestingly, as Wharam points out, most evidence was presented at the time in the form of written statements read by the prosecutors, who also answered any cross-examination questions, and the defendant was able to interject his or her own questions or statements. Essex's defense, that he had been threatened and undermined by the machinations of his enemies, including Robert Cecil and Sir Walter Raleigh, did him little good. He was condemned and was executed on February 25, only seventeen days after his failed coup.

Raleigh, himself, was tried for treason at Winchester in 1603 after the death of Elizabeth, accused of having taken part in a muddled plot to put Arabella Stuart on the throne instead of James VI of Scotland and of having plotted against the king in favor of Spain and Catholicism. Elizabeth’s successor, now James I of England, was predisposed to distrust Raleigh, having given credence to rumors spread by Raleigh’s enemies. Wharam points out that none of the evidence against Raleigh would have been admitted into evidence under modern rules, but despite the defendant’s requests, he was not even allowed to face or question his accusers. Repeatedly called “an odious man” and “a spider of hell” (30) by Coke, who was still Attorney-General, Raleigh finally pointed out that, had the actions of which he was accused taken place, they would not have constituted treason against James I but against Elizabeth, who was still alive at the time. Nonetheless, Raleigh was found guilty after only fifteen minutes of jury deliberation. After fourteen years of imprisonment in the Tower of London, he was released to lead an expedition to Guiana. Instead of bringing back the gold James I expected from the expedition, Raleigh returned in disgrace for having shed Spanish blood in a clash. The Spanish ambassador demanded that he be punished, and, apprehensive about having to deal with Raleigh’s national popularity, James decreed that the 1603 judgment be carried out immediately. Raleigh was executed by beheading on October 29, 1618. Ironically, Raleigh was convicted of the treason of aiding the Spanish but was ultimately executed for fighting against them.

The treason trial of Lady Alice Lisle took place at Winchester in 1685 during the “Bloody Assizes” of Chief Justice Sir George Jeffries. Lisle’s crime was having allowed two outlaws from the Duke of Monmouth’s defeated army to shelter overnight at her house two weeks after the battle of Sedgmoor. Lisle was convicted of having given aid to traitors, but only after
the jury returned verdicts of “Not Guilty” three times. Jeffries refused to accept this verdict and “in a great fury and a transport of rage,” he threatened the jurors with “attaint of treason” (86-7) unless they returned a Guilty verdict. Alice Lisle was granted the request of beheading instead of burning, but as Wharam points out, the alleged traitors she had sheltered had not been tried or convicted of treason at the time of her conviction—so technically, the basis for her conviction did not exist.

Alan Wharam, born in 1928, was educated at Christ’s College, Cambridge. He is a retired barrister and was a professor at Leeds College of Commerce and Leeds Polytechnic Law School before his retirement in 1988. His other works include *The Treason Trials, 1794* (1992) and *Murder in the Tower: And Other Tales from the State Trials* (2001).


It is commonplace to assume that the language of subjective natural rights is a key innovation of the seventeenth-century theorists Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke. Another feature of the familiar picture of their theorizing is that there is something distinctly modern about their natural jurisprudence. Allegedly, our modern languages of human rights and individualist politics are grounded in a tradition which stretches back to their “masterpieces.” Their major works are important and should be studied, it is often assumed, because they provided the foundations of modern political theory and because their ideas can still be conscripted into our own contemporary debates about rights, freedom, toleration, and the relation between individuals and political communities.

It is best to suspend any doubt about the historical validity of this commonly accepted picture if one wishes to enjoy Ross Harrison’s examination of “the great works of Hobbes and Locke” (1). Hobbes and Locke are Harrison’s main players, but Grotius and Pufendorf also enter the stage. The preamble to his analysis of these pioneers’ thought is a rapid and impressionistic sketch (chapter 1) of the sixteenth-century strains and political problems
posed by religion and religious warfare. There follow three chapters which focus on Hobbes, one chapter on Grotius and Pufendorf, and three chapters on Locke. Finally, in the concluding chapter Harrison takes stands on issues which are continuous with our contemporary political philosophy, and reflects on how modern political philosophers should read the texts of their early-modern forerunners. The whole study follows an admirably clear plan and is written with real ingenuity. Typically, Harrison begins with the basic building blocks of a system of politics and then pushes the thinker's ideas as deep as they can go; a particularly pleasing aspect of Harrison's work is that the reader has a sense of a gradual unfolding of the implications of the thinker's key claims. Indeed, this work poses few problems to the reader willing to endorse its starting-point, the paradigmatic understanding of the trajectory from Grotius to Locke.

The leitmotif running through Harrison's work is that the seventeenth century 'was a deeply sceptical age,' a century of 'the scepticism that erodes the possibility of objective moral truth,' as well as a century which began with warfare and conflict, with fear, 'danger, things falling apart' in a confessionally fragmented Europe (38, 41, 50, and 265). It is against the backcloth of doubt and turmoil that Harrison sets the works of Hobbes and Locke, who 'wrote amidst confusion, and so faced the real and pressing question of why and how there could be order' (5). Hobbes's *Leviathan* emerged out of a moral chaos, aspiring towards conceptual clarity and order. Its aim was to rebut Montaigne and Charron's sceptical claims and present a new account of natural law, meant to be indubitable and to hold true across religious divides. Subsequently, after Hobbes's clear-headed attempt to construct a naturalistic, non-confessional model of politics, Locke's answer to the sceptic—in particular, to the problem of why people are obliged to keep their agreements—brought God back into political theorising. After Hobbes's uncompromising statism, Locke's efforts also reintroduced the possibility of political disobedience. This difference Harrison explains by referring to the authors' divergent practical milieux: After the Peace of Westphalia and the Restoration of Charles II 'we have consolidation and systematisation' (135), resulting in a diminishing of concern with the doubt and turmoil which had acted as a stimulant to Hobbes's theorising. Whilst the *Leviathan* had been written as 'a plea for unity, strong government' in a context where the 'political world had fallen apart,' Locke's theory of resistance emanated from a context
where a strong, absolutist government seemed to be taking England in the wrong direction and where things could be allowed to fall apart temporarily (169).

Harrison’s study is an attempt to steer a middle course between the “Cambridge” contextual approach to the study of intellectual history and the idiom in which political philosophers sometimes work, extracting insights from the classic texts without a sense of time and place. Hence, on the one hand, Harrison distances the intentions of “the actual, historical, Locke” (244) from the anachronistic modern use of Locke’s ideas by Robert Nozick and others; but, on the other hand, he concentrates his interpretative efforts on an analysis of the consistency and coherence of Locke’s system. There appears to be no need for the modern commentator to recover the importance of works that are now gnawed by mice only. Even such authors as James I, Barclay, Hooker, and Filmer “are small part players, minor figures of only local significance” (170). Before reading Harrison’s work, I assumed that the result of such an approach would be either historically flawed or entirely derivative of existing historical scholarship. It turns out that Harrison’s account is partly historically flawed and partly derivative.

First, it is unclear to what extent “we have consolidation and systematisation” after 1648. Although it can now be said with hindsight that the religious frontiers established in 1648 were largely retained in early-modern Europe, another line of future development was suggested to Protestant contemporaries by France’s campaigns and the persecution of Huguenots, by the duke of Savoy’s decision to cease to tolerate Vaudois Protestants, and by the accessions, to the thrones of England and of the Palatinate, of the Roman Catholics James II and Philip William of Neuburg. It is not unimportant that Harrison believes mistakenly that Locke wrote the *Epistola de tolerantia* in 1689 (11), the year of its publication, and not in the winter of 1685-6. The poor grasp of historical specifics results in a failure to understand what Locke was doing when he was drafting the text.

Secondly, Harrison’s account is formed by a process of derivation from the existing interpretations offered by historians who stress the significance of the sceptical impulse for Grotius’s and Hobbes’s theorising. Here I must especially single out the names of Knud Haakonsen and Richard Tuck. Recently, however, there has been a growing disposition among historians to stand back from, and to question the validity of, this interpretative tradition.
Harrison fails to engage with the scholarly debate over the emergence of “modern” natural jurisprudence, and makes no mention of the important works by such prominent scholars as Annabel Brett, Quentin Skinner, and Perez Zagorin, who challenged Haakonssen’s and Tuck’s views in their publications in 1997-2000.

