

**THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF
TRADE UNIONS: A LOOK AT TURKEY/EU RELATIONS**

A Senior Scholars Thesis

by

KRISTINA LYNNE YOUNGBLOOD

Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as

UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR

April 2008

Major: Political Science

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Approved by:

Research Advisor:
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ABSTRACT

The Role of Domestic Factors in the Formation of Trade Unions:
A Look at Turkey/EU Relations (April 2008)

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Liberal theories of trade suggest that free trade benefits everyone involved. To facilitate trade specifically, but also economic transactions more generally, states create international institutions. However, not all states are admitted into international trade institutions. Why are some states excluded from institutions that facilitate free trade and economic transactions and others denied, when existing theories suggest that all member states ultimately benefit?

To answer the broad question I studied Turkey and the European Union (EU). Turkey was officially admitted as a candidate country to the EU in 1997. Despite efforts to meet EU demands, Turkey's admittance has been blocked. As recently as 2007 Turkey was denied membership, while Romania and Bulgaria were both admitted into the EU.

To explain why Turkey was denied entrance to the EU and Romania and Bulgaria were admitted, I use the Selectorate Theory. The Selectorate Theory states that to remain in

power leaders need to provide their winning coalition with public and private goods such as tax cuts, security, and even jobs. Public opinion in a country should relate to the leaders position on an issue.

To test the hypothesis that public opinion influences EU country leaders' policy positions on Turkish ascension I use two methodologies. The first method is a statistical analysis of the connection between public opinion over Turkish ascension and subsequent government positions on enlargement. The second is a comparative case study of Romania and Bulgaria and their road to EU membership.

The data was obtained from the Chapel Hill Political Party Dataset and Eurobarometer. After controlling for confounding factors, such as salience, dissent, and economic ties to Turkey, public opinion was shown to have a significant effect on the leaders party's public stance on integration.

The case studies chronicle Bulgaria and Romania's road to EU membership through European Commission. I highlight the main problems of each country and analyze their efforts to reform while contrasting them to Turkey.

A leader's desire to stay in power causes them to pursue favorable policy. Turkish membership is not favorable policy in contrast to Bulgarian and Romanian membership, which was good policy.

DEDICATION

For the little guy; without whom I could not have taken the path less traveled.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Koch for agreeing to guide me through this process. If it were not for his help, this idea would have died with an e-mail in September of 2007. As a BA in political science I had never worked with statistics before and his help in this area will never be forgotten. I also want to thank Dr. Koch for giving me a template to use when forming my arguments. I will never forget: Problem, What Everyone Else Says, So What, and Theory (which needs to be described in the paper).

I would also like to thank Dr. Pacek for sparking my interest in Turkey and Jason Smith for his help on my search for relevant data.

Without the help of Zachary Roberts, for reading various versions of this paper until he wanted to strangle me, this paper would be less organized and without commas.

Calli Fischer took on the daunting task of reading the paper in its entirety on a sunny spring day when she would rather of been sun bathing. Thank you Calli, although I probably saved you from skin cancer.

NOMENCLATURE

EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
EEC	European Economic Community
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
EU 15	First 15 EU Members
Commission	European Commission

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the dramatic increase in the number of trade blocs, or trade unions, has become one of the major developments in international relations. More than one-third of all trade in the world occurs within regional trade agreements (World Bank Staff 2000). States form trade blocs in order to reap the benefits of free trade from proximate states. In addition to the gains from trade, states benefit in other ways as well. As noted in 2000 by the World Bank Staff, “There may be perceived benefits from using a regional agreement as a basis for increasing security against nonmembers, and there are some examples where this has occurred”. The best example for this benefit is the European Union. The second benefit “is bargaining power...The EU has probably been able to secure more in some international negotiations than its member states could acting independently” (World Bank Staff 2000). The third benefit is ‘lock-in,’ and relates to the effect of the regional agreement on domestic politics. Attempts at reform are often undermined by expectations of reversal. A regional agreement can provide a “commitment mechanism” for trade and other policy reform measures (World Bank Staff 2000).

This thesis follows the style of *American Political Science Review*.

Given these substantial benefits, countries regularly form trade blocs. However, some states are paradoxically excluded from entrance into international organizations while others are included. The current research does an inadequate job of explaining this conundrum. Why are some states allowed access to international institutions that facilitate free trade and economic transactions and others denied, when existing theories suggest that all member states ultimately benefit? This dilemma is particularly applicable to the context of Turkish admittance to the EU.

The European Union (EU) is one of the oldest trade unions functioning today. Originally envisioned as a coal and steel community between France and Germany the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (EEC) formed in 1947 as a response to the US Marshall Plan (Dinan 2005). From those humble beginnings the EU has grown to incorporate most of the European continent and is no longer simply the economic community that its founders envisioned, but a multinational democratic government with ordinances and requirements for entrance. Membership in the EU provides status, opportunities, and security to European countries. To become a member of the EU a country must comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, which are rules regarding a country's democratic institutions, protection of minority and human rights, and market economy. Recently, the EU added many Post-Communist countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, proving that the EU can forgive a country for being non-compliant upon application for membership. Turkey is a European country with a questionable past that has sought membership in the EEC/EU since its creation.

The relationship between Turkey and the EU is both special and long enduring. Kemal Ataturk came to power in the newly created state of Turkey after World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. As the founder of modern Turkey, he implemented the European tactic of nationalism to create a unified new state. Turkey was established as a secular state, without regard to religion, using European governments as a model. Shortly after the establishment of the EEC, Turkey began the process for admission to the organization; its first official application was in 1959 (European Commission 2007). Originally denied membership, Turkey was allowed to enter into a special arrangement with the EEC. Because of their special relationship and geographic closeness, Turks are the largest non-EU population living in Europe, over 3 million (European Commission 2004). This special relationship continued to evolve until recently when Turkey applied for membership to the EU in 1987 (European Commission 1993). Twenty years later, in 2007, Turkey's dream of membership was once again put on hold despite the many benefits that Turkish membership would bring to the EU.

Trade and economic gains are not the only benefits that Turkish membership to the EU would bring. Stability in the Middle East and Caucasus is one desirable and likely effect of Turkish/EU involvement. Turkey serves as a model to other Muslim countries in the world as they try to balance democratization and religion, creating secular states instead of countries ruled by Islamic Law. Europe is an aging region with many countries experiencing negative population growth; admission of Turkey would offset this

negative growth and provide a source of young labor willing to pay into the welfare systems of Europe. Energy is a resource that would benefit from Turkish membership to the EU. Turkey would provide “better energy supply routes for the EU” (European Commission 2004).

