DICTATORS, MINISTERIAL CRONYISM, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation examines an underexplored actor on the world stage: the personalist dictator. Personalist dictators are leaders that have consolidated all domestic power for themselves. Idi Amin, Joseph Stalin, Saddam Hussein, Pol Pot, and Benito Mussolini are all examples of these heads of states. Their names often live in infamy, etched in the history books with the blood they spilt. Although these regimes are usually remembered for the violence they exhibited within their own regimes, recent studies have found that these leaders also show a proclivity for conflict at the international level.

In this dissertation, I ask, “Why are personalist dictators so conflict-prone?" To answer this question, I show how domestic institutions vary across autocracies in response to leaders’ incentives and how this variation can be used to explain the propensity of international conflict. In particular, I investigate the role that advisers play in conflict occurrence and outcomes. Often, leaders rely on individuals, such as defense ministers, to give them assessments on the potential outcomes of conflicts. Little attention has been paid to the effects these ministers have. However, if we believe that war may be the product of miscalculation of capabilities or resolve, then we might expect that states with less capable advisers are more likely to experience international conflict. Using this logic, I argue that personalist dictators are more likely to experience conflict, because they are more prone to employ incompetent advisers and ministers.

My theoretical argument starts with the assumption that personalist dictators live in constant fear of being overthrown. In comparison to other leaders, the despot can expect that his removal will more likely end in a negative post-tenure fate: exile, imprisonment, or death. The reason for this propensity is that a personalist leader’s legitimacy is uniquely tied to personal traits. So long as the despot is living, he poses a threat to his successors.

The extreme costs for removal and the proximity of the likely culprits result in the dictator's regime being characterized by paranoia and mistrust. In order to protect himself, the personalist dictator surrounds himself with small, exclusive circles of crony advisers whose loyalty is ensured through bloodlines or long-standing friendships. In utilizing this lever, the dictator trades bureaucratic independence and competence for loyalty and survival.

This loyalty-competency tradeoff results in a personalist leader's inability to get accurate and honest assessments of his opponents from these advisers, making him more likely to underestimate his opponents, experience war (particularly ones in which his state is the weaker party), and incur worse conflict outcomes. After constructing an original cross-national dataset of over 1500 defense ministers from 1945 to 2005, and performing in-depth examinations of the Gamal Abdel Nasser and Saddam Hussein regimes, I provide evidence that personalist leaders are more likely to place cronies in advisory positions, and these advisers undermine the ability for personalist leaders to form accurate war-time assessments, leading to bargaining breakdowns, and subsequently, war.

DEDICATION

To my wife and family. Without them, this dissertation would not have been possible.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Joseph Stalin's life, much like his regime, was governed by terror. On one hand, the Soviet dictator's paranoia benefited him. As Montefiore (2004, 55-56) writes the "Bolsheviks believed that paranoia, which they called 'vigilance,' was an almost religious duty," and Stalin would credit his ability to stay alive to this "holy fear." However, his suspicions would also come at a detriment. In order to discourage coup attempts, Stalin terrorized his elites and constantly purged any individual that he saw as a threat. His inner circle lived under the constant fear of Stalin's mercurial nature; they were always a moment away from provoking his anger, and subsequently, being hauled away to the gulag or their own execution.[1] This campaign of intimidation and domination would only work to create a self-perpetuating cycle, where Stalin's repression produced the very opposition that endangered his life.

