

false solution, seemingly effective in the short run, but ultimately untenable in a Massachusetts and a New England whose social and cultural diversity was only increasing, and whose demands for justice were multiplying. (Winship does not make the connection himself, but his ominous conclusion reminded me of false solutions being pursued since September 2001.)

Following the cue of David Hall, many scholars of Puritan New England like Peterson, Cooper, Erik Seeman, and Laura Henigman have been focusing their attention on the laity more than the clergy. One could wish Winship had turned his archival mastery toward greater attention to the perspective of the laity, since his narrative history approach strays toward a top-down account. One also might have wanted Winship to widen not only the social but also the cultural context, since, except for nods to the presence of Native Americans and of England, his account keeps Puritan leaders eerily segregated from other dimensions of colonial life. Here I am thinking of exciting new scholarship on the economy and on masculinity. But these are quibbles about what is otherwise a tightly conceived and compelling contribution to the field.

Matthew Glozier. *The Huguenot Soldiers of William of Orange and the Glorious Revolution of 1688: The Lions of Judah*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002. xi + 228 pp. + 4 illus. \$69.95. Review by EDWARD M. FURGOL, NAVY MUSEUM, WASHINGTON NAVY YARD, D.C.

As an early modern military historian the title of the book excited me, and I approached it with enthusiasm. I anticipated comparisons with other itinerant groups (Irish Roman Catholics and Scottish Presbyterians, for instance), as well as a work that would answer questions regarding numbers—whether of officers' origins or casualties—usually asked by military historians. However, the book failed to meet those expectations.

The author divides the 148 pages of text into seven chapters plus an introduction and epilogue. The first two chapters, dealing with French Huguenots in France and the Revocation of the Edict

of Nantes, occupy almost a third of the book. In them Glozier makes the case that military activity had attracted the noble Huguenots before the Revocation led to exile of thousands of all classes. Chapters three-five (another third) examine the post-1685 military experiences of Huguenots in The Netherlands and England. Glozier makes the point that William, as Prince of Orange, and the Dutch state (unlike James II and VII) readily employed the refugees in their militaries. James, who had to accept the exiles to cover his re-Catholicization policy, condemned the entire group regardless of social class or previous loyal military service to the French crown as “republicans” (49). His employment of the Huguenot earl of Faversham as commander-in-chief of the Royal Army ran contrary to his general negative perspective. Indeed James thought the only suitable military service for the martial exiles enlisting in Britain was as auxiliaries of the Emperor Leopold against the Turks in Hungary (96-7). Glozier corrects earlier views of the Huguenots being a major presence in the English army pre-1689. While William and the Dutch state in their respective armies employed only limited numbers of Huguenots in 1685-88, they readily accepted them as volunteers and incorporated them in the British brigades in Dutch service, illustrating a linkage of French, Dutch and British Protestant aspirations. In William’s 1688 invasion army they accounted for a fifth of the 21,000 troops (chapter six). More importantly their extremely ferocious loyalty to Calvinism and antipathy to Roman Catholics made them ideal instruments in opposing a king suspected of emulating the practices of their persecutor—Louis XIV. The advent of war in Ireland presented William with a genuine security threat that could divert British military resources from the main confrontation with France. He met part of the need for additional troops by creating a double strength Huguenot cavalry regiment and three battalions of infantry not only from his invasion army but also from recruits from France, Switzerland, Brandenburg and The Netherlands. Fired by their anti-Catholic zeal (71, 105) and view of William as a liberator (107), these troops greatly contributed to Williamite success in Ireland, sadly not free from atrocities (chapter seven). Nearly six

hundred of these veterans settled on the Portarlington estates of the Huguenot earl of Galway. The able-bodied survivors of the Irish campaign served in Flanders until the war ended in 1697, and suffered from the worst level of arrears of any units on the British establishment. The Huguenots' failure to secure other emigrants from France and the attrition of war reduced their numbers. In 1697-99 William contemplated using the Huguenot veterans to stymie Louis' Mississippi Valley ambitions, but the French moved first. Despite their unstinting service to Great Britain, the English Parliament treated them with the same disdain that it had for William's other foreigners. Galway's disastrous defeat at Almanza in 1707 eliminated the Huguenots as a separate military entity. Their descendants featured in the British army and navy throughout the 1700s, and seem even abandoned the French nobility's antipathy to bourgeois activities by forming joint stock companies and participating in skilled crafts. Glozier sees the Huguenot military refugees as an important, but limited influence on European and British military history.