By examining the case of Turkey and why its attempts at membership into the EU have been continually denied over the past 20 years I attempt to discover the rationale behind the decision. I attempt to broaden the understanding of the evolution of trade unions by answering the question, “Why are some states allowed to join and others denied?”

Declining population levels and a growing need for labor among EU countries would seemingly predict a greater likelihood for Turkey’s acceptance into the EU, particularly given its membership in other Eurocentric organizations such as NATO; unfortunately this is not the case. Turkey is a major political actor in a region where Europe has little influence. Turkey sits primarily in the Middle East, an area rich in oil with historical ties to the Balkan Regions (Rouleau 2000). There are several reasons to admit Turkey, not the least of which would be adding a Muslim voice in the struggle to stabilize a conflict-ridden region for the EU (Rumford 2001).

The advantages of EU membership for democratizing countries are numerous as are the advantages gained by the EU from interaction with other countries. When a country applies for membership to the EU they are challenged to improve until they become compliant with EU policies and practices. The recent EU enlargement to include Post-

Communist countries is a contemporary example of the EU expansion policy. The selectiveness of the enlargement leaves room for interpretation of the results. Of the applicant countries in 2004, three were initially denied admission to the EU. Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey were the three countries given a second chance to become members of the EU. The year 2007 was proposed as their next opportunity to join the EU. January 1, 2007 came and only two new member states were brought into the EU. Romania and Bulgaria became the 26th and 27th member states of the EU, leaving Turkey still awaiting its chance to join the EU.

After a close look at the two admitted countries, it is not difficult to see the inconsistencies. Romania and Bulgaria continued to suffer from the same problems that the EU Commission outlined in their first responses after the applications of the two countries. Turkey's evaluation noted significant improvements in all areas improvements that were unparalleled in Romania and Bulgaria during their accession process. Turkey offers a functioning market economy and a gateway to Middle-East democratization for Europe; however the EU is hesitant to integrate with Turkey. Why were Romania and Bulgaria admitted to the EU, with less to offer and less compliance than Turkey? Why was Turkey denied membership, when membership clearly benefits both parties?

To answer these questions, I apply the "Selectorate Theory" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) which argues that leaders desire to stay in power coupled with the political

institutions within their states, creates varying incentives over policy choices that are not always congruent with the broader well being of a state's citizenry. To prove the validity of the theory in this context, I use descriptive historical analysis of the accession process to demonstrate the preferential politics influencing the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, despite their problems. Additionally, I employ survey data from European countries about their attitudes towards Turkey and compare it to the leading party in government's position on European integration. Ultimately, analyzing the case of Turkey is important because it addresses the larger question of why some countries are excluded from trade unions despite the prevailing belief that all member nations benefit when nations combine their efforts (World Bank Staff 2000).

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Liberal theories of trade suggest that free trade benefits everyone involved. Free trade, as defined by the Center for Trade Policy Studies, is the “lowering and elimination of barriers to trade” (Griswold 2005). Going back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, free trade allows states to use their comparative advantages most successfully and leads to an increase in goods available and lowers prices (see Krauss 1997). A simple example of the law of comparative advantage would be a law office considering hiring a secretary. Currently in the law office, the lawyer answers his phone calls, does his running to the court, and types his own briefs. If the lawyer hires a secretary he has more time to take on cases because he can delegate office management to his secretary. Even if the lawyer is more efficient at running the office than the secretary, it is still to his advantage to hire a secretary freeing up more of his time for the higher paying aspect of his job (Krauss 1997).

While economics are important factors in the formation of trade unions, the spillover benefits such as security are just as important. Realist political theory is the philosophy that the international community is in a constant state of anarchy because there is no sovereign governing the world. Survival is the most important goal of the state, and security is the ultimate public good that a state can provide. National security policies vary across nations; international organizations bring congruence on policy and

procedures to the anarchic international system. The model of complex interdependence proposed by Koehane and Nye stresses the roles of international world organizations and lessens the influence of individual security policies. Furthermore, increased trade volume between states also has spillover effects, one of which is an increase in security (Koehane and Nye 2000).

Upon exiting the state of nature, countries became interdependent upon each other for peace. It follows that the international arena is governed by the interdependent actions of states. Countries depend on each other for their prestige, economies, military stability, and communications. “Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Koehane and Nye 2000). The interdependence argument states that countries that are dependent on each other for benefits are less likely to escalate to conflict because they fear losing the benefits that they currently receive.

Democracies are seen as the ideal political structure for interdependent organizations because of their very nature. According to the democratic peace theory democracies do not go to war with each other. There are many explanations offered for this theory but the two most important are the shared cultural values argument and the interdependence argument. Among democracies there is a common norm of resolving differences via bargaining and compromise. This makes warfare less likely even if disagreements arise

between democracies. These interdependent relationships lead to research within the democratic peace literature (see Rousseau, et al. 1996) that states countries that trade together are more peaceful with one another (Reuveny and Kang 1996; Oneal et al. 1996).

International institutions provide a central authority figure to govern the international world, allowing for cooperation. In the book *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Robert Axelrod (1984) explored the ways that nations arrive at cooperation without a central authority figure. The study of international relations is similar to a prisoner's dilemma, where cooperation is the goal for both actors; however, the fear of defection from the opposing actor increases the likelihood that both countries will defect. The prisoner's dilemma is defined as a circumstance with two actors, in which a choice to defect or to cooperate must be made independently. According to Axelrod, a true prisoners dilemma is one in which the participants must make a choice. The choice results in an ordering of outcomes to where mutual cooperation is more desirable than mutual defection, but that defection is most desirable, and the least desirable situation is cooperation when the other defects.

In the international context, his theory can be applied to trade. Nations erect trade barriers to keep their domestic constituents happy. Trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas often have negative effects on trade and the economy in participating countries. Individuals often see trade barriers as protecting their livelihood, when instead they are

lowering their income potential. Free trade is a state of mutual cooperation between participating member states where both member states choose not to erect trade barriers. Free trade reduces the price of goods in the participating countries because there is not a scarcity imposed by a quota and there is no tariff to pass onto the consumer. To facilitate trade, specifically in addition to economic transactions more generally, states create international institutions. Specifically, they do so to overcome coordination problems as well as informational asymmetries and various other compliance issues that may occur (Axelrod 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995; Martin and Simmons 1998).

