

“OUR FIGHT IS HERE:” COALITION NETWORKING AND THE PUERTO RICAN
ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT, 1940-1970

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how Puerto Ricans developed anti-war strategies that rejected the notion of military service as a method to attain social and economic equality during the second half of the 20th century. Central to this fight were the alliances formed between Puerto Rican and U.S. activists within religious and civil rights spaces to argue against Puerto Rico's colonial status and forced military service for men over the age of eighteen. In an era of hyper-patriotism that demanded military participation as a mark of civic duty, U.S. religious and political dissenters shaped their resistance as an interrogation of U.S. society's contradictory messages of freedom and liberty. Through this analysis, I argue that the anti-war coalition networks concerted their interests toward a shared commitment to defend war resisters while also opening a space for Puerto Rican draft resisters to voice their specific grievances.

Vital to this challenge was the development of networks that came together for a shared objective against obligatory military service. Connecting through shared allies in New York and Puerto Rico, Puerto Rican activists expressed their opposition to military service and everyday concerns of the Puerto Rican community through religious coalitions, multiracial political coalitions, and public demonstrations. This research joins extensive scholarship on Latinx social movements through the lens of anti-war movements and the role of religion in solidarity efforts. Despite historical monographs highlighting social activism, attention to twentieth century Latina/o war resistance remains understudied. Additionally, 20th century Latinx social movement history

initially placed social activism and religion as separate entities without acknowledging the religious foundations of individual activists or the role of church spaces in organizing. My dissertation intersects these scholarships to highlight how organizers created political, social, and religious solidarity networks to demand attention given toward militarization shifted to address societal issues on the home front. The struggles mentioned in this dissertation mirror the debates we see today regarding social and religious organizations attempting to achieve the goal of addressing equity and social justice.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my family, who supported my academic journey from the beginning. My abuela, Isabel Alvarez, is the inspiration in all I do. She pushed me to read and learn the histories of Puerto Rico and those that moved to the U.S. like her and my abuelo did. Her strength and love for her family impacts me daily. My tía Millie has been a constant source of support throughout my life. Even when I had to answer questions of what I can actually do with this degree, it was out of a place of wanting to understand and support me as has all of my life. My tío Wilfredo and tía Rosa have given me love and support since childhood and opened their home to me when I was researching this dissertation. To all my cousins from the Alvarez side of the family: Near or far, we grew up together like siblings and pushed each other to excel. Much love for all the support. My nephews and niece provided constant support, even when I was away chasing my pursuits. Especially to Natán and Damaris, I love you both for the amazing people you have grown up to be. My brother Marcos is my best friend: I am not able to pursue my graduate education without his support as my roommate and source of support. To my family in Puerto Rico: You are always on my mind, and I cannot wait to visit you all again. Most importantly, this dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Ileana Grajales. She is the family rock, always there for others as a source of support and love. She and I joke that our personalities are sometimes too alike in that we do some much for others and ignore ourselves. I can never repay the support and love you have provided me throughout this path. I hope I made you proud!

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NOMENCLATURE

ACDT	American Commission on Dependent Territories
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
ALPRI	American League for Puerto Rico's Independence
CCCO	Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors
CJPR	Committee for Puerto Rican Justice
CPS	Civilian Public Service
CPUSA	Communist Party USA
CO	Conscientious Objector
FOR	Fellowship of Reconciliation
MPI	Movimiento Pro Independencia
NCCO	National Committee on Conscientious Objectors
NSBRO	National Service Board for Religious Objectors
PCPR	Partido Comunista de Puerto Rico
PIP	Partido Independencia de Puerto Rico
PNPR	Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico
PRRA	Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration
PPD	Partido Popular Democrático
SANE	National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
UN	United Nations

UPR	Universidad de Puerto Rico
WCDN	World Council of Dominated Nations
YLP	Young Lords Party, New York Chapter

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the August 1971 edition of *Palante*, Carlos Feliciano wrote the first of a series of articles that addressed his arrest in May 1970 for weapons possession and accompanying accusations that he was the leader of a terrorist organization that bombed targets in New York. A former member of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party imprisoned for draft evasion and participation in the 1950 Puerto Rico Uprisings, Feliciano stated that the government of the United States justified his incarceration by arguing that “having once been a Revolutionary is sufficient to warrant a person’s being watched for the rest of his or her life.”¹ Remembering his past as a war resister, Feliciano informed his audience how the United States imprisons men and women who defy the empire’s directives, most notably when young Puerto Ricans evade the draft. The pages of *Palante* informed readers how Puerto Rican anti-war sentiment was not a unique issue to the Vietnam War. Rather, anti-war action intersected with discussions of Puerto Rican

¹ “Carlos Feliciano Speaks to the People” *Palante*, pg. 13-14, August 16-29, 1971. vol 3, no 14, New York. The Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives [hereafter cited as Tamiment Library and Wagner Archives], New York. For this dissertation, the term “Puerto Rican Nationalists” refers to the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, established in 1930 in Puerto Rico under the leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos. Scholars Cesar Ayala and Rafael Bernabé state the Nationalist Party positioned themselves as a political and social entity that rejected U.S. political and economic control, embraced Puerto Rican independence, represented the poor farmer and impoverished working class, and championed Catholic social causes concerning women and family life. In late October-early November 1950, Nationalists attempted to take control of sectors of Puerto Rico, including the governor’s mansion. The term “*independista*” refers to Puerto Ricans who supported independence: being an *independista* could mean a personal connection to Puerto Rican Independence and non-alignment with the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), founded in 1946. For more on this terminology, see Cesar J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabé, *Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History Since 1898* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 95-110, 153-157.

civil rights battles in the United States and the political battles over Puerto Rico's status classification throughout the 20th century.²

Puerto Rican draft resisters shaped arguments against U.S. military service through how they defined their relationship with the United States. Deploying language that demanded equal treatment as full citizens, Puerto Ricans shaped concepts of citizenship and identity in opposition to U.S. colonialism, militarization, and socio-economic inequalities. Puerto Rican anti-war proponents did not work in isolation from the mainstream anti-war movement. One strategy examined in this dissertation demonstrates how Puerto Rican liberation activists established interracial alliances in New York City to oppose military service, tracing the lineage of these coalitions from World War II until the end of the Vietnam War.³ These inquiries allow for the following questions to be addressed within the dissertation: How does Puerto Rican political outreach in New York City connect with other transnational political networking from Latin America and the Caribbean? What strategies do Puerto Rican activists use to connect anti-war activism to social and economic inequality? Does linking anti-war and

² "Carlos Feliciano Speaks to the People" *Palante*, pg. 13-14, August 16-29, 1971. vol 3, no 14, New York; "Carlos Feliciano Framed" *Palante*, pg. 7, August 15, 1970, vol. 2, no. 9, The Tamiment Library and Wagner Archives.

³ I use the term "Puerto Rican Left" to define the organizations that advocated for Puerto Rican Independence and a radical change in U.S. Society, specifically the economic and social issues facing the Puerto Rican diaspora community in New York. The Puerto Rican Left throughout the twentieth century comprised of multiple organizations with various political and social positions, including the pre-1950s Socialist Party that advocated for statehood. However, the groups discussed in this dissertation aligned with the left shared a commitment to revolutionary nationalism that sought to liberate Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans from direct and internal U.S. colonialism, ally with other colonized peoples, and dismantle the capitalist system for a socialist society. I will specify organizational names of groups within the Puerto Rican Left: for example, *Movimiento Pro Independencia* (M.P.I.). For more on the Puerto Rican Left, see Andrés Torres and Jose E. Velázquez, *The Puerto Rican Movement: Voices from the Diaspora* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998), 1-10; Rosie Muzio, *Radical Imagination, Radical Humanity: Puerto Rican Political Activism in New York* (New York: SUNY Press, 2017), 5-10.

anti-militarization to social and economic inequality encourage or discourage multiracial coalition-building within the anti-war movement? Did religious faith or philosophical objection factor into Puerto Rican anti-war activism and mobilization? Was the military service of family members or individuals within the movement a complicating issue for Puerto Rican activists' concepts of citizenship and nationhood through their opposition to U.S. military service? How does the complex relationship between Puerto Rican liberation factions in Puerto Rico and within the diaspora shape and affect internal coalition-building efforts and broader outreach with U.S.-based Leftists?⁴

From these questions, this dissertation investigates how Puerto Ricans advanced their objections to compulsory military service through multiracial coalition networks throughout the second half of the twentieth century.⁵ Collaborating with participants of the U.S. Peace and Civil Rights Movement, Puerto Rican draft resisters shared how compulsory military service intersected with broader social and political issues affecting Puerto Rico. The dynamics of the anti-war coalition saw individuals from a range of racial, ethnic, political, and religious backgrounds define a shared anti-war message. The coalition itself was not seamless or without friction, as bringing many organizations

⁴ I use the term “U.S. Leftist” refers to white activists and reformers that aligned with the political and social Left in the United States during the twentieth century. I will use the terms “Old Left” and “New Left” to define the major shifts in the U.S. Leftists movement, including their stances on reforms in labor, democracy, and civil rights, support for anti-war and anti-imperialism. For more, see Simon Hall, *Rethinking the American Anti-War Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1-12; Vanessa Cook, *Spiritual Socialists: Religion and the American Left* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 1-10.

⁵ Throughout the proposal, I use the term “Puerto Rican” to refer to Puerto Rican-origin people residing in the United States and Puerto Rico. I will, at times, identify Puerto Ricans living in the United States through their location, “New York Puerto Ricans” for example, or use the term “Puerto Rican diaspora.” In the paragraphs that follow I will discuss how political groups and organizations acknowledged Puerto Rican cultural identity is not restricted to geographic boundaries.

under one roof will lead to tensions. This dissertation argues that the anti-war coalition networks concerted their interests toward a shared commitment to defend war resisters while also opening a space for Puerto Rican draft resisters to voice their specific grievances.

The timeline of my dissertation looks at the long-term efforts to develop this coalition network from World War II until the middle of the Vietnam War. Incorporating a long civil rights approach allows me to investigate how coalition-building against U.S. wars had a long history of organizing through networks that were sustained through individual and organizational relationship building.⁶ Puerto Rican migrant communities in New York City engaged in coalition politics and maintained a connection to Puerto Rico's politics during the 1940s and 1950s. The major political organizations aligned Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States with military participation, viewing military service as a route to attaining self-determination and first-class citizenship.⁷ Conversely, groups aligned with Puerto Rican liberation formed alliances with political

⁶ Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," *The Journal of American History* 91, no. 4 (March 2005), 1233-1263.

⁷ The relationship between Puerto Rican and U.S. political parties are not always aligned through the U.S. political lens. During the 1930s, Puerto Rico's Socialist Party advocated for statehood along with the Puerto Rican Republican Party, while Puerto Rican liberals that supported New Deal initiatives and Nationalists argue for independence. I will use the political party names throughout the dissertation to discuss the political and social stance of each group or party (e.g., Popular Democratic Party of Puerto Rico). For more on Puerto Rico's political system, see Arlene Davila, *Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997), 1-23. For a synthesized understanding of Puerto Rico's political and social debates in the 20th Century, see Cesar J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabé, *Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History Since 1898* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

coalitions with U.S. Leftists (Old Left) to argue against U.S. imperialism and obligatory military service.⁸

The long civil rights approach also identifies how the networks of the 1940s and 1950s continued into the 1960s instead of being a part of two separate anti-war generations. Scholarship from Lorrin Thomas and Sonia Lee demonstrated through the timeframe of their studies that a long civil rights approach informs how coalitions are developed and maintained for politics and civil rights initiatives. During the onset of the Vietnam War, island-based organizations like M.P.I organized in New York City against Puerto Rico's colonial status, military service, and the social and economic inequalities faced by Puerto Ricans living in the United States and the archipelago. M.P.I. leader Juan Mari Bras, who was a college student and Nationalist during the 1940s, maintained connections with elements of the Peace Movement. The coalition worked jointly to ensure that Puerto Rican draft resisters received information about draft deferments and legal aid if necessary. Furthermore, the Puerto Rican youth of the 1960s and 1970s was influenced by the Civil Rights movement connected local community reform with Puerto Rican liberation. Viewing the Vietnam War as a U.S. colonial conflict that was

⁸ I define "old left" as a disparate group of individuals and organizations that emphasized a class politics that prioritized a vanguard of the proletariat leading action for social change in society against capitalism. Historian Simon Hall defines the New Left as an assorted coalition of diverse groups that were characterized by their campus base, rejection of anticommunism, decentralized organizing, and emphasis on the politics of authenticity. They would later morph into reformists movements that sometimes embraced Marxist-Leninism. Hall notes that the New Left was important in forging the links between various social movements of the 1960s. When necessary, I will use the organizational names of groups within the U.S. Left that allied with Puerto Ricans (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, SNCC, for example). See Simon Hall, *Rethinking the American Anti-War Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1-12; Vanessa Cook, *Spiritual Socialists: Religion and the American Left* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 1-10; Simon Hall, *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 22-23.

detrimental to community reform, Puerto Rican liberation activists worked within this network of veteran and youth activists to defy the draft under threats of surveillance and imprisonment.⁹

The questions raised above developed through classroom discussions on readings in Latinx History and, most importantly, reflecting on how my life experiences were informed by my family. Mis abuelos, Andrés and Isabel, came to the United States from Aguadilla in the 1950s during the Great Migration. The start of the Korean War saw my abuelo drafted into the Army and stationed in Panama as a mortarman. His stint in the military influenced my abuela's perception that the military was an avenue for mobility. A tradition of military service developed within the family tree that continues to the great-grandchildren of the Alvarez family. Mi abuela displays pride in her family and Puerto Ricaness through a picture of every member of the family that served in the U.S. military in her room, with mi abuelo in the center.

Additionally, my mother considered the military as an option before becoming a Jehovah's Witness. Being raised in that church space saw my early youth molded into rejecting politics and nationalism, which included rejecting military service on grounds that it goes against the teachings of the Jehovah's Witness church. That all changed when I left the church in 2003. Life changed dramatically and I struggled to make sense of my world. I was no longer restrained from expressing a political opinion or viewing

⁹ Ayala and Bernabé, 229-232; Torres and Velázquez, 50; For an example of scholarship that looks at a long Civil Rights approach in Puerto Rican studies, see Sonia Song-Ha Lee, *Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement: Puerto Ricans, African Americans and the Pursuit of Racial Justice in New York City* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Lorrin Thomas, *Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

the military as an economic or social option. When facing that choice, I questioned why this alone was a route to social or economic betterment or that I would have to travel thousands of miles away to the home of someone else and potentially kill. My journey through graduate school and life motivated me to ask what led individuals and organizations to reject military service through times of hyper-patriotism and societal pressure and how they claimed their own political and social consciousness.

This dissertation project engages with multiple streams of historiographical thought to investigate Puerto Rican anti-war activism. Latinx and Puerto Rican historiography focused on social and political movements have emphasized how communities organized against social, political, and economic inequality in the U.S.¹⁰ Despite the complex actors, organizations, and tactics, the image of the twentieth-century U.S. anti-war movement has traditionally been perceived as a majority white space or a universalist collective, with Latinx participation traditionally situated in isolation from the mainstream movement. Moreover, expansive literature on Latino, Chicano, and Puerto Rican social and political action during the second half of the twentieth century did not address anti-war expressions and actions. The scholarly works of Jorge Mariscal, Steven Rosales, Lorena Oropeza, and an in-progress manuscript by Tomas Summers Sandoval analyze the social, economic, and political factors that led Mexican Americans to answer or resist the Vietnam-era military draft.¹¹ However,

¹⁰ In this dissertation, I use “Latinx” when discussing current day scholarship in the field and to inclusively discuss Latinx experiences in historical memory. When discussing the political era, I use Latino/Chicano, Latina/Chicana, and the national origin identifier (e.g., Mexican American, Puerto Rican).

¹¹ George Mariscal, *Aztlán and Viet Nam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of the War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Ernesto Chavez, *¡Mi Raza Primero!: Nationalism, Identity, and Insurgency in the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles, 1966-1978* (Berkeley: University of California Press,

Puerto Rican anti-war activity has received little attention in Puerto Rican historiography, specifically how activists viewed military service and war as perpetuating social and economic inequality in the United States. Centralizing Puerto Rican anti-war activity addresses the gaps in the historical literature concerning how questions of militarization, citizenship, and human rights informed Puerto Rican social activism and coalition-building from World War II until the Vietnam War.¹²

The various activist networks within the Chicano movement exemplified how ethnic empowerment and community struggles prompted anti-war activism. Chicano communities in the United States faced racial and economic discrimination that placed them as second-class citizens. Scholars of the Chicano Movement highlight how high schools became recruitment spaces for the Vietnam War, discouraging students from pursuing college. Youth-led empowerment organizations also provided a political and cultural revitalization that caused young people to question the government.¹³ Similarly,

2002), 61-79; Lorena Oropeza, *¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism during Vietnam War Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 1-10; Tomas Summers Sandoval, *On the Edge of Things: The Vietnam War in Mexican America* (Manuscript in Progress); Belinda Linn Rincón, *Bodies of War: Genealogies of Militarism in Chicana Literature and Culture* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2017); Steven Rosales, *Soldados Razos at War: Chicano Politics, Identity, and Masculinity from World War II to Vietnam* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2018).

¹² There are several personal memoirs by Latino military veterans during the Vietnam War, as well as oral history projects that highlight Latino and Latina service in U.S. conflicts. Although the oral history projects initially focused on the World War II generation, current initiatives appear to reach out to Latino veterans during the Vietnam War. Local examples of oral histories of Latino and Latina experiences during U.S. military conflicts include the *Voces Oral History Project* at the University of Texas at Austin and the *Latino and Latina Veterans of World War II Oral History collection* in the Houston Metropolitan Research Center. Examples of personal memoirs by Puerto Rican Vietnam Veterans include: Sgt. Osvaldo Fernandez Gordian, *Tragedy of Unknown Heroes* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010); Modesto Ñeco Jr., *1650 días cautivo del Vietcong* (Hato Rey, PR: Ramallo Bros. Printing, 1981); Herminio Ramírez, *Vietnam: La terrible verdad* (Guayanilla, PR: Centro Cultural Marina Arzola, 1997); Captain Vazquez-Rodriguez, *Proud to Serve my Country* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011).

¹³ Ernesto Chavez, *¡Mi Raza Primero!: Nationalism, Identity, and Insurgency in the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles, 1966-1978* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 1-8, 61-79. Historian Steven Rosales investigated the role of Mexican American military service as a catalyst for political and social

scholar Lorena Oropeza emphasizes this type of resistance Chicano activists used against U.S. rhetoric of ideal citizenship and service during the Vietnam War. Activists framed antiwar rhetoric with cultural nationalist themes, arguing that manhood did not need to be acquired fighting against the North Vietnamese, as white concepts of racialization did not consider Chicanos masculine. Instead, they stated that the Vietnam War was an imperialist endeavor and that Chicanos needed to stay home to address social injustice in the neighborhood.¹⁴ The examples of youth and social justice activists constructing an alternate masculine identity illustrate the strategies anti-war advocates used to counter attempts to shame them for rejecting military service.¹⁵

Puerto Rican anti-war activity was part of the broader Puerto Rican movements in Puerto Rico and the United States that fought for reforms on the island and in their community while also demanding a change in Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States. Anti-war resistance from World War II to the Vietnam War demonstrates how Puerto Ricans and interracial allies in New York viewed militarization as an extension of political, social, and economic inequality and shaped a civil rights strategy around war resistance. Investigating anti-war activity in New York City demonstrates another aspect of Andres Torres and Jose "Che" Velázquez's examination of Puerto Rican radical

awakening during and after World War II. See Steven Rosales, *Soldados Razos at War: Chicano Politics, Identity, and Masculinity from World War II to Vietnam*. For more on the tensions between service and anti-war, see George Mariscal, *Aztlán and Vietnam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of the War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

¹⁴ Oropeza, 13-24, 102-112, 136-144.

¹⁵ There is a master's thesis about how citizenship and gender shaped Puerto Rican identity during the Vietnam War through the perspective of Puerto Rican nationalists and memoirs of Puerto Rican veterans. See Ashley Black, "From San Juan to Saigon: Shifting Conceptions of Puerto Rican Identity during the Vietnam War" (Master's Thesis, The University of British Columbia, 2012). For perspectives of the U.S. anti-war movement, see Hall, 1-7, 149-150.

tradition that highlights how Puerto Rican Leftists emphasized political struggle to bring attention to the condition of Puerto Ricans. Puerto Rican war resistance critiqued military service as the continued recruitment of men and women under direct and internal colonization to fight imperialist conflicts.¹⁶ By examining the longer trajectory of Puerto Rican anti-war actions going back to World War II, scholars can identify how Latino war resisters within the twentieth-century anti-war movement connected their defiance to political and social issues within their communities.

Puerto Rican migration studies focus on the political, social, and cultural development of Puerto Rican communities in the United States and the continued connection to Puerto Rico. It is important to understand that the histories of the Puerto Rican diaspora, specifically this dissertation's focus on New York City, cannot be done without interrogating the social, political, and cultural impact of Puerto Rico. This project intends to join the scholarship within the field of Puerto Rican Studies that analyzes the political and social decisions migrant communities made as they moved from their homes to the United States mainland. Scholarship and first-person accounts emphasize how Puerto Rican migrants maintained a connection to their homeland while adapting to their new surroundings. Historian Virginia Sanchez-Korrol and memoirs by early migrants Bernardo Vega and Jesús Colón highlighted how twentieth-century Puerto Rican migrants maintained a cultural and political connection to Puerto Rico

¹⁶ Torres and Velázquez, 1-3; Thomas, 225-226; Scholar Darrel Wanzer-Serrano states in his book, *The New York Young Lords*, that Torres and Velázquez work is an essential text in understanding the Puerto Rican Left during the 1960s and 1970s, specifically how the Young Lords mobilized to support and how organizational tactics linked attacked U.S. imperialism while not making independence the singular fight. See Darrel Wanzer-Serrano, *The New York Young Lords and the Struggle of Liberation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015), 4-8.

using newspapers, participation in political clubs, and performance art. Additionally, Sanchez-Korrol and historian Lorrin Thomas countered narratives that coded Puerto Rican migrants as politically disengaged or easily swayed by U.S. political bosses. They argued that Puerto Rican migrants used their votes to push for local reforms in the United States, specifically when candidates acknowledged the issues that affected their community and demonstrated knowledge of Puerto Rico.¹⁷

Increased migration from Puerto Rico to New York City presented island-based Puerto Rican independence advocates with a potential support base from the migrant community and sympathetic U.S. allies that brought attention to Puerto Rico's colonial status. Historian Lorrin Thomas highlights how Puerto Rican politicians in New York discussed Puerto Rican military service and sacrifice during World War II underscoring unequal treatment as citizens. Similar to Mexican Americans in the Southwest U.S., Puerto Rican political leaders and activists championed military participation during World War II as part of a Hispanic tradition of military service that illustrated a readiness for first-class citizenship and political and social progression.¹⁸

Twentieth-century U.S. military service inspired migrants and immigrants to perceive service as a measure of commitment to their new homes. For Puerto Rican political leaders and activists, whose nebulous citizenship status saw them viewed as a

¹⁷ Virginia Sánchez Korrol, *From Colonia to Community: The History of Puerto Ricans in New York City, 1917-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995 [1983]), 166-200; Lorrin Thomas, *Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 133-137, 152-165. See also Ruth Glasser, *My Music, My Flag: Puerto Rican Musicians and their New York Communities, 1917-1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

¹⁸ Lorena Oropeza, *¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism during Vietnam War Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 1-7; Rosales, 3-10; Sanchez-Korrol, 166-200; Thomas, 147-149.

part of and detached from the metropole, military service demonstrated the promise of U.S. citizenship and the contradictions of Puerto Rico's colonial status. Recent scholarship has interrogated how Puerto Ricans experience and assign meaning to citizenship and nationalism despite a lack of sovereignty as a nation-state and vague status under U.S. control. Scholar Jacqueline Font-Guzman illustrates how Puerto Ricans against U.S. colonial control used the legal system to decouple and redefine concepts of citizenship and legal status. Puerto Rican anti-war proponents yearning for a traditional nation-state during World War II used the U.S. legal system to challenge the power structure by using their conferred citizenship to recreate and redefine themselves.¹⁹

Assigning citizenship and nationalism was not singularly a tool of resistance to U.S. colonialism. Those that chose to serve in the military were not tools of local elites or U.S. colonial dictates but made individual choices that served their interests. Historian Steven Rosales posits that military service acted as a major component of the social and political development of Mexican American and Latino soldiers throughout the twentieth century. He highlights how service between World War II and Vietnam influenced the redefinition of individual and collective identity that also inspired political and social engagement.²⁰ Similarly, historian Harry Franqui-Rivera analyzes how rank and file soldiers defined their military service as a way to regain their

¹⁹ Jacqueline Font-Guzman, *Experiencing Puerto Rican Citizenship and Cultural Nationalism*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2015), 1-12. Scholar Jacqueline Font-Guzman's concept of desirable activity (a process of citizenship performed and experienced by citizens instead of defined by the institution) is visible in the actions of Puerto Rican nationalists using the legal system to break from the US while arguing for human and civil rights under the law. She argues further that when 'legal arrangements' comprise excessive power, individuals deconstruct and reconstruct legal institutions in order to alter their reality and recreate themselves.

²⁰ Rosales, *Soldados Razos at War*, 3-10.

masculinity, achieve economic mobility, and attain political enfranchisement that ultimately shape Puerto Rico's political and national identity.²¹ What stands out in this analysis is the connection of economic mobility and political enfranchisement that symbolize participatory citizenship in the United States, a point scholar Gina Perez connects to current motivations of Puerto Rican and Latino/a youth joining the military or Junior ROTC program. The connection of military service to economic, social, and political advancement caused military resisters to face condemnation and reprisals for their choice.²²

Declarations of the self-determination of nations during World War II reignited debates about the future status of colonized peoples. Historians Erez Manela and Elizabeth Borgwardt analyze how US policy attempts to define the post-war global order through the political mechanism of U.S. progressivism. The language used to articulate freedom and transform international society created an expectation from anti-colonial activists that independence would be recognized. Some anti-colonial activists crafted their message of independence through their participation in both World Wars and lack of equity in their present status, using military service as an avenue to attain political

²¹ Harry Franqui-Rivera, *Soldiers of the Nation: Military Service and Modern Puerto Rico, 1868-1950* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), xi-xxvi. Franqui-Rivera highlights the examples of Puerto Rican military personnel as examples of an emerging nation-state able to choose their future path and the creation of military heroes. Maria Acosta Cruz illustrate the construction of identities in their critiques of the dream of independence through the exaltation of nationalist and independence mythologizing despite the political and social realities. See Maria Acosta Cruz, *Dream Nation: Puerto Rican Culture and the Fictions of Independence* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2014), ix-x, 1-18.

²² Pérez also highlights how being regarded as a citizen and economic advancement are major motivators of Latino and Latina youth volunteering to join the U.S. Armed Services. See Gina M. Pérez, *Citizen, Student, Soldier: Latina/o Youth, JROTC, and the American Dream* (New York: NYU Press, 2015), 1-15.

self-determination. Borgwardt's focus on the promises of self-determination and human rights within the Atlantic Charter demonstrates how the rhetoric of change inspires anti-colonial activists. This dissertation will investigate how Puerto Ricans emphasizing and rejecting military service used the language of self-determination to clarify their status as a future nation-state.²³

Examining the longer view of Puerto Rican anti-war sentiment from the 1940s until the Vietnam Era highlights the broader dynamics that shaped twentieth-century anti-war movements in the United States. Scholarship on twentieth-century U.S. war resistance written by scholars and participants traditionally focused on the religious foundations and influences of the Peace Movement during World War II and the Vietnam War.²⁴ Contemporary research demonstrates the global influences that defined the U.S. anti-war movement throughout the twentieth century. Scholar Nico Slate identifies the collaborative efforts of Black civil rights and Indian anti-colonial activists in their shared struggle for freedom. He highlights the dialogue and disagreements over strategies to attain rights, including the practicality of non-violent civil disobedience as a

²³ Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 3-8, 25-28; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7-13.

²⁴ Lawrence Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 1-34. For more examples of works that focus on the 20th Century U.S. Peace Movement, see Mulford Q. Sibley and Philip E. Jacob, *Conscription of Conscience* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952); James Tracy, *Direct Action: Radical Pacifism from the Union Eight to the Chicago Seven* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Terry Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties: Protests in American from Greensboro to Wounded Knee* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Patricia Appelbaum, *Kingdom to Commune: Radical Protestant Pacifist Culture Between World War I and the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

tactic to challenge imperial and federal authorities.²⁵ Expanded focus on the religious and global dimensions of protest still restricted anti-war activity to “peace” organizations, masking dynamics within the movement that argued against military service without adopting or practicing devout pacifism.²⁶

Public denunciation of military service was also informed by mainstream concepts of gender that depicted men that opposed military service as weak or deviant. Scholars Luis Alvarez and Timothy Stewart-Winter contextualize how U.S. citizenship and identity are framed as white, hypermasculine, and patriotic during World War II. Alvarez focused on how whites in power criticized the patriotism and citizenship of Black and Mexican American youth who resisted societal expectations of white normative citizenship during World War II.²⁷ Additionally, scholar Margaret Mollin highlights this perception through her analysis of civil rights initiatives by male radical

²⁵ Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (New York, Harvard University Press, 2012). For more on the history of radical and political pacifism in the United States, see Marian Mollin, *Radical Pacifism in Modern America* (Pennsylvania: University of Penn Press, 2006); Joseph Kip Kosek, *Acts of Conscience: Christian Non-Violence and Modern American Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Appelbaum, *Kingdom to Commune*; Vijay Prashad, “Waiting for the Black Gandhi,” *From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International since the Age of Revolution*, eds. Michael O. West, William G. Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

²⁶ In the dissertation, I define the religious left through historian Vanessa Cook’s analysis on Spiritual Socialists. She defines the U.S. religious left as radicals that embraced the dignity of all individuals through values and moral behavior. Religious leftists eschewed promoting centralized power politics for grassroots, local organizing to promote social and political change. The religious left (or Spiritual Socialism in Cook’s case) promoted a spiritualism that was not rooted in formal religion or theology and observances, wanting instead to promote essential values over hardline doctrine. For more, see Vanessa Cook, *Spiritual Socialists: Religion and the American Left* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 5-10.

²⁷ Timothy Stewart-Winter, “Not a Solider, not a Slacker: Conscientious Objectors and Male Citizenship in the United States during the Second World War,” *Gender and History* 19, no. 3 (Nov 2007), 519-530; Luis Alvarez, *The Power of Zoot: Youth Culture and Resistance During World War II* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2008); Joseph Kip Kosek, *Acts of Conscience*; Marian Mollin, “The Limits of Egalitarianism: Radical Pacifism, Civil Rights, and the Journey of Reconciliation,” *Radical History Review* 88 (Winter 2014), 112-138.

pacifists during the 1940s. In an analysis of the Journey of Reconciliation project that attempted to desegregate interstate bus travel in 1947, Mollin posits that male activists coordinated non-violent direct action to demonstrate their courage to counter the harassment they faced for opposing military service.²⁸ Puerto Rican liberation advocates, radical pacifists, and early civil rights pioneers defined their activism through an organizational identity that countered mainstream attempts to shame those that did not conform to the status quo in society.

The anti-war movement of the 1960s was built on the traditions of a small, active World War II-era peace movement that built coalition networks of activists that tested non-violent direct-action tactics. Recent scholarship has highlighted how anti-war activists borrowed from the U.S. Labor movement of the 1920s and 1930s and Mohandas K. Gandhi's satyagraha campaigns in India to protest military service. Historian Vanessa Cook argues that religious pacifists and social reformers kept the peace movement afloat during the 1950s and were part of the realignment of the Left that occurred in the 1960s.²⁹ A push for universal military training by the Truman Administration saw anti-war dissenters collaborate with non-pacifists from religious, educational, and labor organizations during the 1950s. The Cold War and Red Scare placed political and social dissenters on the periphery by silencing individuals and organizations through calls for loyalty. The emergence of the Cold War saw the United

²⁸ Marian Mollin, *Radical Pacifism in Modern America* (Pennsylvania: University of Penn Press, 2006), 52-54.

²⁹ Cook, 1-15; Slate, 203-220.

States target peace activists and anti-war demonstrators because their stance defied state-sanctioned mobilization of citizens to serve their country during the war.³⁰

U.S. military actions overseas during the 1950s and 1960s animated a new generation that resisted compulsory military service. Recent scholarship by Amy Rutenberg investigates how Cold War draft policies inadvertently shaped the dialogue of draft resistance in the 1960s. The military's focus on providing exemptions for middle-class, educated men while targeting poor and racialized men separated military service from the obligations of citizenship.³¹ Out of this, the New Left emerged as a collection of college-based organizations that questioned the U.S.'s role in Vietnam. Scholar Simon Hall states that the orientation within national social movements shifted from the Old Left campaigners who championed civil rights, labor reform, and anti-war to campus-based student activists who became the New Left during the late 1950s. College campuses saw a shift from the perceived silence of the 1950s generation of students through student activism. Groups like the Students for a Democratic Society situated themselves as dedicated to peace, highlighted by their commitment within the Port Huron Statement to replace the power of the force with the power of love and persuasion. One method used during the initial wave of anti-war demonstrations was the teach-in, a method of activism inspired by sit-ins and freedom schools of the Civil Rights movement, to challenge the militarization of society.³²

³⁰ Wittner, 1-34; Slate, 203-220.

³¹ Amy J. Rutenberg, *Rough Draft: Cold War Military Manpower Policy and the Origins of Vietnam-Era Draft Resistance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 1-11.

³² Hall, 1-10. See also Terry Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties: Protests in American from Greensboro to Wounded Knee* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 124-150; Wittner, 62-124.

Continued migration from Puerto Rico, increased U.S. militarization during the Cold War, and mobilization for the Vietnam War encouraged independence advocates in Puerto Rico to consider the struggles of Puerto Ricans living in the United States. Movements for Black Power, civil rights, anti-colonialism, equitable employment, and anti-war shaped the activism of the 1960s Puerto Rican Movement, specifically Puerto Rican youth in New York City. In *The Puerto Rican Movement* scholar/activist José Velázquez interviews former participants of the Puerto Rican left and found that the Vietnam War and anti-war protests started their early political involvement.³³ The anti-war movement's influence on Puerto Rican activists of the 1960s and 1970s illustrates an understanding of anti-war resistance within the broader context of Puerto Rican activism.³⁴

Political engagement and coalition organizing did not occur solely from the influence of the 1960s or a monumental political awakening. Recent scholarship

³³ Sprinkled in historical accounts of Puerto Rican social and political activism are mentions of draft resistance. Historians Cesar Ayala and Rafael Bernabé dedicated a few pages in their volume on Puerto Rico's colonial history under the United States to the University of Puerto Rico student protests of the Vietnam War that led to island-wide demonstrations. See Torres and Velázquez, 48-51, 90-95, 129, 145-146, 169; Ayala and Bernabé, *Puerto Rico in the American Century*, 229-232; Thomas, 225-226; Lee, 200-209.

³⁴ Monographs that discuss Puerto Rican political and social movements of the 1960s and 1970s include Torres and Velázquez, *The Puerto Rican Movement*; Carmen Teresa Whalen, *From Puerto Rico to Philadelphia: Puerto Rican Workers and Postwar Economies* (Temple University Press, 2001); Jennifer Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement* (New York: NYU Press, 2004); Carmen Whalen and Victor Vasquez Hernandez, *The Puerto Rican Diaspora: Historical Perspectives* (Temple University Press, 2005); Gina Perez, *The Near Northwest Side Story: Migration, Displacement, and Puerto Rican Families* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Ramón Bosque-Pérez and José Javier Morera, eds., *Puerto Rico Under Colonial Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006); Lilia Fernandez, *Brown in the Windy City: Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Postwar Chicago* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Darrel Wanzer-Serrano, *The New York Young Lords and the Struggle of Liberation*; Muzio, *Radical Imagination, Radical Humanity*; Antonio Lopez. "In the Spirit of Liberation: Race, Governmentality, and the De-Colonial Politics of the Original Rainbow Coalition of Chicago." PhD. Diss. (University of Texas at El Paso, 2012).

investigates how Puerto Ricans interpreted their own meaning to international political currents and created hemispheric and international coalition networks throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.³⁵ Sonia Lee demonstrates that grassroots activism in New York was not singularly occupied by youths influenced by outside influences. She emphasizes the potential and promise of coalition-building among Black and Puerto Rican grassroots activists to fight for local reforms and how it inspired local youth to challenge injustice.³⁶ The Vietnam War represented an indictment of how U.S. policies dealt with Puerto Rico's status as a nation and the treatment of Puerto Ricans as second-class citizens within the metropole. It also informed Puerto Rican independence advocates to reexamine how they engaged with Puerto Rican migrants who maintained a connection to island while adapting to U.S. political and social realities.

Research in Latina/o history on how grassroots multiracial coalition politics was a strategy to challenge social, political, and economic inequality is a central part of my dissertation. Grassroots coalition-building allowed Puerto Rican civil rights organizers to create solidarity local, national, and international networks to advance racial, political, economic, educational, and community reform. Informed by Sonia Lee and Juan Flores, this dissertation emphasizes how political collaboration builds and reinforces the cultural

³⁵ For recent scholarship on pre-World War II coalition efforts between Puerto Ricans and the U.S. Left, see Margaret Power, "Friends and Comrades: Political and Personal Relationships between Members of the Communist Party USA and the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, 1930s–1940s," in *Making the Revolution: Histories of the Latin American Left*, ed. by Kevin A. Young (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 105-128; Cristina Pérez Jiménez, "Puerto Rican Colonialism, Caribbean Radicalism, and *Pueblos Hispanos*'s Inter-Nationalist Alliance," *Small Axe* 23, no. 3 (November 2019), 50-68.

³⁶ Lee, 144-148.

consciousness of coalition networks that strengthens cohesion against injustice.³⁷ The Puerto Rican Movement's involvement within New York City's interracial coalitions demonstrated how diverse racial and ethnic communities with histories of activism in urban spaces shaped collectives that directed local and national civil rights objectives.³⁸

Popular depictions and early scholarship of the Vietnam anti-war movement centered on it as a universal space that did not highlight the motivations of Black and Latinx anti-war protesters. The recent scholarship continues to work to amplify these voices within the context of U.S. anti-war activism. Black anti-war activism during the Vietnam Era illustrated the ideological and generational divide among activists within the national Civil Rights campaign and the emerging Black Power movement of youth activists. Veteran anti-war campaigners like Bayard Rustin and James Farmer criticized the war and urged draft resistance because of continued militarization and U.S. government ambivalence toward violence against the African American community. Continuing their advocacy of non-violent protests, Black leaders within the Civil Rights movement increasingly dealt with the increased frustrations of student campaigners who saw white backlash negating the effects of non-violent direct action and legal strategies. Historian Peniel Joseph evokes this frustration through his focus on Stokely Carmichael and the increased radicalism of Black youth. The growth of Black Power as a national

³⁷ Juan Flores, "Que assimilated, brother, *Yo soy asimilao*": The Structuring of Puerto Rican Identity in the U.S.," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* (Fall 1985), 5-7; Lee, 1-3, 144-147.

³⁸ For recent scholarship on racial and ethnic coalition building, see Frederick Douglas Opie, *Upsetting the Apple Cart: Black-Latino Coalitions in New York City from Protest to Public Office* (Columbia University Press, 2014); Lee, *Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement*; Carlos Alamo-Pastrana, *Seams of Empire: Race and Radicalism in Puerto Rico and the United States*. (University Press of Florida, 2016); Johanna Fernandez, *The Young Lords: A Radical History*. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

movement that emphasized race pride, economic independence, and political power also stated their opposition to the Vietnam War, causing tension with national civil rights organizations.³⁹

Black anti-war activists inspired by the Black Power movement increasingly castigated the Vietnam War as another example of U.S. imperial ambitions. The link between U.S. imperialism and white supremacy animated discussions among anti-war activists from other racial and ethnic communities. Scholars Laura Pulido and Cynthia Young illustrate the rise of the Third World Left in the United States and how the title *Third World Left* served as a signifier for Leftists of color to indicate their resistance to economic and racial discrimination. The New Left and Third World Left worked together on causes for racial justice and anti-war. Although white students within the New Left sympathized, they looked toward broader, international goals of injustice instead of local action. At the same time, Third World Left activists focused their attention on the effect of racial and economic inequality, as well as military recruitment, within their communities. The divide is illustrated in perceptions of the war and community. The New Left and Third World Left shared similar moral and political concerns over the war. Third World Left activists mobilized because they viewed the war and military mobilization as perpetuating genocide against their people trapped in an internal colony that perpetuates racial violence.⁴⁰

³⁹ Hall, 1-10; Joseph, 134-173.

⁴⁰ Laura Pulido, *Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles* (University of California Press, 2006), 1-11, 62-64; Cynthia A. Young, *Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of the U.S. Third World Left* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 1-17. For a discussion on internal colonialism, see Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Rodolfo Acuña, *Occupied America: The Chicano's Struggle toward Liberation* (Canfield Press, 1972).

This dissertation project contributes to the understanding of North American Christianity by investigating how individuals and organizations established national and transnational solidarity networks through faith and politics to argue against war throughout the 20th century. Scholarship by Marian Mollin, Leilah Danielson, and Patricia Appelbaum identifies the radical potential of pacifism and how it reshaped political engagement for peace and social justice. Additionally, Vanessa Cook expands on the religious connections to a political ideology that inspired Christian activists to discard dogma and view faith as revolutionary instead of reactionary. I expand on the intersection of religion and activism by U.S. liberals and leftists during the twentieth century by analyzing the formation of interracial, transnational networks between the U.S. and Puerto Ricans. Additionally, this project expands on the role of faith-based actors in multi-ethnic and multi-racial coalition networks in the pursuit of political and social justice. U.S. pacifists and Puerto Ricans built coalitions that shared a commitment to draft resistance despite coalition members holding disparate political ideologies.⁴¹

Social movement theory helps inform this dissertation's understanding of how movements come together for a specific objective. According to Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow, social movements are one or multiple movements that function as a counter to oppressive power. My research on the anti-war movement analyzes how these groups came together and have the capacity to adapt and grow,

⁴¹ Vanessa Cook, *Spiritual Socialists*, 1-15; For additional scholarship on the work of pacifists working with other political and social groups, see Marian Mollin, *Radical Pacifism in Modern America* (Pennsylvania, University of Penn Press, 2006); Patricia Appelbaum, *Kingdom to Commune*; Leilah Danielson, *American Gandhi: A.J. Muste and the History of Radicalism in the 20th Century* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

disappear, or reform as a new movement.⁴² The contentious nature of social movements is based on trying to appease multiple organizations under a common grievance.

Sociologist Francesca Polletta identifies that one method used to organize social movement was the use of participatory democracy to create consensus. A drawback of participatory democracy is that coalition members that disagree with the majority might abandon the larger movement. Moreover, individuals or organizations that functioned as a bridge to multiple collectives built relationships that increased the likelihood of a coalition resolving internal divisions.⁴³

Understanding the complex dynamics of solidarity movements highlights historian Lauren Araiza's contention that multiracial coalition building is a strategy of negotiations that brought various organizations together to potentially influence civil rights outcomes. Araiza's focus on organizations negotiating potential outcomes is visible when examining the relationship building between Puerto Rican activists on the island and in the United States, as well as U.S.-based organizations.⁴⁴ Furthermore,

⁴² Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (New York: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 1-11. For more on social movement literature, see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁴³ Francesca Polletta, *Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 5-20; See also Nella Van Dyke and Holly McCammon, eds., *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xi-xiii, 270-273.

⁴⁴ Lauren Araiza, *To March for Others: The Black Freedom Struggle and the United Farm Workers* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 1-10. Araiza's book and the work of scholars Francesca Polletta, Nella Van Dyke, Doug McAdam, and Holly McCammon informed my opinion that social movements build and maintain through various interconnected networks. The networks allowed for the coalition to continue even when political and social movements broke up over divisions. Currently, historian Tiffany González is theorizing in her future book project about how social movement networking acted as an important element in the reshaping of Latina political representation throughout the twentieth century. For more, see Tiffany González, "Changing Representations: Tracing Latina Involvement in American Politics," Newcombe Institute, Tulane University, accessed June 8, 2022, <https://changingrepresentations.wp.tulane.edu/>.

Araiza's focus illustrates scholar David Roediger's point that broad solidarity work is a precious and fragile long-term task based on timing, distance, and degrees of oppression of members that can still historically silence a movement. This last point is evident in historical understandings of the twentieth-century anti-war movement that is continuously remembered as universalist or white-dominant.⁴⁵

The Latinx social movement historiography initially placed social activism and religion as oppositional in the organization of movements for social, political, and economic equality in the U.S throughout the 20th century. My dissertation joins scholars Felipe Hinojosa and Lara Medina in discussing religious participation in Latinx social movements, demonstrating that faith and activism were not opposing forces in battles for social justice during the second half of the twentieth century in Latinx communities. Individuals and organizations interpreted faith and church spaces as areas that could organize marginalized communities in the pursuit of social justice. In this dissertation, Puerto Rican draft resisters interpreted their objection to military service through their own political and religious training.⁴⁶

Intersecting both branches of scholarship, my dissertation attempts to highlight how organizers created political, social, and religious solidarity networks to debate the

⁴⁵ David Roediger, *Class, Race, and Marxism* (New York, Verso Press, 2017), 28-30, 165-166. For historiographic examples of coalition building, see Laura Pulido, *Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles* (University of California Press, 2006); Felipe Hinojosa, *Latino Mennonites: Civil Rights, Faith, and Evangelical Culture* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Gordon K. Mantler, *Power to the Poor: Black-Brown Coalition and the Fight for Economic Justice* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Max Krochmal, *Blue Texas: The Making of a Multiracial Democratic Coalition in the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Brian Behnken, *Civil Rights and Beyond* (University of Georgia Press, 2016).

⁴⁶ For more on this, see Felipe Hinojosa, *Latino Mennonites: Civil Rights, Faith, and Evangelical Culture* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Lara Medina, *Las Hermanas: Chicana/Latina Religious-Political Activism in the U.S. Catholic Church* (Brunswick, NJ: Temple University Press, 2005).

inequalities in U.S. society, including the question of military service. Focusing on these moments of solidarity and conflict demonstrates the struggle to unify under a common goal when individuals and organizations advocate for various causes and deploy methods that might ideologically clash with an ally. In the case of anti-war activism, religious dissenters debated whether participation in alternative service still amounted to participation in the production of war. Additionally, the debate of pure pacifism versus resistance and self-defense caused friction among the U.S. and Puerto Rican religious pacifists and Puerto Rican independence activists willing to agitate against the U.S. government. The struggles mentioned in this dissertation mirror the debates we see today in political, religious, and social circles about how to address and achieve equity and social justice in the United States.

This dissertation investigates the social and political motivations that inspired Puerto Ricans in the United States to link compulsory military service and militarization as civil rights issues that caused harm to individuals and the community. Discussing Puerto Rican anti-war motivations and coalition organizing within the broader context of twentieth-century U.S. History expands our understanding of U.S. movements for non-resistance, anti-war, and anti-imperialism. Puerto Rican activists and organizations did not work in isolation from the broader U.S. movements. Instead, they collaborated on shared initiatives while centralizing their positions on the imperial status of Puerto Rico and the conditions Puerto Ricans faced on the archipelago and within the US metropole. Additionally, the dissertation joins discussions of multiracial coalition-building in U.S. social movements. The relationship between Puerto Rican and U.S groups devoted to

anti-war and anti-colonialism faced strategic and political disunity, at times over Puerto Rico's status question among members of the U.S. Left. Finally, my dissertation magnifies Latinx representation in the U.S. anti-war movement by highlighting how Puerto Ricans interpreted military participation.

The introductory chapter will establish the project's historiographical and theoretical orientation. I situate Puerto Rican anti-war activism within broader discussions of U.S. anti-militarism, Civil Rights, and the Cold War by demonstrating how World War II and the aftermath shaped discussions of militarization and resistance. This dissertation will be divided into five chapters that examine specific episodes of Puerto Rican anti-war activity throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Each chapter will investigate how the coalition networks developed a shared message to defend war resisters while also providing opportunities for Puerto Rican draft resisters to voice their specific grievances.

Beginning in 1940, Chapter 1 will discuss Puerto Rican non-compliance to the draft, the Nationalist Party's stance on World War II, and the U.S. lineage of non-violence as a political practice for civil and political discourse. The implementation of a draft system in 1940 led to dialogues between radical pacifists aligned with the U.S. Old Left and Puerto Rican independence activists opposed to the imposition of the draft. This interaction is examined through an investigation undertaken by the religious pacifist organization the Fellowship of Reconciliation concerning the credentials of the Reverend J. Lebrón Velázquez, a protestant clergyman who was alleged to sympathize with the Nationalist Party.

Beginning in 1940, Chapter 1 will discuss how the implementation of a peacetime draft in 1940 spurred dialogue between members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and Puerto Rican draft resisters. One issue examined in the chapter is how the FOR would deal with Puerto Rican war resisters with ties to the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, a separatist political independence faction. Chapter 2 continues looking at coalition-building efforts between Puerto Rican independence groups and affiliates of the FOR during World War II to defend the rights of war resisters. The brief incarceration of nationalist Julio Pinto Gandía for draft evasion illustrated how the coalition mobilized and argued that compulsory service infringed on definitions of self-determination. Most importantly, chapters 1 and 2 inform how the coalition network navigated differences to maintain their shared objective to defend war resisters.

