

**CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN A FOREIGN  
POLICY CRISIS: A STUDY OF BENGHAZI**

An Undergraduate Research Scholars Thesis

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# ABSTRACT

Congressional Strategic Communication in Foreign Policy Crisis: A Study of Benghazi

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The 2012 attacks on the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya, caused a lasting impact on U.S. politics continuing today. However, little research regarding how the attack came to create such an impact, has been conducted. By conducting a qualitative analysis of statements made by congressional leadership and comparing it to televised news coverage, I answer two questions; Which U.S. political party within Congress was more successful at implementing their strategic communication goals in response to the 2012 attack on U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya? And, within the two parties, which one maintained a more united communication front? Previous research conducted shows that Republicans have a historic hold on matters of foreign policy. Additionally, media traditionally takes its cues from politicians when deciding what subjects to cover. My hypothesis predicts that Congressional Republicans were more successful and united in their goals.

## **DEDICATION**

*This one's for me.*

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### Contributors

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## NOMENCLATURE

SMC	Special Missions Compound
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
AQIM	al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
PMC	Private Military Contractors
D	Democrat
R	Republican
I	Independent



## INTRODUCTION

As an emerging field of study within Political Science, strategic communication creates space for scholars to question how and why some forms of communication are more effective than others. The strategy behind political strategic communication is important to understand within all fields, especially within the foreign policy sphere. The manner in which actors choose to communicate a foreign policy incident can shape the trajectory of both national and international politics. The attacks on U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya is an example of this phenomenon. Though the attacks themselves lasted less than twenty-four hours, they became an enduringly polarized political incident. This paper seeks to answer two critical questions: First, which U.S. political party within Congress was more successful at implementing their strategic communication goals in response to the 2012 attack on U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya? In addition, between the two parties, which one maintained a more united communication front?

# 1. BACKGROUND

## 1.1 Background

To analyze the strategic communication goals of congressional leadership in response to this case, it is crucial to develop a coherent understanding of what occurred on September 11, 2012. After a day confined to U.S. facilities due to the security concerns surrounding the anniversary of 9/11, the U.S. Special Missions Compound (SMC) in Benghazi, Libya came under attack at 21:41 local time (see appendix A). The attack consisted of three separate waves by local militias— one at the SMC and two at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Annex located less than a mile away. The attackers had firearms, common in Libya at the time; bats and flammable items which led to the destruction of property and smoke inhalation as buildings were set aflame. Four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador to Libya John Christopher Stevens, died. Ambassador Stevens' death was the first of any active U.S. Ambassador since 1979.

2011 was a time of ongoing conflict in the region: the contagion of the Arab Spring had reached Libya. The regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was challenged in a robust civil war, where rebels attracted some limited Foreign Internal Defense (FID) support from major powers (NPR Staff, 2011). In the ensuing power vacuum and confusion that accompanied the ongoing conflict, instability was worsened by the presence of a significant quantity of militias across an ideological space with significant variation. However, issues regarding militia groups brought additional instability to the country – particularly in Benghazi (Judy, 39). This was worsened by the interest that transnational actors, particularly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), took in the region. These factors came together to create an incubator of resentment: young, frustrated

men in a leaderless country had access to arms offered by a range of appealing actors offering to make them men, coupled with an ideology to tie them in (Judy, p. 20).

While Libya was going through a period of intense change, the U.S. was suffering from the time horizons imposed by the potential of change. The 2012 Presidential Election approaching rapidly, with incumbent President Barack Obama facing Republican Nominee Mitt Romney. Though national elections accentuate partisan divisions, America was facing increased polarization, primarily regarding issues of social services (Pew Research Center, 2012). These divides were accentuated with the May 2011 release of classified Guantanamo Bay detainee records regarding prisoners by Wikileaks (Temple-Raston et al., 2011). While it is hard enough for Cabinet departments to coordinate interagency objectives, these leaks caused decision-makers to consider the implications of being tied to contentious decisions. The cultivation of this environment within the national security space encouraged agencies to pursue increasingly isolationist approaches within the administration, causing communication issues that became significant throughout the attacks in Benghazi.