Stalin's constant fear undermined the Premier both personally and professionally. On a personal level, Stalin's "paranoia gave him no rest," as the strongman admitted to confidants that he didn't "even trust himself" (614). His perpetual anxiety resulted in a myriad of medical issues: stomach ulcers, high blood pressure, fainting spells, depression, and tooth loss. Professionally, the need for personal security often weakened his administration's competency and effectiveness, particularly with regards to the military. In the Soviet Union, the Politburo fundamentally mistrusted the military: "Stalin and his cronies were

[1] One particular anecdote demonstrates the depths of this fear. When Stalin suffered a stroke during the early morning hours of March 1, 1953, many of his closest associates were in the residence, including Lavrentiy Beria, Georgey Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, and Nikita Khruschev. The next day, when Stalin did not emerge from his bedroom, these top officials felt that something was wrong but did not check on the ruler, out of fear of angering Stalin. In fact, Stalin's body was not discovered until 10pm that night, when a much lower-ranking governmental official arrived to deliver the mail (638-639).

convinced that officers were to be distrusted and physically exterminated at the slightest suspicion" (226).

Case in point would be Stalin's treatment of Marshal Georgi Zhukov. After Hitler betrayed Stalin by invading the Soviet Union in June 1941, Hitler's duplicity left Stalin "shocked" and "bewildered." As a response, Stalin began to defer to his generals creating an "almost collegiate atmosphere" and "outstanding military partnership." Part of this new strategy was to promote highly skilled officers to top posts. One such individual was Georgi Zhukov. The young general had impressed Stalin with his victory over the Japanese at Khalkin-Gol and his "military gifts, energy, and brutal drive" (804). As a result, the Premier promoted Zhukov to the military's Chief of Staff. The move would work out brilliantly for Stalin. Zhukov would become Stalin's "greatest general" and one of the "greatest captain[s] of the Second World War," securing victories at Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Berlin (343).

However, Zhukov's successes unnerved Stalin. The marshal had generated a following within the military, receiving a personal salute during the WWII victory parade, and the Western media had even named Zhukov as Stalin's likely successor. Feeling threatened by Zhukov's strength, Stalin fabricated a coup plot, so that he could strip the decorated leader of his war medals and demote him to an obscure post in the Urals. Stalin would replace Zhukov with a personal crony: Nikolai Bulganin, who "rose through the ranks" through his ability to "ingratiate" himself with Stalin (*New York Times* 1975, 81). In fact, Bulganin was so woefully unqualified for the post, given his "utterly undistinguished war and civilian record," that in his announcement of Bulganin's promotion, Stalin even felt the need to remind his elites to not question the maneuver: "I think my reason requires no discussion—it's absolutely clear" (549).

On one hand, given the emerging conflict with the United States, a world superpower, it is puzzling that Stalin was willing to replace his most decorated and skilled military leader with a relative novice. On the other hand, maybe it should not be so surprising. I will show that it is common for dictators to trade off their military capability in order to insulate themselves from removal, even amidst ongoing conflict.

During its war with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge, in Cambodia, took several coup-proofing measures that undermined their ability to win that conflict. Nepotistic appointments to high-level governmental positions were commonplace for the Khmer Rouge, so much so, that Pol Pot coined the practice as “familyism" or “siblingism" (Short 2005, 365). Ieng Sary, in particular, placed several of his children and nephews into these posts, most of whom were “unsuited" for such roles. At the same time, the regime’s purges decimated the infantry ranks and kept the military from focusing on their foreign enemy, as the “armed forces spent 60% of their energy defending the regime against internal enemies" (387).

Stalin’s USSR and the Khmer Rouge are not isolated examples. I will demonstrate that dictators’ paranoia about internal threats motivate them to coup-proof their regimes, and that these practices can undermine the dictator’s military. More specifically, I argue that one particular coup-proofing strategy — *ministerial cronyism*, i.e. the appointment of cronies and relatives to military leadership — introduces a loyalty-competency tradeoff that makes dictators less able to avoid unwise military ventures.