Leaving these concerns of an historian aside, it is most worthwhile to work through philosophically with Harrison what assumptions and arguments are involved in the replies by “Hobbes” and “Locke” to moral and political scepticism. Even if seventeenth-century specialists might not agree with his overall interpretation, they could profit from examining the conceptual issues with him. The argument is sophisticated; the focus tightly maintained; and the prose lucid. In sum, to the historically-minded reader Harrison offers a confusion’s masterpiece.


In this edited volume, which brings together a remarkable array of scholars across disciplines, Gerald Sandy proposes to study the classical roots of early modern France. Opening his introduction with a reflection on Étienne Dolet’s *Commentari Linguae Latinae* (1536), focusing more specifically on Dolet’s commonplace thematization of the shift from the middle ages to the early sixteenth century as a move away from a period dominated by “le Monstre d’Ignorance” to one dominated by an increasing interest in the study of letters (*bonae litterae*), Sandy highlights the ways in which the study of Greek and Latin (especially the former) participated in this cultural revolution. As expected, Guillaume Budé plays a prominent role in this volume. Indeed, as Sandy observes in “Guillaume Budé: Philologist and Polymath. A Preliminary Study,” France’s classical heritage is deeply indebted to “Budé’s incorrigible habit of unlocking the political, historical and cultural secrets of classical antiquity and putting them into the context of his own times as part of his campaign to hasten the demise of Medieval scholasticism and to gain for France her rightful place in the world of learning in western Europe” (105). Emblematizing the first wave of French humanism, Budé advocated the restoration, and return to, ancient texts. Budé not only continued to uphold the pertinence of
Latin but also called for the study of ancient Greek, an essential reason France became a cultural center of Hellenist studies.

Against this backdrop of an emergent national humanist French identity, other essays multiply the interconnections between antiquity and France. Translation, a tool that was key to expanding French understanding of the past, attracts particular critical attention here. In “Erasmus and Paris,” Douglas Thomas asks, “What would become of Erasmus if he had not found his way to Paris?” (109). In this speculative but suggestive article, Thomas examines Erasmus’ stay in Paris and the notable impact it had on the Dutch humanist’s decision to pursue both the study and translation of ancient Greek works. Several contributions turn to Michel de Montaigne (1533-92), who exemplifies the second wave of French Humanism. Alain Billault explores the importance of Amyot’s French translation of Plutarch for Montaigne, while Sue Farquhar discusses Montaigne’s other classical sources (such as Tacitus). The merits of Farquhar’s piece (“Michel de Montaigne: The Essais and a Tacitean Discourse”) lie in the author’s contextualization of Montaigne’s Essais, reading the work as a response to the “crisis of exemplarity” (211) characterizing the second half of the sixteenth century. Central to the question of exemplarity is the issue of imitation, and for Montaigne, as for many Renaissance authors, Socrates represents the quintessential “honneste homme,” the perfect example to imitate. George Huppert, in “Under the Shadow of Socrates,” looks at the ways Montaigne appropriates Socratic discourse, transforming himself into a “new” or “modern” Socrates (290). Huppert does mention Montaigne’s objections to “Socrates’ ecstasies and demon” (293), and while his reading is accurate, it tends to flatten Montaigne’s relation to Socrates, ignoring the essayist’s paradoxical representation of the Greek other: Socrates is natural and artificial, formed and self-forming, virtuous and ironic. Lacking any direct access to Socrates, Montaigne opts for a skeptical writing of the other, a questioning of his exemplarity, thus breaking with earlier, more idealizing approaches to the ancient philosopher.

The remaining essays address a wide range of topics: Rabelais’s ambivalent relation to various humanist discourses; the poets of the Pléiade; Anacreontic poetry; the interpretation of classical myths; the influence of Virgil and Ovid; Plautus and Renaissance drama; the relation of Roman Law to legal humanism; sixteenth-century emblems; and the debate of the Ancients and the Moderns (which focused on Nicolas Boileau’s translation of Longinus’ On the
Sublime). Finally, one contribution extends the discussion of France's dialogue with antiquity beyond the early modern period, examining classical architecture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

As this brief review makes abundantly clear, Sandy's volume is a testimony to the diversity marking critical perspectives on France's classical heritage. While the volume makes no claim to offer an exhaustive account of this problematic, a deeper discussion of Joachim Du Bellay's manifesto La Défense et illustration de la langue françoyse (1549), in which its author articulates the paradox facing many French humanists—to be moderns the French must imitate ancient writers, appropriate the discourse of others—would have added even more depth to this study. Though the articles compiled here are intended for non-specialists, some of them will surely stimulate the imagination of even the savviest readers of early modern France.
UNA "fantaisie" sur l'antique: le goût pour l'épigraphie funéraire dans l'Hypnerotomachia Poliphili de Francesco Colonna. By Martine Furno. Travaux d'Humainisme et Renaissance, 377. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2003. 333 pp., including 21 illustrations. 120 SF. As most readers of this journal know, the Hyperotomachia Poliphili has probably exercised a greater fascination on later readers than any other single book of its age. Published in 1499 by the great scholar-printer Aldus Manutius, it has attracted attention in part for its 172 illustrations, in part for its macaronic text, a unique combination of elements from Latin, Greek, and Italian. Part of its appeal, though, is certainly tied to the air of mystery that surrounds it. No one knows for sure, for example, who did the illustrations: was it Mantegna, or Bordone, or a Venetian atelier from Aldus’s circle? Who is the author: Franciscus Colonna the member of a collateral branch of the patrician family of this name in Rome, Franciscus Colonna the Dominican monk at the convent of Sts. Giovanni and Paolo in Venice, or another writer using Franciscus Colonna as a pseudonym, Felice Feliciano, perhaps, or Leon Battista Alberti? And what does this mysterious text, written in a mysterious language, mean?
Starting in the 1970s, scholars like Giovanni Pozzi have tried to shift attention away from the woodcuts, which have encouraged scholars to see the *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili* as an architectural book, to the text, which is a sort of mysterious romance novel. A modern edition and a facsimile reproduction of the original have appeared, along with an interpretation developed in the introduction to the facsimile edition that presents the romance as a sort of initiation into metaphysical knowledge. Furno’s book takes a different approach, attempting an interpretation based in Colonna’s culture and on his perception of antiquity. The inquiry focuses on Book 1, chapter 19, the chapter on Polyandrion, and on the part of chapter 18 where Polia, the heroine of the story, presents the temple of Polyandrion and the rites that accompany it. Furno offers, first, a text of these chapters, then a commentary to it, founded on the presupposition that Colonna’s antiquity is a mental construct resting on the principle of *accommodatio*: accommodation of architectural and archaeological elements, of ancient languages, and of models and literary genres. Detailed discussion is included about the lexicography and syntax of the Greek, Latin, and Italian as they appear in the text, along with mythology and sources. A series of appendices present the inscriptions found in chapter 19, beginning with a text and translation, then extending to a detailed commentary. The book concludes with reproductions of twenty-one woodcuts from the *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili*, along with a good index.

All this work leads Furno to the conclusion that Colonna knew some of the collections of inscriptions that were circulating in the humanist circles of his day, and that he tried to imitate the material presentation of these inscriptions in his book. He had a taste for, and knowledge of, architecture as treated in Alberti’s *De re aedificatoria* and Vitruvius’s *De architectura*, and he knew both common Latin sources like Virgil, Ovid, and Valerius Maximus and fashionable new discoveries like the Greek Anthology and Apuleius’s *Metamorphoses*. These sources were interwoven into a sort of argument by counter-example, designed to encourage conjugal love. A valuable part of the conclusion is a list of suggestions about what remains to be done by scholars who continue to be attracted to the *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili*: identification of the epigraphic collections Colonna used along with the medieval *florilegia* that he relied on along with direct access to classical texts, further study of the author (whom Furno believes to be the Dominican monk of Venice), and exploration of anachronism and historical ‘mistakes’ as a way to create a mental world that is
coherent and meaningful. Several pages on the inscriptions from the *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili* that in turn made their way into collections of genuine inscriptions beginning in the sixteenth century are of unusual interest.