The book would have benefited from critical editorial services. The lengthy introduction to the main topic of Huguenot military service with Protestant armies seems tangential. Glozier provides a chart indicating Huguenot connections with James in 1685-88 (4), but why is none provided for William? Material is unnecessarily duplicated, such as the French population in 1629 given twice (13), and the number of Huguenot exiles (37, 41). The author refers to pre-1685 Huguenot military service outside France before 1685 (40), but provides no numbers. He states both that each Dutch province paid the national regiments (causing a disparity in pay/maintenance rates) and that the States General paid them equally (51). He lists both de Tersay's (1668) and de Mauregrault's (1664) as the oldest French regiments in Dutch service (58). He provides conflicting numbers of Huguenots commissioned by William in his three senior regiments on the eve of invasion (50 on 63 and 88 on 65). He initially claims Protestant constitutionalist militancy appeared to the British brigades in The Netherlands after 1685 (74), but later claims it had started in the

late 1670s (78), which he reinforces by citing James' view of them as disloyal to the crown in 1685 (85). Surely it was Scottish Episcopalians who gave their loyalty to James and not the "Presbyterians" cited by Glozier (89)? No manuscript sources are listed in the bibliography, although they are cited in the notes.

Other problems exist. Why does the discussion of French officers in Dutch regiments (1670s-1680s) lack a chart or graph (59-60)? Glozier's referring to the three English and three Scots regiments as the "Anglo-Dutch brigade" (chapter four) runs contrary to generations of Scottish historiography. Closer attention to numbers would have helped. For instance, we learn that Huguenots replaced English captains in the English brigade, but were there only three of them (79) and did that matter? Glozier likewise claims that William commissioned "known political renegades and refugees" from Britain (86), yet fails to quantify the trend. That matter becomes more important when he refers to 43x53 officers from the British brigades leaving to serve James, but does not provide information on the origins of their replacements (86-7). It is highly unlikely that twenty-six infantry regiments contained only "seven hundred and eighty men" (118). The author uncritically accepts Marshal Schomberg's condemnation of the military qualities of the Williamite Ulstermen (118), who held Londonderry against James' army and defeated a portion of it in the field. He refers to heavy Huguenot losses during the Carrickfergus and Limerick sieges, and the battles of the Boyne and Aughrim, but provides no numbers (119, 122-3, 125, 127). The author notes that in the September 1690 campaign the Huguenots served in the advance guard with Danish and Dutch troops, but provides neither numbers nor proportions (125). Why does the appendix list only seventy-one Huguenot officers in the regiments used in Ireland, when the author states that 510 men served in that capacity (130)? Glozier states that had Irish campaigns not become necessary, that the Huguenots would have been "expanded and depleted" in Flanders (133); I fail to see how that fate differs from what they actually experienced. William knew he had a loyal corps of troops with nowhere to go and he seems uncon-

cerned about husbanding them as a tactical reserve. Quoting a renegade Scots Whig (James Montgomery of Skelmorlie) that William only landed in 1688 to seize British men and money for his war against France (136), completely overlooks the geopolitical disaster that would have engulfed Britain in wake of a French victory in Flanders. Although citing four Huguenot military memoirs for the 1689-97 campaigns, Glozier does not seem to utilize them to any great extent. He rightly notices the assimilation of the Huguenots into British Protestant society after the first generation (138-9, 148), but fails to say how long the process took. In the age of electronic typesetting, why did the press release a book with endnotes instead of footnotes?

The book indicates solid research, but suffers from the problems listed above. The book could have been longer, including extensive lists of Huguenots in Brandenburg, Dutch (both William's and the republic's army) and British service. Or it could have appeared in the form of two dense articles—one detailing Huguenot service in Protestant armies, 1685-88, and the second examining their military achievements from 1689 to 1707. A longer work would have allowed for a comparison of the Huguenot experience abroad with Irish Roman Catholics and Scottish Presbyterians. The exclusion of that analysis limits the book's value as a major contribution to early modern military history. However, its correction of previous historians and assemblage of useful data in one place make it a valuable starting point for early modern French, British, Dutch, and military historians.

Toby Osborne. *Dynasty and Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy: Political Culture and the Thirty Years' War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. xii + 304 pp. \$65.00. Review by MICHAEL R. LYNN, AGNESSCOTT COLLEGE.

The duchy of Savoy has received relatively little attention from historians outside of the Italian peninsula. The first half of the seventeenth century has proven particularly hard on the potential inclusion of Savoy in ongoing historiographical debates and dis-