Concerns about the draft continued after World War II as geopolitical tensions rose to a Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Chapter 3 highlights the draft case of ex-University of Puerto Rico student Antonio Filardi Guzman. Facing a murder charge in jail in 1954 that he claimed was a politically motivated setup, the appeals of Filardi Guzman's legal representatives' direct attention to what motivated his draft resistance in 1950. Chapter 4 will move toward the 1960s and focus on the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade in 1966 as a multiracial march that vocalized a collaborative rejection of the war in Vietnam. It also served as a space for *el Movimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico* (M.P.I.) and other Puerto Rican organizers in New York to demonstrate their opposition to war and address Puerto Rican concerns to a broader audience.

Chapter 5 will focus on the religious, political, and moral objections of individual soldiers through the cases of Adolfo Rodríguez and Private Dennis Mora. Both cases highlight the visibility of Puerto Rican resistance within the military ranks and how that influenced civilian anti-war activists. More importantly, the cases illustrated how each man defined their objection to an understanding of citizenship and received support from within the multiracial solidarity networks. The conclusion will summarize the previous chapters and address the contributions and implications of my research. Furthermore, I will emphasize the new direction for future studies related to my dissertation that highlights how these coalition networks survived the 1970s through campaigns for Puerto Rico's independence that included the release of political prisoners and continued militarization in Puerto Rico and U.S. society.

CHAPTER II

FAITH, ANTI-DRAFT ACTIVISM, AND NATIONALISM: THE COMPLEXITY OF DRAFT RESISTANCE IN THE US AND PUERTO RICO, 1940 TO 1943

Images in the U.S. and Puerto Rican press lauded Puerto Rican contributions to the war economy and on the battlefield during World War II, magnifying perceptions that military service emphasized the highest ideal of citizenship and nationhood specified by the Atlantic Charter. Increased U.S. involvement in World War II saw Puerto Rican political leaders use New York City as a space to link Puerto Rico's political status with the war through outreach to the diaspora and U.S. political entities. New York-based independence organizations emphasized Puerto Rican military participation as a justification for a shift in status, highlighted by a congressional bill (S. 952) promoted by Senator Millard Tydings in 1943 to ensure gradual independence. During a speech in support of the Tydings Bill in New York, independence activist Erasmo Vando highlighted the contributions of Puerto Ricans during World War II as a continuation of services "offered freely and generously to the cause of liberating other nations from the chains of slavery and shame."⁴⁷ He continued:

"No doubt you gentlemen know our record in this great and terrible conflagration: close to 100,000 men and women from that little island are serving under the flag of the United States. Our blood has been shed on the soil of France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Italy, Africa, and all over the Pacific, where the American colors have paid a precious price for the cause of liberty...No doubt you have heard of our record-breaking contributing to all the war bonds, the Red Cross and many other

⁴⁷ Speech, Erasmo Vando, January 1, 1943. New York Organizational Activities, Erasmo Vando Collection [hereafter called the Vando Collection]. Center for Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter College, New York York [hereafter cited as Center for Puerto Rican Studies].

demands and necessities of this war. A nation that so generously responds and so gallantly to a noble cause cannot be kept in chains any longer.”⁴⁸

Puerto Rican participation in the war, according to political pundits, provided a path to reconcile Puerto Rico’s colonial status.

Active Puerto Rican participation in the war effort as the method to redefine Puerto Rico’s status was not universally agreed upon. Independence advocates aligned with el Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico (PNPR) echoed the sentiments of other anti-colonial organizations that critiqued the premise of defending democracy while fighting for national representation.⁴⁹ PNPR Interim President Julio de Santiago articulated the party’s position on military service in a letter circulated to U.S. politicians after Japan attacks Pearl Harbor. He declared that the organization would only fight for democracy if Puerto Rico were able to participate as a free and independent nation.⁵⁰ De Santiago’s anti-draft statement demanded freedom for Puerto Rico instead of a dedication to peace as a condition of military service. The nationalists’ position also demanded that Puerto Ricans arrested as political prisoners, including draft resisters, be released.

In contrast, religious and moral objectors in the United States and Puerto Rico struggled with either working within the system to ensure government protection of draft

⁴⁸ “Speech, Erasmo Vando, January 1, 1943. Vando Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

⁴⁹ *El Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico*, loosely called the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in English, was a political nationalist political entity that started as a political party in 1930. A splinter of the Union Party, the PNPR’s independence stance included complete detachment from the U.S. For more on the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, see Bernabe and Ayala, 95-110, 153-157.

⁵⁰ Julio de Santiago to Representative Vito Marcantonio, May 20, 1942. Vito Marcantonio Papers [hereafter called the Marcantonio Papers], Series III: Subjects Correspondence and Papers, Box 54, Puerto Rico. New York Public Library, New York [Hereafter cited as the NYPL]. De Santiago mentions that this letter circulated to various official in the U.S., including President Roosevelt, a few weeks after the Pearl Harbor bombing and received no acknowledgement from anyone.

resisters or practicing a devout resistance that risked potential jail time. The pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation, a peace organization established in 1917 to defend peace advocates and draft resisters, attempted to support the right of draft resisters during the buildup of World War II.⁵¹ Through political and social bridge builders, U.S. and Puerto Rican anti-draft organizers internally discussed within their vast support networks the issues of obligatory military service and solutions to ensure protection for objectors. Despite a shared commitment to war resisters, the FOR's dedication to pacifism and working within government institutions conflicted with the PNP's refusal to work through political systems and determination to fight for Puerto Rican sovereignty. However, pacifists and independence activists developed a coalition network that defended the civil liberties of draft resisters.

Looking at the response to the Preparedness Policy and Peacetime Draft by Puerto Rican political and religious dissenters and U.S. religious networks of the U.S. Left like the Fellowship of Reconciliation, this chapter investigates coalition-building efforts against compulsory military service in Puerto Rico. A central aspect of this chapter is the dialogue between a Puerto Rican pastor, J. Lebrón Velázquez, asking for funds and official recognition from the Fellowship of Reconciliation's leadership to promote conscientious objector status in his churches. During a background check, the FOR was concerned about Lebrón Velázquez's reported connections with the Nationalist

⁵¹ The Fellowship of Reconciliation began in Europe after the start of World War I as the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. The U.S. based national chapter began after the U.S. entered the war in 1917. Throughout their existence, they provided logistic and legal aid to war resisters that included lectures on conscientious objection and forming networks with members of historic peace churches and the religious left. For more on the FOR, see Appelbaum, *Kingdom to Commune*, 26-28.

Party and overselling his credentials. However, Lebrón Velázquez's position within the Evangelical movement in Puerto Rico post-World War II and his concerns about Puerto Rican protestants receiving information about war resistance from a fellow Puerto Rican created a complex situation for pacifists that acknowledged the lack of Puerto Rican congregants among their membership. The episode's conclusion and continued dialogue between the Fellowship of Reconciliation and Puerto Rican independence supporters demonstrated the main argument of this chapter: that discussions and ideological disagreements did not shut down collaboration efforts against compulsory military service. Instead, the coalition network engaged with questions from independence activists about why Puerto Ricans were subjected to the draft without equal citizenship.

The escalation of the war in Europe saw the United States officially maintain neutrality as the country continued to deal with the Great Depression. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt attempted to balance neutrality with preparing the nation for future conflict without arousing suspicion that he was forcing war. Additionally, scholars emphasized how U.S. military leadership in the 1930s recognized the need for a massive overhaul of the Armed Forces.⁵² Government efforts to revamp the military and provide financial assistance to the Allies faced pushback from political opponents that believed U.S. neutrality was a façade. U.S. public sentiment to join the European war ranged from mixed to opposed, with many pacifists and isolationists railing against the prospect of war. Mixed public opinion and a stifling economic depression did not diminish attempts

⁵² Paul Dickson, *The Rise of the G.I. Army* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2020), 109-110.

by U.S. government officials to address military recruitment and reorganization for possible global or hemispheric conflict.⁵³

US military mobilization in Puerto Rico between 1939 and 1941 escalated the process of industrialization initially undertaken by the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), one of the Second New Deal initiatives specific to Puerto Rico. The U.S. government provided funding for the PRRA to assist the development of infrastructure and public works during the 1930s. Puerto Rico's key position as an essential commercial and military base was central to U.S. military preparations to defend U.S. economic interests in the Caribbean from German naval actions.⁵⁴ The U.S. War department saw the Caribbean as a space to revitalize military strength without presenting an aggressive stance that would startle U.S. isolationists. However, historian Jorge Rodríguez Beruff emphasized that Puerto Rico lacked the infrastructure and sanitation to support increased mobilization. Puerto Rico's role in war preparation would position the colony as a "Caribbean Malta" or "Gibraltar," a crucial base for the offensive and defensive objectives of the U.S. military.⁵⁵ The Roosevelt Administration authorized the activation of a new Army Department on the island in 1939 that obtained the necessary investment provided for the rapid development of bases and airfields in

⁵³ Jorge Rodríguez Beruff and José L. Bolívar Fresneda eds., *Island at War: Puerto Rico in the Crucible of the Second World War* (Jackson, Mississippi: University of Mississippi, 2015), 5.

⁵⁴ Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, *Strategy as Politics: Puerto Rico on the Eve of the Second World War* (San Juan, PR: La Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2007), 355-363; Rodríguez Beruff and Fresneda, 111-115. For more on the work of Puerto Rican professionals within the PRRA, see Geoff Burrows, "Rural Hydro-Electrification and the Colonial New Deal: Modernization, Experts, and Rural Life in Puerto Rico, 1935-1942," *Agricultural History* 91, no. 3 (Summer, 2017), 293-319.

⁵⁵ U.S. military preparations also included the defense of British and French Caribbean colonies that were essential to Caribbean and U.S. trade. See Rodríguez Beruff and Bolívar Fresneda, *Island at War*, 5-10, 111-115; Arturo Morales Carrión, *Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), 257-258.

Puerto Rico. More importantly, the development of roads, sanitation, and waterworks meant for the development of militarization improved the livelihood of civilian populations on the island.⁵⁶

Increased militarization in Puerto Rico and the passage of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 saw the number of Puerto Rican military personnel increase to 25,000 soldiers by 1941. However, submitting to the peacetime draft was not universally accepted in the United States or Puerto Rico. An organization that was integral in defending peace activists and conscientious objectors was the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). Founded in England as the International Fellowship of Reconciliation in 1914 and expanded to a U.S. branch in 1916, the FOR attempted to advocate for religious, moral, and political conscientious objectors of war and militarization. During World War I, the United States defined conscientious objectors as those that claimed membership in the historic peace churches. Individuals that were not part of the Church of the Brethren, Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), or Mennonites that did not apply for the draft or submit to non-combat service were threatened with fines and imprisonment. FOR and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), a Quaker organization founded in 1917 to develop alternatives to military service during World War I, worked diligently to ensure provisions were added to the Selective Service Act of 1940 to protect conscientious objectors.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Rodríguez Beruff, 355-363; Rodríguez Beruff and Fresneda, 111-115.

⁵⁷ Paul Dekar, *Creating the Beloved Community: A Journey with the Fellowship of Reconciliation*, (Telford, PA: Cascadia Publishing House, 2005), 91-98; Appelbaum, 42-46, 62-66.

The parameters of the Selective Service Act of 1940 allowed moral and religious objectors deferment appeals without an affiliation with the Quakers, Brethren, and Mennonite churches. The Act developed alternatives like civilian service work camps for COs to complete public works projects that would be coordinated under civilian authority instead of the military in the U.S. and Puerto Rico. More importantly, the FOR coordinated efforts that informed individuals within their vast network of social, political, and religious connections on how to obtain conscientious objector status. The FOR and the AFSC were aware that a variety of stances informed individual Protestant draft resistance. Sociologist Yuichi Moroi demonstrated that objection could be based on resisters refusing to bear arms or kill another human by order of the nation-state, which could include resisters that did not oppose killing but rejected the U.S. government's demand.⁵⁸ Additionally, individuals declaring conscientious objection could also serve in the military if their conviction is based on not wanting to murder but still wanting to serve the nation-state. With a variety of options available, the FOR used their vast political and religious networks to inform interested individuals about how to appeal as conscientious objectors.⁵⁹

U.S. pacifists' peace activism was inspired by international struggles against British colonialism that influence their ideological direction toward non-violent resistance. Central to this shift was a verbal and intellectual exchange between

⁵⁸ Yuichi Moroi, *Ethics of Conviction and Civic Responsibility: Conscientious Objectors in America during the World Wars* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008), 1-12.

⁵⁹ "'Conchies' to be Placed on Reserve List, *The Chicago Defender*, October 11, 1941; Joseph T. Tinnelly, "The Conscientious Objector under the Selective Service Act of 1940," *St. John's Law Review*, 2, vol 15 (April, 1941), 235-243; Felipe Hinojosa, *Latino Mennonites: Civil Rights, Faith, and Evangelical Culture* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 34-36.

Mohandas K. Gandhi and U.S. intellectuals during the 1930s and 1940s that inspired U.S. pacifists to engage with his philosophy and support the Free India Movement. Social philosopher Richard Gregg and Indian sociologist Dr. Krishnalal Jethalal Shridharani shaped the training of U.S. pacifists in the ethics of satyagraha (soul force) and non-violent direct action to combat racism, imperialism, and war. A.J. Muste directed the FOR toward non-violent direct action to infuse morality and religion in campaigns for social and political change.⁶⁰ However, U.S. intellectuals also questioned the efficacy of nonviolent direct action as a viable route to challenge injustice in the United States. For example, Black religious and political intellectuals debated the viability of non-violent direct action in fighting against U.S. racism. They expressed concern that the violent repression of Indian independence activists from the British ruling minority in India would be multiplied if a minority group in the U.S. used Gandhian non-violence. U.S. pacifists also wondered if confrontation with authorities was an act of violence in itself, wondering if the other methods could be employed. Finally, U.S.-based religious leaders wondered if there was a religious and cultural divergence in Gandhi's practice of nonviolent direct action that would not work in U.S. social movement circles.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Dekar, 91-98; Dennis Dickerson, "African American Religious Intellectuals and the Theological Foundations of the Civil Rights Movement, 1930-1955," *Church History* 74, no. 2 (June 2005), 221-228.

⁶¹ Krishnalal Shridharani was a protégé of Gandhi that worked closely with pacifist and religious leaders to shape the protestant Christian equivalent of *satyagraha*, *kristagraha*. Shridharani's book, *War without Violence*, became a foundational text in the pacifist circles along with Richard Gregg's *The Power of Non-Violence*. For more on the philosophy of non-violence, see Krishnalal Jethalal Shridharani, *War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and its Accomplishments* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1939); Applebaum, 62-67; Joseph Kip Kosek, *Acts of Conscience: Christian Nonviolence and Modern American Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) 178-187; Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 203-220.

The FOR also prepared to defend war resisters that refused to participate in U.S. government-sanctioned alternatives or submit to a non-combat role. Absolute pacifists rejected any service or position that maintained military operations and stated that the preparation and production of war infringed on their inalienable rights. Additionally, draftees defied their draft summons or verbalized their objection to military service at their draft boards for social and political reasons. For example, Black American men refused induction into the U.S. military to protest U.S. racism and the treatment of Black Americans' position as second-class citizens in a nation promoting World War II as a fight for democratic freedom. District and Federal judges did not recognize political and social objections and threatened to impose prison sentences on those that resisted the draft, leading to intervention from the FOR and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Pacifist organizations advocating for conscientious objectors grappled with supporting all conscientious objectors without alienating U.S. government-backed programs or imposing on war resisters a singular directive of draft resistance.⁶²

Chapters of the Fellowship of Reconciliation reached out to the national leadership to guide conscientious objectors in their choices. An exchange between Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) president A.J. Muste and a colleague identified FOR Puerto Rico's concerns about training and consultation efforts in Puerto Rico to

⁶² "Draftee declares He's Conscientious Objector," *New York Amsterdam Star-News*, February 28, 1942; "Refuses to Join Army, Gets Three Years," *New York Amsterdam Star-News*, October 31, 1942."; Conrad J. Lynn, *There is a Fountain: The Autobiography of a Civil Rights Lawyer* (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1979), 92-98. Civil Rights lawyer Conrad Lynn mentions in his autobiography that he represented his brother, Winfield Lynn, in his draft resistance case in 1940. Lynn and other cases covered in African American newspapers during World War I stated their draft resistance was a protest of U.S. racism.

challenge the military draft.⁶³ Encouraged that there were objectors that needed assistance, Muste emphasized that he needed more information about Puerto Rico's situation because "the problem of religious objectors in Puerto Rico is certainly one to which we should give attention and probably aid."⁶⁴ The FOR weighed the needs of individuals who sought information on conscientious objector status while also accounting for the political and social injustices in Puerto Rico that demanded their attention.

Muste received further news about Puerto Rican conscientious objectors from Reverend J.R. Lebrón Velázquez, who he described as a young clergyman "that seemed to me an intelligent and dependable person."⁶⁵ Lebrón Velázquez was an evangelical preacher that organized non-affiliated Evangelical collectives in Puerto Rico under the name of Church of the Savior.⁶⁶ His outreach to U.S. peace organizations was not a

⁶³ Abraham Johannes Muste (1885-1967) was a clergyman that worked extensively in the social movements of the 20th century. He joined the Fellowship of Reconciliation after the organization began in 1916 and was part of their leadership structure throughout his life. During the late 1920s, he became disillusioned with pacifism and faith and left to become a Marxist and work in labor reform. Returning to pacifism in 1936, he dedicated his activist career to building coalitions that centered morality and religion as a part of political engagement for social change. For more on Muste's career and life, see Leilah Danielson, "Saints for the Age: Religion and Radicalism in the American Century," in *The Religious Left in Modern America: The Doorkeepers of a Radical Faith*, eds. Leilah Danielson, Marian Mollin, and Doug Rossinow (London: Palgrave MacMillian, 2018); Leilah Danielson, *American Gandhi: A.J. Muste and the History of Radicalism in the 20th Century* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); Jo Ann Robinson, *Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A.J. Muste* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981).

⁶⁴ A.J. Muste to Mrs. H.H. Pierce, Feb 10, 1941. Fellowship of Reconciliation Papers, Collection: FOR Muste, Ex. Secy. General Correspondence, 1940-1947, Rustin, Bayard [hereafter cited as FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence]. Series A-3, Folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rican Independence. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

⁶⁵ Muste to Mrs. H.H. Pierce, Feb 10, 1941. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

⁶⁶ Associated Press, "Pospuesto el 'Día del Huelga Estudiantil,'" March 18, 1936, *El Mundo* (Puerto Rico). In 1943, the Church of the Savior was incorporated into the Church of the Nazarene and Lebrón Velázquez attained official ordination within the church. He would go on to promote evangelism through radio during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1980s, he is quoted in a New York Times article discussing the rise of Protestantism and Evangelism in Puerto Rico. For more on Reverend Lebrón Velázquez's career in

random decision, as groups like the FOR and the National Service Board for Religious Objectors (NSBRO) advocated for individuals and organizations opposed to the draft. During the early months of 1941, Reverend Lebrón Velázquez contacted NSBRO executive secretary Paul Comly French to inquire about what would be done for religious objectors in Puerto Rico and the purpose of work camps on the island. In his letter to French, Lebrón Velázquez accused U.S. military personnel of projecting immoral attitudes and behaviors in Puerto Rico and using violence against women and children. He provided French with his perceptions of Puerto Rico under U.S. military authorities, specifically the need for a Protestant intermediary within the military bases to ease tensions between the U.S. military bases and Puerto Rican communities.⁶⁷

Reverend Lebrón's inquiry about conscientious objector status and the conditions of Puerto Rico under U.S. military authorities provided members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation a sense of optimism in addressing the needs of Puerto Rican draft resisters. Muste was particularly encouraged at the thought of Puerto Rican Protestants demanding peaceful alternatives to war. Throughout 1941, Muste discussed the situation in Puerto Rico with colleagues in charge of Puerto Rican congregations about how to maintain positive relations with the U.S. and Puerto Rican officials to ensure

evangelical circles, see Samuel E. Perez Rivera, "Past, Heritage and Indigenous Process of the Church of the Nazarene," Ibero America Regional Conference, October 18-19, 2004, San Jose, Costa Rica. Didache Faithful Teaching. <https://didache.nazarene.org/index.php/regiontheoconf/ibero-amer-theo-conf/486-iberoam04-eng-3-puerto-rico/file>; Reginald Stuart, "Protestants Stepping Up Puerto Rico Conversion, February 19, 1984, *New York Times*.

⁶⁷ Paul Comly French to the Reverend J.R. Lebrón Velázquez, January 20, 1941; The Reverend J.R. Lebrón Velázquez to Paul Comly French, January 21, 1941, Center on Conscience and War (DG 025) [hereafter called CCW Files], Part I: Files from 1939-1946, Series C-1, Box 72, Camp Files, Re: CPS: #43 Castañar Project Camp, PR: Martin G. Brumbaugh Unit, General, 1941 (May)-1944 (June), Swarthmore Peace Collection, Swarthmore PA [hereafter cited as the Swarthmore Peace Collection].

conscientious objectors received fair treatment. In a letter to Muste, FOR leader John Nevin Sayre pitched the idea of public service work camps that collaborated with officials of the PRRA. Sayre believed this would be the best course of action despite the potential of the U.S. military dictating a lot of the directives. Recognizing that they lacked knowledge of the political and social terrain of Puerto Rico, Sayre recommended that FOR appeal to Quaker FOR members working on conscientious objector projects in Latin America and pacifists that worked in the U.S. state department under FDR for guidance. Their familiarity with white church members in charge of the church committees in Puerto Rico provided both Sayre and Muste an institutional understanding of congregant concerns. However, both men were cognizant that any type of coordination between religious and political officials in Puerto Rico needed a representative that understood the political dynamics of Puerto Rico and how to intersect politics and faith.⁶⁸

The efforts of the peace movement to defend the rights of war resisters and argue for a continuation of U.S. neutrality during 1941 were challenged as global events pushed the U.S. closer to war. This produced a schism within the U.S. Left over the efficacy of peace advocacy in the face of brutal violence that threatened their political or religious worldview. Members of the Communist Party USA, originally opposed to war,

⁶⁸ Bishop Charles B. Colmore to A.J. Muste, February 17, 1941; John Nevin Sayre to A.J. Muste, March 6, 1941. All in Fellowship of Reconciliation Papers, Collection: FOR Muste, Ex. Secy. General Correspondence, 1940-1947, Rustin, Bayard [hereafter cited as FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence]. Series A-3, Folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rican Independence. Swarthmore Peace Collection. John Nevin Sayre (1884-1977) was an Episcopalian priest and active member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation from its inception in the United States. He took on a number of leadership and editorial roles within the organization, while also forming the Episcopalian Pacifist Fellowship in 1939. For more, see Appelbaum, 26-27, 148, 229.

called for a united front against Hitler and U.S. entrance into the war after Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. A key part of the broad anti-draft coalition, Civil Rights lawyer Conrad Lynn observed the change of direction within U.S. communist circles. He recalled that the CPUSA newspaper, *The Daily Worker*, went from denouncing the U.S. and other Western imperialist nations on June 21st to “calling all Americans to the sacred task of defeating history’s worst monster, Adolf Hitler.”⁶⁹ Additionally, Puerto Rico’s Communist Party, aligned with Communist Party U.S.A., advocated against Puerto Rico’s inclusion in any European conflict until Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. As pacifists continued to champion peace despite internal debates over the necessity of military action, the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 effectively ended U.S. neutrality.⁷⁰

The rise of fascism in Europe and the justification for U.S. entrance into World War II sparked a dilemma within the peace movement. Mainline protestant denominations that advocated for peace during the interwar years reversed their anti-war positions to promote the war as a fight for justice. Sociologist Patricia Appelbaum notes the pro-war shift of Protestant denominations like the Methodist church, which reversed their anti-war sentiments in 1941 because war might be a lesser evil than the spread of global fascism.⁷¹ Although the FOR enjoyed membership boosts after 1940, the fractures in the Peace Movement over how to respond to fascism saw other peace organizations

⁶⁹ Lynn, 85-86, 92; Appelbaum, 34-44.

⁷⁰ Report by the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Porto Rico Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee Held the 31st of August and September 1, 1941,” Jesús Colón Collection [hereafter cited as the Colón Collection], Subject File: Puerto Rico. Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

⁷¹ Appelbaum, 34-36; Wittner, 30-33.

decline. The FOR maintained the peace movement by working with churches that continued to advocate for peace to ensure that pacifists that objected to military service in the coming war were protected.⁷²

The FOR's work in establishing plans for camps and other safeguards for Puerto Rican COs saw the organizations endeavoring to find a Puerto Rican protestant representative that had the trust of the congregations and connections to Puerto Rico's political leaders. Recognizing his lack of ground-level knowledge of the dynamics of Puerto Rico's protestant churches and the general population, Muste reached out to his contacts in Puerto Rico to determine the validity of Reverend Lebrón Velázquez's claims that Puerto Rican COs were not receiving resources and aid to fight draft summons. Additionally, Muste asked his networks about their interactions with the Reverend and if he would be a potential intermediary between U.S.-based peace organizations and Puerto Rican war resisters. Reverend Lebrón offered his services to U.S. peace leaders to act in this capacity, further inquiring about gaining a sponsorship as the FOR's Puerto Rico delegate for a pacifist organized conference discussing conscientious objector status.⁷³ Communication between Muste and members of the FOR chapter in Puerto Rico concerning Reverend Lebrón Velázquez uncovered conflicting reports about his credentials within Puerto Rican religious circles and rumors of controversial political affiliations.⁷⁴

⁷² Lawrence Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 32-34; Appelbaum, *Kingdom to Commune*, 26-28, 34-44.

⁷³ J.R. Lebrón Velázquez to Paul Comly French, January 21, 1941, CCW Files, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

⁷⁴ A.J. Muste to Ray Newton, April 18, 1941. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Muste's contacts in Puerto Rico's protestant churches answered his letters asking for their perspectives on the position of conscientious objectors on the island. In each correspondence, there was an acknowledgment of the need to protect COs and other draft resisters on the island. Additionally, the potential of establishing a CO camp in Puerto Rico gained support from religious leaders affiliated with the FOR, including suggesting the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) coordinate efforts based on their connection within the U.S. government and previous work establishing work camps in Latin America.⁷⁵ When the subject of Lebrón Velázquez came up as a potential bridge to Puerto Rican congregants, the responses given to Muste caused him to recoil at his initial optimism. In an exchange of letters between Muste and FOR Secretary for Latin America Charles S. Detweiler, who stated that he and his colleagues knew of a few COs and encouraged parishioners in Puerto Rico's Baptist churches to register for the draft and indicate their status as COs. Additionally, Detweiler mentions his dealings with Lebrón Velázquez, mentioning his past affiliation and separation from the Baptist church and rumored connections with the Nationalists. Regarding the situation in Puerto Rico, Detweiler observed that the only people facing difficulty from the government were Nationalists who "were advised not to register, that the 'Empire had no right to demand'" their induction into the military through the draft and that Lebrón "may have failed to register, and is looking for someone to save him from his folly."⁷⁶

⁷⁵ A.J. Muste to the Reverend Dr. E.G. Wilson; A.J. Muste to Paul French, March 20, 1941, CCW Files, Series C-1, Box 72, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

⁷⁶ Charles Detweiler to A.J. Muste, April 14, 1941. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection. Charles S. Detweiler (1878-1962) was a Baptist Minister with extensive missionary experience in various Latin

Detweiler's statements about Reverend Lebrón presented a challenge to Muste and other pacifists who grappled with providing information to Puerto Rican congregants about draft resistance while being cautious of the island's political terrain. Reverend Lebrón's alleged past and Detweiler's observation of the Puerto Rico situation highlighted the varying opinions within war resister circles of best practices to oppose the draft without instituting a linear strategy. Detweiler's statement about the "folly" of the nationalists embodies what scholars describe as a culture of perfectionism, a belief defined as a preoccupation with right living, which caused internal conflict among pacifists and allies. Evangelical protestant pacifists and draft resisters who followed this ethos evoked the Sixth commandment of 'Thou Shall not kill,' the call to 'Turn the other cheek' in the Sermon on the Mount, and the calls of the prophets to 'beat their swords into plowshares.'⁷⁷ For perfectionists like Detweiler, the necessary work of missionaries and congregants promoting pacifism might be damaged if they aligned with a questionable figure like Lebrón Velázquez.

The alleged connection to the pro-independence *el Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico* (Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico) produced a dilemma for pacifists. Although the FOR prioritized the protection of COs and pacifists within civilian service work, they also did not want to isolate others who politically opposed military service. However, the NPR's relationship with the U.S.-appointed government of Puerto Rico was animated by violent rhetoric and actions that were antithetical to pacifism. The

American nations. His role as the FOR's Secretary of Latin America was based on his religious fieldwork experience in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Mexico, among other nations.

⁷⁷ Appelbaum, 66-69.

PNPR emerged in 1930 after a split from the political party Unión de Puerto Rico to advocate aggressively for an independent Puerto Rico, which included objecting to U.S. control and participating in military service. Under the leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos, the party advocated for revolutionary struggle by openly rejecting U.S. political authority on the island, advocating for self-defense and violence to attain independence if necessary.⁷⁸

The PNPR's rejection of U.S. imperial authority manifested in public confrontations with U.S. and Puerto Rican government officials and the organization's statements that the U.S. denied the island self-determination and independence. A central tenant used by Albizu and other PNPR members was to point out that Spain had granted Puerto Rico political autonomy through the Autonomous Charter of 1897 and that the U.S. illegally gained the island nation as a possession after the 1898 Treaty of Paris.⁷⁹ Additionally, Civil Rights lawyer Conrad Lynn remarked that the party established a revolutionary ethos after Albizu lost trust in Puerto Rico's electoral politics in 1932 and recognized the U.S. would not give Puerto Rico up willingly. Continued insistence on Puerto Rico's independence and non-compliance ramped up tensions as Albizu verbally attacked U.S. insular government officials in Puerto Rico and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. His verbal assaults on the political establishment and the

⁷⁸ Juan Antonio Corretjer, *Campos and the Ponce Massacre* (New York: World View Publishers, 1965), 7-9; Lynn, 123-128.

⁷⁹ Corretjer, 7-9; Autonomous Charter of Puerto Rico: Royal Decree, November 25, 1897, folder 3, box 2R596, "General Files: 1940's-1950's: Puerto Rico-Independence miscellany, 1945-1955," Farmer (James Leonard Jr. and Lula Peterson) Papers [hereafter cited as the Farmer Papers]. Dolph Briscoe Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin, Texas [hereafter cited as the Briscoe Center for American History].

determination of the party's supporters to resist U.S. authority led to violent confrontations throughout the 1930s.⁸⁰

The tension between the Nationalists and U.S. insular government in Puerto Rico led to an escalation of violence between 1935 and 1938 in Puerto Rico. Throughout this period, the Nationalists employed violent rhetoric to demand independence, with members getting into conflicts with local police. One demonstration by the PNPR at the University of Puerto Rico in 1935 led to a confrontation with Puerto Rican insular police that resulted in the death of four nationalists, an incident remembered as the Rio Piedras massacre. The PNPR blamed the actions of the police in Rio Piedras on Colonel Francis E. Riggs, a former military officer that clashed with the Nationalists and Puerto Rican agricultural workers throughout his tenure. Albizu's calls for nationalists and Puerto Ricans to take revenge on police officials and the U.S. appointed Governor Blanton Winship for the deaths of four party members led to the assassination of police chief Colonel Riggs by Nationalists Hiram Rosado and Elias Beauchamp. The assassination of a public official and the denial of due process and execution of Rosado and Beauchamp without a trial caused a political uproar in Puerto Rico. Additionally, Puerto Rican government officials demanded the arrest of Albizu and other nationalist leaders for inflaming violent rhetoric.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Associated Press, "Porto Rican Party for Independence," *Boston Globe*, September 27, 1932; Morales Carrion, 232-241; Conrad J. Lynn, 123-128.

⁸¹ Associated Press, "G-Men Investigate Puerto Rican Plots," *Boston Globe*, February 25, 1936; "Puerto Rican Convictions Upheld," *Boston Globe*, February 20, 1937; Morales Carrion, 233-241.

Originally intended by the insular government as a measure to quell further political sedition in Puerto Rico, the arrests led to further disruptions by Nationalists' members and sympathizers. The trial proceedings for Albizu and nationalist leaders saw two separate trials occur, leading nationalists and sympathizers to suspect foul play by the judiciary and increasing random acts of violence against U.S. officials. Members of the PNPR staged a demonstration in the city of Ponce on March 27, 1937, to protest the imprisonment of their leadership. PNPR members determined to continue the demonstrations after the initially granted parade permits were rescinded, while local and colonial leadership moved to suppress the march. Police fired shots into the crowd on the afternoon of the march causing the deaths of nineteen PNPR members and wounding over 200.⁸² News of the incident called the Ponce Massacre reached the U.S. and led sympathizers for Puerto Rico independence like Congressman Vito Marcantonio to ask the ACLU to inquire about the shooting and the trial of Albizu and other nationalists.⁸³

Representative Marcantonio's aid toward the PNPR was not a random act of intrigue by a U.S. congressman. Marcantonio, a politician aligned with the American

⁸² Associated Press, "Puerto Rican Convictions Upheld," *Boston Globe*, February 20, 1937; Corretjer, 1-9; Gerald Meyer, "Pedro Albizu Campos, Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia, and Vito Marcantonio's Collaboration in the Cause of Puerto Rico's Independence," *Centro Journal* 23, no. 1 (Spring 2011), 96-100.

⁸³ Arthur Garfield Hays. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Civil Rights in Puerto Rico*, May 22, 1937. New York; Elmer Elsworth to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, January 25, 1939. All in Devere Allen Papers, C-6 Box 3, [hereafter cited as the Allen Papers] Folder, Correspondence and Information, Puerto Rico (1942-1945), Swarthmore Peace Collection; Meyer 96-102. In response to Marcantonio's call for an investigation of the harassment of the Nationalists, the ACLU defended the leaders of the PNPR in court during their second trial by detailing the methods used by U.S. insular officials to suppress civil liberties in Puerto Rico. One public accusation made by the ACLU accused the U.S. insular government of Puerto Rico of tampering with the jury, highlighted by a written statement by juror Elmer Elsworth. In a letter directed to President Franklin Roosevelt, Elsworth recounts his experiences as a juror and his perception that the trial was pushed to deny the PNPR leadership a fair trial.

Labor Party, represented the East Harlem district since 1934. His congressional district included the largest Italian American and Puerto Rican population in New York. His backing for Puerto Rico's independence and relationship with the PNP mirrored his activism that defended individuals and organizations being harassed by the U.S. government.⁸⁴ Marcantonio's attention to his Puerto Rican constituents and promotion of Puerto Rico's independence illustrated how individuals within the U.S. Left balanced radical opposition to U.S. foreign policy and pushed for democratic reforms in the social and economic sphere. Additionally, moderate and liberal Puerto Rican politicians acknowledged Rep. Marcantonio's influence, asking him to support proposals or speak on behalf of Puerto Rico in the House of Representatives. Scholar Gerald Meyer explains how Puerto Rican independence, anti-colonialism, and the personal trust built between leadership forged an unlikely professional and personal partnership between Marcantonio, Nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos, and independence advocate Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia.⁸⁵ His actions supporting Puerto Ricans unfairly charged

⁸⁴ "Eugenio Font Juarez, President of Liga Pro Democracia to Vito Marcantonio, May 15, 1939. Vito Marcantonio Papers, New York Public Library, New York; Rep. Vito Marcantonio to Mr. Victor Rodriguez, May 18, 1939. Marcantonio Papers, Series III: Subjects Correspondence and Papers, Box 54, Puerto Rico, NYPL. These two correspondences demonstrate Representative Marcantonio's attention and support for Puerto Rico breaking away from colonial control, aligning more with independence (stating "You may rest assured that the fight is going on for Puerto Rico Libre" in his letter to Mr. Rodriguez. His attention to Puerto Rico's issues led coalitions in Puerto Rico to ask him to champion their proposals because of his position and "well known spirit of democracy. (Font Juarez to Marcantonio)."

⁸⁵ Meyer 90-102. Marcantonio was an avid Socialist that began his political career aligned with the left-wing of the New York Republican party. He shifted to the American Labor Party after conflicts with the Socialist Party of America and believed that the major U.S. political parties did not support the interests of the working class. Gerald Meyer notes that his political profile saw him considered the national spokesperson for the U.S. Left and one of the most successful political radicals to obtain political office despite his disagreements with the Socialist Party of America and Communist Party USA. For more on Vito Marcantonio's political life and career, see Gerald Meyer, *Vito Marcantonio: Radical Politician, 1902-1954* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989).

by the U.S. government forged a solidarity network between Marcantonio and the Puerto Rican independence factions, including the PNPR. More importantly, it illustrated moments when Albizu and the PNPR collaborated with U.S. organizations that acknowledged their demands for independence despite disagreement over strategies.⁸⁶

The network ties that connected Puerto Rican Nationalists and U.S. communists created a complicated web for U.S. pacifists, who also held direct or indirect ties to the U.S. political left.⁸⁷ Despite a devotion to pacifist ideals that led members like Detweiler to denounce the PNPR of missteps, Muste was cognizant that the Nationalists' political position toward the draft mirrored the actions of devoted pacifists within their own political and religious network. Muste's response to Detweiler and other pacifist leaders demonstrated his skepticism of Lebrón's entreaties but also cautioned US pacifists from generalizing the Nationalists' political stance. In his reply, he reminded Detweiler that "it is nevertheless a fact that some of the most devoted and sensitive Christian spirits in

⁸⁶ Arthur Garfield Hays. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Civil Rights in Puerto Rico*, May 22, 1937. New York; Letter to the Editor, Oswald Garrison Villard, February 8, 1939; We the Undersigned to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, January 25, 1939; Elmer Elsworth to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, January 25, 1939. Allen Papers, C-6, Box 3, Folder Correspondence and Information, Puerto Rico (1942-1945), Swarthmore Peace Collection. Prominent names attached to the We the Undersigned document included Oswald Garrison Villard, Luis Muñoz Marín, Devere Allen, Jeanette Rankin, W.E.B. Du Bois, John Haynes Holmes, and Arthur Garfield Hays.

⁸⁷ Recent scholarship has identified the coalition dynamics of the Communist Party USA and the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party during the 1930s and 1940s. Despite contentious political goals on the organizational level, scholars Gerald Meyer and Margaret Power identify the role of personal relationships in setting coalition goals. For more on the relationship between the PNPR and CPUSA, see Meyer, 90-103; Margaret Power, "Friends and Comrades: Political and Personal Relationships between Members of the Communist Party USA and the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, 1930s-1940s," in *Making the Revolution: Histories of the Latin American Left*, ed. by Kevin A. Young (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 105-128; Cristina Pérez Jiménez, "Puerto Rican Colonialism, Caribbean Radicalism, and *Pueblos Hispanos*'s Inter-Nationalist Alliance," *Small Axe* 23, no. 3 (November 2019), 50-68.

the United States find it impossible for religious reasons to register.”⁸⁸ Muste’s caution with Lebrón Velázquez does not blind him to the possibility that projecting perfectionism for those rejecting war might ignore the needs of objectors in Puerto Rico and the United States that do not share their moral ideology. Although a devoted follower of non-violent direct action, Muste continually cautioned peace activists about perfectionism when dealing with congregants and allies.⁸⁹

Questions about the Nationalists and Reverend Lebrón’s credentials continued to puzzle Muste, who reached out to fellow pacifist Ray Newton to discuss the situation in Puerto Rico and the potential for camps. Regarding Reverend Lebrón Velázquez, Muste mentions that church leaders in Puerto Rico lacked confidence in Lebrón Velázquez and preached caution about who acts as their sponsor or go-between on the island. However, Muste observes that fellow pacifists may be too quick to judge the PNPR and suggests they must acknowledge the Nationalist Party’s political refusal to register for the draft.⁹⁰ Muste wondered aloud if some white pacifists:

“are disposed to underestimate the number of conscientious objectors to war there is among Puerto Ricans and possibly a little too much influenced by the very natural desire not to get into additional difficulties with the government in a situation which presumably is already complicated enough.”⁹¹

⁸⁸ A.J. Muste to Charles Detweiler, April 25, 1941. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

⁸⁹ Appelbaum, 67-69, 239; Dekar, 95-98. Appelbaum provides an example of Muste’s caution with perfectionism through a number of essays her wrote in the protestant peace publication *Fellowship* throughout 1950.

⁹⁰ A.J. Muste to Ray Newton, April 18, 1941. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, Folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

⁹¹ A.J. Muste to Ray Newton, April 18, 1941. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, Folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Despite Muste's devotion to non-violent direct action and personal disagreement with the Nationalists, he implores white church leaders to make sure the Nationalists are not treated unfairly by church leaders or the insular government in the spirit of defending those in need.

Pacifists' optimism in assisting Puerto Rican conscientious objectors and Muste's determination to acknowledge the struggles of draft resisters that did not conform to U.S. government directives were tested as Muste communicated with Reverend Lebrón Velázquez. Draft resisters and peace activists worked to coordinate their efforts through collectives like the Fellowship National Conference organized by the FOR. Despite Muste's optimism about Puerto Rico, Rev. Lebrón's demand to be Puerto Rico's delegate for the conference and conflicting accounts of his status as a respected religious leader continued his caution. Muste asked FOR Secretary of Race Relations Bayard Rustin, staying in an American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) unit in San Sebastián, Puerto Rico, to provide a ground-level report about Puerto Rico's draft resister situation. The goal of this investigation was for Rustin to determine if FOR should sponsor Lebrón Velázquez as a delegate to the conference and gain more clarity on the conditions of war resisters and a potential CO camp.⁹² Rustin proceeded to interview political and religious leaders in Puerto Rico by telephone or in person to gain insight into the temperature of war resistance on the island and the background of

⁹² A.J. Muste to Bayard Rustin, July 29, 1941. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, Folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Lebrón Velázquez. He also scheduled an interview with the Reverend to learn more about his associations and the need of those within his organizational networks.

Detailing his findings in a multiple-page report to Muste, Rustin began by chronicling his meeting with Reverend Lebrón Velázquez. He recounted that the discussion started congenially, beginning with a discussion on each man's political and religious philosophy concerning pacifism. Rustin recalled that the cordial interaction quickly descended into skepticism after Rustin asked a series of questions regarding Rev. Lebrón's associations. According to Rustin, Lebrón Velázquez claimed that his organization included connections with specific Protestant churches with well-known Christian leaders and personal relationships with prominent Puerto Rican liberals. One major issue with Rev. Lebrón Velázquez's answers to Rustin's inquiries centered on the churches he claimed was affiliated with his organization, the Council of Christian Churches of Puerto Rico. Wanting to corroborate the information he was given, Rustin scheduled appointments with the individuals and organizations Lebrón Velázquez named as members of his church council.⁹³

Once his discussion with Rev. Lebrón Velázquez ended, Rustin visited with the leaders of the churches listed as members of the Council of Christian Churches of Puerto Rico. This outreach to Puerto Rico's political and religious leaders led Rustin to inform Muste that "it was in checking the answers to these questions that I finally began to feel

⁹³ Bayard Rustin to A.J. Muste, August 5, 1941 [hereafter cited as Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941]. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, Folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

uneasy about Mr. Lebron.”⁹⁴ He first met with Reverend Dow, the director of the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Puerto Rico. According to Dow, “he knew of Mr. Lebron but had never cooperated with him. In fact, he claimed not to know of the Council of Christian Churches.”⁹⁵ Dow also explained to Rustin that the general body of his church advised congregants of draft age to register for the draft as conscientious objectors, with Dow individually offering the opinion of non-combatant work for religious objectors. Dow’s account appears to directly counter Lebrón’s statement that the Protestant churches are not providing information to their congregants. Additionally, Rustin’s outreach to the Defenders of the Christian Faith, another organization listed as a member of Lebrón Velázquez’s Council of Christian Churches led to the discovery that “no one seemed to know of the existence of any such group nor was one listed in the Telephone directory.” Further entreaties to Union Theological Seminary to assist in finding the group went nowhere, causing further concern about Rev. Lebrón Velázquez’s statements and motives.⁹⁶

Rustin’s investigation into Lebrón Velázquez and his organization’s ties to Puerto Rico’s religious community also opened questions into Rev. Lebrón’s claimed collaboration with Puerto Rican liberals. The name of the former chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico Dr. Juan B. Soto came up during Rustin’s interview with Lebrón, who stated that Dr. Soto was a chief advisor of the religious leadership council. Soto was an important figure in Puerto Rican education circles with a connection to the

⁹⁴ Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941.

⁹⁵ Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941.

⁹⁶ Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941.

Puerto Rican government and U.S. officials. In a meeting in Rio Piedras, Dr. Soto stated that he vaguely remembered Lebrón Velázquez but had no recollection of being affiliated with a religious council. He further stated that “under no circumstances could he cooperate ‘at this time’ with a pacifist organization as he hoped that ‘combined Anglo-American action would crush the Germans once and for all.’”⁹⁷ Rustin’s inquiries continued to uncover more questions about the veracity of Lebrón Velázquez’s claims about his organization and influence as he continued meeting those listed as political or religious advisors of the Council of Christian Churches.

Outreach to the Hugh O’Neill Memorial Church, another religious congregation listed as a member of the council, continued Rustin’s unease over Lebrón’s claims. The Hugh O’Neill Memorial Church was considered the most powerful protestant church in Puerto Rico “because its pastor, Mr. M.A. Valentine, has the ear of the governor, high officials and the military.” Rustin scheduled a meeting with Pastor Valentine to discuss reliable individuals and organizations to mobilize conscientious objectors. During their conversation, Pastor Valentine made a point of suggesting that Rustin avoid Mr. Lebrón Velázquez because of his past affiliations and believing he lacked the respect of the Puerto Rican people.⁹⁸ Valentine specifically mentioned a rumored incident involving Lebrón Velázquez during the mid-1930s, stating that he instigated a strike and political rebellion at San Juan High School that injured several persons. Pastor Valentine’s statements of Lebrón’s actions at San Juan High School and youthful radicalism

⁹⁷ Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941.

⁹⁸ Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941.

encouraged Rustin to continue his investigation to confirm Pastor Valentine's story. Through the Director of Education in Puerto Rico, Rustin read the report of the incident that identified Lebrón Velázquez's family, many of whom he had listed as members of the Council, as organizers of the demonstration. Rustin observed that the political demonstration was supported by the general population of the city during the time but those that participated were presently criticized and avoided.⁹⁹

Rustin finished his investigation on religious pacifism training in Puerto Rico and whether the FOR should support Lebrón Velázquez and his organization and submitted his findings to Muste in a letter. In his detailed, five-page letter, Rustin highlights the political and social dynamics that might challenge religious objectors, stating the "military has much influence, the churches take no definite stand and the army and defense work is happily looked upon as a new kind of W.P.A (Works Progress Administration)." Based on interviews with Puerto Rican liberals and Protestant religious leaders during his investigation, however, Rustin is confident that Puerto Rican officials and clergy "inwardly have profound regard for sincere religious pacifist." He does warn that the FOR and other religious organizations' relationship with the Puerto Rican government must continue so that religious objectors are provided the education and resources needed with government sanction. The misinformation about Lebrón Velázquez's organization, contacts, and questions about his political and religious standing caused Rustin to believe he and Muste were misled by Reverend Lebrón Velázquez.

⁹⁹ Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941.

Regarding Rev. Lebrón Velázquez, Rustin suggested to Muste that he was not the man to represent Puerto Rican Protestant pacifism and that he should not be offered a position as a delegate for the FOR conference. He states plainly that his concerns stemmed from the misleading testimony given by Rev. Lebrón during their interview instead of his radical politics as a youth, staying consistent with Muste's concerns about denigrating individuals for their political actions. Rustin emphasizes that any connection between FOR or other pacifist organizations with Lebrón and his group may damage relationships with officials and clergy members needed to ensure that programs for conscientious objectors, including the building of Civilian Public Services (C.P.S.) camps, would be effectively administered.¹⁰⁰ The issue with Lebrón Velázquez Muste and Rustin's interaction with Lebrón Velázquez and concerns about the PNPR highlighted the varied ideologies of draft resistance in the United States and Puerto Rico that clashed with efforts to politically collaborate for aligned causes.

Throughout the investigation, FOR Puerto Rico members and allies focused their skepticism of Lebrón Velázquez on his political associations and activities instead of his qualifications as a pastor. By the early 1940s, Lebrón Velázquez was affiliated with independent evangelical churches in Puerto Rico and would be recognized as an ordained minister in the Church of the Nazarene and assigned as a missionary to Puerto Rico in 1943 after the Church of the Savior was incorporated into the church. Reverend Lebrón Velázquez would become a pivotal figure in the growth of that denomination in Puerto Rico through community outreach and the use of radio programming to reach

¹⁰⁰ Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941.

broader audiences. His history within Puerto Rican evangelical circles after his ordination in the 1940s suggests his connection with the Nationalist Party waned or he silenced his political sentiments to himself. However, FOR Puerto Rico leaders and Puerto Rican liberals appeared to judge Lebrón Velázquez for his actions as a politically active high school student.