A lot of work has gone into this volume, which summarizes the research presented in December, 2001 as part of a habilitation at the Université Stendhal in Grenoble, but in the end one wonders, at least in passing, if the results really justify the effort. Furno is quite honest in acknowledging that what she has discovered largely confirms the work of others: "les résultats de l’enquête confirmant, dans leur ensemble, les analyses de Pozzi et de Marco Ariani et Mino Gabriele sur la culture de Colonna, et son extraordinaire capacité à bâtir un imagier «beau comme l’antique» à partir d’éléments anciens, médiévaux et modernes. J’espère, simplement, dans les détails, apporter le regard du latiniste qui manquait, jusqu’à présent, aux nombreuses lectures qui ont déjà été faites de ce texte" (12). It may indeed be, as Ludwig Mies van der Rohe once remarked, that God is found in the details, but at a time when it is getting increasingly difficult to find publishers for worthy monographs, it would be better if the whole for one that did find its way into print turned out to be greater than the sum of parts that were largely known already. (Craig Kallendorf, Texas A&M University)

♦  *Girolamo Rorario: un umanista diplomatico del Cinquecento e i suoi dialoghi.* By Aidée Scala. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2004. 308 pp. + 9 black and white plates, 2 color plates. In her dense but enlightening book, Aidée Scala has done more than kindle interest in the little-known humanist and diplomat Girolamo Rorario. She has also performed a rare service to the profession and to Neo-Latinists in particular by publishing for the first time Rorario’s *Dialoghi.* The dialogues remained unknown until the 1930s, when the Friulan historian Pio Paschini wrote an article on Rorario. In the *Iter Italicum,* P. O. Kristeller recorded copies of Rorario’s manuscript in both Italian and foreign libraries, among which was a fifteenth-century codex held in a private Venetian library (la biblioteca Giustiniani-Recanati). Scala used this manuscript in transcribing the dialogues that make up the second half of her book. (Scala does not, however, comment on access to the Giustiniani-Recanati library or to the availability of the codex for future scholarly research.)

Few other reliable versions exist, probably because, as Scala notes, in the
strained political atmosphere of the early sixteenth century, Rorario distributed copies only to his literary friends and to his patrons. Scala reports that, besides the Giustiniani-Recanati codex, there are only two other fifteenth-century copies of the *Dialoghi* in existence, an eighteenth-century manuscript held by the rector of the Francesco Bassini seminary at Concordia and a copy in the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna. She has concluded that neither of these copies contains the author's final corrections, so she therefore decided to use the Giustiniani-Recanati manuscript for the most reliable transcription.

It is ironic, and perhaps bitterly so in terms of Rorario's legacy, that his *Dialoghi* should end up in Venice. Throughout his political life, as well as in his dialogues, Rorario remained virulently anti-Venetian. Scala calls him "filo-asburgico," referring to his loyalty to the Habsburgs, from whom the Rorario family received land privileges in the Pordenone region. Girolamo, who lived from 1485 to 1556, began his studies in Venice at the school of Marcantonio Sabellico, but was then sent to Padua against his will to study jurisprudence.

Like many Italian, and later English, humanists, Rorario prepared for the law, only to reject it. He decided that his prospects for a better career lay in "taking the tonsure," which he did immediately, remaining a member of a minor order until 1545. Probably in the same year that he gave up the ecclesiastical habit, he married the woman who was already the mother of his children.

Scala claims that the greatest turn in his life came when, in 1508, he was exiled from his native city for political reasons. His exile only confirmed his anti-Venetian sentiments, insofar as from 1509-1514 Pordenone remained under what Rorario would term the tyranny of Discord (a personification of the Venetian lion) in the dialogue *Fortuna*. The young man landed on his feet, however, in the Viennese court of the Habsburg emperor Maximilian.

He won Maximilian's favor and by 1516 was invited to the court of Naples to oversee the royal succession when Carlo d'Asburgo, Maximilian's nephew, came to the throne after the death of Ferdinand. Because of his proven abilities as a diplomat, Rorario next received the charge from Maximilian to make peace between Pope Leo X and Francesco Maria della Rovere, duke of Urbino (whom Castiglione soon immortalized). Here too he proved to be skillful, and his first mission to the court of Rome so impressed the Pope that he gave Rorario the title of *protonotario apostolico*. In subsequent years, he acted as Maximilian's *nunzio*, traveling on diplomatic missions to Germany,
France, Naples, and Rome. He later became a papal nunzio as well, serving with evident distinction throughout the 1520s and 1530s. In 1540, however, he returned in disgrace to his native city. The details of his fall from the pope’s service remain murky, although Scala suggests that Rorario’s disgrace was probably remediable. He chose instead to retire to private life, in large measure losing the fruits of many years of meritorious service.

According to Scala, Rorario wrote the ten *Dialoghi* between 1513 and 1520, during his service to Maximilian. She suggests that we regard the works as juvenilia both because they were written when Rorario was still young and because the dialogues seem to represent his first literary effort (he also wrote the *Quod animalia* and the *Heroica historia*, a parody of the *Orlando furioso*). Nevertheless, Scala makes the point that, despite his inexperience, Rorario “demonstrates a certain originality in his decision to compose dialogues in prose on the model of Lucian, a conservative choice anchored to a tradition of the past, that of Greco-Latin humanism, which was dying out” (44). This decision on Rorario’s part reflects the prevailing nostalgia of the dialogues (reminiscent of *Il cortigiano*) for a virtuous period in the recent past when ‘letters’ and virtue went hand-in-hand. The golden age for Rorario was chiefly an anti-Venetian world, but his dialogues are usually not specific on the subject. Scala points out how in both the first and second dialogues, the *Medices* and the *Fortuna*, Rorario interrupts the constant “divertissement mitologico-letterario” with satire alluding to anti-Venetian politics. His speakers are the same as those in L. B. Alberti’s *Intercoenales*, direct descendants of Lucianic satire: Mercury, Virtù, Charon, Justice, and Discord. In his preface to the dialogues, Rorario cites Plato (“divino tra i filosofi”) and Cicero as models of virtue and reason, but explains that he will follow Lucian in constructing his “personifications of the gods and of moral qualities” so that readers might more transparently read them for the novelty and interest of the argument. While this might be a valid aim and a potentially enlightening approach (as in Plato, for instance), in Rorario’s hands the dialogue format becomes a bit cumbersome. The allegorical “personaggi” tend rather to dull the acuity of the debate, in contrast to, say, Phaedrus versus Socrates (Rorario cites the *Phaedrus* as an exemplar of the triumph of reason). Perhaps, as Scala implies, Rorario’s politics interrupt the flow of the exchanges too frequently. Few political satirists weather the ravages of literary time successfully, and one must acknowledge that Rorario is not an exception. While the dialogues certainly owe something to Socratic
banter, in place of wit Rorario often resorts to prolix didacticism. Rorario’s shortcomings as a literary stylist, however, do not detract from the value of these dialogues as historical documents. They offer further proof—if proof is needed—that the humanist education of courtiers manifested itself in ambitious writing throughout their lives. More significantly, perhaps, the publication of the Dialoghi marks the emergence of a new sixteenth-century voice. That this voice issues from a man so well-placed politically, and so engaged in papal and Pordenese politics, underscores the importance of Scala’s contribution to the field.

Unlike many Italian scholarly works, Scala’s offers translated passages from the Latin dialogues throughout the preliminary discussion. Although a fair amount of untranslated Latin remains (apart, of course, from the Dialoghi, which still await translation), Scala has made an effort to make her summaries more accessible to graduate students and others. The writing is informative and, if not lively, also not as strenuously academic as in other, heftier tomes of Italian historical scholarship. The notes are minimal and largely bibliographic, with occasional textual emendations in the text of the Dialoghi, which testifies to Scala’s concern for brevity and clarity.

The reader pays a small price for this concern. For instance, the index contains proper names only, which is unfortunate since Scala introduces numerous topics—such as literary satire and court diplomacy—that a reader might have found usefully headed in the back matter. The bibliography is relatively short, which may reflect the paucity of scholarship on Rorario, although, for example, in the Giovanni and Gian Francesco Pico section, one misses recent titles by Francesco Bausi, Patrizia Castelli, and Elisabetta Schisto. Moreover, Scala takes a great deal for granted in regard to background knowledge of such subjects as the history of Friuli, papal politics, the ups and downs of La Serenissima, and even humanist figures—her references to such giants as Alberti, Pontano, and Pico assume a familiarity that at times seems to contradict her efforts elsewhere to be as informative as possible.

