

WHEN REPRESENTATIVES WORK: THE INFLUENCE OF LOCAL CONTEXT
ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

Representative bureaucracy theory often explains representation without a discussion of agency context. However, in many agencies not only is there a lack of support to develop a passively representative workforce, but there also exists little support for active representation. Scholars have recently developed a theory of context that describes various characteristics of the organizational context as a conditioning variable on management and performance. This research explores how agency contexts will potentially improve or mitigate the effect of minority representation on minority student outcomes. The research addresses three contextual characteristics: the organization's financial uncertainty, the organization's social context, and the organization's political context. I explore my research question in the context of U.S. local public education. Within the research, I use a national survey dataset that captures bureaucratic representation in the largest U.S. school districts, funding data provided by the National Center of Education Statistics, and a unique dataset on school district social capital. The findings indicate first that in the midst of financial stress, negative changes in revenue dedicated to the technical core of the school district (instructional expenditures) will decrease the expected impact of minority teachers on student outcomes. Likewise, increases in bureaucratic investment will significantly improve the ability of minority teachers to affect minority student outcomes. Next, although overall levels of social capital are negatively or insignificantly related to minority social opportunity and outcomes, minority teachers are increasingly effective when minority

social capital can act as a co-productive facilitator for the bureaucracy. Last, this research finds that minority bureaucrats are more effective representatives when various political actors support their representative behaviors. The exact political control actor differs by racial minority group. I conclude that minority representation is influenced by various contextual characteristics within the local school district and addressing these characteristics can potentially affect minority client outcomes in public programs.

DEDICATION

To all of those in my life who have loved me, believed in me, and invested in me,
especially Aubrey and Karen Carroll.

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NOMENCLATURE

NCES	National Center for Education Statistics
G/T	Gifted and Talented
Exp.	Expulsions
PERG	Project for Equity, Representation and Governance
NAEP	National Assessment for Educational Performance
SC	Social Capital

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1. INTRODUCTION

“The fact that my skin color matches that of my students doesn’t give me any superpowers as an educator. But it does give me the ability to see them in a way that’s untarnished by the stereotypes, biases and cultural disconnects that fuel inequality and injustice...”

-David Jackson, a ninth-grad teacher in the New York City area

In 1982, the Little Rock School District sued the Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD) for inhibiting their discrimination efforts. In response the district hired a director for their gifted and talented programing who took on various advocacy efforts to change the nature of its student composition. Between 1988 and 1998 Black student representation in the Pulaski Country gifted and talented program grew from 14 to 26 percent. And as of 2003, the PCSSD was considered one of the most progressive school districts in Arkansas. Although the changes in Pulaski County were rooted in the courts, the distinct advocacy efforts to promote minority students in gifted programming did not happen by chance.

One the first challenges the PCSSD gifted director recognized was that reaching African-American parents would require the help of African-American educators. Black student representation could not be addressed until the underrepresentation of Black teachers in the gifted program was addressed as well. And in 1998, 25 percent of the gifted facilitators in the district were Black.

Next, PCSSD gifted director addressed the fact that the infrastructure for successful gifted programming was simply unavailable in majority minority schools. This prompted the intentional improvement of school facilities in predominantly Black attendance zone. By introducing specialty programs, students in schools that were typically avoided were now given access to the same programming available to their white peers.

Increasing Black student representation would be similarly impossible if the district had not made changes in their communication with the Black community. Because many minority communities have experienced isolation and discrimination in public programming, the Black community in Pulaski County did not trust what they perceived to be a ‘special’ program. Thus the director needed to convince a hesitant and distrusting community that gifted programs would effectively serve the needs of their students and enhance their educational opportunities.

Finally, in order to increase support within the district and improve efforts toward their desegregation plans, the director looked beyond education proponents and to political advocates within the community. Specifically, the director located traditional Black organizations such as the Urban League and churches that would hold the plan accountable and promote its benefits within the community (Grantham 2003).

Although the story and successes in Pulaski County were evident nearly 20 years ago, they demonstrate a phenomenon occurring across public programs today. Specifically, minority clients are on the losing side of inequitable resource distribution in programs from public education to public welfare services and public health. Public organizations are attempting to address these issues while they themselves have not

recruited adequate bureaucratic representation, are not dedicating resources to majority-minority jurisdictions, spend little effort engaging with the community, and focus increased attention on political stakeholders but oddly ignore the interests of their public constituents. Using PCSSD's advocacy efforts as a guide, this research will explore how the economic, social, and political contexts of local school districts will influence minority teacher representation.

The remainder of this chapter will proceed in the following order. First, I will highlight the importance of representation in the public administration literature. I then describe how organizational context is a significant factor that should be considered when discussing administrative processes such as, representation. Next, I outline the dissertation by introducing each empirical chapter and its research question. After describing the empirical work and its suggestive findings, I will conclude by explaining the case selection of this dissertation research and its value to the representative bureaucracy literature.

1.1 Representative Bureaucracy

Public administration scholars have repeatedly researched the positive outcomes of representation on democracy and client groups (Ricucci et al 2014, Roch et al 2010, Meier and Stewart 1991). More recently this literature has explored cases where representation's correlation with positive outcomes is hindered by organizational barriers (Wilkins and Williams 2008, Roch and Pitts 2012). In other words, there are systemic barriers operating within organizations that prevent passive representation from translating to active representation. While this phenomenon is easily recognized in

organizations with strong professional cultures such as law enforcement or charter schools, this research seeks to uncover the overlooked resources that help to translate passive minority representation into positive minority outcomes.

Beginning with passive representation or the degree to which the bureaucracy mirrors groups in society, Mosher (1968) and Krislov (2012) explain that having a bureaucracy that is representative of various client groups will introduce new ideas into the bureaucracy and improve bureaucratic operations. Passive representation can additionally improve outcomes by creating a role-model effect for clients and providing symbolic value to democratic public institutions (Atkins and Wilkins 2013, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006, Riccucci et al 2014). Passive representation will then translate to active representation as minority bureaucrats act on behalf of minority clients or influence the actions of nonminority colleagues. Empirical research indicates that representation has the ability to influence organizational performance, policy outcomes, and minority client outcomes beyond the mission of the agency (Roch et al 2010, Keiser et al 2002, Zhu and Walker 2013, Atkins and Wilkins 2013).

While the majority of research on active representation discusses the bureaucratic outcomes of representation, there must first be a decision on behalf of the bureaucrat to act in the interests of one's group (Pitkin 1967). Sowa and Selden (2003) describe this decision as a bureaucrat taking on the representative role. In research on housing loans, the authors find that the more a bureaucrat perceives their role to be that of a minority representative the better they will represent clients. Taking on the representative role, however, is influenced by a variety of subjective characteristics. The primary

characteristic assumes a shared group identity (Selden 1997). While identity is often assumed to be the only subjective criteria on which active representation depends, identity salience is an additional subjective quality that is equally if not more important for active representation. Identity salience or what some refer to, as an individual's strength of identity will differ among minority individuals. A bureaucrat who identifies with migrant individuals may decide to take on a representative role because they have similar first-hand accounts of the experience of a migrant. Yet, those with experiences that are far removed may identify with the group but choose not to act on their behalf because they do not share experiences.

However, the common assumption that identity equates to active representation has disregarded the subjective values and decision that goes into being an active representative. Understanding that active representation is a decision determined by individual and bureaucratic values is then critical when discussing the micro-processes of representation. The literature's quantitative approach to research on representative bureaucracy and limits to the data may be one reason why it has failed to explore this decision-making process.

Nonetheless, being an effective representative is also tied to the discretion and support minority bureaucrats experience within their agency. It is well known in the literature that without discretion active representation is virtually impossible. The reason being is because when the organization's culture allows for discretion, the individual values of the agents can have a greater effect on implementation (Kelly 1994). Likewise, sufficient discretion is not always available to government agents because most

organizations operate with standard operating procedures and formal processes that limit individual agent discretion (Downs 1967). Even more than the actual level of discretion, bureaucrats must perceive themselves to have the support of their organization or profession. When there is a lack of approval or when bureaucrats fear that their efforts are not supported, they may fail to take risks or pursue actions that produce positive outcomes for underrepresented groups (Carroll 2017).

1.2 Organizational Context

An organization's context can then produce a variety of external pressures that will affect bureaucratic behavior. Context in public administration is described as a factor that fundamentally changes the relationship between management and performance (O'Toole and Meier 2014). The ability to be an active representative may similarly be influenced by organizational context.

Within the representative bureaucracy literature context has been discussed in three different ways. First, research by Meier and Hawes (2009) discussed the influence of national context on representative bureaucracy. By looking specifically at the French context, the authors determined that the concept of representative bureaucracy differs across international settings. In France, for instance, bureaucracy was never perceived to be a democratic institution. Instead, it was established for elites and was not intended to be representative of citizens. Because the intentions of bureaucratic institutions and the perceptions of race differ within the French context, witnessing the effects of a representative bureaucracy would be all but impossible in certain national contexts.

Andrews, Groeneveld, Meier, and Schroter (2016) renew this discussion explaining that context will condition the impact of bureaucratic representation on outcomes such as, organizational policies and performance. Drawing on Meier and Hawes (2009) the authors explain the importance of how national context and administrative traditions shape the meaning of representation. But more importantly, these authors describe context as a factor that will directly affect the opportunities or constraints for active representation. Context will interact with representation by changing the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on performance.

Last, Meier and Morton (2010) introduce context as a variable that will structure identities and identity salience in a bureaucracy. They argue that a representative bureaucracy requires that individual bureaucratic identities are salient in the national, organizational, and individual context to promote action on behalf of clients. For instance, class cleavages create a salient identity in the Indian national context, but are not as influential in other countries. A bureaucrat can then only take on the representative role when structural characteristics of the bureaucracy (at the national or organizational level) have made their identity relevant.

Beyond discussing context and its effect on identity, Meier and Morton (2010) do comment that, “passive representation...is a characteristic while active representation is a process.” While the authors clearly view active representation as a process for individual bureaucrats, beyond identity they do not discuss what goes into that process and what contextual factors may interrupt it. Therefore the question remains, once the salience of identity is established, how might context affect the bureaucrat’s behavior or

ability to be an active representative? I expect that passive representation will fail to translate into active representation when various dimensions of context increase the costs of representation or simply make active representation more difficult for minority bureaucrats. The contexts to be examined in this research include the economic context of the organization, the social and community context of the organization, and the political context of the organization.

1.3 Outline of the Dissertation

1.3.1 Chapter 2: Active Representation and Rationality

In order to understand the micro-processes of bureaucratic representation, it is necessary to recognize how different social identities interact and are activated under various circumstances. Within this chapter, I theoretically explain how specific contexts potentially activate social identities that promote bureaucratic behaviors. Using the logic of rational choice political behavior and social identity theory, this chapter presents a broad theory and illustration of how environmental context will influence bureaucratic actions.

1.3.2 Chapter 3: Economic Context

In the first empirical chapter, I explore the influence of economic turbulence on minority representation. Dess and Beard (1984) explain the three dimensions of organizational task environments as munificence, complexity, and dynamism. Low munificence describes organizations that suffer from unstable economic resources. In fact, Meier (1993) appropriately expects that minimal resources will mitigate active representation.

In addition, complexity describes the diversity of the organization's client population (Andrews et al 2005, Fernandez 2005). In the context of representative bureaucracy, the issue of complexity indicates that as diversity increases more active representation will be needed to address various client goals. Finally, dynamism describes the change over time or the frequency and size of munificence or shifts in complexity. It is expected that organizations operating in an environment of high dynamism are likely to have formulated techniques to adjust to continuous shocks. The combination of these three dimensions results in environmental turbulence or the "unpredictable change in the munificence and complexity of an organization's environment" (Boyne and Meier 2009b, 803).

Environmental turbulence has been found to lead to poor performance of organizations (Boyne and Meier 2009b). However, this is mitigated by internal structural stability. Thus, when organizations experience environmental turbulence, a good organization will readjust to create some level of internal stability to maintain performance (Meier and O'Toole 2009). However, the incorporation of increased internal stability can potentially come in the form of increased rules and structures that limit the bureaucrat's role and level of discretion. In addition, in instances of environmental turbulence, bureaucrats are pressed to focus on more clear and concise goals that are perceived as higher priority. For instance, when a school system is faced with a huge influx of students, the organization is charged with maintaining overall performance. In the midst of turbulence, the time allotted toward and the ability to be an active minority representative can be potentially suppressed. This adjustment in order to

buffer against environmental shocks is expected regardless of the level of discretion inherent in the bureaucracy. As a result, active representation is not always a feasible option for the minority bureaucrat who desires to promote the interests of co-minority clients.

Within this chapter I identify two sources of financial stress that can potentially influence representation. Specifically, I observe the effect of unexpected changes in total revenue compared to the unexpected changes in resources that are devoted to the bureaucratic core of the organization. Within public education these differences are visible in total revenue versus revenue devoted to instructional expenditures. Total revenue includes a combination of federal, state, and local funds. Instructional expenditures are instead devoted to teacher salary, teacher assistants, and additional programming. The results indicate that resources matter for representation when dedicated to the bureaucratic core of an organization. By comparing these two funding measures, I hope to explain how managerial processes can be used to influence representation and continue to promote positive gains even in a time of financial stress.

1.3.3 Chapter 4: Social Context

In the second empirical chapter I continue to observe the influence of context by exploring the community context of local school districts. Every public organization operates in a local community context, which may either provide support or create challenges for bureaucrats. In the education context, schools exist as a center of their community. Because schools are managed by local elected school boards and funded by local property taxes, the relationship between the community and education outcomes is

central. Yet, little research has explored how variation in community involvement between racial groups will influence local school outcomes. In this chapter, literature on social capital and public administration collaboration are used to explore how community involvement can create a supportive context for minority bureaucrats.

Research on social capital or the “networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam 1995, 664),” explores the influence of community on broad outcomes. Social capital theory has consistently explained that social capital and our relations with others in the community influence a communities’ ability to solve collective problems or attain positive outcomes. On multiple occasions social capital is understood to improve education performance (John 2005, Putnam 2000), health outcomes (Lochner et al 2003), crime rates (Rosenfeld et al 2001) and poverty (Hero 2003). Yet, some inconsistent findings have prompted theoretical questions that exhibit a lack of understanding of the relationship between social capital among racial minority groups.

When scholars began to disaggregate the effect of social capital by race, research finds that the effects of community engagement on student achievement were not always positive for minority students. Instead, Hero (2003) found that while the overall rates of minority graduation improved as social capital increased, “the gap in graduation rates for minorities and whites [was also] greater in states with higher levels of social capital (117).” Measures of second-order discrimination also indicated that higher levels of social capital were related to an increase in the gap between whites and minority student suspension rates and an overall increase in the rate of minority students suspended

(Hawes and Rocha 2011). Therefore, in order to address the gaps in achievement between racial groups, social capital and the beneficial networks provided by local communities should be discussed.

To properly understand the effect of social capital on education achievement across racial groups, it requires a look into community engagement at the local level and a measure of social capital that is race specific within communities. With the use of a novel dataset that measures social capital by race for the largest school districts, this research can analyze the influence of representation when interacted with minority community engagement.

The influence of social capital or community networks for minority students should positively influence the relationship between same-race teachers and students. When same-race community members who are engaged in the community supplement the influence of same-race teachers and students (Dee 2005), same-race teachers behave in the workplace as members of a tightly bonded community and are likely to promote the interests of same-race students. Results indicate that strong community ties within the African-American community should further improve the positive effects of minority teachers on student performance. However, the results appear inconclusive for Latino bureaucratic representation.

1.3.4 Chapter 5: Political Context

In the final empirical chapter, I explore a third element of context that is often left out of the education discussion: politics. As local public goods that are managed by elected officials it is odd, to say the least, that public education fails to look at

partisanship and broader themes of political control. Because the majority of school districts conduct nonpartisan elections, schools are assumed to also be nonpartisan institutions. Yet, it would be naïve to think that school board members and local political interests create school policy without consideration of political ideology. Even more, recent research by Meier and Rutherford (2016) find that passive as well as active representation is highly influenced by partisanship within local districts. Their research illustrates that minority representation in school districts was less effective in Republican districts compared to Democratic districts, implying that active and/or passive representation and essentially bureaucratic processes are dependent on the political context of the school district.

These findings promote the research question of my final chapter that asks how different political actors might influence representation. Representation is often thought of as a process that is approved by hierarchical political principals. But bureaucrats do not only operate in a context where support and bureaucratic actions are cued from the top-down. Instead, many bureaucratic organizations function from the bottom-up and make bureaucratic choices based on the support of political stakeholders like the public rather than elected officials.

In public schools, it is likely that teachers are more effective at translating passive to active representation when there are elected officials who offer political support of their behaviors. Yet, education bureaucrats also engage with the public quite often. Drawing on the political control literature, this final chapter asks a broader political question. Is bureaucratic representation a top-down or bottom-up phenomenon? Because

the data observes bureaucracy at the local level, this research has the ability to capture public support as well as elected official support to compare the influence of both on representative behaviors and outcomes. The findings indicate that representation is a different process for different minority groups. While the marginal effect of African-American bureaucrats is greatest when supported by the public, the marginal effect of Latino bureaucrats is greatest when supported by same-race elected officials.

1.4 Case Selection: Why Education

Although, the impact of bureaucratic representation has been applied across policy areas, this research specifically explores representation in the context of public education in the United States. The history of public education in the United States provides a unique context to study representation. Primarily its history is defined by a federally segregated school system that was not dismantled until the 1960s. This segregation created a policy program where achieving equal access and outcomes was essentially impossible. With a lack of resources diverted to minority jurisdictions, African-American and Latino students performed far below their white peers. With the *Brown v. Board* decision in 1954, public schools began to slowly integrate. Yet, movement was entirely unidirectional as minority students moved into formerly all-white schools (Fairclough 2004) and minority teachers and administrators experienced a loss of employment in the public school system (Milner and Howard 2004).

As schools needed to adjust to the influx of unprepared minority students, these schools were filled with educators who were often biased and prejudiced against the experiences of their minority students. Without representation or an advocate within the

new school system, minority students continued to perform well below their white peers academically. Meanwhile their representation among second generational education discrimination categories like special education and disciplinary programs began to grow (Skiba et al 2002). Therefore concerns of minority bureaucratic representation and inequitable student outcomes across racial groups are contemporary problems that have yet to be addressed.

In addition, the United States' public education system is a highly federalized system where schools are funded by formulas that depend largely on local property taxes¹ and local lawmakers exhibit a large amount of discretion. Following Brown, the federal government has attempted to equalize funding across districts beginning with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. This federal act was the first to use a formula based on each state's number of low-income students as a basis for federal contributions (Manna 2013). Given that these new policies are implemented in a federalist system, research has consistently shown that once put in the hands of state and local officials, the monies intended for low-income students are redirected (Manna 2013).

The discussion of local inequities in funding due to uneven taxable wealth across districts has led to various lawsuits of state education finance systems. Since 1970, state education finance systems have been challenged in 36 states and 18 have been overturned (Wong 1999). While some state cases have positively ruled in favor of low-

¹ The base of school funding is provided by local property taxes. The additional state funding that helps to equalize funding differences does vary by state.

income or minority parents who are unequally taxed and whose students are unequally educated (i.e. *Abbott v Burke* 1985, *Serrano v Priest* 1971), other federal cases have ruled to preserve local control and have continued systems of funding inequities (*Rodriguez v. San Antonio* 1973). For the most part litigation has increased state aid to the poorest districts, but in states where reforms were initiated without litigation, funding reforms have been ineffective (Evans, Murray, and Schwab 1998). Within the education finance literature many scholars (Ferguson 1991, Darling-Hammond 2000, Wong 1999) discuss the differences in funding as influential to student outcomes. As a result, schools vary widely. School communities and performance have now become a category considered in homeowner housing choices. As high-income individuals self-select into better school districts, the richest of schools only get richer as poor schools continue to decline.

This perfect storm of historic federal segregation, continual funding disparities, and remnants of housing segregation have resulted in majority minority schools, with ill-prepared teachers, minimal resources, and a poorly engaged school community. As same-race teachers are shown to improve same-race student test scores (Dee 2005, Egalite, Kisida, and Winters 2015), discipline rates (Lindsay and Hart 2017, Holt and Gershenson 2015), gifted and talented assignment (Grissom and Redding 2015, Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom et al 2016), and even future graduation rates (Gershenson et al 2017), the importance of minority teacher representation as a means to improve student outcomes is more important than ever. However, this need not only exists in the urban school context but also in suburban schools where racial majority teachers still fail

to address the needs of students of color who often feel isolated and struggle to perform in the face of institutional biases.