FOR Puerto Rico members were cautious about how any affiliation with known or rumored Nationalists would impact their relationship with U.S. appointed officials in Puerto Rico. Violent episodes between the Nationalists and Puerto Rican government officials throughout the 1930s threatened to paint those affiliated with the PNPR as a collaborator. Reverend Lebrón Velázquez's actions as a high school student, when he led a march at his high school protesting an incident where U.S. insular police gunned down a Nationalist parade in Ponce, publicly aligned him with the PNPR.¹⁰¹ Reverend Lebrón's bold claims about affiliates and sponsors of his church added to the skepticism of his intentions. It is possible that he wrote letters to FOR Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico's protestant churches like he did to A.J. Muste, asking for sponsorship in support of his Church organization. The Fellowship of Reconciliation used similar entreaties in U.S. circles, asking prominent figures political and social figures to support an initiative

¹⁰¹ The front page of *El Mundo* (PR) has an article discussing a proposed student strike to protest the arrest of Albizu Campos and the Nationalists that was organized by Lebrón Velázquez. For more, see Associated Press, March 18, 1936, *El Mundo* (Puerto Rico) Pospuesto el 'Día del Huelga Estudiantil.' Samuel E. Perez Rivera, "Past, Heritage and Indigenous Process of the Church of the Nazarene." *Ibero America Regional Conference*, October 18-19, 2004, San Jose, Costa Rica. Didache Faithful Teaching. <https://didache.nazarene.org/index.php/regiontheoconf/ibero-amer-theo-conf/486-iberoam04-eng-3-puerto-rico/file>

or person facing trial.¹⁰² However, Bayard Rustin cautioned fellow pacifists against passing judgment on individuals for their political alignments based on a dogmatic definition of pacifism. He feared that doing so would alienate friends within their political networks that willingly faced arrest and imprisonment instead of submitting to alternative service.

Lebrón Velázquez's interaction with Muste and U.S. pacifists illustrated the dilemma facing the FOR in their advocacy for conscientious objectors. However, the FOR did not shut off dialogue with Nationalists that opposed military service. Individuals defined as conscientious objectors were treated harshly by U.S. authorities and the public as the war continued, identified as cowards for not serving in the military when able. This is displayed in NSBRO executive secretary Paul French stating to ACLU director and devout pacifist Roger N. Baldwin in a letter regarding the status of Puerto Rican Nationalist prisoners. French stated that although the Nationalists traditionally reject parole, those that did apply for parole would be allowed acceptance into the Civilian Public Work camps instead of rejected. Despite the clear divergence in platform and motivations, the relationship between the U.S. Left and Puerto Rican draft resisters did not sink into a battle of political or religious ideological purity. This

¹⁰² There are a few examples of this type of outreach by the FOR or pacifist communities within this dissertation. One example (discussed in Chapter 4) sees A.J. Muste mentioning that M.P.I. leader Juan Mari Bras would be a speaker at the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade despite never meeting him. However, Mari Bras appeared on sponsor lists with Muste on Puerto Rico specific directives. See A.J. Muste to Norman Thomas, January 14, 1966. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee. Box 1, Folder 3, Correspondences, Oct 1965 to Mar 1966. Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI [hereafter cited as Wisconsin Historical Society].

association would be tested as U.S. involvement in the war continued and questions emerged about the status of colonies in a post-war world.¹⁰³

U.S. mobilization into World War II informed discussions of how Puerto Rico's participation in the war effort would shape the island's future. Puerto Rico's political establishment considered World War II as a potential mechanism to redefine the island's colonial status. Independence and Statehood advocates hoped that participation in the war effort, including answering draft summons and participating in the war economy, would demonstrate the island's devotion to democracy by supporting the war despite their colonial status. This was evident when New York's Puerto Rican population organized community engagements that promoted the war as a just action that would also determine Puerto Rico's status. One example of this was an organized gathering held on December 13, 1941, called *Noche de Estrellas Hispanas*, which aimed to bolster the community's morale and build support for the war. Puerto Rican musicians Davalita, Bobby Capo, Johnny Rodríguez, and Rafael Hernández, among others, headlined the event that was advertised as a call by "El Presidente Roosevelt y el alcalde La Guardia recomiendan que se mantenga la moral, para triunfo de la causa de Las Américas y de la democracia mundial."¹⁰⁴ For Puerto Ricans pushing for independence or statehood, the optics of Puerto Rican pacifists or members of the PNP refusing to support

¹⁰³ Paul Comly French to Roger N. Baldwin, August 17, 1942. Center of Conscience and War Papers (DG 025), Part I: NSBRO Files from 1939-1946, Series B: General Files re: CPS, Puerto Rican Nationalists (in prison).

¹⁰⁴ *¡Ultima Hora! ¡Guerra! ¡Guerra! ¡Guerra!*, Articles and Ephemera. Vando Collection. Center for Puerto Rican Studies. The event roughly translates to "The Night of the Hispanic Stars." Translation in English: President Roosevelt and Mayor La Guardia recommend that morale be maintained, for the triumph of the cause of the Americas and of world democracy.

militarization and the draft damaged their attempts to situate Puerto Rican participation as a method of decolonization.

Active Puerto Rican participation in the war economy, including service in the military and the island's increased militarization, as the method to redefine Puerto Rico's status, was not universally agreed upon. Independence advocates aligned with the PNPB echoed the sentiments of other anti-colonial organizations that critiqued the premise of defending democracy while fighting for national representation. The proclamation of an Atlantic Charter that demonstrated the U.S.-British commitment to defend the world against fascism also animated rhetoric within Puerto Rico that the optics of the war demanded independence or statehood. The Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Puerto Rico stated in a general meeting that he and his party interpreted the Charter including Puerto Rico's independence.¹⁰⁵ The Communist Party of Puerto Rico's reading of the Atlantic Charter aligns with historian Elizabeth Borgwardt's analysis of the document's radical nature in its indirect language inspired individuals and activists fighting for international human rights and independence from colonial control. The quest for a change in Puerto Rico's status was given a rhetorical assist from the leaders of the United States and Great Britain who championed the free world to defend democratic institutions against the threat of fascism. For the political actors of Puerto

¹⁰⁵ "Report by the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Porto Rico Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee Held the 31st of August and September 1, 1941," Colón Collection: Puerto Rico. Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

Rico that had been arguing for statehood or independence, the Atlantic Charter inspired hope that the war meant a redefinition of Puerto Rico's status.¹⁰⁶

The PNPR identified Puerto Rico's colonial status as a contradiction to the United States' rhetorical justification for entering the war to defend global democracy. In a letter to New York House of Representative member Vito Marcantonio, PNPR Interim President Julio de Santiago stated the party's dedication to fighting for democracy against tyranny as a free independent nation instead of U.S. colonial levies. De Santiago demanded an end to colonialism in Puerto Rico and the release of political prisoners, including those charged with draft evasion, believing "it would be dishonorable and antipatriotic on our part to take sides in this struggle with the very jailers of our countryman in prison."¹⁰⁷ Although committed to the defense of Puerto Rico, the letter illustrated an anti-war pulse tied to civil and human rights. An interesting part of the letter is Julio de Santiago bringing attention to the Nationalists' rejection of compulsory military service and the arrest and indictment of Nationalists as political prisoners. Stating the party's willingness to fight for the defense of Puerto Rico and its citizens from injustice defined the PNPR's anti-war stance as a position against colonialism and civil liberties. The PNPR's disregard of U.S. authority and outright resistance against

¹⁰⁶ Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 3-8, 25-35. A comparable situation occurred during World War I during the 1919 Paris Peace talks. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, inspired by U.S. progressivism and wanting assist in establishing a post-war political order, used language in his Fourteen points that inspired anti-colonial activists who saw Wilson's proclamation as a stamp of approval from a major global power. For more on this, see Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹⁰⁷ Julio de Santiago to Representative Vito Marcantonio, May 20, 1942 [hereafter cited as Julio de Santiago to Representative Vito Marcantonio, May 20, 1942]. Marcantonio Papers, Series III: Subjects Correspondence and Papers, Box 54, Puerto Rico, NYPL.

military service and political participation illustrates how they conceptualized their citizenship. Rejecting U.S. political sovereignty, individuals within the PNPR situated themselves as citizens of Puerto Rico under illegal seizure.¹⁰⁸

De Santiago's criticism of U.S. draft directives demonstrated the Nationalists' rejection of U.S. authority that did not dismiss the party's determination to defend Puerto Rico from invasion. U.S. entrance and commitment to World War II saw individuals stigmatized for not displaying enough support for the war effort. Countering critiques meant to remove their legitimacy in Puerto Rican political and social circles, the PNPR projected their rejection of military service as the actions of men willing to be soldiers of Puerto Rico's defense as a free nation. De Santiago used the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter to challenge the sincerity of the United States being a leader of the democratic free world, asking if Puerto Rican men should be "the mercenary soldiers and enslaved fighters of liberty" when it is denied to them and arguing that U.S. colonial directives in Puerto Rico positioned the PNPR "into a position of compelled neutrality and impotence."¹⁰⁹ Through non-compliance with U.S. government directives in Puerto Rico, the PNPR constructed and interpreted nationalism and citizenship within their own experiences to resist U.S. directives. Adopting this approach provided Puerto Rican anti-war activists dedicated to anti-imperialism an opportunity to highlight U.S. abuses against individuals defined as legal citizens.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Julio de Santiago to Representative Vito Marcantonio, May 20, 1942.

¹⁰⁹ Julio de Santiago to Representative Vito Marcantonio, May 20, 1942.

¹¹⁰ Jacqueline N. Font-Guzman, *Experiencing Puerto Rican Citizenship and Cultural Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2015), 1-12.

The relationship built by U.S. leftists and Puerto Rican independence organizations provided an example of how each defined anti-war sentiment and built a relationship with U.S. imperialism despite strategic differences. Members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), a national pacifist organization, prepared resources for individuals that opposed the 1940 Peacetime Draft and later military draft during World War II for moral and doctrinal reasons. In their outreach to individual branches, the FOR encountered requests for information on the rights of draft resisters from FOR members in Puerto Rico. Additionally, Puerto Rican clergy members asked the FOR to assist in providing resources for congregants to understand their rights as conscientious objectors. However, the precarious relationship between FOR officials and the U.S. government regarding protection and authority over conscientious objectors meant that pacifists had to be cautious when dealing with objectors unfamiliar with their network circles. The FOR's interaction with the Reverend Lebrón Velázquez the prudence pacifists took when trying to support conscientious objectors. Lebrón Velázquez's youthful connections with the PNPR led to FOR Puerto Rico members questioning his motivations and convictions. However, Muste and Rustin also acknowledged that pacifists must be cautious with judging the motivations of individual objectors if they intended to support fellow pacifists or allies that took a hardline stance against war.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Detweiler to Muste, April 14, 1941; Muste to Rustin, July 29, 1941; Rustin to Muste, August 5, 1941, all in FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection. Rustin had corresponded with Muste on the issue of FOR officials meeting a Puerto Rican minister that claimed connection to Protestant activists in Puerto Rico and asked for conscientious objector status. Muste answered back that communication with other officials noted the claims by the minister as dubious and his affiliation with the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party.

Interactions between pacifists, Leftist, anti-colonial activists, and Puerto Rican Nationalists in Puerto Rico and New York demonstrated a shared commitment to ending global colonialism and the potential conflict among each entity over political expression and ideology. The escalation of U.S. commitment to World War II and the perception of draft resisters in U.S. society led to continued collaboration between the U.S. Left and Puerto Rican independence groups. Within pacifist circles, there was a purity debate concerning draft resistance that saw arguments ponder if conscientious objectors should participate in the war economy or if non-violent direct action was a form of violence. The PNPR similarly illustrated the internal political debates in Puerto Rico about World War II military participation, as their position of non-compliance and resistance against the war clashed with the other political factions on the island that viewed war participation as the method to redefine Puerto Rico's colonial status. Through their actions and non-compliance, the PNPR attempted to redefine the individual and national status they viewed as forced upon them to dictate their commitment to the war was conditional on the independence of Puerto Rico.¹¹²

¹¹² A.J. Muste to Charles Detweiler, March 20, 1941. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

CHAPTER III

TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-DRAFT SOLIDARITY AND CONFLICT IN NEW YORK,

1943-1950

“Julio Pinto Gandía has received another letter from his draft board, telling him to report for his physical on February 23rd at 6 a.m. in Manatí, Puerto Rico. He also receive a communication from the draft board telling him to ask for transfer of jurisdiction. Of course he is planning to do neither... We have just learned that four Nationalist youth serving sentences for selective service violation have been suffering extremely harsh treatment in Tallahassee... They have been kept in segregation for a more than a month now... I know you will do whatever you can to get an investigation started or whatever else should be done.”

-Ruth Reynolds, Secretary of the Harlem Ashram and American League for Puerto Rico's Independence to Marge, February 12, 1945.¹¹³

“Puerto Rico is the test case of the intentions of the United States toward the Western Hemisphere. There will be no ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ as long as Puerto Rico is enslaved... The whole world has turned its eyes and hopes to the forthcoming Security Conference of the United Nations... Whether the hopes of millions of men, women, and children all over the world are going to be betrayed by unscrupulous politicians and imperialists remains to be seen.”

-Julio Pinto Gandía, Puerto Rican Nationalist Party Representative at the Conference Address at the New York Public Library, April 6, 1945.¹¹⁴

On June 6, 1945, peace activist Ruth Mary Reynolds wrote colleague Manorama Modak about Secretary-General of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (PNPR) Julio Pinto Gandía's arrest for draft evasion. Pinto was supposed to travel with the Reverend Ramkrishna S. Modak to San Francisco as a member of the World Council of Dominated Nations (WCDN) to discuss the post-war future of colonized nations before the newly created United Nations (UN). Reynolds' letter suggests there are several

¹¹³ Ruth M. Reynolds to Marge, February 12, 1945. Folder 2, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949 [hereafter cited as Ruth Reynolds to Marge, February 12, 1945]. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

¹¹⁴ Address by Julio Pinto Gandía at Colonial Conference in New York Public Library, April 6, 1945, folder 2, box 2R596. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

discrepancies with Pinto's arrest and asks if Rev. Modak could discuss what transpired with the United Nations' Latin American representatives.¹¹⁵ Pinto's status as a political leader promoting anti-militarism and anti-imperialism in Puerto Rico through international solidarity networks in New York saw allies assemble and demand the release of Puerto Rican political prisoners through petitions to the U.S. government and the newly formed UN. The arrest of Pinto and other Puerto Rican draft resisters bolstered the PNPR's claims that the rhetoric of the U.S. as a defender of democracy did not match their treatment of colonial subjects, viewed as citizens, demanding independence.

Through appeals to religious moral principles and civic equity, the PNPR and allies within the U.S. Left argued that the incarceration and treatment of war resisters illustrated U.S. government efforts to stamp out dissenting political opinion and curb the right to protest for U.S. citizens during World War II. This chapter focuses on the efforts of Puerto Rican independence activists and U.S. allies in New York City during the mid-1940s to push for international support. I argue that this coalition centralized Puerto Rico's status question and the plight of Puerto Rican political prisoners as an indictment of U.S. commitments to defend global democracy. The PNPR, other pro-independence groups, and U.S. political and religious allies used their resources to shed light on the lack of equity provided to Puerto Ricans under U.S. colonialism, specifically segments

¹¹⁵ "Ruth Mary Reynolds to Mrs. Manorama Modak," June 6, 1945; "Address by Julio Pinto Gandía at Colonial Conference in New York Public Library," all in April 6, 1945, folder 2, box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

of the population that rejected the use of military service as a barometer to attain complete independence or demand equity.

Overall, this chapter analyzes how political and religious war resisters faced social and political challenges and redefined how they perceived equitable citizenship and justice during and after World War II. This chapter will also highlight episodes when the solidarity of the coalition network was tested. Pacifists dedicated to non-violent direct action ideologically clashed with the PNPR's calls for self-defense and violent revolution. Puerto Rico's geopolitical importance to the United States within the emerging Cold War and the referendum of Puerto Rico becoming an associated free state (*estado libre asociado*) also caused internal debate within the anti-war coalition network. Moreover, attempts to mobilize a unified Puerto Rican independence movement ran into conflict as Puerto Ricans that served in the military or supported militarization rejected the Nationalist Party's rigid definition of an independent Puerto Rico. Finally, the coalition network also faced increased surveillance by the Puerto Rican and U.S. governments amidst growing Cold War fears that coded political subversives as politically dangerous between 1948 and 1950.

In February 1945, pacifist Ruth Reynolds discussed with a colleague the plight of four youth affiliated with the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico imprisoned in the United States for draft resistance. According to her contacts, the young men were placed in solitary confinement and segregated from the general population with no explanation for their placement. While discussing how to support the young men, Reynolds also details a draft summons sent to Julio Pinto Gandía, the former secretary-general of the Nationalist

Party of Puerto Rico. Relocated to New York after his release from federal prison on a charge of conspiracy to overthrow the Puerto Rican government during the 1930s, Pinto helped establish the New York branch of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. Reynolds recalled to her colleague that Pinto was ordered to report to his draft board in Manatí or ask for a transfer of jurisdiction to comply with the request. Pinto's case is interesting because he is ordered to report for his physical in Manatí despite being barred from Puerto Rico. Reynolds inquired what the local regulations for Selective Service dictated on induction age into the Armed Forces, remembering that "the last we knew from there orders had been given not to take men over thirty. That was last November."¹¹⁶

U.S. Leftists paid close attention to the arrest and treatment of Puerto Rican draft resisters by the U.S. Government. The formation of the American League for Puerto Rico's Independence (ALPRI) in 1945 fostered a relationship with PNP that highlighted the working networks between Puerto Rico's political factions and liberal and leftist allies within U.S. movements for labor, civil rights, and social reform. The founders of the ALPRI were seasoned U.S. political activists and devout pacifists who worked with the Puerto Rican community as members of the Harlem Ashram pacifist collective. An umbrella organization affiliated with the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the ashram was created as a place for pacifists to study Mohandas K. Gandhi's philosophy of non-violent civil disobedience. Assimilating Gandhi's methods to a U.S. and Christian ethic, U.S. pacifists within the ashram created an interracial enclave that spent their days under a rigorous regimen of study, prayer, and austerity, using what little they

¹¹⁶ Ruth M. Reynolds to Marge, February 12, 1945. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

had to pay for essentials and provide services to their immediate community.¹¹⁷ The establishment of pacifist enclaves to train activists in nonviolent direct action and community service in New York City led to increased interaction between Puerto Rican independence advocates and U.S. Leftists.

The men and women who joined the ashram were members of various labor, civil rights, and political organizations aligned or in solidarity with the U.S. Left, coming together to train in civil disobedience tactics for social and political change. Community members like Ruth Mary Reynolds joined because of their commitment to faith and social activism. Reynolds was raised as a Quaker and worked as a schoolteacher in South Dakota before moving to New York in her early twenties to train in non-violent direct action.¹¹⁸ One essential function of the ashram was to live in solidarity with the Harlem community. This included assisting in the development of cooperative buying clubs and Black and Puerto Rican owned credit unions, investigating police violence

¹¹⁷ Appelbaum, 148-151; Paul Dekar, *Creating the Beloved Community: A Journey with the Fellowship of Reconciliation*, (Telford, PA: Cascadia Publishing House, 2005), 97-100. Appelbaum mentions that the originator of the 'Christian Ashram' structure was pacifist and missionary E. Stanley Jones. Centralizing the Kingdom of God as foundational to his theology, he worked on ways to infuse philosophies of non-violence and justice from his missionary work in India to U.S. Christians. He would organize Christian Ashrams in India and the U.S. and trained pacifists J. Holmes Smith and Ralph Templin, both future founders of the Harlem Ashram.

¹¹⁸ Ruth Mary Reynolds (1916-1989) joined the Harlem Ashram when she was 21 years old, dedicating her life to pacifism and anti-imperialism. Meeting Puerto Rican activists in the mid-1940s saw her dedicate her life to Puerto Rico's independence. Her friendship with members of the Nationalist Party and proximity to the group in Puerto Rico in 1950 while on a fact-finding mission saw her arrested in November 1950 under suspicion of overthrowing the Puerto Rican government. After her release, she spent the rest of her life working with Puerto Rican independence activists and U.S. Leftists to demand Puerto Rico's full independence. For more on Ruth Reynolds, see Conrad J. Lynn, *There is a Fountain: The Autobiography of a Civil Rights Lawyer* (Stanford, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1979), 86-88; Andrea Friedman, *Citizenship in Cold War: The National Security States and The Possibilities of Dissent* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014); Margaret Power, "Puerto Rican Women Nationalist vs. U.S. Colonialism: An Exploration of their Conditions and Struggles in Jail and Court" *Women's Legal History: A Global Perspective* 87, no. 2 (June 2012): 463-479.

against Black and Puerto Rican residents, helping Black southern migrants find homes, and conducting play activities for Black and Puerto Rican children in the streets.¹¹⁹ The work of the Harlem Ashram with the Puerto Rican community brought the local collective of pacifists to the attention of New York's Puerto Rican civic and political leaders.

Ashram members Ruth Reynolds and Jean Wiley recalled being asked by community members about their opinion on Puerto Rico's status. One interaction with a Puerto Rican Baptist minister further exposed the pacifist collective's lack of knowledge about Puerto Rico. Impressed by their community work, the minister was perplexed that the ashram members knew little about Puerto Rico despite being anti-colonial activists for India's Independence.¹²⁰ Admitting that they knew little about the subject of Puerto Rico or U.S. imperialism, members of the Harlem ashram attempted to learn more about Puerto Rico from the community. A crucial interaction that brought U.S. pacifists and Puerto Rican independence activists together came through a chance encounter of two men sharing a jail cell for draft evasion. Ashram member Ruth Reynolds recalls that an acquaintance of the Ashram recently released from prison for draft evasion asked if

¹¹⁹ Associated Press, "Co-operative Living cuts Costs: How to eat on \$2.75 a week..." *New York Times*, May 26, 1943; Ruth Reynolds Interview with The Call, folder 5, Box 1, (Hereafter named Interview with The Call), Personal and Biographical Information, Personal Documents, Ruth Mary Reynolds Papers [hereafter cited Reynolds Papers]. Center for Puerto Rican Studies [microfilm]. The ashram hosted officers of the Fellowship of Reconciliation as visitors or infrequent community members. Ashram members either permanently lived within the community or frequently visited and studied with the collective. Names mentioned as members or guests included Bayard Rustin, James L. Farmer, Pauli Murray, and Ruth M. Reynolds. Farmer would leave the ashram by the end of 1942 to concentrate on his work forming the Congress for Racial Equality in Chicago. For more on the work of the Ashram, see Lynn, 85-87; Appelbaum, 148-151; Dekar, 97-100, D'Emilio, 72-75; Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 208-212.

¹²⁰ Interview with The Call. Folder 5, Box 1, Reynolds Papers. Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

he could bring a visitor who sympathized with his anti-draft convictions. The guest of the ashram was PNPR member Julio Pinto Gandía, who began to discuss the Nationalists' perspective of Puerto Rico's colonial status.

Continued dialogue with Pinto concerning Puerto Rico and their dedication to ending colonialism in India saw ashram members publicly demonstrate Puerto Rico's colonial position in New York City. In one incident in 1944, ashram members marching for Indian independence in New York also had banners advocating for Puerto Rico's independence. Ashram member Ruth Reynolds recalled one incident in 1944 where police got involved and escorted them from the front of the Indian embassy in New York for carrying banners about Puerto Rico's independence.¹²¹ This incident led Pinto to arrange an official meeting between Pedro Albizu Campos, the leader of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, and pacifists Ruth Reynolds, Jean Wiley, and J. Holmes Smith. Wiley and Reynolds remembered the first meeting at Columbus Hospital in New York City, where Albizu was staying because of health complications after he was released from prison in 1943. Both mentioned that he was complimentary of their advocacy against colonialism but encouraged them to look in their backyard. Through this interaction, the members of the ashram worked with Albizu Campos and associates of the PNPR in New York concerning Puerto Rico's independence.¹²² The dynamic between the PNPR and the ashram members blossomed into a relationship where the

¹²¹ Interview with The Call. Folder 5, Box 1, Reynolds Papers. Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

¹²² Interview with The Call. Folder 5, Box 1, Reynolds Papers. Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Wiley, 125-128.

pacifists and their networks acted as legal counsel and a conduit to legislative spaces that were closed off to the Nationalists.

The Nationalists' situated themselves as willing to fight tyranny against the enemies of the free world but opposed forced service in the U.S. military. Resistance to obligatory military service by the PNPR spoke to a larger debate among Puerto Rico's political factions over the merits of military participation as a test case for the island's post-war status. In public declarations and letters to U.S. politicians, PNPR members claimed they would only fight if Puerto Rico were invaded or granted independence. The group further stated that they would not participate in any program that assisted the U.S. war efforts and risk prison, rejecting the option of alternative service for moral objections. Positioning themselves as potential targets of the U.S. government if members or sympathizers rejected or avoided draft summons, members of the PNPR philosophically clashed with statehood advocates and other independence-based groups concerning Puerto Rico's political future.¹²³

The alliance between revolutionary nationalists and radical pacifists appeared strange from an ideological standpoint. Attorney Conrad Lynn recalled being perplexed by the arrangement, noting that pacifists like J. Holmes Smith and Ralph Templin hoped they could show Albizu Campos and the Nationalists the function of non-violent civil disobedience.¹²⁴ Ashram members' dedication to non-violence clashed with the rhetoric

¹²³ Julio de Santiago to Representative Vito Marcantonio, May 20, 1942. Marcantonio Papers, Series III: Subjects Correspondence and Papers, Box 54, Puerto Rico, NYPL.

¹²⁴ Lynn, 124-125. Conrad J. Lynn was a Black American defense lawyer that defended clients viewed as political dissidents throughout the twentieth century, including cases concerning civil rights abuses, politically motivated incarceration, and draft evasion. He was legal counsel for Pedro Albizu Campos from the 1940s until his death in 1965. He also represented other prominent Nationalists and allies, including

and actions of Albizu and the Nationalist Party. The PNPR were willing to agitate and use violent confrontation if necessary to achieve their vision of independence for Puerto Rico. Additionally, Albizu and the PNPR's relationship building with factions of the U.S. Left that agreed Puerto Rico must be independent centered on the alliances arguing for independence in governmental spaces. The PNPR's association with the U.S. left established a network of citizens and politicians within the U.S. political system that would act as proxies in the fight for Puerto Rico's independence.¹²⁵

The relationship between the PNPR and members of the Harlem Ashram is not farfetched. Puerto Rican independence activists' outreach to U.S. diaspora communities and allies followed a lineage of Caribbean intellectuals organizing in the United States. 19th century Cuban and Puerto Rican intellectuals organized movements for independence against Spain and appealed to U.S. allies in cities like New York and Key West. Additionally, New York provided independence activists and intellectuals from the Spanish and British Caribbean a space to debate their political and racial positionality internationally and within the United States. Organizing within the boundaries of the United States permitted Caribbean intellectuals a connection to the political and social fabric of their homelands while also linking with sympathetic allies with proximity to power in the U.S.¹²⁶ Furthermore, Albizu's personal and

Ruth Reynolds, Julio Pinto Gandía, Lolita Lebrón, Rafael Carcel Miranda, and the other nationalists arrested for the 1954 shooting in the U.S. Congress. Lynn's relationship with Albizu was deeper than a business acquaintance, as he stated in his autobiography (page 135) that "I was close to Albizu and Lolita (Lebrón). I had met my wife, Yolanda, through Albizu. Our son Alexander was born in November 1952. His godfather is Albizu. His godmother is Lolita."

¹²⁵ Friedman, 126-130.

¹²⁶ Morales Carrion, 110-113; Lorrin Thomas, *Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010, 23-29, 36-40; For broader

organizational connections with the US Left during the 1930s established a network of individuals and organizations that could transcend ideological differences to collectively dismantle colonialism. Albizu's relationship building during the 1930s and 1940s saw him develop bonds with leaders that shared his convictions for Puerto Rico's independence or justice for Puerto Ricans targeted by the U.S. government despite ideological differences. Pacifist Jean Wiley recalled this attitude of Albizu toward his allies during the 1940s, stating that "though Don Pedro knew us to be pacifists and loved us nonetheless, he maintained his convictions."¹²⁷

Puerto Rican Nationalists expanding relationships with U.S. Leftists that aligned with Puerto Rican independence saw moments where they rearticulated core tenants of their organizational platform to serve their interests. One example of this was the New York chapter of the PNPR openly campaigning for New York Representative Vito Marcantonio's re-election campaign for the House of Representatives in 1944. This at first appears curious considering Albizu and the Nationalists' rejected participation in electoral politics after their defeat in the 1932 Puerto Rican congressional primaries, claiming that the elections were rigged by the U.S. government.¹²⁸ However, the PNPR members in New York City saw an opportunity to campaign for a U.S. politician with a track record of advancing Puerto Rican independence and the social concerns of Puerto

histories of Caribbean migrants developing intellectual enclaves in the United States, see Tammy Brown, *City of Islands: Caribbean Intellectuals in New York*. (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2015), 3-19.

¹²⁷ Lynn, 124-126; Font-Guzman, 1-10; Wiley Zwickel, 125-128.

¹²⁸ Lynn, 124-125. The counter to the Nationalists' position is that their platform and rhetoric were rejected by the people during the 1932 election, with no candidate running as a Nationalists being competitive in any congressional primaries. For more on Marcantonio's political relationship with Puerto Rican constituents in Harlem, see Meyer, *Vito Marcantonio: Radical Politician, 1902-1954*, 144-172.

Ricans within his constituency. The Nationalists campaigned for Vito Marcantonio, describing him as a friend and ally that was “sincerely on our side” in the fight for Puerto Rico’s independence.¹²⁹ Using the election as a tool to elect a representative with influence that would advocate for Puerto Rico illustrated Albizu and the P NPR’s willingness to revise and redefine how they viewed citizenship under the U.S. to achieve independence.

Dialogue with members of the ashram led the pacifists to reach out through their networks to tackle the question of Puerto Rico’s status. Consultations with Albizu and Pinto over strategy led ashram members J. Holmes Smith and Ruth Reynolds to call individuals acquainted with Puerto Rico to form a committee in 1944 to create an organization of Americans that argued for Puerto Rico’s self-determination. Although the committee had a promising start, subsequent meetings were mired because of constant debate concerning how far individual members were willing to situate independence as a central tenant of the organization.¹³⁰ In one meeting, pacifist Oswald Garrison Villard stated that his trips to Puerto Rico caused him to view independence as a viable option but cautioned against centralizing independence as the only option after entering discussions with pro-statehood groups. Attempts by the committee to draft a

¹²⁹ “Banquets de la Asoc. Pro Independencia de P.R. en Honor de Marcantonio, 1944.” Articles and Ephemera, Vando Collection; “Elect Vito Marcantonio Pamphlet.” Subject File: Vito Marcantonio. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Juan Antonio Corretjer, *Albizu Campos and the Ponce Massacre* (New York: World View Publishers, 1965), 22-24; Gerald Meyer, “Pedro Albizu Campos, Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia, and Vito Marcantonio’s Collaboration in the Cause of Puerto Rico’s Independence,” *Centro Journal* 23, no. 1 (Spring 2011), 97-109.

¹³⁰ Minutes of Meetings of Puerto Rico, October 17, 1944 [hereafter cited as MoM, October 17, 1944]. Folder 2, Box 18, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1947. Reynolds Papers; Minutes of Meeting for Puerto Rico Freedom, November 9, 1944 [hereafter cited as MoM, Nov 9, 1944], folder 6, box 10, “Puerto Rico Independence, 1942-1948.” The Papers of the Congress for Racial Equality, 1941-1967 [hereafter cited as CORE Papers]. Wisconsin Historical Society.

statement of purpose led to a division among those that favored supporting Puerto Rico's independence versus a group thought supporting the right to self-determination did not ignore the will of the Puerto Rican people. The split led to the committee dissolving, with members like Ruth Reynolds resigning because she understood the committee as supporting Puerto Rico's independence.¹³¹

Smith, Reynolds, author Pearl Buck, and a few others that supported independence formed another committee on December 19th, 1944 that established the American League for Puerto Rico's Independence (ALPRI) as a U.S.-run and membered organization that would work with Puerto Rican independence organizations. ALPRI's statement also emphasized that they were not replacing Puerto Rican leadership regarding the status issue, encouraging New York's Puerto Rican community to join Puerto Rican organizations in New York and Puerto Rico. By January 1945, ALPRI's creation saw the organization work with Puerto Rico's pro-independence groups but maintain a particularly close relationship with the PNP. This closeness was evident in a letter Pedro Albizu Campos sent to Ruth Reynolds congratulating the creation of ALPRI and her position as secretary. The organization set out to state they would use their political and legal resources to work with pro-independence groups to champion Puerto Rico's independence. Additionally, ALPRI worked to inform the U.S. public and those within their networks about Puerto Rico's colonial position under the U.S. Included in

¹³¹ MoM, October 17, 1944, Reynolds Papers; MoM, Nov 9, 1944; Ruth Reynolds to Carpenter, December 9, 1944. All in folder 6, box 10, Puerto Rico Independence, 1942-1948, The CORE Papers Wisconsin Historical Society; Minutes of Meeting of the ALPRI, December 19, 1944. All in folder 2, box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949, Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center of American History.

this work was to ensure draft resisters in Puerto Rico and the U.S. received legal aid and protection.¹³²

The public shift in attitudes toward U.S. involvement in the war after the bombing of Pearl Harbor led organizations that politically or morally opposed military service to verbalize their message as a human right of conscience. Puerto Rican draft resisters expanded their political efforts to New York City to ensure their message was heard by the U.S. government and the public. Puerto Rico's position as a U.S. colony created a dynamic of being considered a legal citizen while also viewed as an outsider or foreigner by white Americans. Coordinating in New York alongside U.S. organizations that sympathized with Puerto Rico provided Puerto Rican political operatives access to U.S.-based political and church organizations, family members that migrated, and political clubs and mutual aid organizations founded by Puerto Rican migrants.¹³³

Advocates for independence also grappled with the role of individuals defined as political prisoners of the United States, including those arrested for draft evasion. Supporters of independence that held a religious or political objection to military service looked for avenues to avoid military service. For the PNPR and their allies in the

¹³² Statement of Position of ALPRI, [hereafter referred to as Statement of Position of ALPRI], folder 4, box 18, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, Correspondences, n.d., Reynolds Papers; Meeting of Minutes of ALPRI, January 10, 1945 [hereafter referred to as MoM Jan 10, 1945]; "Case brief of ALPRI vs USA, July 22, 1946," Colección de Dr. Fernos-Isern. At the end of the document, this source displayed a partial list of prominent U.S. citizens that were dues paying members. Those on the list represented academia, labor, Civil Rights, education reform, and anti-imperialism. Names listed as members included A. Philip Randolph, Mary McLeod Bethune, Reverend Ramkrishna Modak, Jean Wiley, and Dr. Rachel Davis Dubois, among others.

¹³³ "Juventud Nacionalista de Puerto Rico," "Velada cívico Artística," "Velada cívico Literatura." "La Asociación Nacionalista Puertorriqueña en Nueva York, July 16," "Banquets de la Asoc. Pro-Independencia de P.R. en Honor de Marcantonio, 1944." Articles and Ephemera, all in Vando Collection Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Sanchez Korrol, 187-199; Thomas, 133-146.

ALPRI, Puerto Rico's independence and the plight of political prisoners were not detached issues. The Nationalists' determination to oppose military service saw members arrested for not answering the draft summons, framing their incarceration as politically motivated by the U.S. empire and their colonial magistrates. Pinto Gandía's advocacy on behalf of political prisoners was impacted by his own imprisonments in Puerto Rico and the United States between 1937 and 1943. The Nationalists' stated objections to military service under the United States did not absolve them from future draft summons or potential threats of arrest for failing to meet with the draft board or apply for alternative service.¹³⁴

Puerto Rico's status question and how that was defined by Puerto Ricans and informed individuals within the U.S. developed further through World War II. Puerto Rico's strategic military position in the Atlantic and the island's economic recovery through militarization saw military participation and service as a vital component in determining Puerto Rico's future. Religious subversives continued to frame their draft dissent as a crisis of conscience against violence but faced additional scrutiny when their resistance was lumped in with Nationalists or other political subversives that defied the draft. The PNPR used their understanding of their U.S. citizenship to further push for independence, including the formation of solidarity associations and assisting in the elevation of key allies into positions of power.

¹³⁴ Interview with The Call. Folder 5, Box 1, Reynolds Papers. Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Puerto Rican Nationalist Party Statement, n.d. Marcantonio Papers, NYPL.

The networks established by individuals that supported Puerto Rican independence within U.S. labor, civil rights, and social reform circles would be tested when Julio Pinto Gandía and other Puerto Ricans faced legal challenges regarding their draft status in 1945. Ruth Reynolds reported to a pacifist colleague that young draft resisters affiliated with the Nationalist Party faced physical abuse and were placed in solitary confinement without justification. While planning out how to defend the young men, she also brought attention to Julio Pinto Gandía receiving another draft summons. He was ordered to report to the draft board in Manatí, Puerto Rico by February 23, 1945 or face legal consequences. Reynolds expressed frustration that the federal government knew the stance of the Nationalists and continued to pursue them. Furthermore, she insinuated that the draft board was cognizant of Pinto's health issues that had developed during a stint in federal prison in the late 1930s.¹³⁵ Increased surveillance and the potential of arrest for draft evasion did not stop Pinto Gandía from attending a speaking engagement at a conference about global colonialism at New York Public Library. Under threats of arrest, Reynolds made clear that Pinto intended to reject the summons based on his individual and political position, continuing to act as a voice for Puerto Rico's independence in political spaces.

Puerto Rican political leaders and independence activists paid attention to the treatment of individuals non-compliant with draft directives by the U.S. government. Puerto Rican nationalists positioned their rejection of military service as a conscientious decision against a government they did not recognize. In stating their opposition to U.S.

¹³⁵ Ruth M. Reynolds to Marge, February 12, 1945. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

directives to participate under U.S. authority, the PNP stated that they would only fight for an independent Puerto Rico or if Puerto Rico was invaded, situating their resistance as ideological while countering suggestions of cowardice.¹³⁶ However, pro-war Puerto Rican officials questioned the positions of individuals and organizations that resisted answering draft summons or supporting the war for political purposes, exhibiting a distinction between political and religious objection. One example of this interrogation saw statehood activist Pablo Sosa, in a letter to U.S. pacifist leader J. Holmes Smith, castigate followers of Puerto Rican liberation as anti-American and fanatical. He emphasized the bravery and support of the war by Puerto Ricans to illustrate the instability of the independence position, going further by stating that Black civil rights activists fought for racial justice while still assisting in the war effort.¹³⁷

Sosa's attitude that military participation acted as a declaration of Puerto Rico's readiness for a new status determined by the people of the island connected with other U.S.-based organizations advocating for social change. The perception that military service during World War II emphasized the highest ideals of sacrifice, nationhood, and citizenship informed the directives of U.S civil rights groups and proponents for Puerto Rican statehood and independence support military mobilization. Press coverage of the contributions and valor of Puerto Rican soldiers and the civic sacrifice of civilians on the

¹³⁶ Julio de Santiago to Representative Vito Marcantonio, May 20, 1942. Marcantonio Papers, NYPL.

¹³⁷ Sosa's letter does ignore the stories of Black Americans resisting the draft because of continued segregation or moral conscience, including the arrests of Bayard Rustin and James Farmer. See Pablo L. Sosa to Jay Holmes Smith, July 27, 1945, folder 4, box 18, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, Correspondences, n.d.," Reynolds Papers; Pablo L. Sosa to Jay Holmes Smith, August 16, 1945, folder 6, box 18, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, Correspondences, June 1945-1947, Reynolds Papers.

home front evoked a symbolic figure of Puerto Ricans fighting to gain the freedom of a new tomorrow, whether statehood or independence. New York-based Puerto Rican statehood and independence organizations hosted community fundraisers, galas, and rallies that brought attention to the war support of the Puerto Rican community and the benefits of military participation for the individuals serving and the future of Puerto Rico.¹³⁸ Historian Harry Franquí-Rivera further emphasized that Puerto Rican military mobilization enfranchised thousands of peasants and workers on the island by providing economic benefits and training as well as a sense of pride in assisting their communities. The support of the war by the majority of Puerto Ricans, including independence activists, and alternative service compliance by Puerto Rican religious objectors pushed the PNPR to expand their support networks to Puerto Ricans in the United States and sympathetic U.S. allies.¹³⁹

Conscientious objectors that observed procedures that allowed them to reject war through alternative service faced public scrutiny despite meeting their obligations. In theory, conscientious objectors assigned alternative duty in Civilian Public Service camps or individuals that accepted military service in a non-combatant role should have been viewed favorably for assisting society as far as their moral or religious conscience would allow. However, scholar Patricia Appelbaum suggests that pacifists ran the risk of being connected to political and social agitators by the U.S. government and the public

¹³⁸ “Puerto Rican Soldier” Clippings, Colón Collection. Center for Puerto Rican Studies; ¡Ultima Hora! ¡Guerra! Guerra! Guerra!, Vando Collection; “Speech, Erasmo Vando.” New York Organizational Activities. Vando Collection. All in Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

¹³⁹ Harry Franquí-Rivera, *Soldiers of the Nation: Military Service and Modern Puerto Rico, 1868-1952* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), 127-131; 145-153.

because they rejected military service. Scholar Luis Alvarez examined how Black and Mexican American zoot suiters in California complaining about racial or civic inequality on the home front or subverting patriotic expectations faced harassment and violence from U.S. authorities.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, conscientious objectors that stated their objection World War II military service because of U.S. racial inequality saw their stance dismissed as an individual issue that distracted from the war. For example, mainstream press outlets negatively viewed Black male draft resistance for civil rights abuses by Black activists as an individual act against the common good. Draft resistance ran count to the expectation that citizens participate in the nation's fight, labeling draft dissenters as "subversive or "radical" for failing to perform patriotic service.¹⁴¹

Conscientious objectors faced hostility for their conviction to not fight during World War II. COs that chose non-combat roles within the military recounted harsh treatment from their fellow soldiers. Furthermore, COs that joined the military did so to prove they were not cowards or that service as a non-combatant was more respectable than taking a role in the Civilian Public Service.¹⁴² Conscientious objectors that accepted civilian service under the CPS similarly faced ostracism from U.S. citizens and officials

¹⁴⁰ Appelbaum, 34-40; Luis Alvarez, *The Power of Zoot: Youth Culture and Resistance during World War II* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 157-168.

¹⁴¹ Associated Press, "Refuses to Join Army, Gets Three Years," *New York Amsterdam News*, October 31, 1942; Associated Press, "A Conscientious Objector Finds No Friends on Coast," *Chicago Defender*, August 29, 1942; Bennett, 276-277.

¹⁴² Bennett, 259-292. The case of congressional Medal of Honor winner Desmond Doss illustrates the tension of conscientiously objecting to kill during war. Raised as a Seventh Day Adventist, Doss asked his draft board for non-combat duty in the military and was directed to register as a CO. Despite his choice of serving as a combat medic during World War II, he faced harassment during basic training and initial deployment to the Pacific Theater. Similarly, COs that did not choose noncombat roles faced localized ostracism. For more on experience of soldiers in non-combat roles, see documentary *The Conscientious Objector*, D'Artagnan Entertainment, 2014.

who castigated their convictions with terms that signified betrayal, weakness, and effeminacy. One method, according to historian Margaret Mollin, COs and other anti-war activists chose to counter this stigma was projecting themselves as soldiers of conviction that would face persecution for their beliefs. For example, COs fought against Jim Crow policies in Southern CPS camps and prisons. Fellowship of Reconciliation member and civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, imprisoned in 1943 for refusing to report for a required physical examination, organized a strike in federal prison in Kentucky against the institution's Jim Crow policy. Undertaking civil action against injustice acted as a mechanism for activists to counter depictions of weakness from opponents.¹⁴³

While the PNPR and their U.S. pacifists' allies raised awareness of Puerto Rico's status within their own activist circles, pro-independence groups in New York and Puerto Rico promoted Puerto Rican military service throughout the century as proof of the island's readiness to become an independent nation.¹⁴⁴ Puerto Rican pro-independence and anti-fascist groups coordinated similar alliances with U.S. leftists and liberals that did not align with the PNPR/ALPRI alliance. The *Partido Comunista de Puertorriqueña* (PCPR) and larger Communist Party USA internally struggled to reach consensus over military participation among their membership, with militant anti-fascist Communists facing imprisonment for failure to enlist because U.S. leaders feared a

¹⁴³ "Bayard Rustin Defies Draft, Goes to Prison," March 4, 1944; "Hits Bias at CO Camp, Gets Solidarity," October 21, 1944; "Punish War objectors who protested Jim Crow," July 28, 1945. All in the *Chicago Defender*; Margaret Mollin, *Radical Pacifism in Modern America: Egalitarianism and Protest* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 52-54; Bennett, 276-280. For more on Rustin's incarceration and work to integrate the prison, see John D'Emilio, *Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin* (New York: Free Press, 2003), 71-76.

¹⁴⁴ "Speech, Erasmo Vando." New York Organizational Activities. Vando Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

return of World War I era repressions of political dissidents. Other PCPR and CPUSA members viewed assisting the war effort as a means to coordinate with other liberal and leftist groups for the end goal of “in this historic and decisive moment for humanity the people of Puerto Rico must devote all their powers and energies for the smashing of Nazi-fascism.”¹⁴⁵ Although the PCPR called for unity among Puerto Rico’s independence factions to fight against colonialism, the divisions over military service led to ideological fissures.

As the PNPR railed against forced military participation in World War II, Puerto Rico’s political groups and other pacifists questioned if the PNPR dictated the will of Puerto Ricans and their relationship with the ALPRI. In a letter to ALPRI president J. Holmes Smith, statehood activist Dr. Pablo Sosa implored the pacifist leader to look deeper into the Puerto Rico situation. Sosa stated that Puerto Ricans wanted statehood and the anti-American cries of independence figures like Albizu would doom the country. Statehood proponents similarly promoted their cause by stating participation in World War II was one of the many directives Puerto Ricans met to remove Puerto Rico’s colonial status and become part of the United States. For many, it was puzzling to see U.S. pacifists connected to U.S. protestant congregants that worked with Puerto Rican congregations on community projects and provided materials about conscientious

¹⁴⁵ “Report by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Porto Rico,” Puerto Rico files, Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies. In this meeting, the General Secretary of the Puerto Rican Communist Party chapter called for justice toward CPUSA leader Earl Browder and PN president Pedro Albizu Campos and appeal to members to join the war to smash fascism.

objector status, aligning with a group like the PNPR that were viewed as violent agitators.¹⁴⁶

The PNPR's insistence that their movement was politically targeted for their stance spoke to a larger debate among global nation states and individuals promoting the independence of colonized nations throughout World War II. Advocates for decolonization argued that Great Britain and the United States promised to grant self-determination through the signing of the Atlantic Charter in 1942 after the U.S. entered World War II. As Great Britain struggled with the process of decolonizing the remnants of their empire, debates began in the U.S. Congress over the territorial status of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Global leaders felt pressure to establish a replacement for the League of Nations that would structure a post-war global society. Similar to the end of World War I, politicians and activists from around the world grappled with the continued legacy of colonialism as delegates prepared to gather in San Francisco for the first security council meeting of the United Nations in 1945.¹⁴⁷

Meetings in San Francisco became a rallying cry for men like Pinto and others who wanted to demand the end of colonialism around the world. Despite the calls for a seat at the table, colonized nations like Puerto Rico, India, and Korea were not granted delegate status or invitations inside the proceedings in San Francisco. An effort was made by Puerto Rican independence activists to gain a seat in the Security Council, with

¹⁴⁶ Dr. Pablo L. Sosa to Jay Holmes Smith, August 16, 1945, folder 6, box 18, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, Correspondences, June 1945-1947, Reynolds Papers; "Puerto Rican Soldier," folder 7, box 37, Clippings, 1970. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Thomas, 45-47.

¹⁴⁷ Borgwardt, 3-8, 25-35; Friedman, 126-130.

pro-Independence Congress chairman Rafael Soltero Peralta stating that their grievance should be considered since “our contribution of blood and sacrifice in defeating the totalitarian powers has made Puerto Rico one of the United Nations whose right in this conference cannot be ignored.”¹⁴⁸ However, independence activists and allies urged their followers to travel to California to make their case for decolonization outside of conference spaces and ensure that the voices of those not represented in the Conference were heard.¹⁴⁹ This call for action is highlighted in a letter exchange between author Pearl Buck and journalist James Rorty. Part of the same pacifist and political networks, Rorty offered Buck the following suggestion for those arguing Puerto Rico’s independence in San Francisco:

“Since under the stipulations set up by the great powers for attendance at the San Francisco conference no genuine representation at the conference is possible for Porto Rico inside the conference. I would urge that Porto Rico like India be represented by vigorous voices speaking from San Francisco by outside the official sessions of the conference. If enough of these voices wail in the outer darkness perhaps the press services and the radio broadcasters will permit them to be heard.”¹⁵⁰

Rorty recommendation to present their case to the U.N. provided Puerto Rican and global independence advocates with a strategy to voice their dissent and opened a new political forum to argue for decolonization. Although activists were not invited to attend

¹⁴⁸ “Puerto Rican Seat Asked,” *New York Times*, May 4, 1945.