In general, therefore, Scala’s Girolamo Rorario is clearly a book written for scholars who already have a firm background in fifteenth-century Italian politics and who read Latin well. It promises to become a valuable addition to our knowledge of Juvenalian satire in Italy, as well as a confirmation of the popularity and instrumental force of the dialogue. The historical section of the book provides a useful complement to a period often dominated by
such writer-diplomats as Bembo, Castiglione, and Machiavelli. Rorario offers a fresh voice to the standard fictionalized testimonies of Italian court politics, and, in consequence, Scala's book will undoubtedly become required reading for any scholar interested in *umanesimo friulano*. (Raphael Falco, University of Maryland, Baltimore County)


The first story begins with Erasmus's edition of the New Testament, the *editio princeps* that contained the Greek text, a revised version of the Vulgate translation, and annotations. The book aroused strong reactions right away, with the champions of the new learning praising it and traditionalists condemning it as an attack on the authority of the church. It had been prepared in haste, and Erasmus immediately began to revise, consulting with a number of scholars, including Edward Lee, a prominent English cleric. The relationship degenerated badly, however, with Erasmus trying to get a copy of Lee's notes surreptitiously and Lee claiming that Erasmus published his material without attributing it to him. Lee published his critique in 1520, and Erasmus replied immediately with his *Apologia*, then followed a few weeks later with a fuller treatment, the *Responsiones*. Others were pulled into the controversy, with Lee ending up as the subject of several anonymous lampoons, at least one of which may have been written with input from Erasmus. The two men reconciled formally later in 1520, but Erasmus continued to harbor suspicions about Lee, claiming that Lee had provoked the denunciation of him to the inquisitor general in Spain that led to a formal investigation of his works in
The second volume records Erasmus’s disputes with Alberto Pio (1475-1531), the learned ruler of Carpi whose work for the French king, then the Emperor Maximilian, coupled with his marriage into the Orsini family, related to the Medici popes, made him an unusually powerful adversary. By 1525 Erasmus was hearing that Pio was denouncing him in Rome for being neither a good philosopher nor a good theologian, for lacking solid doctrine, and for being too close to Luther. Erasmus wrote to Pio and asked that he stop attacking him, which stimulated Pio’s *Responsio paraetica*. In it Pio mixes together the causes of Luther and Erasmus, but he made sure his lengthy letter did not circulate until 1529. Five weeks after it was published, however, Erasmus had finished his *Responsio*, a rhetorical masterpiece that uses anonymous reports, partial truths, and clever dodges to present its author as the innocent victim of Pio’s unprovoked attacks. Pio responded in turn with his *XXIII libri*, which makes its case by relying on quotations from Erasmus’s own works. At the heart of the dispute was a radically different conception of how the church should evolve. Erasmus measured current practice by invoking *sola scriptura*, the appeal to antiquity, to what was done in the early church; Pio rested in what would be called today a developmental theory of Christian practice, with the Holy Spirit working actively to bring greater maturity and progress to the church. Erasmus’s view of history, in other words, was humanistic, while Pio espoused the Biblical view of history as linear. The *Apologia* repeated some of the same points, but the colloquy *Exequiae seraphicae* extends the attack to a satirical treatment of Pio’s funeral. In his *Brevissima scholia* (1532), Erasmus responded once again to someone he obviously saw as a grave threat to his reputation. But even though Pio was dead, the controversy did not end, for friends like Guido Steuco (ca. 1497/8-1548) and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (ca. 1490-1573) defended him, as did Luther, thereby provoking Erasmus to write a *Purgatio adversus epistolam Lutheri* (1536).

The controversies unfolded in these volumes are of the utmost importance, for they place Erasmus into both the social and intellectual environment in which his life and thought evolved. The issues were important, both to Erasmus personally and to the life of the church in a key time of transition, and they shed much light on Erasmus himself. The portrait that emerged of his relations with Lee, as we have seen, is not always flattering, and his treatment of Pio is if anything worse, for Erasmus accuses his adversary of lying,
slander, misquotation, and misunderstanding, then of not being smart enough to have written his own books; ultimately he makes fun of his funeral and continues to attack him after he was no longer alive to defend himself. Even when we make adjustments for a different scholarly culture, in which the tolerance for polemic was higher than it is today, this is strong stuff. Yet it provides support for such interpretations as Lisa Jardine’s *Erasmus, Man of Letters* (Princeton, 1993), in which the disinterested scholar yields to a skilled practitioner of self-promotion who is determined to win renown in the world of letters. It is difficult to present this portrait through Erasmus’s side of the controversy alone, but the editors of both volumes, especially the second one, do a fine job of filling out the discussion by summarizing the views of Erasmus’s opponents and providing notes that explain otherwise-cryptic references in the text. Fascinating reading, this. (Craig Kallendorf, Texas A&M University)

♦ *La disputa contra Aristóteles y sus seguidores*. By Hernando Alonso de Herrera. Intro. by M.ª Isabel Lafuente Guantes, ed. by M.ª Asunción Sánchez Manzano. Colección Humanistas Españoles, 29. León: Universidad de León, 2004. 278 pp. The author of this treatise, Hernando Alonso de Herrera, is not well known today, but he is a significant figure in Spanish humanism, having held the chair in rhetoric first at the University of Alcalá, then in Salamanca. *La disputa* was published in Salamanca in 1517 and is important for a variety of reasons. It received a certain diffusion in the intellectual circles of Charles I and therefore merits attention by anyone who is interested in the culture of the time. As the title suggests, the treatise contributes to the reassessment of Aristotle that preoccupied many a humanist of the day. *La disputa* inserts itself in the debate between the rhetoricians and the logicians that, again, is an important part of Renaissance culture, and in siding with the rhetoricians, the author makes his contribution to the history of rhetoric in Spain, a subject that has been attracting a good deal of attention lately from scholars like Luisa López Grigera. And interestingly, it was written in both Latin and Spanish, so that while readers of this journal will approach the treatise with one set of questions, scholars of the vernacular will bring to it a different set of concerns.

That said, *La disputa* is not easy reading, again for a variety of reasons. The social, intellectual, and cultural environment from which it emerged has to be
reconstructed, and a reader of today will not have the easy familiarity with the characters in the dialogue and the positions they represent that the original audience had. Time has blunted the intensity of the debate, and the argument is not always easy to follow for an audience not trained in logic. The theme is introduced early: “Que las hablas nuestras no sean cantidades como lo enseña el mismo filósofo en sus predicamentos” (74). And it continues from there.

The authors have done a good job of making the treatise accessible, beginning with an extensive introduction that devotes forty pages to the role of rhetoric in Renaissance culture, followed by information on the life and works of the author and a detailed analysis of both the form and the content of La disputa. The critical edition in turn receives its own fifty-page introduction, which explains not only the criteria used in making the text, but also an analysis of the literary form in which the philosophical content is expressed. There is an earlier modern edition of La disputa, by Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, in 1920, but it does not contain the Spanish text. The edition of Lafuente Guantes and Sánchez Manzano is therefore more than justified and joins the works of such humanists as Cipriano de la Huerga, Pedro de Valencia, and B. Arias Montano in the series Colección Humanistas Españoles. The University of León also sponsors the journal Silva, making it one of the centers for the study of Renaissance Latin at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Translation and Commentary on the Lectures on Greek Rhetoric by Pedro Nunes (1502-1578): The Art of Public Speaking. Commentary and trans. by John R. C. Martyn. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004. xli + 718 pp. in 2 vols. This is essentially a partial transcription of a newly discovered manuscript, constituting an apparent series of lectures on Greek rhetorical theory by the Portuguese polymath Pedro Nunes (1502-1578; not to be confused with the Valencian humanist-rhetorician Pedro Juan Núñes, 1529-1602). Nunes’s main rhetorical authority is Hermogenes (ca. 160-225 A.D.), from whose On Issues (Peri tôn staseôn) he draws “the ideal structure for a forensic speech, with the [same] ten main divisions and subsections” (xviii). Nunes stood out for his mastery of Greek (“Certainly no contemporary had such a control of that difficult language,” asserts Martyn, xxvi). “Most of the Latin text is a re-working of the Greek used by Hermogenes and the para-
phrases by his major commentators, Sopater, Marcellinus and Syrianus” (xvii). The result is a 292-page Latin text laced out from the 1,280-odd lines in Hermogenes’s original. Martyn aids the reader with a glossary of Nunes’s technical terms and their English translations (xli). A twelve-page biography of Nunes reveals his experience as a teacher in a wide array of sciences (algebra, Euclidean geometry, Aristotle’s physics, theory of the planetary spheres).