Similar to the disparities witnessed in other institutions, the racial and gender biases within our public education system have produced unequal outcomes in educational achievement (Ladson-Billings 2006; Gershenson et al 2016). What is most striking about education however, is its endogenous relationship with every other social issue from political participation to economic wealth, housing, crime, etc (Lochner and Moretti 2004; Hillygus 2005; Day and Newburger 2002). Addressing the gaps and racial biases that affect education has the potential to significantly improve overall life outcomes for underserved communities.

2. ACTIVE REPRESENTATION AND BUREAUCRATIC RATIONALITY

Active representation or the act of working on behalf of specific client interests is a choice among bureaucrats. As rational individuals, there are a variety of subjective characteristics that may influence this decision (Carroll 2017, Wilkins and Williams 2008). This chapter will theoretically explain how specific contexts potentially activate social identities that promote bureaucratic behaviors. Using the logic of rational choice political behavior, this chapter will outline how the subsequent empirical chapters fit this theory.

Social identity theory describes that in making sense of the world around us, individuals order their social environment into categories or social groups such as age, race, organizational affiliation, class, etc. As a member of some social group, individuals develop a self-concept surrounding their social identity. Within each society these social categorizations define an individual's place in society and individuals view the world through the lens of their social group (Tajfel 2010).

Individuals, however, maintain multiple identities. Within identity and social movement politics, Crenshaw (1991) discusses intersectionality as the various ways identities interact to shape multiple dimensions of one's experiences. In her work Crenshaw (1991) describes that discussions often revolve around an individual responding to one or the other identity. Yet, as individuals maintain multiple identities, the totality of these identities may be demonstrated in different behaviors not accounted for in previous one-dimensional approaches (Cho et al 2013). For instance public

bureaucrats maintain various identities. A teacher identifies as a public servant, an education professional, and with their specific school or school district. But these bureaucrats also maintain individual identities of class, race, region of origin, religious affiliation, sex, etc. As bureaucrats sort among these identities they may act upon one or the other. But often, one's totality of identities intersects to influence their behaviors.

Social identity theory informs us that when one's self-concept is related to how the group is perceived, individuals may pursue behaviors in the best interest of their social group (Tajfel 2010). Representative bureaucracy illustrates this concept among public servants and explains that when individuals of various groups are represented within the bureaucracy, they will act on behalf of their social group and subsequently influence outcomes for that group (Meier 1993b, Mosher 1969). Bureaucrats, therefore, make decisions that are informed by their various social group memberships (Watkins-Hayes 2011). The literature has demonstrated that when an identity becomes salient within a policy area, bureaucrats' social identity can influence the outcomes of clients from the same social group.

If we expect bureaucrats to pursue active representation, understanding which identities and how these identities will be activated is necessary for representation. When it comes to one's organizational identity, Ashford and Mael (1989) explain that organizational socialization and the greater internalization of those values will influence one's commitment to and support of their organization. Yet, where some identities conflict with that organizational commitment, bureaucratic behavior is not as clear (Watkins-Hayes 2009a, 2009b). In a study of representation, Wilkins and Williams

(2008) demonstrate that racial minority police officers are not related to a decrease in racial profiling and attribute it to the strong socialization effects in the organization.

Likewise, professional and individual goals of ambition are known to potentially conflict with bureaucratic behaviors that support racial identities (Carroll 2017). Therefore, when individuals maintain multiple identities, how will these identities intersect? When will some identities be activated while others are not?

2.1 Rational Choices

Rational choice theorists explain that political behaviors are motivated by individual goals that range from income and security to a bureaucrat's desire to serve the public (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Downs 1967). Therefore, before engaging in political activity, both political and bureaucratic actors must weigh the individual costs and benefits of their behaviors. For public managers this has been demonstrated in research on career promotion where bureaucrats engage in increased networking behaviors with political actors if it will grant them promotion (Teodoro 2011). Bureaucrats will pursue behaviors that promote their individual goals but will also seek to attain less "whenever the cost of attaining any given [goal] rises...(Downs 1967, 2)." If the goal is pursuing active representation, bureaucrats will decide to take on the minority representative role when the costs are low.

Borrowing from Black (1972), who introduces a rational choice model for political actors deciding to run for office, below is a formula that models individual political behavior. Essentially Black argues that a political actor's choice to pursue office is not a stagnant characteristic but is structured by the experiences and current circumstances of

the actor. A political actor is expected to pursue behaviors that yield the greatest value. This formula explains that the value of the desired office will be determined after evaluating the probability of success, benefits of the behavior, and costs of action. The formula listed below describes that when the benefit times the probability of success is greater than the costs, the value of a political action will be great enough to promote action.

$$((P*B)-C)= U$$

P= Probability of Success

B= The benefit the actor will receive from obtaining success

C= The cost required to pursue action

U= The expected value of utility of achieving one's goal

Fitting with theories of rational political ambition, bureaucrats will similarly make choices that maximize their values at the time. Because bureaucrats operate in an organizational context, their current context will influence their choices. If context introduces factors that increase the potential costs, decrease the benefits, or decrease the probability of success, active representation will be limited.

2.2 Irrational Choices

While the rational choice calculation is potentially structured by organizational context, it is an individual calculation that also depends on individual intrinsic factors. One intrinsic factor that may promote an irrational choice is the bureaucrat's strength of identity. When minority individuals sense that individual chances are tied to their

minority group as a whole (Dawson 1995), they are likely to pursue actions in support of the group (Philpot and Walton 2007, Miller et al 1981). For the bureaucrat who maintains greater feelings of attachment to their minority group, the value of active representation may always be greater than the costs.

A bureaucrat may also make irrational choices when they maintain an inherent risk aversion. Inherent risk aversion will increase the perceived costs of active representation even when the organizational costs are relatively low. Because bureaucratic norms attempt to depersonalize the bureaucrat (Downs 1967), acting in the interests of one group may be perceived as partiality in any bureaucratic organization. As a result, a risk adverse bureaucrat may fear that active representation is too costly for his current job or future goals.

2.3 Rational Choice and Environmental Context

Bureaucrats will look to their external and internal environments for cues that representation will be permissible, possible, and effective (Sowa and Seldon 2003). Bureaucrats essentially use these cues in their decision to act in the interests of minority groups. As contextual variables create changes in the level of organizational or bureaucratic support, the weight bureaucrats associate with the costs, benefits, and the probability of success of active representation may change.

Context has the ability to influence active representation in two ways. First, the external context can potentially change internal organizational processes that will increase or decrease the costs of active representation making it more or less likely. In a time of accountability policies and performance measurement, public organizations are

motivated by goals of objective performance (Boyne et al 2005). When the external context potentially creates a threat to organizational performance, there are a variety of tools managers use to protect performance in the organization. Among these include the ability to centralize organizational activities by reorganizing resources, personnel, and goals (Boyne and Meier 2009). Throughout this centralization process the individual discretion that is often given to bureaucrats is potentially limited because each member within the agency is focused on similar goals and duties (Brewer and Walker 2009). As the external context changes the organizational culture and activities internally, bureaucratic action that goes against the core goals or activities of the organization is done at a greater risk. Therefore, the cost of behaviors like active representation is potentially increased. When the cost of acting on one's personal identities can potentially threaten bureaucratic values such as employee performance, organizational sanctioning, and/or professional status, active representation in favor of organizational/professional commitment is more likely.

Where an organization's external context provides increased support, however, the costs of acting on one's personal identity decreases and the likelihood of success in improving client outcomes will increase. Therefore, external context can additionally influence bureaucratic behaviors by changing the impact of their behavior on performance. Across policy areas, successful bureaucracies are often located within externally wealthy and supportive jurisdictions (Andrews 2009). Within these organizations bureaucracy can achieve higher levels of performance not only because there are more opportunities for bureaucratic action and autonomy but also because

bureaucrats potentially receive the assistance of their clientele. Important processes of collaboration and coproduction are also more likely in environments with active participants (Brudney and England 1983).

In addition, where there is political, organizational, or community support the probability of success may also improve as these political actors contribute to bureaucratic efforts of active representation. For instance, bureaucratic representation is known to spur performance because representation can promote a role model effect among clients encouraging a change in client behaviors (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Where clients and additional political actors are working toward similar goals of minority client performance, the behaviors of those within the organizational environment can supplement the efforts of bureaucrats. When the environment surrounding an organization provides support or resources that are beneficial to bureaucratic efficiency, the probability of success of bureaucratic behaviors like active representation increases. As a result the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on client outcomes will change. This second theoretical mechanism falls in line with the public management literature, which expects that the impact of management on performance will change in different contexts (O'Toole and Meier 2014).

In Figure 1, I present an illustration of how contextual variables interact with organizational processes to influence bureaucratic behaviors. First, by providing a variation of stress, resources, and/or support, context changes organizational processes. Within the organization, management appropriately responds through processes of centralization, co-production, and changes in organizational goals. As bureaucrats

receive cues directly from their environment or from their organization's response to that environment, they will then weigh the costs, benefits, and potential success of active representation as their actions are now potentially limited or encouraged within their organization. A bureaucrat's decision to act or the impact of those actions will result in various client outcomes. This research specifically contributes the importance of environmental context within the bureaucratic representation process. The decision to act on behalf of clients cannot be separated from the changes the organization creates in response to the external context.



Figure 1: How Context Interacts with Active Representation

This rational choice approach to active representation has multiple repercussions for organizational performance and minority client outcomes. Primarily, similar to the ways in which environmental contexts matter for bureaucratic representation, various other identities or contexts can operate within this process. For instance, internal organizational contexts such as goal ambiguity and professionalization may also affect this rational choice calculus. Their agency to choose actions on behalf of their identity group will vary depending on the risks and costs introduced in these various contexts.

In addition, representative bureaucracy is an essential technique used to combat performance gaps across public organizations. But, understanding how context prevents active representation suggests that some public organizations are responding in a manner that prevents an administrative technique that we know will influence client outcomes. The remainder of this research hopes to empirically address the effect of context and indicate how it actually plays a larger role in management and bureaucratic decision-making than we have previously thought.

3. MO' MONEY, NO PROBLEM: THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL STRESS ON REPRESENTATION

Across public schools, health care providers, and welfare services, representative bureaucracies are understood to improve performance. From the impact of representation on client perceptions of trust and fairness (Ricucci et al 2014, Theobald and Haider-Markel 2009) to improvement in objective performance across groups (Meier 1993a, Meier and O'Toole 2006b, Andrews et al 2014, Wilkins 2007), racial minority and gender representation is expected to produce positive outcomes in public organizations. However, no organization or the behaviors of its bureaucrats can be viewed separate from the organization's context (O'Toole and Meier 2014). Because the organizational context outlines the structure, autonomy, and resources of the bureaucracy, this context becomes fundamental in determining bureaucratic behaviors. And it may be the case that these same aspects of context will hinder or promote bureaucratic behaviors such as, active representation. In the setting of United States public education, this research will explore one aspect of context by analyzing how an organization's access to different financial resources will affect bureaucratic representation.

A constant source of stress for many public organizations originates from the uncertain and low resource environments in which they operate. These resources can range from participatory client groups, to quality support networks, and most importantly funding. But in a world where accountability policies have run rampant and the degree of future funding is now dependent on organizational performance, many

local service providers find themselves in environments that are everything but resource rich.

In the context of this research resources are often a concern as many minority students attend public schools in districts where through local tax revenue there are not sufficient funds available to manage their schools. Even with the assistance of state and federal revenue sources, students are attending local schools that struggle to hire teachers, keep supplies in the classroom, or purchase technology for student use. These issues result in bureaucratic and performance inequalities where Black students are expelled at three times the rate of white students and Black and Latino students only account for 26 percent of gifted and talented students (U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights 2014).

Scholars have argued that one method to improve minority performance and address inequalities across public programs is to increase racial representation among bureaucrats, administrators, and elected officials (Grissom et al 2015). But, I would argue that even the most representative organizations require sufficient resources to achieve performance. The interesting question then becomes, how will resources or the lack thereof affect our current understanding of representation? When the racial congruence between minority teachers and students is expected to produce greater minority achievement (Oates 2003, Dee 2004, Dee 2005), how will this relationship change in low resource environments? Even more, are resources more beneficial for representation when allocated toward certain tasks in the organization?

To answer these questions, this research will first present an overview of representative bureaucracy and describe environmental context as a potential threat to representation. Next, I will explain the processes through which I expect resources to affect active representation. And finally, I will empirically test the impact of specific resources on representation. As the gap between minority and white student achievement continues to grow in the United States, this research will demonstrate that maintaining methods to improve performance through diversity and resource management is crucial to future student success.

2.1 Representative Bureaucracy

Successful representation where the presence or actions of minorities in the bureaucracy translates into gains for minority clients has been demonstrated in multiple public agencies (Selden 1997, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Representation is known to influence outcomes that may specifically benefit a minority group. For instance Wilkins and Keiser (2006) find that female representation among supervisors in Child Support Enforcement offices resulted in an increase in child support collections for female recipients. Most often cited in research, however, is the affect of bureaucratic representation on overall measures of organizational performance; this includes perceived job performance (Riccucci et al 2014), client satisfaction (Gade and Wilkins 2013), objective performance scores in education (Grissom et al 2015), and performance rates in public health (Zhu and Walker 2013).

In each case of successful representation three conditions are present. First, there is a shared identity and group socialization between the bureaucrat and client. When a public

agent shares an identity with the client, scholars assume that similar socialization patterns results in shared interests that ultimately encourage a bureaucrat to act on behalf of his/her group (Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981). This degree of in-group socialization or connection with one's identity group, however, is not always guaranteed. In some agencies, such as police departments, the influence of in-group socialization is overwhelmed by the socialization that occurs within the agency. Where organizational or professional socialization strongly determines bureaucratic behavior, the organization's socialization process can threaten or overwhelm individual socialization effects and mitigate the effect of minority representatives in the bureaucracy (Wilkins and Williams 2008, 2009). A similar process was surprisingly uncovered in Georgia public schools where the socialization processes in charter schools lead to a decline in the effects of representation in charter schools compared to traditional public schools (Roch and Pitts 2012).

Second, successful representation is present when the identity of the bureaucrat is salient within the policy area (Meier 1993b). Identity salience is clearly exemplified in research on gender representation, where the impact of women in the classroom is positive for female student math scores (Keiser et al 2002). Because females experience a gap in achievement in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and math (Mangan 2012), female math teachers are expected to be beneficial in a way that female English teachers are not.

The significance of identity salience for racial minorities has also been noted when bureaucrats operate in public sectors characterized by historical or contemporary racial

discrimination. In a national study of representation in public schools, Grissom et al (2009) explore the priming effects of region and find that in the southern United States, where race is more salient and outcomes across racial groups are more severe, the agency's regional context will influence bureaucratic representation. Black teachers in the south can then produce greater benefits for Black students because their racial identity is more salient in that regional context and Black student performance is disproportionately lower.

The final necessary condition for successful representation is the presence of significant discretion in the organization. Sowa and Selden (2003) explore the importance of discretion finding that where there is little perceived discretion, minority representatives are less likely to take on the trustee role in the organization. Similarly, in welfare service delivery, Watkins-Hayes (2011) finds that formalized red tape and strict procedures inhibit any perception of a personalized bureaucrat/client interaction. For minority clients, having a same-race caseworker is not influential when jobs are so formalized that all discretion is squeezed out of the organization.

For various reasons, additional contexts have also been known to influence representation. Most interesting among these is how partisan context can create stark differences in the representation effects across school districts. Meier and Rutherford (2016) explore this relationship and find that compared to Republican districts, African-American teachers are more effective in improving student performance in Democratic districts. This difference in representation has substantive overall effects, as students are 26 percent less likely to be suspended and 33 percent less likely to be expelled in

Democratic school districts. Although, this study looked solely at political context, the environmental context may be equally critical for successful representation.

2.1 Environmental Context and Public Management

Environmental context describes the external context of the organization. When first described by organizational theorists, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) explain that successful organizations are oriented toward their environment as its demands create pressures for both the structure and operations of the organization. As such, the environmental context can either provide positive or negative, uncontrollable circumstances that must be addressed by the organization. Dess and Beard (1984) explain later three dimensions of organizational environments to include munificence, complexity, and dynamism. Low economic munificence describes organizations that suffer from low economic resources. Because prosperous organizations can provide a variety of discretionary services and invest in improving their effectiveness, researchers (Andrews and Boyne 2008) hypothesize that economic munificence is negatively related to organizational failure. When organizations work without economic restriction, the additional resources help organizations generate slack. For those organizations that are financially impoverished, good management is then expected to protect the core activities of the organization and maintain performance. The second dimension of task environment includes the level of complexity or diversity of the organization's client population. In most public organizations, complexity has been known to threaten overall levels of performance because agents must learn to address the needs of various client groups (Andrews et al 2005). However, organizations that invest in representation

among managers are often able to address the difficulties presented by client complexity (Pitts 2007). Dynamism, the final dimension of task difficulty, describes shocks to the organization or the change and frequency of shifts in both munificence and complexity. It is expected that if an organization wishes to maintain performance but is operating in an environment of high dynamism, they are likely to have formulated techniques that adjust to continuous shocks (O'Toole and Meier 2010).

These external constraints are known to influence a wide variety of internal organizational outcomes. For instance, economic munificence and turbulence has been related to a decrease in objective organizational performance (Andrews et al 2005, Boyne and Meier 2009b). By first attacking internal processes, economic munificence can negatively affect organizational efficiency and performance. In addition, Boyne and Meier (2009a) found that high economic munificence created a favorable task environment and decreased turnaround. Aware of the pressures created by the environment, managers' subjective evaluations of their environment were also related to organizational performance (Andrews 2009). A public manager's best defense against the environment is then to create a buffer. Organizations with prepared techniques are then able to serve clients without environmental changes affecting overall performance (Meier et al 2010). In cases where organizations face environments defined by low fiscal resources or unexpected budgetary shocks, successful management practices include maintaining a significant level of managerial capacity, managing personnel, and allocating resources to core organizational performance.

Managerial capacity and stability provides a level of slack resources that allow public organizations to create a buffer when faced with budgetary declines (Boyne and Meier 2009b). Budgetary shocks then have no effect on performance because capacity mitigates the shock (O'Toole and Meier 2010). Similarly, managing personnel is beneficial for organizations such as, school districts where teachers are hired on annual contracts. Unexpected shocks to the district's budget then allow superintendents to not offer contract extensions and effectively decrease the average amount spent on personnel salaries (Meier and O'Toole 2009). Finally managers are known to address stressed financial environments by reallocating resources away from periphery activities and toward areas that address the organization's primary goals (Meier and O'Toole 2009).

While successful at promoting core organizational activities, these buffering activities can take away from periphery activities that may be outside of the defined tasks of bureaucracy. For instance, when schools cut the hiring of teacher's aides and increase class sizes, teachers may no longer maintain the ability to provide extra assistance to students. Instead, they are faced with larger concerns of managing an overcrowded classroom. Therefore, the implementation of techniques used to protect performance can often disturb unseen, internal processes or behaviors in the organization. In organizations where active representation may require additional resources and is not accounted for in the organization's core performance, active representation may be limited.

2.2 Theory and Hypotheses

While the representative bureaucracy literature makes clear assumptions describing where active representation is likely, this literature often fails to include a discussion of how changes to external features of the organization will potentially influence the link from passive to active representation. I expect that as rational bureaucrats, the decision to act on behalf of minority clients will be more likely where there is little risk in demonstrating representative behaviors and there is increased ability through discretion to pursue such behaviors. The impact of these behaviors on performance is also greater when bureaucrats of greater quality perform them. Therefore, as turbulence in the external context potentially influences internal processes of centralization, decreases bureaucratic quality, and/or eliminates bureaucratic assistance in the organization, the decision of bureaucrats to act of behalf of clients and the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on performance may decrease.

Like many school districts across the United States, cuts in federal and state funding have become an unfortunate reality. In 2013, Hickory and Catawaba county school districts in North Carolina expected a loss of more than \$120 million in state funding (Flannick 2013). When asked how the districts would address the cuts, superintendents responded that cuts would affect the hiring of teachers' aides, counselors, and decrease support for special education programs, English-language programs, and staff professional development. This example demonstrates a process where a lack of funding caused managers to make decisions that eliminated activities in the bureaucracy. In the case of education, this often manifests in real-time resources that are taken out of

schools. For instance, the size of gifted and talented programming may decrease as well as the resources spent on advertising such programs to all students in order to guarantee equal access.