¹⁴⁹ “Address by Julio Pinto Gandía at Colonial Conference in New York Public Library,” April 6, 1945. Folder 2, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

¹⁵⁰ James Rorty to Pearl S. Buck, March 28, 1945, folder 5, box 18, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, Correspondences, 1944-1945, Reynolds Papers.

the San Francisco conference as recognized participants, their presence allowed each organization to argue for decolonization outside the conference area.

Without guarantees that their grievances would be taken seriously, Puerto Rican independence advocates and their allies planned to attend the U.N. conferences and petition delegates' regarding Puerto Rico's status and the political arrests of draft resisters. The PNPR and global independence leaders viewed debate in the UN as critical to ensure the powerful nations addressed global imperialism after the promises made by the Atlantic Charter. At a conference on global colonialism organized by the World Council of Dominated Nations (WCDN), Pinto encouraged colonized nations to take their grievances to San Francisco. During his speech, Pinto stated that activists must stress to the UN security council that imperialism, political repression, and racial discrimination were no longer welcome in the world.¹⁵¹ He used this platform to emphasize the status issue and treatment of Puerto Ricans in their own affairs, ending his speech with a challenge to the U.S. government, stating:

“Puerto Rico is the test case of the intentions of the United States toward the Western Hemisphere. There will be no ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ as long as Puerto Rico is enslaved...The whole world has turned its eyes and hopes to the forthcoming Security Conference of the United Nations...Whether the hopes of

¹⁵¹ “Address by Julio Pinto Gandía at Colonial Conference in New York Public Library,” April 6, 1945. Folder 2, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

millions of men, women, and children all over the world are going to be betrayed by unscrupulous politicians and imperialists remains to be seen.”¹⁵²

Pinto’s determination to confront the colonial question, including inquiries about individuals imprisoned for political activity and war resistance, met resistance when his own issues with the U.S. government over his refusal to go before the draft board surfaced.

After returning to New York from San Francisco, Pinto was arrested on the morning of June 5th, 1945 on draft violation charges. In a letter to Pinto’s colleague the Reverend Ramakrishna Modak, Reynolds detailed the reported that three F.B.I agents entered Pinto’s home posing as friends and demanded to search the house. When he demanded they show a warrant and did not comply with their commands, he was arrested and arraigned at a Federal Court House in New York with bail set for \$1000.¹⁵³ Reynolds mentioned that Pinto and other Nationalists faced pressure from the federal government for their resistance against military service. Furthermore, she inferred that the government must be targeting him because there was medical documentation that stated he was medically unfit for military service because of ailments attained during his six years in prison. The ALPRI mobilized their network to push for Pinto’s release, fearful that he would face a long-term prison sentence or receive little communication

¹⁵² “Address by Julio Pinto Gandía at Colonial Conference in New York Public Library,” April 6, 1945. Folder 2, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

¹⁵³ Jay Holmes Smith to Dr. Mario Arapz, Secretary delegate for Bolivia, June 16, 1945. Folder 2, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History. In this letter to Arapz, Smith provides an enclosure of the case against Pinto to impress upon Arapz the urgency of the situation. He further reminds Arapz that he had met with Pinto in San Francisco.

from him based on past treatment of Nationalist prisoners. Using their political networks, ALPRI brought attention to the arrest of Pinto to push for his release.¹⁵⁴

Demanding justice for Pinto and timely action on Puerto Rico's status, the P NPR and U.S. allies used the language of the Atlantic Charter and Good Neighbor policy in their outreach to U.S. political leaders and UN delegates from Latin American nations. Advocates appealed to Latin America for support, citing U.S. disregard of the political sovereignty of Latin American nations as equal nation states, skepticism of U.S. positioning themselves as the protectors of democracy, and a shared lineage as former Spanish colonies. In her letter to Reverend Modak, Reynolds suggested that he file a formal protest with the Secretary General of the UN Security Council and inform the delegates of Latin American nations, specifically naming Cuba, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile, and Mexico (as well as the Philippines).¹⁵⁵ This planned outreach mirrors historian Margaret Power analysis of the P NPR establishing political solidarity networks throughout Latin America during the 1930s and 1940s for Puerto Rico's independence.

¹⁵⁴ Ruth Reynolds to Mr. (Ramkrishna) Modak, June 6, 1945. Folder 2, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History; Jay Holmes Smith to President Truman, June 7, 1945. Folder 6, Box, 18, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, Correspondences, June 1945-1947, Reynolds Papers. In Reynolds letter to Modak, she mentions Pinto's age and health, stating that the U.S. government forbid the mobilization of men over thirty. On Pinto's health, Reynolds revealed that the draft board were aware of his ill health from his six-year sentence at Fort Leavenworth starting in 1938 for conspiracy against the U.S. Government after the assassination of Puerto Rican police chief Colonel Riggs. Additionally, a notarized document from physician Anibal Zelaya from November 1944 to the State of New York regarding Pinto's health, including arthritis, hay fever, and low blood pressure. See "To whom it May Concern" from Anibal Zelaya M.D., November 17, 1944, folder 2, box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center of American History.

¹⁵⁵ Ruth Reynolds to Mr. (Ramkrishna) Modak, June 6, 1945, Farmer Papers. In her letter addressing the outreach to Latin American nations, she also lists the Philippines as a potential avenue, specifically stating Rev. Modak met a specific leader. Reynolds also suggests he write a formal complaint to U.S. Secretary of State Stettinius.

Linking Puerto Rico's struggles with Latin America independence movement, celebrating the heroes of independence in those nations, the checkered relationship between the United States and individual nations fostered solidarity with individual political groups in those nation-states.¹⁵⁶

J. Holmes Smith attempted to individually discuss Pinto's case and the larger issue of Puerto Rico's independence with the UN's Latin American delegates. In one correspondence with Dr. Mario Arpaz, a delegate from Bolivia that met with Pinto in San Francisco, Smith appeals for his assistance in bringing justice for Pinto. In an enclosure attached to the letter providing a step-by-step background of Pinto's case, Smith connected resistance to compulsory military service and demands for political independence by stating the repercussions for those that objected to military service and Puerto Rico's status to question the viability of being charged. He also mentioned the need to curb the power of big nations by asking for Arpaz's consideration in supporting independence and the need to protect political prisoners like Pinto by discussing this

¹⁵⁶ Margaret Power, "The Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, Transnational Latin American Solidarity, and the United States during the Cold War," in *Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity in Cold War Latin America*, ed. Jessica Stites Mor (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013), 21-47; Ayala and Bernabé, 104-106; Morales Carrión, *Puerto Rico*, 222-227. During Albizu's rise as a leader in the PN, the organization attempted to gain political support for independence from Latin America countries. In 1927, Albizu toured Mexico, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Haiti to promote Puerto Rican independence against U.S. Imperialism. During tours, he spoke of Puerto Rico's status as a colony and appealed to their sense of injustice over U.S. interventions throughout the early twentieth century. Albizu also reached out through collective memory when he celebrated the contributions of famed revolutionaries of the respective nations like Simón Bolívar, José Martí, and Toussaint L'Ouverture for the cause of Latin American independence. For primary evidence of his journey, see Informaciones de Puerto Rico. "Albizu Campos emprende la cruzada," *La Prensa* (New York), June 24, 1927; Francisco C. Rivera. "Noticias de Puerto Rico," *Grafico* (New York), February 22, 1930.

issue openly in the UN Security Council.¹⁵⁷ Additionally, Smith wrote a letter to President Truman in June 1945 stating that the incarceration of Pinto Gandía and continued position of Puerto Rico was an action unbecoming of a democratic nation.

Support for Pinto was not isolated to petitions and letter writing. Smith and Reynolds reached out to colleagues working with the National Committee on Conscientious Objectors of the American Civil Liberties Union (NCCO) for legal advice and aide for Pinto, who's court case would begin June 19th. NCCO Washington director Lewis Hill discussed Pinto's case in letter exchanges with Ruth Reynolds. After acknowledging that Pinto Gandía would want to represent himself in court, he suggested Pinto add NCCO member and civil liberties lawyer Francis Heisler as consulting attorney to provide additional assistance. Hill verbalized Heisler's legal strategy of laying out the case on the history of political persecution in Puerto Rico by discussing US actions from the Ponce Massacre in 1936 until the present. This would also provide time for Smith and Reynolds to look for exact procedures on Selective Service to see if an argument could be made that a technical error occurred. Pinto agreed to Hill's proposal and Heisler's defense strategy in a brief acknowledgment letter on June 12, stating that he would "accept to follow it as expressed in your letter to our great friend Miss Ruth M. Reynolds."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Jay Holmes Smith to Dr. Mario Arapz, Secretary delegate for Bolivia, June 16, 1945. Folder 2, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949, Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

¹⁵⁸ Lewis Hill to Ruth M. Reynolds, June 8, 1945; Julio Pinto Gandía to Lewis Hill, June 12, 1945; Lewis Hill to Ruth M. Reynolds, June 14, 1945. All in folder 2, box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949. Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

As discussion continued in the U.N, on how to structure the global post-war society, the ALPRI presented a case to the U.N. against the United States for failure to provide Puerto Rico the option of self-determination as the PNPR acted to address their position in Puerto Rico. Additionally, the case of Julio Pinto Gandía illustrated how independence and political prisoners arrested for war resistance became a debate point in multiple spaces. Pinto's case was dropped after August 1945, with a letter from Lewis Hill to Pinto stating that the Department of Justice intended to drop the matter. Hill stated that the meeting with the DOJ was delayed because the representative Hill needed to contact was on vacation. It was intimated that procedural inequities led to this issue and implied by the official "that a trial would not be desirable from the government's standpoint."¹⁵⁹

Pinto's brush with the federal government over his draft status and the work of his allies to ensure he was defended demonstrated how networks of individuals and organizations work in solidarity with one another. A pro-independence group argued against empire and the imprisonment of members during World War II through the work of allies using their access to challenge the dictates of U.S. colonialism. However, this collective solidarity between the pacifists aligned with the ashram and the PNPR was not a linear relationship or without flash points that threatened to break the coalition. Pro-statehood and independence groups that favored military service similarly established networks with U.S. liberals and leftists. Moreover, the PNPR's violent actions and

¹⁵⁹ Lewis Hill to Julio Pinto Gandía, August 2, 1945. Folder 2, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940s-1950s, American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1944-1949, Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

rhetoric throughout their history led to the group being considered a political and social pariah in Puerto Rico and to US leftists who objected to their tactics.

The efforts to create a transnational solidarity movement focused on Puerto Rico's status and the plight of political prisoners arrested for draft evasion met ideological and internal splintering throughout the collaboration. The violent rhetoric of Albizu and the PNPR against U.S. authority in Puerto Rico created tensions with U.S. pacifist allies and observers during World War II, including pacifist organizations warning that the Nationalists' use of violence was a reason to maintain neutrality when interacting with the political group. An incident that illustrated this caution and the internal dissent within pacifist circles over their relationship with the PNPR occurred in late 1944 when ashram leader and ALPRI president J. Holmes Smith published an article detailing Albizu Campos and the Nationalists' position under the title "The Gandhi of Puerto Rico." The attempt to connect India and Puerto Rico's struggle through Albizu as a Gandhi-figure was negatively received by the Puerto Rico chapter of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. FOR Puerto Rico organizers Stanley Harbison and Herman Will, while acknowledging the targeting of Albizu and the PNPR by the U.S. government, vehemently disagreed with Smith's assertion that Albizu represented a Gandhian figure and called for an article retraction. Will took exception to the claim that FOR Puerto Rico did not support independence. FOR Puerto Rico's advocacy for self-determination

centered on leadership's belief that the Puerto Rican people should be the ones that choose their future path.¹⁶⁰

Will and Harbison also took issue with Smith and the ALPRI's silence of the PNPR attacking their peace work in Puerto Rico. Tensions over how to define Puerto Rico's status and the frictions between pacifism and nationalism fractured the relationships built between the PNPR, other pro-independence groups, and U.S. allies. Although the PNPR established a working relationship with the ashram and later ALPRI, pacifist devotion to non-violent civil disobedience and peaceful protest clashed with political nationalist revolutionary ideals. The PNPR was explicit in their calls for revolution and independence throughout the 1940s, echoing Frantz Fanon's analysis that anticolonial movements must inevitably become violent to achieve their goal of independence. Additionally, historian Manfred Steger's examination of nationalism and non-violence in twentieth century India illustrates that nationalism and ideal pacifism could not coexist when pressure to act demanded action. Gandhi's ideal of peaceful demonstration and nationalism against British colonialism could not coexist.¹⁶¹ This tension was evident when the Puerto Rican Nationalists questioned the tactics of U.S. pacifists, specifically their willing acceptance of submitting to placement in worker camps throughout the United States and Puerto Rico. An article from the Spanish

¹⁶⁰ Stanley Harbison to A.J. Muste, December 20, 1944; A.J. Muste to Stanley Harbison, December 27, 1944, January 5, 1945; Stanley Harbison to A.J. Muste, January 11, 1945; Herman Will to A.J. Muste and John Nevin Sayre, February 13, 1945, all in the FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

¹⁶¹ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. by Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 28-35; Manfred Steger, *Gandhi's Dilemma: Non-Violent Principles and Nationalist Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 41-66.

language magazine “Puerto Rico” supporting the PNPR position questioned the United States commitment to democracy when they isolate and arrest people that politically disagree with the war into “three concentration camps for pacifists” to provide public works in Puerto Rico. The periodical emphasized that “the presence of such concentration camps in our motherland constitutes a problem against the Puerto Rican nation.”¹⁶² Equating the pacifists attempts to provide havens for anti-draft activists to do alternative service instead of risk imprisonment to concentration camps caused fractures within the U.S. Left concerning the PNPR and how their own organizations articulated Puerto Rico’s future situation.

Pacifist interaction with Puerto Rican political and social activists throughout the 1940s saw continued skepticism of Albizu and the Nationalists, even within the circles that actively worked with the PNPR for independence. During a speech in Puerto Rico in 1948, Albizu emphasized the need for Puerto Ricans to act with courage and strength in defending Puerto Rico from the U.S, stating “the United States is here by force. Soon we will find the way of throwing them out, also by force.”¹⁶³ Increasingly violent rhetoric and action by the Nationalists and the political victories of Luis Munoz Marin and his *populares* (PPD) led U.S. pacifists and other leftists to question endorsing an organization that openly advocates violence. One such disagreement between ashram co-founder the Reverend Ralph Templin and member Ruth Reynolds illustrated the split

¹⁶² “Concentration Camps in Puerto Rico.” Folder 6, Box 10, “Puerto Rico Independence, 1942-1948.” The CORE Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.

¹⁶³ U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Section. Office of Public and Congressional Affairs. Pedro Albizu Campos. 105-11898, Section VI.

concerning Puerto Rico's status and the role of the Nationalists. Reynolds responded to a letter from Reverend Templin after he insisted that a three-person investigation was necessary to assess the issues in Puerto Rico without the need of the Nationalists. She called Templin out for this, mentioning that other reports compiled by FOR and other entities on Puerto Rico were influenced by the Puerto Rican government, FOR affiliates, and protestant groups. Growing conflict over Puerto Rico's status question among the U.S. left saw long time collaborators cause divisions within organizations, including the membership of the ALPRI that either continued to support or started to distance itself from the PNPR.¹⁶⁴

The PNPR's relationships with other Puerto Rico and New York based independence groups similarly dealt with tensions over how to attain independence and construct Puerto Rico's future. Religious scholar Anthony Stevens-Arroyo assessed that Albizu's image of an independent Puerto Rico centered the island's connections to Spain, the Spanish language, and the Catholic Church to reclaim a cultural past.¹⁶⁵ In their creation of a Puerto Rican identity rooted in a Catholic, Spanish past, the PNPR minimized the brutality of Spanish colonialism. In doing so, the PNPR willfully constructed a national origin point to reject U.S. imperialism while ignoring or reaffirming the practices of the colonizers. The PNPR's identified their nationalism as a defense of the island from colonialism, a Catholicism rooted in the return of the

¹⁶⁴ Reynolds' Challenge of Richard Templin, n.d. Folder 6, Box 10, Puerto Rico Independence, 1942-1948, The CORE Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.

¹⁶⁵ Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo, "Jaime Balmes Redux: Catholicism as Civilization in the Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos," in *Bridging the Atlantic Toward a Reassessment of Iberian and Latin American Cultural Ties*, ed. Marina Perez de Mendola (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 137-147

traditional, Spanish family structure, and the concept of martyrdom as the ultimate form of sacrifice for the nation.¹⁶⁶

This rigid conception of a future nation and lack of faith in U.S. intentions created a dynamic where the PNPR would not compromise on their convictions, leading to turmoil with other independence groups. The PNPR's position on service and participation in the U.S. military compared to the other independence groups illustrates this tension, as the PNPR risked imprisonment to stand against a conflict that gained popular support on the island to combat fascism and provide economic and industrial development on the island. Albizu and the PNPR railed against those that collaborated with the U.S. or Puerto Rican government and castigated those that attempted to gain independence as traitors.¹⁶⁷ This ideological battle saw other pro-independence organizations push back at the PNPR for being too ideologically rigid. One report described the PNPR's organizational structure as "impractical," "out of touch," and "organizationally weak." From there observation, Albizu's leadership model constricted the PNPR as a spiritually strong, but numerically weak organization. The Puerto Rican Communist Party acknowledged Albizu's prominence as a historical, transcendent leader but wondered if his prominence jeopardized the larger independence movement. Because he did not ascribe to a more communal form of leadership and solidarity, the Puerto Rican Communist Party bemoaned that "Dr. (Albizu) Campos had a wonderful

¹⁶⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (New York: Verso, 2006 [1983]), 9-36, 192-197; Meyda Yeğenoğlu, *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a feminist reading of Orientalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 122-124; Stevens-Arroyo, 137-147.

¹⁶⁷ Franqui-Rivera, 158-168; U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Section. Office of Public and Congressional Affairs. Pedro Albizu Campos. 105-11898, Section VI.

opportunity to unite all the independence forces in all parties when he returned from the United States. He missed that opportunity.”¹⁶⁸

Puerto Rico’s broader independence movement splintered further into factions throughout the mid to late 1940s, with the PNPR garnering negative attention after increased confrontation with U.S. and Puerto Rican authorities in 1948. PPD leader Luis Muñoz Marín’s political shift away from independence in 1945 because of the economic consequences saw a segment of the PPD split to form the Puerto Rican Independence Party in 1946. Additionally, the PPD endeavored to develop a strategy that continued the economic benefits of U.S. alignment while maintaining Puerto Rico’s cultural independence. Muñoz’s election as Puerto Rico’s governor in 1948 and the growing consensus that the PPD held the mandate of the people from U.S. officials, liberals, and some leftists, the former broad coalition against imperialism fractured into small collectives. Additionally, the emergence of the Associated Free State as a third option to statehood and independence gained political support from the Puerto Rican people. The role of militarization and the military service of Puerto Ricans shaped these debates, centered on the role of both mechanisms to Puerto Rico’s economic recovery efforts during the 1940s.¹⁶⁹

Independence activists that were pro-military service continued to work through the system of championing the cause of independence through the UN and U.S.

¹⁶⁸ “The Nationalist Party Reviews the Problem of Independence...” Writings. Colón Collection; “Because of the Political dissent of the Puerto Rican Communist Party.” Subject Files. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

¹⁶⁹ José Trías Monge, *Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1997), 107-110; Morales Carrión, 260-270; Franqui Rivera, 158-168.

government. For the PNPR, Albizu and the PNPR viewed armed insurrection as the only choice after 1948 while the ALPRI advocated for them in U.S. circles. Scholar Cesar Ayala mentioned that the aim of insurrection was to present the evils of colonial rule and embarrass Washington D.C. to a global audience rather than looking to overthrow the U.S. One reported method of illustrating the issues of colonialism was the attempt by the PNPR to recruit disgruntled Puerto Rican soldiers into the party because of their training and the optics of former soldiers recalling their negative experiences as soldiers. Hostilities between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after World War II placed activists aligned with anti-imperialist and communists' organizations under surveillance of the U.S. government. Continued clashes between the PNPR and Puerto Rican and US officials in Puerto Rico placed the Nationalists on the radar of the U.S. government and further positioned them as a political and social fringe organization to the Puerto Rican public.¹⁷⁰

The lack of broad support from the general Puerto Rican public and the promotion of armed revolution saw members of the PNPR attempt to attack and overthrow the government of Puerto Rico during the final days of October 1950. Historian Harry Franqui-Rivera highlights how the acceleration of the attacks by the Nationalists and Albizu was partly inspired by their condemnation of the signing of Public Law 600 (PL 600), a policy that allowed Puerto Ricans to create a constitution

¹⁷⁰ Morales Carrion, 276-277; Ayala and Bernabé, 165-167; U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Section. Office of Public and Congressional Affairs. Pedro Albizu Campos. 105-11898, Section VI. Although the informant recounted this from a speech in 1948, it is unknown if the PNPR was successful in their outreach, especially if the Puerto Rican government was ensuring that former soldiers received their post-war benefits. For more on post-war Puerto Rican soldier experiences, see Franqui-Rivera, 158-168, 173-175.

that established their relationship with the U.S. Attacks on Puerto Rican cities starting on October 30th were quickly repulsed by the National Guard and local police, including an attempt by Nationalists operatives to storm La Fortaleza and assassinate Governor Muñoz Marín. Brief moments where the nationalists held the towns of Jayuya and Utuado eventually saw the National Guard surround and arrest participants of the uprising. Additionally, two nationalists attempted to assassinate U.S. President Harry Truman only to fail when White House guards stopped the assailants. The uprising in Puerto Rico was over by November 2nd, with the Puerto Rican government arresting members of the PNPR and Puerto Rican communists on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government. Included in the arrest sweeps was U.S. pacifist Ruth Reynolds, who had been staying in Puerto Rico on a fact-finding mission for the ALPRI. The attempted revolt and botched assassination attempt on U.S. President Harry Truman made support for the PNPR toxic for Puerto Ricans and their U.S pacifists' allies.¹⁷¹

Liberal, progressive, and leftist organizations in the U.S. faced a similar reckoning of facing scrutiny from the U.S. government of their associations and alliances, visible in the FOR and NAACP purging their ranks of known or suspected communists. Additionally, smaller organizations that faced scrutiny disbanded rather than continue as a grassroots entity. The alliances with Puerto Rican independence activists viewed as “violent revolutionaries” saw the ALPRI make a statement on

¹⁷¹ Associated Press, “Reds Deny any links to attack on Truman.” *New York Times*, November 2, 1950; “BULLETIN,” Subject Files: Puerto Rico. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; “Assassination of Truman Foiled in Gun Fight outside Blair House; Puerto Rican Plotter, Guard Die,” *New York Times*, November 2, 1950; Franqui-Rivera, 169-178; Friedman, 130-137.

November 8th, 1950 about the organization disbanding because they wanted to focus on Puerto Rico's independence and disavow the violence used by the PNPR. Pacifist J. Holmes Smith and legal counsel Conrad Lynn worked in the aftermath to provide legal and political aid for the Nationalists and fellow ALPRI member Ruth Reynolds, who was arrested for her proximity to the Nationalists during the uprising. However, the organization folded to preserve the broader coordinating efforts and highlighted the philosophical differences of the individuals in the group. Although the movements for Puerto Rican independence and U.S. anti-war continued post-1950, the PNPR was suppressed and extinguished as an active political party while U.S. allies clashed internally over Puerto Rico's status. More importantly, Puerto Rican military draft resisters faced increased scrutiny of their intentions if there were any ties to the nationalists or independence.¹⁷²

The fallout of the 1950 Nationalist uprising in Puerto Rico accelerated the already corroded connections the PNPR shared with U.S. leftists and other pro-independence groups in Puerto Rico. Although the period of U.S. involvement in World War II highlighted a pulse in anti-draft sentiment within religious and political circles among Puerto Ricans, connecting the issue to Puerto Rico's status caused fissures within the broader coalition because of ideological and strategic differences. Increased calls by the PNPR for revolution and defying the military draft clashed with other pro-

¹⁷² "ALPRI Disbands Announcement, November 6, 1950," (Hereafter called ALPRI Disbands Announcement). Box 18 Folder 3, "American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1948-1954." Reynolds Papers, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; "Freedom League Disbands," *New York Times*, November 8, 1950.

independence groups and statehood supporters that championed the military service and participation of the Puerto Rican people. Additionally, escalating violence between the PNPR and US and Puerto Rican authorities increased skepticism among the U.S. left regarding the Nationalists' platform and standing in Puerto Rico. The election of Luis Munoz Marin and the PPD's electoral mandate from the people saw U.S. liberals and leftists pay more attention to Munoz's platform or align with non-violent pro-independence groups like the PIP.

Collaboration between Puerto Rico's pro-independence groups and organizations aligned with the U.S. left, emphasized through the working relationship of the PNPR and ashram community in Harlem the potential of coalition building in spaces of contact. Contact with the growing Puerto Rican community in New York informed this community of Black and White pacifists challenged global imperialism. Once confronted with the regional imperialism within their own nation-state, members used their resources and networks to advocate for Puerto Rico's independence. The PNPR's rigid definition of Puerto Rican identity and nationhood saw moments of the group redefining their concept of citizenship. As they argued for Puerto Ricans to defy the draft and U.S. influence in Puerto Rico, the PNPR also encouraged the Puerto Rican community to vote for U.S. allies in New York elections that championed independence and received political and legal aid from pacifist allies. However, this willingness to attain independence also led to increased acknowledgement that armed struggle was the only recourse of the PNPR, alienating them further into the political fringes by the mid-1940s and dissolution within the political apparatus by the end of 1950.

The dissolution of the PNPR did not mean the collaboration between the U.S. left and pro-independence groups ended, specifically those sympathetic to the Nationalists goal of independence. ALPRI's disbanding as a group of U.S. citizens advocating for Puerto Rico's independence still saw former members continue to provide imprisoned Nationalists political and legal aid as they faced sedition charges in the U.S. and Puerto Rico. J. Holmes Smith lobbied to ensure Nationalists were given fair trials and had access to legal representation. Ruth Reynolds, after being imprisoned in Puerto Rico for her proximity to the Nationalists, formed a new organization with Smith and others that continued the fight for Puerto Rico's independence, the Americans for Puerto Rico's Independence. They continued the tradition of providing legal and political aid for Puerto Rican political prisoners, including those swept up in the Nationalist uprising, draft evaders, and the Nationalists that shot at U.S. senators in 1954.

The maintenance of these solidarity networks, despite the damage done by the PNPR's violent clashes and the Cold War environment, ensured a pulse remained when increased militarization during the Cold War and the spark of Vietnam brought pro-independence groups and the U.S. left back within each other's orbit. The tough work of solidarity visible during World War II continued during the Cold War in the face of government attention to political subversives. The anti-war network provided a space for Puerto Rican independence groups to argue against compulsory military service within a national conversation. More importantly, Puerto Ricans within the coalition connected their draft resistance through their own definition of citizenship. Chapter 3 illustrates how these networks continued to advocate for Puerto Rican war resisters during the

Korean War. In a political climate that saw organizations dissolve or purge members because of their affiliations, the anti-war networks still efforted to support the right of the individual to resist compulsory military service.

CHAPTER IV

A MORAL PATH OF DRAFT RESISTANCE: ANTONIO FILARDI GUZMAN'S COLD WAR DRAFT CASE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUERTO RICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

"Antonio Filardi Guzman made clear that he 'felt obliged by his patriotic will to resist the imposition of compulsory military service in the United States Army' because, he then and there stated that 'the military service imposed on the Puerto Ricans is taxation in blood without representation.'"

-Conrad Lynn and Rafael V. Perez Marchand recalling Antonio Filardi Guzman's statements to the court during his 1950 Draft Trial in San Juan, Puerto Rico.¹⁷³

Heightening tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II ignited fears that conflict between the two nations was imminent. Draft resisters that rejected compulsory military service or civilian service alternatives faced new obstacles with the passage of the 1948 Peacetime Draft by President Harry Truman. U.S. Puerto Rican draft resisters continued to state that their draft resistance was based on religious, moral, or political reasons. However, the ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union shaped how U.S. society viewed military service as a fundamental responsibility of citizenship. Individuals and organizations that criticized the draft outside of accepted frameworks faced ostracism and potential arrest on accusations of sympathy to communists. In this tempest, draft resisters pushed back

¹⁷³ United States District Court, New Haven, Connecticut, U.S. versus Antonio Filardi Guzman and William Augustus Butler Jr, Criminal No. 8980, [hereafter called U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief]. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Conrad J. Lynn Papers [hereafter cited as the Lynn Papers]. Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Center, Boston University, Boston, MA [hereafter called the Goetlieb Archival Research Center].

against societal constructions of military service as a barometer for full citizenship by making known their opposition against compulsory military service.¹⁷⁴

Draft resisters treaded carefully during the height of Red Scare as the government surveilled and targeted individuals that politically or religiously refused participation in the draft. Organizations and individuals viewed as politically troublesome navigated organizational survival in the face of pressure, and some groups purged their ranks of known communists and nationalists. Despite this, the networks of Puerto Rican independence and U.S. Leftists continued working together during the Cold War to fight against forced military service and political repression. Military preparations for potential conflict with the Soviet Union and the proxy wars that followed saw continued Puerto Rican presence in policy planning and military recruiting in Puerto Rico. Agitation by the Nationalist Party within Puerto Rico and an assassination attempt on President Truman situated perspectives of Puerto Rican resistance to the U.S. government as nationalist extremism. In addition, the U.S. and Puerto Rican governments focused their attention on communist infiltration, connecting agitation by the Nationalist Party with conspiracies that draft resisters who did not go

¹⁷⁴ For more on perceptions of post-World War II military buildup and development, see Christian G. Appy, *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); A.J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Kimberley L. Phillips, *WAR! What is it Good For?: Black Freedom Struggles & the U.S. Military from World War II to Iraq*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Brian McAllister Linn, *Elvis's Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2016).

through the official channels of conscientious objector status were potential nationalists or communists.¹⁷⁵

One particular case presented to the Committee for Puerto Rican Justice in 1954 demonstrated the complexity of Puerto Rican anti-war resistance and attempts to conflate anti-draft sentiment with communism or nationalism. Committee members received communication from Puerto Rican educator Dr. Antonio Filardi Cantisani Sr regarding his son facing accusations of felonious assault of an inmate at a federal corrections facility in Danbury, Connecticut. Antonio Filardi Guzman was originally sentenced in Puerto Rico to five years in federal prison for resisting his draft summons and transferred to the federal prison in Danbury, which held other draft resisters and conscientious objectors.¹⁷⁶ His family suggested that their son was being set up and hoped there would be a fair trial. Filardi Guzman's resistance to the draft was framed as a matter of moral philosophy rather than a political or religious stance. During his 1950 draft trial, he opined that the imposition of military service on Puerto Ricans amounted to a blood taxation on a colonized people. Filardi Guzman's imprisonment in a facility that housed pacifists who defied their draft summons and the suspicious circumstances around the stabbing led members of the CPRJ to look at this case. The untangling of Filardi Guzman's background during the case highlighted the various currents of draft

¹⁷⁵ "Puerto Rican Radicals Known as Minority Group,"; "Puerto Rico now is Big Problem," *Austin Statesman*, Nov. 4, 1950.

¹⁷⁶ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief; Antonio Filardi Cantisani Sr. to Ruth Reynolds, June 1, 1954. Both in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.

resistance claims during the Cold War and how the political climate converged subversive political and social elements into the same box.¹⁷⁷

This chapter discusses the continued fight by Puerto Rican draft resisters during the height of the Cold War. The association of draft resistance with Nationalism and Communism from the post-Nationalist Uprising is central to the case of Antonio Filardi-Guzman, a Puerto Rican who resisted the draft in 1950 for moral reasons. An incident in prison led to the accusation that he murdered an inmate and brought his draft case to the attention of U.S allies at the same time they organized their efforts to assist imprisoned Nationalists. The case demonstrated the complexity of draft resistance and the interpretation of Puerto Rican draft resistance by U.S. officials. Furthermore, the work of U.S. allies to provide support and justice to Filardi Guzman illustrates the continued dissent and resistance by citizens against the U.S. government during the Cold War despite threats of repression.¹⁷⁸ This chapter focuses on how secular and religious-based groups worked together to defend the rights of Puerto Rican draft resisters. Despite internal debate about connecting with Puerto Rican independence advocates and Cold War fears of being aligned with subversive politics, the pacifistic networks worked to defend those facing government suppression. Situating their defense of Puerto Rican draft resisters and other political subversives through a protection of civil liberties, this

¹⁷⁷ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief; A.J. Muste to Harold Hagstrom, May 14, 1954. Both in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.

¹⁷⁸ Andrea Friedman, *Citizenship in Cold War America: The National Security State and the Possibilities of Dissent* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014), 1-11.

alliance of U.S. based Christian pacifists and Puerto Ricans defined their citizenship to argue against U.S. treatment of political subversives.

Post-World War II geopolitical tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union shifted to an ideological Cold War that influenced the political and social order of the U.S. Public and institutional fears of communism led the U.S. government to surveil individuals and organizations that did not conform to political or societal norms, an action that was mirrored in Puerto Rico. Although government efforts to remove communism began well before 1948, the actions of governments to curb internal dissent led to criticism of the power of governments to curb the rights of citizens. Historian Andrea Friedman notes that the national security state choice of targets determined who was regarded as full citizens and that this influenced the targeting of political and social non-conformists during the Cold War. Their choices displayed the contradiction of a public and government who championed individual civil liberties while also calling for the suppression of suspected communists or other perceived threats and societal outliers.¹⁷⁹

War resisters and conscientious objectors faced increased scrutiny from the federal government and public for their position on military service and affiliations with activist networks. Historian Lorrin Thomas notes that the intensification of red baiting during the Cold War meant that any critique of U.S. policy led to labeling as an unreliable citizen susceptible to sympathies with the Nationalist Party or communism.

¹⁷⁹ Friedman, 1-11; Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-17.

Individuals that went through the proper channels of enlisting for non-combat roles or applying for CO status faced scrutiny for their ties with communists from participation in the Popular Front of the 1930s and 1940s. Puerto Rican Christians and non-Nationalist independence advocates critical of military service faced similar examination from the Puerto Rican and U.S. government. The solidarity networks that advocated for Puerto Rico's independence and draft resisters grappled with maintaining network cohesion under the threat of U.S. government surveillance.¹⁸⁰

Pacifist networks focused their legal approach of draft resisters on a defense of individual civil liberties against the national security state. This stance allowed U.S.-based organizations to defend their allies while also debating how they defined Puerto Rico's self-determination in the post-war era. U.S. pacifists acknowledged the ties between the government and military while also working with the Puerto Rican government and the U.S. military to ensure COs were protected. Puerto Rican military service and mobilization of civilians during World War II was an important marker of post-war readiness and economic development. *Populares* leader Luis Muñoz Marín, an early advocate for independence, shifted his advocacy for Puerto Rico's future because Puerto Rico would continue to be an important strategic location for the United States as the Cold War escalated. The PPDs rise within Puerto Rico's politics during the 1940s,

¹⁸⁰ Lorrin Thomas, *Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 136-137, 146-152; Yuichi Moroi, *Ethics of Conviction and Civic Responsibility: Conscientious Objectors in America during the World Wars* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008), 1-15.

culminating with Muñoz Marín becoming the first elected governor of Puerto Rico in 1948, led the party grappling with how to define Puerto Rico's self-determination.¹⁸¹

Post-World War II anti-war and anti-draft sentiment maintained its fringe position in Puerto Rican politics and society because of its attachment to the nationalist party. Individuals expressing moral or religious objections faced examinations of their political pasts. Additionally, the other major political parties supported individual military service and the part played by the military in Puerto Rico's economic revitalization. Historian Harry Franquí-Rivera notes that each political party, save the Nationalists, supported the war effort and military service to advance their goals for a post-war Puerto Rico. Non-nationalists like Erasmo Vando viewed military service as a mechanism to prove Puerto Rico's responsibility to govern independently without succumbing to anti-Americanism or Communist ideology. Furthermore, Franquí-Rivera asserts that Puerto Rico's industrial revitalization and the role of soldiers in the economic, social, and political change symbolized the PPD's promotion of a way to deal with the status issue outside of independence or statehood. Cognizant of the alignment of their position with the nationalists, draft resisters and pacifists worked to protect their interests while maintaining the relationships built with individuals that might be sympathetic or members of the movement.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Harry Franquí-Rivera, *Soldiers of the Nation: Military Service and Modern Puerto Rico, 1868-1952* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), 162-168.

¹⁸² "Speech, Erasmo Vando, January 1, 1943. Vando Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Franquí-Rivera, 162-168, 178-180.

The political dominance of *el Partido Popular Democrático* (PPD) in Puerto Rican politics and the continued advocacy of violence by the Nationalists placed discussion of independence further on the political fringes. This shift on independence was highlighted by attempts from the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico to violently confront U.S. and Puerto Rican officials in October 1950, leading to the destruction of the party as a political entity. Additionally, the solidarity networks formed by Puerto Rican independence activists and U.S. liberals and leftists centered on draft resistance, independence, and the plight of political prisoners fractured over the PNPR's use of violence.¹⁸³ Pure pacifists continued to question why discussions of independence privileged the nationalists' perspective. Additionally, they viewed the PPD's popular support and political dominance as a signal that the people have chosen their path to self-determination. Facing political repression from the U.S. government during the Cold War because of direct or indirect ties to individuals who sympathized with Communists or revolutionaries, U.S. liberals and leftists' organizations attempted to dissolve problematic associations to survive for their bigger causes.¹⁸⁴

U.S. social movements during the Red Scare made strategic choices to ensure their organizational and ideological survival. Committees and organizations aligned with Leftist and Liberal causes in the United States switched their affiliation to organizations that would not cause suspicion or purged membership rolls of Communists, Anarchists,

¹⁸³ Franquí-Rivera, 171-177.

¹⁸⁴ Herman Will to A.J. Muste and John Nevin Sayre, February 13, 1945. FOR Papers, Ex Secy General Correspondence. Series A-3, folder 10, Box 15, Files on Puerto Rico Independence, Swarthmore Peace Collection; See Vanessa Cook, *Spiritual Socialists: Religion and the American Left* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 3-7, 134-135; Marion Mollin, *Radical Pacifism in Modern America: Egalitarianism and Protest* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 46-54.

and Nationalists. Organizations also disbanded when the disruptive or violent actions of members or allies became public news. The American League for Puerto Rico Independence (ALPRI) dissolved in November 1950 after Puerto Rican Nationalists launched attacks throughout the island and attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman. Additionally, ALPRI Executive Secretary Ruth Reynolds was arrested in Puerto Rico in November because of her proximity to the Nationalists. In a statement to the *New York Times* on November 8th, ALPRI President J. Holmes Smith stated his disapproval of the Nationalists' use of violence and the need for a "fresh approach to the problem of Puerto Rico's political status with new forces taking an active part in a thorough inquiry."¹⁸⁵ Smith additionally highlighted ALPRI's lack of official connection with any political parties in the U.S. or Puerto Rico, obscuring the fact that Albizu and the New York Nationalists acted as advisors in the organization's creation in 1944.

Historians note that the Red Scare fractured the coalitions among Liberals and Leftists in the US built throughout the 1930s and 1940s. ALPRI's retreat from publicly advocating for the Nationalists, despite seven years of collaborative work with Albizu and the PNPR that was often criticized by fellow pacifists, demonstrated the potential reprisals facing U.S. organizations aligning with individuals or groups deemed subversive. Liberals and leftists feared government reprisals during the early Cold War, including the banning of organizations sympathetic to Communists or radical

¹⁸⁵ ALPRI Disbands Announcement. Box 18 Folder 3, "American League for Puerto Rico Independence, 1948-1954." Reynolds Papers, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; "Freedom League Disbands," *New York Times*, November 8, 1950. Friedman, 130-142.

revolutionaries. Heightened tensions with the Soviet Union and fears of a communist plot against the U.S. sparked federal loyalty oaths to government employees that trickled down to the local level. U.S. Pacifist and Liberal attention to Puerto Rico's independence, particularly the political relationship between U.S. based Christian pacifists and Puerto Rican Nationalists, mirrored the Popular Front philosophy of working for a common cause despite ideological differences. Increased surveillance by state and federal authorities led organizations to disavow official connection with individuals deemed political subversives, evident in Smith distancing himself from association with the PNPR.¹⁸⁶

Pacifists and Leftists critical of colleagues' alignment with the Nationalists verbalized their opinions in the aftermath of the Nationalist Uprising. In the periodical *The New Leader*, contributors dedicated a special issue to Puerto Rico's status question. A number of the writers maintained their support for Puerto Rico's status but pointed to Nationalists' irrational use of violence in promoting independence and protection of individuals incarcerated for resistance. Contributor Ruperto Ruiz, leader of the Spanish American Youth Bureau in New York, covered how the Nationalists lost political currency in the 1940s through the rise of Muñoz Marín's PPD. He highlighted the working relationship between Muñoz's political party with Presidents Roosevelt and Truman opening the door for gubernatorial elections, weakening the PNPR's argument of US colonial repression. Furthermore, Ruiz implied that the PNPR was not a dominant

¹⁸⁶ Associated Press, "Freedom League Disbands," *New York Times*, November 8, 1950; Friedman, 130-142.

force among the independence factions after the formation of the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) in 1946. The prevalent attitude of Ruiz and other contributors was that the Nationalist revolt was a desperate effort to disrupt the democratic process by a group of fanatics with little public support. Moreover, they argued that the PNPR's actions portrayed the Puerto Rican people in a negative light and subjected them to increased discrimination and hardship.¹⁸⁷

U.S. Puerto Rican leaders like Ruiz feared that violence and demonstrations would be projected upon the Puerto Rican people despite the Nationalist Party's loss of political currency during the 1940s and the PPD's growing political influence and working relationship with the U.S. government. Ruiz verbalized his worry by stating that he hoped these incidents would not "stimulate discrimination in employment and housing; increase juvenile delinquency and gang warfare; and foster new resentment" among people in the U.S.¹⁸⁸ Portrayals in media after World War II depicted Puerto Ricans, the newest migration wave, as a group stuck in perpetual poverty, socially deviant, and disinterested in assimilation. In addition, U.S. political operatives perceived Puerto Rican migrants as a pawn of U.S. political machines, a common criticism against new migrants in the U.S.¹⁸⁹ In response to this, Puerto Rican leaders in U.S.

¹⁸⁷ Article of *The New Leader*, November 13, 1950. Folder 3, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940's-1950's: Puerto Rico-Independence miscellany, 1945-1955, Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History; Thomas, 144-147.

¹⁸⁸ Article of *The New Leader*, November 13, 1950. Folder 3, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940's-1950's: Puerto Rico-Independence miscellany, 1945-1955, Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History.

¹⁸⁹ Article of *The New Leader*, November 13, 1950. Folder 3, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940's-1950's: Puerto Rico-Independence miscellany, 1945-1955, Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History. Contributions of journalists and social scientists from 1950 to 1970 to the study of post war Puerto Rican migration to New York stigmatized the community as stuck in perpetual poverty, socially deviant, and disinterested in assimilation. A common link among those early writers was focusing on Oscar Lewis' culture of poverty in the U.S. Puerto Rican community as a moral or obligatory failing of family members

communities worked hard to illustrate the sacrifices migrants made to move to the United States. Current scholarship highlights the PPD department of migration's role in recruiting Puerto Ricans to find work in the United States and subsequently return home with skills to develop the island. Puerto Rican leaders wanted to ensure that citizens migrating and working in the United States were given a fair chance.¹⁹⁰

Ruperto Ruiz's essay in *The New Leader* assessed the rise of the PPD and informed the public of Muñoz Marín's political program built on inclusion and solutions that contrasted with Nationalistic defiance and promotion of violence. Both political projects attempted to create a unifying Puerto Rican national identity while still under colonial control. Scholar Arlene Davila connects the PPD's rise with their emphasis on cultural artifacts and symbols to unify politics which simultaneously avoided the racial, class-based, and political tensions in Puerto Rico. The PPD's created broad coalitions with U.S. government officials under the Roosevelt administration that championed assisting the working class. This approach was part of a larger program that brought

that situated families and community members as deviant and poor while ignoring the complexities of the broader community. For a comprehensive look at the role of social science and policy toward the poor, see Alice O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth Century U.S. History* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2002). For those who pushed against this depiction and illustrated the political and social establishment of early Puerto Rican communities in the United States, see Virginia Sánchez Korrol, *From Colonia to Community: The History of Puerto Ricans in New York City, 1917-1948* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995 [1983]), 3-7; Sonia Song-Ha Lee, *Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement: Puerto Ricans, African Americans and the Pursuit of Racial Justice in New York City* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 121-124, 144-147.

¹⁹⁰ Eileen Suarez Finley demonstrates the outreach of the PPD and Muñoz Marín to send rural laborers to the US to gain skills and the trek of migrants to the United States. See Eileen J. Suarez Findlay, *We are Left without a Father Here: Masculinity, Domesticity, and Migration in Postwar Puerto Rico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014). For more on Puerto Rican migration and the Department of Migration, see Edgardo Meléndez, *Sponsored Migrations: The State and Puerto Rican Post War Migration to the United States* (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2018).

people together as an independent political force for social change in contrast to the Nationalists and Albizu. Both political projects further separated themselves from the Nationalists by implementing religious themes and terminology into their vision of Puerto Rico.¹⁹¹

The Nationalist Party's rigid vision of Puerto Rican independence and cultural identity informed Ruiz's observation of the fringe position the Nationalists had among the Puerto Rican public and other independence factions. Religious scholar Anthony Stevens-Arroyo analyzed Albizu Campos' political and religious awakening while a student at Harvard. He posits that exposure to Irish resistance movements against English rule inform his rigid nationalism that rejected any interference from a Protestant nation.¹⁹² Albizu's speeches during the late 1940s insinuated the Puerto Rican people were ignorant and easily manipulated by misinformation from the U.S. and Puerto Rican governments. The Puerto Rican Communist Party noted that Albizu maintained a popular following. However, the PNPR and Albizu's rhetoric proclaiming Puerto Rican opponents as ignorant traitors pushed people away from the Nationalists. According to scholar Ramon Grosfugel, Nationalist Party discourse often blames ignorance and fear of the people when popular support wanes. The Nationalists' rejection of military service

¹⁹¹ Arlene Davila, *Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997), 1-23; Nathaniel Cordova, "The Constitutive Force of the Catecismo del Pueblo in Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party Campaign, 1938-1940," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90, no. 2 (2004), 212-233.

¹⁹² "Because of the Political dissent of the Puerto Rican Communist Party." Subject Files. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo, "Jaime Balmes Redux: Catholicism as Civilization in the Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos," in *Bridging the Atlantic Toward a Reassessment of Iberian and Latin American Cultural Ties*, ed. Marina Perez de Mendola (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 137-147.

followed this tactic, with members of the PNPR accusing those that did serve in the military as ignorant traitors. The consequence of this position placed other draft resisters at risk of being associated with the PNPR and Albizu.¹⁹³

Like Albizu, Munoz Marin built his political program on his understanding of religious themes that would appeal to Puerto Ricans. Rhetorician Nathaniel Cordova suggests that the PPD and Munoz Marin's outreach to working class jibaros succeeded because they incorporated religious articles and language in their political platform. Centering the political experience as a religious duty, Cordova notes that the PPD's message created a rhetorical covenant with the people. Though membership into the covenant is based on political participation, outsider status is publicly situated on those that oppress the people and do not conform to the future vision of the nation state.¹⁹⁴ Scholar Arlene Dávila demonstrates how the PPD infused their populist message of economic reform with a cultural component that aimed to prepare the island for modernity and construct a nationalist identity that could coexist under U.S. political authority. Ruiz and U.S. pacifists criticizing political groups who advocated for violent revolution praised the PPDs' electoral referendum from the people and their willingness to work collaboratively within the system for Puerto Rico's future.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Section. Office of Public and Congressional Affairs. Pedro Albizu Campos. 105-11898, Section VI; Ramon Grosfoguel, "The Divorce of Nationalist Discourses from the Puerto Rican People: A Socio-Historical Perspective," in *Puerto Rican Jam: Essays on Culture and Politics*, eds. Frances Negron Muntaner and Ramon Grosfoguel, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 64-72.

¹⁹⁴ Cordova, 212-233.

¹⁹⁵ Article of *The New Leader*, November 13, 1950. Folder 3, Box 2R596, General Files: 1940's-1950's: Puerto Rico-Independence miscellany, 1945-1955, Farmer Papers, Briscoe Center for American History; Davila, 25-38.

The image of Puerto Rico from the PNP and the PPD placed draft resisters in a particular predicament of how they fit into the political project. Nationalist draft resistance was inspired by defiance against directives of the U.S. and Puerto Rican governments rather than a rejection of violence or religious abhorrence of war. Individuals that avoided the draft for moral or religious convictions but conformed to alternative service were viewed with skepticism by the Nationalists. One example of this was the Nationalists critiquing pacifists for willingly accepting incarceration in camps instead of fighting U.S. authority.¹⁹⁶ Absolute pacifists that would not accept alternative service and did not support violence were placed in the predicament of having to show the government that their draft rejection was morally and religiously informed and not connected to the Nationalists. Despite misgivings from individual pacifists about the CPS camps at the end of World War II, the programs provided a place for pacifists to maintain their conviction to not kill and do works that benefited Puerto Rico's infrastructure. Additionally, pacifist and Nationalist critiques of the increased militarization of Puerto Rico minimized how the war industry and military participation were popularly supported as a marker of economic improvement for Puerto Rico's political future.¹⁹⁷

The willingness to defend Communists and Puerto Rican Nationalists uncovered internal tensions within pacifist circles over how members could justify association with

¹⁹⁶ "Concentration Camps in Puerto Rico." Puerto Rico Independence, 1942-1948, The CORE Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.