The primary U.S. based decision-makers involved in Benghazi were Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and CIA Director David Petraeus. Given the geographic distance, Secretary Clinton maintained contact with the Deputy Chief of Missions Gregory Hicks who was stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya throughout the attacks. Throughout the attack decision-makers placed emphasis on two goals: saving American lives and supporting the ground personnel in Libya, addressing the ongoing attack. While generating a response to the attacks, the five options considered included military action, the Foreign Emergency Service Team (FEST), use of allies in the region, evacuation, and a CIA contracted team. Of the five considered, the two implemented was the use of private military contractors

(PMCs, in this case, Academi), who had been working for the CIA for some time, and evacuation. The contracted team (based in Tripoli, Libya at the time), was seen to be the best response available to send immediate ground force assistance to those in Benghazi, in order to make evacuation possible (U.S. Cong. House. Select Comm., p. 907). Concerns around the United States' increasing reliance on private military companies became an important conversation in the aftermath of Benghazi (Johnson et. al., 2019).

American public opinion research has found that voters are skeptical of the use of PMCs (Ramirez and Wood, p. 1434). Two of the four American deaths in Benghazi were members of the CIA contracted team: whose deaths created a national conversation regarding the competence of PMC personnel deploying to respond to ongoing crises where American government personnel are at risk. After the second wave breached at the CIA Annex, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta worked in tandem to enact the evacuation plan (U.S. Cong. House. Select Comm., p. 1225). Within twenty-four hours of the initial attack, all government personnel had evacuated from Libya to a U.S. military base in Germany.

## **1.2 Strategic Communication**

Benghazi hit the twenty-four-hour news cycle almost immediately, once Secretary Clinton released remarks regarding the attacks, Nominee Mitt Romney responded with a statement condemning the administration's response. With the constant pressure of news reporting, politicians are expected to answer questions on complex issues with little notice. Politicians have become accustomed to boiling down complex, unfolding issues to soundbites appropriate for a-minute-long television segment. Strategic communication, which is essentially a model of persuasion and a process of the management of perceptions, is increasingly crucial for politicians as they increasingly interact directly with the public (Hallahan et al., 2007 and

Gregory, 2005). The key to understanding the nature of strategic communication is the intentional and calculated way that it is both conceived and incorporated (Hallahan et al., 2007). Strategic communication techniques and objectives are held both at the individual-level, by the politicians and their aides, and their party. As a result, the public receives information shaped by both partisan and personal preferences.

### **1.3 Strategic Communication in Benghazi**

It is not a surprise, then, that the immediate responses to Benghazi were shaped by pre-existing strategic communication methods used by those speaking out. As Secretary Clinton unexpectedly announced that an attack occurred in the U.S. Special Missions Compound, partisan framing techniques took over the conversation (Entman and Stonbely, p. 4). The fast-paced nature of the attack in Benghazi left little time for Congressional Republicans to cultivate a message or to prevent less desirable actions to be taken by the incumbent Democrats in response to the attack. In recent political history, Republicans have developed highly institutionalized strategic communication systems. They have enforced party uniformity through the repeated usage of no-nonsense language, outperforming Democrats in their speed and efficacy of response (Entman and Stonbely, p. 5). Entman and Stonbely examine the media coverage of Benghazi and 9/11 primarily focusing on strategic communication. The authors conduct a story-level analysis of newspaper coverage regarding the two attacks and who or what entity is likely to be blamed. Primarily they focus on whether strategic communication goals successfully deflected blame or promoted it, even when evidence counters the claims made. The finding that audiences attach to the perspective of industry officials, regardless of opposing evidence, suggests that whoever has a more convincing message controls the narrative. When the media relies on public officials for information, especially concerning matters of foreign policy,

it could cause both a lack of accountability (when false information is repeatedly perpetuated) and transparency. Their conclusion that Republicans are stronger in communication tactics leads to the probable indication that coverage of Benghazi primarily reflected the perspective of Republicans.