I would argue, however, that it is not only activities but also bureaucratic behaviors that are eliminated based on the organization's financial climate. Because poor resources will negatively influence performance in most agencies (Boyne and Meier 2009b), the agency can mitigate negative environmental stress by strengthening internal structural stability (Meier and O'Toole 2009). Organizations placed in stressed environments follow a process of centralization in order to focus on and guarantee certain outcomes. As good organizations readjust activities, personnel, and resources to create some level of internal stability (Meier and O'Toole 2009), increased rules and structures are introduced that will limit the behaviors of bureaucrats.

Although fiscal stress will create an intentional centralization process, in an attempt to focus the goals of the organization and maintain performance this centralization process will effectively decrease bureaucratic discretion. When the organization's environment can threaten the discretion allocated to bureaucrats and disrupt the process that translates passive to active representation, active representation is all but erased in the bureaucracy. For the minority bureaucrat, a low resource environment is expected to minimize discretion and decrease the ability of minority agents to act in the interests of minority clients. Where resources are rich, the exact opposite is expected to be true. Instead, bureaucrats operating in schools with a greater amount of financial resources

will maintain higher levels of discretion and their ability to be an active representative will be greater.

Given the significant role of teachers in both academic placement and discipline I expect funding to influence active representation in the education context. As school districts experience a decline in funding, bureaucratic and organizational activities may fall across the board. This change implies a decline in bureaucratic procedures such as, teacher communication with clients and organizational investment in discipline intervention for teachers. All of which will inevitably amplify the burden of minority teachers to be a point person for academic and disciplinary referrals. But representation without resources will make it increasingly difficult to achieve positive outcomes. The hypothesis then follows that: *H1: As total funding increases, minority teacher representation will positively influence minority student achievement.*

Nonetheless, some resources may prove more beneficial than others when they create slack in the organization. Recently, Westerville City School District in Franklin, Ohio was fortunate enough to receive additional funding in the form of a Lead Higher Initiative grant (Willis 2015) that will allocate an additional \$25,000 to each high school in the district. Although the additional resources seem like very little, this funding is exactly what is needed to hire temporary consultants to help identify low-income and minority students for placement in Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate programs. In Westerville School District, these resources exemplify the financial and administrative slack that allows teachers to pursue innovative actions or take action on behalf of minority students. In resource environments that maintain a greater level of

slack, the presence of minority teachers can have an even greater effect on minority student performance.

While there is debate regarding whether or not funding alone is beneficial to student achievement (Hanushek 1997, Darling-Hammond 2004), the education literature does maintain one camp of scholars convinced that money matters when allocated toward the proper tasks. Slavin (1999) and Darling-Hammond (2004) discuss the importance of funding when used to improve education practices or quality teaching. When resources are invested in the ongoing professional development of teachers or the implementation of programs intended to support or reach students in less traditional ways, funding is expected to improve performance.

Most importantly, when financial resources are invested within the bureaucracy, this not only influences teacher development but also, can affect the quality of teachers hired by the district. Quality bureaucrats, measured by bureaucratic salary residuals, are then expected to improve performance in the organization (Meier and O'Toole 2002). When slack resources allow an investment in the hiring of quality minority teachers, these minority bureaucrats can be more effective for student performance.

Resource rich environments then allow schools to hire better teachers, invest in the development of teachers already employed, or provide assistance where needed. These resources can also provide bureaucrats with better skills including classroom management practices, gifted student identification training, and the assistance of education consultation firms. For minority teachers who are often faced with the pressure to connect with students of color and identify with them, the resources that

provide slack or needed assistance to better perform bureaucratic activities may help alleviate the burdens of faculty. I expect the relationship between minority teachers to have a positive and larger impact on minority student outcomes than overall organizational resources. The second hypothesis follows that: *H2: As funding for instruction increases, minority teacher representation will have a greater impact on minority student achievement.*

2.3 Methods and Data

This research will model the influence of funding on representation in the context of primary and secondary education. Using a national sample of the largest United States school districts in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012, the analysis will first model student outcomes as a function of representation, resources, and organizational/community characteristics. Next, I will add an interaction of teacher representation and funding to determine if representation is more or less effective for student outcomes at various levels of district resources. To analyze these relationships I will use OLS models with time fixed effects to control for the changes that occur across districts in different years. I also control for the district level effects and potential correlation between districts by clustering the standard errors at the district level. The unit of analysis in these models will be school districts across the United States. After pooling data from multiple sources across years, these analyses include approximately 3,000 individual cases.¹

¹ Additional models were used to test the robustness of these findings. In the supplementary appendix, the results of linear regression interaction models with time fixed-effects and district fixed effects are listed. These models test the effects of funding changes on teacher representation within a district.

2.3.1 Dependent Variables of Interest

The dependent variable of interest is student outcomes across different racial groups. The representation literature often cites the influence of teacher representation on performance (Grissom et al 2015, Egalite et al 2015). Within education ideal measures for student performances include standardize test results, graduation rates, discipline rates, and additional educational programing. Because this is a national sample I have chosen two measures of performance that are both objective and comparable across districts: racial composition of gifted and talented classrooms in the district and the racial composition of students experiencing school discipline. Using these two variables will allow me to capture the influence of representation across high and low achievement indicators. Both variables were collected from the Office for Civil Rights, which records data on student class placement, special education programs, discipline outcomes, and a variety of other student outcomes by race at the district level.

I operationalized these performance variables by the percentage of gifted and talented students that are Black and Latino. To create these variables, I created a percentage by dividing the aggregate number of Black students in gifted and talented programs by the total number of students in the gifted and talented program and multiplying by 100. I completed the same process for Latino students in gifted and talented classrooms. To measure student expulsions by race, I also created a variable measuring the percentage of student expulsions that included Black and Latino students.²

² Student outcomes can be operationalized various ways. Based on previous research (Keiser et al 2002, Meier and Rutherford 2016), I have chosen to operationalize the

Although there is some debate that teachers maintain little control over these outcomes specifically in districts where gifted and talented placement is determined by student exams and discipline decisions are made at the administrative level, both of these policies vary nationally. The state boards of education set vague standards for gifted programs, which often include topics such as student identification practices, instruction, and professional development qualifications. However, as districts implement these programs with increasing discretion, states often fail to hold districts accountable to the standards meant to guarantee performance, accessibility, and high quality. The National Association for Gifted Children identified through surveys completed in 2014 that more than 50% of the school districts surveyed reported that there was no program evaluation or plans to monitor the gifted programs. Likewise only 54 percent of elementary, 39 percent of middle, and 28 percent of high school level programs used National Gifted Education Programming Standards to guide programming (Callahan et al 2014). This varying discretion and lack of accountability creates major concerns for equal accessibility.

Because of the widening disparities between racial minority and white students, student identification practices are also a source of concern. For years, researchers (English 2002) have voiced concern that in some districts' gifted and talented students are selected based on their performance on the IOWA basic skills exams or IQ tests.

dependent variable of performance by the percentage of minority students in high-achievement and low-achievement performance tracks. The under and over-representation of minority students in these two groups respectively are often cited within the education literature using percentages. However, potential measures of the impact of representation on performance could also be the use of a ratio measure.

These methods of standardized testing alone are known to discriminate against disadvantaged and minority students and do not assess the true abilities and potential of students (Hilliard III 1976). As a result, although some districts still identify students based on one examination performance, many attempt to identify underrepresented students using multiple sources such as, student portfolios, student interviews, anecdotal notes, and teacher observations (Callahan et al 2014). The influence of teacher referrals becomes increasingly important for minority students. For low-income or disadvantaged students whose parents are unaware of gifted programming and do not request that their child is tested for these programs, teacher referrals can be the sole way of identifying students. Minority teachers can then have a significant role as a representative by increasing access to the initial assessment for these exams (Nicholson-Crotty et al 2016). Nonetheless, even across states, teacher preparation in order to properly educate or identify gifted and talented students is questionable as only 54 percent of elementary, 49 percent of middle, and 34 percent of high school level programs required that teachers receive a state certification in gifted education (Callahan et al 2014).

In addition, because discipline concerns originate in the classroom and policies are often at the discretion of the school, teachers play a large role in the initial identification of students deserving of discipline. Administrators are less likely to expel students with fewer discipline violations and teachers are the whistle-blowers for discipline violations that occur in their classrooms. When schools are provided with additional resources, funding can be invested in effective discipline alternatives such as behavioral management programs. Discipline alternatives can potentially provide teachers with time

to assess the social, emotional, and behavioral needs of the student before administrative involvement (Christle et al 2005, Bradshaw et al 2009). As co-minority group members, minority teachers' cultural congruence affects their perception of student behavior and potential achievement. When resources are available that promotes alternative discipline, minority teachers will likely be more favorable to these methods than administrative methods of suspension and expulsion (Lindsay and Hart 2017).

2.3.2 Independent Variables of Interest

The first independent variable of interest is teacher representation. This variable was collected as a part of the Project for Equity, Representation, and Governance (PERG) National School Survey distributed to school districts with more than 5,000 students as of 1999 (Meier and Rutherford 2014). These surveys were distributed by mail in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Of the 5,493 districts, the survey had a response rate of 94.5 percent. This survey collected data on the racial representation of public school districts' teachers, administration, and elected school board members. For minority teacher representation, I include separate measures of the percentage of Black and Latino teachers in the district.

The second variable of interest is changes in funding. All funding measures were gathered from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of Data. To analyze hypothesis one, the change in overall resources is operationalized by total revenue per pupil received by the school district. Total revenue includes the local, state, and federal revenue. To analyze hypothesis two, I will operationalize funding invested in the bureaucracy with a measure of the change in total instructional

expenditures in the district. The total instructional expenditures best exemplify resources allocated to the bureaucracy by including payments to teachers for “salaries, benefits, supplies, material, and contractual service for elementary/secondary instruction...” In addition, these expenditures cover programs offered during the regular school year and summer school. Last, these expenditures can be used on the hiring of teachers, teacher’s aides, and assistants.

For both total revenue and instructional expenditures, I divided the total funding amount by the public school enrollment in the district and logged the variable to account for skewed data. To create a variable of change in resources or financial stress, I have used similar methods as that of Boyne and Meier (2009b). I regress the previous years resources on the current year, after logging the variable. I then predict the residuals, which account for the percent change.

2.3.3 Control Variables

In addition to teacher representation and funding, I will control for a variety of organizational and community characteristics that are expected to influence student performance. Because policy is often decided at the administrative level, I have also included variables that capture the amount of minority representation present among administration. Administrative representation is measured by the percent of Latino and Black administrators in the district in each year. These data were gathered as a part of the PERG National School Survey.

I also expect the student population or organizational clientele to influence the outcomes of minority students. With respect to the racial group of interest in each model,

I have controlled for the percentage of Latino and Black students in the district. I have also included a measure of the total enrollment in the district. This variable is operationalized by the total number of students in the district and logged.³

The final organizational characteristic included as a control variable is the program size. In some districts the implementation of certain policies (i.e. zero-tolerance) have created an environment where certain outcomes are more likely (Evenson et al 2009). I expect that where the gifted and talented programs are larger and the rate of total expulsion is greater, the outcomes for minority students will be greater as well. To operationalize this variable, in models that predict gifted and talented, I control for the percentage of students in the district that are in gifted and talented programs. When the outcome variable is expulsion of minority students, the program size variable is operationalized by the percentage of total students in the district that are expelled.

Although, variables at the organizational level will certainly influence student performance, there is truth in the saying, “It takes a village to raise a child.” For this reason, I have also included a variety of district characteristics that are known to influence student outcomes. First, parental education and income are two of the most consistent predictors of student performance (Desimone 1999). Because this analysis does not observe education and income at the individual level, I have gathered U.S. Census data on the education and income of minority groups within the school district.

³ Additional organizational variables such as, teacher quality, teacher experience, student/teacher ratio, and central administrative size may be influential to the dependent variable and relationship in question. However, because the data originate from a national survey taken at different points in time, proxies such as, community characteristics, revenue, and enrollment are used instead.

To control for education, I will use the percentage of Black and Latino individuals in the school district with a college degree or greater. To control for income, I use the average income for Black and Latino families in the district.

Last, I will control for the partisanship of the school district. While many would argue that school districts are nonpartisan given the nonpartisan nature of most school board elections, recent research by Meier and Rutherford (2016) find otherwise. Instead, in Republican school districts African-American students are more likely to have poorer results across performance outcomes including gifted and talented placement, suspensions, expulsions, and standardized test achievement. To control for partisanship I will use the same measure employed by Meier and Rutherford (2014) to measure the average percentage of individuals in the school district that voted for President Obama in 2004 and 2008.⁴

2.4 Findings

Beginning with a base model that controls for representation and district resources independently, an analysis of student gifted and talented outcomes indicates that Black and Latino teachers have an independent and positive impact on minority student performance (see table 1 and table 2). On average, a 10 percent increase in Black or Latino teachers can increase the percentage of Black students in gifted and talented programs by approximately 2.8 percent and Latino students by 3.7 percent. These findings are consistent across the different types of funding and minority group outcomes and are statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

⁴ This variable does not vary across the different time-series in the data.

Independently, the organization's financial resources have different effects across minority groups. For Black students, an increase in total revenue from the previous year does not significantly affect the Black gifted and talented students in the district. Yet, for Latino students, an increase in total revenue is related to a statistically significant increase in performance. However, resources allocated to instructional expenditures have different effects on Black and Latino students. Instructional expenditures can significantly decrease on Black gifted and talented students, but has an insignificant effect on Latino gifted and talented.

Table 1. The Effect of Black Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Black Gifted and Talented

	Black G/T	Black G/T	Black G/T	Black G/T
Black Teachers	0.281*** (0.0695)	0.284*** (0.0638)	0.273*** (0.069)	0.392*** (0.072)
Total Revenue (TR)	0.528 (0.294)	0.516 (0.286)	-	-
Black Teachers x TR	-	0.101*** (0.0259)	-	-
Instructional Expenditures (IE)	-	-	-2.386* (1.172)	-3.587** (1.097)
Black Teachers x IE		-	-	0.284*** -0.06
Black Administrators	-0.00268 (0.0536)	-0.0317 (0.0531)	0.001 (0.053)	-0.021 (0.052)
Black students	0.499*** (0.0338)	0.489*** (0.0334)	0.505*** (0.034)	0.469*** (0.033)
Black College Grads	-0.00004 -0.0099	0.001 -0.0095	-0.004 (0.0103)	-0.002 (0.0097)
Black Income	1.182** (0.377)	1.369*** (0.367)	1.166** (0.367)	1.129** (0.351)
Total Enrollment	-0.659* (0.29)	-0.553* (0.281)	-0.742* (0.301)	-0.738* (0.289)
Democrat Voting	0.0721***	0.068***	0.092***	0.083***

Table 1. Continued from previous page

	Black G/T	Black G/T	Black G/T	Black G/T
	(0.016)	(0.0157)	(0.0161)	(0.015)
G/T Program Size	0.125***	0.132***	0.116***	0.106***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
2008	0.191	0.895	2.004	0.973
	(0.432)	(0.473)	(1.167)	(1.252)
2012	-2.417*	-	0.463	-0.023
		3.781***		
	(0.958)	(0.952)	(1.152)	(1.169)
Constant	-11.21**	-13.34**	-12.76**	-11.46**
	(4.32)	(4.158)	(4.097)	(3.948)
N	2273	2273	2275	2275
R2	0.77	0.78	0.77	0.78
District Fixed Effects not reported				
Standard Errors reported below coefficient				
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001				

Table 2. The Effect of Latino Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Latino G/T

	Latino G/T	Latino G/T	Latino G/T	Latino G/T
Latino Teachers	0.376*** (0.0912)	0.406*** (0.092)	0.367*** (0.093)	0.373*** (0.092)
Total Revenue	1.138*** (0.316)	1.170*** (0.317)	-	-
Latino Teachers x Total Revenue	-	-0.035 (0.0204)	-	-
Instructional Expenditures (IE)	-	-	-2.136 (1.263)	-2.574* (1.251)
Latino Teachers x IE	-	-	-	0.103* (0.052)
Latino Administrators	0.0647 (0.0663)	0.0662 (0.0661)	0.0679 (0.0671)	0.0765 (0.067)
Latino Students	0.560*** (0.034)	0.554*** (0.0343)	0.564*** (0.034)	0.563*** (0.034)
Latino College Grads	0.058*** (0.0152)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.0597*** (0.015)	0.061*** (0.015)
Latino Income	-0.834 (0.495)	-0.855 (0.492)	-1.368** (0.526)	-1.447** (0.529)
Total Enrollment	0.25 (0.263)	0.268 (0.267)	0.21 (0.269)	0.201 (0.267)
Democrat Voting	-0.0324 (0.018)	-0.0327 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.021)
G/T Program Size	0.214*** (0.0286)	0.211*** (0.028)	0.198*** (0.028)	0.197*** (0.028)
2008	1.232* (0.495)	1.062* (0.476)	2.309 (1.256)	2.084 (1.276)
2012	-0.142 (0.975)	0.177 (0.965)	4.536*** (1.193)	4.552*** (1.194)
Constant	2.026 (4.869)	1.999 (4.871)	4.584 (5.312)	5.386 (5.33)
N	2256	2256	2258	2258
R2	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85
District Fixed Effects not reported				
Standard Errors reported below coefficient				
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001				

Although representation does have a positive effect on the high achievement performance measure, tables 3 and 4 indicates that the independent effect of minority teachers is not present when predicting low performance student outcomes. Across models predicting minority student expulsions, on average the presence of minority teachers does not have a statistically significant effect on the percent of expulsions experienced by minority students.

Instead, funding plays a more significant role in determining low performance indicators like Black and Latino student expulsions. For Latino students, a 1 percent positive change in total revenue decreases Latino expulsions by 4 percent. This variable is significant at the 0.001 level. In addition, instructional expenditures will have an even greater effect on Latino student expulsions. Effectively a 1 percent positive change in instructional expenditures will decrease Latino student expulsions by approximately 8 percent. These effects are significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 3. The Effect of Black Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Black Student Expulsions

	Black Exp.	Black Exp.	Black Exp.	Black Exp.
Black Teachers	-0.0065 (0.101)	-0.0054 (0.101)	-0.0185 (0.102)	-0.241* (0.115)
Total Revenue	-2.326** (0.816)	-2.332** (0.815)	-	-
Black Teachers x Total Revenue	-	0.0299 (0.056)	-	-
Instructional Expenditures (IE)	-	-	-2.815 (2.535)	-0.623 (2.488)
Black Teachers x IE	-	-	-	-0.528*** (0.109)
Black Administrators	-0.009 (0.1)	-0.0171 (0.099)	-0.01 (0.1)	0.031 (0.096)
Black Students	0.810*** (0.065)	0.807*** (0.066)	0.803*** (0.065)	0.870*** (0.065)
Black College Grads	0.0004 (0.033)	0.0008 (0.033)	0.029 (0.031)	0.0249 -0.0309
Black Income	-2.614* (1.015)	2.558* (1.011)	-2.052* (0.995)	-1.977* (0.978)
Total Enrollment	3.263*** (0.687)	3.297*** (0.685)	3.131*** (0.712)	3.142*** (0.7)
Democrat Voting	-0.067 (0.041)	-0.069 (0.042)	-0.063 (0.044)	-0.0447 (0.043)
Total Expulsions	9.311*** (1.456)	9.296*** (1.454)	9.155*** (1.454)	9.139*** (1.479)
2008	-14.05*** (1.346)	-13.85*** (1.359)	-9.307*** (2.661)	-7.352** (2.606)
2012	7.433** (2.583)	7.029** (2.532)	4.13 (2.67)	5.047 (2.605)
Constant	1.614 (10.91)	0.97 (10.85)	-3.716 (10.56)	-6.262 (10.43)
N	2273	2273	2275	2275
R2	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.43
District Fixed Effects not reported				
Standard Errors reported below coefficient				
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001				

Table 4. The Effect of Latino Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Latino Student Expulsions

	Latino Exp.	Latino Exp.	Latino Exp.	Latino Exp.
Latino Teachers	-0.13 (0.147)	-0.123 -0.156	-0.177 -0.144	-0.177 -0.144
Total Revenue (TR)	-4.316*** (0.735)	-4.307*** (0.737)	-	-
Latino Teachers x TR	-	-0.008 (0.049)	-	-
Instructional Expenditures (IE)	-	-	-8.367*** (2.285)	-8.367*** (2.285)
Latino Teachers x IE	-	-	-	-0.585*** (0.132)
Latino Administrators	0.236 (0.138)	0.237 (0.138)	0.172 (0.135)	0.172 (0.135)
Latino Students	0.710*** (0.046)	0.709*** -0.0475	0.709*** (0.046)	0.709*** (0.046)
Latino College Grads	-0.045 (0.031)	(0.0452) (0.031)	-0.016 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.029)
Latino Income	-1.936 (1.048)	-1.941 (1.045)	0.832 (1.046)	0.832 (1.046)
Total Enrollment	2.447*** (0.579)	2.451*** (0.579)	2.007*** (0.57)	2.007*** (0.57)
Democrat Voting	-0.033 (0.037)	-0.033 (0.037)	0.012 (0.0404)	0.012 (0.040)
Total Expulsions	4.683*** (0.894)	4.682*** (0.893)	4.015*** (0.859)	4.015*** (0.859)
2008	-13.78*** (1.227)	-13.82*** (1.194)	1.439 (2.416)	1.439 (2.416)
2012	9.196*** (2.531)	9.268*** (2.491)	5.184* (2.256)	5.184* (2.256)
Constant	-1.494 (10.23)	-1.502 (10.24)	-30.14** (11.00)	-30.14** (11.00)
N	2256	2256	2258	2258
R2	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.52

Table 4. Continued from previous page			
Latino Exp.	Latino Exp.	Latino Exp.	Latino Exp.
District Fixed Effects not reported			
Standard Errors reported below coefficient			
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001			

Next, figure 2 illustrates the impact of representation on student outcomes at various levels of total revenue. For both racial groups in the model, when predicting the impact of representation on high achieving performance outcomes, the amount of resources will influence representation. Beginning first with Black gifted and talented performance, on average for districts that experience an increase in total revenue, Black teacher representation has an increasingly positive effect on the Black student participation in gifted and talented programs. In fact, for districts that experience a significant financial shock and decline of 3 to 5 percent of their total revenue, Black teacher representation has no significant effect on student gifted and talented placement. At lower levels of negative financial shock or economic gains to the organization, representation becomes more effective. This finding supports hypothesis one that predicts an increase in resources will positively influence representation.