In the blotchy, frequently hard-to-read manuscript, discovered by Martyn at the municipal library of Évora, the text of the lectures begins at folio 45; Martyn assumes the first forty-four folios “covered Grammar, Logic and an introduction to stasis-theory, through the scholia on Hermogenes” (xvi). The remainder is conveniently supplied in two volumes, enabling the reader to juxtapose the Latin in the first with the English in the second. Folio markings in the Latin and English, inserted into the running text, are the best key for laying a translation alongside its original. Paragraph numberings, which if consistent would have simplified Latin-English coordination for the reader, mysteriously appear, disappear, and resurface without apparent rationale, and sometimes out of sequence and in the original but not the translation. Latin misprints occur but, in my scan, do not obscure the meaning.

The task completed by Martyn is one of impressive compass and is quite serviceable. He has identified the places where Nunes merely quotes extensive passages of Sopater and the other commentators; I anticipate that here the mere fact of the Latin translation of these Greek originals will command interest. Martyn footnotes literary sources for the case-examples and provides occasional brief historical background notes, a bibliography (where J. IJsewijn’s superseded 1977 Companion to Neo-Latin Studies is cited, but not the substantial two-volume later revision), and an index of names. Scholars seeking to pursue and explicate the sometimes-recondite traces of Hermogenes’s influence in sixteenth-century rhetoric will surely find this work valuable.

Nunes is generally readable; sentence brevity is a mark of his style. (Martyn says Nunes cites Cicero only once. Maybe there is a connection.) Yet his expressions can occasionally be obscure; Martyn characterizes the manuscript as not in shape for submission to a printer. The translation ordinarily reproduces the clarity of the original, though the priority on literal rendering sometimes interferes with meaning. Here is an example, from Section F, “On the Pragmatic Issue” (De statu negotiali):
Dicitur autem negotialis, non ex eo quod litigantibus exhibet negotium, id quod efficiunt et alii status, sed quia in se ceteros complectitur, quandoquidem fere in omnibus tractatur, in coniectura, in finitione, in absoluta, interdum quoque in ceteris.

(228)

(Now it is called pragmatic, not from what shows its business to litigants, which is done by the other issues also, but because it embraces the rest in itself, since indeed it is usually handled in all of them, in conjecture, in definition, in quality and sometimes also in the rest. [615])

The underlined Latin should rather be rendered “not because it creates trouble for the [opposing] litigants,” if the expression ex eo quod is rendered properly and if one accepts the meaning of negotium exhibere alicui as at Cicero, De officiis 3.31.112.

Other translation problems may occur, such as in the following passage:

Praeterea cum duo sint in rhetorica causarum genera quae status accipiunt, deliberativum, et iuridicale, deliberativum quidem solus occupat negotialis. Omnia enim deliberativi genemi argumenta ad hunc statum rediguntur. (228)

(Furthermore, although there are two that the issues accept into rhetorical types of cases, deliberative and juridical, only the pragmatic issue in fact occupies the deliberative. For all the arguments of the deliberative type are brought into this issue. [616])

The translation attempts to have rhetorica agree with genera, confusion ensues. I think the meaning is: “Furthermore, although there are two types of cases in rhetoric, deliberative and juridical, which the issues embrace, in fact the pragmatic issue alone holds sway over the deliberative. For all the arguments of the deliberative type are brought into this issue.”

The manuscript, occasionally introducing case examples of principles, following Hermogenes’s own lead, nevertheless uses these examples sparingly. One gets the impression of a series of amplified source notes for lectures that will be supplemented with further illustrations upon presentation.

Students of early modern rhetoric who adjust for the flaws mentioned above will welcome this publication as a copious reservoir of evidence for how a renowned teacher handles Hermogenes, and will be grateful to Martyn for the considerable investment of labor which the project obviously entailed.

(Edward V. George, Texas Tech University, Emeritus)

The essays collected in this volume began in a conference held from November 10-12, 2000 in Naples, under the sponsorship of the Comitato nazionale per le celebrazioni di Giordano Bruno nel IV centenario della morte, the Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, and the Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento. Unlike many other Italian Atti, this set of conference proceedings begins with an introductory essay by Michele Ciliberto, “Bruno nel XX secolo. Filosofia, magia, ermetismo,” which positions Bruno in twentieth-century scholarship as a way to show which issues the conference participants were facing.


Although the editor notes (577) that some of the essays essentially consist of the texts that were read at the conference, in fact an unusually large number have been substantially reworked, so that they will stand as fully fleshed-out studies rather than simple conference papers. The essays range more widely than one might expect, covering Bruno’s relations with some of his non-Italian colleagues and paying special attention to his place among later thinkers and scholars. All in all, this set of conference proceedings transcends the limitations of its genre, offering a good number of solid, substantive studies on an important, yet enigmatic thinker. (Craig Kallendorf, Texas A&M University)

Argenis. By John Barclay. Ed. and trans. by Mark Riley and Dorothy Pritchard Huber. Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 273, Bibliotheca Novae Latinitatis Series. 2 vols. Assen: Van Gorcum; Tempe, Arizona: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2004. vii + 963 pp. Surprisingly, the Romans left us only two novels, Petronius’s Satyricon and Apuleius’s Golden Ass. Yet these two inspired many imitators in the Renaissance. A large number of Renaissance Latin novels survive, among them the two popular novels by John Barclay, the Euphormionis Lusinini Satyriam and Argenis, the latter first printed in Paris in 1621, a work which enjoyed some fifty editions in the next two hundred years or so, and was in addition translated into English, French, Italian, Spanish, German, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Polish, Russian, and Hungarian. Barclay was thus a figure of European renown, a British Neo-Latin writer famous also as a poet.
Like Sidney’s *Arcadia*, the *Argenis* is set in an imaginary landscape in imaginary classical times and owes a great deal to Greek romance. The novel takes its title from a central character, Argenis, daughter of Meleander, King of Sicily, who is in love with the brave Poliarchus and whose marriage to him after many adventures provides the triumphant conclusion of the tale. As with Sidney, the plot is hard to follow, but that is not really the point. The editors provide a helpful summary of the plot of the novel, book by book. These two beautifully printed volumes contain a well-edited text, with spelling and punctuation sensibly modernised. The editors have worked from the first edition of Paris, 1621 and have also been able to consult the printer’s manuscript of the work, which enables a few errors in the first edition to be corrected. The translation is slightly adapted from that of the obscure Kingsesmill Long, printed in London in 1625, the first of a number of English versions of this novel.