¹⁹⁷ John D'Emilio, *Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin* (New York: Free Press, 2003), 72-75; Franqui-Rivera, 162-168.

problematic allies. This was evident in conflicts between FOR members and former members of the ALPRI concerning their collaboration with Puerto Rican nationalists, specifically during the Cold War. In letters to A.J. Muste and the Peacemakers organization, pacifist missionaries Bob and Lillian Pope questioned Ruth Reynolds' dedication to pacifism during her incarceration in Puerto Rico. They critiqued Reynolds' affiliation with the Nationalists, specifically her lack of verbal condemnation for Albizu Campos or the PNPR's violent rhetoric and actions. Reiterating a point made by acquaintance Dr. Rafael Navarro, the Popes suggested that Ruth's claims of pacifism caused great harm to the pacifist cause in Puerto Rico, specifically pacifist outreach to the public and the Puerto Rican government. Reverend Ralph Templin, answering a previous letter from the Popes, pushed back against the policing of a specific type of pacifism in a defense of Ruth Reynolds. Despite his own misgivings about her affiliations, Templin resisted the insinuation that Ruth's activism was a rejection of pure pacifism and called for attention to the threat to individual civil liberties.¹⁹⁸

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, individuals aligned with Christian pacifists dialogued with Puerto Rico's political factions concerning Puerto Rico's economic and political position. Despite proclamations of being apolitical, some pacifist colleagues, theologians, and Puerto Rican officials wondered if organizations like the FOR, the ALPRI, and Peacemakers overly supported the island's independence factions,

¹⁹⁸ Bob and Lillian Pope to A.J. Muste, RE: Your "Report on Visit to Ruth Reynolds in Puerto Rico," July 29, 1951; Ralph Templin to Bob and Lillian Pope, July 17, 1951. All in Peacemakers: Puerto Rico Campaign-correspondence, 1951. Series C: Ernest and Marion Together. Ernest and Marion Bromley Papers, Swarthmore Peace Collection.

specifically the Nationalists. A letter exchange between Ernest Bromley and Catholic Reverend Evrard Stueber focused on pacifist tenants and Puerto Rico's status demonstrated outside perceptions of the pacifists' work in Puerto Rico. In his letter, Stueber lamented that an organization that appeared devoted to a biblical sense of justice would "align itself with a narrow and petty nationalistic cause in Puerto Rico."¹⁹⁹

Stueber's critique of the pacifists' affiliation with the Puerto Rican Nationalists also connected to his skepticism of the dictates of pacifism despite his stated admiration for the work of pacifists like Bromley. He reflected on the Catholic Worker movement and how members like Michael Harrington used pious language to build their point but "resort to a tour de force" in their rhetoric when dealing with the central argument of pacifism. Stueber's view on pacifism suggests that pure pacifism needs to happen for the world to change rather than change coming from acts of violence. Stueber's focus on Harrington's rhetoric and other pacifist speeches corresponds with scholar Vanessa Cook's observation that religious rhetoric allowed those on the religious left to set a moral tone detaching themselves from communism as they struggled to survive the Red Scare. Despite Stueber's respect for pacifists, he held the opinion that "once the aggressor has been converted there is no need to justify defense, but until that time I will hold to the morality of defense." The exchange between Stueber and Bromley illustrated

¹⁹⁹ Reverend Evrard Stueber to Ernest Bromley, October 30, 1951. Series C: Ernest and Marion Together. Ernest and Marion Bromley Papers. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

the tensions the US Left, particularly Christian pacifists, faced concerning their alignments and rhetoric not matching.²⁰⁰

The Cold War atmosphere motivated religious and political leftists to craft an anti-war message centered on the protection of civil liberties to avoid accusations of communism from U.S. authorities. Historian Marian Mollin notes that the FOR and other pacifist groups during the Red Scare developed their messages with no direct connection to Communism despite working to assist individual communists with legal aid. In the case of the FORs relationships with Puerto Rican independence advocates, Communists and Nationalists, they framed collaborations as attention to Puerto Rico's status and defending the civil liberties of U.S. citizens.²⁰¹ Pacifist Ruth Reynolds' ties to the Nationalists and her arrest after the attempted uprising by the Nationalists in November 1950 led the ALPRI to disband. Although the need to preserve the bigger mission caused some pacifists to take a hardline against members that affiliated with the Nationalists, others stated the need to "plunge in with sympathy...than stand back and articulate a perfect approach of non-violence."²⁰² In their message, they asserted their organizational abhorrence to the Nationalists' violent tactics while also demanding that Reynolds and Puerto Ricans arrested for connection to the uprising received equitable treatment from authorities.

²⁰⁰ Reverend Evrard Stueber to Ernest Bromley, October 30, 1951. Series C: Ernest and Marion Together. Ernest and Marion Bromley Papers. Swarthmore Peace Collection; Cook, 134-135.

²⁰¹ Mollin, 46-54; Thomas, 136-137, 146-151.

²⁰² Dave (?) to Wallace (Wally) Nelson, June 11, 1951. Series C: Ernest and Marion Together. Ernest and Marion Bromley Papers. Swarthmore Peace Collection; "Freedom League Disbands," *New York Times*, November 8, 1950.

Self-preservation efforts by organizations and the ideological disagreements among pacifists did not destroy the dedication to non-violent action and social justice by individual Pacifists advocating for Puerto Rican political prisoners. Historian Andrea Friedman suggests that the narrative of the national security state stamping out all forms of dissent in the U.S. during the Cold War is overstated.²⁰³ This is evident in the actions of former ALPRI members using their status as U.S. citizens to critique the U.S. government's abuse of civic and human rights of Puerto Ricans imprisoned for participation in the 1950 Uprising, or for suspected ties with the PNP or Communists, and draft resisters. Christian pacifists organized defense committees like the Committee for Puerto Rican Justice to ensure Puerto Rican prisoners received fair treatment in prison and legal counsel in court, Committee members A.J. Muste, Waldo Frank, Ralph Templin, and Bayard Rustin had experience collaborating with Puerto Ricans to support political and religious resisters since the late 1930s. Using their personal networks for fundraising and legal assistance, the defense committees situated the defense of Puerto Ricans and allies arrested for subversive actions as a defense of individual civil liberties.²⁰⁴

Throughout the 1950s, civil rights lawyer Conrad Lynn worked cases for Puerto Ricans accused of sedition as legal counsel alongside Puerto Ricans Julio Pinto Gandía, Juan Hernández Valle, and Rafael Pérez-Marchand. Pinto's role as a legal intermediary

²⁰³ Friedman, 1-15; Margaret Power, "Puerto Rican Women Nationalists vs. U.S. Colonialism: An Exploration of their Conditions and Struggles in Jail and Court," *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 87, no. 2 (2012), 463-480.

²⁰⁴ A.J. Muste to Ralph Templin, September 24, 1951, Series C: Ernest and Marion Together. Ernest and Marion Bromley Papers. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

for Puerto Rican defendants facing sedition charges from US and Puerto Rican officials developed a defense strategy that ensured the protection of imprisoned U.S. citizens who were political and social non-conformists.²⁰⁵ In letters to committee members, Lynn discussed the roadblocks placed upon him by the Puerto Rican courts and the role of Hernandez Valle and Pinto Gandía to ensure his path to represent Reynolds and Albizu Campos. Additionally, he wrote extensively about the conduct of the imprisoned juxtaposed to their jailers. In one specific recollection, Lynn commented on Albizu's gentle disposition and courteous to "his jailers...the cop who provided the motorcycle escort...the district attorney...the judge...the jurors, to all the jackals who are sending him to his death."²⁰⁶ Lynn also recalled the looks of bystanders toward Albizu Campos, opining that their expressions were respect mixed with fear. Despite a vast separation in ideology with the PNPR or CPUSA, war resisters and other political non-conformists in the U.S. and Puerto Rico faced a Cold War climate that designated them as potential threats to national security.

Providing legal aid in this Cold War climate necessitated defining civil liberties and human rights as a core tenant of defense. For pacifists fearful of links to communism, defending the rights of U.S. citizens allowed the projection of plausible deniability. However, Puerto Ricans with no official ties to the Nationalists faced a

²⁰⁵ A.J. Muste to Warden Harold Hagstrom, May 14, 1954. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.; Nella Van Dyke and Holly McCammon, *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 272; Ramon Bosque-Perez and Jose Javier Morera, *Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), 1-10.

²⁰⁶ Conrad J. Lynn to Julius Eichel, August 4, 1951. Series C: Ernest and Marion Together. Ernest and Marion Bromley Papers. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

conflation of their stances for independence to the violent rhetoric and actions of the Nationalist Party and Pedro Albizu Campos. Individuals that did not conform to the political spectrum of the island or US navigated the legal system with assistance from pacifists' committees to ensure that their moral or religious stance was supported in court. Focus on a defendant's personal and religious background provided defense counsels for Puerto Ricans arrested for subversive acts after World War II to argue that their incarceration was politically motivated.

In 1954, the committee assigned Conrad Lynn as legal counsel to prisoner Antonio Filardi Guzman, who was accused of an assault in Danbury Federal Prison. The Danbury facility traditionally housed war resisters, including many pacifists. The controversy of the case led Lynn and co-counsel Raphael Perez-Marchand to obtain information about the assault and their client's background. After obtaining the Filardi Guzman's background, they unearth a case of a political war resister that defied his draft summons in early 1950 after being expelled from the University of Puerto Rico. Working with the committee, Lynn, A.J. Muste, and the CPRJ learned from Antonio Filardi Cantisani Sr. and his family the back history of Antonio Filardi Guzman's life and what led him to be incarcerated in Danbury.²⁰⁷

Filardi Guzman's draft opposition and political activity formulated during his time as a student at the University of Puerto Rico (UPR). Lynn's background check noted the dedication Filardi Guzman and his family held for education as Antonio

²⁰⁷ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief; Conrad Lynn to Warden Hagstrom, May 14, 1954. Both in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.

excelled in Catholic-run educational programs and public school. He was admitted as a free tuition student to the University of Puerto Rico in Rio Piedras because of his grades. Filardi Guzman academically distinguished himself during his freshman year and was provided an opportunity to study abroad in Cuba.²⁰⁸ Beginning his freshman year, Filardi Guzman became involved in student politics and opposed student repression by university administration at the University of Puerto Rico during the spring of 1949. Student movements against university administrators were not an isolated incident and occurred continuously throughout the 1940s. Six months prior to Filardi Guzman's enrollment as a student at UPR, student demonstrations during the spring of 1948 centered on the administrations clash with independence and nationalist supporting students. Disagreements over changing university policy concerning guest speakers on campus sparked violence around the university and administrative measures that limited student activity and expelled students viewed as political threats. The response to students by the Puerto Rican government and UPR administration led pacifists like Ruth Reynolds to travel to Puerto Rico to learn about the situation. Despite the placement of measures by university administration to quell student dissent, pushback continued under new student leadership.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ Antonio Filardi Cantisani Sr. to Ruth Reynolds, June 1, 1954. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center; Friedman, 1-15; Thomas, 136-142. Historian Solsiree Del Moral mentions in her monograph that the scholarship system was an attempt by the Department of Education to reward high achieving K-12 students, specifically those that attended public school and maintained a GPA of 3.5 or more. However, Del Moral highlights that the Puerto Rican legislature never allocated enough funds to meet the demand, which pushed students and parents to appeal to the government based on their own expectations as citizens within the colonial state. For more, see Solsiree Del Moral, *Negotiating Empire: The Cultural Politics of Schools in Puerto Rico, 1898-1952* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013), 155-158.

²⁰⁹ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief; Antonio Filardi Cantisani Sr. to Ruth Reynolds, June 1, 1954. Both in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center; On

Filardi Guzman's actions against university administration was a continuation of discontent at UPR regarding student political activities that also caught the attention of US pacifists. UPR student leaders met with colleagues and allies throughout the academic year to discuss student issues at the university. Ideological fights between student and the UPR administration did not dissipate after the strikes of 1948 that saw students arrested and expelled. Filardi Guzman and students affiliated with the student organization *el Union del Pueblo* publicly questioned Rector Jaime Benitez's decisions regarding university policy on student political expression and what they viewed as administrative overreach in university life. Rector Benitez's decision in 1948 to ban Pedro Albizu Campos from speaking on campus increased tensions between independence leaning students and the school administration. A major student grievance was the delayed election of a new Student Council, whose previous occupants had been expelled after the 1948 Strikes. University inaction in establishing elections led student leaders to wonder if the administration were purposefully deferring a new election because of university regulations stating that the solicitation of a general assembly of students to the Dean of Students could only be done by the Student Council.²¹⁰

The urge to call a general assembly by independence leaning student leaders was amplified when the American Commission on Dependent Territories (ACDT) in 1949

behalf of the ALPRI, Reynolds traveled to Puerto Rico in 1948 to observe the opinion of Puerto Rico's status and report on the issues of UPR administrators suppressing student free speech. The manuscript of her findings was meant to be turned into a book, which did not occur until the 1980s because of her arrest in 1950 as part of the Nationalist sweeps and the lack of a publisher. For more, see Ruth M. Reynolds, *Campus in Bondage: A 1948 Microcosm of Puerto Rico in Bondage* (New York: Hunter College/City University of New York Press, 1989).

²¹⁰ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goettlieb Archival Research Center.

declared that Puerto Rico should be afforded the opportunity as a nation to choose their own destiny. Student leaders interpreted this as international recognition of Puerto Rico's sovereignty as a nation and grew frustrated at the inability to discuss the findings of the Havana Conference in a general assembly. Incapable of finding common ground with Rector Benitez and university administrators, UPR student leaders like Filardi Guzman attempted to pressure university officials by verbalizing their grievances with outside entities. Independence leaning student groups first reached out to the ACDT, expressing their solidarity with the Havana Conference's decision on Puerto Rico and informing them of the UPR administration's restrictions on the civil liberties of the student body. Additionally, student leaders like Filardi Guzman and Gilberto Lebrón Torres sent letters to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the American League for Puerto Rico's Independence (ALPRI) to state their grievance of being prevented from holding meetings to discuss their solidarity with the findings of the Havana commission.²¹¹

Filardi Guzman and Lebrón Torres' appeal for support from the ACLU and ALPRI did not occur at random. *El Union del Pueblo* followed the example of UPR student leaders from the previous year that asked for assistance from U.S. based organizations. During the 1948 UPR strikes, the ACLU received communication from student leaders on campus that accused Rector Benitez and university administrators of civil liberties violations and escalating violence against the student body. UPR students

²¹¹ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center; Reynolds, 278-282.

also reached out to groups like the ALPRI asking for outsiders that were familiar with Puerto Rico's political situation to observe the situation.²¹² The ACLU sent the students a message that distanced themselves from supporting student accusations of civil liberties violations because of their view that the clashes between students and administrators was political partisanship. Their decision sparked confusion from UPR students and US pacifists, including Ruth Reynolds inquiring to Arthur Garfield Hays why the organization refrains from investigating the matter because of the politics.²¹³

Reynolds position with the ALPRI and dedication to a Christian pacifist ethic of solidarity led her to forcefully disagree with the decision of the ACLU, going as far as to accuse the organization of being blinded to UPR administrators' connections to the PPD. During the strikes at UPR in 1948, Reynolds traveled to Puerto Rico as a representative of the ALPRI to provide context about the situation to her contacts. Reynolds and the ALPRI maintained that the ACLU's attempt to be above partisanship should not blind the organization from investigating any accusation of civil liberties violations. In a report about continued student protests during 1949, ALPRI noted that the issue of student civil liberties violations in 1948 that led to student strikes and university repression continued during the 1949 academic year. At the same time, the ALPRI faced similar criticism

²¹² A History of the Violations of the Civil Rights of the Puerto Rican University Students, 1948; Memorandum: Sobre la Crisis en la Universidad de Puerto Rico. Both in Reynolds Papers. Box 33, folder 3, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1948. Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

²¹³ ACLU to the Students and Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, June 7, 1948; Ruth Reynolds to Arthur Garfield Hays, June 10, 1948. Both in Box 10, Folder 1, CORE PR File. The CORE Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society.

about their own objectivity about Puerto Rico because of their partnership with the Nationalist Party.²¹⁴

The battle over civil liberties between independence leaning students and the UPR administration continued during the 1948-1949 academic year. Lebrón Torres and Filardi Guzman reached out to ACLU director Roger Baldwin and asked why a policy enacted by the university that limited partisan political actors or organizations from using campus facilities was claimed to have been recommended by the ACLU. They pointed to the banning of the President of the Communist Party of Puerto Rico, Cesar Andreu Iglesias, from a campus appearance and the double standard of political events hosted on campus by the PPD and Munoz Marin. Baldwin replied that the controversies over the last few years necessitated a halt of any political meetings on campus and that if the actions stated by the students did happen, they would act promptly despite the lack of faith independence leaning UPR students held for the ACLU. The ALPRI, observing the 1949 UPR issues independently, criticized Baldwin's defense of the UPR administration and the continued suppression of the student body as a political or social entity discussing international findings concerning Puerto Rico's status.²¹⁵

²¹⁴ Ruth Reynolds to Arthur Garfield Hays, June 10, 1948. Box 10, Folder 1, CORE PR File. The CORE Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society; U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center. For more on the ACLU, ALPRI, and UPR students, see Reynolds, 198-215.

²¹⁵ Roger Baldwin to the Students and Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, June 7, 1948; U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center. For more on university actions against freedom of expression of students and professors deemed subversive, see Ellen Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 1-15.

Cognizant that public demonstrations might lead to a repeat of violent clashes with local and federal authorities, student leaders drew attention to the politics of the university and Puerto Rico's status through subversive actions within campus regulations. One example of this included students handing out handbills of their grievances with the university on the first anniversary of the closing of UPR following the 1948 strikes. Included in the pamphlet were the words of Puerto Rican House member Ernesto Ramos Antonini of the *Populares* stating that the actions of the university against students the previous year needed to be investigated further. During another incident, Filardi Guzman gave an impromptu speech about the university's treatment of students after receiving an award for essay writing. Asking to speak to the audience after receiving his award, Filardi Guzman launched into a critique of the suppression of academic speech and expression on campus reading a letter drafted by himself and Lebrón Torres. The letter detailed student grievances against the administration, including their refusal to allow students to discuss the Havana Conference. The impromptu diversion was a strategic choice as this occurred while Dr. Luis Alberto Sanchez, the former rector of San Marcos University in Peru and champion of academic and national liberty, was in attendance to observe the award winners and give a guest lecture. The incident was reported to have embarrassed university officials who could only watch in silence as students urged Filardi Guzman on.²¹⁶

²¹⁶ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center; Reynolds, 278-282.

Remembering the suppression of students strikes the previous academic year, Filardi Guzman and other student organizers encouraged indirect action through noninvolvement in the Commencement activities. On commencement day, student organizers passed out handbills that reiterated the grievances of overreach by the University administration, specifically targeting Rector Benitez. The handbills accused Rector Benitez of being an instrument of U.S. military intervention through the university and the promotion of a bill in the senate that suppressed the representation and participation of the student body in the University Board. They listed four specific complaints about university administrators under Rector Benitez concerning his attempt to use graduation as a mask for his suppression of student rights, going as far as to state his complicity for the expulsion of students and teachers that did not conform to his dictates. The handbill further stated Benitez and the administration were responsible for the violence against the student body by police and military forces. Student leaders like Filardi Guzman verbalized their opposition to what they viewed as U.S. military repression and the curbing of academic freedom by university administrators.²¹⁷

Directing their criticism as a plot by outside forces to suppress student voices, UPR student leaders on the left viewed the actions of the university administration as complicit with U.S. government plans for Puerto Rico. The fight over the limits of academic freedom in university spaces mirrored critiques of local and national efforts to suppress individual expression. As historian Ellen Schrecker notes, many academic

²¹⁷ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.

institutions and administrators during the Cold War/McCarthy era sided with the government to oust subversive faculty and students in the name of national security. Students verbalized their frustrations by stating that the UPR administration was attempting to curb academic freedom by allowing outside forces to determine who would teach and what ideas would be voiced on campus.²¹⁸ Additionally, student leaders reached out to the two university administrators designated as recipients of honorary doctoral degrees for their contributions to the arts and politics. Puerto Rican born stage actor José Ferrer received a letter from student leaders but rejected their outreach and accepted the university's offer. Filardi Guzman traveled to Cuba in 1949 to implore the second recipient, novelist and exiled former president of Venezuela Dr. Rómulo Gallegos, from accepting the honor. Their message to the dignitaries accused the university and government of Puerto Rico of being a tool of U.S. imperialism and an enemy of academic and Puerto Rican freedom.²¹⁹

The efforts of the students led Gallegos to cancel his appearance days before the commencement, stating he rejected UPR's offer after conversing with students and doing personal research on the recent history of the school. Although commencement was not canceled, the events of the day and Gallegos cancelation embarrassed the UPR administration. Furious over what they viewed as an attempt to sabotage the

²¹⁸ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.; Reynolds, 278-282; Schrecker, 1-15.

²¹⁹ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center; House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, Testimony of Jose Ferrer, 649-650. During his testimony in front of the House of Un-American Activities Committee, actor José Ferrer pushed back at accusations that he was a communist by recalling his acceptance of an honorary degree from the University of Puerto Rico and attempts by student activists to have him refuse the honor.

commencement and continued disruption of university operations, UPR officials revoked the ability of Filardi Guzman and fellow student leader Gilberto Lebrón Torres from enrolling for their sophomore year. The ALPRI noted in their summary of events that Filardi Guzman, Lebrón Torres, and other student leaders had followed the university rules in their acts of defiance. However, the university argued that their expulsion from school was due to detrimental conduct against the university that violated “the decorum and respect required by the institutional statutes and regulations.” Listing moments when both students led disruptions on campus or stated that the administration was a tool for Yankee military intervention, Dean of Students Jose Gueits determined that both students would remain barred from their studies and would only be allowed readmission if they apologized for their critiques of the university.²²⁰

Filardi Guzman’s expulsion for his politics inspired others to pressure the university on their position of military service and Puerto Rico’s status. His understanding of the political situation in Puerto Rico as part of a broader U.S. military intervention intensified his personal opposition to university political repression and submission to the military draft. The anti-colonial rhetoric of the students’ mirrored similar sentiments expressed by Puerto Rican political radicals that located local symptoms of U.S. colonialism within a consciousness of international struggle.²²¹ The

²²⁰ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center; Reynolds, 278-282.

²²¹ Puerto Ricans Leftists or those opposed to colonialism positioned their struggles within local and international currents through newsletters and speeches. UPR students with access to these materials or whose parents aligned with these politics continued these connections during their own college careers. For more on understanding Puerto Rican political connections to internationalism, see Kirwin Shaffer, *Black Flag Boricuas: Anarchism, Antiauthoritarianism, and the Left in Puerto Rico, 1897-1921* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2013). For more on the structure of Puerto Rican education and nation

distrust between independence leaning students and the administration deteriorated to the point where any subversive language or action against university policy led to disciplinary measures including expulsion. The university administration likely connected Filardi Guzman and Lebrón Torres actions as sympathetic with the PNP. Benitez position within the PPDs leadership made him a constant target of students who viewed his administration as a tool of the PPD and the U.S.²²²

At the beginning of 1950, Filardi Guzman received his draft summons to report for induction. Despite the early shift of the military to accommodate the atomic age, geopolitical tensions in Southeast Asia and Cold War preparations saw the draft replenish military manpower. Rather than report for induction, Filardi Guzman refused to respond to his summons and awaited his eventual arrest, which occurred on the UPR campus in Rio Piedras in May of 1950. During his trial in a federal court in Puerto Rico, Filardi Guzman pled no contest (*nolo contendere*) to the charge of draft evasion. He defended himself by stating his patriotic conviction to resist the draft because “the military service imposed on the Puerto Ricans is a taxation in blood without representation.”²²³ The prosecution in the case attempted to infer that Filardi Guzman’s draft resistance was based on his membership and role as Secretary of *el Union del Pueblo* instead of a personal conviction. Filardi Guzman, stated to be without legal

building, see Solsiree Del Moral, *Negotiating Empire: The Cultural Politics of Schools in Puerto Rico, 1898-1952*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013).

²²² US vs. Antonio Filardi Guzman and William Augustus Butler Jr., Notes on Filardi Guzman; Excerpt from *Adelante*, Trial of Antonio Filardi Guzman, General Secretary of Union del Pueblo. All in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.

²²³ US vs. Antonio Filardi Guzman and William Augustus Butler Jr., Notes on Filardi Guzman; Excerpt from *Adelante*, Trial of Antonio Filardi Guzman, General Secretary of Union del Pueblo. All in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.

representation, disagreed with this assessment and verbalized his opposition to the draft as a personal choice. He castigated the federal court as an enemy of the Puerto Rican people, including a statement toward presiding Judge Cecil Snyder that accused him of being an accomplice assassin in the massacres of Rio Piedras and Ponce for his role as a District Attorney of the Puerto Rico federal court during the 1930s.²²⁴

Resisting a draft summons and his combative interaction with Judge Snyder led to Filardi Guzman receiving a five-year sentence in a federal prison, first staying in *La Princesa* in San Juan before transferring to a facility in Danbury, Connecticut. Filardi Guzman's expulsion from UPR for his political activism against the administration and his later refusal to be drafted into the military led to suspicion that he was affiliated with communist or nationalist groups. Historian Lorrin Thomas noted that the intensification of the Cold War meant that any critic or subversive were likely to be vilified as an unreliable citizen and as a suspected communist or Nationalist.²²⁵ Filardi Guzman's involvement as secretary of *Union del Pueblo* was scrutinized by the prosecution, who insinuate that this refusal was based on his connection to Nationalists and other political subversives on the island. Family members and colleagues attempted to counter this by stating that the organization was an intellectual student group that fought for the civil liberties of the student body against an aggressive university administration. Despite this,

²²⁴ US vs. Antonio Filardi Guzman and William Augustus Butler Jr., Notes on Filardi Guzman; Excerpt from *Adelante*, Trial of Antonio Filardi Guzman, General Secretary of Union del Pueblo; Antonio Filardi Cantisani to Ruth Reynolds. All in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center. For background on the 1930s cases between the Nationalists and U.S. insular government, see Cesar J Ayala and Rafael Bernabé, *Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History since 1898* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 105-112; Arturo Morales Carrión, *Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1983), 234-236.

²²⁵ Thomas, 144-147.

University administrators and authorities in the U.S. and Puerto Rico viewed individuals and organizations that defied the political status quo as leftists, nationalists, or communists. Puerto Ricans defying the draft or military service for moral reasons, as Filardi Guzman claimed, faced similar vilification of their personal alignments.²²⁶

Observations of court proceedings for Filardi Guzman's draft evasion case saw allies suggest that the defendant was not provided due process or the assistance of a court-appointed attorney. Despite entering his own plea in court, Filardi Guzman's family and allies questioned the judgement of the court for sentencing him to a five-year term. In a letter to Ruth Reynolds from the court case in 1954, Antonio Filardi Cantisani Sr. questioned the legality of his son's sentencing during his draft evasion trial because he was not provided legal counsel. Furthermore, Filardi Guzman organizational allies attempted to paint the court as a sham trial, focusing their ire on Judge Snyder. Spectators that sympathized with Filardi Guzman accused the judge of acting impulsively against individuals he viewed as enemies of the U.S. and Puerto Rico. Snyder likely connected Filardi Guzman's draft objection, political associations, and attitude toward the court as representative of a university student aligned with groups he viewed as enemies of order like the Nationalists. Additionally, Snyder's familiarity with the nationalists as a problematic entity throughout his legal career on the island informed his decision.²²⁷

²²⁶ US vs. Antonio Filardi Guzman and William Augustus Butler Jr., Notes on Filardi Guzman; Excerpt from *Adelante*, Trial of Antonio Filardi Guzman, General Secretary of Union del Pueblo, Lynn Papers.

²²⁷ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center; Excerpt from *Adelante*, Lynn Papers.

Revisiting Filardi Guzman's draft case as his defense team gathered evidence to defend him from a charge of felonious assault illustrates the ways people redefined their understanding of citizenship to refuse draft summons. Although non-nationalist draft resisters faced a conflation of their stance with the PNPR or Communists, Filardi Guzman situated his draft resistance in court and correspondences as a personal and moral choice. Equating compulsory service to blood taxation, He critiqued Puerto Rico's status as a colony whose inhabitants occupied a position within the United States where they held some but not all rights of political and social citizenship. Critics of U.S. colonialism argued Puerto Ricans occupied what political scientist Elizabeth Cohen terms semi-citizenship, a status that offers some but not all political rights. Filardi Guzman's argument against being drafted and his objections to the lack of transparency by university officials while at UPR highlight his personal political understanding of Puerto Rico's status and how he defined that objection.²²⁸

Critiquing compulsory military service as a blood taxation demonstrated a critique of the price individuals with semi-citizenship paid to potentially gain first class citizenship. Filardi Guzman's anti-draft arguments and critiques of U.S. imperialism as a student imply a stance that U.S. citizenship was imposed on Puerto Ricans without their consent, a common critique by Nationalists. Whether he was fully aligned or sympathetic with the Nationalist cause, Filardi Guzman situated his draft resistance as the actions of an individual with a moral and philosophical grievance. The language he

²²⁸ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief; Filardi Guzman to Lynn, n.d. All in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center; Elizabeth F. Cohen, *Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-15.

incorporated in his condemnation of U.S. actions in Puerto Rico, specifically the imposition of a military draft, highlighted an understanding of the value of citizenship in defense of his personal civil liberties. The use of “blood tax” to describe the cost of being drafted further demonstrated Filardi Guzman’s defining how he understood and redefined the citizenship imposed on him. For him, if he was not afforded full rights as a citizen, the imposition of forced military service to defend a nation was not equitable.²²⁹

The draft trial and later conviction for felonious assault in 1954 led Filardi Guzman’s family to question U.S. commitments to equity under the law. In correspondences with members of the CPRJ in 1954, Filardi Cantisani verbalized his disgust at the treatment and lack of justice provided to his son. During these exchanges, he hinted that Filardi Guzman did not receive assistance from an attorney at law or a public defender, though it was never mentioned in these exchanges if Filardi Guzman chose to defend himself. The family’s perspective of their son’s draft case and opinion that he was being framed for assault in 1954 highlighted an erosion of confidence in U.S. legal and moral institutions. The depth of this erosion is evident in a letter Antonio Filardi Cantisani sent to Warden Hagstrom regarding his son’s incarceration, sarcastically applauding the Warden for his fealty to the U.S. government.²³⁰

Filardi Guzman’s family reinforced their son’s position, stating that his draft resistance was based on moral opposition. They insisted that their son held no direct

²²⁹ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief; Excerpt from *Adelante*,. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center;, Lynn Papers; Cohen, 1-15; Font-Guzman, 1-15.

²³⁰ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief; Filardi Cantisani to Warden Hagstrom, July 17, 1954; Report of Interview with Mrs. Filardi. All in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.

membership or affiliation with a particular political party, especially the nationalists. Additionally, the family positioned themselves and their son as strongly anti-communist and anti-nationalist. The defense in the 1954 assault case focused on the background of the family, describing them as professionals working in the fields of architecture, education, and medicine throughout the island. They also highlighted the immigrant story of Filardi Guzman's paternal grandfather, Vicente Filardi Ponzi, who immigrated to Puerto Rico from Italy. Filardi Ponzi and his sons established themselves as designers and architects who did contract work for the city of Yauco, including a Beaux-Arts style house in Yauco called Casa Muñoz.²³¹ The CPRJ defense team emphasized the family's credentials and positions in the professional fields of education and medicine to suggest that Filardi Guzman and the family were not a political threat.²³²

The focus on the family's professional and educational background did little to alleviate the assault allegations against Filardi Guzman or disconnect his draft resistance from his political activity in college. Additionally, assaults on Puerto Rico and U.S. officials in the 1950s saw draft resistance in Puerto Rico attached to PNP membership. One example of this was the admission by nationalist Rafael Cancel Miranda during his testimony for his part in the 1954 Senate Shooting that he was incarcerated multiple

²³¹ Filardi Guzman Case brief; Letter from Filardi Sr to Ruth Reynolds. All in Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center. Casa Muñoz, now Casa Filardi, is an attraction in Yauco and was designated as a historic landmark and building. See "Nomination Form of Historic Places Inventory, Filardi House." U.S. National Park Services. National Register of Historic Places. Filardi House, Yauco, Puerto Rico. Antonio Filardi Cantisani was a designer and taught art at the Metropolitan Vocational School in Rio Piedras. Carmen Guzman Rodríguez was a teacher at Labra Intermediate School in Santurce. Manuel Guzman, Filardi Guzman's maternal grandfather, was a practicing physician in Mayaguez and served for a time as head radiologist in Hato Rey.

²³² U.S. versus Filardi Guzman and Butler brief. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center. For discussions on the Cold War political current, see Friedman, 1-15; Thomas, 136-142.

times for draft evasion between 1948 and 1953.²³³ It was noted in trial notes that prior to the alleged assault, Filardi Guzman was a model prisoner that was viewed by officials as a political prisoner. Lynn mentioned that Warden Kennedy, the Danbury facility's previous warden during the 1940s, viewed political prisoners as "the highest type of young men, conscientious, superior in education, concerned for the social welfare...Society would not be hurt if every one of them were set free at once."²³⁴ With an implied link to the nationalists based on draft evasion and political activity in college, Lynn and his defense team focused on Filardi Guzman's moral right to dissent and his position as a prisoner in Danbury.

The individuals within the CPRJ worked to defend individuals like Antonio Filardi Guzman even with their personal reservations about his political affiliations. Christian pacifists remained cautious about affiliating with those identified by the U.S. government as subversive while they tried to survive the Cold War environment.²³⁵ However, individual pacifists and the organizations they represented chose to defend political subversives in Puerto Rico and the United States, believing it was their duty as Christians and activists to support those facing hardship. Although the initial case that brought him to pacifist attention was an alleged violent assault, Filardi Guzman's

²³³ Witness Index: Rafael Cancel Miranda, Court Case USA vs. Dolores Lebrón et al., October 1, 1954. Conrad Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center.

²³⁴ U.S. versus Filardi Guzman, Trial Notes. Folder: Antonio Filardi Guzman Case. Lynn Papers, Goetlieb Archival Research Center. Lynn's record of the previous Warden's statements on political prisoners comes from a book written by a conscientious objector that revealed the treatment of CO's and other political prisoners during World War II. For more, see Lowell Naeve, *A Field of Broken Stones* (Michigan: Libertarian Press, 1950).

²³⁵ A list of presidential pardons by Richard Nixon shows one was received by Antonio Filardi Guzman in 1973. For more, see U.S. Department of Justice. *Pardons Granted by President Richard Nixon (1969-1974)*.

background as a war resister demonstrated commitment of progressive Christian collectives to use their platform to defend the rights of Puerto Ricans, draft resisters, and fellow Christians. Working through internal ideological debates over political action during an era that suppressed dissenting opinion, these networks attempted to find a shared understanding of their rights to define how citizenship functioned to protect individuals from abuses of civil liberties based on political, spiritual, or moral objections.²³⁶

The Cold War climate and the development of a consensus to suppress political subversives led the solidarity of alliance networks to be tested as progressive and leftists' organizations fought to survive. Individuals and organizations opposed to military service, a position that was precarious during World War II, faced additional scrutiny because of the connection of draft resistance with fringe political and social organizations. Draft resistance for religious or moral reasons faced criticism because of the pivots of mainline churches to support militarization. Additionally, focus on the work of Christian liberals and leftists with Communists and groups like the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party increased skepticism of draft resistance coming from a position of faith instead of politics. Individuals that rejected both the draft and government sponsored programs saw support for draft resistance conflated with supporting communism or political projects considered subversive by the United States. The connection of draft

²³⁶ Font-Guzman, 1-15; Anna Wiederhold Wolfe, "Organizing Collective Action amid the Ripple Effects of Change: Narratives of Crisis, Disaster, and Opportunity," *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 44, no. 1 (2016), 1-21.

resistance with the Nationalists during World War II placed non-affiliated Puerto Rican moral and religious objectors in a precarious position.

The support networks of Puerto Rican independence advocates and U.S. Christian progressives faced challenges over tactics and political positions during the post-World War II era. Christian pacifists argued internally over the status of Puerto Rico and wondered aloud if the support some of their colleagues placed with the PNP and Pedro Albizu Campos was troublesome. Despite these dynamics and organizational detachments, the network of secular and religious activists continued to assist one another. Instead of a support network that functioned seamlessly and with order, the fluidity of the network allowed for dissenting ideological outlooks. Moreover, they established a defense against the suppression of individual civil liberties through an understanding of citizenship that demanded full membership or, for Puerto Ricans, release from the commitments of full citizens.²³⁷

Individuals and organizations aligned with Christian pacifism defended Puerto Ricans facing charges of sedition and draft resistance during the 1940s and 1950s to ensure that the defendants received fair treatment under the law while incarcerated. Puerto Ricans facing charges of seditious behavior during the Cold War used the legal system and the alliance network with Christian pacifists to situate their individual resistance with the Puerto Rico status question. In the draft and assault trials of Antonio Filardi Guzman, it was argued that Puerto Rico's status and the treatment of its people

²³⁷ Wolfe, 18-21; Dorothy Holland, Gretchen Fox, and Vinci Daro. "Social Movements and Collective Identity: A Decentered, Dialogic View." *Anthropological Quarterly* 81, no. 1 (2008), 95-126; Font-Guzman, 1-10.

on the island and migrants to the United States as second-class citizens did not warrant Puerto Rican participation in the military. The secular and religious networks emphasized this understanding of semi-citizenship to argue the right of individual civil liberties and protect the political and religious stance of draft resisters.²³⁸ Finding this common ground allowed these groups to function without a tangible connection to communism or Puerto Rican nationalism, providing pacifists involved in Puerto Rican causes to support. Puerto Rican war resisters not affiliated with the PNPR articulated their resistance to a citizenship status that suppressed their full citizenship, providing them an avenue to personally reject draft summons on moral or religious grounds instead of just the political.²³⁹

Cold War targeting of political subversives tempered by the mid-1950s, leaving organizations and alliances fractured from the fallout. However, individuals and organizations that survived the McCarthy era suppression maintained the support networks that came together for intersected goals despite political and tactical divisions. The Fellowship of Reconciliation and other Christian progressives continued their advocacy for draft resisters while also protesting the militarization of society and growing threat of nuclear warfare. Puerto Ricans independence advocates opposed to U.S. colonialism and not attached to the Puerto Rican Independence Party formed collectives near the end of the 1950s. Informed by the Cuban Revolution and tracing

²³⁸ Antonio Filardi Guzman's draft resistance was considered a part of the Korean War by Puerto Rican Leftists during the 1970s, despite his draft summons coming prior to the start of the war. For this, see "Repression Resistance: Documents from National Liberation Struggles and their Allies." *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional*, The Freedom Archives.

²³⁹ Mollin, 42-48; Font-Guzman, 1-10; Wolfe, 19-21.

their lineage to Puerto Rican resistance to colonialism, groups like *el Movimiento Pro Independencia* criticized what they viewed as imposed citizenship, including the imposition of compulsory military service on Puerto Rican youth.

The continuation of the Cold War, specifically the continued conflict in Southeast Asia during the 1960s saw these groups exchange dialogue about compulsory military service and Puerto Rico's independence. Christian pacifists, the emerging New Left, and Puerto Rican independence groups shared spaces to protest military service and the imposition of war on society. While each individual and organization within the network held their own rationale on how to advocate change, the emergence of the anti-war movement in the United States brought common grievances together into attempted mass movements. The end of the Red Scare led youth and seasoned social activists from the United States and Puerto Rico to publicly question the status quo concerning compulsory military service and Puerto Rico's status. The next chapter will highlight these gatherings, specifically how Puerto Rican independence activists opposed to military service were active participants in the planning against militarization in the hemisphere. Additionally, the networks highlight a continued push by progressive Christian churches to critique U.S. colonialism and militarization despite mainline churches maintaining an a-political stance.

CHAPTER V

END THE VIETNAM WAR NOW!: PUERTO RICO'S ANTI-WAR STANCE WITHIN U.S. LEFT COALITION SPACES

Representatives from various religious, labor, civil rights, and revolutionary organizations met to discuss plans for a march in New York on March 26 to protest the Vietnam War. Mobilizing as the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, the collective intended to bring veteran and youth activists together to publicly demonstrate against the draft. Under the direction of veteran peace activist A.J. Muste, the committee created a collective that shared resistance to U.S. involvement in Vietnam despite differing individual ideologies. During the meeting, the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee deliberated over what spaces could be used for the marching procession and what demonstrations would be joined. The committee also addressed who they intended to invite as keynote speakers for the march. The list of potential speakers included known figures for civil rights, anti-war, labor, and anti-imperialism such as Dr. Benjamin Spock, Martin Luther King Jr., Julian Bond, Jean-Paul Sartre, Staughton Lynd, and Juan Mari Bras of Puerto Rico. At the marches and beyond, these networks verbalized their discontent over a war that ignored the issues of civil rights and civil liberties at home.²⁴⁰

U.S. military mobilization during the atomic era and hemispheric Cold War fears illustrates how religious and secular activists rejected the machines of war through messages of freedom and civil liberties. Cold War containment of global communist

²⁴⁰ Minutes of the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Meeting, January 11, 1966. Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Minutes, 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

threats saw increased U.S. militarization during the 1950s and 1960s, including focus on the affairs of Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. The U.S. government viewed Puerto Rico as a strategic location for defense. A majority saw Cold War militarization as necessary for security and economic development, including Puerto Ricans that viewed military participation as an avenue to construct their meaning of being Puerto Rican. Despite the silencing of dissent during the Cold War and consensus of U.S. foreign policy objectives, a vocal minority in the United States and Puerto Rico expressed their discontent over militarization efforts.²⁴¹

The solidarity networks built during the 1940s and 1950s by Puerto Rican independence activists and U.S. leftists challenged the U.S. government's treatment of draft resisters. Shifts within the U.S. Left during the 1950s and 1960s led a New Left to emerge from college campuses and urban centers that advocated for participatory democracy and a non-exclusionary approach to anti-war organizing. Despite various political and generational divergences, groups came together for a common cause. The increase in Cold War hostilities during the 1960s, including the escalation of military activity in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, led Puerto Rican independence activists to collaborate with Leftists over the issues of compulsory military service.²⁴² Secretary General of the M.P.I. Juan Mari Bras' ties to the independence movement since the

²⁴¹ Harry Franqui-Rivera, *Soldiers of the Nation: Military Service and Modern Puerto Rico, 1868-1950* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), 199-213; Lorena Oropeza, *¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism during Vietnam War Era* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 1-10, 24-30.

²⁴² Simon Hall, *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 22-23; Vanessa Cook, *Spiritual Socialists: Religion and the American Left* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 1-10.

1940s established long term relationships with U.S. organizations that rejected colonialism and compulsory military service. The coordination of local marches for civil rights, anti-militarization, and anti-colonialism demonstrated the potential of these networks to work together on shared objectives.

The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee brought together religious and secular movements despite moments when the internal objectives of organizations clashed. The planned rally, scheduled in March and coordinated with other marches in the United States and globally, was the second in a series of demonstrations against the Vietnam War that also addressed draft resistance. The contentious solidarity networks led Puerto Rican concerns with the draft and civil rights to be discussed within the early years of the broader Vietnam anti-war movement. The organization of the Fifth Avenue Rally exemplifies the central focus of chapter four: how coalition work permitted secular and religious progressives and revolutionaries to define their understanding of citizenship through the rejection of war. More importantly, this chapter argues that the M.P.I.'s active participation in the anti-war coalition provided Puerto Rican independence activists an opportunity to share their political grievances to a broader audience.²⁴³ Puerto Rican concerns with the draft, Civil Rights, and Puerto Rico's status were addressed through the participation of Puerto Rican independence and social activists within the broader anti-war movement. Collaboration proved to be a challenge as the committee leadership attempted to bring fifty or more organizations together

²⁴³ Jacqueline N. Font-Guzman, *Experiencing Puerto Rican Citizenship and Cultural Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2015), 1-12; Elizabeth F. Cohen, *Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-15.

under shared commitment to stop the military draft and the war in Vietnam. However, secular and religious organizers that objected to compulsory military service and defended the right of individuals to resist war worked to unify the disparate collectives into a support network.²⁴⁴

The Gulf of Tonkin affair led the U.S. government to call for military action against Communist North Vietnam. As the U.S. directed their military resources toward Southeast Asia, opposition to war and compulsory military service in the United States and Puerto Rico mobilized. Cold War draft resisters argued that the militarization of U.S. society threatened individual civil liberties and that military service should be a personal choice. Additionally, Puerto Rican independence activists articulated their war resistance as a call for an independent Puerto Rico.²⁴⁵ One point of contention among religious and moral pacifists dating back to World War II was how to navigate draft deferments or alternative service. Although the U.S. government offered deferments for conscientious objectors, the conditions caused individuals with a rigid ideological standing to resist directives to submit to the draft.²⁴⁶ Devout pacifists and liberal Christians, situating their war objection with a scriptural and theological commitment to avoid murder, grappled with accepting service or other duties in society where their labor would be used to advance the military industrial complex. Pacifist fears were

²⁴⁴ “Committee for Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade, List of Organizations.” Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Committee Members and Organizations, 1965-1967; A.J. Muste to Gilberto Gerena Valentin, March 31, 1966. Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, Correspondences, Oct 1965-March 1966. Both in Wisconsin Historical Society.

²⁴⁵ Cesar J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabé, *Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History Since 1898* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 226-231.

²⁴⁶ Amy J. Rutenberg. *Rough Draft: Cold War Military Manpower Policy and the Origins of Vietnam-Era Draft Resistance* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2019), 14-26.

exacerbated as public imagination and policy directives depicted a future military force that leaned on nuclear power. Remembering their own prosecution for resisting the draft during World War II and the Cold War, radical pacifists and moral draft resisters mobilized for 1960's draft resisters.²⁴⁷

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, conflict with the Soviet Union and military operations in Southeast Asia informed how the U.S. would prepare draft-eligible individuals for war. Historian Brian Linn emphasizes how the U.S. military during the Cold War established an egalitarian culture through job training and education. The integration of the U.S. military in 1948 situated the institution as more democratic than civilian society, placing soldiers in situations where they had to work as one regardless of racial or ethnic tensions. However, the integration of the military and other national spaces did not melt away racist and xenophobic attitudes or grant equal citizenship. Historian Kimberly Phillips notes that the integrated U.S. military still policed segregation and racial/ethnic hierarchies on military bases in the United States and overseas.²⁴⁸ For example, Puerto Rican soldiers informed family members or the public about experiencing racism from fellow soldiers and superior officers, including unequal punishments for defending themselves.²⁴⁹ Soldiers of color highlighted harsher treatment toward them by drill instructors, non-commissioned officers, and officers.

²⁴⁷ Marian Mollin, *Radical Pacifism in Modern America* (Pennsylvania: University of Penn Press, 2006), 151-181; Jill K. Gill, *Embattled Ecumenism: The National Council of Churches, The Vietnam War, and the Trials of the Protestant Left* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011), 137-154.

²⁴⁸ Kimberly Phillips, *WAR! What is it Good For?: Black Freedom Struggles and the U.S. Military from World War II to Iraq* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 1-20, 128-151.

²⁴⁹ "Puerto Rican Soldiers Discriminated in Vietnam." Writings. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Phillips, 128-151, 152-156.

U.S. government draft policy post World War II directed who would benefit from social and economic engineering through military service and whose presence was needed in civilian society. Historian Amy Rutenberg illustrates that military manpower policies between 1945 and 1965 established parameters in drafting and recruitment that aimed to maintain U.S. society. Cold War directives broadened deferments for individuals based on religious conviction, family status, and occupation. For example, married men with children or individuals that worked in occupations deemed necessary to the home front could obtain a deferment.²⁵⁰ Moreover, an individual could choose to enlist in the military and choose their military occupation instead of waiting to be drafted. Federal officials granted college-educated and middle-class white men draft deferments throughout the 1950s and 1960s because they were deemed essential civilian workers and breadwinners. Federal officials saw the possibilities of the military as an agent for societal uplift that draftees could later translate to civilian life. Individuals not eligible for draft deferments were viewed as essential to maintaining military readiness.²⁵¹

Shaping manpower policies within parameters caused individuals to question the imposition of the draft on specific communities. Fears of youth delinquency and poverty in rural and urban spaces created a growing expectation that the working poor and youth would benefit from the structure of military service. Despite the U.S. military promoting

²⁵⁰ Rutenberg, 90-95

²⁵¹ Michael S. Foley, *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance during the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 35-40; Brian McAllister Linn, *Elvis's Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2016), 3-8, 338.

the training and advancement within the organization as a social benefit, the institution and the U.S. government still maintained a form of segregation. Historian Amy Rutenberg points out that deferment options were not available to all U.S. citizens and that the U.S. government prioritized drafting the working class and minoritized men as a form of individual and social betterment starting in the 1950s.²⁵² Growing discontent among a minority in U.S. society led to attempts to circumvent the military draft when individuals were not eligible for deferments. Individuals situating their anti-war defiance as a political, moral, or religious stance highlighted the contradictions of militarization and global security limiting their conceptualization of citizenship.