#### **1.4 An Introduction to Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing**

It is nearly impossible to discuss the establishment and success of strategic communication goals in the media without also discussing the effects that media has on both the public and on officials. The traditional watchdog role assigned to media asserts the primary existence of media is to hold accountable actors in positions of power, such as politicians. However, it is often the case that the media must over rely on the information presented by politicians. Media's dependence on politicians for information has led some to believe that the traditional watchdog role is disappearing. This co-dependency between politicians and media has now become the lifeblood of American news coverage. While the watchdog factor established the right for the media to call attention to impropriety, corporate media hesitates to raise issues that stray from mainstream topics introduced by public officials (Lawrence, p. 445). Meanwhile, public officials rely on media coverage to relay and promote their messaging. This reliance on public officials becomes especially prominent when the coverage is over matters of foreign policy (Baum and Potter, p. 7).

#### **1.5 Effects of Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing**

Agenda setting, as established by McCombs and Shaw, hypothesizes that the emphasis mass media puts on issues directly correlates to how important audience members view that issue (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Priming, an extension of agenda-setting, "occurs when news content suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for

evaluating the performance of leaders and government” (Iyengar & Kinder, p. 63). Framing, a model often associated with both agenda-setting and priming, “is based on the assumption that how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is understood” (Scheufele and Tewksbury, p. 11). Media's influence has only expanded with the rise of partisan news networks (like MSNBC and Fox News) and social media sites.

Media, especially when covering matters of foreign policy, rely on political leaders as the driving force of information and “are assumed to be more legitimate sources of newsworthy information” (Lawrence and Schafer, p. 770). Separate studies conducted by Noelle-Neumann and George Gerbner assume that the agenda-setting factor in mass media has long-term effects on the public due to the continuous nature of news coverage. While Gerbner faults conservative entertainment media, Noelle-Neumann argues that liberal media sources are more likely to cause these long-term effects of influence. A study conducted by Gentzkow and Shapiro finds that “Republicanism on demand has a clear positive relationship with...[media] slant,” contradicting Noelle-Neumann’s claim (Gentzkow and Shapiro, p. 54). Previous research holds that audiences are more likely to subscribe to media sources that promote their ideology. This concept of an echo-chamber creates profit-based incentives for media to frame the issues they present under a specific microscope to meet consumer demands (Gentzkow and Shapiro, p. 48). This poses the important question of why we allow media outlets to frame information? Notwithstanding current trends, we historically rely on our media to be objective and truthful; however, this “ritualized journalism” pressures journalists to present from more than one perspective. While this sounds ideal in theory, this pigeon holds journalists to rely solely on the words of competing industry leaders and leaves little room for verification of statements or a deep dive into the prospects of either argument (Lawrence and Schafer, 2011).

## 1.6 Hypothesis

Though the Benghazi Attack has continued to have a remarkable impact, little research has been conducted regarding the messages formulated by the elites in decision-making roles.

Considering the research mentioned above, I hypothesize two probable findings:

H<sub>1</sub>: Congressional Republicans were more successful in the implementation of their strategic communication goals by earning more airtime – more Benghazi-related televised media interviews – relative to Democrats in the observed time-period.

H<sub>2</sub>: Congressional Republicans maintained a unified communication strategy – themes were more consistent across Republican talking points relative to Democrats



## **2. DATA AND METHODS**

### **2.1 Independent and Dependent Variables**

Congressional investigations into Benghazi lasted until 2016, offering a significant amount of time for congressional members to release statements regarding the events. However, with that comes the issue of additional information separate from what was originally known to allow the development of new or updated strategic communication goals. When narrowing the timeline of focus, I chose to pull coverage from the four months after the attack, specifically from September 12, 2012 to January 23, 2013. This timeline allowed to consider immediate statements from the attack to the first congressional appearance of Secretary Clinton.

Establishing a timeline allowed me to then choose which members of congress and televised news networks to cover. The first congressional members I selected to analyze consisted of the four key members that made up the leadership team; House Speaker John Boehner (R – OH), House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D – CA), Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D – NV), and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R – KY). In addition to these leadership members, I included the 20 congressional members that chaired the committees investigating the attacks: House Armed Services Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Intelligence Committee, House Judiciary Committee, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Senate Intelligence Committee, Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Members of the leadership play an important role in shaping their party's strategic communication goals, the committee members had both more experience working within the field of foreign policy and produced more statements regarding the issue.