CHAPTER III

PUZZLE

All of this creates a puzzle of sorts. Why are some states allowed access to international institutions that facilitate free trade and economic transactions and others denied, when existing theories suggest that all member states ultimately benefit? This dilemma is particularly applicable to the context of Turkish admittance to the EU. Turkey's most recent application for full membership was filed in 1987 (European Commission 2007). Despite efforts to meet EU demands, Turkey's admittance has been blocked by influential member nations. This is an issue of concern because Turkey is a lynchpin to regional security and is emerging as an economic powerhouse (Rouleau 2000). The EU last opened talks of accession with Turkey in 2000. Immediately following, Turkey began a new wave of reformation that included a decrease in military control of the government, acknowledgment of minorities, and improvement of human rights standards and freedoms (Hughes 2004). Despite their adjustments, the EU denied Turkey full candidate status in 2002, while agreeing to admit ten primarily Post-Communist countries in the 2004 enlargement. Turkey's application was put on hold along with Bulgaria and Romania's until 2007.

After denial of membership in 2002 and again in 2007, Turkey faced difficult decisions about the country's future, putting it at a crossroads. One of the two decisions Turkey faced was to continue the reforms begun in 2000 in an effort to bring their government

closer in line with EU standards, continuing to seek membership status in the EU. Another decision facing Turkey was whether to remain a secular Muslim state, as opposed to an Islamic ruled state. As late as December 2006, officials warned that if talks regarding Turkish membership to the EU were called off Turkey could fall back into autocracy (Mardell 2006). These crossroads decisions remain in a tenuous balance, and threaten to unravel the progress made thus far. Democratization in Turkey was a long and arduous process that may not be able to recover if the country begins to backslide into authoritarian rule. Admittance to the EU would provide Turkey the stability needed to continue down the path of democracy, economic growth, and secular government. Joining the EU would also help to reinforce the tradition of democracy in a region with little democratic support (World Bank Staff 2000).

The question remains, why, after acceptance of Turkey as a potential candidate for membership in 1999, was Turkey denied entrance to the EU (European Commission 2007)? Turkey would economically benefit the EU by providing labor and other resources that the EU is currently lacking. The answer can be found in the Selectorate Theory. Support for Turkish membership is low in EU member states, and leaders wishing to remain in power do not want to entangle themselves with such an unpopular policy. Romania and Bulgaria may be less qualified for membership; however, there was stronger public support for their membership.

Theory

The Selectorate Theory attempts to explain how leaders maintain power. According to the theory all leaders wish to keep power once it has been given to them. To maintain power leaders must successfully allocate the correct amount of public and private goods to the winning coalition allowing the leader to defeat challengers. A challenger is a member of the selectorate that desires to gain power. To become a leader, an individual must have a larger winning coalition than others desiring power. A leader brings people into his winning coalition by doling out public and private goods; members of a small winning coalition receive private goods. Members of large winning coalitions receive public goods. However, public goods potentially benefit any member of society not just the winning coalition.

Residents, which are the people that live under a government, are separated into two groups: the selectorate and the disenfranchised. Disenfranchised residents do not have the right to vote and their opinion does not matter in terms of policy or leadership. The selectorate is made up of the residents that have the right to vote on government policy and leadership. As defined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) the selectorate is “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership”. The winning coalition is a group of individuals from the selectorate that give the leader the right to rule. In line with Bueno de Mesquita et al. the winning coalition is “a subset of the selectorate of

sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society" (2003). The winning coalition can vary by size according to each country's laws governing enfranchisement; however, all members of the winning coalition must be members of the selectorate.

Support for the leader is gained through the use of public and private goods. Public goods are nonexcludable and nonrival; therefore, private goods are excludable and rival. Society as a whole benefits from public goods. Two important public goods relevant to international relations are national security and the promotion of a state's cultural belief system. Private goods, as related to trade, include subsidies and tariffs. In relation to the EU, entering countries are public goods promoting national security and free trade. In accordance with this interpretation, EU member states should favor integration because of the substantial gains from the public goods. However, members of the winning coalition in each respective member state have an opinion of Turkey beyond economic and security benefits. Many Europeans are opposed to Turkish membership to the EU and would not support a politician who supports Turkey. If a leader's winning coalition opposes Turkish membership then this makes Turkey an undesirable good regardless of tangible benefits.

CHAPTER IV

METHODS

To test the hypothesis that public opinion influences EU country leaders' policy positions on Turkish ascension I use two different methodologies. The first method is a statistical analysis of the connection between public opinion over Turkish ascension in member states and subsequent government positions on enlargement. While the statistical analysis allows me to test for whether my hypothesis is generalizable across governments, it does not give a complete picture of the connections between citizens and leaders and the underlying processes. Therefore, I also use a comparative case study of Romania and Bulgaria and compare their efforts to join the EU to Turkey. These three countries were evaluated for membership during the same period and have similar problems although Romania and Bulgaria were admitted in 2007 and Turkey was denied entrance.

My statistical analysis is a fixed effects model. However, one problem to overcome when studying EU decisions is that the EU does not make the votes of the individual commissioners on such issues as enlargement public. To overcome this problem I use the chief executive's party position on EU enlargement as a proxy for the leader's likely position on Turkish ascension. Therefore, my dependent variable is the Prime Minister or President's party position on enlargement. To code this variable I employ the Chapel

Hill data set on the Positioning of Political Parties¹. The data provides a reliable measure of party position on the subject of EU enlargement. The dataset spans the years 1984 to 2002² and surveys roughly every four years. The dependent variable I use is called Position. This measure is a scale of one to seven where one represents that the party is strongly opposed to European integration and seven means that the party is strongly in favor of European Integration.

My key explanatory variable is public opinion on Turkish membership in EU member states. The survey data are from Eurobarometer, a public opinion research and survey group by and for the EU Commission. They conduct a variety of surveys throughout the year focusing on major issues that affect Europeans. The standard Eurobarometer survey is conducted twice a year in the fall and spring. I use the data from 1996, 1999, and 2002. 1996 was the first year that Eurobarometer asked citizens their opinion on Turkey joining the EU. The specific surveys employed are: 1996 spring, 1999 fall, and

¹ Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Marco Steenbergen and Ryan Bakker. 2005. "Crossvalidating Data on Party Positioning on European Integration: A Comparison of Manifesto and Expert Data." Mimeo, downloadable from <http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe>

² Ray, Leonard. 1999. "Measuring Party Orientations toward European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey." *European Journal of Political Research* 36: 283-306.

2002 spring. The specific surveys are numbers 45³, 52⁴, and 57⁵ respectively.