U.S. citizenship and military participation in war did not automatically provide Puerto Rico a definitive end to the status question or provide Puerto Ricans full rights as citizens. Despite active participation of Puerto Ricans within the military and war economy during and after World War II, large scale migration from Puerto Rico to the United States led white Americans to view the new migrant community as a threat. Puerto Rican leaders in New York and Puerto Rico contested the Puerto Rican problem in the United States, a term coined by U.S. based journalists and academics. Historian Lorrin Thomas specifies that many of the social science studies undertaken during the 1940s through 1960s were initially viewed favorably by Puerto Rican leaders as a sense of visibility. Instead, these studies treated their subjects as partial citizens of the U.S., erasing the organizations' work to solve problems facing the Puerto Rican community,

²⁵² Rutenberg, 90-95; Phillips, 152-187.

and silencing political dissenters resisting depictions of Puerto Ricans as foreign criminals that were unwilling to assimilate to the U.S.²⁵³

Puerto Rican migrants struggled with U.S. racial constructions that differed from their own perceptions of race in Puerto Rico. Middle class Puerto Rican leaders were troubled that Puerto Ricans were racialized or coded by U.S. media as Black instead of white. Scholars Jorge Duany and Arlene Davila explain that twentieth-century Puerto Rican nationalist discourses by politicians attempted to present Puerto Rico as a racial democracy. Attempts by politicians and intellectuals to place Puerto Rico's relationship with race as an integrated racial democracy ignored the class-based racial system of Puerto Rico that silenced discussion of race.²⁵⁴ Historian Ileana Rodríguez-Silva comments that "to address issues of racialized exclusion or to express/embrace a racialized sense of self is understood by most Puerto Ricans as anti-national."²⁵⁵ For community leaders, positioning Puerto Rican military service as an obligation to Puerto Rico's security served to counter racialized depictions of their constituents. However, Puerto Rican independence groups highlighted the contradictions of U.S. treatment of Puerto Ricans on the archipelago and migrants as racialized and colonized people while demanding compulsory military service.

²⁵³ Lorrin Thomas, *Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 190-199; Ayala and Bernabé, 205-206.

²⁵⁴ Jorge Duany, *The Puerto Rican Nation on the Move: Identities on the Island and in the United States* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 24-28; Arlene Davila, *Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997), 4-12, 24-49. Davila acknowledges "that Puerto Rican nationalism is a heterogeneous movement that ranges from government-dictated cultural nationalism, cultural and political nationalist projects deployed by Puerto Rican leftists, and separatist political nationalism.

²⁵⁵ Ileana M. Rodríguez-Silva, *Silencing Race: Disentangling Blackness, Colonialism, and National Identities in Puerto Rico* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 1-17.

Puerto Rican independence supporters aligned with *el Movimiento Pro Independencia* (M.P.I.) and other groups to resist US colonialism politically and socially. Independence and progressive organizations further critiqued militarization as the U.S. government prioritized war over addressing Puerto Rico's status or the lack of basic citizenship rights. The M.P.I. and other independence groups attempted to build on grievances against the Puerto Rican and U.S. governments by aligning their message within the lineage of Puerto Rican independence movements. These collectives viewed compulsory military service as continuing the militarization and colonization of Puerto Rico that placed Puerto Rican soldiers in imperialist wars. However, opposition to military service was not a static decision based solely on politics or the status of Puerto Rico. Historian Felipe Hinojosa identified how peace theology influenced Puerto Rican religious objectors' decisions to submit for conscientious objector status or oppose war entirely.²⁵⁶ The U.S. and Puerto Rican governments sometimes conflated faith-based or moral war resistance as an alignment with the aims of independence advocates.

The fusion of Puerto Rican anti-draft and pro-independence sentiment during the 1960s was not universally accepted by Puerto Ricans. The U.S. military's presence on the island and within the lives of Puerto Ricans, including active service in the military or public development, was viewed by some as a net benefit to the social and economic advancement of Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican government viewed the economic and military relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico as vital to the archipelago's post-

²⁵⁶ Felipe Hinojosa, *Latino Mennonites: Civil Rights, Faith, and Evangelical Culture* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), 36-39.

World War II development. U.S. and Puerto Rican politicians lauded Puerto Rico's position in the Caribbean as an example of U.S. democracy in action, including the military sacrifice of Puerto Rican soldiers. More importantly, military service served as an important marker of personal, cultural, and social identity for Puerto Rican soldiers and veterans. Latino and Puerto Rican soldiers articulated their choice of service in terms of a societal or personal obligation, something historian Lorena Oropeza term a "Hispanic Tradition of Service to the military." Historian Harry Franqui-Rivera also suggests individual Puerto Ricans soldiers and veterans viewed their own military service in terms of personal identity and opportunity that reflected their perception of Puerto Ricaness.²⁵⁷

Political debates over what constituted a Puerto Rican identity shaped discourses of who supported and opposed military service during the Vietnam War. It was automatically assumed that a Puerto Rican opposing the draft aligned with the independence movement or supported communists. However, an anti-draft stance did not automatically mean an individual or organization aligned with Puerto Rico's *independistas* or the political left.²⁵⁸ Puerto Ricans that held moral or faith-based objections voiced their concerns about compulsory military service and the alternative civilian public service offered to dissenters, fearful that this option assisted the war economy. More importantly, a perception throughout the Cold War linked Puerto Rican war resistance exclusively with the island's independence and nationalist factions. Moral

²⁵⁷ Oropeza, 1-10, 24-30; Franqui-Rivera, 199-213.

²⁵⁸ Arlene Davila, *Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997), 24-49.

and religious objectors in Puerto Rico voiced concern that their stance would be perceived as politically supporting the independistas instead of their own stance based on a spiritual aversion to murder.²⁵⁹ Puerto Rican objectors could seek deferments to the draft under the same policy guidelines that U.S. pacifists did, including appealing for conscientious objector status. Access to the processes of conscientious objector or deferment status was not always available to the public, necessitating pacifists' work to inform their communities. Part of this was a continued effort of religious based peace movements in Puerto Rico to increase Puerto Rican membership within their organizations. A FOR operative noted that despite pacifists' work to promote CO status on the island, FOR Puerto Rico and other groups struggled to attract Puerto Rican members.²⁶⁰

Anti-draft activity in North America during 1965 encouraged leaders of organizations against the Vietnam War that there was a small but growing pulse that opposed overseas military action. The broad range of U.S. and North American based anti-war activists established networks to organize efforts that resisted military escalation, recognizing the necessity of both localized and national action. Individuals and organizations representing civil rights, labor, high school and college students, third

²⁵⁹ L. William Talton to Father Thomas Dorney, June 10, 1969. Fellowship of Reconciliation Papers, Series D, Box 22: Program Staff, A.S. Curry and M. Nelson, Field Work, 1967-1972, New York (State)-Washington/Br, Columbia [hereafter cited as Box 22]. Folder: Puerto Rico and Puerto Rican Peace Center. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

²⁶⁰ Inter-Office Memorandum, Allan Stauffer to Al Hassler, September 27, 1968. Fellowship of Reconciliation Papers, Series C, Box 41, Executive Director Alfred Hassler, General Correspondence, 1966-1968, Pax Christi International-United Nations [hereafter cited as Box 41, Alfred Hassler, General Correspondence, 1966-1968]. Folder: Puerto Rican Peace Center, 1966-1969. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

world liberation, and Christian pacifism used a variety of methods in their local communities to argue against the draft and U.S. involvement in the war. Degrees of activism varied from hosting teach-ins on campuses to direct draft refusal through verbal confirmation at the draft board or demonstrative burning of draft cards.²⁶¹ The use of demonstration and picketing against draft locations and in public locations allowed dissenters to practice resistance. Religious and political objectors publicly demonstrated against the war and compulsory military service at local draft boards and public spaces implementing their training in non-violent direct action through teach-ins, public demonstrations, and preach ins.²⁶² A positive consequence of these demonstrations was the building of networks with other activists fighting for political and social equality that also argued against the utility of war.

Veteran objectors aligned with the religious left provided recommendations to draft resisters on how to handle their local draft board or induction into the military. U.S. pacifists' groups passed out pamphlets and offered community training on how to argue for conscientious objector status. The materials provided to resisters included a detailed explanation of the different classifications that met the requirements for conscientious objectors. Draft age individuals that were the only son of a family or worked in an occupation deemed necessary to civic life met the exemption list. Resisters that lacked resources or access to challenge a summons reached out to pacifist communities and

²⁶¹ "Teach in, Teach Out" Pamphlet. Vietnam Summer Papers. Box 1, Folder Organizational-Early Organization. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

²⁶² "Preach in on Vietnam: The Moral Issues." Donna Allen Papers [hereafter cited as Donna Allen Papers], Box 6, Folder 9: Vietnam, Miscellany, 1965-1967. Wisconsin Historical Society.

political networks for advice on how to challenge their draft status. Members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors would advise youth on their legal rights to resist, providing materials and verbalizing their own experiences facing draft boards. In a letter to 19-year-old draft resister Carlos Ramirez, CCCO representative Arlo Tatum stated his support for the young man's situation. Tatum further empathized with Ramirez position by stating that his advice and sympathy came from his own incarceration.²⁶³

Attention to the plight of draft resisters that lacked access to challenge their summons highlighted the growing pulse against compulsory military service. U.S. military escalation in 1964 and 1965 led students and veteran activists to lead early mobilization efforts opposing the war, with the first teach-ins occurring on U.S. college campuses in March of 1965.²⁶⁴ U.S. mobilization for war in Vietnam saw rapid escalation of anti-war activism that questioned the draft and necessity of overseas conflict. Anti-war proponents, intellectuals, and students shared concern over increased military operations overseas and the toll of war on communities. Determined to show that the Vietnam War and militarization was a point of contention, anti-war and peace activists representing organizations like the Students for a Democratic Society, the Vietnam Day Committee, and the National Coordination Committee to End the War in Vietnam dialogued to determine a course of action. Dealing with disparate organizing

²⁶³ Arlo Tatum to Carlos Ramirez, February 25, 1965. CCCO Papers, Series VI Box 21. Folder, Carlos Ramirez, 1965. Swarthmore Peace Collection. In the letter to Ramirez, Tatum mentioned that he served a two-year prison sentence for opposing the draft and not accepting alternative service.

²⁶⁴ "Vietnam Day Committee: October 15-16, International Days of Protest." Students for a Democratic Society Papers, Box 54, Folder 6, Vietnam Day Committee, Vietnam Summer Meeting, 1965, 1967. Wisconsin Historical Society.

bodies representing multiple issues, anti-war collectives attempted to create a shared message that respected the independence of the local affiliates and sponsors.²⁶⁵

A massive anti-war protest in Washington D.C. organized by the SDS and the actions of college student led demonstrations on campuses during the spring of 1965 inspired liberal and leftist elements in the United States to expand their message. The establishment of the Vietnam Day Committee at the University of California in Berkley built on the early momentum of the anti-war expression and organized a mass demonstration and teach in at Berkley May 21st to May 23rd. Organizers representing academics, students of the New Left, and Old Left coordinated a plan of protests that would call for an end of U.S. militarization, an end to compulsory military service, and returning troops deployed in Vietnam back home.²⁶⁶ Encouraged by the early reception to the movement, the Vietnam Day Committee proposed national and international protests against the Vietnam War. Called the International Days of Protest, the Vietnam Day Committee intended for demonstrations to be held in cities around the world over two days in October 1965. Vietnam Day Committee organizers stated that the marches would be a “long range benefit to the peace movement, for the emphasis on the ‘national days of action’ is on community organization and education as well as on direct action

²⁶⁵ “Vietnam Day Committee: October 15-16, International Days of Protest.” Students for a Democratic Society Papers, Box 54, Folder 6, Vietnam Day Committee, Vietnam Summer Meeting, 1965, 1967. Wisconsin Historical Society.

²⁶⁶ “Vietnam Day Committee: October 15-16, International Days of Protest.” Students for a Democratic Society Papers, Box 54, Folder 6, Vietnam Day Committee, Vietnam Summer Meeting, 1965, 1967. Wisconsin Historical Society; “Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Statement.” A.J. (Abraham John) Muste Papers. Collection DG 050. Folder: Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee: meeting minutes, financial records [microfilm]. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

against the war.”²⁶⁷ Central to this call of action was the creation of local committees that would bring various groups under a shared commitment to oppose the draft.

Organizers in Berkley encouraged mobilization both nationally and globally to establish a widespread movement in opposition to the war. Anti-war and progressive organizations in New York, including leaders of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and other peace and civil rights groups, joined the fray by creating a steering committee in the summer of 1965. New York’s position as an international city with expansive organizational branches presented an ideal space to illustrate discontent with the Vietnam War. The Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee was formed in coordination with the International Days of Protest scheduled in October of 1965. The objective of the committee was to organize mass demonstrations of experienced and youthful activists against war and the military draft. A vital component of the committee was the demonstration against the Vietnam War through a collective agreement that the war needed to end despite the political and ideological differences among membership.²⁶⁸

Establishing a space where representatives from multiple groups and networks can discuss internal issues yet still come together under an agreed upon consensus illustrates the arduous work of mobilizing collaborative actions. In this regard, the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee benefited from the guidance of veteran activists like A.J.

²⁶⁷ “Vietnam Day Committee: October 15-16, International Days of Protest. Students for a Democratic Society Papers, Box 54, Folder 6, Vietnam Day Committee, Vietnam Summer Meeting, 1965, 1967. Wisconsin Historical Society.

²⁶⁸ “Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Statement.” A.J. (Abraham John) Muste Papers. Collection DG 050. Folder: Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee: meeting minutes, financial records [microfilm]. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Muste and Dave Dellinger. The committee endeavored to create a forum that used respectful debate and consensus among sponsors and memberships to forward the common agenda instead of a purely top-down structure. Scholar Francesca Polletta observes that activists used this form of participatory democracy to find common ground and learn from one another.²⁶⁹ Acknowledging that each organization held different political and ideological objectives, organizers promoted the committee as a space that allowed the various currents of anti-war activism to come together under a common principle. The groups within the organization could also use the committee as a space to promote their individual objectives.²⁷⁰

Mobilization of a mass movement requires individuals that are movement crossovers, whose activism in multiple spaces allow them to inform their allies of developments in a shared struggle despite potential ideological and generational divergence. The role of bridge builders serves as an essential element of bringing social movements from various factions together under a shared grievance. Scholars Nella Van Dyke and Holly McCammon emphasize how a collective like the Fifth Avenue Parade committee was a coalition of members that maintained their organizational independence instead of merged under one singular umbrella. Additionally, the composition and mobilization of the parade sponsors and membership illustrates the

²⁶⁹ Francesca Polletta, *Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 5-25.

²⁷⁰ "Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Statement." A.J. (Abraham John) Muste Papers. Collection DG 050. Folder: Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee: meeting minutes, financial records [microfilm]. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

contention that social movements rise when threats and political opportunities occur.²⁷¹ The escalation of military buildup in Southeast Asia and growing vocal disagreement over compulsory military service created an opportunity to build a collective based on a shared conviction.

Outreach by organizers sent invitations to individuals and organizations within an extended network of activism representing U.S. initiatives for civil rights, women's rights, labor, and religious figures within the peace movement, asking for support through active participation and sponsorship for the cause. Additionally, organizers promoted their cause as representing "people of every conceivable philosophy and point of view...from patriotic, ethnic, religious, civic and many other groups" coming together to voice their displeasure and resistance military escalation.²⁷² Members of the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee worked within that group to establish a working relationship with the entire collective. The essential role of A.J. Muste, the M.P.I.'s Dixie Bayo and Juan Mari Bras, and Norma Baker as bridge leaders established an organizational body that shared a commitment to an objective and ensured colleagues in their individual organizations followed the same course.²⁷³

²⁷¹ Ellen Reese, Christine Petit, and David S. Meyer, "Sudden Mobilization: Movement Crossovers, Threats, and the Surprising Rise of the US Anti-War Movement," in *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements*, eds. Nella Van Dyke and Holly McCammon, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 272; Van Dyke and McCammon, x-xxi.

²⁷² Linda Danneberg to Samuel White, Department of Parks, (n.d), Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, Correspondence Oct 1965 to Mar 1966. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

²⁷³ I am still trying to find more information about Dixie Bayo. I have seen her mentioned in documents and named as a representative for the M.P.I. for a women's march against the war in 1967. I have only seen her mentioned briefly in Jose "Che" Velázquez's recent work on the Puerto Rican Socialist Party in the United States, where she was described as a leader of the local chapters of the M.P.I. before they transition to the Puerto Rican Socialist Party in the 1970s. For more on bridge leadership within social movements, see Lauren Ariaza, *To March for Others: The Black Freedom Struggle and the United Farm Workers* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 8-10.

New York's position as a metropolitan, global city that housed the leadership of various political and social movements illustrated the potential unwieldy nature of anti-war coalitions. The call for support and sponsors by the organizers of the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee reached across the lines of political ideology, race, and ethnicity. Political battles for basic civil rights and resources fostered potential divisions among white, Black, and Puerto Rican groups. However, building on past coalition efforts, anti-war organizers worked to create an organizing space built on the foundation of participatory democracy. New York's position as a global city also provided an opportunity for the coalition to reach out to Puerto Rican networks affected by militarization and the draft. Most importantly, the establishment of committee that respected the individuality of each sponsor group during the Cold War through created a potential avenue to pursue social and political change regarding the war. Historian Shana Bernstein notes that interracial coalition alliances can influence the aims, outcomes, and public consciousness through their message and collaboration. Potential push back from pro-war or anti-civil activism proponents about the limited reach of anti-war action could be countered with the committee's proposed march representing the will of members from a variety of political, social, racial, ethnic, and religious identities.²⁷⁴

The Fifth Avenue initiatives' call for support in the summer of 1965 led forty organizations to sign on. The groups joining the Fifth Avenue committee included representatives dedicated to civil rights, labor, anti-war, and poverty reform, as well as

²⁷⁴ Shana Bernstein, *Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth Century Los Angeles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3-15.

campus-based movements for social justice. However, skepticism of the Vietnam War and early draft resistance was not isolated to individuals solely aligned with the U.S. or Christian Left. Included in the organization for draft resistance was a delegation from the U.S. branch of the M.P.I. to represent the concerns of draft resisters in New York. *El Movimiento Pro Independencia*, formed in 1959 as an independence organization devoted to a socialist vision of a free Puerto Rico, organized action in Puerto Rico and outreach to diaspora communities in the U.S. In their political calls for an independent Puerto Rico, the M.P.I. articulated their opposition to compulsory military service.²⁷⁵ Puerto Rican independence activists that rejected U.S. based military service at the start of the Vietnam War mirrored the resistance of Puerto Rican war objectors during World War II. M.P.I. leaders like Juan Mari Bras, who resisted the draft as a college student during the late 1940s, viewed Puerto Rican military service as a blood tax and called on all Puerto Ricans to resist. Moreover, independistas like Mari Bras viewed the stamping out of political dissent in Puerto Rico, including unsanctioned draft resistance, and the treatment of Puerto Ricans as second-class citizens as a contradiction to entreaties for Puerto Ricans to fight for a country proclaiming to be the beacon of democracy.²⁷⁶

Concerns among Puerto Ricans opposed to military service for political and moral reasons emerged in the spring of 1965 around the same time as increased escalation on college campuses in the United States. Draft resistance among Puerto Rican college students and workers affiliated with independence factions did not occur

²⁷⁵ Committee for Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade List. Fifth Avenue Peace Committee Papers. Folder 2, Box 1, Committee Members and Organizations 1965-1967. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

²⁷⁶ Ayala and Bernabe, 226-229.

in isolation to the Vietnam War. The 1959 cases of Juan Angel Silen and Norman Pietri challenging their draft summons highlighted continued defiance by political objectors despite threats of imprisonment and the U.S. and Puerto Rican government linking their political stance with communist or nationalist elements. Independence activists argued that the draft highlighted Puerto Rico's colonial status in their lack of say in the conflict and the potential role of their young men in war. Both men refused to take their loyalty oath and issued declarations that they would serve under protest, earning 4-F classifications as unfit for military service. Individuals that challenged their draft status through this tactic were marked security risks by the U.S. and Puerto Rican governments.²⁷⁷

The draft refusal case of Sixto Alvelo during the spring of 1965 galvanized the independence factions to defend him and other draft resisters. It also gained attention of U.S. draft resisters unaware of the position of Puerto Rico. Alvelo was a member of the M.P.I. that presented the draft board in a 1965 declaration stating he would join the Army under protest because of threat of arrest if he did not. Verbalizing his objection, Alvelo stated that "he does not believe he has a moral obligation to serve in the United States Army as he is an independista and as such does not recognize any loyalty beyond what he owes to his own country, Puerto Rico."²⁷⁸ The military's rejection of Alvelo's declaration caused him to lose his job and face prosecution from Puerto Rico's Federal

²⁷⁷ "The Struggle against the Selective Service System in Puerto Rico."; "Puerto Rican Draft Resistance, Liberation News Service." Both in the Alice and Staughton Lynd Papers, Box 16, Folder: Reference and Subject File/Puerto Rican Draft Resistance, the 1960s. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

²⁷⁸ "Committee to Defend Sixto Alvelo, Press Release, May 2nd, 1966. Fellowship of Reconciliation Files, Series C, Box 41, Folder: General Correspondences, 1966-1968; Puerto Rican Peace Center, 1966-1969. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Court. Independence supporters and anti-draft activists in Puerto Rico rallied to support Alvelo and other draft resisters facing similar circumstances. A committee was formed in late 1965 for the defense of Alvelo that brought Puerto Rican intellectuals, politicians, and activists together to raise funds and provide legal aid. Additionally, the Committee to Defend Sixto Alvelo reached out to contacts in the United States for funds to mount the legal aid from the New York law firm Rabinowitz, Boudin, and Standard to work with the M.P.I. lawyers to navigate English only courts.²⁷⁹

Growing discontent against military service in the U.S. and Puerto Rico led individuals to demonstrate a conscious anti-war impulse despite much of the population holding an ambivalent attitude toward the war. Religious and social activists representing the U.S. Left and Puerto Rican independence movements found a shared struggle against compulsory military service, demonstrated by the M.P.I.'s New York branch answering the initial call for sponsors and organizational participants in the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee. M.P.I. members Dixie Bayo and Alfredo Peña acted as representatives and committee's sponsors, with Bayo's affiliation on the committee starting as early as the summer of 1965.²⁸⁰ In this capacity, they would attend when the

²⁷⁹ "Committee to Defend Sixto Alvelo, Press Release, May 2nd, 1966. Fellowship of Reconciliation Files, Series C, Box 41, Folder: General Correspondences, 1966-1968; Puerto Rican Peace Center, 1966-1969; "The Struggle against the Selective Service System in Puerto Rico."; "Puerto Rican Draft Resistance, Liberation News Service [hereafter cited as Liberation News Service]." Both in the Alice and Staughton Lynd Papers, Box 16, Folder: Reference and Subject File/Puerto Rican Draft Resistance, 1960s. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

²⁸⁰ "List of Sponsors, Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee."; "Committee for Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade." Both in Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Committee Members and Organizations, 1965-1967. Wisconsin Historical Society; "List of Sponsors, Fifth Avenue Peace Parade." A.J. (Abraham John) Muste Papers. Collection DG 050. Folder, Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Papers: Miscellaneous [microfilm]. Swarthmore Peace Collection. M.P.I. member Pedro Juan Rúa would function as another representative as the parade committee expanded its efforts to national and international anti-war coordination throughout the late 1960s.

collective met to plan direct action, vote on motions brought to the group, and offer to host meetings. Bayo also participated as a member of the administrative committee in preparation for the March 26th parade, collaborating with members to send information to colleagues and allies. Puerto Rican independence supporters in New York, despite philosophical divergence on methods of resistance, reached out to U.S. activists that assisted Puerto Ricans in legal or political distress. Working collectively within this space directed U.S. based members to the issues facing Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans in the U.S. concerning the draft.²⁸¹

Many U.S. leftists were still unaware of Puerto Rican draft concerns despite Puerto Rico's status as a U.S. territory and the growth of diaspora communities in the United States. As one of the newer pro-independence factions in Puerto Rican politics, the M.P.I. reestablished a connections with U.S. religious and political organizations developed through previous relationships between independence groups and the U.S. Left.²⁸² For example, veteran U.S. peace activist A.J. Muste worked with others in his network to address draft resistance and independence initiatives in Puerto Rico since the 1940s. Muste also served as a member of multiple committees that demanded the release of Puerto Rican political prisoners throughout the 1940s and 1950s, including nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos and independence supporters arrested for draft evasion.

²⁸¹ "Proposed Staff and Admin Committee for March 26 Activity." A.J. (Abraham John) Muste Papers. Collection DG 050. Folder, Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Papers: Miscellaneous [microfilm]. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

²⁸² "26 Arrested in Puerto Rico under the order of J. Edgar Hoover." Alice and Staughton Lynd Papers. Box 16, Folder: Subject File, 1960s Puerto Rican Resistance. Swarthmore Peace Collection; "Liberación: A Message from Ossie Davis and Dr. Benjamin Spock, July 26, 1968 [hereafter cited as *Liberación Message*]. Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records. Box 10, Folder 2: Puerto Rico 1966-1969. Wisconsin Historical Society.

U.S. religious pacifists affiliated with Muste were also attentive to draft resisters without political affiliation to the Nationalist or Independence factions, providing judicial assistance to ensure their stance was not conflated with political objections. Muste maintained that despite his disagreement with the Nationalists or other groups, he would demand that their human rights were respected by the judicial system.²⁸³

Cold War escalation in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s led U.S. leftists to pay closer attention to the issues of colonialism in their own hemisphere. The escalation of conflict and victory by the 26th of July Movement under Fidel Castro in Cuba inspired the political left in North America. Scholar Rafael Rojas suggests that the early emergence of the Cuban Revolution inspired the U.S. Left's vision of social revolution in the United States.²⁸⁴ The Cuban Revolution also animated discussions in the United States about the political ideologies and strategic importance of the Caribbean to the Cold War. Activists aligned with Puerto Rico's independence connected the events of the July 24th Movement with the imagery of young revolutionaries taking down a U.S. backed government. Scholar Roberto Rodríguez-Morazzani suggests the linking of Cuba's historical and contemporary struggles against colonialism with Puerto Rico's independence was a crucial factor in most sectors of the Puerto Rican Left.²⁸⁵

²⁸³ "A Petition to President Kennedy for Clemency for Puerto Rican Political Prisoners." A.J. (Abraham John) Muste Papers. Collection DG 050. Folder: Puerto Rican Political Prisoners. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

²⁸⁴ Rafael Rojas, *Fighting over Fidel: The New York Intellectuals and the Cuban Revolution* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1-28. Rojas' book highlights how the Cuban Revolution animated the U.S. Left as it was still reeling from Cold War repression. However, Rojas also examines how the U.S. Left that at first championed revolutionary Cuba as a new utopia became disenchanted with Fidel Castro's rapid shift to authoritarianism.

²⁸⁵ "Despierta, Boricua." Clippings, Jesús Colón Papers, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Liberación Message. Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam Records. Box 10, Folder 2: Puerto Rico 1966-1969. Wisconsin Historical Society; Roberto Rodríguez-Morazzani, "Political Cultures of the

The U.S. Left's fascination with the Cuban Revolution did not extend to knowledge of the issues concerning Puerto Rican leftists, specifically Puerto Rico's relationship to the United States. A student group of anti-draft independence activists in Puerto Rico echoed a common criticism of the left's lack of attention to Puerto Rico when they observed that "this is not unexpected, but consistent with the position of the left in imperialist countries towards their own colonies."²⁸⁶ The growth of student led organizations and interest in local and national issues blocked engagement with issues in the Caribbean or Latin America. The work of A.J. Muste and Dave Dellinger for Puerto Rican political prisoners and their discussion of Puerto Rico's status was an exception instead of the rule among U.S. Left circles. However, a shared commitment to challenge compulsory military service and the connection to global currents of progressive and leftist activism brought these disparate groups together.

Linking compulsory military service with the debates over Puerto Rico's status provided independence leaning anti-draft activists a language to question the necessity of Puerto Rican participation in war and demand for a shift in the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship. The M.P.I. and other groups linked independence struggles in Puerto Rico with other colonized nations and revolutionary fronts, critiquing the continued colonialism of the United States and other Western powers. Inspired by the events of the Cuban Revolution, the Puerto Rican independence solidarity with global independence

Puerto Rican Left in the United States," in *The Puerto Rican Movement: Voices from the Diaspora*, eds. Andrés Torres and José E. Velázquez, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998), 39-40.

²⁸⁶ "26 Arrested in Puerto Rico under the order of J. Edgar Hoover." Alice and Staughton Lynd Papers. Box 16, Folder: Subject File, 1960s Puerto Rican Resistance. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

factions continued a tradition of establishing international alliance networks to add visibility to their own struggles. International independence networks acknowledged each other's struggle for freedom in organizational meetings or international bodies. An example of this solidarity network included Marxist revolutionary Ernesto 'Che' Guevarra representing Cuba in a speech to the U.N., using his platform to acknowledge the struggle of the Puerto Rican independence factions.²⁸⁷ Regarding the escalation of U.S. conflict in Vietnam, Puerto Rican independence factions issued statements that supported the North Vietnamese government's right to defend their independence against U.S. imperialism and criticism of the U.S. waging war on the Vietnamese people.²⁸⁸

Political arguments over the status and military service connected with the contention of Puerto Rican independence factions that did not recognize U.S. authority to send individuals to war. A major grievance the M.P.I. articulated was a disagreement of Puerto Ricans being included in the U.S. Selective Service Act. Despite their own attitudes toward U.S. citizenship, Puerto Rico's independence factions argued that Puerto Ricans do not receive the full benefits of U.S. citizenship yet were called upon for U.S. military service. Additionally, independistas emphasized that the lack of allowance to vote for the U.S. based officials that call Puerto Ricans to war was a contradiction of U.S. proclamations of representative democracy.²⁸⁹ For the independence factions,

²⁸⁷ Associated Press, "Guevara, in U.N., asserts U.S. is Planning Attacks," *New York Times*, December 12, 1964.

²⁸⁸ "P.R. Anti-Draft Pickets at U.N." Clippings. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

²⁸⁹ "Support Draft Resisters in Puerto Rico." Clippings. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

Puerto Ricans defying their draft resistance highlighted Rutenberg's analysis of communities targeted for the draft. The viewpoint of the draft as a form of social uplift for the working class and minoritized communities was further complicated by the view of independistas. Independents used the debate as a rallying point to demand independence and reject military service.²⁹⁰

The lead-up to the International Days of Protest led committees to internal debate about how they would direct action that was agreeable to all members. The outgrowth of the anti-war movement led seasoned peace activists and radicals to work with college-aged students on mass mobilization against war. Calls for active civil disobedience by members of the SDS and Vietnam Day Committee organizer Jerry Rubin would be determined by local organizers. The purpose of the mass demonstrations was “to mobilize as many of those people now opposed to Johnson as possible, rather than try to change the minds of those supporting Johnson...An active minority of 1,000,000 people marching on Washington or 100,000 in coordinated civil disobedience would likely be sufficient to stop the war.”²⁹¹ Though members of the VDC considered blocking military equipment from reaching military installations as civil disobedience, the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade decided on non-violent action through a public demonstration starting in Central Park. Estimating a crowd of 5,000, the committee planned to march with each group representing their own organizational affiliation.

²⁹⁰ Rutenberg, 90-95, 132-134.

²⁹¹ “Vietnam Day Committee News. Vol 1, No. 3, July-August 1965.” Donna Allen Papers. Box 6, Folder 9, Miscellany: Vietnam, 1966-1969. Wisconsin Historical Society Papers.

The Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee's action with the International Days of Protest movement on October 15th, 1965, was considered a success by organizers. Rallying under the slogan "Stop the War in Vietnam Now," the demonstration started at the mall in Central Park with speakers discussing their resistance to the Vietnam War to a crowd. The Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade stated their march represented "every major peace group in the area, as well as many religious, labor, pacifist, veteran, neighborhood, civil rights, and professional groups" coming together in a broad-based anti-war coalition. The march began down 5th Avenue in New York after organizers and guest speakers addressed the estimated crowd of 25,000 participants holding banners and posters stating their objection to the war. New York City organizers were encouraged that the crowd was well over their initial estimates of 5,000.²⁹² During the march, the burning of draft cards by youth marchers led to a few arrests. Moderates within the committee and network allies were displeased with the burning of draft cards while others felt that members within the group could act in accordance with their conscience.²⁹³

Building on the momentum of the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade, New York based anti-draft organizers and activists proposed another set of international demonstrations

²⁹² "Informational Pamphlet of the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee." Social Movement Collection, Box 17, Folder 76, Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee. Vietnam Archives and Research Center, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas [hereafter cited as the Vietnam Archives and Research Center].

²⁹³ A.J. Muste to Norman Thomas, January 14, 1966. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee. Box 1, Folder 3, Correspondences, Oct 1965 to Mar 1966. Wisconsin Historical Society; "Informational Pamphlet of the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee." Social Movement Collection, Box 17, Folder 76, Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee. Vietnam Archives and Research Center; "Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Statement." A.J. (Abraham John) Muste Papers. Collection DG 050. Folder: Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee: meeting minutes, financial records [microfilm]. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

against the war in the Spring of 1966. The Fifth Avenue Parade Committee internally discussed in December 1965 how to coordinate such an effort among its membership in New York City. In subsequent meetings it was determined that the increase in mobilization work necessitated a paid salary for coordinators Dave Dellinger and Norma Becker. The first major discussion within the committee focused on inviting speakers that would inspire national and international audiences. Organizers asked members for suggestions on who could speak at an anti-war rally in New York, with suggestions including Dr. Benjamin Spock (SANE), the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (SCLC), and French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre. It was also proposed that the committee reach out to speakers that spoke for organizations representing women, military veterans, and labor regarding the Vietnam War.²⁹⁴

The first major dilemma the committee faced was choosing a space for the demonstration that was tenable for the members and sponsors of the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee. They discussed four potential locations in Manhattan and Queens during meetings in December. The most ambitious of the four locations was the privately owned Yankee Stadium, which would cost money and the work of volunteers to ensure the rally was in good order with a stadium estimated to fit 80,000 people by the committee.²⁹⁵ However, Yankee Stadium was removed from consideration because of the cost and the stadium manager stated the rally would conflict with the start of the

²⁹⁴ December 1st Minutes; December 14 Minutes. All in Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

²⁹⁵ December 1st, 1965, Minutes; December 14th, 1965, Minutes. All in Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

Major League Baseball season. After entreaties to the recently opened and publicly funded Shea Stadium offering the same financial and logistical problems, the committee focused on public spaces in the mall at Central Park or Times Square. Attaining access would not be easier in these spaces because of the need of permits that could be rebuked because of the political nature of the rally. If they could not get permits for Central Park, a fallback plan was to hold the rally as an act of public, non-violent civil disobedience that would potentially lead to the arrest of leaders and participants.²⁹⁶

Initial efforts to use Central Park as a rallying point for the march faced push back from New York City's Parks and Recreation Services. City officials argued that the march would be a political affair and were concerned about what would happen. Central Park's proximity as a rallying point in New York and the committee's use of the site during the October 1965 marches created confusion over why the space was being restricted for a future march. Pushing back on the suggestion that their use of the park would be of "strictly political nature," organizers stated that the parade would bring together Americans of all points of view together against the Vietnam War.²⁹⁷ After exhausting all possibilities, including sending multiple entreaties to the New York Parks Department, organizers received permission to organize a march. During a committee meeting on March 9th, leaders stated that the march would be held at the mall in Central

²⁹⁶ Bill Bergesch to Norma Becker, January 21, 1966. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers. Box 1, Folder 3. Correspondence, Oct 1965 to Mar 1966; February 1st, Minutes; February 15th, Minutes. Both in Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

²⁹⁷ Lisa Dannenberg to Samuel White, New York City Parks Department. Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, Correspondence Oct 1965 to Mar 1966. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Park. The committee worked to ensure plans for the day were uniform and understood those within the committee to inform their organizations and networks.²⁹⁸

With a location solidified, committee members and sponsors worked together to recommend event speakers that represented the various causes they supported. During the January 13th, 1966, meeting, the committee created a two-tier list of speakers that would be invited to speak at the anti-war rally in March. The first tier sent invitations to headline figures that included philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Luther King, Dr. Julian Bond, historian Staughton Lynd, and M.P.I. leader Juan Mari Bras. Additionally, the committee proposed a second list of speakers as a contingency for their first choices declining or canceling their appearance. This list included committee member Dave Dellinger, civil rights activist Fannie Lou Hamer, Vietnam Day Committee organizer Jerry Rubin, actor Sterling Hayden, and novelist Arthur Miller, among others.²⁹⁹ On February 1st, the committee reported that M.P.I. Secretary General and leader Juan Mari Bras was the first to openly accept while Lynd and Bond tentatively agreed to speak.

Mari Bras' position as a main speaker at the rally ensured that Puerto Rican concerns over the draft and the independence question would be discussed within the broader movement. The choice of Mari Bras illustrated the committee working as a collaborative network instead of directed by an executive group within the collective. Fifth Avenue Committee chair A.J. Muste responded in a letter that he did not personally

²⁹⁸ March 9th Minutes of Meeting, 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

²⁹⁹ January 13, 1966, Minutes of meeting. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

know Juan Mari Bras yet knew of his work for Puerto Rico and wanted a broad range of perspectives speaking at the rally. Additionally, Mari Bras' position as Secretary-General of the M.P.I. saw him collaborate with U.S. leftists aligned with anti-colonial, labor, and peace movements in defense of Puerto Rican political prisoners and a reexamination of Puerto Rico' colonial case by the United Nations.³⁰⁰

The committee's work ensured that each member group voiced their concerns and were represented while conforming to the political parameters of marching spaces in New York City. The use of material to spread the word about the rally provided organizers with an approximation of how many people might attend the rally. Additionally, members could pick up materials from the Parade Committee Office that advertised the parade for sale and keep the profits for their individual organizations. Organizers asked each member within the organization to provide volunteers to act as monitors, banner carriers, and crowd counters.³⁰¹ The parade would have to abide by a flag policy that situated the U.S. flag at the beginning of the procession followed by others. Parade organizers planned to follow this by having a group representing U.S. veterans against the war carry the flag, followed by a thirteen stars American Revolution Flag and a Puerto Rican flag.³⁰²

The issue of what messaging would be used during the planned parade was a constant internal battle. Echoing moderate peace activists' concerns about the burning of

³⁰⁰ February 1st, 1966, Minutes. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁰¹ March 9th Minutes of Meeting, 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁰² March 9th Minutes of Meeting, 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

draft cards during the October 1965 parade, committee organizers and sponsor members deliberated over what messages would be used on banners and signs during the march before permission was received to host the event at Central Park.³⁰³ The committee met on February 15nd to propose ideas for parade slogans that highlighted the broad scope and interests of the individual organizations without the slogans representing a full endorsement by those in the collective. . Despite establishing a collective devoted to projecting a clear voice, disagreement could lead to groups leaving and working within their own networks. During the February 15th meeting, a question was raised about what slogans would be used for the March 26th march. The committee passed a motion in that meeting that the committee “would adopt several slogans, encourage their use, and take responsibility for them.” The administrative committee also recognized that each member of the collective has the right of individual expression to state their discontent over the war with their own slogans.³⁰⁴

Recognition of the individuality and politics of each member of the collective demonstrated the contentious dynamics within the 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Van Dyke and McCammon note that coalition movements come together through a lineage or part of a different network group. The M.P.I.’s relationship with Muste and Dellinger based on their work defending Puerto Rican political prisoners emphasizes this collective making. However, the various ideologies of individuals within could lead to

³⁰³ February 22nd Minutes of Meeting, 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁰⁴ February 15th Minutes of Meeting, 5th Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

members leaving or the dissolution of the committee.³⁰⁵ The contentious nature of the collective was displayed during the February 22nd and March 9th meeting regarding the use of slogans. On February 22nd, the Arrangements committee proposed six official slogans to the membership that would all include “Stop the War in Vietnam Now” printed in smaller letters on the top of posters. The six slogans included: Stop the Bombing in Vietnam; Support the G.I.’s Bring ‘em Home Alive; Vietnam for the Vietnamese; Negotiate with the NLF; War on Poverty, Not on People; and Escalation (with a graphic of a mushroom shaped cloud).³⁰⁶ After the slogans were brought before the group, a motion was offered to the committee to change the language of the second sign option from “Bring ‘em Home Alive” to “Bring ‘em Home Now.” The motion was put to a vote and led to a tie after intense discussion, leading to chair Dave Dellinger casting the deciding vote for “Now” to be added. Dellinger’s vote caused several members to voice displeasure that the chair cast the deciding vote when there was an even split within the Committee.

Dellinger defended his vote and the stance of the organizations voting for an affirmative statement on ending the war now. He first stated that “he did not think the parade committee was at the point of splitting over the inclusion of a withdrawal now sign” emphasizing that the majority of the Committee approved of that position and pointed out a few groups that voted against “now” did so out of fear of one or two

³⁰⁵ Van Dyke and McCammon, xi-xv.

³⁰⁶ February 22nd Minutes of Meeting, Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society.

groups dropping out over its inclusion. Dellinger's main point of contention was that it would not make sense to exclude 'withdrawal now' as an official slogan if the committee were offering a statement saying that the slogans represented a broad expression within the group. After a suggested motion to do away with official slogans was proposed, Dellinger pushed back about the need of the committee to stand on the vote of the collective. This potential impasse highlighted scholar Francesca Polletta's contention that a dilemma of using participatory democratic processes in a social movement is that conflicting political messaging and agendas could lead to fracturing. Despite the committee agreeing that the common slogan, "Stop the War in Vietnam Now" would be used to symbolize the collective, Dellinger suggested that the issue of withdrawal now should be reconsidered by each organization to bring back to the committee.³⁰⁷

The committee gathering on March 9th settled the slogan issue from the last meeting collectively. Discussion started with the representatives from Women Strike for Peace and NY SANE bringing their organization's dialogue about the slogan issue. Dealing with a similar stalemate, the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee voted again on having officially sanctioned slogans attached with a statement. The Fifth Avenue Committee's process of participatory democracy within the collective illustrated an attempt to ensure the voice of the majority within the group moved motions instead of the directives of the administrative committee. Scholar Francesca Polletta states that the

³⁰⁷ February 22nd Minutes of Meeting. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971. Wisconsin Historical Society; Polletta, 212-218.

goal of this was to promote efficacy through the authority of the entire group instead pushing for unanimous consensus.³⁰⁸ By a vote of 30 for, 14 opposed, and 2 abstentions, the committee designated seven slogans that represented the broad interests of each member. The unanimous “Stop the War in Vietnam Now” was included in the list and slogan two was revised to ‘Bring ‘em Home Now.’” The committee provided placards and posters with the slogans during the parade while encouraging those that made their own signs to use the official slogans and place group identifiers on their banners. Individual organizations that chose other slogans or banners to promote during the march would bear responsibility.³⁰⁹

The spirit of efficacy through the committee’s composition influenced the choice of speakers for the rally. The Fifth Avenue Committee’s outreach to speakers represented their determination to address a broad range of anti-war movement concerns. The committee also worked to ensure that they were up front with potential speakers about the composition of the committee and possible political conflict. Historian Simon Hall noted that anti-war liberals did not welcome marching against war with communists.³¹⁰ In a letter to Father Daniel Berrigan asking for his participation in the March 26th rally, A.J. Muste identifies the tensions among moderate and radical political members. Highlighting a recent attack by New York City officials on a New York

³⁰⁸ Polletta, 5-25

³⁰⁹ March 9th Minutes of Meeting. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box 1, Folder 1: Minutes 1966-1971; A.J. Muste to Senator William Pitts Ryan, March 9, 1966. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers. Box 1, Folder 3. Correspondence, Oct 1965 to Mar 1966. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³¹⁰ Simon Hall, *Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in the 1960s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 23-24.

W.E.B. Du Bois Club chapter, Muste stressed the importance of coalition to object to the Vietnam War. Muste stated that he understood the disagreements moderates held over the Du Bois Club's connections to the Communist Party USA. However, he impressed upon Berrigan the importance of the committee as a place for each organization to state their views and the necessity of the more moderate factions within the group to be fully on board with the march.³¹¹

Muste's correspondence with Daniel Berrigan and other moderates demonstrates the precarious nature of the coalition. The political disagreements with the collective could have easily destroyed the committee. Muste himself expressed issues with Communist ideology dating back to repudiating Marxism in the late 1930s. However, Muste's spiritual dedication to justice saw him remain a respected figure among U.S. Marxists.³¹² Muste was determined that solutions to social problems must be confronted from a grassroots level coalition to impact social change. Maintaining coalition cohesion demanded confidence among sponsors and members. This was demonstrated when Muste trusted the recommendation to invite Juan Mari Bras to discuss Puerto Rico's anti-war stance at the rally despite not knowing him personally.³¹³

New York's anti-war demonstrations on March 26th, 1966, occurred in coordination with other marches in the United States and around the world. The Fifth

³¹¹ A.J. Muste to Father Daniel Berrigan, March 17, 1966. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers, Box, 1, Folder 3, Correspondences Oct 1965-Mar 1966. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³¹² Vanessa Cook, *Spiritual Socialists: Religion and the American Left* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 36-45; Jo Ann Robinson, *Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A.J. Muste* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), 65-69.

³¹³ A.J. Muste to Norman Thomas, January 14, 1966. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers. Box 1, Folder 3. Correspondence, Oct 1965 to Mar 1966, Wisconsin Historical Society. Wisconsin Historical Society Papers; Reese, Petit, and Meyer, 272; Polletta, 3-14.

Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade rally in Central Park was considered a rousing success. The parade began at 12:30 on Madison Avenue and made its way to Central Park, where the invited speakers discussed their perspective of the Vietnam War. An estimated 50,000 people participated in the demonstration. Marchers faced pockets of resistance from counter protesters and passersby, with committee members acting as marshals keeping order to avoid eliciting a response. However, it was stated by the *Fifth Estate* magazine that the overt pro-war heckling seems to decrease compared to what activists faced during the October 1965 rallies.³¹⁴ The networks built during the march waves of 1965 and 1966 continued as organizing committees attempted to form networks of support “where unity is expressed on points held in common by a wide variety of groups which are opposed to war.” The members of the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee continued their work in New York and the broader United States promoting an anti-war message through organized mass rallies and quick strike actions based on the needs of members within the group.³¹⁵

Contributors to the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee worked collectively to connect the war with social issues like the disproportionate number of soldiers coming from poor, Black, and Latino backgrounds. Additionally, members strategized over ensuring that legal defense committees would support the draft cases of objectors. Puerto Rican concerns about the Vietnam War and the draft within the marches of 1965 to 1967

³¹⁴ “The 26th of March.” *Fifth Estate Magazine*, #7, April 1966; Paul Warren, “The 1966 Peace Parade down Fifth Avenue.” *The Village Voice*, March 31, 1966, Vol. XI, no. 24.

³¹⁵ “Minutes of meeting, Sept 1966”; “Statement of Fifth Avenue Parade Committee.” All in A.J. (Abraham John) Muste Papers. Collection DG 050. Folder: Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee: meeting minutes, financial records [microfilm]. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

were not isolated to the causes of the M.P.I. or Puerto Rican pacifists. Advocates for Puerto Rican civil rights in the United States perceived the war as distracting the U.S. from dealing with the social and political issues in the country. It was reported during the March 1966 rally in Central Park that Puerto Rican political activist Gilberto Gerena Valentin appeared at the rally in a show of support. Gerena Valentin's dedication as a leader for Puerto Rican civil rights was evident in his participation in events as a form of solidarity and inform individuals about the issues affecting Puerto Ricans. In a letter to Gerena Valentin, A.J. Muste thanked him for his appearance and impassioned speech to the crowd while also hoping that he was able to make his scheduled community engagement that same day.³¹⁶ Gerena Valentin's dedication to Puerto Rican causes through community engagement and solidarity work with other organizations led him to collaborate within these spaces as a sponsor and guest speaker during anti-war marches in 1967.³¹⁷

The August 1966 rally organized in Central Park by the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee further illustrated the continued struggle organizers faced arguing draft resistance as a broad common tie. Commitment to Christian pacifism and direct action by committee leaders like A.J. Muste, Dave Dellinger, and others contrasted sharply

³¹⁶ A.J. Muste to Gilberto Gerena Valentin, March 26, 1966. Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee Papers. Box 1, Folder 3. Correspondence, Oct 1965 to Mar 1966, Wisconsin Historical Society.