Figure 2: The Marginal Effect of Representation on G/T Students across Total Revenue

However, the relationship between Latino teachers and student outcomes provides an interesting and unexplainable finding. As the money provided through total revenue increases, on average the impact of Latino teachers on Latino gifted and talented participation decreases. In districts experiencing a decrease in resources, Latino teachers on average maintain a positive impact on Latino gifted and talented placement. Yet, where there are additional gains in resources, Latino teachers have less influence on student gifted and talented placement. Nonetheless, across levels of total revenue, the impact of representation does not statistically differ.

Similarly, in models predicting minority student expulsions, an increase in total revenue does not have a significant effect on the relationship between minority teachers and minority student outcomes. This finding is consistent across Black and Latino student expulsions and illustrates the inconsistent effects of resources like total revenue. Total revenue is only found to positively influence representation in one of four models.

However, when organizations experience financial shocks in areas that are designed to promote bureaucratic assistance and quality, the results are quite different. If you recall, hypothesis two expects that as resources allocated toward instructional expenditures increase, the impact of minority representation on minority student outcomes will be positive and even greater than the impact of total revenue resources. The findings illustrated in figures 3 and 4 demonstrate support for this hypothesis.




Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of Representation on G/T Students across Instructional Expenditures




Figure 4: The Marginal Effect of Representation on Expulsions across Instructional Expenditures

Beginning with figure 3, the impact of instructional expenditures on the relationship between minority teacher representation and student participation in gifted and talented programs is positive. In fact, the impact of instructional expenditures demonstrates a relationship more beneficial for representation than the effects witnessed across levels of total revenue. The maximum marginal effect that a Black teacher can have on Black student participation in gifted and talented is larger when there are positive changes in instructional expenditures (by 0.10 percent). On average, Black teachers in districts that experience a loss of instructional expenditures, have no significant effect on gifted and talented outcomes. When the financial shock is minimal or positive, Black teachers,

however, have a significant positive impact and can increase the percentage of Black student in gifted programming.

For Latino teachers, although the relationship in figure 3 is increasing, it is not significantly different from zero across levels of instructional spending. In contrast to the effects of total revenue that produced a negative relationship between Latino teacher representation and student outcomes, instructional expenditures proves to be a more effective allocation of funds for performance.

When predicting the relationship between minority teachers and minority student expulsions, figure 4 illustrates that instructional expenditures are consistently beneficial as well. As the resources allocated for instructional expenditures increases, the percent of Black teachers in the district will decrease the percent of expulsions distributed to Black students. The same is true for Latino teachers and students where resources improve the effectiveness of Latino teachers on reducing Latino student expulsions. Across the range of instructional expenditures, increasing resources in this area shifts the relationship between teachers and students from positive to negative. In other words, in organizations that experience a decline in instructional spending, on average minority teachers increase minority student expulsions. However, when districts are faced with unexpected funding for instruction, minority teachers begin to have an insignificant affect on expulsions (around -0.5 percent or no change) and eventually will decrease the percent of minority students experiencing expulsion.

While independently Black and Latino teachers did not have a significant effect on minority student expulsions, instructional expenditures demonstrates an investment of

resources that will produce an effective bureaucracy and result in successful representation. The differing effect across models implies that the effect of minority teacher representation is contingent on resources. The resulting significant findings across outcome variables and racial groups additionally provide support for the claim that certain types of resources can better promote representation in an organization.

Among the control variables in these analyses, the majority of variables including the percent of minority students, program size, Black and Latino education, and income frequently influence minority student outcomes. However, in table 2 Latino income led to a significant decrease in Latino gifted and talented placement. Each of these control variables obtains a 0.05 level of statistical significance. Partisanship has an interesting effect across minority groups where Black students benefit in majority democratic school districts. However, across all models Latino students are not significantly affected by the partisanship in the school district. A control variable that remains insignificant across all models is the racial representation among administration. These findings align with the literature that argues representation among administration and local school boards is important in the hiring of more racially diverse faculty. However, once representation exists in the classroom, street-level bureaucrats have a much greater affect on student outcomes (Meier and O'Toole 2006a).

2.5 Discussion and Conclusion

Across the United States minority clients achieve poorer performance when it comes to organizational performance and access to public services. Representation as a process to mitigate and correct for these outcomes can be beneficial to attain equity of outcomes

and opportunity. However, the organization's financial resources may prevent minority bureaucrats from acting in the interests of their minority clients.

The results of these analyses demonstrate not only that money matters for representation, but also that resources applied to the organization's technical core can improve representation. When analyzing the effect of total revenue on representation, the influence of simply more resources does not maintain consistent results across racial groups or performance indicators. Finding that a simple increase in more total resources is only positively related to the relationship between Black teachers and Black students in gifted and talented courses, the findings did not consistently support hypothesis one.

However, the interesting story was found when analyzing the effect of resources invested in the bureaucracy's technical core. Changes in instructional expenditures that can provide additional slack specifically to bureaucratic actors can provide bureaucrats with room for movement and assistance in their daily work. By potentially increasing discretion in the organization, minority bureaucrats are allowed the additional resources needed to act in the interests of minority clients. The analysis in this research finds that instructional expenditures will affect representation in a positive manner in 3 out of 4 models.⁵ For Black and Latino students in gifted and talented courses, an increase in instructional expenditures may provide teachers with the assistance needed to identify students that are normally overlooked but suited for gifted and talented education.

⁵ These results are robust and consistent across all models of instruction and minority representation found in Appendix A (tables 15-18), which include time and district fixed effects. Therefore, the percent change within a district in instructional expenditures is influential to minority representation on student outcomes.

Similarly, the provision of slack resources to the bureaucracy that are targeted at the technical core of the organization can promote the advancement of street-level bureaucrats. For this reason, investment in the bureaucratic core of the organization is potentially correlated with the quality of teachers. If a district can improve quality teaching by investing in teacher development, schools have the potential to cultivate personnel that have more productive methods of classroom management and reach the academic needs of all students. When students perform better academically, research indicates that these students are less likely to experience issues with discipline (Gregory et al 2010). As a result, an increase in resources dedicated to bureaucratic advancement, can promote effective representation as minority teachers have a negative effect on minority students experiencing expulsions.

These findings imply that when sufficient resources are invested in the bureaucracy, resources will influence bureaucratic processes and behaviors. The story illustrated through this research falls directly in line with education scholarship that explains overall resources are not predictive of performance but resources invested in program development and teacher quality directly improve student achievement (Darling-Hammond 2004). For public administration scholars the impact of these findings goes beyond the setting of U.S. public education. For many local service providers from welfare to public health and more, organizations that are funded by local revenue often face difficulties in achieving equitable service delivery across minority groups. The importance of external context on representation is also applicable outside of the U.S. in bureaucratic systems where funding is regulated at the local level.

Therefore, in order to address performance concerns and create effective bureaucratic representation, it is important that the bureaucracy create processes to address revenue changes. This research suggests that when faced with a stressed organizational environment, public organizations should be cautious to implement centralization processes as a means to maintain performance. Instead, good management can focus on protecting bureaucratic processes such as, active representation that will in turn maintain organizational performance.

4. IT TAKES A VILLAGE: MINORITY SOCIAL CAPITAL, REPRESENTATION, AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE

In the past year, public outcry against racial disparities in education, policing, and social services have reached modern day heights. While bureaucrats attempt to address these disparities with human capital such as, increased representation, resources, and infrastructure, the depth of these issues continue to grow. What remains, however, is an understanding that communities matter for bureaucratic performance. Yet, social capital and community engagement is declining across groups (Putnam 1995). In a culture so content with ‘bowling alone,’ this chapter seeks to understand how social capital will influence outcomes directly and act as a co-productive facilitator for public bureaucrats.

Social capital or connections among individuals is known to influence positive outcomes across policy areas (John 2005; Putnam 2001, Lochner et al 2003). For this reason, some have looked to social capital to help decrease disparities between white and minority individuals. In fact, it can be argued that the influence of social capital is best illustrated within minority communities. Throughout the 1900s, de jure and de facto segregation left many Black Americans to depend on their own communities for survival and advancement. Likewise social spaces and community engagement through venues such as the African-American church became a bedrock for future political activism (McDaniel 2008; Lui, Austin, and Orey 2009). Among Latino communities, community networks and connections have also operated as a quasi-immigration service helping new immigrants locate and find work upon arrival to the United States (Aguilera and

Massey 2003). Although the presence and importance of community engagement in minority communities exists, however, researchers have failed to appropriately study the influence of social capital within these communities. Instead past research has used broad, aggregate measures of social capital to explain minority group outcomes. As a result, the findings have been mixed because aggregate levels of social capital are often more descriptive of behaviors within the white community.

This article hopes to address these issues by presenting a new measure of social capital for multiple racial groups within major US counties in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012. In the context of U.S. public school communities, this research will explore the ways in which a community's social capital and minority teacher representation will affect minority student outcomes. Proposing that social capital will act as a co-productive facilitator for public bureaucrats, this research finds that social capital measured within minority communities does not directly influence minority student performance. But, social capital is an influential resource that indirectly promotes the effectiveness of minority teachers for minority student performance. While it is no surprise that student achievement is dependent on both the work of teachers and the influence of their school community, this research supports the broad understanding that teachers and bureaucrats' work is only enhanced by cooperation within their 'village'.

4.1 Social Capital Theory

Social capital refers to the “networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam 2001, 664).” Social capital is caused by a reciprocal relationship between participation and trust. In a study

by Brehm and Rhan (1997), the authors trace the causes of social capital and find a strong relationship between an engaged citizenry and an increase in the levels of trust between individuals. More trusting individuals are likely to be engaged within their community (Uslaner and Brown 2005). As this engagement helps develop relationships and strengthen one's political confidence, citizens are willing to engage politically with government institutions to pursue shared goals. The presence of social capital then leads to a variety of positive outcomes for communities that work together toward a collective good. For instance, social capital and one's engagement with others in the community will influence the communities' ability to solve collective problems or attain positive outcomes. Not only do the networks between individuals facilitate a space to create agreement and solve collective problems, but also social capital can lead to government responsiveness. When citizens are engaged in politically relevant social networks, their likelihood of participation in government increases (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). Politically engaged communities then have the political power to hold governments accountable to certain levels of performance (Knack 2002). In multiple studies, social capital is associated with an improvement in education performance (John 2005; Putnam 2001), health outcomes (Lochner et al 2003), crime rates (Rosenfeld et al 2001) and poverty (Hero 2003).

There does exist, however a 'dark side' of social capital. Specifically, scholars call attention to the fact that most individuals engage in groups with others who share similar characteristics. As a result, when engagement is focused inward and is exclusive to some, community engagement can have negative effects on broad community interests

and goals. In multiple studies of public education, researchers (Hero 2003) found that while overall rates of minority performance improved as social capital increased, higher levels of social capital were related to an increase in the gap between whites and minorities suspension rates (Hawes and Rocha 2011, Hero 2003). Hero (2007) contends that, “the assertion that higher social capital leads to better outcomes results almost entirely from the situation of whites...(155).” Contrary to Putnam (2001) this characterization implies that bonding characteristics limit the benefits of social capital and community engagement. Social capital and the strength of community networks are then relatively beneficial to racially homogenous, non-minority groups. In combination with the racial threat hypothesis, it is possible that in relatively heterogeneous areas, levels of social capital among whites are a method to further withhold resources from minority communities.

When applied to government performance and processes, this same fear prevails across research areas. In an analysis of public policy agreement, Hill and Masubayshi (2005) find that bonding social capital actually decreases agreement between elites and the mass public. Similarly, measures of bonding social capital that focused on individual rather than broad community interests were found to have no effect on government performance and bureaucratic outcomes (Knack 2002). On the other hand, when social capital was measured using indicators of generalized reciprocity such as, social trust, volunteering, and promptly responding to the census, social capital boosts government performance. These findings imply that bonding social capital may have a negative

effect on democratic outcomes as the strength of social connectivity between in-group members potentially comes at an expense to overall cohesion.

The threat of bonding social capital is even more important when we consider social capital's potential interaction with government processes such as, collaboration. Public administration scholars have explored the dynamic effects of social capital on collaboration. Specifically, Oh and Bush (2016) explain that social networks have influential effects during every phase of the collaborative process. Government outcomes are then expected to increase where social capital creates trust that facilitates reciprocity, shared information, and commitment to the collaborative process. Because bonding social capital is focused within groups, the potential to develop a commitment to overall community efforts and expose citizens to broad information is often limited (Leung et al 2016). In fact, research indicates that bonding social capital has a negative effect on the level of trust in government (Myeong and Seo 2016). If bonding social capital potentially suppresses the trust that facilitates government collaboration, bureaucratic processes meant to serve disadvantaged and excluded communities may be disrupted.

4.2 Bureaucratic Representation

One bureaucratic process that receives significant attention in the literature is that of representation. Representation is composed of passive and active representation. While passive representation describes the degree of descriptive representation within the bureaucracy, active representation is a process of action that leads to improved outcomes and policy gains for underrepresented groups. Passive representation is expected to lead

to active representation once bureaucrats have sufficient discretion to influence outcomes in an identity salient policy area.

Most often the discussion of active representation refers to bureaucrats acting on behalf of or in the interest of co-minority citizens. This process of representation is illustrated in schools where minority teachers influence a decline in punitive discipline policies by favoring learning-oriented discipline policies (Roch et al 2010). While this process of representation is most often noted in the literature, movement from passive to active does not just occur. Instead, active representation in this sense requires a sense of shared commonality between the bureaucrat and the client. This commonality provides bureaucrats with better cultural and social awareness of client groups. Bureaucrats can then use this awareness to approach problems in culturally relevant ways.

However, there are a variety of characteristics that may affect movement from passive to active representation. For instance, minority bureaucrats must decide first to be a representative. While the literature frequently assumes action based on shared group identification, bureaucrats must decide whether their sense of shared commonality is strong enough to warrant action on behalf of the group. Oftentimes the socialization of the organization, an individual's commitment to the profession (Nigro and Meier 1975) or, an individual's desires of promotion within that profession (Carroll 2017) may interfere and discourage movement to active representation.

Second, active representation is possible when descriptive or passive representation encourages non-minority bureaucrats to act according to minority interests. In this case non-minority bureaucrats or elected officials are able to learn from their interactions

with minority colleagues. By engaging with diverse bureaucrats, non-minorities are exposed to social differences and concerns of diverse communities that will influence bureaucratic actions. At the judicial level, Kastellec (2013) found that the mere presence of a minority judge had a peer effect that resulted in an increased likelihood of nonminority judges voting in favor of affirmative action.

Last, active representation is possible when the presence of minority representatives activates a response among clients (Ricucci et al 2016). Best exemplified in law enforcement, gender representation on the police force was related to an increase in the number of sexual assaults reported (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). In this example, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) explain that a women victim may be more inclined to report a rape or assault when she perceives the police force is representative. A similar example is present in Georgia public schools where Atkins and Wilkins (2013) found that female minority teachers were related to a decrease in minority student pregnancy rates because female students were willing to approach and discuss sexual education with these bureaucrats. Although active representation is typically considered to be activity on the part of the bureaucrat, the process of representation here appears to be highly dependent on client behaviors.

Client behavior then becomes a determining factor in translating passive to active representation. This citizen participation or process of co-production is a relationship “between professionalized service providers...and service users or other members of the community...(Bovaird 2007, 847).” Within this relationship, citizens help contribute to the quality and quantity of public service delivery by directly assisting local officials,

bringing about changes within their own behavior, and or changing behaviors in a way that addresses concerns facing the organization's environment (Sharp 1980, Alford 1998). Scholars propose that co-production creates multiple benefits for public organizations including enhancing performance outcomes, lowering budgetary costs, enhancing public agency accountability, and increasing citizen knowledge and participation (Percy 1984, Sharp 1980, Marschall 2004, Bovaird 2007, Pestoff 2006).

Co-production is best illustrated in representative bureaucracy in the work of Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006). In this example, the authors found that female clients provided inputs for police departments by reporting sexual assaults and as a result assisted local officials in the performance of their duties. The ability of law enforcement agencies to better perform their jobs was enhanced as a result of client provided information. Next, client co-production is most effective where clients transform their own behaviors (Sharp 1980). Within representation, Atkins and Wilkins (2013) illustrate this transformation with the role-model effect. In their example the presence of minority teachers encouraged students not only to request needed assistance and work with bureaucrats to develop effective services, but also bureaucratic role models encourage students to change their behaviors. However, when clients are less likely to engage with bureaucrats, the potential role-model effect will be inactivated and there will be little improvement in outcomes. Last, client efforts are crucial in regards to observed performance outcomes. For instance, minority teachers cannot help decrease the rates of Black student pregnancy if students did not implement the sex education that was provided. When clients participate in a manner that strengthens a bureaucrat's sense of

commonality, holds bureaucrats accountable, and/or shares information that will assist in the production of organizational outcomes, bureaucrats will likely be encouraged to work in pursuit of better outcomes. An increase in minority group social capital, which helps build trust between minority citizens and their bureaucratic peers may then work as a co-productive facilitator that enhances the bureaucratic process of representation.

4.3 Theory

The organization's external community is expected to influence bureaucratic representation in potentially two ways. First, a high degree of social capital can promote organizational processes such as, co-production. As this process hold bureaucrats more accountable to client needs, the likelihood of bureaucrats acting on behalf of clients is increased. In addition, social capital indicates the presence of community resources that may potentially influence the impact of bureaucratic representation on client outcomes. As both bureaucrats and clients engage in high social capital communities, representative behaviors are more likely to produce positive outcomes.

Public education provides an exemplar case of co-production as its foundation and continuance is dependent on the relationship between bureaucrats (or educators) and community members. Practitioner reports in education have lamented that although schools attempt to adjust for educational disparities through improving funding and teacher quality, these efforts cannot be effective without the support of the school community (Roekel 2008). In fact, historically public schools were designed to be a community effort where local residents and parents came together to make decisions in the best interests of students. Contemporarily, the focus remains on the importance of

parental involvement. Yet, social capital has the ability to account for broader community wide engagement that encompasses participation by those who are not directly linked to the schools. For instance, in Durham, North Carolina educators began asking people from the community, faith-based organizations, and parents ‘how can [they] help [these] schools?’ From the perspective of administrators, community organizers, and education associations, improving the school district requires that the community become involved as the public schools belong to these residents (Milliken 2010).

In accordance with previous literature (Jensen and Svendsen 2011), I expect that social capital or community efforts for the sake of the public good will have a direct and positive impact on outcomes by increasing bureaucratic accountability and extending opportunity to all members of the community. The ability of social capital to lead to policies results from its direct correlation with a politically engaged community. Politically engaged citizens keep bureaucrats accountable and additionally utilize their political power to pursue policy. In a cross-national study, Bjornskov and Svendsen (2013) found that communities with high social capital are willing to invest in public programs. Where social capital is greater, I would expect a greater willingness among community members to address educators with their grievances and potential solutions. In 2007, the Durham volunteer director stated to The Herald-Sun that her job was to reach out to those underrepresented and not only ‘[talk] to parents but, more importantly, [listen] to them (Hinchcliffe 2007).’