Given the polarization of U.S. politics, the inclusion of diverse political perspectives within the outlets selected better scrutinized the overall coverage promoted in response to the attack. Additionally, media outlets have a financial incentive to promote the ideology of their audiences requiring the scrutinization of various outlets (Gentzkow and Shapiro, p. 48). By studying ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox, MSNBC, and NBC I was able to review the coverage from the major news outlets and those promoting different ideologies. Figure B.1 in Appendix B displays a graph that categorizes the different ideologies of media outlets. While it is from 2016, and polarization between 2012 and 2016 increased, it is still an accurate depiction of media slant in 2012.

## **2.2 Methodological Approach**

To explore which party was more successful at implementing their strategic communication goals and more united in their messaging, I analyzed both statements made by the congressional members selected, as well as interview transcripts during the time for analysis.

To access congressional websites no longer available, I used Internet Archive and selected to look at the websites as they were in February 2013 to access all statements published. Once the websites were accessed, I navigated to the press release section and looked at all press statements regarding Benghazi (including remarks and letters to administrative officials) and saved them to be analyzed. For current members, this process was repeated, though accessed through active congressional websites.

After gathering all congressional statements, I used LexisNexis to access interview transcripts from CNN, CBS, Fox, MSNBC, and NBC. Interviews were found by using broadly inclusive search terms (i.e., “Benghazi and John McCain”) then manually narrowing down items to include content regarding any discussion of the Benghazi or aftermath response to it.

Interview transcripts from ABC, not fully available in LexisNexis, were accessed via the ABC website through the same search process utilized in LexisNexis.

Beginning the analysis of the information gathered required first separating the qualitative data into an index then calculating the quantitative data. When creating the index for congressional statements I started by putting each member into a spreadsheet. Based on the content of the statements made I created an index with six different categories; Condemn without mentioning accountability, condemn mentioning accountability, request answers from administrative officials, defend Ambassador Rice, support accountability review board report, and request additional information from accountability review board report. Transcribed interviews gathered from LexisNexis were sorted first by its network then secondly by party. From there I correlated the connection between network and member interview to calculate the total amount of interviews per party, network, and member.

Using a qualitative analysis in addition to observational methods, the research method used allows for a comprehensive understanding of the research question asked. By using congressional websites to access statements I was able to see the statements that were most important for the congressional member to promote. This allowed for a better understanding of their perspective and influence in the aftermath of the attacks. Furthermore, given their agenda-setting privileges, the choice to analyze mainstream televised news networks provided a better insight into those media messages most likely to directly shape the public's understanding of Benghazi.

### 3. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

#### 3.1 Hypothesis One: Analysis and Results

H1: Congressional Republicans earned more airtime – more Benghazi-related televised media statements – relative to Democrats in the observed time-period.

The analysis conducted of the research gathered determines that Republicans garnered a significantly higher number of interviews than Democrats, both overall and within each network. Figure 3.1, seen below, represents the data collected from LexisNexis regarding televised interviews conducted from September 12, 2012 to January 23, 2013. Of the six networks selected the two with the most interviews conducted were CNN and Fox. Despite MSNBC being more left leaning than CNN, they only conducted four interviews placing them only before NBC in terms of least number of interviews.




Figure 3.1: Interview coverage of congressional members gathered from LexisNexis

The data gathered shows that between CNN and Fox, Fox was more likely to interview congressional members that reflect the conservative ideology often promoted within the network. Although CNN interviews more Democrats than Fox, CNN similarly conducted more interviews with Republicans than Democrats. Of the 34 interviews conducted across CNN, 28 of them were with Republican congressional members. Although it is unexpected that a traditionally liberal leaning media source gave the majority of coverage to conservative members, it also substantiates my previous claim that those with a more convincing message control the coverage. While the issue of incumbent versus opposition could be a factor in this coverage ratio, I am of the perspective that (in American politics) this phenomenon still pairs down to a Republican versus Democrat dispute. Additionally, with the hold that Republicans have on matters of foreign policy in conjunction with the media's reliance on public officials, it is not unimaginable that CNN would offer more coverage to Republican members. The Republican senator with the highest number of interviews was Senator McCain with a total of 38 interviews. Senator McCain's coverage was mainly split between Fox and CNN at 15 interviews each. This was not only the largest amount of coverage within the Republican party, but among all congressional members analyzed. Senator McCain's counterpart on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin (D – MI), only appeared in three televised interviews. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D – CA) participated in 5 interviews also mainly split between Fox and CNN at two each, causing her to be the Democrat with the highest number of interviews.