³¹⁷ "Official Program: Mobilizer to End the War in Vietnam, April 15, 1967." Social Movement Collection. Box 43, Folder 27: Spring Mobilization Committee to End the Vietnam War. Vietnam Archives and Research Center. Gerena Valentin and M.P.I. member Pedro Juan Rúa were on the list of scheduled speakers for the event. For more on Gilberto Gerena Valentin's coalition work, see Charles L. Sanders, "'Playing Hooky' for Freedom," *Ebony Magazine*, April 1, 1964, 153-162; Sonia S. Lee and Ande Diaz, "I was the One-Percenter: Manny Diaz and the Beginnings of a Black-Latino Coalition," *Journal of American Ethnic History* (Spring 2007), 52-80.

with other members that articulated a confrontational approach to war resistance. Puerto Rican draft resister Sixto Alvelo, speaking at the August rally in New York after fighting the draft board in Puerto Rico for a year, positioned his war refusal as standing against U.S. authority. Instead of situating his position through the lens of Christian peace or pacifism, Alvelo and other pro-independence youth stated an aggressive stance against the U.S. and the Puerto Rican government. The contested political and ideological dynamics within the network did not dissolve committee and solidarity work, as individual leaders continued to campaign against shared causes throughout the Americas.³¹⁸

The M.P.I.'s message to fight against U.S. authority and militarization contrasted with their pacifist allies in the United States and Puerto Rican religious objectors. The anti-draft movement in Puerto Rico was not exclusive to the independence parties as individuals situated their personal resistance as a political, moral, or religious choice. Growing discontent about military service, despite being a minor sector of society, provided a chance for a growing collaborative network to combat compulsory military service. Pacifists in Puerto Rico conceptualized the development of a Puerto Rican Peace Center that would provide resources to the growing anti-war pulse in Puerto Rico. Pitched in 1967 as a concept to the Fellowship of Reconciliation by Father Tom Dorney, a Jesuit priest with a history of draft resistance,

³¹⁸ Ashley Black, "From San Juan to Saigon: Shifting Conceptions of Puerto Rican Identity during the Vietnam War." (Master's Thesis, The University of British Columbia, 2012), 19-38; "Committee to Defend Sixto Alvelo, Press Release, May 2nd, 1966. Fellowship of Reconciliation Files, Series C, Box 41, Folder: General Correspondences, 1966-1968; Puerto Rican Peace Center, 1966-1969.

the goal of the center was to provide peace education and legal resources to Puerto Rican draft resisters on the island. Hoping to attract Puerto Rican members within the group instead of having a North American dominated space like FOR's Puerto Rico, the Peace Center endeavored to establish networks of support with fellow draft resisters, including those connected to the independence movement.³¹⁹

Draft resistance served as a symbol of revolutionary struggle for independence activists. Moreover, the groups mobilized further networks with U.S. and international groups that shared their commitment to liberation and protesting compulsory military service. Interactions in meetings for international liberation and network building through the Tricontinental Congress and M.P.I. work in the United States between 1965 and 1966 developed the relationship between Carmichael and Mari Bras, leading to the SNCC-M.P.I. pact. An example of this was a pact signed between Stokely Carmichael's Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and the M.P.I. in January 1967 centered on shared struggle against colonialism, support for global independence movements, and resistance to joining the U.S. military. The network between Black and Puerto Rican groups endeavored that "the opposition to the draft and U.S. aggression in Viet Nam can be strengthened by concerted actions between the two organizations."³²⁰

Establishing international networks enabled the Puerto Rican independence factions to mobilize internally toward an independent Puerto Rico. Rebounding from the

³¹⁹ "Inter-office Memorandum, Allen Stauffer to Alfred Hassler, September 28, 1968. FOR Files, Series C, Box 41 Folder: Alfred Hassler Correspondence, Puerto Rico Peace Center. Swarthmore Peace Collection; Resist, "Resist Newsletter, Sept. 16, 1969" (1969). *Resist Newsletters*. 14. <https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/resistnewsletter/14>

³²⁰ US Congress "Committee of the Judiciary: Communist Threat in the Caribbean Report, 1365-1370.

political suppression during the 1950s, independence groups initially articulated their individual group vision as the way to independence. These organizational disagreements over ideology led to attempts by the F.B.I. and Puerto Rico's CARPETA program to cause dissension with the independence movements through disinformation. In one example, the F.B.I. office in Puerto Rico sent an anonymous leaflet throughout Puerto Rico that Albizu Campos and the Nationalist Party were betrayed by the socialist and communist infiltration of the independence movement.³²¹ Despite these attempts to create dissension, the groups worked to establish a shared image of continuing the lineage of prominent independence figures like Ramon Betances and Jose de Diego. A shared commitment toward Puerto Rican liberation and against compulsory military service led the factions to develop independent networks to reach out to the Puerto Rican people on the archipelago and abroad.³²²

Demonstrations in Puerto Rico for independence and against the draft increased publicly during 1967. The M.P.I. specifically encouraged Puerto Rican youth to refuse their draft summons through public demonstrations or proclamations of their defiance at local draft boards in Puerto Rico. During one march in January 1967, 200 college students from the University of Puerto Rico marched against the draft from Fort Brooks to San Juan proper accompanied by SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael. Public demonstrations by high school and college anti-draft advocates against draft boards and campus ROTC during the spring of 1967 led to clashes with pro-statehood and pro-

³²¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation. Puerto Rican Groups, Part I, 1962.

³²² Carta Semanal (Spanish), March 30, 1967. La Colección de Izquierda, 1950s to Present, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

military demonstrators.³²³ However, the largest scale action by the independence collectives occurred on April 16, 1967, with the organization of *La Gran Marcha Patriótica*. The march publicly demonstrated for the independence of Puerto Rico, which included the end of compulsory military service that targeted Puerto Rican youth on the island. The action, with an estimated ten to fifteen thousand attending, included six U.S. based individuals of the U.S. political left. Representatives included Don Tucker (CORE), Jose Stevens (W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs), and Tom Hayden (ex-president of SDS) joining the march in solidarity with the independence factions in Puerto Rico.³²⁴

Anti-war activists in the United States conceptualized the action of war as an issue of citizenship. Religious resisters defined their defiance as an objection to the militarization of society and pursued a course of global peace for all citizens. However, Puerto Rican independence activists involved in the anti-war movement vocalized that the Vietnam War continued a pattern of U.S.³²⁵ Anti-war adverts throughout 1967 started to link social inequality to the resources spent on the Vietnam War, remarking that the initiatives of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society appeared hollow. To activists, seeing the toll of the war did not make sense with cost of living rising and a lack of investment in educational and health facilities.³²⁶

³²³ US Congress "Committee of the Judiciary: Communist Threat in the Caribbean Report, 1365-1370.

³²⁴ Carta Semanal (Spanish), March 30, 1967. La Colección de Izquierda, 1950s to Present, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

³²⁵ "Support Draft Refusers in Puerto Rico." Subject Files Vietnam. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

³²⁶ "It's Costing YOU \$80 million a Day." Subject Files Vietnam. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

Increased scrutiny of the number of poor Black, Brown, and white youth into the military led anti-war activists to question what being a full American was. For Black, Puerto Rican, and Mexican American resisters, the Vietnam War was conceptualized as another roadblock to pursuing social change, arguing that their communities did not receive the benefit of full citizenship yet were tasked with defending democracy abroad as soldiers. A lack of deferment options further illustrated a division in access even among allies, as white pacifists, many of them middle class and college-bound, would receive draft deferments. The position of military service as a vehicle to demand social change was shifted to a demand that citizens should enjoy basic human and civil rights at home instead of having to die overseas.³²⁷

Responding to a conflict that did not value the right of citizens to morally or politically resist, religious and social anti-war activists emphasized that the real-life domestic issues facing the U.S. took precedence over acting as an occupying force overseas. The slogan “Our Fight is Here” popped up in anti-war advertisements and literature, specifically as a way for Black and Latino draft resisters to articulate that military service did not erase the injustices of police brutality and social inequality in their home communities.³²⁸ The broader message calling for the U.S. to focus on internal social change resonated despite the rhetoric of some anti-war groups devoted to fighting for freedom at home. The anti-war demonstration in New York was one of many that brought groups together against the Vietnam War. The expansion of youth activism as

³²⁷ Rutenberg, 1-13.

³²⁸ “Our Fight is Here.” Subject Files Vietnam. Colón Collection, Center for Puerto Rican Studies; Oropeza, 1-10.

the war escalated led these networks to support one another in the face of government repression and internal splits.

New York's place as an international city with multiple currents of social and political activism illustrated the potential for mass networks to share a direction despite varied tactics and philosophies. Aware of the growing potential for a national movement, organizers of the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee maintained the philosophy of a space for all anti-draft activists to work on the common cause and formed the National Mobilization Committee to End the Vietnam War. M.P.I. members Dixie Bayo, Pedro Rúa, and Alfredo Peña represented Puerto Rican draft resisters while working collaboratively with U.S. based religious, labor, and social activists in the United States to spread the anti-war message nationally.³²⁹ Despite most of the country showing support for the war, resistance against the war continued to focus on protecting youth potentially facing induction in the military through the draft. The protracted nature of the Vietnam War also led youth and inducted soldiers, including those from Puerto Rico or children of the diaspora, to actively question the conflict or their place as soldier.

Collectives like the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee demonstrated the possibilities of a movement that attempted to balance the central message of the whole while also respecting the individual ideologies of its sponsor members. The coming together of an interracial and multiethnic committee that addressed the religious, moral, and political objections of members against military

³²⁹ Administrative Committee List, National Mobilization Committee to End the Vietnam War. Series I, Box 1, Organization. Folder, Steering Committee Minutes. Swarthmore Peace Collection; Polletta, 5-25; Van Dyke and McCammon, x-xxi.

service highlighted how coalition work attempted to create spaces that could weather disagreement under a shared ideal. These networks of support, even with ideological and intergenerational differences, established a system that demanded the right of each organization within the committee to exist and direct their activism. The continuation of these network systems among U.S. and Puerto Rican draft resisters provided youth resisters facing draft summons or orders for deployment resources to defend their political, religious, and moral objections. Chapter 5 will discuss how the coalitions mentioned in this chapter identified dissenting U.S. soldiers as another constituency needing representation within the anti-war movement. The separate episodes of a U.S. Marine from Puerto Rico and three U.S. Army members stationed at Fort Hood highlighted the complexity of dissent within the military and how anti-war coalitions responded to these cases.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOLDIERS HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY: PUERTO RICAN SOLDIERS' RESISTANCE AND THE GROWTH OF THE ANTI-VIETNAM WAR MOVEMENT

During the summer of 1966, U.S. Army Private Dennis Mora faced a court martial for defying orders to embark to Vietnam. Mora and colleagues Private First-Class James Johnson and Private Davis Samas were dubbed by supporters as the “Fort Hood Three” for their objections to the draft. All three men centered their resistance on a definition of citizenship that grants draftees moral appeals against war. Additionally, Dennis Mora illustrated how being a first-generation Puerto Rican migrant from Spanish Harlem shaped his experience as a second-class U.S. citizen. Recounting to supporters how he was told throughout his youth that he would never amount to anything because he was Puerto Rican, the college graduate and former New York City caseworker explained how his marginalized identity shaped his decision. Mora connected his lived experiences and the question of Puerto Rico’s status to the struggles of everyday people in Vietnam fighting for independence. The court-martial proceedings of Mora, Johnson, and Samas further galvanized the anti-war movement, pushing leaders to include resisting soldiers. More importantly the case of the Fort Hood Three highlights the experiences of dissenting Puerto Rican soldiers who entered the service despite their moral or political objections and later defied their orders to deploy overseas.³³⁰

³³⁰ “Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, Letter of the Trial to Friends.” Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.

The Vietnam War's continuation throughout the late 1960s saw Puerto Rican youth in Puerto Rico and the United States grapple with the choice of compulsory military service. Although the majority did serve when summoned, individual youth also rejected their draft summons for political, moral, or religious reasons. Soldiers from working class, poor, and minoritized communities questioned their position as drafted soldiers in the army of a country that treated them as second-class citizens. Calls to resist military service within the military during the Vietnam War saw individual Puerto Ricans face judicial consequences for their political stance. Puerto Ricans soldiers during the Vietnam War similarly interrogated their commitment to a conflict that did not conform to their political, social, or religious worldview. The broader movement of soldiers questioning their place within the military illustrated the potential of politically conscious soldiers choosing to morally or personally object to killing others rather than conform to orders. The examples of U.S. Marine Adolfo Rodríguez and Dennis Mora highlight how Puerto Ricans born on the island or children of the diaspora challenge their status within the military.

Through public declaration and individual defense during their trials, Puerto Rican war resisters and soldiers redefined individual and organizational understandings of citizenship to object to military service. Puerto Rican resisters within the military grappled with their political and moral decisions defining their own understanding of identity and citizenship. Soldiers resisting orders to deploy interpreted their citizenship through their spiritual dedication to peace or their rights as individuals from communities. The cases of Rodríguez and Mora featured individuals that based their

decisions to refuse orders on their political and personal leanings despite facing charges of desertion. Furthermore, resisters situated their need to remain home as continuing the fight for social justice in their own communities, carrying slogans like “The War is Here” at anti-war rallies. The growing press attention for U.S. soldiers defying their orders impacted Puerto Rican youth critical of the war as another colonial conflict sapping resources from their community. Increased attention to the anti-war movement in the U.S. and individual political awakening during their military service influenced Puerto Rican youth in the U.S. to actively resist military service despite pressure to serve. More importantly, the individual case Private Rodríguez and the case of Mora and the Fort Hood Three illustrated how secular and religious networks, families, and legal defense committees worked to ensure the soldiers received monetary and legal aid to challenge their status as objectors and deserters.

Chapter five will focus on how Puerto Rican leftists and U.S. progressive Christians used platforms such as community space, churches, and printed materials to organize and defend Puerto Rican military personnel defying their deployment orders to Vietnam. Individual soldiers shaped their own political and social positions during their service and attempted to resist their position in the U.S. military. Defending themselves in military courts saw anti-war coalition networks form to argue that the U.S. ignored social issues through allocating resources to the war effort. Additionally, coalition members were cognizant that many of their congregants and political allies, if called up for the draft, would not have legal resources to defend themselves if they chose to resist compulsory service or direct orders within the military for moral or political reasons.

Within the context of the anti-war movement, draft eligible Black and Latino males received less access to deferments or resources to avoid the draft compared to white college students. Anti-war networks that connected the U.S. religious and political left with Puerto Rican independence activists ensured that resisting soldiers facing judicial and political pressure received collective support.

Anti-war marches in the United States and Puerto Rico between 1965 and 1967 highlighted the diverse voices opposed to U.S. military efforts in Southeast Asia. Military escalation after Operation Rolling Thunder saw gradual increases in the draft quota that saw war critics emphasize the disproportionate number of poor white, Black, and Latino soldiers targeted by the draft. The diverse reasons that drove coalition anti-war activism during the Vietnam War also caused fractures that threatened the work of collective action. Committee work and coalitions faced the threat of members walking out over ideological differences, a phenomenon that increased as the Vietnam War continued into the late 1960s. U.S. based sponsors and members within the collectives' criticized leadership within committees for being predominantly white, male, and middle class. Moreover, there was a general perception that the leadership of predominately white organizations situated their own analysis of race and class in the areas they committed to assist without working in coalition with activists and residents of the spaces they occupied.³³¹ Individuals and groups dedicated to non-violent anti-war action clashed with colleagues who did not denounce violence as a method of self-defense.

³³¹ Amy Sonnie and James Tracy, *Hillbilly Nationalist, Urban Race Rebels, and Black Power: Community Organizing in Radical Times* (New York: Melville House, 2011), 4-9.

Veteran war resisters, still of the opinion that the U.S. could be redeemed through social change, continued to emphasize the logistical and tangible changes that occurred through campaigns that implemented non-violent direct action.

Tensions over methods and the utility of direct action also strained the relationship between U.S. resisters and their Puerto Rican independence networks. Puerto Rican independence organizations, like the M.P.I. and the burgeoning youth led groups in New York, situated their resistance as a rejection of U.S. colonialism and treatment as second-class citizens. When presenting themselves before draft boards or ignoring a summons, Puerto Rican draft resisters stated their objection as a political stand against U.S. colonialism. These groups projected a willingness to fight and die for Puerto Rico, their home communities, and in the defense of colleagues and allies.³³² However, Puerto Rican youth born or raised in the United States were not fully exposed to the political activism of the M.P.I. or their U.S. based branches. In an interview discussing their role as leaders of 1960s Puerto Rican student movements in New York, many of the interviewees stated that they gained much of their political awareness from movements for Black Power and the anti-war movement.³³³

Their rhetorical approval of violence in self-defense clashed ideologically with allies in the U.S. and Puerto Rico who advocated for pacifism and non-violent direct action. Despite these tensions, coalition networks continued to function as groups

³³² "Puerto Rico: How Much Independence Does it Want?" Clippings, Colón Collection. Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

³³³ Andrés Torres and Jose E. Velázquez eds., *The Puerto Rican Movement: Voices from the Diaspora* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998), 88-106.

collectively working on a shared grievance while maintaining individual autonomy in promoting their organizational objectives. U.S. religious leftists received verbal or written requests from congregants and network allies regarding how to resist a summons. Facing public ostracism and potential arrest, Puerto Rican resisters who lacked the resources to defend themselves would reach out to individuals and organizations committed to defending objectors. Draft resister Antonio Rios reached out to the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors asking for resources to navigate a dilemma facing his draft board. Rios stated in his letter that he received his I-A-O status from the board and instructions to find approved civilian work outside of New York City. After diligently looking for employment in the hospitals on the approved list to fulfill his obligation as a conscientious objector. Despite the hospitals having openings, Rios could not take a position because they required him to work Saturdays. He stated to the CCCO that “due to religious training and belief I do not work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.”³³⁴ Rios struggled to find work that would accommodate his strict observation of the Sabbath.³³⁵

³³⁴ Antonio Rios to the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, May 25, 1964. Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors Papers [hereafter called the CCCO Papers], Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rios, Antonio. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³³⁵ Notes on the Rios Case. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rios, Antonio. Swarthmore Peace Collection. Rios was a member of the Radio Church of God, known today as Grace Communion International. The Radio Church of God was started by Herbert Armstrong as an offshoot of Seventh Day Adventism. There is debate whether Armstrong changed the name of the church to the Worldwide Church of God during the late 1940s or 1968. The church changed names again to Grace Communion International during the 1980’s and rejected much of Armstrong’s early doctrine. For more on Radio Church of God, see “Herbert W. Armstrong and his “Radio Church of God.” *The Ministry*, 34, no. 3 (March 1961), 14-19; “Obituary: Herbert W. Armstrong, Founded Radio Church, magazine, and College,” *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto, Ontario, Canada), January 17, 1986.

After informing his draft board about his issues, he received another letter directing him to three employment options deemed appropriate. Facing the same issue of not working Saturdays and fearful that the board would determine his fate, he asked the CCCO to send three copies of “‘Details of Compulsory Work Program,’ ‘Agencies Approved for the Employment of Drafted C.O.s,’ ‘Handbook for C.O.s,’ ‘The C.O. and the R.O.T.C.’”³³⁶ Additionally, he asked the CCCO to send a draft counselor from New York to provide further direction on how to navigate his draft case. In a response letter to Rios, CCCO activist Arlo Tatum asked for clarification about his stance on not working sabbath to ensure that the Selective Service was not trying to violate the religious obligations of a conscientious objector. Understanding the issue from a religious and logistical standpoint, Tatum provided Rios the names and contact information of New York draft counselors Dan Seager of the American Friends Committee and Ralph DiGia of the War Resisters League. Both men, in Tatum’s estimation, would respond promptly and ensure that Rios’ religious and moral objection were respected.³³⁷

Regarding the Vietnam War, ideologically opposed groups within the U.S. and Puerto Rican Left acted individually and within their coalition networks to ensure the movement actively supported those facing imminent draft summons. The anti-war networks also provided a basis of support for drafted soldiers questioning the purpose of overseas conflict and their own place within the machines of war. Resistance was not

³³⁶ Rios to CCCO, May 25, 1964. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rios, Antonio. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³³⁷ Arlo Tatum to Antonio Rios, May 28, 1964. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rios, Antonio. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

isolated to individuals about to be inducted into the draft. Soldiers, informed by their experiences within the military as well as their own individual moral or political philosophies, voiced their opposition to obeying deployment orders. One case in 1966 saw a U.S. Marine of Puerto Rican descent, Private Adolfo Rodríguez, demand a discharge from the military. Rodríguez described in a letter to the psychologist at Camp Lejeune his specific objection to serving in the Marines and the steps he would take to resist. Rodríguez's positioning of his objection as an issue of mental health and conscientious objection led him to reach out to the U.S. Left and Puerto Rican independence groups.³³⁸

Discontent among drafted individuals and military personnel alarmed military officials. The Rodríguez case demonstrated how individual soldiers might question their position within the military and demand a discharge from their duties based on how they interpreted citizenship. Although his shifting reasonings and overt political statements clouded the case, Private Rodríguez was willing to accept imprisonment and dishonorable discharge for a matter of conscience. Moreover, his stated political and moral disagreements against war came from his own understanding of citizenship, which was based on the belief that Puerto Rico's national status and lack of representation in U.S. politics should exclude him from service. His moral and spiritual convictions dictated his higher calling to use his gifts and education for the betterment of humanity instead of killing. Taking part in actions viewed as insubordinate to the order and

³³⁸ Adolfo Rodriguez to Doctor, March 1, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection. The Folder lists the last name "Rodriguez" without the accent. However, his own writing and typing emphasize the ascent mark (Rodríguez).

structure of the military and federal government, soldiers resisting their status in the military made their case through drastic measures like refusing orders. Objecting under the pretext of a moral or spiritual objection that was overtly political reached out to political and social organizations dedicated to defending an individual's right to moral objection.³³⁹

Rodríguez's case further illustrated the contentious dynamics within anti-war and anti-draft circles regarding what route an individual could take to defy military service and the draft based on their religious, moral, or political conscience. Individuals and organizations supporting draft resisters and military personnel defying deployment to Vietnam escalated their tactics by testing the limits of official channels. Private Rodríguez tested how the U.S. Marine Corps interpreted their policies on medical and conscientious objectors within the ranks. His actions echoed how individuals within the broader anti-war movement escalated action to avoid the war. The progression of the Vietnam War saw draft-eligible men and servicemembers fail their health physicals at the draft board and take their individual cases to court to tie up the legal system. Individuals also openly defied official channels through public acts like the burning of draft files, refusing to register, and fleeing to Canada to avoid induction. For servicemembers, escalation included refusing basic duties, rejecting deployment orders to Southeast Asia, or deserting from service. It was vital for the various factions within

³³⁹ Jacqueline N. Font-Guzman, *Experiencing Puerto Rican Citizenship and Cultural Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2015), 1-10; "To Whom it May Concern by Adolfo Rodriguez, April 26, 1966." CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

the anti-war movement to concentrate their efforts on collective action to ensure that individual resisters knew they did not have to stand alone in their objection.³⁴⁰

Originally called to the draft board in Berkley, Rodríguez stated his intention to enroll at the University of California to continue his education in psychology. After moving to Washington D.C. to apply for school at George Washington University and submit to joining the Peace Corps, he was placed on a list of delinquents by the Selective Service in his hometown of Hato Ray, Puerto Rico. Initially fearful of the consequences of dealing with Selective Service, he signed up for a four-year term with the Marines as a supply man.³⁴¹ In his letter asking for a medical discharge, Rodríguez described his mental health deterioration as clashing with the tenants of the military system itself stating, “I have been retained against my own will in the military service of the United States after requesting a medical discharge on the sound reason that my mental health has been deteriorated.”³⁴² Demonstrating his resolve, he stated that if a medical waiver was not provided after a psychiatric evaluation, he would demand an inquiry for discharge as a conscientious objector and practice non-violent civil disobedience against the military system.³⁴³

³⁴⁰ “The Draft is in Trouble.” Madison Committee for the End of the Vietnam War Papers. Box 3, Folder 7, Draft Resistance. Wisconsin Historical Society. Madison, WI.

³⁴¹ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodríguez. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodríguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁴² Adolfo Rodríguez to Doctor, March 1, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodríguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁴³ Adolfo Rodríguez to Doctor, March 1, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodríguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Rodríguez wanted to make sure the military knew that his objection was based on his concern for his mental well-being and moral opposition to war. In the letter to the military psychiatrist, he stated “I have come here for a discharge not because I don’t respect the Constitution of the United States or because I despise your country but only because I will not exist nor function properly within this huge military system and I have decided to say: Enough!”³⁴⁴ On the same day, Rodríguez submitted his objections to the unit co-commander, Captain Ulses, in writing. In the letter, he mentioned his request to meet with the psychiatrist to find a solution to his problem and restated his commitment to seek discharge as a conscientious objector should this medical evaluation fail. Discussing the reasons for the letter, Rodríguez recounted that Captain Ulses offered him some concessions that included improved job prospects and potential transfers to Officer’s school or to a duty station in Puerto Rico. Rodríguez replied that his objection was not based on the need for a better status and these concessions would not improve his mental health. Because the psychiatric evaluation was still being processed, Rodríguez made a concession with Captain Ulses that he would continue his duties until the evaluation was completed and in the hands of battalion commander Major O’Hara.³⁴⁵

Waiting to meet his superior officer, Private Rodríguez continued to go about his daily routine. Before meeting with Major O’Hara on March 7th, Rodríguez demonstrated his commitment to resisting his service by verbally rejecting a promotion to Private First

³⁴⁴ Adolfo Rodriguez to Doctor, March 1, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁴⁵ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Class on March 4th.³⁴⁶ Three days later, Major O'Hara met with Private Rodríguez about his request and the doctor's recommendation from the psychiatric evaluation. In his evaluation, Dr. A.F. Barrow observed that Private Rodríguez's condition did not justify a diagnosis as mentally unable to serve. Furthermore, he stated that Rodríguez would be evaluated as "sane and responsible should he violate any of the articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice." Cognizant that Private Rodríguez might become a potential "administrative nuisance in the future" and the patient's own refusal to submit to more consultation, Dr. Barrow suggested that the patient be separated from the military for apathetic or disruptive actions.³⁴⁷ Undeterred, Rodríguez restated his commitment to refuse orders as a conscientious objector but agreed to do his duty at the advice of Major O'Hara, who promised a resolution to the issue.³⁴⁸

Several incidents after the meeting with Major O'Hara committed Rodríguez to practice civil disobedience and reach out for aid from Puerto Rican and U.S. peace groups. He implied that duties assigned to him after March 7th was of a demeaning nature that normally went to a specific department. Additionally, complaints from his friends and family that mail sent to them was blatantly handled by military officials concerned Rodríguez despite his belief that he had nothing to hide.³⁴⁹ Waiting nine days for any type of response, he was ordered to the Battalion Office. To his shock,

³⁴⁶ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁴⁷ Psychiatric Interview, March 1, 1966, Case: Adolfo Rodriguez. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁴⁸ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁴⁹ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Rodríguez was given new orders that directed his transfer to Vietnam instead of the resolution of the request he made. Asked to sign his transfer orders, he refused and requested his original petition be resolved before continuing. On March 17th, he refused to accept his payment check from Sergeant Major Thorpe, stating that he would not accept payment until the issues he reported to Captain Ulises was resolved.³⁵⁰

Feeling misled by his commanding officers, Private Rodríguez continued his assigned duties while also commencing with a hunger strike that began on March 21st. He sent a second letter to Captain Ulises on March 23rd to reiterate his request for discharge because of his mental health. Rodríguez's language in his letter championed the right of the individual to fight for personal freedom. However, his appeal that the fight for his freedom individually and within society "had been imposed upon us since 1898 Treaty of Paris—Spanish American War" implies a personal or political objection based on Puerto Rico's independence. The use of the 1898 Treaty of Paris by *independistas* in Puerto Rico positioned U.S. control of the island as an imposition instead of an agreement.³⁵¹ Rodríguez also used the letter to state his intention to continue obeying orders from superior officers while practicing civil disobedience through a hunger strike and refusal for payment. Appealing to Captain Ulises' sense of integrity, Rodríguez stated that he would not break the commitment he made to his job and the orders of his superiors. However, he stated that he was committed to his personal

³⁵⁰ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez; Enclosure 4: Adolfo Rodriguez to Sergeant Major Thorpe, March 17, 1966. Both in CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁵¹ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez; Enclosure 5: Adolfo Rodriguez to Captain Ulises, March 23rd, 1966. All in CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

hunger strike until the point of collapse, further stating that his resolve to free himself from the military system included a willingness to die for his principles.³⁵²

During the hunger strike, Rodríguez claimed the military officials ignored his appeals and allowed non-commissioned officers to escalate matters with intimidation tactics. He recalled an interaction with Sergeant Major Thorpe on March 24th saw him face verbal and physical threat. First, Rodríguez recalled that the Sgt. Major verbally berated him to leave the battalion without providing any clarifying information about his demand. When he asked to speak to Captain Ulses, Sgt. Major Thorpe “got mad, lost his control, and using physical force pushed me four or five times out of his office.”³⁵³ Placed in custody after the incident, Rodríguez requested a meeting with General Bouker, the commanding general of the fort. In a meeting with the inspector adjutant of Force Troops on March 28th, Rodríguez recalled that Colonel Horne questioned the necessity of his custody and allegedly mentioned the late arrival of his transfer orders. Offered twenty days of leave, Rodríguez refused Colonel Horne’s offer the following day and continued his resistance until his case was settled through the chain of command. Rodríguez stated that Horne suggested he submit a plea for dismissal from the Marines under sections 13262 and 13265E of the Marine Corps Personal Manual.

³⁵² Adolfo Rodriguez to Captain Ulses, March 23rd, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁵³ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection. In the Personal Data section, the commanding General of the post was John G. Bouker. However, Rodriguez addressed his letter on April 1st to General Bowser. His father would write a letter the same day to another senior officer stationed in Norfolk, Virginia, Lieutenant General A.L. Bowser. Lt. General Bowser sent Mr. Rodriguez Perez a letter to inform him who he needed to contact. For more, see Lt. General A.L. Bowser to Eduardo Rodriguez Perez, April 21, 1966; Request for Discharge from Adolfo Rodriguez to General Bowser (Bouker), April 1, 1966. All in CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

Appealing to the guidelines that soldiers could be separated or dismissed from the Marines for individual convenience or because of apathy and defective attitudes, Rodríguez submitted his discharge request while also informing his family about his predicament.³⁵⁴

Rodríguez's father and mother wrote letters to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Camp LeJeune chaplain Patrick Keeley concerning their son's plea. Both parents highlighted their son's personal and spiritual commitment to humanity in their correspondences. In a letter written to President Lyndon Johnson, Eduardo Rodríguez Perez described how his son's objection to military service was based on "his belief...to avoid anything and everything that could harm human beings."³⁵⁵ In the correspondence, Private Rodríguez's father stated that his son valued the ideals of citizenship and that his refusal of military service was not because of cowardice. Instead, he situated his son's decisions as an appeal to his views on faith and humanity through his conviction as a conscientious objector. Rosa Rodríguez, Adolfo's mother, similarly stated in a letter to Reverend Keeley that her son's resistance was based on "the irrevocable belief of the conscientious objector" motivated by his personal and spiritual convictions about humanity. The military

³⁵⁴ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez; Request for Discharge from Adolfo Rodriguez to General Bowser (Bouker), April 1, 1966. Case: Adolfo Rodriguez. All in CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Peace Collection. The specific directives of sections 13262 and 13265E are, respectively: "Section 13262: Discharge or relieve from active duty for own convenience. Section 13265E: Under which individual could be separated by apathy and defective attitude."

³⁵⁵ Enclosure 6: Eduardo Rodriguez Perez to President Lyndon B. Johnson, March 28, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

countered that Private Rodríguez willfully disobeyed orders of superior officers and had not reported physical or psychological mistreatment.³⁵⁶

As Private Rodríguez requested his release from service through the Marine Corps Personal Manual, he and his parents crafted their appeals for release by highlighting Adolfo's connection to a spiritual and personal connection toward humanity. The humane appeal provided Adolfo a language to connect his objections with other objectors who situated their resistance through moral and spiritual crises. In a letter to General Bowser (Bouker) requesting a discharge, Adolfo stated that his conviction as a conscientious objector came "from the deepest roots of my resistance or protest against the system which are placed in the debatable concepts of human dignity and freedom."³⁵⁷ Additionally, his parents highlighted their son's studies as a psychologist to illustrate his commitment to humanity. Stating that their son chose psychology "as a means of helping other humans suffering from the problematic world in which we are living," the Rodríguez family inferred his vocation is both a personal and spiritual commitment to humanity.³⁵⁸

The Rodríguez family expanded their outreach to Santiago Abreu-Polanco, Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner, and the American Civil Liberties Union in search of support. When the response to their son's plight was slow, they also reached out to

³⁵⁶ Personal Data of Adolfo Rodriguez; Eduardo Rodriguez Perez to President Lyndon B. Johnson, March 28, 1966; Rosa C. Rodriguez to Father Patrick Keeley, April 1, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁵⁷ Request for Discharge from Adolfo Rodriguez to General Bowser (Bouker), April 1, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁵⁸ Request for Discharge from Adolfo Rodriguez to General Bowser (Bouker), April 1, 1966; Eduardo Rodriguez Perez to President Lyndon B. Johnson, March 28, 1966. Both in CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

networks aligned with the U.S. Left and Puerto Rican independence movement that defended the rights of draft resisters and objectors within the military. Although Resident Commissioner Abreu-Polanco could only offer to investigate the case, he did provide the Rodríguez family with the contact information of lawyer and Puerto Rican independence activist Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia. Concepcion de Gracia's contacts with various independence factions and the particulars of the case saw MPI Secretary General (and trained lawyer) Juan Mari Bras act as Private Rodríguez's legal counsel by June of 1966.³⁵⁹ The ACLU determined that some of the irregularities in the Rodríguez case did not warrant their pursuit of the case. A letter from ACLU Legal Department Director Melvin Wolf exclaimed that every case of a soldier or draft resister facing judgement should not go straight to the ACLU. Despite this ruling, civil rights lawyer Marvin Karpatkin, a volunteer attorney for the ACLU, reached out to CCCO leader Arlo Tatum to see if his organization would assist Rodríguez.³⁶⁰

These appeals to the CCCO drew attention to Private Rodríguez's case. M.P.I. leader Juan Mari Bras asked Karpatkin for any help he or the ACLU could offer Rodríguez, including investigating an appeal to Amnesty International (AI) to attract the attention of international organizations that protected political detainees.³⁶¹ In his correspondence with AI, Rodríguez stated his determination to discontinue service based

³⁵⁹ Santiago Polanco-Abreu to Rosa C. Rodriguez, March 28, 1966; Marvin Karpatkin to Juan Mari Bras, June 30, 1966. All in CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁶⁰ Nicholas Hyman to Adolfo Rodriguez, May 16, 1966; Melvin Wulf to Marvin Karpatkin, June 6, 1966; Marvin Karpatkin to Juan Mari Bras, June 30, 1966; Marvin Karpatkin to Arlo Tatum, September 23, 1966. All in CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁶¹ Marvin Karpatkin to Melvin Wolf, ACLU, May 14, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

on his moral and political stances and his willingness to accept discharge or imprisonment for his actions. AI Investigator Nicholas Hyman answered this entreaty by stating that AI could only act if Rodríguez was detained. After suggesting that he not escalate the situation by deserting, Hyman stated that he reached out to the CCCO and War Resisters International about Rodríguez's case and suggested he also write to them.³⁶² Although the ACLU and Amnesty International rejected their case, both organizations suggested Rodríguez reach out to groups that worked in the same political and social networks.

The materials sent by the CCCO, and other pacifist groups gave Private Rodríguez a network of groups including the Students for a Democratic Society. Learning about their actions for conscientious objectors through Times Magazine, he determined that the SDS cared "to defend the individual's right to dissent and his freedom to live."³⁶³ However, the case faced legal and practical hurdles because of Rodríguez's shifting rationale for dismissal from the Marine Corps. After his initial request for release based on self-diagnosed mental health issues was rejected, he revised his objection through a moral determination of pacificism. Moreover, Rodríguez challenged the lack of political rights afforded soldiers. Rodríguez's political appeals that situated sympathy for the independence movement created further scrutiny of his case. The overt and covert political appeals, specifically statements that he was "a

³⁶² Adolfo Rodriguez to Amnesty International, April 27, 1966; Nicholas Hyman to Adolfo Rodriguez, May 12, 1966. Both in CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁶³ Adolfo Rodriguez to Paul S. Booth, SDS President, Yale University, April 26, 1966. CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

member of a political community which has not resolved its political status,” placed his demand for conscientious objection status into question.³⁶⁴

Organizations committed to supporting draft resisters and defiant military personnel leaned on their understanding of exemptions within the Selective Service Act. Historian Amy Rutenberg highlights how the 1950s established parameters within the U.S. Selective Service that placed exemptions for those that worked in essential industries, went to college, or held a religious conviction against war. However, policies benefited mostly white, middle-class men and provided little accommodation for working-class men or men of color. Access to materials discussing conscientious objector status or other deferment policies was not open to the public unless an individual researched their plight or received materials from Christian peace activists.³⁶⁵ Working-class men and men of color could not afford the legal costs of challenging their draft status or risk a possible dishonorable discharge that would limit their employment opportunities in civilian society. Cognizant that their reach was limited to those within their networks, the anti-war movement created national services that would work with local groups to inform and assist civilian and military war resisters.³⁶⁶

Local, national, and international anti-war activism networks allowed organizations to mobilize efforts identifying problems with U.S. militarization and the

³⁶⁴ “To Whom it May Concern by Adolfo Rodriguez, April 26, 1966.” CCCO Papers, Series VI. Box 22, Folder: Rodriguez, Adolfo. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

³⁶⁵ Amy Rutenberg, *Rough Draft: Cold War Military Manpower Policy and the Origins of Vietnam-Era Draft Resistance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 1-15.

³⁶⁶ “Resist Flyer”; “A Request for Funds, Draft Resistance Clearing House.” Both in the Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Committee Papers. Box 3, Folder 7, Draft Resistance. Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.

draft system. As the peace movement grew, activists recognized that outreach to discontented soldiers was minimal based on lack of access and troop perception that anti-war activists were the enemy of the troops. Peace activist David McReynolds was one of many that recognized the difficulty of reaching out to soldiers unless they had ties to peace organizations in civilian life or acquired subversive materials against the war on base. McReynolds advocated for organizations like the War Resisters League, student groups, and underground newspapers to directly dialogue with the rank and file instead of letting military and government officials dictate the narrative.³⁶⁷ In an article meant to be distributed to military bases and rank and file personnel, McReynolds directed his prose toward the soldier facing deployment to Vietnam or other Cold War theaters in Southeast Asia. He addressed the composition of the war movement noting that those marching against the war were not just communists but Christians advocating for peace and activists fighting for civil rights. Most importantly, McReynolds articulated what support was available for soldiers willing to defy the war.³⁶⁸

The potential of U.S. soldiers defying orders, including deployment to Vietnam, became a national story in June 1966 when three members of the U.S. Army refused their deployment orders to Vietnam. The three soldiers represented a cross section of draftees that had little access to alternative service options and had to accept their draft summons because of their class, race, and ethnicity. Private First Class (PFC) James

³⁶⁷ David McReynolds to membership, September 18, 1967. Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Committee Papers. Box 3, Folder 7, Draft Resistance. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁶⁸ "An Open Letter to Our Men in Service, by David McReynolds." Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam. Box 3, Folder 7, Draft Resistance. Wisconsin Historical Society.

Johnson and Privates David Samas and Dennis Mora first met when they were assigned to the 142nd Signal Battalion, 2nd Armored Division in Fort Hood, Texas. It was reported that the three men connected during basic training over their shared opinion that the war in Vietnam was wrong.³⁶⁹ Mora, Samas, and Johnson received orders to report to the Oakland Army Terminal for processing and shipment to Vietnam on July 13th, 1966. Allowed a 30-day pre-embarkation leave, the three soldiers grappled with the decision to follow orders and deploy to Vietnam or their conscience and reject deployment. Aware of the impending consequences, all three men decided that their conscientious disagreements with the war would not allow them to be sent to Vietnam.³⁷⁰

Mora, Johnson, and Samas started their objection to the war in Vietnam before being drafted into service, demonstrating that conscience superseded their oath to the U.S. military. David Samas stated that he opposed the war from the beginning despite being drafted and hoped that he would not face deployment to Vietnam. He situated his objection from his belief that Vietnam had the same right to fight for independence that led his extended family to leave Lithuania and Italy. James Johnson framed his objection on the plight of Black men in America who were asked to fight to defend freedom that did not exist for them. He further emphasized that Black Americans had “a much more important war to be waged at home” for equality.³⁷¹ Dennis Mora echoed Johnson’s

³⁶⁹ “Three G.I.’s Arrested and Held at Fort Dix to Prevent their Speaking on their Legal Case against the Vietnam War.”; Martin Arnold. “3 G.I.’s Announce They Will Not Go to Vietnam.” *The New York Times*, July 1, 1966. Both in the Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁷⁰ “Editorials: Stand and Fight.” Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3. Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁷¹ Editorials: Stand and Fight.” Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3. Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

decision about combating issues of inequality and injustice in the United States. He recalled that “as a Puerto Rican, the first war I knew was against the poverty of Spanish Harlem...and went to school where teachers counseled Puerto Ricans to forget higher education because they were Puerto Ricans and therefore somehow inferior.”³⁷² Active in the Peace Movement through his membership in the Du Bois Club at City College, New York, Mora’s objection focused on the billions of dollars wasted on war that could be reallocated for community development, education, and social programs. All three men represented “a cross section of the Army and of America” who believed the war was unjustified and jointly decided that they would refuse to go to Vietnam.³⁷³ Committed to their decisions, the three men journeyed to New York to seek the help of the peace movement.

Thanks in part to Mora’s previous networks from his membership with the Du Bois Club and the peace movement as a college student, the three reached out to attorneys and the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Obtaining the services of attorneys Stanley Faulkner and Selma Samols, the three men sought an injunction to halt their deployment in Federal Court. They directed their injunction against the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara through the claim that the war was illegal. Their potential suit argued that the war in Vietnam was illegal because it violated multiple global pacts that included the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, the Geneva Accords of 1954, the

³⁷² Editorials: Stand and Fight.” Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3. Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁷³ Editorials: Stand and Fight.” Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3. Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

U.N. Charter, and the Constitution itself.³⁷⁴ The three soldiers coordinated with their attorneys and individuals representing various social movements in the United States to publicly declare the intention of the three to refuse embarkation to Vietnam and their appeal to federal courts. A press conference was scheduled for June 30, 1966, in the auditorium of the Community Church at 10 East 35th Street in New York. This event was sponsored by the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee and attended by individuals representing the civil rights and anti-war movements. Attendees supporting the three soldiers included Fifth Avenue Committee organizer and pacifist leader A.J. Muste, Professor Staughton Lynd, SNCC chair Stokely Carmichael, associate national director of CORE Lincoln Lynch and Ruth Gage Colby of the Women's International League.³⁷⁵

The three G.I.s' stated their issues with the war and why they refused embarkation during the press conference. A *New York Times* article covering the event noted that the tenor of the conference felt like a revival meeting, as each soldier's testimony was met with verbal agreement from the audience. The article also centered their attention on Dennis Mora as the potential leader because he read the group's joint statement and articulated his experiences as a first-generation Puerto Rican New Yorker and college student. His experiences within the peace movement during his time at City College and as a New York City Social Worker motivated his personal and political disagreements with the war. All three men verbalized their view of the Vietnam War as

³⁷⁴ "The Fort Hood Three: The Case of the Three GI's Who Said "NO" to the War in Vietnam." Donna Allen Papers. Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁷⁵ "3 G.I.'s Announce they will not go to Vietnam."; "Editorial, Stand and Fight."; "Three G.I.'s Arrested and Held at Fort Dix to Prevent their Speaking on their Legal Case against the Vietnam War." All in the Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3. Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

conflict that harmed Black and Brown bodies. Mora and Johnson highlighted the issues facing Black, Puerto Rican, and other ethnic and racial groups being forced to fight in a conflict while their communities were denied the full benefits of citizenship. Samas added to this by asking if the United States was really fighting against fascists and communists or “are we killing little brown peasants who in turn are fighting for their freedom?”³⁷⁶

A vital component of the Fort Hood Three’s motivations for refusing their orders was how their individual identities and experiences shaped their political and social conscience. In press conferences and correspondences, Dennis Mora stated that his worldview was shaped by his family’s experiences as Puerto Ricans migrating to Spanish Harlem. Mora mentioned the sacrifices his parents made for him to go to college despite facing bigotry and poverty that teachers and police officers in his community situated as an individual, moral failing instead of systemic issues that needed change. Equating his experiences with poverty as “the first war” he knew, Mora noted that teachers and other authorities ensured Puerto Ricans were aware of their socially inferior status. Remembering the death of two childhood friends from drug overdoses as the first casualties he saw, Mora noted that the two died “trying to escape a world which held no jobs or education for them and where they were made to feel ashamed of their color, language and culture.”³⁷⁷ Instead of Vietnam, Mora stated that there needed to be a war

³⁷⁶ Martin Arnold. “3 G.I.’s Announce They Will Not Go to Vietnam.” *The New York Times*, July 1, 1966. Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁷⁷ Editorial, *Stand and Fight.*; Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3. Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

at home against poverty and racism to ensure that those treated as second-class citizens had their social and educational needs met.

Private Mora's personal story added a new dimension to the discussion of resisting the military for political or personal reasons. Early cases tackled by Puerto Rican anti-war resisters focused more on individuals refusing draft induction and facing the courts. Most of the cases occurred in Puerto Rico, with the M.P.I. and Juan Mari Bras actively supporting draft resisters and mobilizing support from the U.S. Left. The early cases of Sixto Alvelo and other Puerto Rican resisters reached U.S. audiences through Puerto Rican organizations participating in demonstrations and fundraising campaigns in New York. However, the plight of Puerto Rican soldiers drafted with little option to fight their status offered another avenue to discuss how Puerto Ricans lived as second-class citizens under U.S. authority. Dennis Mora's dilemma showcased a first-generation Puerto Rican migrant from New York influenced by the U.S. Left who made a stand against imperialism using similar language of resistance as the M.P.I. Facing prospective judgement under military law instead of civilian courts, Puerto Rican anti-war activists worked with allies to ensure Puerto Rican soldiers resisting the draft attained legal aid.³⁷⁸

Tackling social, political, and economic inequality at home shaped Black, Puerto Rican, and Chicano anti-war activists' position to object to service. Privates Mora and Johnson pointed statements about unequal social and political access for Black and

³⁷⁸ "Puerto Rican Soldiers Discriminated in Vietnam." Writings, Colón Collection; "Support Draft Resisters in Puerto Rico." Clippings, Colón Collection. All in the Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

Latino communities echoed sentiments debated throughout the 1960s Civil Rights movement. Resisting soldiers and activists as more than a demand for equal citizenship within a liberal democracy. As historian Lorrin Thomas suggests regarding Puerto Rican political demands, Black and Puerto Rican activists and objectors demanded recognition of the legitimacy of claims to inclusion that would allow them to critique U.S. failure to enact social and racial justice.³⁷⁹ Moreover, Black and Puerto Rican war objectors challenged their status as second-class citizens within the U.S political and legal system by redefining and reconstructing what citizenship meant to them. The examples of Mora, Johnson, and Rodríguez demonstrate how soldiers from marginalized groups in the United States condemned U.S. treatment of their communities while also demanding their participation in armed conflicts.³⁸⁰

Stating their intent to resist their orders, the three men also announced that they planned to file an injunction in civilian courts against their deployment to Vietnam. The injunction directly named the United States as the defendant, particularly Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of the Army Stanley Resar. The press conference and aftermath demonstrated how the various currents of anti-war activism supported individuals challenging the U.S. military. The next day, sponsors of the press conference formed a legal committee called the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Intending to provide funding for the defense of Mora, Johnson, and Samas, the committee was led by veteran peace activists A.J. Muste and Professor Staughton Lynd.

³⁷⁹ Lorrin Thomas, *Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 18-20.

³⁸⁰ Font-Guzman, 1-10.

Early sponsors to the committee included representatives from various U.S.-based social organizations, churches, and universities. Each organization within the committee worked within their activist networks to bring national attention to the Fort Hood Three case and fundraise to cover attorney and court fees.³⁸¹ Participation in the committee was based on individual and shared convictions regarding the Vietnam War and war resisters. For example, Stokely Carmichael's attention to this case focused on supporting PFC Johnson's reasoning for avoiding the war and endorsing Mora's position based on his previous solidarity with Puerto Rican objectors.³⁸² However, the three men and their supporters understood that the military would react to the three men's public defiance and the long odds they faced filing an injunction in civilian courts as military personnel.

As they waited for the New York District Court to rule on their injunction that prevented their deployment to Vietnam, the Fort Hood Three continued to discuss their legal proceedings with the public. On July 7th, 1966, they planned to attend a public meeting at the Community Church in New York to explain their legal and personal choices against the Vietnam War. Thirty minutes before the event was about to start, the Fort Hood Three were arrested by military police and taken to Fort Dix, New Jersey.

Anti-war supporters of the soldiers saw this as an encroachment that trampled on

³⁸¹ "Sponsors of the Fort Hood Three Committee (complete list as of August 17, 1966)"; "Letter to Supporters, October 25, 1966." All in the Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society. A.J. Muste would be involved with the Fort Hood Three Case and other anti-war activities until his death in February 1967 at the age of 82. From there, Staughton Lynd took on more of a direct role.