The editors provide a very thorough introduction to the work, giving an account of Barclay’s life and writings, and his activities as a controversialist and diplomat on behalf of James I. They discuss its reception and its latinity, and they show that many incidents of the novel parallel contemporary European political realities. Hence the novel has value as a political treatise too, providing comment on events in England, France, and Germany in particular. The work has many international connections and is dedicated to Louis XIII of France, whose queen was Anne of Austria, a Spanish princess by birth. Many topics discussed in early modern formal political treatises, such as religious toleration, taxation, the status of ambassadors, the pros and cons of a standing army, and the merits of a monastic life are also elaborated in this novel. From an early date editions of the novel were provided with a key linking its characters and places to the real world, and the editors reproduce this with their comments. Thus the character of Argenis can be regarded as “a proto-Marianne, the symbol of state power” (46); Mergania stands by an obvious anagram for Germania, and Hippophilus for Philip III of Spain. The authors also provide an illuminating account of the novel’s origins and its sequels, and print much ancillary material, including a Latin poem (with translation) on the death of Barclay by Raphael Thorius. The volumes reproduce a number of illustrations from early editions of the work. All in all the introduction is a thorough and informative piece of work, and it seems fair to describe the whole lengthy enterprise as a labour of love. Certainly it is a worthy addition
to the Bibliotheca Latinitatis Novae series, which is doing much to make important Neo-Latin works more easily accessible to a present-day readership. (J. W. Binns, University of York)

♦ Urania victrix—Die siegreiche Urania. By Jacob Balde, S.J. Ed. and trans. by Lutz Claren, Wilhelm Kühllmann, Wolfgang Schibel, Robert Seidel, and Hermann Wiegand. Frühe Neuzeit, 85. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2003. XLIV + 394 pp. 108 euros. In seventeenth-century Europe Jakob Balde (1604-1668) was one of the most celebrated German poets, chiefly because of the range and variety of his works written in Latin. Known as the ‘German Horace,’ his fame eclipsed the likes of Paul Gerhardt (1607-1676), Hans Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen (1622-1676), Andreas Gryphius (1616-1664), and Martin Opitz (1597-1639), authors who appear to be more important to today's readers. It is interesting to note that Opitz also wrote in Latin, like many of his fellow poets from the Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft (Fruitbearing Society), the first literary society on German soil, whose purpose was to standardize the German vernacular in order to increase its appeal to scholars and poets and to create a national literature that could stand up to what already existed in French, Italian, or English. In spite of these efforts, however, Latin retained its dominant status for those addressing an educated public, not only in German-speaking lands but in all of Europe well until the end of the century. It is in this context that Balde's fame must be viewed. In fact, Opitz's seminal Buch der deutschen Poeterey (1624), which led to a reform of German prosody, was itself primarily based on classical models such as Aristotle, Horace, and the humanist Julius Caesar Scaliger.

Born in Alsace, like so many important early modern authors from Sebastian Brant to Johann Fischart, Balde spent most of his life in Bavaria, where he became a Jesuit after an unsuccessful bid for the hand of a pretty baker's daughter. He is often referred to as Bavaria's greatest poet, and the many exhibitions and events organized in honor of his four hundredth anniversary in 2004 testify to a renewed interest in a poet that Johann Gottfried Herder and Goethe held in high esteem. He was an inspiration to many contemporary poets, both Catholic and Protestant, who translated some of his works into the German vernacular.

Urania victrix (1663) is one of Balde's very last works and remained
incomplete. Only the first volume out of three planned was published. An erotic epistolary novel written in the style of Ovid’s elegies, it depicts the struggles of the soul, represented here by Urania, in her effort to fend off the pursuits of the five senses, who are described as suitors competing for their chosen bride Urania (Greek  
uranós = sky / heaven). As the soul’s only and true bridegroom is Christ, Urania rejects all these obnoxious suitors for this heavenly union with much humor and wit.

The present work is an edited translation of the first two books of  
Urania victrix: Book I: Sensus I. Visus and Book II: Sensus II. Auditus. The note on page XLIV makes it clear that this translation was a collective enterprise of Neo-Latin scholars at the University of Heidelberg, but it also emphasizes the major contribution by Wilhelm Kühllmann, a leading Balde scholar, who wrote the introduction and also contributed a great deal to the commentary section. In their introduction the editors justify their choice of not including the translation of the books on the other three senses by pointing out that Balde himself gives a concise overview of his  
opus maximum in his isagoge, and that the importance of this work in literary history is sufficiently demonstrated by presenting an edited translation of the first two books (XXXIX). The present translation is based on the first edition from 1663, although all the variants found in the  
Opera poetica omnia of 1729 are listed in the critical apparatus, found at the bottom of each page with the Latin text. Only the critical apparatus for Balde’s introduction is presented in its entirety on pages 52-53.

Wilhelm Kühllmann’s introduction (vii-xli) is divided into three parts. First he frames this work in its historical and literary context. He then sketches Balde’s development as a poet and his poetic program, and finally discusses Jesuit censorship regarding  
Urania victrix. In the second and third part, he focuses on the two senses (visus and auditus) and presents a rich and detailed overview of the cultural context in which these senses were discussed from antiquity to Balde’s time. The German translation (1-203) is impressive, and the thorough commentary (205-372) testifies to the immense research invested in order to highlight philological difficulties and to explain the multitude of cultural and historical references necessary for the understanding of  
Urania victrix. The book closes with a useful bibliography and an index nominum.

In conclusion, this work reaches the standards to which all translations aspire but which few attain. The introduction, translation, and commentary are altogether outstanding and will provide a fertile ground for further scholarship for anyone with a solid reading knowledge of German. (Josef Glowa,
John Michael Herremans

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Moravian College)

♦ Pietas victrix—Der Sieg der Pietas. By Nicolaus Avancini, S.J. Ed., trans., introd., and with commentary by Lothar Mundt und Ulrich Seelbach. Frühe Neuzeit, 73. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2002. Nicolaus Avancini (1611-1686) has always held a special place in the history of German Jesuit theater, but until the appearance of the current edition, scholars have not had much access to his work. From the foundation of the Jesuits in the German Empire in the mid-sixteenth century until their suppression in 1773, German Jesuit schools produced an exceptionally large corpus of plays, written, for the most part, as the crowning exercise of the year’s course in rhetoric and performed before the students’ parents and the school’s sponsors. The majority of these plays are known to us only through the Periochen, or program booklets, that offered a scene-by-scene summary in German or Latin of the action on the school stage. In addition, hundreds of anonymous manuscripts of these and other German Jesuit plays still reside, unmined, in the state libraries of central Europe that inherited the collections from the earlier Jesuit schools. Only a relatively small number of German Jesuit plays were published under a particular author’s name, and those few writers (e.g., Jacob Gretser, Jacob Pontanus, Jacob Bidermann, Jacob Masen, Nicolaus Avancini, Franz Neumeyer, Ignaz Weitenauer, Anton Friz) have shaped the current literary-historical understanding of German Jesuit theater.

The dramas of the prolific Avancini occupy an important place in this literary-historical narrative, for his twenty-seven plays, written between the 1630s and 1670s, are held to exemplify a key turning point in the development of Jesuit drama. Before Avancini, Jesuit school plays were rarely performed in a court setting (the dramas performed for the Wittelbachs of Bavaria in the late 1580s and 1590s were a notable exception), and were presented for the most part on modest platforms with minimal props in the auditorium of a Jesuit grammar school. Audiences were mixed: parents and teachers, city administrators and clergy, but few nobles and, with the exception of Bavaria and some German and Austrian bishoprics, few members of the ruling house. In contrast, Avancini’s work was written in large measure for the nobility, and especially for the imperial house of Habsburg, and his plays were presented at the court in Vienna. The Pietas victrix, which recounts
the victory of Constantine the Great over Maxentius and the proclamation of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire in 312, was written to celebrate the crowning of Leopold I as the Holy Roman Emperor (August 1, 1658) and was presented in a lavish production at court on February 21 and 22, 1659. Although the students and teachers of the Jesuit school in Vienna acted in the play, the production was not a mere series of dramatic set-pieces and stichomythic dialogue inspired by Seneca, but an elaborate, visually exciting performance reminiscent of seventeenth-century operatic stagings in Italy. Characters cavort with devils and journey to the underworld during raging thunderstorms; there are earthquakes; battles on land, on sea (the Tiber), and in the air (between the Austrian eagle and the dragon of Impieta); flying angels and devils; parades in Hades replete with chariots drawn by fire-spewing dragons; a stunning re-enactment of the fall of Phaëthon from his sun-chariot; water ballets with Tritons and Naiads; triumphant victory parades culminating in an eye-catching joyeuse entrée, and carefully wrought tableaux vivants exemplifying the triumph of Christianity over paganism. In melding logocentric neo-Senecan drama with theatrical performance, Avancini achieved the Jesuits’ long-standing ambition not only to educate the spectators about the primacy of the Roman Church, but also to persuade them visually of this truth through awe-inspiring performances. His dramas also unabashedly advanced the Hapsburgs’ claim to Catholic political hegemony in Europe. This coalescence of theatricality and empire has been seen as the climax of the Catholic Baroque in central Europe. After Avancini, so the argument runs, Catholic Latin writing, indeed even Catholic literature in the vernacular, entered into a state of decline and gradually died out as the new north German (lege. Protestant) paradigm of the Enlightenment took hold.

