

**RECIPIENT ALLOCATION PREFERENCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CHOICES: A FIT PERSPECTIVE**

A Dissertation

by

CELILE ITIR GOGUS

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 2005

Major Subject: Management

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ABSTRACT

Recipient Allocation Preferences and Organizational Choices:

A Fit Perspective. (December 2005)

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The purpose of this dissertation is to understand how individuals' preferences for resource allocation affect their attitudinal and behavioral responses towards the organization. Building on the three main allocation norms (equity norm, equality norm and need norm) and taking the perspective of the recipient of an allocation, a model that predicts the antecedents of norm preference and consequences of using different allocation norms by the organization is presented and tested with a sample of Turkish registered nurses. Results show that recipients have differential preferences for allocation norms depending on resource type being allocated and characteristics of the environment. Furthermore, the fit or misfit between recipients' preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization affects recipients' justice perceptions about the organization, their outcome satisfaction and performance.

DEDICATION

To my mother and to my father . . .

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First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their guidance and support throughout the course of this research. Adrienne Colella was not only my dissertation chair but also a role-model. She put much thought into how my work might be improved and I am appreciative for her guidance. Christopher O. L. H. Porter was one of the most influential people throughout my graduate career, I thank him for his tremendous help with this dissertation and also for our work in the Team Research Lab. Mindy Bergman and Angelo DeNisi were very helpful in improving this research from very early on and Michael Wesson was kind enough to step in during the last phases of the process and I am thankful to all of them.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Outcome allocation is one of the most frequently conducted activities in organizations (e.g., Deutsch, 1985). Effective allocation processes are essential for the well-being of an organization as proper distributions are necessary for achieving organizational goals such as high levels of performance and maintenance of harmony within the work group (Leventhal, Kamza & Fry, 1980). Decision makers in organizations may choose to follow various norms or rules when allocating outcomes such as past performance, seniority, employee needs, allocating the outcome equally among all those involved, or making allocations randomly (Deutsch, 1975; Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004).

A decision-maker's choice of an allocation norm is important not only because distributions have important individual and collective consequences (Leventhal, 1980), but also because the manner in which an allocation is made will be a major determinant of fairness perceptions (Parks et al., 1999; Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004). Fairness perceptions have been linked to various important organizational outcomes such as satisfaction, trust, organizational commitment and withdrawal (Colquitt et al., 2001). Furthermore, Deutsch (1975) defined justice as being intrinsically concerned with both individual well-being and societal functioning. Thus, choice of an allocation norm has

significant consequences as it may affect an employee's judgments of fairness and consequently important organizational attitudes and behavior.

Decisions makers base allocations on the equity rule (where outcomes are allocated based on recipients' inputs), the equality rule (where outcomes are allocated equally among recipients) or the need rule (where outcomes are allocated based on a needs principle) (Deutsch, 1975). Leventhal's (1976a; 1980) justice judgment model also specifies three justice rules individuals may choose to use when deciding on recipients' deservingness. Although conceptually identical with Deutsch's rules, these rules in Leventhal's model are called the contributions rule, the needs rule, and the equality rule.

Even though Deutsch and Leventhal identified these different distributive principles almost two decades ago, research on these different distributive principles and their antecedents or outcomes have not progressed significantly (Tornblom, 1992). To the contrary, research on allocation rules, so far, has disproportionately and almost entirely focused on the equity rule (and mainly on equity theory as proposed by Adams, 1963) (e.g., Deutsch, 1975). Although equity theory answers some very important questions and contributes significantly to our understanding of distributive justice concerns in the workplace, it nevertheless presents a unidimensional definition of justice by disproportionately focusing on the equity rule and ignoring other rules that may be employed in resource allocation decisions (Leventhal, 1976b). Furthermore, as stated by both Kabanoff (1991) and Chen and Church (1993), organizations are not simply equity-oriented systems but use equality and need rules in addition to the equity rule to achieve two different and at times contradictory organizational goals: task performance and

social cohesiveness. Another major shortcoming of the research on allocation norms is that it focuses extensively on the allocation preferences of allocators (i.e., decision makers) and ignores recipients' preferences (i.e., those who are impacted by the allocation). Even those few studies that examined recipient preferences used designs where the recipient was also an allocator, a situation that does not reflect the allocation situations in traditional organizations where a decision maker (usually a supervisor) makes the allocation decision without any input from the subordinates.

The proposed research in this dissertation precisely aims to fill this gap in the organizational justice literature. By acknowledging that there are a number of different distributive norms that may be used and affect a recipient's perceptions of fairness, the proposed research tries to answer some important questions regarding both the antecedents and consequences of these different norms. This dissertation will contribute to the existing literature on allocation norms and organizational justice by examining different allocation norms, their antecedents and their consequences by testing a model of the antecedents for a recipient's preference for a specific distribution norm as well as the effects of the fit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization.

The focus of this proposal will be the three main allocation norms discussed above: equity, equality, and need. Despite the fact that there are numerous norms or rules that may be followed when allocating outcomes, most of them seem to derive from these three basic rules. Furthermore, as the following chapter reveals, the existing literature on allocation norms and rules still has many important questions unanswered and a thorough investigation of these three allocation norms is warranted.

Individuals have a tendency to adopt different kinds of distribution rules and interpersonal orientations that are congruent with these rules under different kinds of interdependence (Kabanoff, 1991). For instance, most individuals tend to prefer the equality rule when they want to maintain good relationships in a non-competitive situation but prefer the equity rule when they want to maximize productivity in a competitive environment (Deutsch, 1975). The first part of this dissertation will build on this tendency to examine the antecedents of a recipient's preferences for a specific distribution rule. The second part will examine the interplay among the recipient's preferred distribution rule and the actual rule used by the organizations. To give an example, when a recipient prefers the equality rule for monetary outcomes and the organization uses the equity rule, this misfit between the preferred and actual allocation norms may create feelings of resentment and dissatisfaction in the recipient affecting satisfaction and perceptions of fairness. Thus, the two main research questions examined in this study are: 1) What are the antecedents to a preferred allocation norm (from the perspective of the affected party by the decision, i.e., the recipient of the outcome allocation) and 2) What are the effects of the fit or misfit between a recipient's preferred and perceived allocation norm on outcomes such as outcome satisfaction, distributive justice perceptions and procedural justice perceptions?

The proposed study contributes to the literature on allocation norms and organizational justice in at least three important ways. First, most of the studies in the literature take the perspective of the resource allocator. Although it is very important to understand how decision makers in organizations make their allocation choices, it is

equally important to understand what the recipients of these allocations would prefer. This study, thus, focuses on the perceptions and preferences of the allocation recipient.

Second, this is the first comprehensive study that looks at both the antecedents and consequences of an allocation norm preference in a single model. Most, if not all, of the studies that have examined allocation norms have only focused on one or two antecedents or solely focused on the consequences of allocation norms. Tornblom (1992) stated that “the theoretical and pragmatic utility of future research would be enhanced by systematic and explicit attention to the question ‘What type of positive or negative consequences does the application of a given justice principle in the distribution of what kind of resource have for what, for whom, when, where, and from whose point of view?’” (p. 200). The model proposed here aims to portray a full picture of the allocation rules in organizations and contribute to the literature by providing some of the answers to Tornblom’s question.

Third, most of the research on allocation norms has been conducted in the laboratory. There are only a few field studies in the literature and even those field studies have used scenario designs that did not examine actual allocations and relied on participants’ assessments of hypothetical situations. This is a field study that examines the actual allocation preferences of recipients and the consequences of actual allocation decisions made by organizations.

Overview of Dissertation

This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter II presents a review of the extant literature relevant to this study in distributive justice and allocation norms

literature. In Chapter III, the hypotheses and overall research model are presented. Chapter IV describes the data collection methods used in hypothesis testing. In Chapter V, the results of data analysis are presented. Lastly, Chapter VI discusses the meaning and implications of the results, strengths and limitations of the study as well as practical implications and future research directions.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review consists of three sections: The first section is a short description of the three allocation norms. The second section reviews several theoretical models of the three main allocation norms. The third section focuses on empirical studies that examine the determinants of allocation norms preferred and/or used by different parties (i.e., the allocator, co-recipient allocator and recipient) in an allocation. The fourth section reviews the empirical literature on the outcomes associated with using various allocation norms.

Allocation Norms

Literature on allocation norms originally derived from the distributive justice theory. Distributive justice is the perceived fairness of outcomes and has been linked to a wide variety of outcomes such as outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, trust, evaluation of authority and withdrawal behaviors (Colquitt et al., 2001). The main theoretical framework behind distributive justice research is the equity framework. Equity theorists share the view that injustice is proportional and in a just distribution, outcomes would be allocated to individuals in proportion to their contributions leaving individuals who contribute more with proportionally more outcomes than individuals who contribute less (Deutsch, 1985).

Although most of the empirical research in the distributive justice literature focuses on equity, when allocating outcomes in organizations, the equity rule is not the only rule that may be followed. In fact, solely focusing on the equity rule in examining distributive justice presents a unidimensional definition of justice, which may be misleading as justice is a multidimensional construct (Colquitt et al., 2001) and there may be other distributive norms than just the equity norm that may affect an individual's perceptions of fairness (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976a; 1980). In fact, theoretical discussions of distributive justice rules in early works (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal 1976a; 1980, Rescher, 1966) all focused on three rules: equity, equality and need.

Deutsch (1975) identified eleven values that have been associated with distributive justice. According to him, distributive justice has been conceptualized as treating people so that all receive outcome proportional to their (1) inputs, (2) ability, (3) efforts, (4) accomplishments, (5) according to the principle of reciprocity (equity); (6) as equals, (7) so that they have equal opportunity to compete without external favoritism or discrimination (equality); (8) according to their needs, (9) so that no one falls below a specified minimum, (10) according to the supply and demand of the market place, (11) according to the requirements of the common good (need). Building on these eleven values, Deutsch (1975) further contended that decisions makers in allocation situations may choose to adopt the equity (where outcomes are allocated based on recipients' inputs; values 1,2,3,4 and 5), the equality (where outcomes are allocated equally among recipients; values 6, 7) or the need (where outcomes are allocated based on recipient needs; values 8, 9, 10, 11) rules.

Rescher (1966) acknowledged seven principles of distributive justice: equality, need, ability and/or achievement, effort, productivity, social utility, and supply and demand. The principle of equality proposes the treatment of all individuals as equals. Need principle states that treating people according to their needs yields justice. The principle of ability and/or achievement dictates to treat individuals according to their abilities. Effort principle suggests individuals should be treated based on their efforts and sacrifices they make on behalf of themselves or their group. The principle of productivity states that fairness is treating individuals according to their actual productive contribution to their group. The social utility principle suggests individuals should be treated according to the likelihood of advancing of the greater good of the collective. Lastly, the principle of supply and demand proposes that individuals should be treated according to the value of their “socially desired” contributions, evaluated not only on the basis of the face value of the contribution but also on the desirability or necessity of and the supply of the contribution.

Leventhal (1976b) also examined an individual’s perceptions of distributive fairness and defined a justice rule as a belief that outcomes ought to be distributed in accordance with certain criteria. According to Leventhal’s justice judgment model, in order to decide on an individuals’ deservingness, three different rules may be used: the contributions rule, the needs rule, and the equality rule. The contributions rule is based on the premise that individuals with greater contributions should receive higher outcomes. The needs rule states that individuals’ outcomes should satisfy their legitimate needs and prevent suffering. Lastly, the equality rule states that individuals should obtain similar outcomes regardless of any differences in their contributions or needs.

Throughout this proposal, an allocation norm is a belief and/or a social rule which specifies criteria that define certain distributions of outcomes as fair and just (Leventhal, 1976a; 1976b). The equity norm refers to the allocation of resources where individuals with greater contributions to the organization receive higher outcomes. The equality norm refers to the allocation of resources where all the individuals receive the same outcomes, regardless of any differences. Lastly, the need norm refers to the allocation of resources where individuals with greater need receive higher outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the definitions of allocation norms found in the literature as well as the definition used in this study.

TABLE 1
Summary of Allocation Norms

Author	Equity	Equality	Need
Deutsch (1975)	Outcomes should be allocated based on recipients' inputs.	Outcomes should be allocated equally among recipients.	Outcomes should be allocated based on recipient needs.
Rescher (1966)	Treatment of all individuals based on their abilities, effort and productivity.	Treatment of all individuals as equals.	Treatment of all individuals according to their needs.
Leventhal (1976a)	Individuals with greater contributions should receive higher outcomes.	Individuals should obtain similar outcomes regardless of any differences in their contributions or needs.	Individuals' outcomes should satisfy their legitimate needs and prevent suffering.
Current study	Allocation of resources where individuals with greater contributions to the organization receive higher outcomes.	Allocation of resources where all the individuals receive the same outcomes, regardless of any individual differences.	Allocation of resources where individuals with greater need receive higher outcomes.

More recent research on allocation norms (other than those that focus solely on equity theory) tend to build on the three main norms and their various conceptualizations identified by Deutsch (1975). For instance, Parks et al. (1996) used the equality rule to examine the distribution of unexpected gains and losses among acquaintances and friends. There are also some other studies that used allocation norms other than those identified by Deutsch. For example, Parks et al. (1999) examined the preference of manager allocators for a self-interest rule (operationalized as repaying debt or creating indebtedness), in addition to the equity, equality, and need rules. Despite these few exceptions, however, it is safe to assume that most of the research on allocation norms has been built on the influential work of Deutsch.

Theoretical Models of Allocation Norms

Deutsch (1975), in a prescriptive model of distributive justice rules that may be used by allocators, stated that the primary goal of the cooperative relations is the key determinant of what rule will be the dominant principle in distributing outcomes by stating that “the typical consequences of a given type of social relation tend to elicit that relation” (p. 147). Building on the eleven conceptualizations of distributive justice mentioned above, Deutsch identified three main propositions which link these values with different environmental conditions: (1) In cooperative relations in which economic productivity is a primary goal, equity rather than equality or need will be the dominant principle of distributive justice; (2) In cooperative relations in which the fostering or maintenance of enjoyable social relations is the common goal, equality will be the dominant principle of distributive justice; (3) In cooperative relations in which the

fostering of personal development and personal welfare is the common goal, need will be the dominant principle of distributive justice.

The justice judgment model (Leventhal, 1976a) states that distribution rules are applied selectively and the basic criteria for evaluating fairness might change with contextual factors. The relative weight given to each rule by the allocator varies with factors such as self-interest in the situation, conformity to other people's beliefs and behaviors, and availability of reliable information. Furthermore, when allocators estimate a recipient's deservingness based on contributions, they consider 1) social comparison of the recipient with other receivers and with self, 2) recipient's role in the situation, 3) task difficulty, 4) recipient's ability, and 5) the allocator's personal characteristics such as personality and demographics. When estimating a recipient's deservingness by needs factors that affect an allocator's decision are the legitimacy and the origin of the need. When estimating a recipient's deservingness by equality, however, the allocator does not engage in a comparison process among the recipients as each one receives an equal share.

Leventhal (1976a) also discussed different situations where an allocator may choose one justice rule over another. He stated that the contributions (equity) rule is more likely to be given a higher weight in situations where performing effectively is the primary responsibility of a receiver. The need rule, on the other hand, is more likely to be given a higher weight in situations where there is a close, friendly relationship between the allocator and the receiver. And lastly, the equality rule is more likely to be given a higher weight in situations where maintenance of harmony and solidarity among receivers is essential.

Leventhal (1980) presented a revised and expanded form of the justice judgment model. Here, a justice rule was defined as an individual's belief that a distribution of outcomes, or procedure for distributing outcomes, is fair and appropriate when it satisfies certain criteria. Building on this definition, he defined a distribution rule as an individual's belief that it is fair and appropriate when rewards, punishments, or resources are distributed in accordance with certain criteria. This expanded form of the justice judgment model presented a four-stage sequence by which an allocator evaluates the fairness of outcomes. The sequence begins when the allocator determines which distribution rules are relevant for the given situation and decides on their relative importance and weight. The second step is called preliminary estimation where the allocator estimates the amount and type of outcomes the receiver deserves based on each relevant rule determined in the first step. During the third step, which is called the rule combination step, the allocator combines the preliminary estimates from the second step with the weights determined in the first step in order to arrive at a final judgment of the receiver's deservingness. In the fourth and final step of the sequence, the outcome evaluation stage, the allocator assesses what outcomes the receiver actually received and compares it to receiver's deservingness.

Leventhal, Kamza and Fry (1980) presented a model of allocation behavior (both for allocators and recipients) that combines the effects of the social structure and individual level psychological processes. They discuss three kinds of allocation preferences: performance matching distributions, equal distributions, and needs-matching distributions. Performance-matching distributions would be preferred (by both the allocators and recipients) when maximizing productivity is the main goal. Equal

distributions would be preferred (by both the allocators and recipients) when the goal is to preserve harmony. Lastly, needs-matching distributions would be preferred (by both the allocators and recipients) when the main goal is the well-being of individuals, when individual needs are closely linked to group success, or when there is a desire to prevent waste and conserve valuable and rather scarce resources.

Leventhal, Kamza and Fry (1980) also presented a theory of allocation preferences (both for allocators and recipients) which predicts choice of a distribution principle in a specific allocation situation. The theory is based on an expectancy model of motivation where preference for an allocation norm is predicted by the expectancy that a given distribution will lead to the attainment of a given goal (i.e., expectancy) and the relative importance of the given goal (i.e., instrumentality). According to the model, an allocator and/or recipient may have multiple goals at a given time and may assign different importance levels to each goal. Furthermore, because more than one distribution rule may be relevant for a given goal, the allocator and/or recipient ranks them in a preference hierarchy.