³⁸² An initial list of individuals (representing their organizations) included Dorothy Day (editor, Catholic Worker), Professor Eugene Genovese, Fred Halstead, Reverend Lee Ball (Methodist Federation for Social Action), Tom Hayden (SDS), Professor Noam Chomsky, Herbert Aptheker, Stokely Carmichael (SNCC), Lincoln Lynch and Floyd B. McKissick (CORE), among others. For the full list, see "Sponsors of the Fort Hood Three Committee (complete list as of August 17, 1966)." Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

individual rights, arguing that the arrest was unjustified as the men waited for civilian courts to finish the review of their injunction.³⁸³ Furthermore, supporters of the three soldiers stated that the arrest of the soldiers by MPs and lack of access to their civilian counsel amounted to overreach. Fort Hood Three Defense committee members stated that military officials initially held the three men under administrative restriction, which was described as by anti-war committee members as “a suppression of their rights to free speech...without filing any official charges.”³⁸⁴

Having lost their appeal in District Court on July 11th, the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee filed an appeal to the U.S. Circuit Court in Washington D.C.³⁸⁵ Faith-based organizations and religious leaders committed to anti-war initiatives worked in tandem with the committee to ensure that Mora, Johnson, and Samas received legal and public support. This included providing monetary support for legal counsel Stanley Faulkner, who filed a motion to the military to postpone a potential court martial for the three men until their case was heard in civil court. Circumstances escalated on July 17th when the soldiers were ordered to board a plane for Vietnam again. After they refused, it was reported that Mora, Johnson, and Samas were confined to the stockades at Fort Dix under solitary confinement. One month later, the three men were formally charged by

³⁸³ “Is it Against the Constitution for the Army to Send GIs to Vietnam? Why Won’t the Army let the Civil Courts Answer this Question?”; Three GIs Arrested and Held at Fort Dix to prevent their Speaking on their Legal Case against the Vietnam War.” Both in the Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁸⁴ “Is it Against the Constitution for the Army to Send GIs to Vietnam? Why Won’t the Army let the Civil Courts Answer this Question?” Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁸⁵ Stanley Faulkner to Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, RE: Status of the Cases of PVT. Dennis Mora, PFC. James A. Johnson, Pvt. David A. Samas. Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

the U.S. military with disobeying an officer's orders in violation of Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Additionally, the Army refused a motion of the Fort Hood Three that would postpone their court martials until their case was heard in civilian court and scheduled their court martial trials for early September. Anti-war activists saw this action as a mechanism to bypass the courts as civil courts grappled with the question of the rights of individuals in uniform to resist their service.³⁸⁶

Committee members mobilized to support the Fort Hood Three as their court martial was scheduled to begin September 6th. In an appeal to supporters, the FHTDC put out an urgent call for funds and local action to publicize the plight of the three soldiers. Co-chair A.J. Muste stated in the urgent call for help that this case would be a test to see if government power could constitutionally demand that soldiers who were not pacifists but refuse to go to war should be forced to go. He further highlighted that "it is a matter which involves the civil rights of all men in the armed services, their right to think for themselves, to discuss the issues raised by the war in Vietnam, and to refuse to obey orders to commit what they believe to be war crimes."³⁸⁷ During the start of the court martial, the supporters of Mora, Johnson, and Samas brought their case to the public with demonstrations in different U.S. cities, including outside of Fort Dix in New Jersey. Informed by attorney Stanley Faulkner that the court martial would be accessible

³⁸⁶ "Is it Against the Constitution for the Army to Send GIs to Vietnam? Why Won't the Army let the Civil Courts Answer this Question?"; Three GIs Arrested and Held at Fort Dix to prevent their Speaking on their Legal Case against the Vietnam War." Both in the Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁸⁷ A.J. Muste to Supporters, Urgent, August 26, 1966. Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

to the public, the FHTDC encouraged the attendance of supporters and those active in civil rights circles as a demonstration of the general public's support of the case.³⁸⁸

Court martial proceedings began on September 6th, 1966, with the three soldiers defending their choice of disobeying direct deployment orders to Vietnam. Each man was represented by their attorney Stanley Faulkner and military legal counsel Major Edwin Lassiter and Lt. Jasin Cotton. Outside of Ft. Dix, demonstrations organized by anti-war coalitions gathered outside the base and in several cities in the United States. During individual testimony, each man stated their objection to the Vietnam War for moral and personal reasons. The defense first pushed back at the jurisdiction of the proceedings, arguing that the Army and law officers prosecuting could not fairly judge the case in question. After their appeals were denied, the defense argued that the charges all three faced were illegal because the military knowingly pushed to discipline the soldiers. Faulkner pursued this inquiry during cross-examination of Captain D.M. DeVera, the officer who gave Mora his deployment order. introduced evidence that DeVera acted in concert with top officials at Fort Dix to get Mora to verbally disobey orders so that he would face the maximum sentence for his disobedience.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁸ A.J. Muste and Staughton Lynd, Co-Chairmen, to Supporters, August 26, 1966. Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society; "Sponsors of the Fort Hood Three Committee (complete list as of August 17, 1966)." Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society. This letter would include other cases that mentioned the Fort Hood Three as inspiration for their own stance. By this point, the committee received sponsorship from names like Father Philip Berrigan, actor and Civil Right activist Ossie Davis, folk singer Pete Seeger, and attorney/professor of law Arthur Kinoy.

³⁸⁹ "Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, Letter of the Trial to Friends." Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

Throughout the court martial proceedings, the Fort Hood Three connected their stance within broader societal issues in the U.S. During his individual trial, PFC Johnson reiterated his conviction that the continued call for Black soldiers to fight in wars where they are placed in the most dangerous positions on the battlefield and do not receive equality and freedom under the law at home is unethical. Dennis Mora's trial similarly discussed rejection of orders to fight because of the lack of equal citizenship. Pvt. Mora's statements connected his lived experience that the United States acted as an imperial power. Facing questions from the defense about his refusal to follow orders, Mora emphasized how his upbringing in Spanish Harlem as a Puerto Rican migrant shaped his understanding of how U.S. society valued him as a Puerto Rican. He recounted that while trying to get out of the slums of Harlem, he was told by teachers and others that he could "never amount to anything." Mora further connected the issues Puerto Ricans face as "not much different than the plight of the Vietnamese fighting for their freedom and independence."³⁹⁰ The Military Court, rejecting the claim that they did not have jurisdiction over soldiers' rights, determined that the three men disobeyed direct orders and found the Fort Hood Three guilty.

Sentencing recommendations were offered at the end of each man's trial, with the prosecution pursuing the maximum sentence of five years hard labor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.³⁹¹ The defense argued that each man faced the draft unlike other

³⁹⁰ "Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, Letter of the Trial to Friends." Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁹¹ "Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, Letter of the Trial to Friends." Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society; Fort Hood Three Defense Committee to Friends, November 10, 1966. Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

young men who had the access to flee or attain deferments; Each man did their duty admirably until orders conflicted with their personal and moral convictions. The prosecution countered by stating, “orders are the foundation stone upon which the army is built” and that the three men disobeyed orders knowingly.³⁹² Additionally, the prosecution argued that any action that previously defined the three men as good soldiers were erased by their disobedience to direct orders. The court recommended a three-year sentence for Dennis Mora and five-year sentences for James Johnson and David Samas, all to be served at Fort Leavenworth. All three men also “received dishonorable discharges, total forfeiture of pay, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade.”³⁹³

Dennis Mora’s particular circumstances, joining the military when drafted and not following orders based on his conscience, highlighted how military service shaped Puerto Rican communities. Historians Lorena Oropeza and Harry Franqui Rivera emphasize how Mexican American and Puerto Rican soldiers, respectively, perceived military service through their own understanding of citizenship and themselves.³⁹⁴ Despite his own activity in the anti-war movement in college, Mora did not have the option to resist the draft as a social worker that supported his family. He did understand how to resist the draft based on his experiences as a politically active college student

³⁹² “Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, Letter of the Trial to Friends.” Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁹³ “Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, Letter of the Trial to Friends.” Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society; “Urgent, September 20, 1966.” Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁹⁴ Harry Franqui-Rivera, *Soldiers of the Nation: Military Service and Modern Puerto Rico, 1868-1950* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), 199-213; Lorena Oropeza, *¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism during Vietnam War Era* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 1-10, 24-30.

with the Du Bois Clubs of America during the early 1960s, evident in his suggestion that the Fort Hood Three travel to New York to seek the assistance of prominent organizations in the anti-war movement. However, other Puerto Ricans in the United States and Puerto Rico did not have access to resources about obtaining deferments. Furthermore, individuals with a moral or political objection may not have the economic resources to resist the draft without the family facing consequences. For Mora, who described the sacrifices his family made to get him out of the ghettos of Spanish Harlem, resisting the draft board might not have been feasible at the time of his induction.³⁹⁵

After the trial, legal counsel and the committee for the Fort Hood Three developed a plan to continue challenging military courts and to appeal the case to civilian courts. During appearances at churches and colleges discussing the three soldiers, attorney Stanley Faulkner and Sonia Samols strategy included taking the case to the Board of Military Review and the Military Court of Appeals. Legal counsel noted that they would also argue the illegality of war to civilian courts. Already arguing another soldier's case against the U.S. government, the attorneys were prepared to take the Fort Hood Three case to the Supreme Court if all other appeals were denied.³⁹⁶ The committee wanted to demonstrate that the issue of soldiers' and anti-war resistance represented questions about government power and war in broader society. Mora and Johnson's objections to fight magnified issues of asking individuals to fight for freedom

³⁹⁵ "Editorials: Stand and Fight." Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3. Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁹⁶ "Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, Letter of the Trial to Friends." Donna Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society. Earlier in 1966, Faulkner and Samols represented soldier Robert Luftig in determining if civilian courts held jurisdiction to declare war illegal and stop the transfer or deployment of military personnel.

abroad while they are treated as second-class citizens at home. A unilateral push to impress service upon citizens without providing equal access to deferments establishes a perceived system of military recruitment that enlists soldiers that are marginalized by race, ethnicity, and class.

Committee sponsors and family continued to advocate for justice for the Fort Hood Three from civilian authorities and called into question the fairness of military court. Aware that public attention was needed to build support for the case, committee members and faith leaders suggested that supporters within their networks reach out to the public. This included providing resources for GIs on military bases and asking prominent community leaders and figures to send statements of support. Using New York as a base of operations, the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee collaborated with other organizations. Anti-war activists set up tables in New York neighborhoods to discuss the Fort Hood Three case and other anti-war cases, creating public community centers on street corners. Additionally, the Students for a Democratic Society and the NY Du Bois Clubs organized a demonstration outside of the New York State Selective Service Office in support of the Fort Hood Three. Through these acts, the committee wanted to demonstrate that the broader anti-war movement recognized and supported the three men because they placed themselves on the front line of this cause.³⁹⁷

Reaching out to anti-war networks within U.S. and Puerto Rican, sponsors worked to raise funds to provide the soldiers legal aid and support their immediate

³⁹⁷ “Dear Friends of the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee, July 19, 1966.”; “Fort Hood Three Defense Committee to Friends, October 13, 1966.” Both in the Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

families. The networks worked together and independently based on their political and social affiliations. New York's Puerto Rican community formed *el Comité Puertorriqueño Pro Defensa de Dennis Mora* to rally a community response for Dennis Mora and coordinate with the broader anti-war movement. Additionally, New York Members of *el Movimiento Pro Independencia* like Dixie Bayo and Pedro Rúa verbalized the plight of Puerto Ricans resisting the draft and saw the issue of Puerto Rican soldiers as another direction to fight against Puerto Rico's status.³⁹⁸ The broader anti-war movement stated their solidarity with the Fort Hood Three and promoted their cause during organizational meetings and demonstrations against the war. In the lead up to the November Days of protest scheduled from November 5th to 8th, march organizers invited members of the committee and the family of the Fort Hood Three to speak to crowds in New York, Chicago, Boston, and other planned marches.³⁹⁹

Organizers utilized religious spaces attached to denominations sympathetic to anti-war and civil rights initiatives for the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Churches acted as one area for organizers, sponsors, and family supporters to hold fund raising projects that would inform the community about the case and the larger anti-war movement. During one meeting, attorney Stanley Faulkner and the Samas' family spoke to a Unitarian Church in Los Angeles about the plight of the Fort Hood Three. Another gathering scheduled at the Philadelphia Ethical Society, a society dedicated to honoring

³⁹⁸ "Fort Hood Three Defense Committee to Friends, October 13, 1966." Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

³⁹⁹ "Fort Hood Three Defense Committee to Friends, October 13, 1966." Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

the worth of every human being, saw Faulkner and Grace Mora Newman speak in front of 150 people and raise \$300 for the FHTDC.⁴⁰⁰ The group used their local networks in New York City to affectively publicize the Fort Hood Three case. One event held at a Town Hall on October 9th, 1966, saw representatives from the press, labor, civil rights, and religion come together and listen to the families of the three soldiers and attorney Stanley Faulkner. During the same meeting, political folk singer Pete Seeger appeared and offered his support to the cause, later writing the song ‘Ode to the Fort Hood Three.’ Utilizing these spaces allowed the committee to bring various groups together to discuss and support the Fort Hood Three case, raising \$950 dollars alone from 600 people attending the meeting at Town Hall.⁴⁰¹

Members of the FHTDC and allies additionally focused their attention on the health of the three while they were incarcerated, investigating and reporting any irregularities in their treatment to the anti-war networks and the public. Committee members received information from activist and committee member Grace Mora Newman, Dennis Mora’s older sister, about what conditions the three men faced while confined in Fort Meade. She inferred that her brother and the others were told that something could be worked out if they changed their mind about going to Vietnam. According to Mora Newman, the officer attempting to persuade Mora implied that a

⁴⁰⁰ “Fort Hood Three Defense Committee to Friends, October 25, 1966”; “Fort Hood Three Defense Committee to Friends, November 10, 1966.” Both in the Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

⁴⁰¹ “Fort Hood Three Defense Committee to Friends, October 13, 1966”; Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

long prison term at Fort Leavenworth may cause Mora and his friends to leave as “hardened criminals.”⁴⁰² Disturbed by the report from Mora Newman, faith leaders used their position as to question the perceived treatment of the three men in custody. Methodist minister the Reverend George Custer Cromwell and FHTDC co-chair Reverend A.J. Muste demanded answers from administrators of Fort Meade concerning the allegation that prisoners were placed in isolation with no privileges.⁴⁰³ Reverend Richard Fernandez, the executive director of the Clergy and Laity Concerned, appealed to U.S. government officials about the treatment of the prisoners, demanding some light be shed to his organization.⁴⁰⁴

Faith leaders granted access with civilian and military authorities demanded the soldiers receive fair treatment while confined. Father Philip Berrigan and other clergymen were granted permission, after much effort, to check on the well-being of the prisoners. Concerned about their treatment, faith leaders within the anti-war movement informed their networks and the public about the plight of the prisoners. In a letter to supporters of the Fort Hood Three, Father Phil Berrigan and co-signers Dave Dellinger and Ruth Gage-Colby lauded the bravery of servicemembers willing to stand by their convictions to resist. Acknowledging that the small number of those rejecting combat

⁴⁰² “Urgent, September 20, 1966.” Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

⁴⁰³ Annalee Stewart to Folster, Graham, Barron, Allen, Carner, and Marcus regarding Follow up on Fort Hood Three by rev. Custer Cromwell. Donna Allen Papers. Box 6, Folder 8, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society; “Dear Friends of the Fort Hood Three from Staff.” Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3: Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

⁴⁰⁴ The Reverend Richard Fernandez to Senator Paul H. Douglas, October 11, 1966. Clergy and Laity Concerned Papers. Series III, Box 4: Programs and Projects 1966-1972, E-Fort Hood Three. Folder: Fort Hood Three. Swarthmore Peace Collection.

may look insignificant compared to the multitude choosing to serve, the letter lauded soldiers' "conviction that this no longer is a question of loyalty or patriotism but rather a matter of sheer decency and sanity."⁴⁰⁵

The families of the Fort Hood Three played a pivotal role in organizing the defense of their kin through public entreaties to their home communities and nationally. Grace Mora Newman's role within the committee and broader fights for social change in New York highlighted her own political place within these networks beyond solely supporting her brother. A veteran of fights for school and anti-poverty initiatives in her local community, she participated on speaking tours with Stanley Faulkner to discuss the Fort Hood Three case and to inform audiences of the conditions the three men faced in military prison. Mora Newman continued to push for the release of the three soldiers after they had been sentenced and transferred to Fort Leavenworth, holding fundraising events at churches and colleges. Increased attention of the Fort Hood Three case led more soldiers to defy their orders and reach out to the Fort Hood Three Committee and the anti-war movement for support. Mora Newman verbalized the sacrifice these soldiers were making and connected it to the plight of the Fort Hood Three. By 1967, the committee had shifted from focusing solely on the Fort Hood Three to defending other servicemembers rejecting their orders. As this transition occurred, Grace Mora

⁴⁰⁵ "Dear Friends of the Fort Hood Three, from Father Phil Berrigan, Ruth Gage-Colby, and Dave Dellinger." Madison Committee to End the War in Vietnam Papers. Box 3, Folder 3, Fort Hood Three Defense Committee. Wisconsin Historical Society.

Newman's role within the Fort Hood Three Committee changed to the position of National Chairman after the death of A.J. Muste in 1967.⁴⁰⁶

Undeterred by the verdict of the Fort Hood Three, the Fort Hood Three Committee and family members continued to push for the remission of sentence for the Fort Hood Three. One small victory for the committee was that the prison terms of James Johnson and David Samas were downgraded to three years, the same sentence given to Dennis Mora.⁴⁰⁷ The committee expanded their efforts to support other soldiers resisting their orders through public attention and fundraising for their legal defense. In a letter to supporters in March of 1968, national chairwoman Grace Mora Newman laid out plans for the committee to reorganize their advocacy efforts. The committee asked supporters to come to the Hotel Commodore on May 10th to commemorate a fundraising event, with the money going toward the defense and counseling of soldiers who object their deployment. Mora Newman's reasoning for the reorganization focused on providing accessible resources to soldiers, many who had little choice but to accept their draft summons and enlist in the military.⁴⁰⁸

Mora Newman's active leadership demonstrated the work Latinas and families did to hold government officials accountable for their decisions during the Vietnam War. During the early part of the Vietnam War, M.P.I. member Dixie Bayo spoke at a rally

⁴⁰⁶ "Grace Mora Newman to Friends, March 1968." Colón Collection. Incoming Correspondences, 1950-1978. Center for Puerto Rican Studies. By 1968, Grace Mora Newman is listed as the National Chairman of the Fort Hood Three Defense committee. For more on the life and death of A.J. Muste, see Leilah Danielson, *American Gandhi: A.J. Muste and the History of Radicalism in the 20th Century* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

⁴⁰⁷ "Fort Hood Three has Prison Terms Lowered." *The Fifth Estate*, no. 34, July 15-31, 1967.

⁴⁰⁸ "Grace Mora Newman to Friends, March 1968." Colón Collection: Incoming Correspondences, 1950-1978. Center for Puerto Rican Studies.

outside the U.S. Armory in New York that was organized by women anti-war activists demanding the return of G.I.s from war. Additionally, author Tere Rios (full name Marie Teresa Rios Versace) led a concentrated public campaign about the plight of POWs and the obstruction by the U.S. government after her son was captured in Vietnam in 1963 and reportedly killed by the Viet Cong in 1965.⁴⁰⁹ Scholar Eileen Suarez Findley illustrates, through her focus on the gendered politics of contract laborers, that Puerto Rican families demanded justice for their family members based on their own loyalty to Puerto Rico and the United States. Family members defended their kin's patriotism by equating their moral choice to a form of patriotism that followed religious or moral conscience instead of blindly following orders. In the cases of Adolfo Rodríguez and Dennis Mora, the family questioned the U.S. government's punitive treatment of their kin's moral decision despite their kin's acceptance of draft summons without seeking deferment or fleeing out of country.⁴¹⁰

Faith leaders supporting the plight of war-resisters continued to highlight the treatment soldiers and draft resisters faced when imprisoned for their moral or political conviction. Although many of the chaplains and faith leaders within the movement were pacifist, they championed the right of individuals to defy orders based on a religious or personal belief. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, faith leaders demanded

⁴⁰⁹ "New York Women's March May 7th." *The Militant*, 30, no. 18 (May 2, 1966); Tere Rios was born in New York and lived in early Puerto Rican communities with her Puerto Rican born father. Before her POW advocacy, she was an author of short stories. One of those stories, *The Fifteenth Pelican*, became the basis of the 1960s sitcom "The Flying Nun" starring Sally Field. For more on Tere Rios, see Tere Rios Versace Papers. Wisconsin Historical Society.

⁴¹⁰ Eileen J. Suarez Findlay, *We are Left without a Father Here: Masculinity, Domesticity, and Migration in Post War Puerto Rico* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 150-172. For more on Latina/Chicana anti-war activity creating a counter narrative for male resistance to war, see Oropeza, 1-10.

access to civilian and military prisons to check in on the conditions of imprisoned servicemen. The Fort Hood Three case and a later case known as the Fort Dix 38 saw faith leaders representing anti-war organizations, like the Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC), use their access to describe the issues facing resisting soldiers to the public. One representative of the CALC, the most Reverend Antulio Parilla Bonilla, toured nineteen jails and stockades during the final months of 1969 and January of 1970. Connected to his critique of the treatment of soldiers was his own criticism of the conduct of military chaplains. During his tour of the military jails, prisoners informed him that they received little spiritual guidance, a concern voiced by other faith leaders during the Rodríguez case. Bishop Parilla Bonilla publicly expressed his concerns that “chaplains are Army men first and churchmen second.”⁴¹¹

The Fort Hood Three’s action broke ground and pushed the broader anti-war movement to consider that there was a broader audience questioning the role of the United States in the conflict. Paying attention to the motivation of soldiers’ resisting their orders and stating specific objections regarding their perception of citizenship and community identified the anti-war movement as a space with multiple constituents and a variety of motivations. The Fort Hood Three case further galvanized youth-led social movements concerned about the potential that themselves or a family member could face the draft without resources. Stories of soldiers, specifically Black and Latino men, resisting their orders only increased while Mora, Johnson, and Samas were imprisoned.

⁴¹¹ “Bishop Assails Chaplain System after Visiting Military Prisons,” *The New York Times*, January 14, 1970, p 10.

In 1969 a group of soldiers imprisoned for desertion or refusing orders revolted at Fort Dix, the location where the Fort Hood Three faced incarceration and court martial. Many of the soldiers charged with inciting the revolt were Black and Puerto Rican, leading to members of the religious and political left to defend the Fort Dix 38. The coalition of various groups, which included the recently formed New York chapter of the Young Lords, the Black Panther Party, and religious pacifists, organized a demonstration outside the fort to protest the conditions of the prison and the treatment of the soldier.⁴¹²

Puerto Ricans participating in political and social organizations voiced their concerns about U.S. militarization and war through both a moral and political lens. For many Puerto Ricans, the anti-war movements in their neighborhood influenced them to pursue social activism. Groups aligned with the Puerto Rican left forced audiences to ponder how militarization and the Vietnam War connected with the lack of access to social programs for Black and Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. This was emphasized in an article published by the underground newspaper *Palante* covering a 1970 demonstration at a military base. Young Lords Deputy Minister of Defense Juan Ramos recalled his experiences at a counter rally during Armed Forces Day at Fort Campbell in Kentucky. Attending the demonstration to support military personnel opposed to the war, Ramos was encouraged by the questions asked by G.I.s about how to be a revolutionary. He emphatically connected the growing soldiers' movement with

⁴¹² “Thousands March on Fort Dix, October 17, 1969. Shakedown vol. 1, no. 11. Social Movement Collection, Box 109, Folder 23: Shakedown (Ft Dix). Vietnam Archives and Research Center; Johanna Fernandez, *The Young Lords: A Radical History* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2020), 233-240.

the broader movement for liberation by stating “This is not our army, and I refuse to serve the u.s. army.”⁴¹³

Responses to soldiers resisting their orders to deploy, specifically the objections and treatment of Black and Latino soldiers, continued to inspire the Puerto Rican youth movements in Puerto Rico and the United States. Societal pressure to participate in the Vietnam War from U.S. officials and family members who served in World War II and Korea pushed Puerto Rican men to conform or face societal reprisals. The Sixto Alvelo case from the previous chapter, along with public declarations by Puerto Rican youth to resist the draft during the early days of Vietnam War, provided a language of resistance. More importantly, draft resisters and soldiers of Puerto Rican descent who defied directives from government institutions subverted traditional understandings of military service as a form of social service. Instead of bending to threats, male Puerto Rican anti-war activists presented themselves as individuals willing to sacrifice their individual liberty to contest the draft and, in the case of Rodríguez and Mora, orders within the military. Draft age Puerto Rican youth and soldiers within the service centered their resistance on demands of equitable social and economic citizenship at home. Instead of looking at war and conflict as a defense of the island or the United States, resisters stated their concerns for their home communities.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹³ “Title” PALANTE, June 7-20, vol, ed, Tamiment Library Archives, New York, New York University [hereafter called the Tamiment Library Archives].

⁴¹⁴ Marysel Asencio, “Locas, Respect, and Masculinity: Gender Conformity in Migrant Puerto Rican Gay Masculinities,” *Gender and Society* 25, no. 3 (June 2011), 335-338; Ashley Black, “Of Soldiers and Saints: Gender Constructs, the Puerto Rican Independence Movement, and the Fight against Conscription,” *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 38, no. 2 (Nov. 2013), 309-315.

The example of Puerto Rican soldiers resisting their orders speaks to how war and military service shape soldier's political and social development. Historian Steven Rosales emphasizes how Vietnam serves as an awakening for Latino soldiers within the military because of disillusionment and anger over the continued treatment of themselves and their communities as second-class citizens. For men like Mora and Rodríguez, their political or philosophical awakening occurred early in their service, leading them to challenge their position within the military. Soldiers that challenged their status as soldiers or finished their tour of service disillusioned from the war publicly voiced their opposition to war through participating in anti-war and empowerment movements of the 1960s and 1970s or did community work in education and reform.⁴¹⁵ For many within this broad coalition, the fight for social and political change at home inspired the formation of a shared message that brought them together despite the various political influences within the network. The message of Puerto Rican soldiers, the U.S. anti-war movement, and the emerging Puerto Rican youth movements in opposition to the Vietnam War centered their opposition as a critique of U.S. actions abroad and lack of social and political change at home. Each individual group within the network fused moral and religious appeals of conscience and resistance to reach a broader audience and redefine understandings of idealized citizenship.

⁴¹⁵ Steven Rosales, *Soldados Razos at War: Chicano Politics, Identity, and Masculinity in the U.S. Military from World War II to Vietnam* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2018), 195-206.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the summer of 2019, Puerto Ricans living in Puerto Rico and the United States organized public demonstrations against Puerto Rican Governor Ricardo Rosselló after 900 pages of private messages from the instant messaging app Telegram containing derogatory messages were made public. The correspondences among the governor's closest confidants used vile gendered and racialized language to attack political opponents, specifically targeting San Juan mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz. More importantly, the disparaging comments and attitudes by Rosselló and his inner circle toward those that died during and after Hurricane Maria galvanized Puerto Ricans across geographical and political divides to action. Demonstrations against Governor Rosselló were organized in Puerto Rico throughout the summer of 2019 and spread to the United States using social media and local word of mouth under the moniker of #RickyRenuncia.⁴¹⁶ Attending a demonstration in Austin, Texas in July 2019, I was fascinated at the sight of people with disparate political and social ideologies coming together for a shared grievance. The #RickyRenuncia campaigns throughout the summer of 2019 highlighted the possibilities of political mobilization across ideologies when there is a consensus on an issue.

⁴¹⁶ For more on ousting of the wave of activism to remove Puerto Rico's governor in 2019, see Marisol Moreno, "Puerto Ricans Have Had Enough: #RickyRenuncia is about a lot more than Roselló. *The Hill*, July 24, 2019. Retrieved from <https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/454558-puerto-ricans-have-had-enough-rickyrenuncia-is-about-a-lot-more-than-rosello/>

This dissertation analyzed the prospects of anti-war coalition efforts between Puerto Rican and U.S draft resisters during the second half of the twentieth century. I argued that the anti-war coalition networks concerted their interests toward a shared commitment to defend war resisters while also opening a space for Puerto Rican draft resisters to voice their specific grievances. Challenges to compulsory military service from war resisters between World War II and the Vietnam War focused on how the state defined conscientious objector status or who was defined as essential to maintaining society. Although World War II is remembered as the good war that saw all citizens join the fight, organizations pushed back on the imposition of war because of moral opposition to killing. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, draft resisters grappled with either working within government-approved objector programs or projecting a total commitment to war resistance that would lead to incarceration. Coalitions provided draft resisters an understanding of what their choices were and who would defend their right to resist based on their convictions, even if there was disagreement among coalition members.

The decisions of the individuals and organizations covered in this dissertation point to their understandings of what ideas of citizenship meant regarding military service, specifically during World War II and the emergence of the Cold War. Arguments over Puerto Rican military service were intertwined with discussions of Puerto Rico's place in the post-World War II world. As mentioned throughout the dissertation, Puerto Rican draft resisters situated their opposition to compulsory military service as a rejection of increased militarization that infringed on their independence.

Additionally, arguments that Puerto Ricans occupied second-class citizenship despite being asked to fight in U.S. military conflicts were also merged with moral justifications to avoid war, ranging from an ethic of religious-inspired pacifism to a political ethic of rejecting unjust wars. Moreover, U.S. draft deferment policies during the Cold War sparked debate over who was viewed as worthy of contributing to the home front, as a disproportionate number of soldiers drafted during the 1950s and 1960s were from working-class or minoritized communities. Questions of status and citizenship animated how Puerto Rican war resisters stated their objections and what avenues they pursued to recognize their grievances.⁴¹⁷

Another point of the dissertation is analyzing how political and religious organizations resisting U.S. wars did not work in isolation throughout the 20th century despite ideological and theological divisions. Willing to stand by their moral and political convictions, Puerto Rican anti-draft proponents established networks within Puerto Rico and with individuals and organizations aligned with establishment liberals and U.S. Leftists. The chapters in this dissertation identify the coalitions representing a broad array of social, religious, and political reformers and revolutionaries working together against the U.S. government about the draft and the overall militarization of U.S. society. A common theme discussed within various anti-war circles from the 1940s until the end of the Vietnam War focused on how the war distracted from the need for

⁴¹⁷ Christian G. Appy. *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 1-12; Amy J. Rutenberg. *Rough Draft: Cold War Military Manpower Policy and the Origins of Vietnam-Era Draft Resistance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 1-14.

social and political change in North America. Inferences that military spending could support the social programs and the need for revolution to inspire change highlighted the growing sentiment among those in the anti-war movement that the real war was in their home communities, not thousands of miles in Southeast Asia.

Christian anti-war activists resisted militarization based on their religious ethic to create a better world through a sacred community that embraced all individuals. Instead of being dogmatically rigid to political Marxism or religious doctrine, Christians aligned with the left during this study endeavored to achieve a movement that based its foundation on coalition and devotion to the oppressed in society. As Rebecca Cook highlights, these spiritual socialists merged their religious ethics with their politics instead of occupying separate spaces and were a part of the 20th century Left instead of a tolerated entity. Cook illustrates that the focus on the whole person as an agent of God pushed these groups to attend to issues of oppression based on race, gender, and state violence instead of just class. More importantly, it was necessary to follow this edict as a counter to white supremacy in the US and globally, stating that this has no place in the Kingdom of Heaven. The actions of U.S. Christian churches aligned with the U.S. Left supporting Puerto Rican issues against military service and the status of Puerto Rico highlights this mission to create a beloved global community. Although there were arguments among individuals over the tenets of pacifism and political alignment, those

abiding by the idea of the community looked toward the shared struggle and determined that all within the network had a right to their own political and social expression.⁴¹⁸

Independence advocates viewed compulsory military service as a contradiction, arguing that it was unethical to fight for the defense of democracy and freedom when those tenets were not practiced by the United States. Nationalists and Puerto Rican Leftists' objections to war were not based on a pacifist ethic, verbalizing a willingness to fight in defense of Puerto Rico or their home communities. Opponents of U.S. presence in the affairs of Puerto Rico viewed U.S. citizenship as an imposed status. However, independence advocates and unaffiliated draft resisters incorporated the language of citizenship to demonstrate the contradictions of U.S. demands. As discussed in the dissertation, Puerto Rican anti-war proponents attempted to redefine the language of their status through challenges in court, military draft boards, and within the military itself. Independence advocates Julio Pinto Gandía and Antonio Filardi Guzman verbalized a point stated by Black anti-war advocates of fighting for freedom while still living as second-class citizens. Soldiers Adolfo Rodríguez and Dennis Mora similarly identified the dilemma of the treatment of Puerto Rican people throughout the hemisphere by the United States that justified their moral and political objection to following deployment orders.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁸ Vanessa Cook, *Spiritual Socialists: Religion and the American Left* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 3-7, 134-135; Patricia Appelbaum, *Kingdom to Commune* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 32-44.

⁴¹⁹ Jacqueline N. Font-Guzman, *Experiencing Puerto Rican Citizenship and Cultural Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 2015), 1-12.

Puerto Rican draft resisters and soldiers rejecting orders to deploy also understood their objection as a question of how their conscience dictated their action forward. Objectors and their families appealed to a religious and moral dilemma of accepting compulsory service, clinging to a message that their belief in a God of love and justice compelled them to reject compulsory service. Furthermore, those with no religious affiliation defined their draft resistance through religious and philosophical ethics of moral objection. Military personnel facing deployment justified their decision to disobey direct orders on their moral objection to kill another human being or not act as an oppressor to an oppressed people. Resisters intertwined the religious and the political to argue against a conflict they believed was unjust and an imposition on their right to their convictions. Connecting the political and the moral in their resistance to the draft, Puerto Rican resisters further defined their interpretation of citizenship based on their understandings instead of what the state imposed.⁴²⁰

Identifying what each group shared as a grievance saw these culturally, politically, and religiously disparate organizations work together to inform the public of their reasons to resist the draft and support resisters. Coming together through geography or shared contacts, Puerto Rican and U.S.-based anti-draft proponents discussed their positions collectively to build a movement that brought various collectives together under a shared banner of campaigning for the right to resist war and the draft. Black Americans that resisted war for political reasons objected to a continued demand from the U.S. to fight for the freedom of others without experience of the same equity and

⁴²⁰ Font-Guzman, 1-12; Rosales, 195-206.

equality at home. The post-World War II years also saw Black and white working-class individuals wonder aloud why they were drafted while middle- and upper-class individuals had access to deferments.⁴²¹ Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate how the anti-war coalitions mobilized in New York shaped discussions on why the draft was a shared issue that also affected individual groups differently. What allowed these networks to build were activists and individuals that crossed over into multiple movements, acting as a bridge that could mobilize others in their network for a shared cause.⁴²²

Working with multiple organizations was not always harmonious, with infighting over the direction of the movement causing some groups to leave. For example, the 1970s saw alliance networks fracture over ideological purity or fold because attempts to promote a broad range of issues clouded a central message. As Lorena Oropeza emphasized, subsequent anti-war marches after the first Chicano Moratorium faced a muddled response as activists attempted to fight multiple causes in a shared space.⁴²³ Despite the initial growth of campaigns for civil rights and social causes during the 1960s through coalition networks, the urgency of specific reforms caused networks to dissolve for a litany of reasons. Battles over ideological rigidity also led social organizations to disengage with coalition networks and later individually dissolve.

⁴²¹ Kimberley L. Phillips, *WAR! What is it Good For?: Black Freedom Struggles & the U.S. Military from World War II to Iraq* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 1-20; Rutenberg, 129-140.

⁴²² Shana Bernstein, *Bridges of Reform: Interracial Civil Rights Activism in Twentieth Century Los Angeles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-13; Ellen Reese, Christine Petit, and David S. Meyer, "Sudden Mobilization: Movement Crossovers, Threats, and the Surprising Rise of the US Anti-War Movement," in *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements*, eds. Nella Van Dyke and Holly McCammon (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 272-274.

⁴²³ Lorena Oropeza, *¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism during Vietnam War Era* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 1-10.

Chapters 1 and 2 highlight the precarious balancing of social movements, as analyzed by Van Dyke and McCammons. The freedom of coalition that allows organizations to maintain their sovereignty will also cause friction and potential dissolution if ideological tensions become untenable. As evident in the case of Puerto Ricans aligned with the Nationalist Party and U.S. pacifists, friction over how each group approached resistance against the United States caused parts of the network to rupture.⁴²⁴

The relationship between U.S. and Puerto Rican-based religious pacifists, social reformers, and Puerto Rican independence supporters within the broad network continued throughout even after the anti-war movement dissolved. U.S. groups campaigned through committee work, demonstrations, and letter-writing within their organizations to support Puerto Ricans fighting similar social and political battles. Coalition mobilization through participatory politics within the collective and honoring individual organizational freedom could be unwieldy and lead to conflict and dissolution. This was especially evident when bringing together a multiracial and multi-political campaign. However, scholars Lauren Ariaza and Francesca Polleta contend that contentious politics of multiracial and multiplatform coalitions are built on negotiation and discourse to potentially influence outcomes. In this dissertation, I have argued that the long-term relationships developed by bridge builders who linked disparate organizations and individuals together to discuss concerns about compulsory military service allowed for internal relationships to build among member groups when other

⁴²⁴ Nella Van Dyke and Holly McCammon, *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), x-xxi.

connections broke apart. For example, Puerto Rican community leaders and leftists worked with trusted contacts in the U.S. Left throughout the 1970s and 1980s on committees to organize campaigns in defense of political prisoners, Puerto Rico's independence, and stop the bombing of Vieques Island in Puerto Rico.⁴²⁵

The power of these movements did not come from being able to change outcomes rapidly. Most change that came was either incremental or developed because of a variety of circumstances. However, these anti-draft and anti-war collectives came together to define how they individually and collectively viewed citizenship within their community and in opposition to the nation-state. Soldiers within the service also added their voice by questioning whether their induction into the Armed Services meant they had to strip away their right to a moral or religious conviction as a citizen of the United States or member of a religious or global community. Multiracial and transnational coalition politics presented the potential to share individual grievances and come together to voice those concerns under a shared theme. Keeping together this mass collective of organizations and ideologies was not easy, as scholar David Roediger emphasizes the arduous work of coalition work when discussing issues of race and class.⁴²⁶ And those issues were prevalent among network members and individual organizations. Political, economic, and social connections provided advantages for some of the figures discussed in this dissertation compared to others that had to grapple with

⁴²⁵ Lauren Araiza, *To March for Others: The Black Freedom Struggle and the United Farm Workers* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 1-10.; Francesca Polletta, *Freedom in an Endless Meeting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 5-25.

⁴²⁶ David Roediger, *Class, Race, and Marxism* (New York: Verso Press, 2017), 28-30, 165-166.

the consequences of defying the draft or orders. Ultimately, those willing to face the consequences of defining their concept of citizenship and defying militarization had a broad network that would defend their right to dissent even when they clashed over strategies and ideologies.

Between World War II and the Vietnam War, religious war resisters pushed back on statements that their claims of conscientious objector status were invalidated because of their political allegiances. Scholars of religious movements throughout the 20th century have demonstrated that the political and the religious were not isolated spheres from each other in movements for social reform. The history of the U.S. Peace movement illustrates the intersection of religious and political organizers working together against war. Moreover, scholars Felipe Hinojosa and Lara Medina highlight that faith and activism were not opposing forces in Latinx battles for social and political change, as is evident in Puerto Rican actions against compulsory military service discussed in this dissertation.⁴²⁷ The Reverend J.R. Lebrón Velázquez inquired about conscientious objector status for Puerto Rican protestants during World War II, only to face questions about his past dealings with the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party. His political and religious positions informed how he appealed for support, even when controversy arose over the veracity of his associations within religious circles. Bishop Parrilla Bonilla's stance against the U.S. draft imposed upon Puerto Ricans during the

⁴²⁷ Leilah Danielson, Marian Mollin, and Doug Rossinow. *The Religious Left in Modern America: Doorkeepers of a Radical Faith* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 1-11; Lara Medina, *Las Hermanas: Chicana/Latina Religious-Political Activism in the U.S. Catholic Church* (Brunswick, NJ: Temple University Press, 2005), 27-35; Felipe Hinojosa, *Latino Mennonites: Civil Rights, Faith, and Evangelical Culture* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), 1-8.

Vietnam War was shaped by his political alignment with independence and his Catholic faith directing him to peace unless the defense of his community justified the use of violence. Moreover, Private Arturo Rodríguez's resistance to his deployment orders included an appeal that his religious and moral convictions did not permit him to murder another human being. The moral stance of everyone, whether based on scriptural or personal ethics, spoke to a spiritual determination to stand on conviction and fight the system that demanded their service.

Although military service was viewed by politicians, military officials, and individual soldiers as a marker of citizenship and identity, war resisters interpreted service as a function that denied social and political change. It also details the work political leaders and activists did in building coalition networks that sustained despite disagreements. Scholars Sonia Lee and Frederick Douglass Opie emphasize how Black and Puerto Rican coalitions worked within this contentious political framework to pursue political and social change. In this dissertation, Julio Pinto Gandía, Antonio Filardi Guzman, and Dennis Mora framed compulsory military service as a blood tax paid without receiving the benefits of full citizenship. More importantly, Puerto Rican war resisters linked how the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, including the treatment of Puerto Rican migrants to the U.S., as a symptom of how the U.S. treats racial and ethnic minorities.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁸ Sonia Song-Ha Lee, *Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement: Puerto Ricans, African Americans, and the Pursuit of Racial Justice in New York City* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 121-124, 144-147; Frederick Douglas Opie, *Upsetting the Apple Cart: Black-Latino Coalitions in New York City from Protest to Public Office* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 1-12.

The application of coalition-building by political and religious communities committed to social justice during the 20th century still has applications today. Whether working together to protest naval bombing in Vieques during the Iraq Wars or collectively opposing the conduct of Puerto Rican governor Ricardo Rossello in 2019, coalition potential can spark a movement that challenges authority through voices that normally would not work together. The example set throughout the Puerto Rican Civil Rights efforts highlights how various Puerto Rican and U.S.-based social and political factions operated within coalition spaces. For Puerto Rican war resisters during the 20th century, working with U.S. groups that shared concerns over individual draft status provided access to discuss grievances specific to Puerto Rican living on the island and migrants in the United States. More importantly, coalition spaces allowed political and religious voices from the U.S., Puerto Rico, and beyond to contest the imposition of war and military sacrifice as a barometer of full social and political citizenship. Although limited by how state power-imposed ideals of citizenship, Puerto Ricans worked within these coalition networks to reconfigure and redefine these notions based on their understanding of citizenship and social equity.

The political and religious dialogue between Puerto Ricans and the U.S. Left during the World War II-era established collaborative networks that lasted into the Vietnam Era. In 1969 and 1970, anti-war demonstrations in Puerto Rico and the Northeast United States demonstrated the connection of anti-war networks and the impact of the role of Puerto Ricans within the military. In San Juan, massive anti-war demonstrations attended by *el Movimiento Pro Independencia* (M.P.I.) and Bishop

Antulio Parrilla Bonilla highlighted the collaboration of religious and political forces against the increased threat of the draft on Puerto Rican men.⁴²⁹ Between 1970 and 1973, the New York chapter of the Young Lords Party's underground newspaper, *Palante*, provided coverage of Vietnam and the trials of members resisting the draft. The cases of Benny Cruz, Pablo "Yoruba" Guzman, and M.P.I./PSP member Jose "Che" Velázquez received attention from the underground newspaper that offered a critique of the war. The editors and writers expressed that Puerto Rican men rejecting the draft did so as a stand against U.S. imperial wars, promoting Puerto Rico's independence, and pushing for social and political reforms in their local communities. Puerto Rican anti-war activism received support from network members in the United States, including on the ground support during marches and committee work in the defense of a draft resister.

The link between generations of Puerto Rican draft resisters demonstrated the visibility of dissent among Puerto Rican draft resisters from the World War II-era until Vietnam. In Fort Dix, New Jersey, the plight of Puerto Rican and Black soldiers facing harsh conditions for opposing orders sparked support from veteran Christian faith leaders within the peace movement, civil rights activists, and Puerto Rican groups like the New York chapter of the Young Lords Organization (later the Young Lords Party).⁴³⁰ Additionally, one editorial written in *Palante* by former Nationalist Party member Carlos Feliciano, accused of terrorist actions by the New York Police,

⁴²⁹ "Copy of San Juan Star, 24 de Septiembre 1970. Draft Card Burn Sparks Lares Ceremony." MIAU-LAB News Service Records, 1969-1971, Box 1, Folder 4, MIAU Files, 1970; "Copy of El Nacional de Ahora, 5 de Septiembre 1970. Solicitan Eximen Boricuas de Hacer Servicio Militar." MIAU-LAB News Service Records, 1969-1971, Box 1, Folder 5, MIAU Files, 1970. All stored in Columbia University Burke Theological Library, New York.

⁴³⁰ "Huge Protest is Staged at Fort Dix. GI Press Service, no 1., Vol 10

articulated the shared political persecution of those resisting U.S. wars past and present that also aligned with Puerto Rico's independence. Even after the end of the Vietnam War, many of these elements continued to work within these long-term networks for Puerto Rico's independence and the plight of political prisoners. The Puerto Rican Solidarity Committee was formed in 1975 after 20,000 people attended a rally for Puerto Rican independence, with committee members including Dave Dellinger, Jose "Che" Velázquez, the Reverend David Garcia, and Grace Mora.⁴³¹

Military escalation throughout the 1960s and 1970s saw Puerto Rican youth, many second-generation migrants who spent most of their life in the US, mold their political activism on the influences surrounding them in the U.S. Inspired by the Black Power and anti-war movement, Puerto Rican political action by the MPI and other groups, and the example of their parents, these youth critiqued the draft as the imposition of military service on a colonized people. They accomplished this through establishing grassroots organizations within their home communities or forming collectives for social and political empowerment as first-generation students in college. Additionally, collaboration with U.S.-based religious and political organizations devoted to social justice and anti-imperialism discussed the war as a symptom of the lack of resources and treatment of Black and Puerto Ricans in urban centers as second-class citizens. Despite individual sentiments that criticized the role of the church as a participant in corruption,

⁴³¹ "Puerto Rico Libre, March 1976, vol 3 no 7." Social Movement Collection. Box 38 Folder 26: Puerto Rican Anti-War Mobilization. Vietnam Archives and Research Center, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas; Minutes of Meeting, Executive Committee of the U.S. Support Committee for International Conference in Solidarity with Puerto Rican Independence. Rafael Anglada Papers Box 18 Folder 24, Series III, Executive Committee of the U.S. Support Committee for International Conference in Solidarity with Puerto Rican Independence. Center for Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter College, New York, NY.

neighborhood church spaces dedicated to social change opened their doors to discuss the impact of the war on communities. Pushing back on the need for war to preserve democracy abroad, these gatherings verbalized the need to change the social and political order at home.

This dissertation covered the years 1940 to 1970 and demonstrated Puerto Rican coalition efforts within the twentieth-century U.S. anti-war movement. However, there are still gaps that I plan to address in future book projects. First, stopping the timeline in 1970 omits the continued efforts of these coalitions as the Vietnam War entered its final phases. 1970 through 1973, in particular, saw moments where Puerto Rican political radicals resisted the draft and publicized their cases in alternative newspapers. The targeting of members of the Young Lords and M.P.I. (later rebranded as the Puerto Rican Socialist Party) produced animated discussion about the access to draft deferments and accusations that the arrests of these radicals were politically motivated. Additionally, defense committees composing members of the U.S. Left still worked to provide legal aid during the same period that large-scale coalitions started to dwindle. The existence of these coalitions continued after the final troop withdrawal in Vietnam. Coalition members came together on issues connected to Puerto Rico's freedom, including actions against test bombing by the U.S. military on Vieques Island and demanding the release of all Puerto Rican political prisoners.

Next, stopping in 1970 does not allow for an examination of anti-war activity in predominately Latinx and Black church communities. Churches inspired by liberation theology or civil rights opened their doors for youth to discuss the issues affecting them,

including the potential of fighting and dying in war. One example of this is the work of St. Mark's Church on the Bowery in New York, where Fathers Michael Allen and David Garcia provided youth in the community a church space to express themselves with art and discussion of the issues that affected them. Father Garcia, in particular, participated in various coalition committees throughout the 1970s that promoted the release of Puerto Rican political prisoners.

Within the timeframe of the dissertation, more analysis must be done on Puerto Rican issues with the draft or within the military. Attorney Conrad Lynn defended several Puerto Rican soldiers or draft resisters during the 1950s, each with a particular motivation and story. What motivated them to resist? And how did they navigate conscientious objector status when Puerto Rican draft resisters faced skepticism over their political affiliations? Additionally, further research is needed on the continued struggle of U.S. peace missionaries to build a congregant base in Puerto Rico during the Vietnam War. An attempt by Catholic priest Father Thomas Dorney to create a service that provided Puerto Ricans access to materials letting them know their draft rights gained some traction during the late 1960s. However, protestant peace activists noted that their previous outreach efforts during U.S. conflicts suffered from a lack of engagement or buy-in from local communities.

Future research focused on this dissertation and the gaps within will further historical understandings of the broader anti-war movement in the U.S. and the continuity of coalitions as networks that can be maintained and remobilized over shared objectives. Understanding coalition networking also informs how Puerto Ricans engaged

within the anti-war movement and voiced political and social concerns affecting Puerto Rico and the diaspora community in the United States. More importantly, identifying the religious and moral aspects of the anti-war movement demonstrates how Puerto Ricans defined their draft resistance as a political and religious decision of conscience.

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