The analysis of interview coverage reflects the successful implementation of the Republicans strategic communication goals. Across the political spectrum, Democrats had significantly less interview coverage when discussing Benghazi. An unexpected result was the amount of Republican coverage on media outlets traditionally more liberal leaning. Research

formerly cited suggested that media outlets tend to reflect the ideology of their viewership (but see Padgett et al. 2018). Though specific research connecting the relationship between media and public opinion about Benghazi is needed, it isn't a stretch to hypothesize that there is a correlation between the two. However, the results of this data suggest that congressional interviews were offered relatively equally between Democrats and Republicans. The exception being that Fox and CNN had slightly preferred congresspeople reflecting the ideology of the network. While Republicans had significantly more interviews conducted than Democrats, the majority of them covered the perspective of Senator McCain. However, even without the interviews of Senator McCain, Republicans continued to have the highest number of total interviews.

### **3.2 Hypothesis Two: Analysis and Results**

H2: Congressional Republicans maintained a unified communication strategy – themes were more consistent across Republican talking points relative to Democrats.

When analyzing the statements gathered from congressional offices, I discovered two items worth noting. First, there was significantly less statements released than there were interviews conducted. Secondly, the two categories on which Republicans commented the most were condemning the attack while mentioning the need for accountability and requesting more answers from the Administration.

### Congressional Statements




Figure 3.2: Statements gathered from congressional offices

As exemplified in Figure 3.2, those whose statements included comments about the Administration often did so twice within the time period analyzed. Though Democrats did comment on the attack they were split between mentioning accountability and not. Members of the leadership were more likely to release press statements via their offices than appear in televised interviews. This goes against the trend seen from the majority of members who acted opposingly to the leadership. The choice to release statements rather than appear on the networks could be related to the prioritization of other issues to spend political capital on. Republican leadership, both when analyzing statements and interviews, spent more time communicating their messaging regarding Benghazi than Democrats did.

Despite the usefulness of this method to gather the necessary data to create conclusive results, there were weaknesses that should be addressed in future research. There was substantial variation across congressional websites in terms of statements posted. Each website consists of content and design based on the members (or their staffs) discretion. This resulted in a gap between what some members' sites published versus others. There were also occasions where

one member would post joint statements in congruence with other members, but it would only be available on one website (i.e., joint statements between Senator Joe Lieberman (I – CT) and Senator Susan Collins (R – ME) were singularly available on Senator Lieberman’s archived website), in this case I counted the statements under each member within the selected pool.

Although there was less content than the televised interview coverage, Republicans remained more unified on their messaging when releasing congressional statements. While the statements released by Democrats covered more topics, Republicans focused on two criteria. Firstly, Republicans were mainly united when condemning the attack and calling for accountability. Secondly, they focused on requesting additional information from the Obama Administration regarding the attack. Statements from Democrats were split when mentioning accountability in the immediate responses to the attack. Their statements differed further when focusing on specific members of the Administration and defending the Accountability Review Board report.



## CONCLUSION

“Benghazi” is a loaded term in the United States, even now, almost a decade later. It conjures, in the American people, either disgusted outrage at the Clinton-led State Department; or frustration at the perceived conspiracies that emerged from the event, that perhaps marked a new era of partisan politics. This split is testament to the power of strategic communication, of both parties. Yet, it’s clear that Republicans are better able to manage and implement their communication goals than the Democrats within the foreign policy sphere. Research conducted repeatedly shows that across various media outlets, Republican messaging is promoted over Democrats when discussing matters of foreign policy (Entman and Stonbely, 2018). The late Senator McCain became a spokesperson for the Republican Party, and as a trusted official known to work effectively as a bipartisan, the party was able to leverage his political capital and credibility with the public to amplify their messaging.