In education, where social capital is present, school educators have a venue for collaboration between parents, students, and the community. The ability of social capital to create collaborative partnerships provides a social good by increasing interactions among individuals who may not usually be in contact. If social capital represents a true bridging phenomenon, it is likely that groups will be in contact with those who are not a member of their in-group. Intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954) suggests that under optimal circumstances where there is intergroup cooperation, groups have equal status during contact, and groups share a common goal, increased contact between groups can reduce intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Increased interactions between groups and the development of social capital has the ability to minimize differences, foster trust, and create better opportunities for marginalized and underprivileged groups.

H1a: Social capital will positively influence the size of social programs.

H1b: Social capital will positively influence minority client opportunities.

However, it is often the case that social capital does not exemplified a bridging phenomenon. Within education, the history of neighborhood segregation has often left many minority residents in majority minority schools. Like many majority minority communities, in 2007 there were 11 failing public schools in Duval County, Florida. And each of these schools was located in African-American communities. Columnist, Bill Maxwell, proclaimed that “If the failing schools are in the black community, the black community shares essential responsibility for the schools’ poor performance (Maxwell 2007).” And while this is indeed partly true, the current research fails to

provide an appropriate measure of social capital or community engagement within minority groups.

Research by Uslaner and Conley (2003) indicate that those with narrower social networks tend to either withdraw from civic life or engage only within the community with which they identify. This finding is exemplified within minority groups because their historic and contemporary experiences lead to them to have faith only in their own group. Although research (Knack 2002, Leung et al 2016) expresses a fear that within group social capital will negatively affect outcomes broadly, most research does not take into account the benefits of growing social capital among minority groups. For instance, within immigrant communities, Aguilera and Massey (2003) illustrate social capital by explaining how communities in 'receiver' cities provide a network for employment, housing, and familial/non-familial support to new migrants. In African-American communities, research also describes the African-American church as a resource for community engagement as the church provides a social network that can increase education outcomes and even act as an avenue for political participation (Liu et al 2009, Fitzgerald and Spohn 2005, McDaniel 2008, Barrett 2010).

Minority communities, who often experience disparities in public goods or services, are expected to benefit from a growth of social capital within their minority community. Primarily, social capital within a minority community has the possibility to enhance the cultural capital of the community group. Cultural capital creates a sense of group belonging, collective identity, and group consciousness. In a world of extrinsic prejudice and intrinsic racism, the support of cultural capital can provide a space of

encouragement and support for minority individuals (Yosso 2005). The growth of social capital within a minority community is then not only a benefit to the community but also a benefit to oneself. In addition, social capital provides a network of supportive individuals who can act as role models for younger citizens as they develop into social and political citizens. As minority communities develop increased trust and engagement, find their political voice, and maintain a political influence through community interaction, I expect disparities in outcomes to decline.

H2: Social capital within minority groups will have an even greater, positive effect on minority client outcomes.

Last, social capital is expected to have an indirect impact on outcomes as its development creates a co-productive resource for bureaucrats. The coproduction literatures acknowledges that ‘without active citizen participation the capacity of government to provide public goods and services is severely compromised (Marschall 2004, 232).’ Schools provide the best example because within this institution both teachers and parents must be willing to reach out to each other to find the best approach for a student. This co-production requires an assertive and engaged client but also a receptive bureaucrat.

Social capital can potentially act as a co-productive facilitator by first empowering citizen participation. Tavits (2006) found that trust, volunteering, membership, and informal socializing were all related to increased political activism. When citizens engage with their community, their collective confidence is transferred to the individual who begins to participate, voice grievances, and hold government accountable.

Also, because bureaucrats are members of the community, high levels of social capital imply bureaucratic involvement. In fact, Brewer (2003) finds that public employment is seen as a predictor of civic engagement. When bureaucrats are involved, they become aware not only of the concerns of the community but resources as well. Marschall (2006) found that the more knowledgeable teachers were about their schools' community, the greater influence teachers had on performance. In fact, the influence of a teacher's community awareness far outweighed the influence of parental involvement on performance. In addition, a bureaucrat's active participation in the community may also help dispel clients' negative perceptions of government. For example, Watkins-Hayes (2011) explains that clients did not feel bureaucrats were concerned about their individual cases or influenced by their shared identity status. Some argue that these concerns arise due to a difference in class or socialization between minority bureaucrats and clients. However, in a high social capital region, I would expect bureaucrats to be active participants in the community.

As increased interactions help to minimize differences and develop relationships with bureaucrats, clients begin to view bureaucrats beyond their role as a public servant. When there is confidence in the bureaucracy, clients are willing to engage in partnerships, share information, and actively work toward a collective good. Increased social capital then creates a space for understanding between both the bureaucrat and client. This increase in cooperation should lead to better efficiency for public organizations.

H3: Social capital will positively influence the effectiveness of minority bureaucrats on minority client outcomes.

4.4 Data and Methods

The previous hypotheses will be tested in the context of US elementary and secondary public education. Public school districts present a good context to study social capital, bureaucracy, and outcomes. The local nature of public schooling from its dependence on local property taxes to local board elections imply a community context where social capital can be developed. In public schools school administrators and teachers have significant discretion, which will allow them to have independent effects on student outcomes. Last, public education has multiple achievement indicators available that provide objective measures of district performance.

Using a national sample of the largest United States school districts in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012, the analysis will first model the independent effects of community social capital (H1a, H1b) and social capital within minority groups (H2). Next, I will add an interaction of teacher representation and social capital to determine if social capital acts as a co-productive mechanism for representation (H3). To analyze these relationships I will use OLS models with time fixed effects to control for the changes that occur across districts in different years. I also control for the district level effects and potential correlation between districts by clustering the standard errors at the district level. The unit of analysis in these models will be the local school district. The school districts included in the research are the largest school districts in the U.S. in years 2002,

2004, 2008, and 2012.¹ In the interaction models, I model within effects by adding district fixed effects as well. After pooling data from multiple sources across years, these analyses include approximately 2,000 individual cases.²

4.4.1 Dependent Variable

In order to test hypothesis one, social opportunity is represented by two performance indicators: the size of high achievement programs and the size of disciplinary programs. These two indicators are operationalized by the percentage of students in gifted and talented programs and the percentage of students being expelled. I expect that social capital will expand opportunity, which will be visible in an increase in access to gifted and talented classrooms. On the contrary, students will experience less punishment in schools with expanded educational access.

For the remaining hypotheses, the dependent variables are minority student group representation within the two categories: gifted and talented achievement and expulsions. Although ideal measures for student performance would be an average performance on state standardized testing, because this is a national sample there is no national equivalent at the district level. Instead, the dependent variable of minority outcomes in these models will be a high achievement and low achievement indicator. The high achievement indicator is the racial composition of gifted and talented classrooms in the district. The low achievement indicator is the racial composition of

¹ The school districts chosen were those with more than 5,000 students as of 1999. The original sample included 5,493 school districts in the United States.

² Because social capital indicators by racial group were only available for the largest counties, many cases were removed from the dataset once social capital was included.

students experiencing school discipline. I operationalized these performance variables by the percentage of gifted and talented students that are Black and Latino. To create these variables, I created a percentage by dividing the aggregate number of Black students in gifted and talented programs by the total number of students in the gifted and talented program and multiplying by 100. I completed the same process for Latino students in gifted and talented classrooms. To measure student expulsions by race, I also created a variable measuring the percentage of student expulsions that included Black and Latino students. All dependent variables were collected from the Office for Civil Rights, which records data on student class placement, special education programs, discipline outcomes, and a variety of other student outcomes by race at the district level.

4.4.2 Independent Variables

The main independent variable of interest in this research is social capital. In the context of education, many contend that social capital is not distinctly different from the commonly used indicator of parental involvement. In fact, many education scholars use measures of parental involvement to conceptualize a school's social capital (Perna and Titus 2005). I argue, however, that the social capital thesis is distinct from the current literature on parent participation and school achievement. Social capital describes a phenomenon beyond parental involvement because it measures a variety of participatory behaviors that are pursued in an effort to achieve a public good.

A measure of social capital will also capture the involvement of community members other than parents who may not be directly connected with the school but who provide a positive network for students. Although many low-income and minority

schools struggle to achieve high levels of parental involvement, which is often dependent on income and parental education levels (Ramirez 2003; Crozier 2001), high social capital can potentially still be present and influential as other community members fulfill this role. For students whose parents have non-typical work hours and struggle to be present at school, an engaged community may indicate additional invested adults who can fulfill that role. This process is most likely prominent within minority communities where marginalized groups have difficulty becoming involved in traditional forms of parental involvement (Singh et al 1995, Crozier 2001).

Social capital in this research will be measured using an indicator of community cooperative behavior from the PERG Social Capital Project. Using the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, this project conceptualizes and measures public and private social capital at the state and county level. In addition, the project produced a measure of social capital by racial groups at the county level by aggregating racial group responses within each county available. The dataset ranges from 2002-2015. Public social capital, which is used in this research, captures measures of community volunteerism and engagement in public affairs. This measure essentially captures engagement in public social settings for the sake of public policy. The measure is a factor variable of multiple questions regarding individual's political and social behaviors

(see Table 5). This measure of public social capital has a significant correlation coefficient of 0.77 with Putnam’s SC Index.³

Table 5. Measure of Public Social Capital

	Eigenvalue	4.15	
	Cumulative Explained	0.54	
SC Concept	Survey Item	Factor Loadings	Uniqueness
<i>Engagement in Public Affairs</i>	Attend Pub. Meeting	0.80	0.24
	Participate in Boycott	0.56	0.65
	Political Org. Participation	0.50	0.59
	Voted	0.33	0.74
	Contact Pub. Official	0.13	0.10
<i>Community Volunteerism, & Charitable Activity</i>	Fixed a Problem in Community	0.79	0.37
	School, Youth Group Participation	0.72	0.44
	Environmental Org. Participation	0.64	0.57
	International Org. Participation	0.63	0.18
	Survey Item	Factor Loadings	Uniqueness
	Volunteer Abroad	0.55	0.22
	Donated Food, Money, Etc. to charity	0.45	0.30
	Volunteer Long Distance (>50 mi.)	0.44	0.04
	Public Health Participation	0.41	0.72

The second variable of interest will be representation among street-level bureaucrats. This variable was collected as a part of the PERG National School Survey distributed to

³ Within the models, the unit of analysis is the school district. Because counties overlap with districts, districts within the same county will not experience variation in their social capital indicators.

school districts with more than 5,000 students as of 1999 (Meier and Rutherford 2014). These surveys were distributed by mail in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Of the 5,493 districts, the survey had a response rate of 94.5 percent. This survey collected data on the racial representation of public school districts' teachers, administration, and elected school board members. For minority teacher representation, I include separate measures of the percentage of Black and Latino teachers in the district.

4.4.3 Control Variables

In order to account for relationships that may influence the dependent or independent variables, I will control for a variety of organizational and community characteristics. Because policy is often decided at the administrative level, I have also included variables that capture the amount of minority representation present among administration. Administrative representation is measured by the percent of Latino and Black administrators in the district in each year. These data were gathered as a part of the PERG National School Survey.

I also expect the student population or organizational clientele will influence the outcomes of minority students. With respect to the racial group of interest in each model, I have controlled for the percentage of Latino and Black students in the district. Overall student population is also used as a control variable in models predicting gifted and talented program size as well as the percentage of total expulsions. The student population is operationalized by logged enrollment in the school district.

In the necessary models (H1b-H3), I include a control variable for the size of the gifted and talented program and total expulsions in the district. In some districts the

implementation of certain policies (i.e. zero-tolerance) have created an environment where certain outcomes are more likely (Evenson et al 2009). I expect that where the gifted and talented programs are larger and the rate of total expulsion is greater, the outcomes for minority students will be greater as well. To operationalize this variable, in models that predict gifted and talented, I control for the percentage of students in the district that are in gifted and talented programs. When the outcome variable is expulsion of minority students, the program size variable is operationalized by the percentage of total students in the district that are expelled.

The final organizational control variables included in the models will be a measure of financial resources in each district. Given the local context of school district funding and policies that monitor district resources, many of the gaps in student outcomes are projected to be a result of funding differences. I expect that in districts with more resources gifted and talented programs will be larger and identification practices for students will be more inclusive. Similarly in these districts, I expect fewer expulsions as a result of an investment of discipline techniques and greater financial capital of students. The total revenue per pupil received in the district will operationalize financial resources. This variable was gathered from the National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data.

Although, variables at the organizational level will certainly influence student performance, education scholars have explained for decades that physical capital and resources are highly influential as well (Davis-Kean 2005). For this reason, I have also included a variety of district characteristics that are known to influence student

outcomes. First, parental education and income are two of the most consistent predictors of student performance (Desimone 1999). Because this analysis does not observe education and income at the individual level, I have gathered U.S. Census data on the education and income of minority groups within the school district. To control for education, I will use the percentage of White, Black, and Latino individuals in the school district with a college degree or greater. To control for income, I use the average income for Black and Latino families in the district. In overall models of social opportunity (H1a), income is operationalized by the median income in the district.

Last, I will control for the partisanship of the school district. To control for partisanship I will use the same measure employed by Meier and Rutherford (2014) to measure the average percentage of individuals in the school district that voted for President Obama in 2004 and 2008. Recent research by Meier and Rutherford (2016) find that in Republican school districts African-American students are more likely to have poorer results across performance outcomes including gifted and talented placement, suspensions, expulsions, and standardized test achievement.

4.5 Results

Beginning with a base model that tests the influence of social capital on social opportunities, the analysis (table 20 found in Appendix B) indicates that public social capital does not have a significant effect on gifted and talented program size or total expulsions. Instead, as expected, district education, Democratic voting, and income significantly influence these variables. The significance of many community characteristics such as, education and Democratic voting indicate that there are factors

beyond the organization that relate to social opportunity. However, the models explain very little variance in the dependent variables. Although research explains that access to gifted and talented programs and growth of disciplinary programs are highly correlated with financial revenue and minority student population, these variables explain very little in this model. The lack of explained variance may be a result of missing variables such as the percentage of low-income students in the district or additional academic achievement indicators. The data available, however, do not provide consistent measures of these variables.

Next, when analyzing the effect of social capital on minority programs (H1b), there are mixed findings.⁴ When observing the effect of social capital on Black student outcomes, overall social capital in the county has no significant effect. However, only Black teachers positively influence high achievement indicators. For Latino students, social capital does have a significant effect on both outcome variables for Latino students. These effects, however, are in the opposite direction. An increase in social capital by one standard deviation will decrease Latino gifted and talented student representation by 0.44 percent and decrease Latino expulsions by 1.42 percent. Similar, to parallel models for Black student outcomes, these models indicates that where social capital within groups is ineffective to boost performance, once again minority bureaucrats are significantly influential. An increase in Latino teacher representation by 10 percent can substantially increase Latino gifted and talented students by 3.2 percent.

⁴ The models for H1b can be found in Appendix B, Table 21.

Next, hypothesis 2 expected that social capital would have an even greater effect on minority outcomes when measured within minority groups. In other words, minority community cooperation efforts would affect minority students independently. For Black student outcomes, Black social capital has no significant effect. Instead, for gifted and talented outcomes, Black teachers are again effective. In the analyses predicting Latino student outcomes, Latino social capital has a statistically significant effect. However, for both gifted and talented representation and expulsions, the influence of social capital is in the negative direction.⁵ A one standard deviation increase in social capital will decrease Latino gifted and talented students by 0.53 percent and increase Latino expulsions by 1.7 percent. As expected total revenue per pupil, minority group income, college graduates, program size, and minority student representation significantly explain our dependent variables. The significance of these control variables indicate that although community factors expected to increase both social capital and educational achievement are significant to the model, the measure of minority involvement in traditional activities for the sake of the public good has a direct negative or insignificant effect on performance.

However, this is not the case when minority community efforts assist the bureaucracy. The final hypothesis 3 expects that social capital will enhance the effect of minority bureaucrats by acting as a co-productive mechanism.⁶ And indeed in three out of four models, the interaction between social capital and representation are statistically

⁵ The models for hypothesis 2 can be located in Appendix B, table 22.

⁶ The models for hypothesis 3 can be located in Appendix B, table 23. Figures are provided within the text to illustrate this relationship.

significant. Although Black social capital has an insignificant effect on Black student outcomes, when interacted with Black representation among street level bureaucrats, Black students excel on high achievement indicators. As Black social capital increases, the marginal effect of Black teachers on Black students in gifted and talented increases significantly as well (see figure 5). This finding indicates that social capital within the Black community can be a large asset to minority teachers as increased community efforts may provide a venue for teachers to share information on gifted and talented programs with parents. Likewise, involved communities are more likely to request access or testing for these programs. Engaged minority communities may also provide a space of encouragement for students, giving them confidence to pursue academic programs.




Figure 5: The Marginal Effect of Black Teachers on Black G/T across Black Social Capital

In addition, figures 6 and 7 indicates that unlike the negative, independent effects of Latino social capital on Latino student outcomes, when coupled with the efforts of bureaucrats, Latino students witness an increase in gifted and talented representation and a decrease in expulsions. Moving from low levels of social capital to high levels of social capital the maximum marginal effect of 10 percent Latino teacher representation is a possible 4 percent decrease in Latino expulsions. The positive effect of Latino social capital when interacted with representation indicates that Latino teachers have the ability to utilize the cohesion and engagement of the Latino community for the success of

students. For many Latino parents, some who are migrants and new to the American education system, teacher representation provides a point of cultural understanding. When teachers can access the efforts of parents outside of education and share the necessity of their engagement in their child's education, students will benefit.




Figure 6: The Marginal Effect of Latino Teachers on Latino G/T across Latino Social Capital




Figure 7: The Marginal Effect of Latino Teachers on Latino Expulsions across Latino Social Capital

4.6 Discussion

In a context of growing disparities between minority and majority groups, the influence of bureaucratic representation on minority group outcomes is a steady predictor of improved outcomes. However, the effect of representation is enhanced by the social context of the organization. And it is not surprising that bureaucrats work best in communities that are collaborative and engaged toward a public good.

In most models, social capital within minority groups is found to enhance the marginal effect of minority bureaucrats. Unfortunately, given the limitations of the data, it is unknown whether the co-productive mechanism of social capital is the result of an

engaged clientele that holds government accountable, an engaged bureaucracy that is present and aware of the community context, or a combination of both that facilitates shared information. Nonetheless, this research finds that minority bureaucrats are expected to be more effective when operating in communities with high social capital. Unfortunately, I would not expect social capital to interact in similar ways with well-trained white teachers because although these educators may be willing to engage with the community, the communities' sense of trust of the bureaucrat may only be strengthened by shared minority status.

Yet, most surprising within this research is the finding that overall or within minority group social capital will not independently influence social programs or minority outcomes in the positive direction. In fact in some cases, it had a negative effect. For instance, table 22 indicates that Latino social capital has an independent and negative effect on both gifted and talented percentages and rates of expulsion. This finding is unique, because unlike research that simply would explain these results as an outcome of declining social capital, I find that even as social capital grows within the Latino community it produces harmful outcomes. Because of the generational diversity that is present among the Latino community, the data may be illustrating a recurring conflict among more established and migrant Latino communities. For instance, more established Latino communities might be less concerned if younger, likely recent-immigrant groups are punished within American institutions. If these established communities are positively correlated with social capital, the data may be capturing trends within the community.

In addition, as mentioned previously, within minority communities social capital has been present historically but it is typically conceptualized in a different manner. For instance, within the Black community the African-American church has served as a place of collaboration to improve community outcomes. Yet, affiliation in this context and others (such as local business establishments) often goes unmeasured by our typical understanding of social capital. In other words, within minority communities the norms of social capital may be different and demonstrated in an immeasurable way. Whereas the current measure of social capital still captures traditional norms of cooperation that have historically been exclusive or uncommon among minority groups, it is possible that we are only capturing behaviors that were intended to further promote disadvantages among minority communities. A measure of social capital that captures its different conceptualizations might result in different outcomes.

4.7 Conclusion

For years, education practitioners have been aware of the importance of diversity among teachers. Recently education groups from Teach for America to the National Education Association have called for an increase in the recruitment of Black and Latino teachers. While blogs proclaim how important it is that students see and interact with teachers of diverse backgrounds, what often goes unsaid is how important it is that minority students have non-white teachers. This research hopes to change that conversation by explaining not only the importance of minority teacher representation for minority student access to opportunity, but for community engagement as well.