I also include a number of variables to control for either intervening or confounding effects. As with parties in the United States, European parties have platforms and stances on various issues. However, not all issues are equally important to every party. To control for this I use a measure from the Chapel Hill data called Salience. Salience represents the relative importance of European integration to the party's public stance in the given year.

Another important factor to each EU party is the amount of internal dissent or conflict in the party over the issue of European integration. Dissent is an important factor to take into consideration because if a party is divided on the issue then the Prime Minister may not have the same opinion on European integration as the party. Because my analysis is dependent upon the Prime Ministers party, if his preferences were in disagreement with the party this could cause problems with validity. The Chapel Hill data provides a

³ European Commission. Directorate-General X. 1996. Report number 45. Spring 1996. Brussels: E. Commission.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb45/eb45_en.htm

⁴ European Commission. Directorate-General for Education and Culture. 2000. Eurobarometer Public Opinion in the European Union. Report number 52. Autumn 1999. Brussels: E. Commission.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb52/eb52_en.htm

⁵ European Commission. Directorate-General for Education and Culture. 2002. Eurobarometer Public Opinion in the European Union. Report number 52. Spring 2002. EU15 Report. Brussels: E. Commission.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_en.htm

measure of internal party dissent. Dissent is not coded exactly the same across years. In the 2002 survey, dissent is measured on a scale of one to ten where one represents no dissent and ten represents no cohesion on the issue. The surveys in 1996 and 1999 use a one to five scale from complete unity to disunity. To account for this I rescale the various dissent measures and create a new measure called DISSENT. I recode the 2002 data fitting it to the one to five scale used in prior years.

A final variable used to evaluate my theory is economic ties to Turkey. This is measured by the trade ties a country has to Turkey in the given year. The value recorded is the amount of Turkish exports to the stated country. A country with higher trade ties to Turkey is expected to favor Turkish membership in the EU more than a country with little or no trade ties. Countries that trade with Turkey would benefit more from Turkish inclusion in the EU internal market because restrictions and tariffs on goods produced by or imported to Turkey would be reduced.

To add to my case that public opinion is a major influence on leaders' policies towards European integration, I include a case study of Romania and Bulgaria. Romania and Bulgaria applied for membership to the EU after Turkey and were both accepted as new member states in 2007 after initial holds in 2004. Romania and Bulgaria offer good case studies because all three states applied for admission and were originally denied. Both countries are Post-Communist countries with weak economies and corrupt practices;

both countries also lack judicial reform. Many scholars believe that neither of the three candidate countries were ready for admittance to the EU in 2007.

CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

The hypothesis is directional so that when the party favors integration there should be more public support for Turkish membership in the EU. Typically, an Ordinary Least Squares regression test would be used to evaluate the hypothesis, but because I only have access to a small amount of data a Fixed Effects Model is used instead. There are fourteen countries used in the dataset and I am only using the data from the last three surveys; adding in the elections that took place in the year of the survey, there are still only fifty observations. The number of observations shrinks to 47 after discarding the observations with incomplete information. To control for all possible confounding factors such as economy, differing electoral rules, and domestic concerns of each individual member state, a dummy variable was to be created. I used Belgium as the dummy variable because the capital of the EU resides in this country.

TABLE 1. Effect of Public Opinion on Party Position on Integration

Party Position Integration	Coefficients	Standard Error	P-value	95% Confidence Interval	
Saliency	0.7955	0.1514	0.0001	0.486	1.105
Ties to Turkey	0.0024	0.0003	0.0001	0.001	0.003
Good Public Opinion	0.0183	0.0095	0.063	-0.001	0.0378
Dissent	-0.0472	0.0472	0.002	-0.254	-0.061

R-squared = 0.9147

Degrees of Freedom = 46

Table 1 displays the results from the Fixed Effects Model. The first column lists the variable tested against the dependent variable—Party Position on Integration. The second column lists the coefficients. The third column lists the standard error. The fourth column is of particular importance; it shows the p-value for the variable and its statistical significance. The last two columns show the 95% Confidence Intervals for each of the variables.

As expected, the more salient the issue of integration to a party, the higher the support for Turkish membership to the EU. Countries with strong trade ties to Turkey were also stronger supporters of Turkish membership in the EU. Countries that had good public opinion of Turkish membership were also in favor of integration. As predicted, there is a negative relationship between integration and public opinion of Turkey in parties with a lot of internal dissent.

CHAPTER IV

COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

Romania and Bulgaria, the two remaining Post-Communist candidate states from the 2004 enlargement, entered the EU on January 1, 2007. Citizens and governments rejoiced at the completion of the monumental task of membership into the EU. Euroskeptics and Eurocrats alike were apprehensive about the addition of two of the poorest countries in Europe to the elite EU. Many people in the EU 15, the original 15 member states, wondered if the EU had been caught in a trap when they admitted Romania and Bulgaria. For the first time since its formation, the EU included safeguards to membership in the accession treaties of Bulgaria and Romania.

The 2004 enlargement of the EU brought much of Eastern Europe into the organization excluding Bulgaria and Romania. Romania officially applied to the EU for membership on June 22, 1995 with candidate status given by the Commission on July 17, 1995 (European Commission 1997a). Bulgaria's application was not far behind, officially applying on December 14, 1995 and candidate status shortly after on January 29, 1996 (European Commission 1997b).

Neither of the countries were able to gain admission to the EU in 2004; consequently, leaders set their sights on the soonest date possible. Both countries sought reassurance from the EU that they were only being left out temporarily and that they would be able

to join the union soon. Fear of the countries backsliding after initial progress led the EU to agree to a concrete timeline for accession for the two less reformed countries. The timeline, while helpful for the applicant countries by giving them concrete dates by which to implement reforms, hindered the European Commission's ability to slow the accession process. Conditionality requirements were written into the accession treaties of the two countries to help the EU cope with the timeline that they had inadvertently committed themselves to. As the accession date approached, the EU realized that Bulgaria and Romania were not as ready to join the EU as they portrayed themselves on paper. This realization caused the EU to invoke additional conditionality to membership and still allow the countries to join the EU on January 1, 2007.

Safeguards

As late as May 15, 2006 the official date of Bulgaria and Romania's accession remained unclear; however, there was little that the EU could do to stop the two countries from becoming its 26th and 27th members (Noutcheva 2006). Scholarly opinion agreed that Bulgaria and Romania were not yet politically ready to join the EU, corrupt officials in the judiciary and political offices of both countries still heavily influenced policy, and there were doubts about their capabilities to function in the internal market.