Determinants of Allocation Norms Preferred and/or Used by Parties in an Allocation

The literature on the antecedents of different allocation norms has focused on many variables. This review presents this research under three main categories: characteristics of the environment, type of outcome allocated and individual's differences of the parties engaged in allocations.

Characteristics of the Environment

Leung and Park (1986) showed that outsiders evaluating an allocation situation perceived the equity rule as more fair in a competitive social relationship and the equality rule as fairer in a cooperative social relationship. This work was based on Deutsch's (1975) propositions regarding the effects of goals of the social relationships on which allocation norms will be dominant in a given situation. The same authors also found that these effects held true for different evaluators coming from different countries. Deutsch (1985) reported several laboratory studies which also reported similar results. Likewise, Chen (1995) showed that the more humanistic an allocator's goal orientation (i.e., the extent to which the allocator perceived the organization as having humanistic as opposed to economical goals) was, the more she or he found the equality norm as more appropriate in allocation of resources.

Several empirical studies have examined the characteristics of the social relationship on the allocator's choice of an allocation norm. These studies conceptualized social relationships different than the competitive-cooperative taxonomy offered by Deutsch. Some researchers, for instance, operationalized the characteristics of the social relationship as whether the participants working on a common task were strangers or friends (e.g., Austin, 1980; Lamm & Schwinger, 1983; Morgan & Sawyer, 1979; Sondak, Neale & Pinkley, 1999). The general finding among these studies was that strangers preferred the equity norm and friends preferred the equality norm as an allocation choice. Tornblom (1992), however, gave examples of situations where friends acting as allocators may prefer equitable allocations (for instance when there is unequal

effort involved) and concluded that the empirical evidence on this issue was inconclusive (p. 211).

Other studies looked at the relationship between expectations of future interaction and choice of an allocation norm (Sagan, Pondel & Wittig, 1981; Shapiro, 1975). These studies suggested that when participants (acting as allocators) expected future interaction with the other participants, they preferred the equality norm to allocate the rewards. When there were no expectations of future interaction, the equity norm was preferred.

Another group of studies examined the input levels of recipients in an allocation situation as a determinant of allocation norm choices (e.g., Austin, 1980; Austin & McGinn, 1977; Kahn, Nelson & Gaeddert, 1980; Kahn, Nelson & Lamm, 1977; Leung & Park, 1986; Marin, 1981; Messick & Sentis, 1979; Shapiro, 1975; Sondak, Neale & Pinkley, 1999). For recipients, Messick and Sentis (1979) showed an egocentric bias where participants in the low input condition preferred the equality rule as fairer. Sondak, Neale and Pinkley. (1999) found the same effects where both strangers and roommates in the low input condition preferred the equality norm. In the high input condition, strangers preferred the equity rule and roommates preferred the equality rule. The same results were also obtained for allocators who were also recipients. It is important to note, however, that in a review of the literature on the equity and equality rules, Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) questioned these findings by stating that the experimental manipulations through which these results were obtained may have sensitized the participants to individual performance levels and a may have resulted in a preference for the equity norm.

Based on these different studies, it can be concluded that the characteristics of the environment has some influence on which norm parties in an allocation situation perceive as appropriate.

Type of Outcome

Empirical research that examined the relationship between different outcome types and choice of an allocation preference almost exclusively focused on the outcome categories proposed by the social exchange theory (Foa & Foa, 1975). The theory identifies six outcome categories that may be exchanged in allocation situations: love (any expression of affectionate regard, warmth or comfort); status (evaluative judgments that express prestige, regard or esteem); information (advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment); money (anything that has some standard unit of exchange value); goods (tangible products, objects and materials); services (activities that affect the body or belongings of a person) (please refer to Chapter III for a detailed discussion of these categories).

These studies that looked at these different resource groups and allocation preference showed that the nature of the resource being allocated affected the preferences for different allocation norms both for the allocators and recipients alike (e.g., Allison, McQueen & Schafer, 1992; Chen, 1995; Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004; Foa & Stein, 1980; Giacobbe-Miller, Miller & Victorov, 1998; Martin & Harder, 1994; Parks et al., 1996; 1999; Tornblom & Foa, 1983; Tornblom, Jonsson & Foa, 1985). For instance, Martin and Harder (1994) showed that allocators considered the equity (performance norm) more appropriate for financial rewards and the equality norm for

socioemotional rewards. Likewise, Giacobbe-Miller, Miller and Victorov (1998) showed that recipients of an allocation perceived the allocation of monetary rewards by the equity norm as fairer than payment with the equality norm. A review of six different studies by Tornblom and Foa (1983) revealed that the equality rule was the most preferred rule by the allocators for love, goods and services and the equity rule was the most preferred rule for status. For information, allocators equally preferred the equality and need rules and for money they equally preferred the equity and equality rules.

Despite establishing a link between outcome characteristics and allocation norm preferences, however, it is almost impossible to draw any other solid conclusions from previous research on this topic as it is very hard to compare the studies directly. For instance, some of the studies compared the equity and equality rules (e.g., Kahn, Nelson & Gaeddert, 1980) whereas some others compared all three norms (e.g., Parks et al., 1999). Likewise, the frame of reference (whether the participant was an allocator, an allocator who also was a recipient or just a recipient) also differed among the studies. Parks et al. (1999) stated that although it was a strength of this literature to use various measures, allocation rules and resource categories it also presented a weakness making it very difficult to compare the results across studies.

Individual Differences of Parties in an Allocation

Individual difference variables have not been extensively investigated as antecedents of allocation norms. The two main categories that researchers have examined are sex of the allocators and/or recipients and their cultural orientation.

Sex

A general finding with respect to sex is that men tend to prefer the equity norm and women prefer the equality norm (e.g., Sagan, Pondel & Wittig, 1981). There are, however, some studies that fail to show these effects (e.g., Kahn, Nelson & Lamm, 1977). Austin and McGinn (1977) concluded that sex differences in third-party allocation situations depended on the expectation of future interaction. More specifically, they showed that in situations where there was an expectation of future interaction both males and female allocators preferred the same rules, when there was no expectation of future interaction, however, female allocators tended to prefer the equality rule and male allocators tended to prefer the equity rule. Major and Deaux (1982) reviewed the literature on the role of sex differences on allocation norms and found that whether the allocator is a co-recipient moderated this relationship such that sex differences were not significant when the allocator was not a co-recipient. When the allocator was a co-recipient of the allocation, women followed the equality norm and this effect was more significant when women's inputs were greater than her partner's inputs. Kahn, Nelson and Gaeddert (1980) suggested that differences in allocation rule preferences due to sex were most likely to occur in weak or ambiguous situations.

Cultural Orientation

The general expectation for cultural orientation is that individualistic cultures should prefer equity whereas collectivistic cultures should prefer equality. However, empirical findings do not always confirm these expectations. Parks et al. (1999), for instance, did not find any differences with respect to preference for an allocation norm

between individualistic and collectivistic allocators. Likewise, Chen (1995) found that Chinese managers (allocators) who are traditionally assumed to be high on collectivism were more economically oriented and more likely to use differential rules than US managers (allocators).

Meindl (1989) investigated the effects of leadership style on allocation preferences and showed that managers (allocators) who had higher task orientation preferred the equity norm compared to the managers (allocators) who had lower task orientation. Being people oriented, on the other hand, did not yield any significant differences for allocation norm preference. When the managers were given the goal of being just, however, leadership style did not explain the preference for the allocation norm.

Summary

In general, these studies show that the characteristics of the environment affect allocation rule choices of allocators such that in competitive, performance oriented environments the equity norm is prevalent and in environments where good social relationships are important the equality norm is prevalent. Likewise, expectations of future interaction has an effect on allocator's choice. When there is an expectation of future interaction the equality norm is preferred and when there is no expectation of future interaction the equity norm is preferred. Furthermore, inputs of a recipient also affect allocation decisions for both the recipients and allocators alike such that those individuals in the low input conditions prefer the equality norm as opposed to the equity norm preferred by those in the high input conditions. Type of resource being allocated

also affects the allocation norm choices of allocators. Given the different and complex nature of the studies, however, it is not clear what allocation norm allocators mostly prefer for what type of resource. Lastly, it is not possible to reach firm conclusions on the effects of individual differences of parties in an allocation situation as there are a limited number of studies available and the results of those studies contradict each other. It is also important to note that only a very small subset (e.g., sex and collective orientation) of possible individual difference variables have been examined in the literature.

Another striking conclusion from this review is the paucity of empirical studies that have examined the need norm. This may be due to limited application of a need based distribution norm in organizations (Mannix, 1994) or it may be because of the difficulties in terms of creating a strong need manipulation in the laboratory settings where most of the research has been conducted. Along the same lines Schwinger (1986) stated that “specific hypotheses about the use of the need principle in allocation situations were developed not by using a justice approach, but by referring to theory and research about helping behavior... the term need changed its meaning from a personal need to a description of a deficiency of material resources. In summary, it can be said that the need principle has been vaguely defined and conceptualized as a principle of economic exchange” (p. 214).

Effects of Using Different Allocation Norms on Organizational Outcomes

Research examining the effects of different allocation norms such as fairness perceptions is scarcer than research examining the determinants of these norms. This

review will look at different categories of organizationally relevant outcomes that have been examined.

Recipient Performance

Very few studies in the literature have examined performance as a dependent variable. Deutsch (1985) summarized the results of six laboratory studies with undergraduate students that examined four different allocation norms (winner takes all, equity, equality and need) for allocating money. The results showed that allocation norms did not have an effect on productivity with the exception of tasks where performance depended on social cooperation. In the latter case, highest productivity was observed with equality norm. Another interesting finding from these six studies is that there was no relationship between fairness perceptions of different allocation norms (or working under a preferred allocation norm) and actual performance. Giacobbe-Miller, Miller and Victorov (1998) also failed to find a significant effect of allocation norms on performance. There are some other studies, however, that have reported increased performance under the equity norm (Tornblom, 1992). Meindl (1989), in a scenario study, found that managers perceived the equity norm to be positively related to productivity. Weinstein and Holzbach (1973) also showed that individuals were more productive under an equity based reward system compared to an equality based reward system.

Another body of literature that is relevant to allocation norms and performance is the compensation literature. Pay plans such as individual incentives, merit-pay systems and profit-sharing plans are all application of the equity and equality norms in

compensation situations. Murray and Gerhart (1998), for instance, looked at the relationship between skill based pay and performance and showed that using skill based pay resulted in increased performance. Likewise, Harris, Gilbreath and Sunday (1998) found that performance ratings of employees correlated with merit pay systems. Bloom (1999) showed that more compressed pay dispersions (the array of compensation levels paid for differences in work responsibilities, human capital, or individual performance within an organization) were positively related to multiple measures of individual and organizational performance meaning that individuals performed better under pay systems that closely watched their differences with their coworkers. Lastly, in a meta-analytical review of the literature between financial incentives and performance, Jenkins et al. (1998) showed that financial incentives were not related to performance quality but were related to performance quantity. Thus, although the studies done in the laboratory do not yield conclusive results, the compensation literature shows that there are positive effects of differential pay systems (i.e., application of the equity norm) on performance.

Recipients' Attitudes Towards the Task, Group Members, the Allocator and the Outcome

Deutsch (1985) and Tornblom (1992) concluded that the equality norm resulted in more favorable perceptions of the task and more intrinsic motivation to perform well compared to other allocation norms. Deutsch (1985) also reported cooperative feelings among participants under equality and need norms and competitive feelings under equity norm. Meindl (1989) found that allocators perceived the use of equity norm to negatively affect solidarity and leader relationships. Leung and Park (1986) showed that recipients perceived an allocator who used the equity rule in a competitive situation and

an allocator who used the equality rule in a cooperative situation as higher on social competence. Sondak, Neale and Pinkley (1999), in a lab study where the participants had to reach an agreement on an allocation rule through negotiation, showed that strangers were more likely to use the equity rule and be satisfied with their outcomes than roommates (who were more likely to use the equality rule). These results are in line with the basic assumptions of Deutsch (1975) in that the dominant allocation preference should be the equity norm in competitive environments and the equality norm in cooperative environments. In other words, both allocators and recipients think that the appropriate allocation norm in a competitive situation is the equity norm and that the equality norm is appropriate in a cooperative environment.

Kahn, Nelson and Lamm (1977) showed that the liking of an allocator depended on his or her generosity (i.e., maximizing other's outcomes) such that recipients preferred an equitable allocator when the use of the equity norm maximized the outcomes of the group members and preferred an allocator who used the equality norm when the use of the equality norm maximized the outcomes of the group members. Given that this study used a scenario design (where the scenario was not based on an organizational context), it is not surprising to see that participants preferred an allocator that maximized group outcomes regardless of the allocation norm used.

Fairness Perceptions

Deutsch (1985) reported that participants strongly preferred the equity norm over the equality and the need norms and rated the equity norm as more fair (in competitive environments). Conlon, Porter and Parks (2004) assessed perceptions of fairness as a

function of resource type, allocation type, allocation rule (and different operationalizations of the equity, equality and need norms), and effect on the individual and found that equity norm, in particular operationalized as equity based on past performance, was seen as more fair than all the other allocation norms. For the equality norm, random draw operationalization resulted in higher fairness perception than chance meetings. For the need norm, business need was seen as more fair than personal need. The interaction of resource type and justice rule on fairness perceptions was not significant with the exceptions of random drawing where fairness perceptions were higher for resources that are classified as goods compared to resources that are classified as money or status.

Giacobbe-Miller, Miller and Victorov (1998) and Marin (1981) also found that the equity norm was perceived as fairer than equality norm among managers and students acting as managers. Meindl (1989) found that managers (allocators) perceived that the equity norm positively affected fairness perceptions.

Parks et al. (1996) examined the distribution of adventitious (i.e., unexpected) outcomes in a laboratory (non-organizational scenario) study and showed that individuals evaluated equality norm as the most fair allocation norm, even compared to keeping all the gain to themselves. Their results also showed that individuals rated their own actions as fairer than the same actions of others. Linkey and Alexander (1998) investigated the need norm in the setting of a Catholic Church and found that monetary allocations based on personal need was seen as fair.

One overarching theme of the studies reviewed above is that the equity norm is perceived as the fairest allocation norm in organizational settings (i.e., competitive).

Equality norm is perceived as fair in non-organizational contexts (which usually are non-competitive as well). Despite the scarce research on the need norm, it can be concluded that allocations based on business needs are perceived fairer than allocations based on personal needs.

Summary

As can be seen from the above review, the literature on consequences of different allocation norms is scarce and conclusions are underdeveloped. Although the above reviewed studies reveal that allocation norms affect various attitudinal and perceptual outcomes in organizations, at this point, there are still important questions that are unanswered.

Limitations of Extant Literature

Based on this literature review, there are several issues that call for attention. First, despite the several studies in the literature that look at the factors that lead to the choice or preference of an allocation norm, most of this research is inconclusive. There are three main reasons for this inconclusiveness. First, the studies have different frame of references such that some of them take the perspective of the resource allocator, some of them focus on situations where the allocator is also a co-recipient and some take the perspective of the recipient in the allocation situation. This difference in the frame of reference renders it difficult to make comparisons across these studies.

Second, the studies reported in this review all used different operationalizations of resource categories. For instance, some studies operationalized monetary rewards as

bonuses (e.g., Chen, 1995) whereas some others operationalized both money and a camera as a monetary resource (e.g., Parks et al., 1996). Tornblom and Foa (1983) stated that different examples of the same resource category might affect the choice of allocation norm differently. Likewise, the studies differed in the extent to which they operationalized the allocation norms. In some studies, the need rule was operationalized as a personal need whereas in some others it was operationalized as a business need (e.g., Chen, 1995; Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004). Likewise, there are several operationalizations of the equity norm such as equity due to past, present and future contributions (e.g., Parks et al., 1999).

The third main reason is the different designs of the studies in terms of participants, settings and experimental manipulations. For instance, some of the studies used laboratory studies where the participants engaged in the allocation tasks that were not organizationally relevant. Some of the studies used organizationally relevant scenario designs where the participant assumed the role of the allocator yet in some other studies the participants evaluated the allocator as an outsider. In addition to these, most of the laboratory research on the topic used dyads, leaving questions of generalizability of these results to larger organizational contexts. The few field studies that examined allocation norms used scenario designs. Thus, although there is a large body of empirical literature on allocation norms, it is problematic to compare the studies directly and draw solid conclusions. Furthermore, there is a lack of field research that looks at what actually happens in organizations rather than only examining what managers would do in hypothetical situations.

Most of the studies only looked at one or two variables that may affect allocation choices. Sondak, Neale and Pinkley (1999) concluded that “while the parties’ contributions, relationship, and needs relative to available resources must all be known in order to infer the goals of an allocator, most research to date has focused on one or at most two of these three contextual factors” (p. 491). Furthermore, the empirical literature on the need norm is very limited and does not delineate on all the factors it entails.

Fourth, research on the consequences of different allocation norms is very scarce. The main dependent variable that has been examined is fairness perceptions but there are many other dependent variables such as outcome satisfaction, and different types of justice judgments that deserve further attention. Moreover, there is almost no research that examines what employees in an allocation prefer versus what the organization chooses to do and consequences this would have on employee attitudes and behavior.

CHAPTER III


THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES

The proposed model of recipient allocation preferences can be seen in Figure 1. Most of the extant research on allocation norms has focused on the allocation preference or actual allocation decisions of managers and/or executives (third parties) or individuals who were also the co-recipients of the allocation. The model proposed here, however, is about the preference of the recipient in an allocation situation who is affected by the allocation norm used but who does not have direct input to the actual allocation decision. In other words, the focus of the model is neither the allocator nor a third party observer to the allocation situation, but rather the individual who is directly impacted by the allocation and who does not have an input to or voice in the allocation decision.