Beyond contributing a new measure of social capital, this research suggests that instead of expecting social capital to produce independent effects on outcomes, as was the case historically, contemporarily social capital may be best understood as a co-productive facilitator for government. In this case social capital and its development should not only be left to citizens, but bureaucrats should work to develop social capital as it in turn will aid them in producing positive outcomes for the community (Jakobsen and Andersen 2013). If public administrators hope to better reach the needs of their clients, understanding contemporary patterns of social capital and increasing client's latent propensity to engage with their community will be necessary to enhance bureaucratic performance.

5. IT'S ALL ABOUT POLITICS: MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL CONTROL

In the context of public education, although elected officials and appointed executives are at the core of school governance, few researchers have explored how politics interacts with teacher behaviors and decision-making. As public servants who are held accountable by appointed executives, managers, and their profession, teacher behaviors may be the result of top-down political influence within their district. Yet, as public citizens and constituents, it may also be the case that bureaucrats are highly influenced by bottom-up or public political actors. This research will compare the influence of top-down versus bottom-up political actors to determine from whom do street-level bureaucrats take their political cues.

Every bureaucrat has multiple political principals. Political principals include elected officials, appointed managers, the public, interest groups, and bureaucratic professions (Waterman and Meier 1998, Wilson 1989, Downs 1967). The political science literature typically focuses on political forces in the form of top-down political control agents such as the chief executives and legislators (Calvert et al 1989, Eisner and Meier 1990, Wood and Waterman 1991). Within these top-down relationships, the principal's goal is to control a response in the agent and they have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence desired bureaucratic behavior. However, political control can also manifest in a bottom-up process. Within this process rather than assuming that the electorate

influences policy because they have control over policy makers, the public can participate in policy-making directly through bureaucratic interaction.

Active representation like most bureaucratic processes and goals becomes increasingly feasible with increased political support (Rourke 1984). Political support for the bureaucracy can come in the form of executive or legislative support, professional support, and even the public. This chapter explores the influence of various political actors on bureaucratic behaviors. Specifically, it asks how might elected officials and/or the public influence teacher representation?

To study the influence of political actors on street-level bureaucratic behavior, I employ a survey of the largest school districts in the United States to capture school board representation. In addition, the data include past election results on the political leanings within the districts, which can serve as a proxy for the public interest. While the current literature is often focused on federal and state bureaucracies, observing political control within the local bureaucracy provides a unique and clearer context for research. Within the local bureaucracy, the potential influence of local elected officials and the public on bureaucratic behavior is probable because bureaucrats can personally interact with both actors. The preliminary results indicate that the most influential principal for representative behavior varies depending on the bureaucrat's community context. While African-American representatives are effective when the public provides political support, Latino representatives find support in and are more effective when their values align with their elected officials. These findings imply that there is not a one size fit all model of representation. Although political context matters for representation, the

political structure of different communities will also play in role in producing substantive representation outcomes.

5.1 Bureaucracy and Representation

Lipsky explains “public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers (2010, xii).” Street-level bureaucrats are then situated at a unique and powerful position within the bureaucracy. As the public face of the bureaucracy and entity of government that works directly with the public, the characteristics and behaviors of street-level bureaucrats have far reaching effects. While often overlooked as policy makers, bureaucrats obtain various levels of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority. Both of these qualities allow bureaucrats to determine the distribution of public goods and services, but it also allows bureaucrats to influence the organization’s policy agenda (Meyers and Vorsanger 2007).

Bureaucratic influence is commonly recognized in agenda setting because bureaucrats control implementation. Therefore, their interpretation and support of policies can potentially influence how they are implemented. For example, survey results indicate that street level bureaucrats’ actions in pursuit of a policy goal are dependent on their perception, their endorsement, and their knowledge of a policy (May and Winter 2009). The policy agenda can therefore be shifted in implementation when bureaucrats fail to understand or support its original goals. In addition, bureaucratic perceptions of clients may influence disparate treatment and subsequent policy outcomes. Historically,

the effect of bureaucratic discretion coupled with implicit biases has affected outcomes for white and nonwhite clients across programs (Katznelson 2005). In a study of welfare sanctioning, Keiser et al (2004) found that the chance of sanctioning was decreased by 23 percent if the recipient was white and that race influenced sanction rates across the state of Missouri. The authors found that the decision to extol sticks or carrots is available to bureaucrats not only because there exists a lack of monitoring but also because many of the rules and guidelines are open to interpretation. When given greater autonomy and discretion, subjective values and ideology can influence policy outcomes.

For this reason maintaining a representative bureaucracy where bureaucrats represent client interests can influence the policy agenda. A representative bureaucracy is made up of both passive and active representation. Passive or descriptive representation describes the visible representativeness of a bureaucracy (Mosher 1968). Having a visibly diverse bureaucracy places bureaucrats of typically underrepresented groups in positions as public officials. For the public whose typical reference of government is through interactions with local bureaucrats, passive representation provides a symbolic benefit for citizens and is related to citizen satisfaction (Riccucci et al 2014), perceived government legitimacy (Theobald and Haider-Markel 2009), and an increase in political efficacy (Atkeson and Carillo 2007).

Passive representative translates to active representation as bureaucrats exercise discretion and act in the interests of their clients. Active representation is best represented where bureaucrats affect policy design. For instance, Roch et al (2010) explain that racial representation among teachers and school administrators promoted the

use of less punitive and more learning oriented disciplinary policies. As representatives of minority students, these bureaucrats were responsive to the visible inequities in disciplinary policies and considerate of client needs.

Often, however, because of the wide discretion provided to bureaucrats, the exact activities taken by bureaucrats to improve client outcomes are unclear. For example, a variety of scholars have found that same-race teachers provide culturally congruent benefits to same-race students and influence their academic achievement (Meier 1993a, Dee 2005, Grissom et al 2015, Egalite et al 2015). This may be a result of minority bureaucrats serving as a role model and empowering client efficacy, minority bureaucrats being more empathic toward and responsive to same-race students, and/or minority bureaucrats potentially influencing their peers' behaviors and providing them with tools to address the needs of minority client groups.

Yet, bureaucrats work within constraints. And in order to determine appropriate behavior, bureaucrats look to their political principals and their organizational context for support of their actions. As rational actors, bureaucrats seeking to be active representatives are likely only to engage in this behavior when the costs are low. The organization's external political environment, therefore, could potentially change the calculus that determines active representation. Increased support, whether from hierarchical superiors or public client groups promotes agency among bureaucrats. When support is present, bureaucrats can confidently be active representatives without fear of administrative disapproval or organizational sanctions. In an organization where political principals are adversarial to the bureaucracy and do not support their goals of

representation for lack of resources or perceived need, active representation is unlikely. Therefore, value alignment between bureaucrats and their principals can potentially decrease some of the costs of active representation. Similar to other bureaucratic behaviors, bureaucratic representation may be contingent on the support of political principals.

5.2 Political Control

The majority of the literature on bureaucratic behavior and political control indicates that bureaucrats are responsive to the public as they are accountable to those who are hired by the public, i.e. elected officials (Redford 1969, Furlong 1998, Wood and Waterman 1991). The literature focuses strongly on the relationship between bureaucracies and elected officials for fear that bureaucracy may diverge from the interests of those officials and essentially fail to be responsive to the public. With a goal of maintaining democratic morality, research has been dedicated to understanding how to best control bureaucratic actors. Elected officials can successfully influence bureaucratic actions through a variety of methods. At the federal level congressional officials use methods such as, direct review of bureaucratic actions and political appointees to control bureaucratic behavior. In a survey of federal bureaucrats, elected executives and representatives were listed as having the most influence on bureaucratic policy (Furlong 1998). Less successful methods of control were found to be budget changes, legislation, and administrative reorganization (Wood and Waterman 1991). At the local level, however, direct contact between bureaucrats and officials is more likely.

Often local oversight can result in decreased bureaucratic discretion when the bureaucracy is at odds with their principals (Waterman et al 1998).

Yet, can we assume that elected officials are the best conduits of the public interest? While the public can certainly keep elected officials accountable at the ballot box, a variety of sources indicate that there are cases when elected officials are not reflective of their constituents but instead are serving the needs of their party and/or their own ambitions (Herrick and Moore 1993, Hibbing 1986). Likewise, the failure of elected officials to significantly influence the bureaucracy does not necessarily guarantee bureaucratic unaccountability. In fact, within education, research on top down political control found that bureaucratic values far outweighed those of elected officials when creating outcomes. When looking at the influence of elected officials on student performance, the influence of elected officials and political appointees significantly declines once the authors control for bureaucratic impact (Meier and O'Toole 2006a). While this research is an example of the bureaucracy demonstrating more leverage than political officials would like, it also suggests that the bureaucracy may be responding to the desires of the public directly.

The public has the ability to influence bureaucratic and government responsiveness by participating directly in the policy process. Because clients are not believed to have significant authority over bureaucrats and cannot discipline bureaucrats in the same way as their hierarchical superiors (Lipsky 2010), it is often contested that clients can influence bureaucratic actions and policy-making. However, clients do have a significant advantage of interaction that may potentially promote bureaucratic responsiveness and

democratic accountability. In fact, through the analysis of interviews and focus group statements, Selden et al (1999) note that one of the primary goals expressed by public agents was the perception of themselves as stewards of the public interest. In this study, the authors found strong evidence that agents saw themselves as serving the public and rejected being controlled by elected officials.

Using bottom-up tools of accountability clients serve as an additional check on bureaucrats (Stivers 1994). Research by Waterman, Rouse, and Wright (1998) distinguished that federal bureaucrats work within different venues of influence. For some, Congress, the president, administrators, and courts loaded strongly as one category of political sponsorship. However, loading within its own factor was the media, public opinion, and interest groups. When the same survey was observed among state bureaucrats, client interest groups were said to interact directly and more intimately with bureaucratic actors. The authors, likewise, noted that the media, interest groups, and public opinion loaded within the same factor as Congress and the executive for state bureaucrats. Their results indicate that public interests are potentially as influential as traditional principals. Additional research on citizen participation indicates that citizens are more effective at holding bureaucrats accountable when interest groups are highly organized (Berry 1991, Berry et al 1984), there is high issue saliency, and administrative structures promote interaction (Berry 1979).

At the local level bottom-up political control measures may be even more influential to the bureaucracy for a variety of reasons. The primary reason the bureaucracy may take their cues from bottom-up political actors is because of the unique relationship between

street-level bureaucrats and their clients. As frontline workers, street-level bureaucrats have the daily task of interacting with clients. In many local organizations where bureaucrats meet frequently with their clients, the likelihood of developing relationships and sharing information is greater. In fact, one of the tools of political control used by bottom up political actors is informal interest group communication with agency personnel (Berry 2015). This tool is likely to be used even more at the local level where the degree of separation between the client community and local bureaucrat is small. Although some research has found that out of multiple actors, the public had the least amount of influence on the federal bureaucracy (Furlong 1998); at the local level this relationship is likely to be different for the reasons listed above.

In addition, as bureaucrats engage with clients and develop trust, clients can become a political resource that provides the bureaucracy with increased influence during the policy process. A significant resource provided by the public is increased information (Berry 1981). One of the central threats provoked by the bureaucracy is the information asymmetry between the agent and their elected principal (Waterman and Meier 1998). The fear that this information asymmetry will enable bureaucrats to act outside of the guidance of their principals is the reason political control mechanisms are used initially. However, as bureaucrats engage in close relationship with their clients, trust is developed between these two actors promoting government responsiveness (Yang and Pandey 2007). Within this relationship, the agent's knowledge will only increase in comparison to their principal giving the agent more power to take independent action.

When the public looks upon their bureaucrats positively, they may also provide them with the indispensable resource of political support (Rourke 1984). This support not only extends from the positive relationship bureaucrats have with their clients, but also as a result of the negative or non-existent relationship clients have with elected officials. In a time where skepticism is high towards politics, it is likely that clients are more likely to develop relationships with bureaucrats who are also perceived as neighbors and community members, than elected officials who are often not visible within the community.

As the public heightens their support behind bureaucratic actions and provides them with information, bureaucrats are empowered to act prior to or in spite of the calls from their executives (Rourke 1984). Literature on political interest groups indicates that the public as political support can result in the agent wielding power over their principals. As such, within local education, teachers have been known to wield their political power individually and as members of unions to influence elections and potentially flip the traditional principal-agent relationship (Moe 2006). Similarly, supportive public interest groups can advocate for racially-representative discipline outcomes in education, a position that bureaucrats support but often cannot pursue because it would put them in a unfavorable position with their executive. The support of the public can then become incredibly valuable in enabling agencies to oppose their principals (Rourke 1984).

5.3 Data and Hypothesis

With both top-down and bottom-up pressures on the bureaucracy, from whom are bureaucrats taking their cues? In order to explore this question, the research will employ

a national dataset that surveys the United States' largest school districts in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012. The data originates from the National School Survey distributed to school districts with more than 5,000 students as of 1999 (Meier and Rutherford 2014). The surveys were distributed by mail each year. Of the 5,493 districts surveyed there was a response rate of 94.5 percent. The survey requested data on each district's school board elections, the characteristics of the current school board, and teacher/administrative representation.

While school districts may at first glance appear to be an interesting context in which to study questions of top-down and bottom-up political control, this context does provide multiple advantages to explore the research question. Primarily, school districts are independent government organizations with a hierarchical political structure. Within each school district, a locally elected school board appoints school superintendents and administrators to oversee the district and individual school campuses. These administrators then hire teachers who operate as street-level bureaucrats with high levels of individual discretion. The local nature of public school implies that the community and public influence is present within the district. The public works to influence the behaviors of school board members, administrators, and teachers.

In addition, this context provides an analysis of top-down and bottom-up political control within a local context that is not often discussed within this literature. Within public administration, the widespread support for overhead democracy creates a tradition where scholars fail to consider the direct effects of the public. The majority of studies on political control are then focused on the federal level, observing the relationship between

executives, political appointees, and federal bureaucrats. But, the local context of this study provides a case where there is a greater likelihood of direct engagement between the bureaucracy and public. In addition, at the school district level we can imagine a scenario where teachers interact with minority school board members with the same ease that teachers interact with parents. The distance between the bureaucrat and client is then similar to that of the bureaucrat and the executive, a phenomenon that is unlikely at the federal level. This provides an excellent case to compare the influence of elected officials and the public on bureaucratic behavior.

The bureaucratic behavior studied here is bureaucratic representation. As mentioned previously, representation can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. The literature has observed the influence of minority bureaucrats on policy (Roch et al 2010), client behaviors (Keiser et al 2002), and overall improved organizational outcomes for represented groups (Dee 2005, Meier 1993a). Because this research looks at a variety of school districts, individual level data on bureaucratic actions and client actions are not available. However, descriptive data on overall organizational outcomes for racial minority groups are available.

5.3.1 Variables

To operationalize the dependent variable, I will use a high-achievement and low-achievement indicator in public education (Meier and Rutherford 2016). The high-achievement indicator is gifted and talented outcomes (Nicholson-Crotty et al 2011), measured by the percentage of Black and Latino students in gifted and talented programs in the district. The low-achievement indicator is discipline (Holt and Gershenson 2015),

measured by the percentage of Black and Latino students being expelled in the district. Education research indicates that the gap between minority students and their white peers are present across every achievement indicator from standardized test scores to graduation rates (Lee 2002). For the two measures used in this study, minority students are often overrepresented when it comes to discipline and underrepresented in high achieving academic programs (Gregory et al 2010).¹ These outcome variables originate from data collected by the Office for Civil Rights.

To operationalize the independent variable of top-down and bottom-up political pressure, I will use a measure of school board representation and public political opinion respectively. The measure of school board representation will include the percentage of Black and Latino school board members. As members of minority groups, these elected officials can empathize with the concerns of minority clients and often work toward minority interests. Similarly, minority school board members are not likely to be at odds with the goals of minority representation and therefore support teacher representative behaviors. The measure of public or bottom-up political pressure will be the percentage of the district that voted for the Democratic Party in the respective years. This ideology measure represents the public's political preferences for a wide range of issues. Because the Democratic Party has historically been more supportive of racial minority issues in the past decade, a public that ideologically supports the party is likely to support teacher

¹ Although a common measure would be minority student performance on standardized tests, the national nature of this data makes comparable test scores unavailable as a dependent variable.

representative behaviors. Last, Black and Latino teacher representation within the district will represent the bureaucracy.

There are also a variety of control variables that will be used in this analysis. According to the education production function, school resources, community characteristics, and district administration are influential to student performance. I have included the following variables that are expected to benefit student performance: administrator representation, district educational attainment, district median income,² district instructional expenditures, and gifted and talented program size. In addition, I control for the following constraints, which are typical indicators of task difficulty: minority student population and the percent of all students expelled.

5.3.2 Methods

Using OLS regression analysis with separate interaction analyses for the school board and the public, I can observe the influence of these actors on the relationship between minority teachers and student outcomes. Within the data it is necessary to control for spatial heterogeneity and wide changes across time. I cluster the data at the district level and include time fixed effects to address these data concerns. Therefore, the remaining coefficient will indicate the average effect within a district, controlling for the year. By comparing the predicted values of minority teacher representation on minority student outcomes given the different political interests, the analyses indicate whether the school board or the public will influence teachers more effectively.

² Education attainment and income are measured by these values within the minority population being observed.

5.3.3 Hypothesis

Given the unique relationship between local bureaucracy and clients, I expect that bottom-up political influence from the public will have a greater effect on bureaucratic actions toward representation than pressure from elected officials. Recent findings tested within education speaks to this relationship as Meier and Rutherford (2016) illustrate that minority representation in school districts was ineffective in Republican districts compared to Democratic districts. Within this study minority teachers and elected officials are potentially taking cues from the public context where the majority of citizens may not support the active representation of minority interests.

Therefore bottom-up political pressure can work to promote and/or interrupt bureaucratic behavior. There are two reasons to expect this relationship. First, as mentioned previously, the public provides bureaucrats with political resources, in the form of political support and information, which can potentially empower the bureaucrat. The acquisition of these resources is dependent, however, on the participation of the public with bureaucracy. In many administrative programs it is worthwhile to ask if individual participation is common. Yet, in the context of this research, there is increased pressure among educational professionals to communicate often with parents in order to best address the needs of students. The opportunity for participation is available through parent-teacher conferences, parent-teacher association meetings, and informal communication when needed. Through this communication, educators share information with parents and gain information from them. For instance, in the gifted and talented assignment process, oftentimes students are tested for the

program at the request of their parent. However, in many communities of color, the importance and availability of such programs are often unknown. Teachers, then, can act as a representative to help identify students for the program and/or share the benefits of this program with parents who do not have previous experience with gifted programming (Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom et al 2016).

In addition, as clients, the public is often very aware of the shortcomings of public programs. Because they interact directly with these programs, clients can share with bureaucrats various ways to address problems. As community members, clients only think of these issues in the context of their community. As such, they often know more appropriate ways to address the issue. To illustrate, research found that citizens helped to co-create environmental policy solutions in a majority Latino neighborhood. The author explains that by sharing methods that aligned with the economic, political, and social context of the community, citizens provided contextual expertise to develop more effective policies (Corburn 2007). Likewise, in some cases, research has found it is the knowledge and expertise of public interests that have been able to gain the attention of and develop communication with bureaucratic agencies (Berry 1981). Therefore, when it comes to school discipline, I would expect that many parents provide suggestions to teachers to address discipline concerns before expelling students. Contemporary interests point to methods such as providing students with a chance to learn how to better solve problems, teaching students conflict-resolution skills, and understanding student communication and intent from a cultural perspective (Gaines 2016).

Here political distance plays an important role because clients are likely only to share information where there is community and trust developed with the bureaucrat. Developing trusting relationships are more likely between the public and street-level bureaucrats than elected officials. This relationship is strong primarily because bureaucrats maintain two identities, as bureaucrats and citizens. The bureaucracy as an institution is intended to promote values among bureaucrats that support citizen development (Cook 1992). Clients then potentially have a strong influence on bureaucrats not only because they are more willing to share information with bureaucrats who are neighbors/friends, but also because bureaucrats may connect better with the public as they encourage the sharing of political ideas and solutions. While, school elected officials do provide public forums in the form of open school board meetings where they hope to hear public opinion and gain information, research indicates that public meetings may not serve its purpose in allowing citizens to directly influence school board decisions (Adams 2004). Yet, citizens can pursue a more accessible venue to influence policy through informal and consistent communication with teachers.

Second, bureaucratic actions toward representation are less likely to be influenced by elected officials because of the procedural requirements elected officials must follow before policy change. While minority representatives are aware of the concerns and achievement gaps facing their community, their desire to address these issues with formal policy may lengthen the process. For instance, when creating policy elected officials must go through a process of researching, developing, presenting, voting, approving, and implementing changes. Creating a new process of gifted identification or

an intervention for students needing discipline requires resources and time these officials are often not provided. As a result, elected officials may not have clear plans or policy changes to suggest to bureaucrats.