In light of the critical position that Avancini holds in German and Jesuit literary history, it is remarkable that there has been only one modern reprinting of any of his plays: Pietas vicietrix, by the literary historian Willi Flemming in 1930 (rpt. 1965). The current edition is the first German translation—or translation into any modern European language—of this work. Pietas vicietrix exists in three contemporary printings: the work was published separately in 1659, and reprinted twice without the stage directions and copper engravings of the 1659 production in the second volume of the five-volume Poesis dramatica Nicolai Avancini (1669; 1675). Flemming’s 1930 edition contained only a few of the many stage directions in the text, none of the engravings, and no
translation. Lothar Mundt and Ulrich Seelbach have thus provided an enormous service to early modern German studies by making this text available to a broader readership. In addition to the play, scholars now have at their disposal all the ancillary material from the editio princeps of 1659. Besides the invaluable translation, the editors have also provided a historical introduction, a commentary, a fine bibliography of scholarship on Avancini and on Jesuit theater in general as well as of the historical sources to the play, and a useful list of textual variants among the three seventeenth-century editions.

The introduction provides the essential details of Avancini's career as a Jesuit and an overview of his prodigious output, not only as a dramatist, but also as a theologian, preacher, and poet. Based on the numbers of editions of his works, Avancini's fame rests not on his dramas but on his theological and meditational writings. His Vita et doctrina Jesu Christi (reprinted 32 times before 1750) continues the imitatio Christi tradition best exemplified by Thomas à Kempis, and Avancini's book was often printed together with the latter's work. The editors also review the remarkable range of Avancini's dramatic subjects—the Bible, ancient and medieval history and legend, the history of the Jesuits, the Thirty Years War—the place of drama in the Jesuit schools, and the political nature of Viennese Jesuit drama. They take pains to delineate the historical sources for Avancini's representation of the Constantine / Maxentius struggle, summarizing the deviations in the characterizations from the historical record in a helpful appendix. They also retrace the familiar connections between Avancini's dramatic panegyric of the Habsburgs and the concept of pietas Austriaca (following Anna Coreth's important 1965 study, Piaetas Austriaca: Wesen und Bedeutung habsburgischer Frömmigkeit in der Barockzeit), and they underline the connections between Piaetas victrix and other Jesuit plays about Constantine, and between the allegorical figures of piety, justice, good counsel (consilia), and hard work (industria) and the mottos of those ideal Catholic emperors, Leopold I and his father Ferdinand III. The editors could have noted as well the appearance of other characters from Piaetas victrix on the Catholic stage: the Louvain dramatist Nicolaus Vernulaeus, a royal historiographer of Ferdinand III, devotes an entire tragedy to Crispus, Constantine's elder son, and his fatal passion for his stepmother. Maxentius, Constantine's hapless opponent, had also appeared in several Jesuit plays as the tormentor of the virgin martyr St. Catherine of Alexandria, and his ultimate punishment at the hands of Constantine was viewed as retribution for this crime. The
editors admit that there are many topics still to be discussed that they hope their edition will inspire, e.g., the relationship of _Pietas victrix_ to other Avancini plays and the connections between Avancini’s dramas and his literary model, Seneca. To their list of desiderata, this reviewer would add the relationship of Avancini’s writings to other historical dramas, both Jesuit and non-Jesuit, both German and Latin. A consideration of the unusual popularity that _Pietas victrix_ has enjoyed in German literary history would also be welcome. I suspect that, in light of its inaccessibility and the declining Latin skills of scholars outside of the field, _Pietas victrix_ has seldom been read, yet the drama has almost effortlessly assumed canonical stature. Why has _Pietas victrix_ been accorded this special status? Why haven’t other Avancini plays displaced it? Could the success of this particular play be tied to the alluring copper engravings of the most dramatic scenes from the 1659 edition that appease the fears of literary historians that the German seventeenth century was unusually backward? Do the engravings suddenly give 1659 Vienna the theatrical panache of seventeenth-century Florence or Venice? Has the theatricality of the Italian Renaissance finally arrived in the German Empire through Avancini? These, too, are interesting questions to ponder, and especially important not only for the history of Jesuit theater and its place in the German literary-historical narrative, but also for the concept of the High Baroque in the German Empire. It is hoped that this edition will raise these new issues rather than merely reinforce the standard, and mostly uninformed, literary-historical positioning of this play.

The German translation has been very well done, although there are occasional moments of editorial embellishment of Avancini’s plainer Latin original (e.g., _lano pede_ (I. 2. line 225) becomes “samtweichen Sohlen”; or _miles ... viam / Per nostra castra ... ingentem ... scripsit_ is rendered as “ein Krieger ... eine gewaltige Schneise in unser Lager einzeichnete” (IV.6. lines 2979-2982). The difficulty in translating a neo-Senecan text such as Avancini’s into German lies in deciding on the best way to transpose Seneca’s compressed style into a language that often syntactically requires more words than Latin to transmit an idea. The editors have mostly succeeded in meeting this challenge, and stylistic infelicities arise in those few instances where they have not, e.g., _Prima lex regni est ..._ (Proludium; line 43) is rendered by the prolix “Die wichtigste Voraussetzung zur Ausübung der Herrschaft ...”, or _suspensa labris verba_ (I. 4. 517) as “Die den Lippen stockend sich entringenden Worte.” The editors are not consistent in
their translation of the names of the allegorical figures: sometimes they appear untranslated in the German version; at other times they are translated. This is most confusing with Consilium, especially given the semantic range applied to this word: at times it is rendered simply as consilium, meaning "good counsel," at other times as "Klugheit," meaning political prudence, a central concept in seventeenth-century political theory that is not necessarily consonant with ethical behavior. There are endnotes to many passages in the text in which historical and mythological references are explained, but unfortunately, there is no indication in either the Latin or the German text that the endnotes are present. The notes cover most, but not all, of the obscure passages: e.g., the reader will be left wondering about the underworld creature quisquis in vivam Leae / Paratus escam membra laniari doles / refecta saepe (I. 2. line 274), and Perusia (a city in Etruria) is unidentified in III. 2. Despite these minor omissions, the editors / translators have done an enormous service to German Neo-Latin studies, and one hopes that this new edition will inspire future studies of this prolific author and the many Austrian Latin playwrights (both Jesuit and Benedictine) who followed him.

A final note: This edition also serves as a warning for Neo-Latin scholars. The editors' account of how difficult it was to secure funding for the current edition (the text was ready for the press in 1989!) should alert Neo-Latinists to the challenges facing modern editions of Latin works in the current environment of declining resources for scholarly presses and research libraries. If the purpose of these time-consuming projects is to ensure that works previously buried in the archives are broadly disseminated rather than transplanted back into the libraries once the new edition of a few hundred copies has been printed, then digitalized publication of these works may be the best—and only—course to pursue in the future. (James A. Parente, Jr., University of Minnesota)

prose written in Latin between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. Anyone who has worked with early modern manuscripts and printed books will at some point have become furious with the citation practices of the past, in which material is quoted without reference to author or title, or with a misattribution caused by quotation from memory. Bertalot kept a file on this material, in which the first lines of early humanist poetry and prose were identified as fully as possible, ideally to author and title, but failing this to a manuscript in which a copy of the work could be found and / or to a modern secondary work in which it was discussed. The existence of this file was known for many years to scholars who were working in Italy, and after Bertalot’s death the German Historical Institute in Rome undertook publication. This was no easy task, in that the index was a handwritten finding tool in which many loose ends remained to be tied up. The first volume, covering poetry, appeared in 1985. The first part of the volume on prose came out some time ago, and the volume under review completes the series.