The first part of the model (Figure 1) depicts the proposed antecedents of a recipients' preferred allocation norm. This first part of the model states that the characteristics of the outcome being allocated, the environment and the personality of the recipient are influential in predicting recipient's preferred allocation norms. This perspective in modeling the antecedents to a recipient's preferred allocation norm is also in line with the views expressed by several other researchers that claim that distributive values in a just world should depend on contextual factors (Baron & Cook, 1992; Bierhoff, Buck & Klein, 1986; Deutsch, 1975; Tornblom, 1992). The second part of the model (Figure 1) investigates the effects of the fit or misfit between a recipient's preference for an allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization on

five outcome measures: distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and performance.

FIGURE 1
Model of Recipient Allocation Preferences



Existing research on allocation norms have looked at various factors to understand the antecedents of allocation norms used by decision makers and consequences of using different allocation norms. The model proposed here is built on the review of the literature and tries to fill in the gaps that are left unanswered. Towards this end, the model includes variables that have been examined before and that are relevant for organizational settings in addition to some other variables that have not been examined before. For instance, there are several studies that have examined the role of acquaintance on the choice of an allocation norm. This factor, however, is not included in the model because in organizational settings all the employees, by definition, are acquaintances.

Antecedents to a Recipient's Preferred Allocation Norm

Following Leventhal (1976a, 1976b), an allocation norm is defined as a belief and/or a social rule which specifies criteria that define certain distributions of outcomes as fair and just. Recipient's preference for a specific allocation norm is an attitudinal response to specific features of the allocation situation and disposes an individual to favor a certain distribution over others (Leventhal, Kamza & Fry, 1980).

As noted in the second chapter, Deutsch (1975) identified three different distributive justice norms that can be used to allocate outcomes: equity, equality and need. Although there are other allocation norms that may be used in organizational settings (e.g., chance meetings, future performance expectations; see Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004, for a more complete list), the three main norms identified by Deutsch will be the focus of this dissertation proposal not only because they apply to the majority of organizational settings but also because most of the other allocation norms fall under these three main rules (e.g., allocations based on seniority are actually allocations based on equity norm).

Outcome Characteristics

Outcome characteristics refer to the properties of the outcome that are being distributed. There are many outcomes that may be distributed in organizational settings such as salary, bonuses, status, organizational perks, accommodations, vacation time, and organizational resources such as computers. This list of outcomes is not exhaustive at all, and even this small list is sufficient to show the variety of outcomes that may be distributed in organizational settings. Existing research on resource allocation reveals

that different outcomes lead to different allocation norm choices; however, there are no solid conclusions on the specific type of resource and the allocation norm choice (Parks et al., 1999).

Resource theory (Foa & Foa, 1975) which originally developed as a theory of social exchange is a useful and parsimonious way to categorize outcomes. According to the theory, anything that can be transmitted from one person to another in an interpersonal relationship is a “resource” and can be grouped into six basic categories: love, status, information, money, goods and services. “Love” includes any expression of affectionate regard, warmth or comfort and may be treated as friendship and/or affiliation in organizational settings (Parks et al., 1999). “Status” includes evaluative judgments that express prestige, regard or esteem. “Information” consists of advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment. “Money” is anything that has some standard unit of exchange value. “Goods” refers to tangible products, objects and materials. Lastly, “services” are activities that affect the body or belongings of a person (Foa & Foa, 1975).

Resource theory (Foa & Foa, 1975) classifies these six resources on two main dimensions: particularism and concreteness. Particularism refers to the degree to which the individuals and their relationships involved in the exchange affect the value of a resource. Resources that fall under love are considered to be highest on particularism as the allocator of this resource affects the value of the resource. For instance, the value of love received from a parent and a manager are completely different. Resources that fall under money are considered to be lowest on particularism as money has the same value

regardless of its allocator. According to the theory, service and status are less particularistic than love but more particularistic than goods and information.

Concreteness refers to the form or type of expression characteristic of a resource and ranges from concrete to symbolic. In other words, concreteness of an outcome refers to its tangibility. Resource types of service and goods are considered high on concreteness whereas status and information are considered low on concreteness. Love and money are considered medium on concreteness (Foa & Foa, 1975).

Foa and Foa (1975) also proposed some relationships between the resource classes and distribution rules. According to the authors, individuals would prefer an equality rule for the allocation of love, goods and services and an equity rule would be preferred for the allocation of status. Resources that fall under information would either be allocated based on an equality or a needs rule and monetary resources would be allocated based on an equity or a needs rule.

Despite its parsimony and theoretical focus (Parks et al., 1999), empirical research on resource theory does not support Foa and Foa's original predictions in organizational settings and remains inconclusive (Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004; Foa & Stein, 1980; Parks et al., 1999; Tornblom & Foa, 1983; Tornblom, Jonsson & Foa, 1985). This inconclusiveness, however, is not surprising given that the theory originated as one of social exchange predicting allocation norms in social exchange situations. In other words, it is almost inevitable that some modifications need to be made to the theory to make it more appropriate for organizational settings.

The main issue with the theory is the particularism and concreteness differentiation of the resource categories. Given the inconclusiveness of the empirical

research on these two dimensions, Parks et al. (1999) and Conlon, Porter and Parks. (2004) stated that there may be other underlying dimensions on which the resources identified by the theory differ.

One possible underlying dimension of the outcome categories is whether they are given as a consequence of an individual's contribution to the organization or if they will be used towards an individual's contribution. Tornblom (1992) used a similar dichotomy with contributions. More specifically, he identified two facets of a contribution as the input and the outcome of the input. The input includes such factors as effort, education or ability. The outcome of the input includes performance outcomes such as quality and quantity of work. An outcome can also be classified along the same two dimensions. Some of the outcomes allocated in organizations serve as an input to an employee's work (e.g., office space, computers, access to market data) and yet some other organizational outcomes are given to employees as a consequence of their work (e.g., stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, the latter category represents the "rewards" organizations allocate to their employees and the former one represents the "resources." Combining this categorization with the outcome categories of resource theory, monetary and status outcomes can be considered as being allocated based on consequence of work and information, goods and services can be considered as inputs to work.

Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) state that using the equity principle is more appropriate when differences among individuals are stressed and when there is prior knowledge of individual performance. Outcomes that are allocated as a consequence of work or rewards, by definition, stresses the differences among individuals as each individual is differentiated by his or her own performance. Thus, it is expected that

recipients will have a preference for the equity norm for the outcomes that are allocated as a consequence of work and are seen as rewards.

Hypothesis 1: For the allocation of outcomes that are perceived as a consequence of work (monetary and status outcomes), recipients will prefer the equity norm to the equality and the need norms.

For organizational outcomes that are inputs to work (information, goods, services), it is expected that recipients will have a preference for an equality or a need norm. Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) state that the equality principle is more appropriate when the equality of and similarity among individuals are emphasized. Recipients will have a preference for an equality norm for the allocation of these resources as they would like to be considered equal with their coworkers for the resources they would need to complete their work.

Hypothesis 2: For the allocation of outcomes that are perceived as an input to work (information, services, goods, affiliation), recipients will prefer the equality norm to the equity and the need norms.

One exception to previous two hypotheses, however, would be for resources that are perceived as scarce. Scarce outcomes can be defined as those outcomes that are limited and/or constrained. Because of their limited nature, not all the recipients can receive an equitable or an equal share of these resources. Leventhal, Kamza and Fry (1980) suggested that in situations where resources are constrained, the equity and the equality norms would be of less concern and the need norm would be perceived as more legitimate. Thus, I hypothesize that recipients will prefer the need norm for the allocation of resources that are perceived as scarce.

Hypothesis 3: Perceptions of scarcity of a resource will be positively related to recipients' preference for the need norm to the equity and the equality norms.

Environmental Characteristics

Sondak, Neale and Pinkley (1999) recently stated that the meaning of preferences for distribution norms cannot be adequately understood without consideration of the context in which distribution decisions are made. Environment is an important factor that affects individual's perceptions and preferences. Leventhal (1980) suggested that one of the factors that would affect the choice of an allocation rule is the surrounding social context. He further contended that the preference for a certain rule will depend on the extent to which that rule would help achieve goals of social relationships. Likewise, Deutsch (1975) proposed that the nature of the environment is the main determinant of an individual's preference for a specific allocation norm. Baron and Cook (1992) suggested that context is especially important in explaining equity and justice issues in organizations. A study by Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) empirically showed that situational cues are important for individuals when determining their preference for allocation rules.

As indicated by the above comments, the characteristics of the environment in which the allocation is taking place are essential factors that determine a recipient's preferred allocation norm. Here, I'll focus on two characteristics that may influence an individual's preferred allocation norm: goal priority and the level of resource dependency in the environment.

Deutsch (1975) contended that in cooperative relations where economic productivity is the main goal, equity would be the dominant principle, in relations where the fostering or maintenance of enjoyable social relations is the main goal, equality would be the dominant principle and in relations where fostering of personal development and personal welfare is the primary goal need would be the dominant principle in distributing outcomes by allocators.

Goal priority (Chen, 1995) refers to an individual's perceptions about an organization's goals. An organization may have economic goals (e.g., quality, productivity), humanistic goals (e.g., employee satisfaction, warm atmosphere) or both. The goal priority argument rests on the idea that allocation norms are related to the collective goals of the system (Leventhal, Kamza & Fry, 1980) and the allocation preferences of individuals in an organization will match the goal priorities of the organization. Chen (1995) tested a model of goal priority with Chinese and US organizations and showed that goal priorities predicted allocation preferences such that employees (acting as allocators) working at economically oriented organizations preferred equity norms and those that work at humanistically oriented organizations preferred equality norms.

Goal priority is one method of inferring about the characteristics of a social relationship. Given the ample evidence in the literature about the relationship between the characteristics of the social relationship and allocation norms used, goal priority is expected to affect the allocation preferences of recipients in an organization. Thus, combining the economic and humanistic goal orientations with the basic propositions of Deutsch (1975) raises the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4a: Perceptions of an economic goal priority will be positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm to the equality and the need norms.

Hypothesis 4b: Perceptions of a humanistic goal priority will be positively related to recipients' preference for the equality norm to the equity and the need norms.

The level of resource dependency is the second environmental characteristic that is hypothesized to influence recipients' preference for an allocation norm. Following Kabanoff (1991), resource dependency is defined as dependence on critical resources, i.e., one party (x) having power over another (y) to the extent that (y) depends on (x) for critical resources and/or outcomes for which there is no alternative supply. It is important to note that resource dependency of a party is not the equivalent of its resources or outcomes; resource dependency develops as a result of having control over critical resources and/or outcomes but may become institutionalized over time (Kabanoff, 1991, p. 422).

Kabanoff (1991) stated that resource dependency in social relationships would be influential in how different parties, i.e., strong and weak in terms of their resource dependency, view their dependence, entitlements, and contributions and would be influential in shaping their distributive orientations. Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) stated that the equity principle was more appropriate when differences among individuals were stressed and equality principle was more appropriate when the equality of and similarity among individuals were emphasized. Along the same lines, Kabanoff (1991) proposed that in contexts where resource dependency differentiation is high, there would be an unequal (differentiated) social interdependence and the dominant distributive orientation would be the equity rule. In contexts where resource dependency

differentiation is low, on the other hand, the social interdependence would be equal (undifferentiated) and the dominant distributive orientation would be equality.

The results of studies conducted by Mannix (1993, 1994) revealed similar results to those proposed by Kabanoff (1991). She showed that allocation norm served as a moderator in the relationship between resource dependency and resource allocation in small group negotiation situations. More specifically less resource dependent parties received higher outcomes under the equity norm and lower outcomes under a need norm whereas high resource dependent parties received higher outcomes under the need norm and lower outcomes under the equity norm.

Given that there are no published studies that test Kabanoff's (1991) predictions in terms of a preference for an allocation norm, the following hypotheses which are originally offered by Kabanoff (1991) are proposed.

Hypothesis 5: Resource dependency will be positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm to the equality and the need norms.

Recipients' Individual Difference Variables

The last group of factors proposed to affect a recipient's preferred allocation norm are personality and individual differences. Leventhal (1976b) expressed the importance of personality in assessing the fairness of a relationship. Tornblom (1992) stated that the research in allocation behavior had underscored the importance of personality and how it affected individual's allocation preferences.

In examining the effects of personality on allocation rule preferences, I will rely on the five-factor model of personality (Digman, 1989; 1990). "Big Five" personality

dimensions (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness to experience) have been shown to be sufficient to account for the underlying structural representation of an individual's personality and to validly predict a variety of organizational outcomes (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Of the five dimensions, I will focus on agreeableness as this is the only dimension that is theoretically relevant in resource allocation situations. I choose to exclude the other four dimensions, as there is no theoretical basis for including those dimensions in this model.

Agreeableness is the extent to which an individual is courteous, good-natured, flexible, trusting, cooperative, empathic, caring and tolerant (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Individuals high on agreeableness tend to get along with others around them and care about the well-being of others. The equality norm has been associated with maintaining harmony and fostering of enjoyable social relations. Thus, it is expected that recipients who are high on agreeableness will prefer an equality norm in allocation situations.

Hypothesis 6: Agreeableness will be positively related to recipients' preference for the equality norm to the equity and the need norms.

Concern for others is a relatively stable other-oriented individual value that reflects an individual's emphasis on being helpful and cooperative toward others. This orientation is unrelated to constructs included in most personality models and exhibits small correlations with personality dimensions (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004). Individuals who are high in concern for others place less emphasis on own personal outcomes and are less likely to engage in rational calculations (i.e., making choices based on the option that has the highest utility or expected utility) when making choices. Research on concern for others has shown that it may explain differences in a variety of

judgment and decision making contexts and a wide range of organizational processes which are unrelated to and beyond helping behavior (Korsgaard, Meglino & Lester, 1997).

Concern for others is an important individual difference variable that is likely to affect recipients' allocation preferences. Given that individuals who are high on this value place less importance on their own personal outcomes, something that would be associated with a preference for an equity and/or equality norm, the following relationship between concern for others and the recipients' preferred allocation norm is expected.

Hypothesis 7: Concern for others will be positively related to recipients' preference for the need norm to the equity and the equality norms.

The cultural model as a determinant of allocation preferences states that cultural values and norms affect allocation preferences by predisposing individuals to favor certain allocation norms over others (Chen, 1995). Collectivism is one of the main dimensions of the cultural model. Collectivism is usually conceptualized as having a social orientation, whereas individualism is characterized by having a self-orientation (Hofstede, 1980). Allocentrism vs. idiocentrism is the individual level equivalent of collectivism vs. individualism (Triandis et al., 1988). Findings show that the allocentrism vs. idiocentrism reflect a multidimensional construct (Gelfand, Triandis & Chan, 1996). Previous research (e.g., Triandis et al., 1988) has shown that allocentrism was positively related to social support and low levels of alienation and idiocentrism was positively related to emphasis on achievement. Thus, it is expected that recipients who

are high on allocentrism to prefer the equality norms and recipients who are high on idiocentrism to prefer equity norms.

Hypothesis 8a: Allocentrism will be positively related to recipients' preference for the equality norm to the equity and the need norms.

Hypothesis 8b: Idiocentrism will be positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm to the equality and the need norms.

Self-efficacy refers to "beliefs in one's capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet given situational demands" (Wood & Bandura, 1989, p. 408). Self-efficacy reflects differences among individuals in terms of their predispositions to view themselves as capable of meeting task expectations and has been linked to numerous outcomes such as training proficiency and job performance (Chen, Gully & Eden, 2001). Recipients who are high on this variable will feel confident about their abilities and feel that they can perform their roles satisfactorily. This, in turn, will lead to a preference for the equity norm as they will want to be differentiated based on their abilities and performance. Recipients who are low on self-efficacy, on the other hand, will not prefer to be differentiated from the group as they will doubt their abilities and performance.

Hypothesis 9: Self-efficacy will be positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm to the equality and the need norms.

Consequences of Misfit Between Recipient's Preferred and Actual Allocation Norms

Tornblom (1992) stated that “The operation (as well as the evaluation and violation) of different justice principles may result in different (positive as well as negative) consequences for an individual's satisfaction with his lot, a group's effectiveness in performing a joint task, the socio-emotional climate among group members, the power and prestige order among group members, intergroup relations, etc” (p. 197). In allocation situations, recipients compare their preferred allocation norms to the norms used by the organization. The outcome of this evaluation, i.e., the fit or misfit between the preferred and perceived allocation norm, in turn, is expected to affect various organizational outcomes. The following discussion elaborates on this evaluation and identifies different attitudinal responses recipients may develop when they experience different kinds of fit and misfit between preferred and actual allocation norms. Meindl (1989) stated that when recipients of an allocation are the focus of investigation, their satisfaction levels, perceived fairness of the decision process and the outcome are important variables that need to be examined. Thus, the five dependent variables of this model are perceptions of distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and performance.

Before discussing the fit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the perceived allocation norm used by the organization, however, it may be useful to make a distinction between different types of justice judgments individuals make and especially between distributive and procedural justice. Leventhal, Kamza and Fry (1980) stated that

a distribution is a result and the procedures are the part of a causal network that generates that result. Thus, distributive justice refers to the fairness of outcome distributions or allocations and procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures that are used to make those outcome distributions or allocations (Adams, 1963; Colquitt et al., 2001; Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In their meta-analyses of the justice field, Colquitt and his colleagues (2001) tested for the independence of different types of justice and showed that distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational justice are distinct constructs that underlie different dimensions of the justice phenomena.