In addition, elected actors are concerned with public support and re-election outcomes (Canes-Wrone et al 2001). Research (Weaver 1986) indicates that politicians are more concerned with avoiding blame for unpopular decisions. For those who experience a fear of upsetting community members who do not agree with their policy positions and where racial representation is an issue that promotes tension, school board officials may limit their agenda to avoid the loss of some public support. As such, they may not pressure bureaucrats to promote representation. Given the various dynamics at play between clients, bureaucrats, and elected officials, I anticipate the following relationship: *Bottom-up political actors will have a greater effect on bureaucratic representation than top-down political actors.*

5.4 Findings

Beginning with high achievement indicators, table 6 indicates that both school board and the public positively influence minority teacher effectiveness for minority gifted and talented placement. The significant relationship for both political actors is not surprisingly. In fact, I expect that in many districts, when similar interests of the school board and public aggregate Black teachers will experience support from both actors to be representatives. Because on many occasions we expect the two political actors may complement each other, by comparing the predicted marginal effects of each interaction separately I hope to get a glimpse at the independent effects.

Therefore table 7 compares the predicted marginal impact at one standard deviation below the mean, the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean. The results indicate that the ability of Black teachers to improve Black G/T representation is greater in districts with Democratic support. Moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean, the predictive marginal impact of average Black teacher representation increases the Black G/T population from 6.9 percent to 9.1 percent. This growth outweighs the growth experienced across average levels of Black school board representation. These predicted outcomes imply that Black representatives' behaviors are highly related to the public and political landscape of the district. This may be a result of higher levels of Black citizen political engagement or the importance of community organizing within Black communities. Nonetheless, Black bureaucratic representation is highly influenced by the publics' politics in their district.

Table 6. The Effect of Political Actors on Teacher Representation and Black G/T

	Black G/T	Black G/T
Black Teacher	-0.0905* (0.0442)	-0.569*** (0.081)
Black School Board	-0.0361 (0.028)	-
Democrat Voting	-	-0.042*** (0.012)
Black Teachers x Black School Board	0.008*** (0.0008)	-
Black Teachers x Democrat Voting	-	0.016*** (0.002)
Black Administrators	-0.0268 (0.0375)	-0.005 (0.044)
Black Students	0.498*** (0.0294)	0.453*** (0.028)
Black College Grads	-0.0152* (0.008)	0.00007 (0.007)
Black Income	1.212*** (0.31)	0.753** (0.272)
Instructional Expenditures	0.312 (0.774)	-0.995 (0.783)
G/T Program Size	0.099*** (0.02)	0.089*** (0.018)
2004	0.382 (0.547)	-0.513 (0.545)
2008	-0.341 (0.355)	0.049 (0.346)
2012	-1.031 (0.596)	-0.201 (0.584)
Constant	-15.12* (6.849)	1.359 (6.746)
N	2934	3399
R2	0.81	0.8
Standard Errors reported below coefficient		
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001		

Table 7. Predicted Effect of Top-Down and Bottom-up Actors on Black Teachers and Black G/T

	-1 SD	Mean	+1 SD
Black School Board	6.81 (0.322)	7.11 (0.194)	7.7 (0.481)
Democratic Voting	6.9 (0.205)	7.8 (0.149)	9.1 (0.210)
Standard errors reported in parentheses All values have p<0.01			

For high achievement indicators within the Latino community, however, similar results are not found. First table 8 indicates positive yet insignificant trends across both political actors. Instead, when comparing predictive margins within the Latino community, representation cues are more effective when coming from top-down political actors.³ The predicted values in Table 9 indicate that on average, the marginal effect of Latino teachers on Latino gifted and talented students increases to a greater degree with an increase in school board rather than Democratic Party representation. For instance, moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean of Democratic Party representation, the results indicate very little growth in Latino G/T representation (less than 1 percent). When compared to similar changes across Latino school board representation, Latino teacher impact on G/T representation grows from a predicative 10 percent to 14.5 percent. While these results may indicate differences between Latino and Black political ideology, it may also indicate a different

³ It is important to note that in neither equation does the marginal effect of teachers change across levels of school board representation or district partisanship. However, the predicted value is significantly different from zero in both cases.

method of Latino representation. Research on Latino superintendent representation and English language learner (ELL) programs found that superintendents influenced representation by distributing resources in the form of teachers to ELL programs (Theobald 2007). Similarly, Latino bureaucrats may be more effective representatives when supported by Latino elected officials. This is increasingly probable if these officials recruit Latino bureaucrats with a purpose to address certain needs. For example the board may intend to expand gifted programming and hope to serve Latino students within these programs; as a result they may hire more Latino teachers to help identify and serve these students.

Table 8. The Effect of Political Actors on Teacher Representation and Latino G/T

	Latino G/T	Latino G/T
Latino Teachers	0.191* (0.076)	0.427* (0.165)
Latino School Board	0.198*** (0.043)	-
Democrat Voting	-	0.009 (0.015)
Latino Teachers x Latino School Board	0.001 (0.001)	-
Latino Teachers x Democrat Voting	-	-0.001 (0.002)
Latino Administrators	-0.059 (0.06)	0.085 (0.057)
Latino Students	0.546*** (0.033)	0.547*** (0.033)
Latino College Grads	0.051*** (0.014)	0.056*** (0.013)
Latino Income	-0.911 (0.513)	-1.270** (0.432)
Instructional Expenditures	-1.888* (0.94)	-1.942* (0.884)
G/T Program Size	0.161*** (0.030)	0.168*** (0.027)
2004	-1.002 (0.598)	-1.216* (0.553)
2008	0.652 (0.395)	0.64 (0.396)
2012	2.240** (0.77)	2.991*** (0.68)
Constant	20.19* (7.964)	23.11** (7.179)
N	2907	3392
R2	0.86	0.85
Standard Errors reported below coefficient *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001		

Table 9. Predicted Effect of Top-Down and Bottom-up Actors on Latino Teachers and Latino G/T

	-1 SD	Mean	+1 SD
Latino School Board	10.03 (0.306)	11.26 (0.266)	14.56 (0.716)
Democratic Voting	11.33 (0.315)	11.35 (0.189)	11.37 (0.283)
Standard errors reported in parentheses All values have p<0.01			

Next, table 10 indicates the influence of top-down versus bottom-up pressures on low-achievement outcomes. The hypothesis expects that teachers will take their cues and be more effective representatives as the percentage of the public voting for the Democratic Party increases. Our findings for Black expulsion rates are similar to that of Black G/T and support this hypothesis. Across average levels of Black school board representation, Black teachers potentially decrease Black expulsion rates by less than 0.5 percent. However, moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean Democratic Party support, Black teachers decrease Black expulsion rates by 1 percentage point. It is clear again that Black teachers seem to be more effective at improving Black student outcomes in Democratic districts. Yet, the small impact experienced in both analyses indicates that expulsions are a much more difficult performance measure to change. This difficulty and the results found might imply that expulsion rates speak to a larger community issue that requires community/parent support and engagement to address broader concerns of discipline.

Table 10. The Effect of Political Actors on Teacher Representation and Black Expulsions

	Black Expulsions	Black Expulsions
Black Teachers	0.165 (0.116)	0.580** (0.213)
Black School Board	0.029 (0.065)	-
Democrat Voting	-	0.061 (0.039)
Black Teachers x Black School Board	-0.006** (0.002)	-
Black Teachers x Democrat Voting	-	-0.013** (0.004)
Black Administrators	0.053 (0.092)	0.037 (0.087)
Black Students	0.907*** (0.067)	0.918*** (0.057)
Black College Grads	0.039 (0.027)	0.027 (0.026)
Black Income	-1.297 (0.873)	-1.108 (0.779)
Instructional Expenditures	-6.296** (2.043)	-5.900** (1.895)
Total Expulsions	7.178*** (2.046)	7.305*** (1.913)
2004	-3.052* (1.382)	-2.855* (1.338)
2008	-10.48*** (1.225)	-10.66*** (1.187)
2012	2.667 (1.905)	1.031 (1.69)
Constant	67.72*** (18.6)	
N	2933	3398
R2	0.44	0.437
Standard Errors reported below coefficient *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001		

Table 11. Predicted Effect of Top-Down and Bottom-up Actors on Black Teachers and Black Expulsions

	-1 SD	Mean	+1 SD
Black School Board	20.7 (0.851)	20.49 (0.581)	20.06 (1.165)
Democratic Voting	19.93 (0.691)	19.52 (0.463)	18.91 (0.623)
Standard errors reported in parentheses All values have p<0.01			

When observing Latino expulsions, similar to Latino G/T outcomes again it is not the public that influences effective representation but the school board. In fact, average Democratic voting is not statistically significant for teacher representation and may have the opposite effect. Moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean Democratic Party support, Latino teachers are related to a predicted increase of 15.6 to 16.5 percent Latino expulsions. Compared to the impact of Latino teachers across averages of Latino elected officials, it appears that Latino teachers are taking cues from their political superiors. Across average levels of Latino school board representation, Latino teachers are predicted to decrease Latino expulsions by 0.5 percent. Although these results fail to support our hypothesis, the surprising positive impact of Latino teachers and Democratic Party support on expulsions implies interesting dynamics between the Latino community and local Democratic Party.

As alluded by these and previous findings, Latino bureaucrats may fail to see Democratic Party support as support for Latino representative behavior. This may be a result of the wary support Latinos provide the Democratic party. In addition, although Latino communities are facing many of the same problems as African-American youth,

Latino citizens may not engage in the same type of co-productive, political engagement as their Black counterparts. These results may then be the failure of local Democratic parties to provide a space of community organizing for Latino citizens. As such, there may be less promotion of the inequalities experienced by their students and fewer public efforts to address them.

Table 12. The Effect of Political Actors on Teachers Representation and Latino Expulsions

	Latino Expulsions	Latino Expulsions
Latino Teachers	-0.019 (0.163)	0.034 (0.322)
Latino School Board	-0.021 (0.068)	-
Democrat Voting	-	0.055 (0.034)
Latino Teachers x Latino School Board	-0.002 (0.002)	-
Latino Teachers x Democrat Voting	-	-0.003 (0.005)
Latino Administrators	0.369** (0.122)	0.221 (0.118)
Latino Students	0.720*** (0.056)	0.739*** (0.047)
Latino College Grads	0.0019 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.025)
Latino Incomes	-0.192 (1.045)	0.111 (0.875)
Instructional Expenditures	-10.14*** (1.987)	-10.58*** (1.848)
Total Expulsions	2.783*** (0.745)	3.187*** (0.748)
2004	-5.029*** (1.306)	-5.133*** (1.231)
2008	-7.262*** (1.133)	-6.988*** (1.099)
2012	1.827 (2.016)	0.102 (1.519)
Constant	88.81*** (17.87)	87.42*** (15.24)
N	2907	3392
R2	0.54	0.53
Standard Errors reported below coefficient *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001		

Table 13. Predicted Effect of Top-Down and Bottom-up Actors on Latino Teachers and Latino Expulsions

	-1 SD	Mean	+1 SD
Latino School Board	17.7 (0.613)	17.49 (0.540)	16.92 (1.195)
Democratic Voting	15.61 (0.645)	15.99 (0.413)	16.55 (0.567)
Standard errors reported in parentheses All values have $p < 0.01$			

Across all models various control variables are influential to these relationships. For instance, program size, minority student population, and instructional expenditures influence student outcomes in the ways expected. Interestingly, representation among school administrators is not as influential for minority outcomes when including district partisanship or school board representation. This may be a result of the public working directly with bureaucrats or administrators allowing teachers to take on the duties of representing minority student interests (Meier and O’Toole 2006a). Last, minority educational attainment and income were not consistently significant for student outcomes. Although the education production function would expect parent education and income to influence these outcomes, much of that research is focused on non-minority communities and may not have the same consistent effects given the outcome variables observed here.

5.5 Discussion and Conclusion

Within most bureaucracies, street-level bureaucrats receive pressure from different actors to take action and behave in a way that will influence client performance. However, given the different relationships between the bureaucracy and political actors,

bureaucratic behavior may be cued in response to some but not all actors. This study sought to understand from whom are minority representatives in the bureaucracy taking their cues: are bureaucrats empowered to be more effective bureaucrats when supported by their hierarchical political principal or the public?

The findings indicate that in fact both political actors may be effectively influencing bureaucratic representation. But the answer also depends on the minority community in question. When observing the relationship between Black teachers and student outcomes, both high and low achievement indicators are greater in a Democratic school district. This indicates that within these districts Black teachers are more effective representatives because the community may potentially vocalize their support of bureaucratic active representation. While an increase in school board representation can lead to an increase in Black teacher effectiveness as well, the maximum impact is not as substantively significant as that found in Democratic districts. This result implies that in Democratic districts where there is no minority elected representation, minority teachers may be able to effectively influence minority student outcomes in spite of elected officials by leaning on the support of their public political community.

Similar results, however, were not found within Latino communities. In fact, the opposite occurred for both high and low achievement indicators. The data indicate that Latino teachers take cues of representation not from partisanship within the public but Latino elected officials. Essentially this result implies that Latino teachers are more comfortable and more likely to take on an active representative role when there are co-minority school board members who will potentially support their behavior. This result

does fail to support the hypothesis, but given the community observed there are reasons why this may occur. I expect most likely that the insignificant relationship between teacher representation and district partisanship is a result of the small ties between the Latino community and the Democratic Party. Unlike African-Americans who experience a much longer history and somewhat positive relationship with the Democratic Party, a similar relationship may not exist for Latino communities (Michelson 2005). In fact, many Latino communities struggle to participate politically and are skeptical of partisanship within the United States (Shaw et al 2000). Because Latinos lack political incorporation, there also exists low political trust and high internal efficacy within the community (Marschall 2001). The presence of a Latino elected official, therefore, may help improve trust among Latino bureaucrats and foster political activity towards representation. For this reason, Latino teachers may feel that the costs of active representation are minimized when hierarchical political principals support their behavior rather than the public. In addition, the results of chapter four indicate a similar occurrence where Latino social capital negatively affects Latino educational outcomes. Together both results highlight a difference between Latino community and political engagement that may not be easily comparable to their African-American peers. Additional research exploring partisanship within the Latino community may help explain these results.

Essentially these results imply once again that bureaucratic politics is highly dependent on context. Within this chapter the context in question appears to be the minority political context and the education context. First, different minority

communities may have different relationships with various political actors. Those with close relationships within the community or with political parties may be more comfortable incorporating and responding to public interests directly. Yet, those who have closer ties with individual political principals may look to elected officials when taking action.

The education context may create certain limitations as well. Within public education, bureaucracy is focused on the public and teacher/parent relationships. For bureaucracies that are less focused toward the public, the political influence of the public may not overwhelm that of elected officials. This phenomenon is precisely one of the reasons why research at the federal level often indicates the significance of the executive and their appointees. Although this may be perceived as a limit to the generalizability of this study, I believe it is a contribution. This limitation exemplifies why it is important to explore the influence of political actors at the local level.

Last, the results of this study are limited because it compares political actors who are statistically correlated with each other. Essentially in the U.S. Black and Latino elected officials are likely to be represented at least descriptively in the Democratic Party setting. While it would be appropriate to see how these political actors work together instead of comparing the two, the collinearity of the data does not provide this type of analysis.⁴

⁴ A three-way interaction between teacher representation, school board representation, and district partisanship was insignificant across outcomes.

Nonetheless, this study does provide a contribution across literatures. First to the representative bureaucracy literature, this chapter illustrates that minority bureaucrats do take cues from political actors before pursuing active representation. While the representative bureaucracy literature often assumes active representation, this research implies that minority representatives are more or less effective at improving minority outcomes depending on the support of political actors within their organizational context.

This research also contributes to the literature on political control. Studies of political control are often focused on the federal bureaucracy and dismiss the potential effect of the public. Yet, bottom-up pressures can be influential to bureaucratic behavior and outcomes at the local level where bureaucrats waiver between two identities of bureaucrat and community member. The relationships developed within this context will potentially affect bureaucratic behavior far more than pressure from elected officials.

Finally, within the field of education focus on minority student outcomes has consistently grown in the past decade. Other than research that explores school board representation, little research explores the political dynamics working within school districts. This research has done just that in explaining that both top-down and bottom-up political pressures influence teacher behaviors. Because teachers play such a crucial role in eliminating the gap between minority students and their peers, additional research on the role of district politics and teacher behaviors in public schools should be pursued.

6. CONCLUSION

As minority clients face disparities in various public programs, the importance of representation to potentially address these disparities is crucial. Yet, if there are barriers that potentially disrupt effective representation, it is necessary to recognize and potentially tap into resources that can assist in promoting positive outcomes for minority clients. The story of the Pulaski County Special School district (presented in the introduction) illustrates a district that successfully achieved minority representation across performance outcomes because of their various advocacy efforts that included resource adjustments, community development, and political support (Grantham 2003).

Throughout this dissertation I have outlined first the importance of representation on minority client outcomes. But additionally I have explained that bureaucrats will have difficulty being successful when the proper support is not provided to them. In chapter three I describe one of the most visible contexts from which support is necessary, the organization's economic climate. Empirically, I find that racial minority representation is in fact influenced by financial stress in the organization. And, the type of resources will matter. A simple increase in total resources has a limited effect on representation. However, changes in instructional expenditures can potentially provide additional slack to bureaucratic actors and provide bureaucrats with room for movement and assistance in their daily work. As in the PCSSD district, chapter three's results illustrate that if an organization seeks to truly improve minority representation they must first dedicate resources to improve the infrastructure and create the opportunity for effective growth.

Second, this dissertation proceeds to illustrate that community context can create a support network for bureaucratic representation. Within the Black community, a higher level of Black social capital is related to an increase in the marginal effect of Black teachers on Black students in G/T courses. For Latino communities, Latino social capital independently decreased Latino student achievement. But when coupled with the efforts of Latino bureaucrats, Latino students experienced gains in gifted and talented representation and a decline in discipline. These results indicate that social capital within minority communities can be a large asset for minority teacher representation. And as members of the community, bureaucrats are in a unique position to reach out to the community and maximize their engagement efforts. Thus, without getting Black parents on board, administrators in PCSSD may still be facing concerns of underrepresentation in their gifted programming. Yet, given the community group in question, community engagement may be a unique challenge for many public programs. In order to further client understanding of bureaucratic services, bureaucrats particularly in low social capital communities should first learn the challenges and strengths facing their client community.

Last, in the fifth chapter, I explore how different types of political control actors will impact representation. Historically, in order to achieve goals of representation and equity, minority political actors have pursued multi-level governance. In other words, minority political and bureaucratic actors add to the efforts of each other. In various works of literature (Meier et al 2004, Meier and Stewart 1991), Black and Latino school members, lead to racial minority school administrators, and the hiring of more Black and

Latino street-level bureaucrats. Together, representation at each level contributes to minority outcomes, although street-level bureaucrats are most influential. The results of this chapter speaks to this literature, but the differences between Latinos and African-Americans found in this study do indicate that multilevel governance and representation may take effect differently in the two communities. The data illustrate that while Black teacher representation was related to an improvement in Black student outcomes in Democratic districts, Latino teacher representation successfully improved Latino student outcomes when there was top-down Latino representation on the school board.

The literature on Latino political participation potentially speaks to these differences as it indicates that Latino candidates on the ballot spur Latino voter participation (Barreto et al 2005).¹ Similarly, Latino representation on the school board may activate a Latino group consciousness and spur bureaucratic efforts toward active representation. Although African-Americans do indeed experience a similar type of political activation, there is also a greater sense of political cohesion among Black communities that may promote political advocacy among Black bureaucrats. The Black community's political organization may then serve as an additional source of political pressure on Black bureaucrats. Thus, similar to the ways in which PCSSD knew political voices within the Black community were influential to their efforts, local bureaucrats must use constituent political groups and/or state political representatives to further their goals of equity.

¹ Similar findings have been noted within African-American communities and participation as well (Tate 1991).

6.1 Theoretical Contributions

In 2015, O'Toole and Meier collaborated and developed a more general theory of the importance of organizational context on public management. The theory suggests that management matters to various degrees given the political, environmental, and internal context of the organization. In this research, I extend their theory as a framework for effective representation. In the contemporary representative bureaucracy literature, there is a tendency to assume that active representation and its positive outcomes will eventually manifest in organizations with some degree of passive representation. Some literature, has called this into question by asserting that organizational socialization may still operate as a barrier to active representation (Wilkins and Williams 2008, Carroll 2016). Yet, I would argue that active representation is more dependent on the organization's ability to support bureaucrats' representative behaviors in the face of external constraints rather than on the bureaucrats themselves. When framed in this manner, active representation is not just a behavior that develops organically once more minorities are a part of the bureaucracy. Instead, this research presents evidence that active representation can be approached as an intentional process if organizations develop the proper venues to support its success.