The series is not cheap, but it is invaluable. The two prose volumes contain 24,783 entries, including the first lines of individual letters in letter collections and obscure speeches surviving in very limited numbers of manuscripts as well as the beginnings of well known works whose opening lines scholars do not necessarily recognize out of context. Anyone trying to annotate a Renaissance Latin text, for example, will save hours of work by using these volumes. To be sure, the whole business is rather hit-and-miss, in that a comprehensive version of this index would take a team of scholars many years to complete. This index reflects what Bertalot knew, but in the tradition of German scholars of his generation like Paul Oskar Kristeller, he knew a great deal, and we are all the richer for it. (Craig Kallendorf, Texas A&M University)
del convento de San Marcos de León: dominio del ámbito europeo y olvido americano.”

For a North American Neo-Latinist, this volume may well be of greatest interest for the insight it provides into how our Spanish colleagues approach the field. Essays like those of Bécares Botas on historical consciousness in the Renaissance and Signes Codoñer on Erasmus and another famous humanist (El Pinciano) will seem familiar enough. Others exemplify things that Spanish scholars do especially well. The essays of Moreno González and Rubio Masao, on notarial documents about Pedro de Valencia and his family in the Archivo Histórico Municipal in Zafra, and of Viforcos Marinas and Campos Sánchez-Bordona on historical-bibliographical sources from the convent of San Marcos de Léon, show the kind of careful attention to archival material that is found in the best of contemporary Spanish scholarship. Spanish scholars also tend to pay more attention to book history than many North American Neo-Latinists, as the essays by Alcina Rovira, Fernández López, Salvadó, Navarro Antolín and Gómez Canseco, and Viforcos Marinas and Campos Sánchez-Bordona show. The essay by Álvarez del Palacio, Jover Ruiz, and Robles Tascón moves into the relationship between humanism and the history of science, something that is certainly done now and again by Anglophone scholars, but not often. Fully eight of the essays in this volume touch on some part of the relationship between humanism and religion—hardly unknown for Neo-Latinists beyond the Pyrenees, but a strain of scholarship that is often considered peculiarly Spanish, a topic that the honoree of this Festschrift explored in one of his last writings. Almost as many essays are devoted to matters philological, some as preliminary studies for the preparation of a critical edition, some as an edition of a short work with commentary, and others as observations on the text of key works. The essay of Domínguez Domínguez deserves special mention here as a masterpiece of its genre, a study focused on one word in Juvenal 5.155 that works systematically through medieval manuscripts and humanist printed editions to show that the modern received text rests on an unsupported conjecture of a seventeenth-century humanist and should be emended. The essays focus overwhelmingly on Spanish topics, which is typical of Neo-Latin scholarship in Spain.

The man in whose memory this volume was prepared, Gaspar Morocho Gayo, is the author of five books, along with more than fifty articles and forty
contributions to conference proceedings. He was also the guiding spirit behind the Colección de Humanistas Españoles, which now contains twenty-nine volumes (see the review of La difesa contra Aristóteles y sus seguidores, above), and the journal Silva, which has recently joined Humanistica Lovaniensia and Neulateinisches Jahrbuch as one of only a handful of journals devoted specifically to Neo-Latin studies. It is not easy to imagine a Festschrift worthy of a scholar like this, but the editors of this volume have created one. (Craig Kallendorf, Texas A&M University)

As the preface states, the contributors were invited to submit an essay that contributes directly or indirectly to our understanding of the problem of humanism and the Renaissance, in either historical or historiographical terms. In some cases, the connection is quite indirect, as with the second essay on fourteenth-century Parisian philosophy or the final one on Croce; in others, like the first essay on Dante, we are reminded that Italian scholarship does not necessarily approach this problem in exactly the same way as Anglo-Saxon scholarship does. The essays in this collection range widely, with some interesting pieces on non-Italian material complementing nicely the expected Italian-oriented ones, and most, if not all, are worth reading. As is increasingly the case with Italian essay collections, this one contains a good index, which helps considerably in making its contents more accessible. A worthy tribute, in the end, to one of the great Neo-Latinists of his generation. (Craig Kallendorf, Texas A&M University)
Proceedings of the Milton Society of America

Marriott Metro Center, 775 12th St. NW, Washington, D. C.
December 28, 2005

Secretary: A. C. Labriola, Dept. of English, Duquesne University,
Pittsburgh, PA 15282 (E mail: Labriola@duq.edu)

The officers and Executive Committee met in a preliminary session at 4:00 PM at the Marriott Metro Center. Present were Edward Jones (President), Laura L. Knoppers (Vice President), Labriola (Secretary), Diana Treviño Benet (Treasurer) and the following members of the Executive Committee: Margaret Arnold, Stephen B. Dobranski, and Thomas Luxon. Excused were Gardner Campbell, Angelica Duran, and Jeffrey Shoulson.

1. OFFICERS AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. The following members of the society were nominated for offices: Laura L. Knoppers for President; Paul Stevens for Vice President; and Mary Fenton and Gregory Machacek for three-year membership (2006-2008) on the Executive Committee, replacing Stephen B. Dobranski and Jeffrey Shoulson.

2. TREASURER'S REPORT. Benet indicated that the assets and net worth of the society as of July 1, 2005, were $11,500.00. Benet and Labriola stressed the importance of donations and space advertisements as sources of revenue in order to stabilize the cost of the annual dinner at $55.00. Benet will monitor the added revenues and report whether they are adequate to cover the mounting costs of the dinner and the increased expenses of printing the booklet, postage, and the like.

3. COMMITTEE ON SCHOLARLY AWARDS. Benet indicated that Joseph Wittreich will serve as chair. She has a list of other distinguished Miltonists (chiefly past recipients of the awards) as eventual replacements for the present committee members, Joan S. Bennett and John Leonard. All officers and members of the Executive Committee are urged to be in contact with Benet to nominate Miltonists to serve on the committee.
4. SECRETARY'S REPORT. Labriola indicated that his announcements are printed on pages 5-6 of the annual booklet. He announced the names of the members of the society who are recently deceased: Patrick G. Hogan, Roland M. Frye, Sister Hilary Yoggerst, Sister Hilda Bonham.

5. OPEN MEETINGS AT MLA 2006 in Philadelphia. The following open meetings, each 75 minutes long, were approved:
   A. “John Milton: A General Session,” with Laura L. Knoppers presiding;

   NOTE THE FOLLOWING RULES FOR THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MEETINGS:

   A. The chairs should have 8-page, 20-min. papers by 15 March (hard copy or e-mail attachment). Usually three papers are chosen, and the chair may appoint a respondent; or two longer papers may be selected, with or without a respondent; or a panel discussion might be organized. It is essential, however, to provide time for questions and comments by attendees.

   B. The chair must submit the names of participants, academic affiliations, and titles of presentations to Labriola no later than April 1st. Labriola’s E-mail (Labriola@duq.edu).

   C. Labriola will place an announcement concerning the open meetings in the upcoming MLA Newsletter; Benet will also include notice in her upcoming letter to all members; and the chairs of the open meetings are urged to publicize in other ways.

   D. All presenters must be members of MLA. If not, they must join by April 1st unless their specialty is something other than language and literature, in which cases they must seek, through Labriola, special permission for their participation from the MLA Executive Director.

   E. Chairs are encouraged to be in contact with each other to be sure that they are not considering duplicate papers and to call attention to papers that may seem more suitable for the other’s open meeting.
Approximately 85 members and guests attended the dinner and meeting at which Jones presided.

1. The nominees for office (see item 1 above) were elected by acclamation.

2. Labriola announced the two open meetings at MLA 2006 (see item 5 above).


4. The Irene Samuel Memorial Award recognized the excellence of the following edited commentary on Milton’s epic: Paradise Lost, 1668-1968, ed. Earl Miner, William Moeck, Steven Jablonski (Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 2004).

5. The featured address, “A Miltonic Life,” was given by Gordon Campbell.

6. Edward Jones, Professor of English, Oklahoma State University, cited Gordon Campbell, Professor of Renaissance Studies, University of Leicester as Honored Scholar of 2005.

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At the executive session after the general business meeting, the following were present: Knoppers (President), Stevens (Vice President), Labriola (Secretary), Benet (Treasurer), Arnold, Campbell, Duran, Fenton, Luxon, and Machacek of the Executive Committee.

1. Labriola and Benet were reappointed Secretary and Treasurer, respectively.

2. Benet was empowered to choose a site for the 2006 dinner and meeting in Philadelphia.

3. David Loewenstein was the nominee for Honored Scholar of 2006.