Despite the distinctness of the different dimensions of justice, however, the central thesis underlying the model presented here, following Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996), is that the procedures that yield an allocation (i.e., allocation norms) cannot be examined in isolation from the outcome of the allocation itself. In other words, it is expected that recipients' fairness perceptions about an allocation will be influenced by both the fit or misfit between preferred and perceived allocation norms and the outcome of the allocation itself. Referent cognitions theory (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987), built on a would/should conceptualization, states that in outcome allocation situations "resentment is maximized when people believe they *would* have obtained better outcomes if the decision maker had used other procedures that *should* have been implemented" (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989, p. 293). Thus, the favorability of the outcome is expected to moderate the relationship between fit or misfit between preferred and perceived allocation norms and satisfaction and fairness perceptions.

Effects of Fit/Misfit

When a recipient's preferred allocation norm matches with the perceived allocation norm used by the organization, it is expected to result in outcome satisfaction and favorable perceptions of distributive, procedural and interactional fairness judgments as well as increased performance. In instances where an recipient's preferred allocation norm matches the norm used by the organization, the recipient would not engage in the "would/should" comparison process identified by the referent cognitions theory as both the would and should norm would be the same. This, in turn, is expected to lead to favorable perceptions of the outcome as well as positive perceptions of distributive, procedural and interactional fairness and increased performance. This relationship is expected to hold true for both types of resources, inputs and outcomes.

A misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization in a particular situation, on the other hand, is expected to result in negative perceptions of the outcome and the organization in general. According to the referent cognitions theory (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987), when there is a misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the perceived allocation norm used by the organization, recipients will engage in the "would/should" comparison and compare the outcome they obtained with the perceived allocation norm to the outcome they would have obtained if their preferred allocation norm was used.

Hypothesis 10: A misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the perceived norm used by the organization will be negatively related to a) distributive justice, b) procedural justice, c) interactional justice, d) outcome satisfaction and e) performance.

Although a misfit is expected to lead to some dissatisfaction, however, this does not necessarily mean that recipients will feel total dissatisfaction over an outcome when the outcome is not distributed according to their preferred rule or that all the felt dissatisfaction will be similar in nature. Studies in the resource allocation literature (most of which allocated resources that can be classified as outcomes) have shown that allocations that used equity norms are seen as more fair than allocations based on other norms (e.g., Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004). This tendency is more prevalent in organizational contexts where an individualistic orientation is especially salient. In organizational settings, societal norms hint to individuals that equity norms are more appropriate where competitiveness is part of the daily routine. This societal norms are especially more prevalent for the allocation of outcomes, as opposed to inputs, as outcomes are allocated as a consequence of one's work. Thus, when the recipient has a preference for the equity norm and the perceived allocation norm is the equality or the need norm, the recipient will develop negative perceptions for the organization not only because his/her preferred norm is not used but also the "norm" of using equity in organizations has been violated. On the other hand, when the recipient has a preference for the equality or the need norm for the allocation of outcomes, but the organization uses the equity norm, the recipient may not develop as strong negative perceptions about the organization as the organization is following the "norm." Thus, negative perceptions developed when there is violation of preferred equity norm will be stronger than when there is a violation of preferred equality and need norms.

Hypothesis 11: A misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the perceived norm used by the organization such that the recipient prefers the equity

norm and the perceived allocation norm is the equality or the need norm, will be more negatively related to a) distributive justice, b) procedural justice, c) interactional justice, d) outcome satisfaction and e) performance compared to other types of misfit.

Moderating Role of Outcome Favorability

Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996), in a review of the justice literature, found an interaction effect of distributive and procedural justice such that when procedural justice is relatively low, outcome favorability influences individuals reactions and when outcome favorability is relatively low, procedural justice has a direct effect on individuals reactions. These findings are also in line with Folger and Kass (2000) who stated that “it is certainly possible for fair procedures to produce unfair outcomes or unfair procedures to yield fair ones” (p. 431). Morgan and Sawyer (1979) concluded that allocation norms affect not only the decisions about the allocation but also the decisions about procedures used to arrive at the allocations. Brockner and Wiesenfeld’s results show the impact of outcome favorability on individual’s reactions and I expect outcome favorability to moderate the relationship between fit or the misfit between recipients’ preferred allocation norms and the norms used by the organization and satisfaction and fairness perceptions. I expect outcome favorability to increase the positive effects of a fit on the outcome variables and decrease the negative effects of a misfit.

Hypothesis 12: Outcome favorability will moderate the relationship between the misfit between the recipient’s preferred and perceived allocation norm and the dependent variables: a) outcome satisfaction, b) distributive justice,

c) interactional justice, d) procedural justice and e) performance) such that outcomes that are more favorable will reduce the negative effects of the misfit on the dependent variables.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Sample

Participants in this study were registered nurses (RNs) working at a university hospital in Turkey. The hospital has two main divisions, an adult hospital and a children's hospital and the hospital administration endorsed the study and encouraged the RNs to complete the surveys. Participation in the study was voluntary and participants remained anonymous.

A total of 700 RNs working at both hospitals received the initial survey. Of the 700 first surveys distributed, 544 respondents completed the first survey, 454 respondents completed the second surveys and 363 respondents completed the third survey. Matching the three surveys yielded 255 usable surveys, representing a 36% response rate. Of the usable responses, respondents had a mean age of 31.70 (s.d. = 7.83) and 98% were female. Mean tenure with the profession was 10.80 years (s.d. = 8.99) and mean tenure with this hospital was 9.97 years (s.d. = 8.77). 38.4 % of the respondents had a 2-year college degree, 54.5 % a 4-year college degree while 2.7% had graduate degrees. 13.8% of the respondents were in supervisory positions, 25.1% were clinic nurses (only worked the day shift) and 57.3% of the respondents worked on rotating shifts. 34.1% of the respondents were contract employees.

One important and potentially problematic aspect of this sample in terms of its external validity was that it predominantly consisted of female participants (98% of the

participants were female). Although using a predominantly female sample may have created some problems because of previous findings in the justice literature that show some differences between male and female respondents, I do not believe that this created major problems. First, the composition of the sample was not because of any particular characteristic of the hospital but a characteristic of nursing practice in Turkey (to some extent even in U.S.). Second, and perhaps more importantly, Kahn, Nelson and Gaeddert (1980) suggested that sex differences in allocations situations are more likely to occur when situational demands are weak. Given that organizational contexts are strong situations (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989), the authors argue that sex differences in the past research have been exaggerated. Thus, considering the potential advantages of conducting a field study, I do not expect the sample's nature to be a limitation for the study.

Another important and potentially problematic aspect of this sample in terms of its external validity is that the all the sample consists of Turkish nationals. Most scholars (e.g., Cortina & Wasti, 2005; Goregenli, 1997) define Turkey as a country that rates higher on collectivism than it does on individualism. One may argue that because of this characteristic of the sample, the results obtained in this study would not be generalizable to a North American sample which is generally considered high on individualism and low on collectivism. First, the means and standard deviations obtained from the data show that the sample rates almost the same on idiocentrism (mean = 3.55, s.d. = .41) and allocentrism (mean = 3.72, s.d. = .34). Second, and more importantly, nursing, as a profession, has a very strong culture and professional norms that go beyond a national culture (e.g., Bottorff, 1991; Donaldson & Crowley, 1978; Watson, 1985). Thus,

although the sample consists of Turkish nationals, because these individuals are all in the nursing profession, these strong norms and professional culture would overshadow any effects national culture would have on their reactions.

Translation

All the survey instruments were translated into Turkish using the back translation method (Brislin, 1970) where two individuals independently conducted the translations. One translator (who is familiar with the literature) translated the English scales into Turkish. This version was back-translated by a bilingual translator into English.

Procedure

Participants answered three questionnaires at three different times (1 week apart from each other). At Time 1, participants answered questions regarding the individual difference variables and environmental characteristics. At Time 2, participants answered questions regarding their preferred allocation norms. At Time 3, participants answered questions regarding the allocation norms used by the organization and the dependent variables. All the responses were strictly confidential and at no time during the study were participants asked to identify themselves with their names or any other personally identifiable information. The three surveys were matched through a coding system only the respondents knew.

Measures

Control Variables

Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their sex, age, education level, tenure with the hospital, tenure in the profession, and organizational rank (items 91-104 in Appendix A).

Independent Variables

Agreeableness. Agreeableness was measured using the shortened version of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-S). This scale had 12 items (e.g., “I try to be courteous to everyone I meet” and “I would rather cooperate with others than compete with them”) and used a 5-point Likert scale. Cronbach’s alpha for this item was .59 (items 1-11 in Appendix A).

Concern for others. Concern for others was measured by the Concern for Others subscale of the Comparative Emphasis Scale (CES) (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987). This subscale consisted of 6 items. Sample items included “Correcting others’ errors without embarrassing them” and “Lending a helping hand to someone having difficulty.” Cronbach’s alpha for this item was .94 (items 67-78 in Appendix A).

Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy was measured by the 10-item self-efficacy scale developed by Bandura (1991). The participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with items like “I am an expert at my role” and “When my performance is poor, it is due to my lack of ability” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) response scale. Cronbach’s alpha for this item was .72 (items 12-22 in Appendix A).

Allocentrism-idiocentrism. Collectivistic and individualistic values were measured by using the INDCOL instruments proposed by Singelis et al. (1995). This scale has been used in Turkish context before and has been validated by Robert and Wasti (2002). The participants indicated their agreement with the statements on a 5-point scale (1-strongly disagree to 5- strongly agree). Cronbach's alpha was .74 for allocentrism and .74 for idiocentrism (items 23-59 in Appendix A).

Resource type. The six resource types proposed by Foa and Foa (1975), status, information, money, goods, services, and affiliation were clustered into two main categories: resources that are given as an input to an employee's work and resources that are given as a consequence of an employee's work. Although this distinction was made on a theoretical basis (see the development of Hypotheses 1 and 2), respondents were also asked to classify the six resource types as an input to employee's work or as a consequence of an employee's work and the results of this classification are discussed in the results section (items 1-6 in Appendix B).

Scarcity. Scarcity was measured with a one-item measure that asked respondents their perceptions about whether the inputs and outcomes at their organization were scarce on a 1 (very scarce) to 5 (very abundant) scale (item 11 for inputs and item 16 for outcomes in Appendix B).

Goal priority. Goal priority was measured by the goal priority scale (Chen, 1995). This scale is consistent with the productivity-solidarity categorization of system goals (Deutsch, 1985). The scale listed twelve goals (see appendix) and respondents were asked to indicate how much each goal is emphasized at their organization on a scale of 1 (to a very small extent) to 5 (to a very large extent). Cronbach's alpha was .78

for economic goal priority and .97 for humanistic goal priority (items 79-90 in Appendix A).

Resource dependency. Resource dependency was measured with a 4-item scale that is developed for this study by building on the definition of power proposed by Kabanoff (1991). Respondents indicated their agreement with the items on a 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) Likert-type scale. Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .72 (items 60-63 in Appendix A).

Outcome favorability. Outcome favorability was measured with a three-item response scale adopted from Brockner et al. (2000) and Chen, Brockner and Greenberg (2003). Participants answered the scale twice for inputs and outcomes. A sample item is "How satisfied are you with your monetary outcomes?" Cronbach's alpha was .92 for outcomes and .88 for inputs (items 6-8 for inputs and items 36-38 for outcomes in Appendix C).

Dependent Variables

The respondents answered the following measures twice throughout the study, once for inputs and once for outcomes.

Preferred allocation norm. First, the respondents were given a brief description of each allocation norm (equity, equality and need). Then, they were asked to rank order the three allocation norms (equity, equality and need) for both inputs and outcomes. The allocation norm that was ranked as the first preference was used as the preferred allocation norm (item 7 for inputs and item 12 for outcomes in Appendix B).

Perceived allocation norm. Respondents were asked to rank order the degree to which the three allocation norms (equity, equality, and need) were used at their organization to allocate both inputs and outcomes. The allocation norm that was ranked as the first preference was used as the perceived allocation norm (item 1 for inputs and item 31 for outcomes in Appendix C).

Norm fit. Norm fit was operationalized as a dummy variable separately for inputs and outcomes. If the respondent gave the same ranking to both his/her preferred allocation norm and perceived allocation norm, then that was coded as a fit (1), if the preferred and perceived allocation norm had different rankings then it was coded as a misfit (0).

Norm misfit. Norm misfit was operationalized as a dummy variable separately for inputs and outcomes. If the respondent gave different rankings to his/her preferred allocation norm and perceived allocation norm, then that was coded as a misfit (1), if the preferred and perceived allocation norm had the same rankings then it was coded as a fit (0).

Distributive justice. Distributive justice was measured with a 4-item scale developed by Colquitt (2001). The scale was given to the respondents twice, one time for inputs and one time for outcomes. Sample items include: “Does your (outcome) reflect the effort you have put into your work?” and “Is your (outcome) justified, given your performance?” The responses were measured on a response scale from 1 (to a small extent) to 5 (to a large extent). Cronbach’s alpha was .88 for outcomes and .87 for inputs (items 11-14 for inputs and items 41-44 for outcomes in Appendix C).

Procedural justice. Procedural justice measure was adopted from a 7-item scale developed by Colquitt (2001). As with distributive justice, respondents were asked about their procedural justice judgments about inputs and outcomes separately. Sample items include: “Have you been able to express your views and feelings during allocation procedures?” and “Have the allocation procedures been free of bias?” The responses were measured on a response scale from 1 (to a small extent) to 5 (to a large extent). Cronbach’s alpha was .83 for outcomes and .84 for inputs (items 15-21 for inputs and items 45-51 for outcomes in Appendix C).

Interactional justice. Interactional justice was measured with the 9-item scale developed by Colquitt (2001) and respondents were asked to indicate their interactional justice judgments separately for inputs and outcomes. Although Colquitt had two factors under interactional justice (interpersonal and informational justice), a factor analysis revealed that all the items loaded on a single factor so I combined those two measures to form interactional justice. Sample items from the measure are, “To what extent has the authority figure that enacted the procedures treated you in a polite manner?” and “To what extent has the authority figure that enacted the procedures explained the procedures thoroughly?” The responses were measured on a response scale from 1 (to a small extent) to 5 (to a large extent). Cronbach’s alpha was .84 for outcomes and .94 for inputs (items 22-30 for inputs and items 52-60 for outcomes in Appendix C).

Outcome satisfaction. Outcome satisfaction was measured by two items (Colquitt, 2001). Respondents used a 5-point Likert type scale (strongly disagree- strongly agree) and indicated their outcome satisfaction with inputs and outcomes separately. The items include “The (outcome) I am currently receiving is satisfactory”

and “I am satisfied with my (outcome) in this course.” Cronbach’s alpha was .93 for outcomes and .90 for inputs (items 9-10 for inputs and items 39-40 for outcomes in Appendix C).

Performance. Performance was be measured with a self-report measure of performance adopted from Welbourne, Johnson and Erez (1998). Respondents rated their own performance on 5 dimensions (job, career, innovator, team, and organization) on a 5-point Likert type scale (1= “needs much improvement”, 2= “needs some improvement”, 3= “satisfactory”, 4= “good” and 5= “excellent”). Cronbach’s alpha was .94 for this scale (items 61-80 in Appendix C).

Confirmatory Factor Analyses

In order to test the adequacy of the factor structures of the measures in the study, confirmatory factor analyses were performed. These analyses were performed using LISREL on surveys administered at time one and time three.

For the measures used in the survey administered at time one (agreeableness, self-efficacy, concern for others, allocentrism, idiocentrism, power, economic goal priority and humanistic goal priority), a 8-factor model ($\chi^2 = 9078.722$; $df = 3626$, $p < .05$; GFI = .69; NFI = .80; NNFI = .86; CFI = .87; RMSEA = .06) revealed that all the items loaded on their intended factors.

For the measures used in the survey administered at time three, there were some concerns with regard to the measures of outcome favorability and outcome satisfaction as the items were very similar and a high correlation was expected between the scales. Results showed that a 6-factor model ($\chi^2 = 3786.30$; $df = 930$, $p < .05$; GFI = .64; NFI =

.90; NNFI = .91; CFI = .92; RMSEA = .10) was marginally, significantly different ($\Delta\chi^2 = 10.13$; $\Delta df = 5$; $p = .07$). than a 5-factor model where outcome favorability and outcome satisfaction were loaded on a single factor ($\chi^2 = 3796.430$; $df = 935$, $p < .05$; GFI = .64; NFI = .89; NNFI = .91; CFI = .91; RMSEA = .10). Thus, outcome satisfaction and outcome favorability were treated as separate constructs in the study.

Another concern with the measures in the third survey was the interactional justice measure. In the justice literature, there is some evidence that looks at interactional justice as two separate constructs, interpersonal justice and informational justice. Results showed that a 7-factor model ($\chi^2 = 3520.303$; $df = 924$, $p < .05$; GFI = .66; NFI = .90; NNFI = .90; CFI = .92; RMSEA = .10) where interactional justice was treated as two separate constructs were significantly different ($\Delta\chi^2 = 265.997$; $\Delta df = 6$; $p < .01$). than a 6-factor model ($\chi^2 = 3786.30$; $df = 930$, $p < .05$; GFI = .64; NFI = .90; NNFI = .91; CFI = .92; RMSEA = .10). Despite this, however, interactional justice was treated as one variable in the model for parsimonious interpretation.

Analysis

The first part of the model that looks at the antecedents of recipient allocation preferences was tested using multinomial logistic regression. For all the other analysis, hierarchical multiple regression was used. All the variables were centered around the mean.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

Antecedents of a Recipient's Preference for an Allocation Norm

The first step in my data analyses was to test how the recipients viewed the different resource categories. Although no formal hypotheses were formulated, the first two hypotheses of the study were based on the prediction that monetary and status resources would be seen as outcomes of work whereas information, services, goods and affiliation would be seen as inputs to work. Table 2 presents the results of rotated factor analysis of different resource categories. One way to interpret these results is that respondents of the survey viewed monetary and status resources as an outcome of work and information, services and goods as an input to work. The only outcome category that did not load on its predicted factor was affiliation. This outcome category was expected to load on input to work factor but loaded on a separate factor by itself. Thus, in a way, respondents viewed affiliation/friendship as neither an input to work nor a consequence of work.