Surprisingly, this research has also produced outcomes that are concerning for the representative bureaucracy literature in regards to different minority communities. Particularly, the inconsistencies of chapters four and five call attention to the fact that there is no model of bureaucratic representation that fits both Black and Latino communities alike. The difference in findings that are consistent across these two

chapters may potentially indicate very unique characteristics about the Latino community. First, Latino community involvement may distinctly differ from other minority groups. This difference is potentially a result of the various identities that make up Latino communities and the lack of political cohesion resulting from various national backgrounds (Meier and Melton 2012). In addition, when Latinos are not a numerical majority political engagement and networking may suffer (Meier and Melton 2012). In research on community involvement, Marschall (2001) finds that the motives of participation are different for Latinos and African-Americans. For Latinos common political attitudes are a sense of political mistrust and a high sense of efficacy. African-Americans on the other hand are motivated by high efficacy and trust, signally a sense of political integration within the community (Marschall 2001). Where increased levels of partisanship and community organization are not the norm, one would not expect these venues of public engagement and support to influence outcomes. Likewise, if a base sense of political efficacy, participation, and engagement with government services contributes to bureaucratic representation, its inconsistent nature within the Latino community may be responsible for the varying accounts of Latino bureaucratic representation.

Finally, public support may be represented in entirely different ways for the Latino community. The research of Rodney Hero (2003) points to similar discrepancies in that social capital does not have an independent positive effect on minority student outcomes. Within my research, these findings were the case for overall levels of social capital as well as social capital within minority groups. This implies that Black and Latino

networks and norms of interaction may not be captured in measures of voting, participating in a boycott, or volunteering to fix a community problem. Thus, the ways in which we measure and theoretically conceptualize public social capital and community involvement for white communities may not extend to minority groups.

6.2 Future Research: Suggestions to the Scholar

Although this research seeks to explain the micro-processes that underlie bureaucratic representation, like most studies of representative bureaucracy it does so using a large N quantitative dataset. One of the benefits of this approach is that the nature of the dataset allows readers to view reliable relationships within the data. However, if we truly want to understand the micro-processes of representation, a qualitative approach to representation may help to uncover various inquiries that still remain. For instance, broad questions regarding how minority bureaucrats perceive themselves as representatives and if their representative behavior is dependent on administrator support have yet to be addressed. Additional research on this topic should consider many of the assumptions made in the literature broadly and even within my own research.

In addition, bureaucracies are operating in community contexts that are much more multi-racial than the segregated communities of the past. The possibility of cross minority group representation may assist in representation efforts. Particularly, do Latino and African-Americans serve as active representatives for racial minority students that are not of their same-race? Former research on coalition building indicates that Latinos and African-Americans are unlikely to be first choice coalition partners (Meier and

Stewart 1991, Rocha 2007). Nonetheless, research of attempts toward cross minority group representation and successful coalitions should continue. These are just a few of the research questions that will help to shed light on representation as a bureaucratic process and help to improve minority public outcomes toward equity.

6.3 Policy Implications: Suggestions to the Practitioner

Public bureaucracies are under increased scrutiny to increase representation among their workforce. And calls for minority bureaucrats are noted in both public education and local law enforcement. Organizational barriers, however, still remain in these agencies that do not fully support active representation from minority bureaucrats. There are resources, however, that matter for representation. For instance, the amount of economic resources the agency decides to invest in minority programs will benefit the representative efforts of their bureaucrats. Likewise, developing and tapping into the proper community and political support networks are critical for bureaucratic co-production.

I would argue that practically this implies that bureaucracies must look beyond simply improving their passive representation. Passive representation will not produce the desired substantive outcomes until public organizations ensure that resources exist for active representation. Therefore, local administrators must make an effort to invest in their bureaucrats, mend relationships with local minority communities, and understand the various community politics that empower representation.

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APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3

This appendix provides the supplementary material for chapter three, “Mo’ Money, No Problem: The Impact of Financial Stress on Representation.” Table 14 provides summary statistics for the models in chapter three. The interactive models for both total revenue and instructional expenditures changes with fixed effects are found here as well (Table 15-Table 18). These models provide additional robustness checks.

Table 14. Chapter 3 Summary Statistics

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Black Teachers	7.228	12.686	0	99
Latino Teachers	6.344	12.991	0	99
Total Revenue	0.055	1.431	-5.09	3.624
Instructional Expenditures	0.045	0.448	-1.324	1.248
Black Administrators	10.648	16.042	0	100
Latino Administrators	6.315	13.92	0	100
Black College Grads	17.627	14.415	0	100
Latino College Grads	15.301	12.574	0	100
Black Income	22071.33	23532.74	0	330000
Latino Income	22351.72	22178.14	534.5	215707
Democrat Voting	47.527	12.498	9.962	93.818
Total Enrollment	9.231	0.757	3.045	13.864
Black Gifted and Talented	6.905	13.947	0	100
Latino Gifted and Talented	9.362	18.223	0	100
Black Expulsions	14.926	26.742	0	100
Latino Expulsions	12.639	25.045	0	100
G/T Program Size	6.625	6.398	0	100
Total Expulsions	0.206	0.721	0	40.851

Table 15. The Effect of Black Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Black G/T (w/ Fixed Effects)

	Black G/T	Black G/T
Black Teachers	-0.0401 (0.0265)	0.00871 (0.0282)
Total Revenue	-0.00803 (0.485)	-
Black Teachers x Total Revenue	-0.0194 (0.00997)	-
Instructional Expenditures	-	0.215 (1.012)
Black Teachers x Instructional Expenditures	-	0.0747*** (0.0188)
Black Administrators	0.0601* (0.0236)	0.0513* (0.0232)
Black Students	0.364*** (0.0633)	0.390*** (0.0628)
Black College Grads	0.0224 (0.0228)	0.0208 (0.0225)
Black Income	0.0974 (0.697)	0.0534 (0.69)
Total Enrollment	-0.513 (1.705)	0.478 (1.698)
Democrat Voting	0.049 (0.475)	-0.0697 (0.47)
G/T Program Size	0.102*** (0.0275)	0.096*** (0.0274)
2008	-0.61 (0.494)	-1.298 (0.99)
2012	0.487 (1.393)	-0.35 (1.263)
Constant	1.535 (17.05)	-3.551 (16.91)
N	2273	2275
R2	0.99	0.99
District Fixed Effects estimated, not reported		
Standard Errors reported below coefficient		
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001		

Table 16. The Effect of Latino Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Latino G/T (w/ Fixed Effects)

Table A.3: The Effect of Latino Teachers and Funding on Gifted and Talented Students		
	Latino G/T	Latino G/T
Latino Teachers	0.285***	0.144**
	-0.0547	(0.0517)
Total Revenue	-0.191	-
	(0.813)	
Latino Teachers x Total Revenue	-0.098***	-
	(0.0159)	
Instructional Expenditures (IE)	-	-0.255
		(1.753)
Latino Teachers x IE	-	0.235***
		(0.0306)
Latino Administrators	-0.0929	-0.103*
	(0.0493)	(0.0484)
Latino students	0.593***	0.647***
	(0.0966)	(0.0944)
Latino College Grads	-0.019	-0.0425
	(0.0577)	(0.0565)
Latino Income	1.081	-0.773
	(1.155)	(1.112)
Total Enrollment	3.09	4.221
	(2.864)	(2.812)
Democrat Voting	0.26	0.0435
	(0.928)	(0.914)
G/T Program Size	0.394***	0.386***
	-0.0468	(0.0462)
2008	-0.657	-1.24
	(0.892)	(1.725)
2012	1.083	1.131
	(2.33)	(2.225)
Constant	-50.75	-38.27
	(31.86)	(31.29)
N	2256	2258
R2	0.98	0.98
District Fixed Effects estimated, not reported		
Standard Errors reported below coefficient		
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001		

Table 17. The Effect of Black Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Black Expulsions (w/ Fixed Effects)

	Black Expulsions	Black Expulsions
Black Teachers	0.282 (0.164)	-0.00468 (0.175)
Total Revenue	-4.279 (2.999)	-
Black Teachers x Total Revenue	0.104 (0.0617)	-
Instructional Expenditures	-	-1.084 (6.247)
Black Teachers x Instructional Expenditures	-	-0.429*** (0.116)
Black Administrators	0.116 (0.146)	0.166 (0.144)
Black students	0.65 (0.392)	0.456 (0.391)
Black College Grads	-0.0756 (0.141)	-0.0602 (0.14)
Black Income	-4.733 (4.307)	-4.439 (4.28)
Total Enrollment	11.5 (10.54)	7.137 (10.53)
Democrat Voting	-0.952 (2.93)	-0.525 (2.913)
Total Expulsions	8.146*** (1.984)	7.760*** (1.97)
2008	-14.82*** (3.077)	-7.33 (6.093)
2012	13.23 (8.599)	9.667 (7.802)
Constant	-38.18 (105.4)	-14.35 (104.9)
N	2273	2275
R2	0.85	0.86
District Fixed Effects estimated, not reported		
Standard Errors reported below coefficient		
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001		

Table 18. The Effect of Latino Teachers and Economic Turbulence on Latino Expulsions (w/ Fixed Effects)

	Latino Expulsions	Latino Expulsions
Latino Teachers	-0.193 (0.185)	-0.146 (0.176)
Total Revenue	-0.252 (2.755)	-
Latino Teachers x Total Revenue	-0.00848 (0.054)	-
Instructional Expenditures (IE)	-	-3.818 (5.946)
Latino Teachers x IE	-	-0.354*** (0.104)
Latino Administrators	0.259 (0.167)	0.251 (0.165)
Latino students	0.21 (0.327)	0.222 (0.321)
Latino College Grads	-0.155 (0.195)	-0.152 (0.192)
Latino Income	5.179 (3.92)	5.317 (3.796)
Total Enrollment	12.03 (9.688)	11.01 (9.566)
Democrat Voting	-0.868 (3.14)	-0.558 (3.109)
Total Expulsions	3.063 (1.823)	3.067 (1.802)
2008	-7.882* (3.051)	-1.757 (5.834)
2012	-6.583 (7.884)	-2.914 (7.563)
Constant	-132.5 (107.9)	-136.4 (106.6)
N	2256	2258
R2	0.87	0.87
District Fixed Effects estimated, not reported		
Standard Errors reported below coefficient		
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001		

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 4

This appendix provides supplementary materials for chapter four, “It Takes a Village: Minority Social Capital, Representation, and Student Performance.” Table 19 presents the summary statistics for the data in chapter four. Tables 20-23 list the models associated with the figures in chapter four.

Table 19. Chapter 4 Summary Statistics

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Public Social Capital	-0.258	1.463	-2.872	9.295
Latino SC	-0.52	1.26	-2.66	8.74
Black SC	-0.34	1.37	-2.86	8.67
G/T Program	6.53	6.35	0	100
Total Expulsions	0.21	0.71	0	40.85
Black G/T	6.79	13.87	0	100
Latino G/T	9.37	18.23	0	100
Black Expulsions	14.69	26.61	0	100
Latino Expulsions	12.62	25	0	100
Latino Students	18.82	23.38	0	99.9
Black Students	15.75	19.95	0	99.71
Latino Administrators	6.36	13.88	0	100
Black Administrators	10.57	16.12	0	100
Black Teachers	7.17	12.74	0	99
Latino Teachers	6.39	12.92	0	99
Total Revenue	8.7	1.35	2.75	14.069
White Education	23.37	13.22	0	100
Latino Education	15.45	18.7	0	100
Black Education	17.29	20.86	0	100
Democrat Voting	47.53	12.49	9.96	93.82
Median Income	64015.7	16784.48	26009	137216

Table 20. The Impact of Social Capital on Social Opportunity

	G/T Program Size	Total Expulsions
Public Social Capital	-0.061 (0.108)	-0.006 -0.013
Total Revenue	-0.717 (0.377)	0.047 (0.029)
White Education	0.134*** (0.022)	-0.002 (0.001)
Latino Education	-0.052* (0.024)	-0.001 (0.0009)
Black Education	0.061** (0.023)	-0.0004 (0.0007)
Total Enrollment	0.974*** (0.223)	0.017 (0.017)
Black Students	0.005 (0.009)	0.004* (0.002)
Latino Students	0.006 (0.008)	-0.0009 (0.0008)
Democrat Voting	-0.038* (0.017)	-0.004 (0.002)
Median Income	-0.108 (0.969)	-0.194* (0.076)
2004	-1.254 (1.049)	0.241* (0.119)
2008	-2.066 (1.143)	0.097 (0.097)
2012	-1.485*** (0.374)	0.115** (0.037)
Constant	3.533 (11.41)	1.952** (0.755)
N	2606	2606
R2	0.09	0.02
Standard Errors reported below coefficient *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001		

Table 21. The Impact of Overall Social Capital on Minority Outcomes

	Black G/T	Black Exp.	Latino G/T	Latino Exp.
Public Social Capital	0.157 (0.189)	0.36 (0.496)	-0.440* (0.172)	1.422** (0.528)
Black Administrators	-0.01 (0.088)	-0.188 (0.131)	-	-
Black Teachers	0.361** (0.124)	0.061 (0.154)	-	-
Black Students	0.495*** (0.053)	0.877*** (0.088)	-	-
Black Education	-0.008 (0.014)	0.078 (0.05)	-	-
Black Income	1.229* (0.54)	-3.022* (1.322)	-	-
Latino Administrators	-	-	0.034 (0.072)	0.186 (0.133)
Latino Teachers	-	-	0.320** (0.1)	-0.0344 (0.138)
Latino Students	-	-	0.636*** (0.036)	0.730*** (0.053)
Latino Education	-	-	0.163*** (0.025)	-0.0481 (0.046)
Latino Income	-	-	-3.618*** (0.872)	-2.301 (1.886)
Total Revenue	1.057* (0.436)	-2.751* (1.224)	1.110* (0.436)	-6.489*** (1.094)
Democrat Voting	0.057* (0.026)	-0.041 (0.067)	-0.008 (0.031)	-0.039 (0.056)
G/T Program Size	0.062* (0.026)	-	0.207*** (0.042)	-
Total Expulsions	-	8.573*** (1.774)	-	6.774*** (1.523)
2004	2.679 (1.402)	-6.177 (3.435)	2.725* (1.363)	-16.28*** (3.297)
2008	2.089 (1.407)	-18.84*** (3.424)	4.379** (1.453)	-30.57*** (3.524)
2012	-2.967* (1.195)	1.156 (2.602)	5.116*** (1.472)	3.325 (3.522)
Constant	-25.94***	59.03***	15.46	85.32***

	(6.87)	(16.71)	(8.897)	(21.05)
N	1415	1415	1417	1417
R2	0.76	0.39	0.87	0.56
Standard Errors reported below coefficient				
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001				

Table 22. The Impact of Minority Social Capital on Minority Outcomes

	Black G/T	Black Exp.	Latino G/T	Latino Exp.
Black SC	0.187 (0.204)	0.492 (0.549)	-	-
Latino SC	-	-	-0.534** (0.188)	1.786** (0.595)
Black Administrators	-0.007 (0.089)	-0.18 (0.133)	-	-
Black Teachers	0.361** (0.126)	0.024 (0.158)	-	-
Black Students	0.491*** (0.053)	0.911*** (0.08)	-	-
Black Education	-0.009 (0.014)	0.087 (0.051)	-	-
Black Income	1.385* (0.571)	-3.237* (1.36)	-	-
Latino Administrators	-	-	0.033 (0.072)	0.179 (0.133)
Latino Teachers	-	-	0.317** (0.102)	-0.018 (0.136)
Latino Students	-	-	0.635*** (0.036)	0.740*** (0.053)
Latino Education	-	-	0.172*** (0.026)	-0.063 (0.047)
Latino Income	-	-	-3.864*** (0.908)	-1.913 (1.952)
Total Revenue	1.046* (0.453)	-2.817* (1.263)	1.225** (0.452)	-6.641*** (1.125)
Democrat Voting	0.059* (0.027)	-0.044 (0.068)	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.031 (0.057)
G/T Program Size	0.062* (0.027)	-	0.209*** (0.043)	-
Total Expulsions	-	8.440*** (1.822)	-	6.924*** (1.541)
2004	2.578 (1.472)	-5.76 (3.549)	3.072* (1.416)	-16.82*** (3.379)
2008	2.063 (1.451)	-19.23*** (3.513)	4.937** (1.564)	-32.06*** (3.696)
2012	-3.176**	1.33	5.470***	2.649

Table 22. Continued from previous page.				
	(1.227)	(2.614)	(1.51)	(3.629)
Constant	-	61.42***	16.66	83.21***
	27.35{***			
	(7.255)	(17.18)	(9.223)	(21.71)
N	1361	1361	1377	1377
R2	0.76	0.41	0.87	0.56
Standard Errors reported below coefficient				
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001				

Table 23. The Impact of Minority Representation and Social Capital on Minority Outcomes

	Black G/T	Black Exp.	Latino G/T	Latino Exp.
Black SC	-0.312 (0.274)	0.844 (0.92)	-	-
Black Teachers	0.049 (0.059)	-0.104 (0.196)	-	-
Latino SC	-	-	-1.008** (0.379)	1.822 (1.236)
Latino Teachers	-	-	0.095 (0.063)	-0.535** (0.205)
Black SC x Black Teachers	0.106*** (0.017)	-0.0762 (0.058)	-	-
Latino SC x Latino Teachers	-	-	0.055* (0.025)	-0.177* (0.081)
Black Administrators	0.168*** (0.046)	-0.096 (0.154)	-	-
Black Students	0.454*** (0.111)	-0.7 (0.37)	-	-
Black Education	0.019 (0.056)	-0.006 (0.189)	-	-
Black Income	0.865 (1.549)	-9.089 (5.214)	-	-
Latino Administrators	-	-	0.016 (0.048)	0.027 (0.156)
Latino Students	-	-	0.557*** (0.101)	0.714* (0.332)
Latino Education	-	-	0.001 (0.101)	-0.266 (0.328)
Latino Income	-	-	-0.519 (2.043)	6.526 (6.664)
Total Revenue	0.514 (0.608)	1.644 (2.035)	0.882 (0.715)	-3.485 (2.328)
Democrat Voting	-0.819 (0.742)	-0.33 (2.485)	0.049 (1.001)	1.313 (3.258)
G/T Program Size	0.099* (0.042)	-	0.322*** (0.049)	-
Total Expulsions	-	11.23*** (2.325)	-	5.449* (2.504)

Table 23. Continued from previous page

2004	1.647 (1.654)	5.925 (5.527)	2.014 (1.95)	-10.4 (6.338)
2008	0.464 (1.636)	-4.697 (5.485)	4.751* (2.077)	-20.87** (6.798)
2012	-1.052 (2.262)	11.72 (7.598)	2.316 (3.131)	-6.989 (10.22)
Constant	29.55 (42.57)	100.4 (142.7)	-7.892 (56.51)	-83.84 (184)
N	1361	1361	1377	1377
R2	0.96	0.85	0.98	0.85
Standard Errors reported below coefficient				
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001				

APPENDIX C

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 5

This appendix provides the supplementary materials for chapter five, “It’s All About Politics: Minority Representation and Political Control.” Table 24 lists the summary statistics for the data used in chapter five.

Table 24. Chapter 5 Summary Statistics

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Black School Board (%)	10.038	17.257	0	100
Latino School Board (%)	6.279	16.871	0	100
Democratic Voting	47.527	12.498	9.962	93.818
Black Teachers	4.711	12.036	0	100
Latino Teachers	4.079	10.795	0	100
Black Administrators	6.993	17.427	0	100
Latino Administrators	3.912	12.613	0	100
Black G/T	4.471	12.562	0	100
Latino G/T	6.539	15.447	0	100
Black Expulsions	8.638	22.561	0	100
Latino Expulsions	7.309	20.666	0	100
Black Students	12.348	21.104	0	100
Latino Students	14.834	21.301	0	100
Black College Grads	17.296	20.863	0	100
Latino College Grads	15.445	18.701	0	100
Black Income (logged)	9.952	0.884	5.974	12.707
Latino Income (logged)	10.149	0.885	6.281	12.413
Instructional Expenditures (logged)	8.616	0.475	2.198	12.598
G/T Program Size	4.971	6.67	0	100
Total Expulsions	0.189	0.768	0	40.851