1.1 Theoretical Argument

The central assumption in my theoretical argument is that leaders’ actions are driven by a desire to stay in power. There are numerous justifications for this preference such as the continuing receipt of rents, prestige, and the unique ability to dictate policy in a desired

manner (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003). Moreover, I assume the intensity of that preference is determined by the leader's anticipated post-tenure fate, i.e. the outcome associated with the leader's removal. I argue that post-tenure fates vary across regime type. In democracies and institutionalized autocracies, after removal, leaders often are allowed to return to civil society or other political posts and continue to live in prosperity within their homeland. However, for personalized dictatorships, i.e. regimes where all power is consolidated in the leader, removal from office often means the leader's exile, imprisonment, or death (Goemans, 2000a,b, 2008; Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004, 2011; Debs and Goemans 2010).[2]

The reason for variation in post-tenure fates is that institutions (or the lack thereof) determine what right a leader has to exercise authority. In *Economy and Society*, the renowned sociologist Max Weber (1978) argued that leadership is meaningless without authority, and that authority is dictated by the leader's legitimacy. Subordinates will not follow orders unless they hold some belief that the leader has the legitimacy to give them instructions. In his review of political groups and organizations, Weber found three main sources of legitimate authority: law, tradition, and charisma. I argue that legal authority is the type of authority that underlies democracies and institutionalized autocracies,[3] traditional authority is the basis for leadership in many monarchies or patriarchal societies,[4] and charismatic authority often gives personalist leaders their legitimacy.

The legal authority in democracies and institutionalized autocracies (single party and military regimes) eases leadership transitions in two ways. First, it provides a legitimate,

[2]Throughout this dissertation, I use Geddes et al.'s (2014, 319) definition of personalist dictators: "autocracies in which discretion over policy and personnel are concentrated in the hands of one man, military, or civilian," to classify personalist dictatorships.

[3]By institutionalized autocracy, I mean that there is some legal document, law, or set of rules that outline the nonviolent removal of the leader and that leaders agree to adhere to these rules. Once a leader defies such rules, he must rely on personalism to stay in power.

[4]Limited or constitutional monarchies can be based on legal authority.

nonviolent means to remove the leader. Leaders are removed when those, who are able to use legal mechanisms to remove a leader, exercise that ability. In democracies, this means leaders are voted out by an enfranchised public. For institutionalized autocracies, this often means a vote or consensus by an executive committee, i.e. other members of the military junta or the party's leadership such as the Politburo in the Soviet Union. Second, since the law establishes authority, the leader no longer has legitimacy to hold office once legal mechanisms for removal have been exercised. Thus, the removed leader poses no imminent threat to his successors. As a result, these leaders usually get to retire to lives of ease.

Personalized dictators usually take power by force and not through legitimate means. In order to build legitimacy, they use charisma and propaganda to develop a god-like status, i.e. claims that the leader possesses some special wisdom, courage, strength, etc., usually divinely given, which bestows on him the sole right to rule. However, this use of charismatic authority ties legitimacy to the dictator's person. In doing so, it creates two problems. First, there is no legitimate means to remove the leader; the only option is through illegitimate means: coup d'état. In most cases, the only domestic actors willing and able to remove the leader are those within the leader's inner circle, particularly military elites. In fact, 60-67% of all dictators are removed by a coup conducted by their own elite (Svolik 2009, 2012). Second, since legitimacy is inextricably tied to the dictator's persona, the dictator maintains his legitimacy to rule, even after removal. Therefore, so long as the dictator is alive, he poses a threat to his usurpers and thus must be eliminated.

Consequently, personalist dictators' lives are inherently different than democratic and autocratic leaders in more institutionalized regimes. Despots, unlike other leaders, are constantly experiencing two basic psychological forces: fear and paranoia (Tullock 1987, 2005; Wintrobe 1998). Given the high cost of removal (potential death) and the closeness

of the threat (within their inner circle), dictators are constantly preoccupied by potential plots against them. The fact that a dictator interacts on a daily basis with those that could choose to murder him at any moment causes him to see threats everywhere, even those that might not exist. As a result, the dictator inherently distrusts all his senior officials, particularly competent ones, as they are the most likely to pull off a successful coup. Naturally, the dictator must take steps to protect himself. He could try to bribe his officials against a coup but there is no guarantee that the economic calculus of his inner circle will never be tilted towards removing him. A better means for ensuring his life is to surround himself with those individuals he trusts the most: his closest friends and family members.