TABLE 2
Factor Analysis for Resource Categories

Resource Category	Input	Outcome	X
1. Affiliation	.03	.06	.87
2. Status	-.07	.81	.32
3. Information	.59	-.27	.21
4. Money	.09	.69	-.46
5. Good	.74	.14	-.26
6. Services	.71	.03	.05

All the analyses in this chapter are built on this distinction among the resource types. In other words, all the analyses, consistent with the way the data was collected, were run separately for inputs and outcomes and reported as such.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that for the allocation of resources that are perceived as a consequence of work recipients will prefer the equity norm to the equality and the need norms. Preliminary analysis of the data revealed that 71.56% of the respondents preferred the equity norm, 21.78% preferred the equality norm and 6.67% preferred the need norm for the allocation of inputs. To formally test this hypothesis, chi-square goodness of fit test was conducted. A chi-square goodness of fit test allows to test whether the observed proportions for a categorical variable differ from being equal. Table 3 reports the results of this test where the equity norm is the comparison group. As can be seen in the table, the overall model was significant ($\chi^2 = 155.627$, $p < .05$) and the observed proportions were significantly different from each other as reported by the Wald statistics ($z = -7.29$, $p < .05$; $z = -8.79$, $p < .05$). Hypothesis 1, thus, was supported.

TABLE 3
Chi-square Test for Outcomes

	B	Wald	Sig.
Equality	-1.19	-7.29	.01
Need	-2.37	-8.79	.01
$\chi^2 = 155.627$ $p < .05$			

Hypothesis 2 predicted that for the allocation of resources that are perceived as an input to work recipients will prefer the equality norm to the equity and the need norms. Contrary to this hypothesis, 50.22% of the respondents preferred the need norm for the allocation of inputs, whereas only 21.52% preferred the equality norm and

28.25% preferred the equity norm. Table 4 presents the results of the chi-square goodness of fit tests for this hypothesis where need is the comparison group. The results show that the overall model was significant ($\chi^2 = 30.143$, $p < .05$), however, hypothesis 2, was not supported.

TABLE 4
Chi-square Test for Inputs

	B	z	Sig.
Equity	-.58	-3.65	.01
Equality	-.85	-4.91	.01
$\chi^2 = 30.143$ $p < .05$			

I used multinomial logistic regression to test hypotheses 3 through 9 and results of the multinomial logistic regression to test these hypotheses can be seen in Tables 5a through 5f. Multinomial logistic regression is a special form of logistic regression where the dependent variable has more than two categories. In multinomial logistic regression, a set of logit coefficients is estimated for each of the categories of the dependent variable. These estimated logit coefficients indicate the independent log odds of each independent variable of being in the particular dependent variable category of interest versus being in the base (contrast) category. In multinomial logistic regression, one of the categories of the outcome variable is set a comparison group and all results are displayed in comparison to that group. In the following analyses, the need norm is set as the comparison group.

TABLE 5a
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Outcomes – The Need Norm as Comparison Group

Variable		χ^2 (model)	df (model)	Sig. (model)	B	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Outcome Scarcity	Equity	8.37	2	.02	-.28	.57	1	.45	.76
	Equality				.38	.85	1	.36	1.46
Concern for Others	Equity	.82	2	.67	-.23	.15	1	.70	.79
	Equality				.08	.01	1	.91	1.08

Need is the comparison group.

TABLE 5b
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Inputs – The Need Norm as Comparison Group

Variable		χ^2 (model)	df (model)	Sig. (model)	B	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Input Scarcity	Equity	.44	2	.80	.00	.00	1	.98	1.01
	Equality				.14	.40	1	.53	1.15
Concern for Others	Equity	.15	2	.93	.10	.09	1	.77	1.10
	Equality				-.05	.02	1	.88	.95

Need is the comparison group.

TABLE 5c
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Outcomes – The Equity Norm as Comparison Group

Variable		χ^2 (model)	df (model)	Sig. (model)	B	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Economic Goal	Equality	1.89	2	.39	.42	1.40	1	.24	1.52
	Need				-.22	.22	1	.64	.80
Resource Dependency	Equality	9.08	2	.01	-.25	.98	1	.32	.78
	Need				1.15	6.69	1	.01	3.14
Idiocentrism	Equality	3.41	2	.18	-.10	.06	1	.80	.90
	Need				1.18	3.09	1	.08	3.26
Self-Efficacy	Equality	1.31	2	.52	-.19	.31	1	.58	.83
	Need				.53	.82	1	.37	1.70

Equity is the comparison group.

TABLE 5d
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Inputs – The Equity Norm as Comparison Group

Variable		χ^2 (model)	df (model)	Sig. (model)	B	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Economic Goal	Equality	5.39	2	.07	-.17	.16	1	.69	.85
	Need				-.70	4.10	1	.04	.50
Resource Dependency	Equality	.41	2	.81	.11	.15	1	.70	1.12
	Need				-.06	.06	1	.81	.95
Idiocentrism	Equality	5.85	2	.05	-.37	.63	1	.43	.69
	Need				-.92	5.37	1	.02	.40
Self-Efficacy	Equality	6.96	2	.03	-.54	1.66	1	.20	.58
	Need				-.90	6.61	1	.01	.41

Equity is the comparison group.

TABLE 5e
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Outcomes – The Equality Norm as Comparison Group

Variable		χ^2 (model)	df (model)	Sig. (model)	B	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Humanistic Goal	Equity	3.20	2	.20	.09	3.39	1	.53	1.10
	Need				-.29	1.56	1	.21	.74
Agreeableness	Equity	.88	2	.64	-.31	.52	1	.47	.73
	Need				-.67	.72	1	.40	.51
Allocentrism	Equity	1.51	2	.47	-.58	1.45	1	.23	.56
	Need				-.30	.12	1	.73	.74

Equality is the comparison group.

TABLE 5f
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Inputs – The Equality Norm as Comparison Group

Variable		χ^2 (model)	df (model)	Sig. (model)	B	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Humanistic Goal	Equity	16.52	2	.00	-.48	3.96	1	.05	.62
	Need				-.76	11.42	1	.00	.47
Agreeableness	Equity	.33	2	.85	.27	.00	1	.95	1.03
	Need				.22	.24	1	.63	1.25
Allocentrism	Equity	1.41	2	.49	-.16	.08	1	.78	.85
	Need				-.54	1.13	1	.29	.58

Equality is the comparison group.

Hypothesis 3 predicted perceptions of scarcity of a resource will be positively related to recipients' preference for the need norm to the equity and the equality norms. The first row of Table 5a shows the results of multinomial regression ran to test this hypothesis for outcomes. The overall model was significant ($\chi^2 = 8.37, p = .02 < .05$), however, the coefficients for the equity and equality norms were not significant. Furthermore, although not significant, the coefficient for the equity norm ($B = -.28, p = .45$) was in the predicted direction whereas the coefficient for the equality norm ($B = .38, p = .36$) was not indicating that when recipients perceived outcomes as scarce, they were .76 times less likely to prefer the equity norm to the need norm and 1.46 times more likely to prefer the equality norm to the need norm. For inputs (Table 5b, first row), the overall model was not significant ($\chi^2 = .44, p = .80$). Hypothesis 3 was not supported either for outcomes or for inputs.

Hypothesis 4a stated that perceptions of economic goal priority would be positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm. The χ^2 statistic for the model was marginally significant for inputs ($\chi^2 = 5.39, p = .07$) but insignificant for outcomes ($\chi^2 = 1.89, p = .39$). For inputs, the model was only significant in the contrast of the equity and need norms ($B = -.70, \exp(B) = .50, p < .05$) and for every increase in economic goal priority, there was a increase of .50 in the log odds of preferring the equity norm compared to preferring the need norm. Furthermore, for every increase in economic goal priority, there was a increase of .85 in the log odds of preferring the equity norm to the equality norm. Thus, the hypothesis that perceptions of economic goal priority being positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm was supported for inputs and not supported for outcomes.

Hypothesis 4b stated that perceptions of humanistic goal priority would be positively related to recipients' preference for the equality norm. As with economic goal priority, the model was significant with inputs ($\chi^2 = 16.52, p < .05$) but insignificant with outcomes ($\chi^2 = 3.20, p > .10$). In other words, humanistic goal priority was related to recipients' preference of an allocation norm for inputs but not for outcomes. And for inputs, for every increase in humanistic goal priority, there was an increase of .62 in the log odds of preferring the equality norm to the equity norm ($B = -.48, \exp(B) = .62, p < .05$) and an increase of .47 of preferring the equality norm to the need norm ($B = -.76, \exp(B) = .47, p < .05$). Thus, humanistic goal priority was positively related to recipients' preference for the equality norm to the equity and need norms for inputs. This hypothesis was supported for inputs but not for outcomes.

The next hypothesis of the study (hypothesis 5) stated that resource dependency in the environment would be positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm over the equality and need norms. For inputs, the model was insignificant ($\chi^2 = .41, p > .10$), suggesting that resource dependency differentiation did not influence recipients' norm preferences for the allocation of inputs. For outcomes, however, the model was significant ($\chi^2 = 9.08, p < .05$). A one-unit increase in resource dependency differentiation increased the odds of a recipient preferring the need norm by 3.14 times ($B = 1.15, \exp(B) = 3.14, p < .05$) and decreased the odds of a recipient preferring the equality norm by .78 times ($B = -.25, \exp(B) = .78, p < .05$). Thus, resource dependency differentiation made a difference in recipients' allocation norm preference for outcomes but not as predicted. Recipients preferred the need norm when they perceived their

environment as high on resource dependency differentiation. Thus, this hypothesis was rejected for the allocation of both inputs and outcomes.

The next set of hypotheses in the study (hypotheses 6-9) dealt with how various individual difference variables would affect a recipient's preferred allocation norm. Among these variables, I failed to find support for most of them, agreeableness ($\chi^2 = .33$, $p = .85$ for inputs; $\chi^2 = .88$, $p = .64$ for outcomes), concern for others ($\chi^2 = .15$, $p = .93$ for inputs; $\chi^2 = .82$, $p = .67$ for outcomes) and allocentrism ($\chi^2 = 1.41$, $p = .49$ for inputs; $\chi^2 = 1.51$, $p = .47$ for outcomes) were not significant predictors of a recipient's preference for an allocation norm. Thus, hypotheses 6, 7 and 8a were not supported.

Hypothesis 8b predicted that idiocentrism would be positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm. Although not significant for outcomes ($\chi^2 = 3.41$, $p > .10$), the results showed that idiocentrism was a significant predictor of recipient allocation norm preference for inputs ($\chi^2 = 5.85$, $p < .05$). More specifically, each unit increase in idiocentrism decreased the odds of a recipient preferring the need norm compared to the equity norm by .40 times ($B = -.92$, $\exp(B) = .40$, $p < .05$) and decreased the odds of preferring the equality norm to the equity norm by .69 times ($B = -.37$, $\exp(B) = .69$, $p > .05$). Hypothesis 8b, thus, was supported for inputs but not supported for outcomes.

Hypothesis 9 stated that self-efficacy would be positively related to recipients' preference for the equity norm. The results showed that this hypothesis was not supported for outcomes ($\chi^2 = 1.31$, $p > .05$). For inputs, the multinomial regression showed that self-efficacy was a significant predictor of recipient norm preference ($\chi^2 = 6.96$, $p < .05$). More specifically, every unit increase in self-efficacy decreased the odds

of a recipient preferring the need norm to the equity norm by .41 times ($B = -.90$, $\exp(B) = .41$, $p < .05$) and decreased the odds of a recipient preferring the equality norm to the equity norm by .69 times ($B = -.54$, $\exp(B) = .20$, $p > .05$). This hypothesis was supported for inputs but not for outcomes.

Effects of the Fit/Misfit between a Recipient's Preferred Allocation Norm and the Norm Used by the Organization

The second part of the proposed model dealt with the effects of a fit/misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the norm used by the organization as perceived by the recipient.

Hypothesis 10 dealt with the effects of misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the perceived norm used by the organization. More specifically, hypothesis 10 stated that a misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the perceived allocation norm used by the organization will be negatively related to the distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and performance. In order to test this hypothesis, I dummy-coded misfit using fit as the reference group and regressed this dummy-coded variable on the dependent variables (Table 6a for outcomes, Table 6b for inputs). I also created a cell means table for all the different types of misfit and fit and the dependent variables (presented after each regression table).

TABLE 6a
Misfit Regression Analyses for Outcomes

Step and Variables	Distributive Justice			Procedural Justice			Interactional Justice			Outcome Satisfaction			Performance		
	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2
Step 1. Misfit	-.15*	.02*	.02	-.15*	.02*	.02	-.15*	.02*	.02	-.12 [†]	.02 [†]	.02	-.08	.01	.01

[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

TABLE 6b
Misfit Regression Analyses for Inputs

Step and Variables	Distributive Justice			Procedural Justice			Interactional Justice			Outcome Satisfaction			Performance		
	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2
Step 1. Misfit	-.04	.00	.00	-.05	.00	.00	-.15*	.02*	.02	-.12 [†]	.02 [†]	.02	-.08	.01	.01

[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

Below I discuss my findings for hypothesis 10 in regards to outcomes before turning next to inputs. The regressions revealed a significant negative main effect of the misfit on distributive justice ($\beta = -.15, p < .05$), procedural justice ($\beta = -.15, p < .05$), interactional justice ($\beta = -.15, p < .05$) and outcome satisfaction ($\beta = -.12, p < .10$), providing support for Hypothesis 10a, 10b, 10c and 10d for outcomes. Cell means for the different misfit and fit categories for outcomes are also presented in Table 6c. These findings suggested that a misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization as perceived by the recipient had negative effects on recipients' distributive, procedural and interactional justice judgments and outcome satisfaction perceptions. Although there was only marginal effects for misfit on performance ($\beta = -.08, p > .05$), i.e., hypothesis 10e, the results were still in the predicted direction. A misfit between a recipients' preferred allocation norm and the norm used by the organization as perceived by the recipient had a negative effect on recipient performance.

Turning next to the findings regarding inputs for hypothesis 10, the results were much less supportive (refer to Table 6d for cell means for misfit and fit categories). Although, all the coefficients were negative, indicating that misfit was negatively related to distributive, procedural, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and performance, only the coefficients for interactional justice and outcome satisfaction were significant ($\beta = -.15, p < .05$ and $\beta = -.12, p < .10$, respectively). Thus, for the allocation of inputs, Hypotheses 10c and 10d was supported and Hypotheses 10a, 10b and 10e were rejected.

TABLE 6c
Cell Means for Hypothesis 10 for Outcomes

Preferred-Perceived	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Interactional Justice	Outcome Satisfaction	Performance
Equity-Equality					
Mean	2.03	2.05	3.07	2.26	3.39
S. D.	.72	.71	.85	.84	.70
N	45	45	45	45	45
Equity-Need					
Mean	1.75	1.84	2.57	2.15	3.21
S. D.	.59	.75	1.08	.99	.6820
N	20	20	20	20	20
Equality-Need					
Mean	1.75	2.15	3.00	2.06	3.40
S. D.	1.06	.87	1.18	1.32	.91
N	8	8	8	8	8
Equality-Equity					
Mean	1.92	1.73	2.90	1.67	3.31
S. D.	1.16	.58	.72	.80	.80
N	18	18	18	18	18
Need-Equality					
Mean	2.25	2.13	2.50	2.13	2.94
S. D.	1.02	.60	.90	1.03	1.06
N	4	4	4	4	4
Need-Equity					
Mean	2.01	2.37	3.04	2.30	3.16
S. D.	.84	.80	.88	1.10	.71
N	5	5	5	5	5
Equity-Equity					
Mean	2.26	2.25	3.26	2.38	3.48
S. D.	.87	.67	.99	.90	.71
N	76	76	76	76	76
Equality-Equality					
Mean	2.11	2.02	2.90	2.53	3.36
S. D.	.96	.90	.95	1.43	.51
N	16	16	16	16	16
Need-Need					
Mean	1.65	1.93	3.24	1.60	2.65
S. D.	.60	.72	.58	.89	.98
N	5	5	5	5	5

TABLE 6d
Cell Means for Hypothesis 10 for Inputs

Preferred-Perceived	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Interactional Justice	Outcome Satisfaction	Performance
Equity-Equality					
Mean	2.57	2.29	2.64	2.21	3.34
S. D.	1.20	.97	.90	.86	.91
N	12	12	12	12	12
Equity-Need					
Mean	2.92	2.38	3.04	2.53	3.39
S. D.	.83	.61	.91	.88	.76
N	31	31	31	31	31
Equality-Need					
Mean	2.58	2.55	3.23	2.44	3.48
S. D.	.82	.65	.89	.85	.77
N	25	25	25	25	25
Equality-Equity					
Mean	2.08	2.25	2.94	2.58	3.13
S. D.	1.16	1.20	1.05	1.11	1.02
N	6	6	6	6	6
Need-Equality					
Mean	2.74	2.41	3.06	2.81	3.13
S. D.	.73	.66	.94	.81	.71
N	26	26	26	26	26
Need-Equity					
Mean	3.08	2.78	2.84	2.92	3.14
S. D.	.76	.83	.79	.81	.56
N	13	13	13	13	13
Equity-Equity					
Mean	2.83	2.83	3.53	3.04	3.45
S. D.	.92	.79	.71	1.06	.67
N	13	13	13	13	13
Equality-Equality					
Mean	2.84	2.40	3.44	2.46	3.18
S. D.	.92	.79	.71	1.06	.67
N	14	14	14	14	14
Need-Need					
Mean	2.78	2.50	3.22	2.83	3.48
S. D.	.88	.71	1.13	.86	.68
N	62	62	62	62	62

Hypothesis 11 stated that a misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the perceived allocation norm used by the organization such that the recipient prefers the equity norm and the perceived allocation norm is the equality or the need norm, will lead to lower perceptions of a) distributive justice, b) procedural justice,

c) interactional justice, d) outcome satisfaction and e) performance compared to other types of misfit. To test this hypothesis, I created three categories: one category for misfit types of interest (where the recipient prefers the equity norm but perceives the organization as using the equality or the need norms), another for all other types of misfit and one fit category. When running the regressions, I used the misfit category for all other types of misfit as the base category.

