

# Premature Dry Gas Seal Failure on a Sales Gas Centrifugal Compressor


Sergio Vidal  
(Saudi Aramco, Hawiyah Gas Plant - Reliability Unit)

أرامكو السعودية  
Saudi Aramco



# Index

- Introduction
- Mechanical findings
- DCS findings
- VMS findings
- Analysis
- Conclusions
- Recommendations
- References
- Comments




# Introduction

- On Saturday, July 7, 2012, **sales gas compressor K002D tripped due to high outboard dry gas seal first leak pressure** (tag 64PI-854).
- The compressor was kept stopped for an investigation, which confirmed that an **actual dry gas seal (DGS) failure had happened on the machine**; dry gas seal rupture disk open, dry gas seal leak lines full with lube oil, compressor uncoupled and found not be able to rotate, etc.
- The installed **dry gas seal set were just installed 10 months ago** in September 2011, following a complete K002D compressor overhaul due to a DGS failure.



# Introduction



**Machine:** Barrel type centrifugal compressor, 4 impellers.

**Fluid:** Sales gas (approx. mol.%: 75% methane, 10% ethane, 5% propane).

**Speed:** 9579 rpm.

**Rated suction pressure:** 458 psia.

**Rated discharge pressure:** 965 psia.

**Rated flow:** 351.9 MMscfd

**Total power:** 15268 HP / 11.375 MW



**Year constructed:** 1998

**Year commissioned:** 2001/2002




# Introduction

Seal Application	
Seal Type	Unidirectional rings (one direction of rotation), Tandem Arrangement
1st seal rotating ring/ stationary ring	Tungsten Carbide/Carbon
2nd seal rotating ring/ stationary ring	Tungsten Carbide/Carbon
Seal Size/Shaft Size	6.625 inches / 130 mm
Allowable Axial Movement	+/- 2.54 mm Including Installation Variance
Allowable Radial Movement	+/- 0.6 mm Except Labyrinth
Operating Conditions and Leakage Rates	
Process Gas/M. W.	CH <sub>4</sub> (73-74%) + other H.C. + H <sub>2</sub> S (<4 ppm) + H <sub>2</sub> O (0.1-0.11%)/M.W. = 17.82-21.97
Shaft Speed	9,300 rpm (RATED)/9,765 rpm (FUTURE)
Temperature	88.3 ° C (RATED)/95 ° C (FUTURE)
Pressure	32.54-41.04 barG (486-612 psia)
Seal Buffer Gas	Filtered Process Gas
Tertiary Seal	
Seal Arrangement	Barrier Seal With Hard Coated Sleeve
Seal Size	165 mm
Barrier Gas Source	100% Nitrogen
Method of Supply	Controlled Pressure/Flow Monitoring
Controlled Gas Pressure	Min. 0.15 barG (2.15 psig)/Nor. 0.45 barG (6.52 psig)/Max. 1.0 barG (14.50 psig)
Gas Flow Rate per Seal End	38 std. ltr./min (1.34 SCFM) at 0.45 barg (6.52 psig)
Minimum Operating Pressure	0.15 barG (2.15 psig) Press switch low to be activated






# Introduction



Fluid	Tag	Normal range	Alarm	Trip
Buffer gas	PDIT-841	2-5 psi	1 psi	
Buffer gas	PIT853	0-2 psig	10 psig	30 psig
Buffer gas	PIT854	0-2 psig	10 psig	30 psig
Buffer gas	FIT847	0 - 120 SCFH	480 SCFH	
Buffer gas	FIT848	0 - 120 SCFH	480 SCFH	
N2	PIT857	0-1 psig	12 psig	
N2	PIT867	0-1 psig	12 psig	
N2	PIT856	6-8 psig	3 psig	
N2	FIT 853	50-100	204 SCFH	
Lube oil	PIT865	15-18 psig	11.6 psig	6.5 psig