Postponement of accession by one year was an option for the Commission in respect to Romania and Bulgaria; however, with a sense of caution and unease they were allowed to become full member states on January 1, 2007 rather than postponing until 2008.

Because of the unease from many member states towards Bulgaria and Romania additional safeguards were placed on the countries allowing for a three year conditional membership (European Commission 2005a). Reform was a slow process in both Bulgaria and Romania and many problems remained unresolved at the moment of accession causing a fear among member states that the governments would relax and not continue to reform. Often reforms were carried out only as far as the paper trail. Bulgaria and Romania learned early in the process that if the law existed on paper the EU was willing to close the chapter, although implementation of the law could take many years. Many reforms were carried out in this way with the countries becoming “EU-compliant on paper only” (Noutcheva 2006). Among member states there was also a fear that Bulgaria and Romania were unprepared to integrate fully into the European Community (Pridham 2007). Apprehension accompanied the enlargement of these two countries at every turn.

The EU tried to protect itself from the precarious position of admitting a country that was not yet ready for admission while not denying admission to a country that needed EU support to continue democratization by writing safeguards into the accession treaties of Romania and Bulgaria. Postponement of accession until January of 2008 was the most viable safeguard written into the newer accession treaties. This option, while allowing the countries more time to fix their internal problems, was still unfeasible. The postponement clause only allowed one extra year before accession; a very short time period for the needed government changes to take effect. The postponement clause was

originally written when Bulgaria had a competent government in power; therefore, unanimity was required to postpone the accession of Bulgaria. However, by May of 2006, Bulgaria was considered behind Romania in readiness to join the EU (Noutcheva 2006). To postpone the accession of Romania, only a qualified majority was needed. At the close of 2004, when the treaties were written, Romania was seen as more of a threat to the stability of the community. While neither of the countries functions at the desirable level for a country entering the EU, the fear that the implications of postponement would result in a derailment of the democratization process were sufficient to guarantee the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.

In September of 2006 the Commission announced that Bulgaria and Romania would enter the EU in 2007 rather than postponing until 2008. The Commission cited slight improvements in judicial reform and the fight against corruption in Romania but continued to express concerns. Postponement was seen as detrimental to the entire negotiation process. As early as December 2005, arguments against postponement included the fear that it would be more dangerous for the EU to postpone Romania's entrance by one year than to admit the country unreformed (Pridham 2007). The reforms needed in Romania to fight corruption and overhaul the judicial system would take more than one year to implement and get results, making the one-year delay more of a penalty for continuing reforms than an incentive.

Clauses

After Bulgaria and Romania became official members of the EU three additional safeguard measures would allow the Commission to continue to have leverage over their access to EU benefits. This leverage ideally would ensure that Bulgaria and Romania continued to reform post-accession. These safeguard measures ensure that the Commission has the right to intervene and influence policy in the two states for three years after their membership becomes official.

Two of the three clauses focus on the economy and economic conditions with the EU and its acceding countries. The first of these is the economic safeguard clause, which applies to old and new member states. This clause is inadequate to put pressure on either country to reform. The clause protects sectors of the economy from the pressures of the internal market. The second clause is an internal market clause pertaining to the possibility of taking actions against a country that has an adverse effect on the internal market across borders. Desirable EU structural funds could be taken away from Bulgaria and Romania under this clause if they fail to conform to EU market standards (Noutcheva 2006).

Judicial practices and corruption are the most prominent problems in Bulgaria and Romania. To address these issues, the third EU safeguard measure focuses on justice and home affairs. While there is little that the EU Commission can do to directly influence Bulgaria and Romania in this sector, there are many little ways for EU member

states to show their displeasure with the two countries. For example, decisions by the courts of Bulgaria and/or Romania could be disregarded if the EU has little confidence in the courts (Noutcheva 2006). There is a possibility that arrest warrants issued by the two countries would be ignored because of displeasure with the police departments' methods of interrogation and apprehension (Noutcheva 2006). These seemingly small measures would be enough to make Bulgaria and Romania feel excluded from the benefits of being an EU member state.

Despite the shortcomings of the safeguard clauses, there are other ways to influence policy in Romania and Bulgaria post-accession. Rule of law is a major concern in both Romania and Bulgaria. Common principles binding the EU are “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” according to the Treaty on European Union. If a member state is found to be in violation of any of these principles, its peers can take action against the state by suspending the states voting rights in the Council. However, to initiate these protections a country must persistently violate the founding principles, and support from a majority of member states must exist, to punish the violating country (Noutcheva 2006).

Romania and Bulgaria must continue to uphold the rule of law and fight corruption within their borders so as not to dissatisfy the older member states into taking actions against them.

Regardless of their shortcomings and apprehension from current member states, Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the EU with continued conditionality beyond their accession agreements. Unprecedented conditionality to membership for the two countries puts added pressures on them to continue to reform (Pridham 2007). As members of the EU, Bulgaria and Romania continue to be closely monitored for compliance with mandated reforms not sufficiently implemented at accession. Judicial reform is still needed in both countries and hinders their economic development. Marks against a countries' judiciary create an uninviting environment for business investments, potentially threatening the slowly evolving economies of these states (Noutcheva 2006).

Romania

In 1997, the EU released a report detailing their opinion on Romania's application for membership. This report detailed the requirements for EU membership and the areas where Romania needed to improve before they could proceed to candidate status and eventual membership in the EU. The European Commission evaluated Romania according to the Copenhagen Criteria established for EU membership. The Copenhagen Criteria mandate that, to obtain membership, a candidate country must have, "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union" (European Commission 1993). These values are

the foundation for the EU and the criteria that all candidate countries must adhere to before they can be granted membership.

Findings

The Commission found that Romania had a functioning democracy but lacked “respect in practice for the rule of law” and “fundamental rights” (European Commission 1997a). Romania’s economy was transforming into a market economy but lacked property rights for land, modern technology, and equipment. The economy was in need of serious structural reform before it could handle the pressures of joining the EU internal market. The report concluded with uncertainties. Romania was judged to be far behind the EU in all aspects of membership and the commissioners were unable gauge a date for accession. The Commission did recommend talks be opened with Romania reiterating that serious improvements were needed to address its shortcomings (European Commission 1997a). Other concerns included slow economic reform, weak policy-making environment, and the conditions of institutionalized children (Pridham 2007).