First turning to outcomes (Table 7a), the results indicate that there were no significant results for this prediction. The way the data is coded, a significant main effect of misfit on the dependent variables would mean support for these hypotheses. As can be seen in the first row of Table 7a, none of the coefficients were significant. Results were not different for the allocation of inputs, either, i.e., none of the coefficients for misfit interest category was significant (Table 7b, first row). Tables 7c (for outcomes) and 7d (for inputs) show the cell means for these categories. Thus, hypotheses 11a through 11e were rejected for both the allocation of outcomes and of inputs.

Hypotheses 12a through 12e dealt with the interactive effects of outcome favorability and norm fit on the dependent variables. More specifically, the hypotheses stated that outcome favorability would moderate the relationship between norm misfit and the dependent variables such that favorable outcomes will decrease the negative effects of misfit on the dependent variables. Step 3 in Tables 8a and 8b show the results of the tests for this hypothesis for outcomes and inputs, respectively. Tables 8c (for outcomes) and 8d (for inputs) show the cell means for misfit-fit categories by high-low outcome favorability. Some of the values in some of the cells are missing as there were very few cases and cell means could not have been calculated.

TABLE 7a
Regression Analyses for Different Types of Misfit for Outcomes

Step and Variables	Distributive Justice			Procedural Justice			Interactional Justice			Outcome Satisfaction			Performance		
	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2
Misfit (preferred equity-perceived equality/need)	-.02	.02	.02	.01	.02 [†]	.02	.02	.02 [†]	.02	.15	.03 [†]	.03	.05	.01	.01
Fit	.13			.16 [†]			.16 [†]			.23*			.11		

[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

TABLE 7b
Regression Analyses for Different Types of Misfit for Inputs

Step and Variables	Distributive Justice			Procedural Justice			Interactional Justice			Outcome Satisfaction			Performance		
	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2
Misfit (preferred equity-perceived equality/need)	.06	.00	.00	-.11	.01	.01	-.06	.02 [†]	.02	-.10	.02 [†]	.02	.06	.01	.01
Fit	.06			.00			.12			.08			.10		

[†] $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

TABLE 7c
Cell Means for Hypothesis 11 for Outcomes

Fit and Misfit Categories	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Interactional Justice	Outcome Satisfaction	Performance
Misfit (Equity-Equality/Need)					
Mean	1.95	1.99	2.95	2.26	3.37
S. D.	.68	.73	.94	.87	.66
N	62	62	62	62	62
Fit					
Mean	2.19	2.19	3.19	2.35	3.42
S. D.	.89	.73	.95	1.03	.70
N	92	92	92	92	92
Misfit (Other)					
Mean	1.95	1.98	2.94	1.93	3.25
S. D.	1.07	.71	.83	.99	.82
N	34	34	34	34	34

TABLE 7d
Cell Means for Hypothesis 11 for Inputs

Fit and Misfit Categories	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Interactional Justice	Outcome Satisfaction	Performance
Misfit (Equity-Equality/Need)					
Mean	2.82	2.35	2.93	2.44	3.38
S. D.	.94	.72	.92	.88	.80
N	43	43	43	43	43
Fit					
Mean	2.79	2.54	3.30	2.80	3.43
S. D.	.91	.73	1.07	.91	.68
N	89	89	89	89	89
Misfit (Other)					
Mean	2.69	2.51	3.07	2.68	3.26
S. D.	.83	.74	.90	.86	.74
N	70	70	70	70	70

TABLE 8a
Moderated Regression Analyses for Outcomes

Step and Variables	Distributive Justice			Procedural Justice			Interactional Justice			Outcome Satisfaction			Performance		
	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2
Step 1. Misfit	-.10	.01	.01	-.13	.02	.02	-.16	.03	.03	-.22*	.05*	.05	-.10	.01	.01
Step 2. Outcome Favorability	.35**	.12**	.13	.43**	.18**	.20	.45**	.19**	.22	.50**	.24**	.29	.13	.02	.03
Step 3. Misfit x Outcome Favorability	-.31	.02	.14	-.35	.02	.22	.05	.00	.22	.03	.00	.29	.00	.00	.03

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

TABLE 8b
Moderated Regression Analyses for Inputs

Step and Variables	Distributive Justice			Procedural Justice			Interactional Justice			Outcome Satisfaction			Performance		
	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2	β	ΔR^2	R^2
Step 1. Misfit	-.03	.00	.00	-.04	.00	.00	-.15*	.02*	.02	-.12†	.02†	.02	-.08	.01	.01
Step 2. Outcome Favorability	.24**	.06**	.06	.29**	.08**	.09	.27**	.07**	.10	.68**	.45**	.47	.09	.00	.01
Step 3. Misfit x Outcome Favorability	-.25*	.02*	.08	-.14	.01	.09	-.19†	.01†	.11	.03	.00	.47	.10	.01	.02

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

TABLE 8c
Cell Means for Hypothesis 12 for Outcomes

Preferred- Perceived	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Interactional Justice	Outcome Satisfaction	Performance
Equity-Equality					
Low Fav. Mean	1.38	1.50	2.52	3.25	2.93
S. D.	.53	.71	.27	2.47	.95
N	2	2	2	2	2
High Fav. Mean	3.00	2.17	3.44	3.50	3.47
S. D.	1.41	1.65	.47	.71	.52
N	2	2	2	2	2
Equity-Need					
Low Fav. Mean	1.50	1.55	2.38	2.00	3.06
S. D.	.50	.31	1.10	1.41	.97
N	5	5	5	5	5
High Fav. Mean	2.41	2.44	3.66	3.11	3.54
S. D.	.66	.58	.64	.59	.82
N	14	14	14	14	14
Equality-Need					
Low Fav. Mean
S. D.
N	1	1	1	1	1
High Fav. Mean	2.39	2.44	3.71	2.78	3.64
S. D.	.52	.60	1.07	.71	.59
N	9	9	9	9	9
Equality-Equity					
Low Fav. Mean
S. D.
N	1	1	1	1	1
High Fav. Mean	.	2.58	3.72	2.75	3.65
S. D.	.	.12	.39	.35	.42
N	2	2	2	2	2
Need-Equality					
Low Fav. Mean	2.25	1.67	2.56	.	2.93
S. D.	1.41	.71	1.26	.	.74
N	2	2	2	2	2
High Fav. Mean	2.54	2.45	3.12	3.46	.
S. D.	.77	.72	.94	.95	.
N	13	13	13	13	13
Need-Equity					
Low Fav. Mean
S. D.
N	0	0	0	0	0
High Fav. Mean	2.58	2.73	2.94	2.58	.
S. D.	.68	.47	1.06	.80	.
N	6	6	6	6	6
Equity-Equity					
Low Fav. Mean
S. D.
N	1	1	1	1	1
High Fav. Mean	2.63	2.50	3.61	2.63	3.26
S. D.	1.10	.89	1.05	.52	.70
N	8	8	8	8	8

TABLE 8c
Continued

Preferred-Perceived	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Interactional Justice	Outcome Satisfaction	Performance
Equality-Equality					
Low Fav. Mean	2.42	1.67	2.65	2.83	2.95
S. D.	1.84	.58	.61	1.89	.79
N	3	3	3	3	3
High Fav. Mean	2.38	2.61	3.81	3.33	3.65
S. D.	.41	.61	.40	.75	.25
N	6	6	6	6	6
Need-Need					
Low Fav. Mean	1.75	1.83	2.38	2.15	3.50
S. D.	1.26	.92	.95	1.56	.92
N	10	10	10	10	10
High Fav. Mean	2.56	2.44	3.49	2.95	3.44
S. D.	.87	.57	.70	.71	.60
N	20	20	20	20	20

TABLE 8d
Cell Means for Hypothesis 12 for Inputs

Preferred-Perceived	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Interactional Justice	Outcome Satisfaction	Performance
Equity-Equality					
Low Fav. Mean	2.36	2.22	2.44	2.05	3.15
S. D.	1.01	.85	.82	.72	.84
N	10	10	10	10	10
High Fav. Mean	3.63	2.67	3.61	3.00	4.32
S. D.	1.94	1.89	.71	1.41	.68
N	2	2	2	2	2
Equity-Need					
Low Fav. Mean	2.81	2.17	2.91	1.91	3.36
S. D.	1.01	.67	.92	.55	.80
N	16	16	16	16	16
High Fav. Mean	3.03	2.59	3.18	3.20	3.42
S. D.	.58	.47	.91	.65	.75
N	15	15	15	15	15
Equality-Need					
Low Fav. Mean	2.75	2.45	3.08	2.03	3.46
S. D.	.86	.64	.83	.45	.85
N	17	17	17	17	17
High Fav. Mean	2.21	2.75	3.56	3.31	3.54
S. D.	.61	.67	.97	.84	.61
N	8	8	8	8	8
Equality-Equity					
Low Fav. Mean	1.25	1.42	2.39	1.50	2.30
S. D.	.35	.59	1.02	.71	.71
N	2	2	2	2	2
High Fav. Mean	2.50	2.67	3.22	3.13	3.55
S. D.	1.22	1.25	1.09	.85	.94
N	4	4	4	4	4

TABLE 8d
Continued


Preferred-Perceived	Distributive Justice	Procedural Justice	Interactional Justice	Outcome Satisfaction	Performance
Need-Equality					
Low Fav. Mean	2.52	2.32	2.96	2.29	2.90
S. D.	.59	.52	.95	.64	.64
N	14	14	14	14	14
High Fav. Mean	3.00	2.51	3.18	3.42	3.39
S. D.	.81	.79	.95	.51	.71
N	2	2	2	2	2
Need-Equity					
Low Fav. Mean	3.21	2.58	2.89	2.25	3.23
S. D.	.73	1.11	.87	.42	.56
N	6	6	6	6	6
High Fav. Mean	2.96	2.95	2.79	3.50	3.06
S. D.	.82	.52	.79	.58	.59
N	7	7	7	7	7
Equity-Equity					
Low Fav. Mean	2.25	2.73	3.31	2.20	3.77
S. D.	1.16	1.11	1.24	.57	.44
N	5	5	5	5	5
High Fav. Mean	3.19	2.90	3.67	3.56	3.25
S. D.	.89	.53	1.07	.73	.74
N	8	8	8	8	8
Equality-Equality					
Low Fav. Mean	2.84	2.19	3.32	2.00	3.08
S. D.	1.12	.83	.79	1.07	.69
N	8	8	8	8	8
High Fav. Mean	2.83	2.69	3.61	3.08	3.33
S. D.	.66	.70	.60	.74	.68
N	6	6	6	6	6
Need-Need					
Low Fav. Mean	2.34	2.17	2.69	2.22	3.44
S. D.	.81	.68	.78	.59	.82
N	29	29	29	29	29
High Fav. Mean	3.17	2.80	3.68	3.36	3.51
S. D.	.77	.60	1.20	.69	.55
N	33	33	33	33	33

First turning to the interactive effects of outcome misfit and outcome favorability on the dependent variables for the allocation of outcomes, none of the interaction coefficients were statistically significant indicating that the interaction outcome favorability did not moderate the relationship between norm misfit and the dependent

variables. Thus, hypotheses 12a through 12e were rejected for the allocation of outcomes.

For the allocation of inputs, the results were more promising. More specifically, the interactive effects of norm misfit and outcome favorability were significant on distributive justice ($\beta = -.25, p < .05$) and interactional justice ($\beta = -.19, p < .10$). To better understand these effects I plotted their interactions. Figure 2 shows the interaction of misfit and outcome favorability on recipients' distributive justice judgments.

FIGURE 2
Interaction of Misfit and Outcome Favorability on Distributive Justice for Inputs



As can be seen from Figure 3, and not surprisingly, highest perceptions of distributive justice were observed when there is a fit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization as perceived by the recipient and when outcome favorability was high. Furthermore, when there was a misfit

between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization as perceived by the recipient, outcome favorability did not seem to matter much. Surprisingly however, lowest perceptions of distributive justice were observed when there was a fit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization as perceived by the recipient and when outcome favorability was low. A very similar interaction figure was also observed for the effects of misfit outcome favorability interaction on interactional justice. These interaction effects suggest that when recipients expect some form of fairness (i.e., fit between their preferred allocation norm and the norm used by their organization) but receive a bad allocation as a consequence of this norm, their reactions are the worst. The results presented in this section are summarized in Table 9.

FIGURE 3
Interaction of Misfit and Outcome Favorability on Interactional Justice for Inputs




TABLE 9
Summary of Results

Hypothesis 1		Supported
Hypothesis 2		Supported
	Inputs	Outcomes
Hypothesis 3	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 4a	Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 4b	Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 5	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 6	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 7	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 8a	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 8b	Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 9	Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 10a	Not Supported	Supported
Hypothesis 10b	Not Supported	Supported
Hypothesis 10c	Supported	Supported
Hypothesis 10d	Supported	Supported
Hypothesis 10e	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 11a	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 11b	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 11c	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 11d	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 11e	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 12a	Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 12b	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 12c	Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 12d	Not Supported	Not Supported
Hypothesis 12e	Not Supported	Not Supported

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this dissertation was to understand how individuals' preferences for resource allocation affect their attitudinal and behavioral reactions towards the organization. Building on the three main allocation norms (equity norm, equality norm and need norm) and taking the perspective of the recipient of an allocation, this study examined the antecedents of recipients' allocation norm preferences and the effects of the fit or misfit between recipients' preferred allocation norm and the perceived allocation norm used by the organization on organizational justice perceptions, outcome satisfaction and performance.

In the study reported, I proposed and tested a two-stage model where the first part of the model predicted recipients' allocation norm preferences by resource type, environmental characteristics and individual difference variables. The second part of the model dealt with the fit or misfit between recipients' preferred allocation norms for inputs and outcomes (i.e., resource type) and the effects of this fit or misfit on perceptions of distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and performance.

The theoretical background of the model consisted of Deutsch's (1975) categorization of the allocation norms, social exchange theory (Foa & Foa, 1975) and the referent cognitions theory (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987). The model was tested with a sample of Turkish registered nurses. Data from the sample was

collected with three surveys administered at three different times (one week apart from each other).

The following discussion summarizes the main results and highlights the major contributions of the study. It concludes with some limitations and several suggestions for future research.

Overview of the Results

Social exchange theory (Foa & Foa, 1975) was one of the cornerstones of the model proposed and tested in this dissertation. Social exchange theory classifies organizational resources into six main categories. Although most of the existing research on allocation norms have been built on these six resource categories, the overall conclusion of researchers (e.g., Parks et al., 1996) is that the categorization proposed by Foa and Foa did not adequately explain the relationship between these six classes of resources and allocation norm preferences of parties in an allocation. Although not directly hypothesized, an attempt was made in this dissertation to re-evaluate the dimensionality of the six resource classes of the social exchange theory. More specifically, the model in this dissertation proposed that a resource could be classified on two main dimensions; (1) resources that are given to an employee to be used as an input to his/her work and (inputs) (2) resources that are given to an employee as a consequence of the work he/she has done (outcomes). All the hypotheses in the model were tested separately for these two different resource types and reported separately.

Interestingly enough, recipients' preferences and reactions were very different for these two different types of resources. The below discussion elaborates on these differences.

Antecedents of an Allocation Norm

The antecedents of recipient allocation norm preference that were proposed and tested in this study were nature of the resource, goal priority, resource dependency, agreeableness, self-efficacy, concern for others, allocentrism and idiocentrism. The results showed strong support for the relationship between resource category and recipient allocation norm preference. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, respondents in this study indicated their preference for two main categories of resources, resources allocated as an input to one's work (inputs) and resources allocated as a consequence of one's work (outcomes). For resources that are perceived as a consequence of work, i.e., outcomes, recipients preferred the equity norm to the equality and the need norms. For resources that are perceived as an input to work, however, the recipients preferred the need norm to the equity and equality norms. This finding was noteworthy as indicated that recipients' actually differentiated between these two types of resources and had different preferences for their allocation.

Post-hoc analysis of the data revealed some interesting explanations for allocation norm preference of recipients. Recipients preferred allocation norms that would yield themselves the best possible allocation. When asked to indicate the allocation norm that would yield the best allocation for themselves, 45.9% of the recipients indicated that the need norm would yield the best allocation for inputs and

58.4% indicated that the equity norm would yield the best allocation for outcomes. Furthermore, a logistic regression analysis of this best allocation-yielding norm on allocation norm preference indicated that this variable was a significant predictor of allocation norm preference of recipient for both inputs and outcomes. Thus, in a way, recipients preferred the allocation norms that gave themselves the best allocation.