# Field Mechanical Findings

- **Lube oil spread all around the machine surroundings,** through the secondary seal leak line discharge to the atmosphere (3<sup>rd</sup> floor compressor bay).
- **Compressor shaft was found to be stuck/not rotating.**
- **Inboard dry gas seal 2nd leak drain** to sewage (1<sup>st</sup> floor): Some traces of lube oil.
- **Inboard dry gas seal 1st leak drain** to sewage (1<sup>st</sup> floor): Without any liquid.
- **Outboard dry gas seal 2nd leak drain** to sewage (1<sup>st</sup> floor): **Lube oil.**
- **Outboard dry gas seal 1st leak drain** to sewage (1<sup>st</sup> floor): **Lube oil and hydrocarbons liquid.**
- **Outboard dry gas seal 1st and 2nd leak lines** (1<sup>st</sup> floor): **Completely filled with lube oil.**



Outboard dry gas seal 1st and 2nd leak lines were completely filled with lube oil.





# Field Mechanical Findings

- **Outboard dry gas seal 1st leak line rupture disk on 1<sup>st</sup> floor: rupture and full of debris (metal and other particles).** This debris appears to belong to dry gas seal internal components (rotating and static rings, springs, etc.).
- **Inboard dry gas seal 1st leak line rupture disk on 1<sup>st</sup> floor: Not damaged.** Lube oil only on the vent side of this rupture disc (no lube oil coming from the inboard dry gas seal 1st leak line).
- **Filter for N<sub>2</sub> supply to the dry gas seal on 1<sup>st</sup> floor: Not plugged and in good condition.** There were no moisture or liquid traces on this filter.
- **Dry gas seal buffer gas filters on 1<sup>st</sup> floor (in service and standby): Liquid inside both of them.**



Inboard dry gas seal 1st leak line rupture disk was intact.

Outboard dry gas seal 1st leak line rupture disk was found ruptured and full of debris.





# Shop Mechanical Findings

- **Inboard dry gas seal:** Not seriously damaged (just some medium scratches in seal journal area), a very little amount of lube oil was found on the tertiary seal area.
- **Outboard dry gas seal tertiary seal:** Oil contaminated and with black deposit but no visible wear or scratches.




Outboard dry gas seal  
tertiary seal.



# Shop Mechanical Findings

- **Outboard dry gas seal 2nd seal: Springs had disappeared, the rotating ring (tungsten carbide) and the stationary ring (carbon) were found broken in pieces.**
- **Rotating ring (tungsten carbide) and stationary ring (carbon) of the outboard dry gas seal 1st seal were not broken.** The seal faces have scratches, on the stationary ring (carbon) a little piece was missing. The spring was in good conditions and in place.
- The process side labyrinth/shaft clearance on both inboard and outboard dry gas seal has found be **around 0.017" (design values: 0.012" to 0.15"), value acceptable.**




Outboard DGS 2nd seal, broken rotating ring.




Outboard DGS 2nd seal, broken tungsten carbide pieces.

# DCS Findings




- DGS 1st leak pressure outboard side (tag PI854) **reached 8.3 psig on 30-04-2012** and for around 2 weeks had higher values than the normal values of 0-2 psig.
- DGS 1st leak pressure inboard board side (tag PI853) on **04-07-2012 start increasing to 4 psig until the trip on 07-07-2012**, normal values 0-2 psig.

- 2nd leak pressure inboard and outboard side (tags PI857/PI867) **started to rise around 20-06-2012 and reach 7/6 psig on 30-06-2012 then dropped to 5/4 psig until the trip on 07-07-2012**, normal values 0-1 psig.
- 6 days before the failure, around 01-07-2012 several DGS parameters start **showing more fluctuations than normal**.






# DCS Findings




- The **DGS buffer gas ΔP (tag PDIT841) values start fluctuating** around 2:30 h before the trip on 07-07-2012.
- Between 02-07-2012 to 03-07-2012 (5-6 days before the failure), the **DGS buffer gas ΔP showed several times unusual fluctuations.**

- The tertiary seal N2 gas supply flow (Tag FI853) **increase to 168 SCFH on 14-06-2012 and drop again** to normal values of 80-90 SCFH. It increase back to around 150-160 SCFH on 04-07-2012 and maintain this values until the trip on 07-07-2012.