Romania was often viewed as “the ‘laggard’ of Eastern enlargement” (Pridham 2007). Many in Europe were apprehensive of the possibility of Romania joining the EU because of its seeming inability to reform. Negotiations were never ceased although there were moments in the process where the EU threatened to stop negotiations because of Romania’s inability to act. The progress that Romania made in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption were often miniscule and unsatisfactory (Pridham

2007). The Commission was criticized for treating Romania too leniently in the early stages of negotiations (Pridham 2007). Romania was a difficult country to handle during the accession process. Like most former Communist countries Romania had problems with corruption and judicial reform, but Romania also had many problems unique to it.

Corruption

Corruption in Romania was a central point from the beginning of negotiations. In December of 2004, corruption and judicial reform threatened to derail accession for Romania. Romania had made commitments on paper, but had failed to act upon them. The failure to implement reforms, on the part of Romania, brought about a compromise to close the chapter on justice and home affairs the safeguard clause. Corruption was a problem of most EU candidate countries; however, according to Transparency International in 2006⁶ Romania was the most corrupt nation in Europe coming in as the 84th most corrupt country in the world. Corruption proved to be a difficult problem to solve because of the sheer influence it had on society. Politicians and officials had no respect for the rule of law and continued to make the economy their personal treasury. Self-interested politicians were adverse to reform party practices that would endanger their patronage systems. Other problems with corruption that Romania encountered were in the public services sector, administration and judicial reform, and the will of politicians (Pridham 2007). To please the EU, politicians would write plans and

⁶ Transparency International. 2006. "Corruption Perceptions Index." Retrieved 12 March, 2008, from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.

strategies to fight corruption; however, their plans were rarely implemented or acted upon. The EU was able to influence the saliency of corruption as an issue over time, but the Romanian government did little by way of legislation.

Bureaucracy

Romania's bureaucracy was inefficient and incapable of making decisions. Largely overstuffed and underpaid, bureaucratic officials were afraid of taking responsibility and make decisions at the lower level, instead sending their problems to senior officials causing even more delay (Pridham 2007). Inefficiency in the bureaucracy caused reforms to be slow in implementation, meeting resistance from every sector. It was only after the EU applied direct pressure and influence that the Romanian bureaucracy improved. Departments with more EU contact improved at a more rapid pace often functioning on a different level than departments with little or no contact with the EU.

Judicial Reform

Keeping with the trend of Eastern Europe, corruption and judicial reform were two of the more difficult factors facing Romanian accession. Judges remaining from the days of Communism and reliant upon political influence primarily staffed the Romanian judiciary. Under Communism, a political culture of corruption formed; after Communism the corruption remained. Romania eventually created the Anti-Corruption Agency after heavy pressure from EU officials, but the Agency was short lived. Romania's Constitutional Court, possibly for challenging the corrupt practices of high-

ranking officials, declared the Agency unconstitutional (Pridham 2007). In 2004 the European Parliament released a report threatening to suspend Romania's application if the government continued to ignore calls for reform. The report listed several Romanian trouble spots highlighting absent government will to reform in many areas (Pridham 2007).

Bulgaria

The EU committed itself to admitting the Post-Communist countries in 1993 (Dimitrov 2000). The commission released opinions on applicant countries in the middle of Bulgaria's darkest economic hour, and the EU agreed to open talks with Bulgaria only after war broke out in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria was not as important for the EU strategically until the thought of a Balkan crisis on their doorstep gave the country a push into the EU. When the European Commission announced that they would allow Bulgaria entrance to the EU in 2007, there was still a laundry list of unfinished reforms that needed to be instituted.

Findings

The Commission released their Opinion on Bulgaria in 1997 highlighting the areas that needed improvements per the Copenhagen Criteria. Bulgaria was found to be a functioning democracy without respect "for the rule of law, at all levels of public administration" (European Commission 1997b). The Roma population in Bulgaria suffered from a lack of minority rights. Corruption, as with most Eastern European

countries, was a major red flag for Bulgaria. Reforms were also needed in the judicial system. The police and secret services were known to abuse individual liberties (European Commission 1997b). A market economy was not well established in Bulgaria suffering from a lack of commitment by the government. Bulgaria had not begun privatization of many market sectors until the mid-nineties (European Commission 1997b).

The European Commission agreed to open accession agreements with Bulgaria in 2000, but noted the need for significant improvement. Human rights was a problem area for Bulgaria including slow integration of the Roma population, protection of children in orphanages, and protection of civilians against police and the secret service (European Commission 1997b). Corruption and judicial practices were also cited as areas needing improvement.

Government

Bulgaria acceded to the European Union on January 1, 2007 after slow negotiations and undersized reform. In the first years after Communism, Bulgaria suffered from a lack of commitment to Europe. Bulgaria was “governed by scarcely reformed communists” until 1997 (Dimitrov 2000). The EU opened talks with Bulgaria in 1999 more out of strategy than because of Bulgaria’s readiness (Dimitrov 2000). The Balkans had recently become a threat to Europe with war breaking out in Kosovo. The first 11 chapters of EU membership were opened with Bulgaria in early 2000 and closed rapidly,

8 out of the 11 within the first ten months (Dimitrov 2000). Appearances can be deceiving; this result would lead many to conclude that Bulgaria cooperated fully with the EU but truthfully all the Bulgarian government did to close the chapters was to accept the Copenhagen Criteria (Dimitrov 2000).

Economy

Trade and the economy were areas that needed much improvement. Bulgaria traded little with influential member states of the EU, such as Germany. Early economic reform in Bulgaria brought private market tendencies but not stability. Bulgaria asserted that by 1999 they had a “functioning market economy” despite the fact that many private businesses operated at a loss, and the government continued to own “the national telecommunications company and the national tobacco company” (Dimitrov 2000). The ability of Bulgaria to function in the demanding internal market of the EU is hampered by an underdeveloped infrastructure that craves investment.

Judicial Branch

Constitutionally, Bulgaria’s judicial system appeared to function independently and made many controversial decisions in the 1990s (Engelbrekt 2007). Further scrutiny of the judicial system reveals many shortcomings. Much like an Attorney General, Bulgaria’s system has a Chief Prosecutor whose job is to “launch civil proceedings, engage in civil legislation, order public administrative officials to alter their decisions, and ask the Constitutional Court for rulings on the constitutionality of given norms”

(Engelbrekt 2007). The Chief Prosecutor is a very powerful man with the ability to influence the fight on corruption; however, in practice no efforts have been made.