In terms of environmental characteristics predicting recipients' allocation norm preferences, the results were again different for the allocation of inputs and outcomes. For the allocation of inputs, goal priority (both economic and humanistic) was a significant predictor of recipient allocation preferences. More specifically, recipients who perceived their organization as having an economic goal priority preferred the equity norm while the recipients who perceived their organization as having a humanistic goal priority preferred the equality norm. Resource dependency did not make a difference in the preference of an allocation norm for the allocation of inputs but was a significant predictor for outcomes. When the recipients perceived that resource dependency differential was high, i.e., both they and their coworkers depended on each other for critical resources for their work; their preferred allocation norm was the need norm.

As for individual difference variables, the results were less than ideal. Of the eight hypothesized effects, there were only two significant relationships and both of those relationships were observed for the allocation of inputs. Recipients who had higher self-efficacy and who were more individualistic were more likely to prefer the equity norm.

Although disappointing, the weakness of the effects of the effects of individual difference variables on recipients' allocation norm preference were not that surprising. Individual differences in justice literature have been shown to have weak effects in general (e.g., equity sensitivity, personality, etc.). Furthermore, measures used to assess individual difference variables in the study might have been less than ideal. Although all the measures used were established measures, their Turkish translations were not validated in previous research (except for the collectivism-individualism scale). This explanation may be especially true for the insignificant effects seen with the agreeableness measure, which had very low reliability.

A second explanation, yet a related one, is that there was not enough variance on the individual difference variables between the subjects to capture different allocation norm preferences. It can be argued that nursing is a profession that individuals self-select into and that those individuals tend to be similar to each other with respect to individual difference variables. Thus, the homogeneity of the sample in terms of the individual difference variables included in the model may have prevented me from finding meaningful results.

It is also possible that the strong professional norms of the nursing profession did not allow individual differences to make a difference in recipients' allocation norm preferences. This explanation makes even more appeal when one considers that the data showed strong support for the effects of environmental characteristics (goal priority and resource dependency) on recipient allocation norm preference. It may be that strong environmental and cultural influences do not allow recipients' individual differences to

affect their allocation norm preferences. This explanation is also supported by the argument that organizations are strong situations that does not allow its members' individual difference variables affect their attitudes or behaviors (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989).

One interesting general theme across the results of this first part of the model was that both environmental characteristics and individual difference variables had different relationships with recipients' allocation norm preference depending on the type of the resource being allocated. In other words, variables that predicted norm preference for inputs did not predict norm preference for outcomes and vice versa. The results of this study not only showed that recipients discriminated between different types of resources but also different factors influenced norm preference for different types of resources. For the allocation of outcomes, regardless of their individual differences or environmental influences, the recipients' preferred the equity norm. For the allocation of inputs, however, environmental characteristics and recipients' individual differences made a difference in what recipients' preferred in terms of allocation norm preference.

Although not hypothesized in the model, I had also conducted some post-hoc analyses regarding the interactive effects of environmental and individual difference variables on recipients' allocation norm preference. These interactions, however, did not provide any meaningful result to explain the variance in recipients' allocation norm preference over and beyond that explained by the main effects.

Misfit and Fit of Preferred and Perceived Allocation Norms and Consequences

The findings in this the second part of the study indicated that a misfit between recipients' preferred allocation norm and perceived allocation norm used by the organization had negative effects on recipients' organizational justice perceptions as well as outcome satisfaction and performance. Moreover, as with the antecedents of allocation norm preferences, these effects varied with different resource categories.

For the allocation of outcomes, a misfit was significantly and negatively related to distributive, procedural and interactional justice perceptions as well as outcome satisfaction. For the allocation of inputs, however, a misfit was only significantly related to interactional justice and outcome satisfaction. In other words, a misfit mattered more to recipients when outcomes were allocated than when inputs were allocated.

Outcome favorability, as predicted, reduced the negative effects of recipients' allocation norm preference misfit, but only for inputs and only for two of the dependent variables, distributive justice and interactional justice. Furthermore, an interaction of these plots revealed that lowest perceptions of distributive and interactional justice were observed when there was a fit between the recipient's preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization and when outcome favorability was low. This finding was interesting given that one would not assume a fit situation (presumably a fair process) to result in lowest perceptions of distributive and interactional justice. However, it is also reasonable to expect recipients' to be most frustrated when they expect a fair process and presumably favorable outcomes (i.e., fit) but receive unfavorable outcomes.

To sum up, the findings in this study clearly suggest that recipients have differential allocation norm preferences for different types of resources, namely resources that are allocated as an input to one's work and resources that are allocated as a consequence of one's work. Organizations are usually perceived as equity oriented systems where most of the allocations are based on the principle of each according to his/her inputs. The findings reported here, however, suggest that recipients of allocations may not always prefer these types of allocations. More importantly, this research sheds light on some of the factors that influence recipients to make the switch from preferring the equity norm to preferring other allocation norms (equality and need).

Contributions to the Literature

The current study adds to the existing body of research on allocation norms in several ways. First, this study represents an attempt to advance the research on allocation norms by taking the perspective of the recipient in the allocation situation. Most of the extant research on allocation norms has taken the perspective of the allocator, i.e., decision-makers, in the allocation situations and this has resulted in a one-sided view of a much bigger phenomena. Recipients in allocation situations are one of the major parties involved and incorporating their perspective will lead to a more complete understanding of allocation situations in organizations.

Another major contribution of this study is that it distinguishes between the different resource categories proposed by (Foa & Foa, 1975). Most of the studies in the allocation literature classified these resources based on the original particularism-

concreteness differentiation of the authors but have failed to find consistent results (e.g., Parks et al., 1996). This study suggested a two-way classification system for organizational resources: inputs and outcomes. The results showed that antecedents of a preferred allocation norm as well as consequences of the fit/misfit between a recipients' preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization differ by resource type. In other words, a one-size-fits approach does not really work in predicting recipients' reactions to allocation decisions.

In terms of methodology, the present study also contributes to the existing research in a significant way. Most of the studies conducted in the allocation literature have relied on laboratory studies and even those few studies that have employed field settings have utilized scenario-based designs. In contrast, the methodology used in this study allowed me to assess the perceptions and reactions of recipients about actual allocation situations. Moreover, by using a research design that used three surveys at three time periods, I was able to overcome most of the problems (i.e., common methods bias) associated with survey research.

Managerial Implications

The results of this study offer some practical implications. First, results demonstrated that both the fit and the misfit between what allocation norm a recipient prefers in an allocation situation and what norm the organization uses have important implications on recipients' attitudes and behaviors toward the organization. Although a fit between these two have been shown to lead to more positive attitudes and behaviors,

from a managerial standpoint, it is obvious that this may not always be the case. In other words, managers are more than likely to encounter situations where their choice of an allocation norm will not be preferred by the recipient of the allocation. The results of this study showed two important things about these situations. First, managers need to be aware that not all types of misfit will elicit the same reactions from the recipients. Second, even though a recipient does not prefer a certain allocation norm used by the organization, the negative reactions that arise from this misfit may be lessened by more favorable outcomes. In other words, recipients may still react positively to an allocation (or at least less negatively) when they think the result of the allocation is favorable for them, even though the organization did not use their preferred allocation norm for that allocation.

Another important managerial implication of this study is the finding that environmental factors are more influential in predicting a recipient's allocation norm preference than his/her individual differences. Given that changing individual difference variables are usually beyond a manager's capabilities, a manager can try to align a recipient's preference for an allocation norm with the norm used by the organization by trying to influence the environmental factors that are present in the workplace.

Limitations and Future Research

As with any other research, this study also has several limitations. First, some of the measures were less than ideal. For instance, performance was measured based on a self-report scale. It was not possible to have objective measures of performance with this

sample because of participant anonymity but future research should use better measures of performance. Furthermore, although all the measures used in the study were established measures, the Turkish-translated versions were used for the first time in this study. Despite that the translations were done with utmost care and several Turkish native speakers proof-read the questionnaires before administration, the fact that these Turkish scales were not validated is a major limitation for this study.

Another limitation of this research, and related to the first one, is the nature of its sample. The sample for this study consists of Turkish registered nurses. Although no differences are expected between a North-American sample and a Turkish sample in terms of the results, it may be a little harder to generalize these results to other professions. Nursing profession, by its nature, has its own norms and culture and the results observed in this study may be only generalizable to professions with such strong norms and culture. Future research should replicate this study with other professional samples.

Third, although the total sample size of the study was adequate, usable data to look at different fit and misfit categories was very limited. Some of the categories had fewer than eight cases, which led to insignificant results due to lack of statistical power. Future research should design laboratory experiments where recipients' allocation norm preferences are manipulated to where there is enough valid data in each fit and misfit category.

One other important future research idea that stemmed from this study is the further categorization of the resource types (Foa & Foa, 1975). Results of this study

indicated that respondents viewed friendship/affiliation category as distinct from all the other resource types. Future research should try to understand why these type of resources are unique from other types.

Finally, the model presented here may have left out important factors that affect recipient allocation preferences and their reactions to allocation decisions. Future research should examine different contextual factors and their influence on recipient allocation preferences. Likewise, the model presented and tested here only looked at five dependent variables, distributive, procedural, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and performance and the effects of a fit/misfit between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the perceived allocation norm used by the organization are likely to affect more than just these five dependent variables. Future research should examine other potentially relevant dependent variables such as organizational commitment.

Conclusion

By building on extant theoretical and empirical literature, this study contributes to our understanding of antecedents of recipients' allocation norm preferences and the effects of the interplay between a recipient's preferred allocation norm and the norm used by the organization on several organizational outcomes. This study is the first to offer a big picture approach to recipient allocation preferences and how recipients feel about their organization's allocation norm choices in a field setting. Despite its limitations, this study adds to the literature on allocation norms and organizational

justice by taking the perspective of the recipients and by examining both the antecedents and consequences of allocation norms in a single, theory-driven model.

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APPENDIX A

EXAMPLE SURVEY I INSTRUMENT FOR EMPLOYEES



Dear X employee,

X University has agreed to participate in an important research project sponsored by Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. We request your individual assistance in this study by completing the attached survey and two other surveys in the following two weeks.

The purpose of this survey is to investigate how individuals perceive allocation decisions at their organizations. Each survey (there are a total of three) should take about 15 minutes to complete. This research has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board-Human Subjects in Research, Texas A&M University. As such, we are required to note that the risks associated with this study are minimal and there are no personal benefits (i.e., compensation) from participation in this study. The survey is entirely voluntary; there will be no penalty if you choose not to participate. However, it is critical for the success of the study that we receive a high response rate, so we would greatly appreciate your participation!

Your responses to this survey will be kept completely anonymous. We will **never identify you as a participant in this study**, nor will we share your individual responses with anyone inside or outside of X University. When you have completed the survey, please enclose it in the provided envelope. You may then drop the envelope into the return mail box located at your break room within the next 3 days. After the surveys are returned to the primary researchers, they will be stored in a secure place. We will make available to your hospital management team an executive summary of the findings and implications after the data are processed and analyzed. The report will **not** include any information that will allow anyone to identify any individual responses. After that, the hard copies of the data will be shredded and recycled.

You may contact either one of the researchers with questions you may have about this study. For questions regarding subjects' rights you can contact the Institutional Review Board through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of Vice President for Research at (979)845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu.

By answering the questions on this survey, I consent to participate in the study.

Thank you very much!

Prof. Dr. Adrienne Colella
Mays Business School
Texas A&M University
4221 TAMU 77843-4221
acolella@mays.tamu.edu

Please fill the blanks below so that we can match the three surveys you will complete for our project. This information is requested solely to match the three surveys you will complete throughout this project. In no means will it be used to identify you.

Your mother's maiden name _____

Last four digits of your phone number _____

Your favorite color _____

Instructions:

Please **circle** (with pen or pencil) directly on this form, the number that best represents your agreement with the statement(s) provided. You will be asked to indicate your level of agreement or to determine which statement most accurately describes your perceptions. Multiple options will be provided from which you should choose only one (1) answer. Be sure to read the introduction to each new section to ensure you interpret and answer the questions correctly. Please note that there are no correct answers to these questions. A sample question is provided below:

EXAMPLE:

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement. Please refer to the table below for your answers.

COMPLETELY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE
1	2	3	4	5

1. I keep my belongings clean and neat.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Please read the questions carefully. Please do not skip any questions.

Please do not discuss the questions and/or your answers with your coworkers. Please be honest with your answers.

The questionnaire begins on the next page. Thank you!

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Please refer to the table below when answering the questions.

COMPLETELY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE	
1	2	3	4	5	
1. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet.	1	2	3	4	5
2. I often get into arguments with my family and co-workers.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Some people think I'm selfish and egotistical.	1	2	3	4	5
4. I would rather cooperate with others than compete with them.	1	2	3	4	5
5. I tend to be cynical and skeptical of others' intentions.	1	2	3	4	5
6. I believe that most people will take advantage of you if you let them.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Most people I know like me.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Some people think of me as cold and calculating.	1	2	3	4	5
9. I am hard-headed and tough-minded in my attitudes.	1	2	3	4	5
10. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate.	1	2	3	4	5
11. If I don't like people, I let them know it.	1	2	3	4	5
12. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate people to get what I want.	1	2	3	4	5
13. I have confidence in my ability to perform my role.	1	2	3	4	5
14. There are some tasks required by my role that I cannot do well.	1	2	3	4	5
15. When my performance is poor, it is due to my lack of ability.	1	2	3	4	5
16. I doubt my ability to perform my role.	1	2	3	4	5
17. I have all the skills needed to perform my role very well.	1	2	3	4	5
18. Most people who complete this job can perform this role better than I can.	1	2	3	4	5
19. I am an expert at my role.	1	2	3	4	5
20. My future in this hospital is limited because of my lack of skills.	1	2	3	4	5
21. I am very proud of my skills and abilities as it relates to this job.	1	2	3	4	5
22. I feel threatened when others watch me work at this task.	1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Please refer to the table below when answering the questions.

COMPLETELY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE	
1	2	3	4	5	
23. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me.	1	2	3	4	5
24. Winning is everything.	1	2	3	4	5
25. I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.	1	2	3	4	5
26. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.	1	2	3	4	5
27. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.	1	2	3	4	5
28. It is important to me that I do my job better than others.	1	2	3	4	5
29. I like sharing little things with my neighbors.	1	2	3	4	5
30. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me.	1	2	3	4	5
31. Competition is the law of nature.	1	2	3	4	5
32. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud.	1	2	3	4	5
33. Being a unique individual is important to me.	1	2	3	4	5
34. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.	1	2	3	4	5
35. I often do "my own thing".	1	2	3	4	5
36. It is important to me that I respect decisions made by my groups.	1	2	3	4	5
37. I rather depend on myself than on others.	1	2	3	4	5
38. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.	1	2	3	4	5
39. Parents and children must stay together, as much as possible.	1	2	3	4	5
40. My personal identity independent from others is very important to me.	1	2	3	4	5
41. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want.	1	2	3	4	5
42. My personal identity is very important to me.	1	2	3	4	5
43. I am a unique person, separate from others.	1	2	3	4	5
44. I respect the majority's wishes in groups of which I am a member.	1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Please refer to the table below when answering the questions.

COMPLETELY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE	
1	2	3	4	5	
45. I enjoy being unique and different from others.	1	2	3	4	5
46. It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision.	1	2	3	4	5
47. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means.	1	2	3	4	5
48. Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society.	1	2	3	4	5
49. One should live one's life independently of others.	1	2	3	4	5
50. I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it.	1	2	3	4	5
51. I feel good when I cooperate with others.	1	2	3	4	5
52. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.	1	2	3	4	5
53. I prefer to be direct and forthright when I talk with people.	1	2	3	4	5
54. Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.	1	2	3	4	5
55. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.	1	2	3	4	5
56. Success is the most important thing in life.	1	2	3	4	5
57. When I succeed, it is usually because of my abilities.	1	2	3	4	5
58. I hate to disagree with others in my group.	1	2	3	4	5
59. I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity.	1	2	3	4	5
60. I am dependent on my coworkers and supervisors for resources that are critical for my work.	1	2	3	4	5
61. I am dependent on my coworkers and supervisors for resources for which there is no alternative supply.	1	2	3	4	5
62. My coworkers and supervisors are dependent on me for resources that are critical for their work.	1	2	3	4	5
63. My coworkers and supervisors are dependent on me for resources for which there is no alternative supply.	1	2	3	4	5
64. I cannot accomplish my tasks without information or materials from my coworkers.	1	2	3	4	5
65. My coworkers depend on me for information or materials needed to perform their tasks.	1	2	3	4	5
66. Jobs performed by my coworkers are related to one another.	1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate the extent to which the following work values are important to you. Please refer to the table below when answering the questions.

NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL	SOMEWHAT NOT IMPORTANT	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT	EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	
1	2	3	4	5	
67. Trying to avoid hurting other people	1	2	3	4	5
68. Encouraging someone who is having a difficult day	1	2	3	4	5
69. Trying to help a fellow worker through a difficult time	1	2	3	4	5
70. Trying to help reduce a friend's burden	1	2	3	4	5
71. Helping others on difficult jobs	1	2	3	4	5
72. Offering help to others when they are having a tough time	1	2	3	4	5
73. Helping those who are worried about things at work	1	2	3	4	5
74. Trying to be helpful to a friend at work	1	2	3	4	5
75. Trying not to hurt a friend's feelings	1	2	3	4	5
76. Sharing information and ideas which others need to do their job	1	2	3	4	5
77. Correcting others' errors without embarrassing them	1	2	3	4	5
78. Lending a helping hand to someone having difficulty	1	2	3	4	5

Each organization has its own goals. Please indicate the extent to which you think the following goals are emphasized and important at your organization.