- The lube oil pressure (PIT 865) to the bearings has been around **20-21 psig, which is higher than the COMPRESSOR OEM recommended values of 15-17 psig.**

# Vibration Monitoring System (VMS) Findings



- The vibration monitoring system (VMS) is **configured with 3 seconds filter time delay** for the danger alarm (i.e., HH vibration) to avoid trips on vibration spikes.
- As per API 670 Machinery Protection System section 5.4.1.5:

*"With exception of electronic over speed detection, fixed time delays for shutdown (danger) relay activation that are field changeable (via controlled access) to require from 1 to 3 seconds sustained violation. **A delay of 1 second shall be standard.**"*


- Before the trip of 07-07-2012 20:51:01 h due to the DGS 1st seal leak outboard, there was a **vibration peak 2.36-2.6 mils Pk-Pk** at 20:50:55 h (compressors bearings) above the shutdown value (2.26 mils Pk-Pk) that lasted no more than 1 second.
- As **vibration peak at 07-07-2012 20:50:55 h of 2.36-2.6 mils Pk-Pk** lasted less than the current 3 second time delay it didn't cause a trip.

# Analysis

- Considering the major findings we have described before, the theoretically possible causal factors for this failure are (as per API dry gas seal subcommittee RCA table):
  - Dry gas seal secondary seal failure.
  - Dry gas seal N2 tertiary seal failure.
  - Excessive lube oil supply to compressor bearing.
  - Liquid in dry gas seal buffer gas.
  - Reverse pressurization-pressure deformation of the dry gas seal 2nd seal.
  - Excessive vibration.
  - N2 failure or contamination.
- During our investigation we ruled out two of the previous theoretically possible causal factors:
  - **Excessive vibration** – The trends show that the compressor vibrations were stable within the acceptable values (below alarm) without any spikes or increasing trend.
  - **N2 failure or contamination** – The trends values show that the N2 pressure has always supply whenever the lube oil system was working. The N2 supply filter has without any moisture/liquid, there were some particles but were retained by the filter mesh.
- **We asked DGS manufacturer to perform a failure analysis on both dry gas seal (inboard and outboard).**




# Analysis




- The DGS manufacturer investigation report states the cause for this seal failure was due to **reverse pressurization of the dry gas seal 2nd seal, outboard side.**
- Reverse pressurization occurs when the **pressure on the ID of the seal is higher than the OD of the seal** (normally the seal operated with the pressure on the OD higher than on the ID of the seal).

- **Reverse pressurization tends to close the faces at the outside diameter producing a divergent gap**, which can cause thermal stress at the OD of the tungsten carbide seat due to localized high temperature.
- The localized **thermal stress create and propagated axial cracks** through the seat which can cause a catastrophic DGS failure.



# Analysis




- There were traces of liquid residues on the dry gas seal 2nd leak seat, outboard side;
- API 617 "Axial and Centrifugal Compressor and Expanders for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas" identifies the possibility of **reverse pressurization causing DGS failure**:

*"2.8.4.2 Self-acting dry gas seals shall be provided with connections to allow the user to inject filtered gas, and to protect against reversal of differential pressure during sub-atmospheric operation. Note: Some self-acting dry gas seals can be destroyed by reversal of pressure differential."*

- As stated in article "*Design Improvements Enhance Dry Gas Seal's Ability to Handle Reverse Pressurization*" of the *Turbomachinery Symposium*, **dry gas seal failure can occur for values of around 6 psig reverse pressurization in running conditions.**
- The **maximum reverse pressurization we had on the dry gas seal 2nd seal was of 4-6 psig during around 10-15 days before the failure (running conditions).**
- **Reverse pressurization under static conditions can also cause damage** to the DGS ("*Dry Gas Seal Retrofit*" article of the *Turbomachinery Symposium*) and should be limited normally around 10 psig.