If the Democratic Party wants to ‘take back’ foreign policy, they need to build the party infrastructure to control the narrative in much the same way that has been successfully implemented by the counterpart. Strategic communication places an emphasis on short-term and long-term objectives (Hallahan et. al., 2007). In the case of short-term objectives, the ability to quickly respond to a situation in a coordinated effort helps audiences attach to a point-of-view before evidence can contradict it. Republicans responded in an efficient and convincing manner to the crisis as a cohesive unit to promote their objectives. Long-term goals require repetition and coordination for a successful outcome. The ownership of foreign policy did not happen overnight, but in a coordinated effort that contained messages that mirror each other. In both cases, Democrats fall short in comparison to their Republican counterparts. At these windows of

opportunity, having a unified, easy message for the public to hear and adopt would have served the party better than lengthy, logically valid discussions on Benghazi and its management.

In an analysis of televised interview coverage across six networks and congressional statements published, the results clearly show that Republicans were united in their messaging and successful in their implementation. Democrats, on the other hand, lacked uniformity and promotion of their strategic communication goals. These findings encourage the development of research in two areas. Firstly, additional research specific to Benghazi should be conducted, as well as the connection between the party's strategic communication goals and public opinion. Secondly, the role that PMCs play in foreign policy, both within the U.S. and abroad, should be examined more carefully. The "cloak and dagger" nature of PMCs has led to a series of unanswered questions when attempting to understand the decisions of public officials. Not only should this be a priority for researchers, but also those who have an interest in government transparency.

This brings me back to my concluding consideration: having a better understanding of our leaders' strategic goals and decisions, especially in matters of foreign policy, not only helps hold decision makers accountable, but also gives us a glimpse into the future of foreign policy. Furthering research within this field is crucial to this understanding. Americans with differing ideologies not only benefit from this development, but so do members of the international community.

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## APPENDIX A: BENGHAZI TIMELINE

- 2142 local: Firearm shots heard around Special Mission Complex (SMC)
- 2145 local: Embassy Tripoli set up command center and notified Washington (also reached out to LAR and Armed forces contacts, February 17th leadership, UN, and third country embassies)
- 2145-2200 local: Local intruders attack SMC entrance and breach Villa C (where Ambassador Stevens, ARSO 1, and IMO Sean Smith were located)
- 2200 local: Villa C set aflame and ARSO 1, Ambassador Stevens, and IMO Smith attempt to escape the safe room – only ARSO 1 escapes. ARSO 1 and other diplomatic security members continuously attempt to recover IMO Smith and Ambassador Stevens, only being able to recover the remains of IMO Smith
- 1700 (Washington D.C. Time): AFRICOM surveillance drone rerouted from previous mission to several Benghazi and President Obama briefed during a regularly scheduled intelligence briefing from Leon Panetta and Marty Dempsey
- 2205 local: CIA Annex response team departs to SMC
- 1705 (Washington D.C. Time): Secretary Clinton notified of the attack by Steve Mull (Departments Executive Secretary) and calls POTUS
- 2300 local: AFRICOM surveillance aircraft monitors the area
- 2330 local: Remaining team from SMC and annex team arrive at the CIA Annex w/o Ambassador Stevens shortly coming under attack at the CIA Annex

0030 local: Six-person CIA contracted security team departs from Tripoli to Benghazi

0130 local: Security team arrives in Benghazi

0500 local: Six-person response team arrives to provide support, facing heavy impact within 15 mins arrival

0515 local: Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods (members of the CIA contracted security team) killed

0630 local: AFRICOM orders C-17 aircraft in Germany to Libya for evacuation

0730 local: Depart from Benghazi to Tripoli

1130 local: Last U.S. government personnel evacuated with Ambassador Stevens remains to Tripoli

1415 local: C-17 departs Germany for Libya

1925 local: All U.S. government personnel departed Libya on a C-17 for Ramstein Air Force Base

## APPENDIX B: MEDIA BIAS CHART (2016)




Figure B.1: Media Bias Chart Courtesy of Ad Fontes Media