79. Quality	1	2	3	4	5
80. Productivity	1	2	3	4	5
81. Profit	1	2	3	4	5
82. Sales	1	2	3	4	5
83. Efficiency	1	2	3	4	5
84. Competitiveness	1	2	3	4	5
85. Management-employee relations	1	2	3	4	5
86. Employee satisfaction	1	2	3	4	5
87. Decision making participation	1	2	3	4	5
88. Quality of work life	1	2	3	4	5
89. Employee development and growth	1	2	3	4	5
90. Warm and friendly atmosphere	1	2	3	4	5

Lastly, we would like you to answer some demographic questions.

91. Your age	_____
92. Gender	<input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/> Male
93. How long have you been in the nursing profession?	_____
94. How long have you been working at this organization?	_____
95. What is your education level? (Please mark only the highest one)	<input type="checkbox"/> High School <input type="checkbox"/> College (2 years) <input type="checkbox"/> College (4 years) <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____
96. What is your current position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Supervisor (ward) <input type="checkbox"/> Supervisor (block) <input type="checkbox"/> Nurse (ward) <input type="checkbox"/> Nurse (office) <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____
97. What are your working hours?	<input type="checkbox"/> Day (8-17) <input type="checkbox"/> Shift (8-16, 16-24, 24-8) <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____
98. What is your employment status?	<input type="checkbox"/> Permanent <input type="checkbox"/> Contracted
99. What department do you work in? (e.g., internal medicine, pediatrics, psychiatry, vb.)	_____
100. Please mark your marital status.	<input type="checkbox"/> Married <input type="checkbox"/> Single <input type="checkbox"/> Widowed <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____
101. How many dependents do you have?	_____
102. Do you live in company-owned housing?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
103. Do you live in the city?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
104. What is your monthly income? (please mark one)	<input type="checkbox"/> 600 - 699 YTL <input type="checkbox"/> 700 - 799 YTL <input type="checkbox"/> 800 - 899 YTL <input type="checkbox"/> more than 900 YTL

You participation is very valuable for us. Thank you very much.

APPENDIX B

EXAMPLE SURVEY II INSTRUMENT FOR EMPLOYEES



Dear X employee,

As we have mentioned before, X University has agreed to participate in an important research project sponsored by Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. We requested your individual assistance in this study by completing three surveys. We fully appreciate your participation in the first survey and thank you.

The following is the second survey in this project. Again, your responses to this survey will be kept completely anonymous. We will **never identify you as a participant in this study**, nor will we share your individual responses with anyone inside or outside of X University. When you have completed the survey, please enclose it in the envelope provided.

You may contact either one of the researchers with questions you may have about this study. For questions regarding subjects' rights you can contact the Institutional Review Board through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of Vice President for Research at (979)845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu.

Thank you very much!

Adrienne Colella
Mays Business School
Texas A&M University
4221 TAMU 77843-4221
acolella@mays.tamu.edu

Please fill the blanks below so that we can match the three surveys you will complete for our project. This information is requested solely to match the three surveys you will complete throughout this project. In no means will it be used to identify you.

Your mother's maiden name _____

Last four digits of your phone number _____

Your favorite color _____

Instructions:

Please **circle** (with pen or pencil) directly on this form, the number that best represents your agreement with the statement(s) provided. You will be asked to indicate your level of agreement or to determine which statement most accurately describes your perceptions. Multiple options will be provided from which you should choose only one (1) answer. Be sure to read the introduction to each new section to ensure you interpret and answer the questions correctly. Please note that there are no correct answers to these questions. A sample question is provided below:

EXAMPLE:

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement. Please refer to the table below for your answers.

COMPLETELY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE
1	2	3	4	5

2. I keep my belongings clean and neat.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Please read the questions carefully.

Please do not skip any questions.

Please do not discuss the questions and/or your answers with your coworkers.

The questionnaire begins on the next page. Thank you!

There are a variety of resources used in organizations. Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an input to an employee's work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data) and yet some other organizational outcomes are given to employees as a consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, the latter category represents the "outcomes" organizations allocate to their employees and the former one represents the "inputs". Based on this distinction, please indicate whether you perceive the following resources as an **input** or an **outcome** by using the table below.

THIS RESOURCE IS AN INPUT 1	THIS RESOURCE IS AN OUTCOME 2
1. Affiliation refers to an expression of affectionate regard, warmth or comfort. An example of an affiliation resource would be whether your supervisors spend time listening to your personal problems and concerns.	1 2
2. Status refers to an expression of evaluative judgment that conveys high or low prestige, regard, or esteem. An example of a status resource would be being invited to a party organized by the administration or receiving an award.	1 2
3. Information refers to advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment and excludes those behaviors that can be classified as affiliation or status. An example of information would be having access to patient records and files.	1 2
4. Money refers to any coin, currency, or token that has some standard unit of exchange value. An example of money would be your salary or pay raises.	1 2
5. Goods refer to tangible products, objects or materials. An example of a good would be the uniforms you wear for work or the equipment you use for your work such as thermometers and blood pressure machines.	1 2
6. Service refers to activities on the body or belongings of a person that often constitute labor for another. An example of service would be cleaning of your offices or availability of food during your shifts.	1 2

Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this page.

Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an **input** to an employee's work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data). In a sense, these comprise the resources employees need to conduct their work.

7. Below, there are three methods of allocating inputs in organizations. Please indicate how you prefer inputs to be allocated at X by ranking them from 1 (most often used) to 3 (least often used).

Equity, i.e., based on each individual's performance _____

Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same _____

Need, based on each individual's need _____

Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to the table.

I DON'T PREFER THIS RULE AT ALL	I DON'T PREFER THIS RULE	NEUTRAL	I PREFER THIS RULE	I STRONGLY PREFER THIS RULE
1	2	3	4	5

8. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer **inputs** to be allocated based on each individual's performance. 1 2 3 4 5

9. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer **inputs** to be allocated equally, i.e., everyone gets the same. 1 2 3 4 5

10. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer **inputs** to be allocated based on each individual's need. 1 2 3 4 5

Please answer the following question referring to the table below.

VERY SCARCE	SCARCE	NEITHER SCARCE NOR ABUNDANT	ABUNDANT	VERY ABUNDANT
1	2	3	4	5

11. Please indicate the extent to which you think inputs at X are scarce. 1 2 3 4 5

Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this page.

Some of the resources allocated in organizations are given to employees as a consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, these represent the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their employees.

12. Below, there are three methods of allocating outcomes in organizations. Please indicate how you prefer inputs to be allocated at X by ranking them from 1 (most often used) to 3 (least often used).

Equity, i.e., based on each individual's performance _____

Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same _____

Need, based on each individual's need _____

Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to the table.

I DON'T PREFER THIS RULE AT ALL	I DON'T PREFER THIS RULE	NEUTRAL	I PREFER THIS RULE	I STRONGLY PREFER THIS RULE
1	2	3	4	5

13. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer outcomes to be allocated based on each individual's performance. 1 2 3 4 5

14. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer outcomes to be allocated equally, i.e., everyone gets the same. 1 2 3 4 5

15. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer outcomes to be allocated based on each individual's need. 1 2 3 4 5

Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to the table.

VERY SCARCE	SCARCE	NEITHER SCARCE NOR ABUNDANT	ABUNDANT	VERY ABUNDANT
1	2	3	4	5

16. Please indicate the extent to which you think outcomes at X are scarce. 1 2 3 4 5

APPENDIX C

EXAMPLE SURVEY III INSTRUMENT FOR EMPLOYEES



Dear X employee,

As we have mentioned in our previous surveys, X University has agreed to participate in an important research project sponsored by Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. We requested your individual assistance in this study by completing three surveys. We fully appreciate your participation in the first and the second survey and thank you.

The following is the third and the last survey in this project. Again, your responses to this survey will be kept completely anonymous. We will **never identify you as a participant in this study**, nor will we share your individual responses with anyone inside or outside of X University. When you have completed the survey, please enclose it in the envelope provided.

You may contact either one of the researchers with questions you may have about this study. For questions regarding subjects' rights you can contact the Institutional Review Board through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of Vice President for Research at (979)845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu.

Thank you very much!

Adrienne Colella
Mays Business School
Texas A&M University
4221 TAMU 77843-4221
acolella@mays.tamu.edu

Please fill the blanks below so that we can match the three surveys you will complete for our project. This information is requested solely to match the three surveys you will complete throughout this project. In no means will it be used to identify you.

Your mother's maiden name _____

Last four digits of your phone number _____

Your favorite color _____

Instructions:

Please **circle** (with pen or pencil) directly on this form, the number that best represents your agreement with the statement(s) provided. You will be asked to indicate your level of agreement or to determine which statement most accurately describes your perceptions. Multiple options will be provided from which you should choose only one (1) answer. Be sure to read the introduction to each new section to ensure you interpret and answer the questions correctly. Please note that there are no correct answers to these questions. A sample question is provided below:

EXAMPLE:

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement. Please refer to the table below for your answers.

COMPLETELY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE
1	2	3	4	5

3. I keep my belongings clean and neat.

1 2 **3** 4 5

Please read the questions carefully.

Please do not skip any questions.

Please do not discuss the questions and/or your answers with your coworkers.

The questionnaire begins on the next page. Thank you!

Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this page.

Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an **input** to an employee's work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data). In a sense, these comprise the resources employees need to conduct their work.

1. Below, there are three methods of allocating inputs in organizations. Please indicate how inputs are allocated at X by ranking them from 1 (most often used) to 3 (least often used).

Equity, i.e., based on each individual's performance _____

Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same _____

Need, based on each individual's need _____

2. Below, there are three methods of allocating inputs in organizations. Please rank these methods as the allocation of inputs according to these will give you the best allocation for your self-interest from 1 (the best allocation) to 3 (the worst allocation).

Equity, i.e., based on each individual's performance _____

Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same _____

Need, based on each individual's need _____

Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to the table.

TO A VERY SMALL EXTENT	TO A SMALL EXTENT	NEUTRAL	TO A LARGE EXTENT	TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT
1	2	3	4	5

3. Please indicate the extent to which you think **inputs** are allocated based on each individual's performance. 1 2 3 4 5

4. Please indicate the extent to which you think **inputs** are allocated equally, i.e., everyone gets the same. 1 2 3 4 5

5. Please indicate the extent to which you think **inputs** are allocated based on each individual's need. 1 2 3 4 5

Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this page.

Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an **input** to an employee's work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data). In a sense, these comprise the resources employees need to conduct their work.

Please answer the following two questions in reference to the inputs you receive from X. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions.

COMPLETELY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE
1	2	3	4	5

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6. I am very satisfied with the inputs I receive from X. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. Inputs I receive from X are very favorable. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. Inputs I receive from X are much better than I expect. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9. The inputs I am currently receiving are satisfactory. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10. I am satisfied with my inputs. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Please answer the following questions in reference to the inputs you receive from X.

TO A VERY SMALL EXTENT	TO A SMALL EXTENT	NEUTRAL	TO A LARGE EXTENT	TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT
1	2	3	4	5

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11. Do the inputs you receive from X reflect the effort you have put in your work? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. Are your inputs appropriate for the work you have completed? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 13. Do your inputs reflect what you contribute to X? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 14. Are your inputs justified, given your performance? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this page.

Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an **input** to an employee's work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data). In a sense, these comprise the resources employees need to conduct their work.

Please answer the following questions in reference to the procedures used for allocating inputs at X.

TO A VERY SMALL EXTENT	TO A SMALL EXTENT	NEUTRAL	TO A LARGE EXTENT	TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT	
1	2	3	4	5	
15. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during the procedures?	1	2	3	4	5
16. Have you had influence over the outcomes arrived at by those procedures?	1	2	3	4	5
17. Have those procedures been applied consistently?	1	2	3	4	5
18. Have those procedures been free of bias?	1	2	3	4	5
19. Have those procedures been based on accurate information?	1	2	3	4	5
20. Have you been able to appeal the outcomes arrived by those procedures?	1	2	3	4	5
21. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?	1	2	3	4	5

Please answer the following question in reference to those who allocate inputs at X.

22. Has she treated you in a polite manner?	1	2	3	4	5
23. Has she treated you with dignity?	1	2	3	4	5
24. Has she treated you with respect?	1	2	3	4	5
25. Has she refrained from improper remarks and comments?	1	2	3	4	5
26. Has she been candid in her communications with you?	1	2	3	4	5
27. Has she explained the procedures thoroughly?	1	2	3	4	5
28. Were her explanations regarding the procedures reasonable?	1	2	3	4	5
29. Has she communicated details in a timely manner?	1	2	3	4	5
30. Has she seemed to tailor her communications to individuals' specific needs?	1	2	3	4	5

Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this page.

Some of the resources allocated in organizations are given to employees as a consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, these represent the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their employees.

31. Below, there are three methods of allocating outcomes in organizations. Please indicate how outcomes are allocated at X by ranking them from 1 (most often used) to 3 (least often used).

Equity, i.e., based on each individual's performance _____

Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same _____

Need, based on each individual's need _____

32. Below, there are three methods of allocating outcomes in organizations. Please rank these methods as the allocation of outcomes according to these will give you the best allocation for your self-interest from 1 (the best allocation) to 3 (the worst allocation).

Equity, i.e., based on each individual's performance _____

Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same _____

Need, based on each individual's need _____

Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to the table.

TO A VERY SMALL EXTENT	TO A SMALL EXTENT	NEUTRAL	TO A LARGE EXTENT	TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT
1	2	3	4	5

33. Please indicate the extent to which you think **outcomes** are allocated based on each individual's performance. 1 2 3 4 5

34. Please indicate the extent to which you think **outcomes** are allocated equally, i.e., everyone gets the same. 1 2 3 4 5

35. Please indicate the extent to which you think **outcomes** are allocated based on each individual's need. 1 2 3 4 5

Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this page.

Some of the resources allocated in organizations are given to employees as a consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, these represent the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their employees.

Please answer the following two questions in reference to the outcomes you receive from X.

COMPLETELY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEUTRAL	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	COMPLETELY DISAGREE	
1	2	3	4	5	
36. I am very satisfied with the outcomes I receive from X.	1	2	3	4	5
37. Outcomes I receive from X are very favorable.	1	2	3	4	5
38. Outcomes I receive from X are much better than I expect.	1	2	3	4	5
39. The outcome I am currently receiving is satisfactory.	1	2	3	4	5
40. I am satisfied with my outcome.	1	2	3	4	5

Please answer the following questions in reference to the outcomes you receive from X.

TO A VERY SMALL EXTENT	TO A SMALL EXTENT	NEUTRAL	TO A LARGE EXTENT	TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT	
1	2	3	4	5	
41. Do the outcomes you receive from X reflect the effort you have put in your work?	1	2	3	4	5
42. Are your outcomes appropriate for the work you have completed?	1	2	3	4	5
43. Do your outcomes reflect what you contribute to X?	1	2	3	4	5
44. Are your outcomes justified, given your performance?	1	2	3	4	5

Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this page.

Some of the resources allocated in organizations are given to employees as a consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, these represent the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their employees.

Please answer the following questions in reference to the procedures used for allocating outcomes at X.

TO A VERY SMALL EXTENT	TO A SMALL EXTENT	NEUTRAL	TO A LARGE EXTENT	TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT	
1	2	3	4	5	
45. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during the procedures?	1	2	3	4	5
46. Have you had influence over the outcomes arrived at by those procedures?	1	2	3	4	5
47. Have those procedures been applied consistently?	1	2	3	4	5
48. Have those procedures been free of bias?	1	2	3	4	5
49. Have those procedures been based on accurate information?	1	2	3	4	5
50. Have you been able to appeal the outcomes arrived by those procedures?	1	2	3	4	5
51. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?	1	2	3	4	5

Please answer the following question in reference to those who allocate inputs at X.

52. Has she treated you in a polite manner?	1	2	3	4	5
53. Has she treated you with dignity?	1	2	3	4	5
54. Has she treated you with respect?	1	2	3	4	5
55. Has she refrained from improper remarks and comments?	1	2	3	4	5
56. Has she been candid in her communications with you?	1	2	3	4	5
57. Has she explained the procedures thoroughly?	1	2	3	4	5
58. Were her explanations regarding the procedures reasonable?	1	2	3	4	5
59. Has she communicated details in a timely manner?	1	2	3	4	5
60. Has she seemed to tailor her communications to individuals' specific needs?	1	2	3	4	5

The items below refer to your perceptions of several different aspects of your performance at your job. Please indicate your performance along these dimensions.

	NEEDS MUCH IMPROVEMENT	NEEDS SOME IMPROVEMENT	SATISFACTORY	GOOD	EXCELLENT
	1	2	3	4	5
61. Quantity of work output				1	2 3 4 5
62. Quality of work output				1	2 3 4 5
63. Accuracy of work				1	2 3 4 5
64. Patient service provided				1	2 3 4 5
65. Obtaining personal career goals				1	2 3 4 5
66. Developing skills needed for my future career				1	2 3 4 5
67. Making progress in my career				1	2 3 4 5
68. Seeking out career opportunities				1	2 3 4 5
69. Coming up with new ideas				1	2 3 4 5
70. Working to implement new ideas				1	2 3 4 5
71. Finding improved ways to do things				1	2 3 4 5
72. Creating better processes and routines				1	2 3 4 5
73. Working as part of a team or work group				1	2 3 4 5
74. Seeking information from others in her work group				1	2 3 4 5
75. Making sure her work group succeeds				1	2 3 4 5
76. Responding to the needs of others in her work group				1	2 3 4 5
77. Doing things that help others when it is not part of her job				1	2 3 4 5
78. Working for the overall good of the company				1	2 3 4 5
79. Doing things to promote the company				1	2 3 4 5
80. Helping so that the company is a good place to be				1	2 3 4 5

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Wesson, M. J. and Gogus, C. I. (2005). Shaking hands with a computer: An examination of two methods of organizational newcomer orientation. *Journal of Applied Psychology*.

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