# Analysis



- The possible causes for reverse pressurization of the dry gas seal 2nd seal in running conditions are:
  - N2 supply failure or contamination (*already ruled out before*).
  - N2 barrier seal failure.
  - 2nd leak vent line blockage.
- DGS manufacturer **didn't find any major or severe damage to the N2 barrier seal failure.**
- On the K002D failure of September 2011, **all the dry gas seal console and pipe was found completely full with lube oil for both DGS ends.**
- There is the possibility that **some oil from the September 2011 failure to have been trapped** on the 2nd vent line low points (between the 1st and 3rd floor of the compressor bay), which may have **contributed to the 2nd vent dry gas seal leak line blockage** of July 2012.





# Analysis

- Dry gas seal technology has developed around 1970s and **its first oil and gas industrial application were around 1980s.**
- DGS has been applied in the process gas centrifugal compressor **for around 35-40** years but there is still **no complete and extensive industry accepted standard for dry gas seal and their support system design.**
- The API has only started addressing gas seal design in its standard **“API Std 614 - Lubrication, Shaft-sealing and Oil-control Systems and Auxiliaries” in 1999.**
- The **sales gas compressor K002 A-D were design around 1998-1999** so at the time API didn't even address the dry gas seal technology design and reliability concerns.
- Only in **“API Std 614 - Lubrication, Shaft-sealing and Oil-control Systems and Auxiliaries” latest edition (2008)** the dry gas seal support design is described much more in detail, but the API subcommittee on mechanical is still working on a new dry gas seal standard.

# Conclusions

- Our final conclusion is that the K002D dry gas seal failure of July 2012 (outboard seal) was due to the **dry gas seal reverse pressurization of the 2nd seal, probably due to the 2nd leak vent line blockage/partial filling with oil.**
- This failure could have been prevented if the original **dry gas seal design and instrumentation by DGS manufacturer/COMPRESSOR OEM made in 1999 had been properly setup** to protect our dry gas seal from reverse pressurization. In 1999, the DGS manufacturer already knew about such phenomena.
- The **liquid content that we found on the buffer gas was not the root cause** for this failure but will cause a dry gas seal failure in the long run.



# Recomendations

- Change the **current DGS secondary leak pressure (PIT857/PIT 867) alarm from 12 psig to 4 psig** – DGS manufacturer recommendation accepted by compressor OEM.
- **Don't run the compressor lube oil system without having N2 supply to the DGS tertiary seal** – DCS interlock to prevent this situation.
- Change the **current time delay** setting for the vibration protection systems shutdown values **from 3 seconds to 1 second**, which is the standard value recommended by API 670.
- DGS instrumentation (pressure and flow transmitters) should be **replaced/sent to calibration every 5 years**.



# Recomendations

- **Normal lube oil pressure range should be around 15-17 psig** (set-point: 17 psig), the lube oil pressure must not higher than 17 psig, use PCV 874 to control this pressure.
- In all compressors dry gas seal replacement, **properly clean (by solvent, water, high air pressure, etc.) the 1st and 2nd vent leak line to the flare and the atmosphere between the compressor 1st floor and 2nd/3rd floor.**
- **Install a invert U-shape pipe at the end of the 2nd leak vent line** of all sales gas compressors to prevent dirt and liquid from entering the 2nd leak vent line.





# References

- API 614, 1999, "Lubrication, Shaft-sealing and Oil-control Systems and Auxiliaries," 4th Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C.
- API 614, 2008, "Lubrication, Shaft-sealing and Oil-control Systems and Auxiliaries," 5th Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C.
- API 617, 2002, "Axial and Centrifugal Compressor and Expander-Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Industry Services," 7th Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C.
- API 670, 2003, "Machinery Protection Systems," 4th Edition, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C.
- Mayeux, P.T., Feltman, L.P., 1996, "Design Improvements Enhance Dry Gas Seal's Ability to Handle Reverse Pressurization," Proceedings of the 25th Turbomachinery Symposium, Turbomachinery Laboratory, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.
- Shah, P., 1988, "Dry Gas Compressor Seals," Proceedings of the 17th Turbomachinery Symposium, Turbomachinery Laboratory, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.
- Sweeney, M.J., Feltman, L.P., 1995, "Dry Gas Seal Retrofit," Proceedings of the 24th Turbomachinery Symposium, Turbomachinery Laboratory, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.

Thank you very much for your  
time!



Any questions, doubts,  
comments?