Corruption

Corruption is a common problem of the newest members to the EU. Corruption comes in two forms in Bulgaria, administrative and political (Engelbrekt 2007). Corruption is on the rise in Bulgaria instead of becoming obsolete. According to Transparency International, Bulgaria consistently ranks in the mid-fifties. Recently, Bulgaria has fallen in the ranks from 57th in 2006 to 64th least corrupt country in the world in 2007 (Transparency International 2006 and 2007). In 2006, the Center for the Study of Democracy released a report detailing which branches of government receive bribes; the report found that the judicial system receives less bribes than it had previously while the police force receives more (Engelbrekt 2007). There are no restrictions in Bulgarian law on financing political parties and it is estimated that about 1% of Bulgaria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used to finance "party infrastructure and "grease the system" during the electoral process" (Engelbrekt 2007). Corruption is a cultural holdover from Communism. Corruption has become so ingrained in the political process of many post-communist countries that in order to fight corruption completely the movement needs to come from the ground up (Engelbrekt 2007).

Turkey

In December of 1997, Turkey was declared to be eligible for EU membership. Two years later, in December of 1999, the EU opened accession talks with Turkey (European Commission 2007). Eleven years later Turkey is still waiting to become a member of the EU.

Turkish Economy

In its 2004 Regular Report, the Commission concluded that:

Turkey has made further considerable progress towards being a functioning market economy, in particular by reducing its macroeconomic imbalances. Turkey should also be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, provided that it firmly maintains its stabilisation policy and takes further decisive steps towards structural reforms. (European Commission 2005b)

Of candidate countries in 2005, the Turkish economy was the only one seen as able to function in the competitive European Internal Market. Turkey also has the longest sustained market economy of the three countries; as early as 1999, the Commission believed that Turkey's economy would be able to compete with the pressures inside the EU (European Commission 1999). Turkey has good trade balances with neighboring countries and an increasing amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) particularly in the banking sector (European Commission 2005b). Turkish GDP continues to grow and expand. The Turkish economy is growing at a rate of 5.2%, a rate much higher than most member states of the EU and twice as high as the EU itself, which has a current growth rate of 2.8% (Freedom House 2006). Unemployment is a particular trouble spot

in Turkey, hovering consistently around 10% with a slight decrease in 2004 (European Commission 2005b). Increases in the comparative advantages of joining the EU would help lower Turkey's unemployment rate. Turkey's seemingly high unemployment rate is misleading compared to the EU average unemployment rate of 9.4% in 2005 (CIA 2006).

Human Rights

Human rights violations were a barrier to Turkish membership to the EU for a long period of time. Turkish political philosophy saw recognition of minorities as an unnecessary divide amongst common peoples, and its EU candidature forced Turkey to reevaluate the theory of homogenous democratization in favor of a theory allowing for more plurality and respect for minority rights (Rumford 2001). The Kurdish peoples of Turkey have a long history of resistance against the Turkish government. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was the first organization to unite Kurds together against Turkey. Formed on 27 November 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK was presented as a "liberation movement" (Gunter 2007). In practice, the PKK was a terrorist organization violently protesting the actions of the Turkish government to suppress their fight for a separate Kurdistan. After the 1999 capture of Öcalan and an initial violent uprising, a ceasefire between the Kurds and the Turks was negotiated (Gunter 2007).

The year 1999 was a big year for Turkey politically, not only was there an end in sight to the Kurdish issue but they were finally granted candidate status by the EU. In light of

these two developments, Turkey lifted many of the bans placed on its Kurdish citizens after they were given candidate status. Late in 1999, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem broke with precedent by announcing plans to extend cultural rights to the Kurdish people, giving them the right to use their native language in education and broadcasting (Rumford 2001). Turkey began to give concessions to the Kurdish peoples bringing the country closer inline with the EU policies on Human and Minority Rights. In their 2003 report, the Commission noted that improvements had been made but that restrictions still existed on minority and cultural rights for all groups (European Commission 2003). The Commission's report in October of 2004 cited Turkey's significant improvement in the area of human and minority rights (European Commission 2004).

Corruption

Corruption remains one of the most common problems among candidate states to the EU and Turkey is no exception. Measures to reduce the amount of corruption in Turkey include the creation of committees to investigate complaints of corruption, and becoming members of European organizations such as the Group of States Against Corruption (European Commission 2003). While corruption is a problem faced by the Turkish government they continue to pursue anti-corruption legislation. One former Prime Minister and seven former ministers were tried before the High Tribunal on charges of corruption in 2004 under the new corruption laws (European Commission 2005b). This shows that Turkish politicians are willing to fight corruption even in high places. Transparency International consistently ranks Turkey between current EU

member states Bulgaria and Romania, and above Poland. In 2007, Turkey and Bulgaria were both ranked in the 64th most corrupt countries bracket (Transparency International 2007).

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION

Romania and Bulgaria were admitted to the EU with a cloud hanging over their heads. Many reforms were inadequately completed at the time of accession and a culture of democracy was not fully institutionalized. Bulgaria and Romania are member states of the EU on paper, although still incompliant with many EU policies. Without the prodding and often interventionist policies of the EU, Bulgaria and Romania would have remained outside of Europe. Why then were they treated differently? Why, with as many problems and difficulties that they encountered along their path to accession, were these backwards and often obstinate countries admitted to the EU?

Public Opinion

Public opinion in the EU for enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania influenced the advancement of the two countries. In the year 1996 the average public opinion in favor of Romania's admission to the EU according to Eurobarometer was the highest of the three countries with 39%. Public opinion against Romania was equally strong at 40%. These numbers suggest that Europe is against integration with Romania; however, public opinion of Turkish membership is dismal, 35% in favor and 45% opposed. Public opinion of Bulgaria is only a point less than Romania and the same amount oppose Bulgarian membership. Even in the year 1996 Turkey is seen as an unpopular candidate country to back for future membership. Interestingly, according to the 1999 survey,

public opinion in favor of both Turkey and Romania dropped two points and rose one point for Bulgaria. By the 2002 survey, there are clear differences in public opinion of the three countries applications for membership. Only 33% of the Europeans favored Turkish membership with 46% opposed. In contrast, Europeans favored Bulgarian membership at a rate of 40% and Romanian membership at a rate of 37%. Public opinion was still strongly against the membership of the two countries resting at 37% and 40% respectively. The differences between public opinion in favor and against were small, but more respondents were favoring the membership of Bulgaria and Romania progressively. Opinion in favor of Turkish membership was remaining low and opposition was growing.

A year after the expansion of the EU to include most of Eastern Europe there was a substantial difference in public opinion in favor of extending membership to Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. According to the 2005 Eurobarometer⁷, there was a substantial increase in public opinion in favor of enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania over previous years, while support for Turkey remained at a solid 32% in the EU 15. There was an 11% increase in support for Bulgarian membership among respondents in 2005 than 2004; the increase was equally as strong in support of Romania at 10%. Support for Bulgarian membership was 46% among the citizens in the older EU 15 and 70% in the 10 new member states. Europeans were not as enthusiastic about Romanian membership

⁷ European Commission. Directorate General Communication. 2006. Eurobarometer 64 Public Opinion in the European Union. Autumn 2005. E. Commission. Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.htm

with 43% of respondents in the EU 15 favoring membership and 58% in the new member states. Although support is not above 50% for Romanian membership throughout the entire EU, there is still a 10% difference between respondents that favor membership. This difference translates into over 50% of respondents against Turkish accession, 52%. Only 41% of respondents opposed Romanian accession.

The 2005 Eurobarometer included a section on Turkish ascension to the EU in which respondents were asked a series of nine questions and told to answer agree or disagree. According to the results, respondents overwhelmingly saw Turkey's membership as flawed. More than three-quarters of respondents believed that the EU should not admit Turkey until there have been significant improvements in the area of human rights and the economy. Over 60% of Europeans surveyed fear that Turkish membership would raise immigration to the more developed countries in Europe. In regards to cultural differences, over half of respondents view Turkey as too different from Europe. Turkey's primary benefit to the EU, security, was also viewed negatively. Only 38% of respondents thought that Turkish membership would increase EU security.

Looking at the results from the 2005 survey, it is not difficult to see Turkey's undesirability to EU citizens. Economics are an area that the European Commission praises Turkey regularly; nevertheless, EU citizens still view Turkey's economy as backwards and in need of significant improvement. Many citizens also see security, a major benefit to the EU, in a negative light. The results of this survey overwhelmingly

serve to prove the Selectorate Theory. Citizens view Turkey in a different light than policy makers, but to keep their jobs politicians will represent their winning coalitions. The benefits of Turkish membership are ignored and often seen as flawed by citizens, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Factors

The admittance of Bulgaria and Romania is similar to manifest destiny of the United States. Europeans felt that admitting Bulgaria and Romania to the EU was a way of reaching their lost siblings. Cultural issues are also an important consideration. Turkey is over 90% Muslim and has a population the size of Germany. Its admittance would make Islam one of the most practiced religions in the EU. Bulgaria and Romania are small Christian countries, which made enlargement to these countries easier because there were less structural issues to consider. Despite the benefits Turkish membership would bring to the EU, the domestic factors forming public opinion of Turkey sufficiently render its membership a taboo stance by any politician desiring to remain in power.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

As shown with the statistical analysis, party leaders provide their constituents with public goods to stay in power. Turkey would be a great benefit to the EU in a myriad of ways; however, public opinion in favor of Turkish membership is low. In the years included in the statistical analysis, public opinion never rose above 51% in the Netherlands in 1996. Public opinion in favor of Turkish membership was lowest during 1996 in Greece at just 10%. Since public opinion in favor of Turkish membership hovers around 32%, leaders are unable to pursue the benefits of including Turkey in the EU without fear of losing their positions in power.

Bulgaria and Romania had many problems meeting the demands of the EU during the accession process, leaving many reforms to the last minute and even more incomplete. Economically, neither Bulgaria nor Romania is expected to function well with their current infrastructure. Implementation of the Euro in the near future in either of these countries is a false hope. Their lack of commitment to one clear economic policy hinders any development that would reduce inflation and balance their budgets. The economy is so small in Romania in particular that in ten years it's expected to grow to the size of Hungary's current economy. In contrast, Turkey's budget is balanced with few trade deficits and a strong stable currency. The process of adopting policies to bring

Turkey into the Euro community has already begun. The Turkish economy is growing at rapid rates, well above the EU average.

Corruption is a way of life in Bulgaria and Romania and measures to fight corruption are few and weak. Politicians have little incentive in these countries to fight corruption because they derive their political support from these practices. Turkey has created many committees to aide in the fight against corruption, and has even brought corruption charges against former senior officials in the country. Officials in Turkey are willing to fight against corruption and bring their policies inline with the EU.

Judicial branches suffer from a lack of commitment from high-ranking politicians to reform. The judicial branch often suffers from corruption in Romania and Bulgaria. Judges in Romania and Bulgaria have little support from politicians to investigate corruption and often declare anti-corruption legislation unconstitutional. Turkey had minor problems with the judicial system that were resolved primarily by the formation of civilian courts, and the removal of the military from the judicial branch.

Human rights violations were an issue with all three countries. Specifically, Bulgaria and Romania had difficulties integrating their Roma populations into civil society. Turkey relinquished rights to their Kurdish minority that were unprecedented only fifteen years ago. Broadcasting in Kurdish and naming children Kurdish ancestral names are no longer forbidden. Torture and the death penalty have been abolished.

With regard to each other, Turkey appears to be more compliant with EU policies and economic criteria. Turkey is the only country associated with the EEC that has not gained membership into the EU. The lengthy relationship between Turkey and Europe proves Turkey is committed to reformation and EU membership, despite the reluctance shown by Europe. Bulgaria and Romania are more recent applicants to the EU with substantial problems; conversely, they were admitted because of strong public support for their membership after 2004. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania it is clear to see that public opinion influenced leaders' positions on their integration. Favorable public opinion in Europe for Bulgaria and Romania allowed leaders to pursue their membership, despite the unwillingness of the countries to comply with EU demands.

Leaders pursue policies that lengthen their tenure in power. The policies that leaders pursue must be supported by a large enough size of the electorate to ensure their reelection. A population must either support a policy or be apathetic on the issue in order for a leader to actively support the issue. Because there is little support for Turkish membership in the EU, a politician is only likely to favor membership when he has a large enough winning coalition to absorb the affects of his position.

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APPENDIX A

List of Countries in Dataset:

1. Belgium
2. Denmark
3. Germany
4. Greece
5. Spain
6. France
7. Ireland
8. Italy
9. Netherlands
10. United Kingdom
11. Portugal
12. Austria
13. Finland
14. Sweden

APPENDIX B

Means Table

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Ma
partypoison~n	47	6.161064	0.7012109	3.5	7
Salience	47	3.406228	0.5052361	2.44	4.14
Dissent	47	2.6897	1.177187	1.33	6.08
Tiestoturk	47	890.2128	1282.317	42	5460
Goodpotky	47	33.42553	10.01682	10	51

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