However, by restricting the selection pool for top governmental posts, particularly within the military, to his closest friends and relatives, the dictator sacrifices competency for loyalty. Specifically, the dictator restricts his ability to produce favorable policy outcomes by limiting his access to the best advice he could receive. During a crisis, a leader often receives counsel from his top international officials, foreign ministers, military officials, and defense ministers. In the case of a dictatorship, these individuals are woefully underqualified for their roles, and as a result, the leader does not receive accurate and objective information about his own forces' capabilities and resolve or that of his opponents. As a consequence, the dictator, assuming he has more bargaining leverage than he has, finds it difficult to accept peaceful settlements that are appropriate given his position. Conversely, opponents are unwilling to accept the unreasonable terms these dictators insist upon during crises. Eventually, as negotiations grind to a halt, one or both sides opt for war. For these reasons, personalist dictators are more likely to experience crisis bargaining breakdowns, and subsequently, war.

1.2 Research Question and Contribution

Recent research has delved deep into the connection between regime type and war and has found that personalist dictatorships are the most conflict-prone (Enterline 1998; Peceny, Beer, and Terry 2002; Peceny and Beer 2003; Reiter and Stam 2003; Peceny and Butler 2004; Colgan 2010, 2013; Weeks 2012, 2014; Colgan and Weeks 2015). However, such studies have only scratched the surface of why certain autocracies experience higher rates of conflict and few have staked any claim on what the causal mechanism is. Some possible answers have been hinted: weaker ability for oppositional groups to voice dissenting opinion (Peceny and Beer 2003), firmer holds on power (Peceny and Beer 2003; Weeks 2012), or the narcissist, militaristic, and risk-prone tendencies of certain autocratic leaders (Glad 2002; Post 2004; Rosen 2009; Colgan 2010, 2013; Weeks 2012, 2014). However, few of these theories have been directly tested.

The main research question that I seek to answer in this dissertation is “why are personalist dictators war-prone?" However, I argue that in developing an answer to this question, three puzzles need to be examined first. In doing so, I show a single answer connecting these three seemingly unrelated topics, and that this common thread provides insight into this age-old question of war. In the following three sections, I review these puzzles.

1.2.1 Understanding Dictators

For most people, there is a crystallized image of “dictatorship" in their minds. When the word is used, a mental video plays. There is an ostentatious parade of large missiles and tanks, punctuated by columns of infantrymen goose-stepping in union. Above, the nation’s feared leader carefully watches from his palace balcony; he is backdropped by banners adorned with his portrait and a cadre of stern-looking men dressed in full military regalia. However, the video stops there. What happens next? What occurs inside the

dictator's fortress? The simple answer is we do not know. The inner workings of the world's most totalitarian regimes, personalist dictatorships, largely remain an enigma.

This lack of knowledge is a problem. Understanding these dictatorships is of vital importance. Throughout modern history, these regimes have represented some of the largest threats to global security. On April 22, 2017, the *The Economist* ran an article labeling Kim Jong Un's North Korea as the "world's most dangerous regime" and one of Donald Trump's "trickiest" foreign policy tasks as Commander-in-Chief. North Korea has openly defied the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by creating its own nuclear program. Despite increasing UN economic sanctions, the small nation has continued to test its nuclear capability. Kim Jong Un launched six missile tests this year alone. This capability presents a harrowing possibility. On any day, North Korea could launch a nuclear attack that would reach key US allies in the region: Japan and South Korea. If progress continues, such an attack could one day reach Los Angeles.

North Korea is not the only such threat. In 2003, President George W. Bush outlined Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the nation's greatest foes, labeling the group as the "axis of evil." Undersecretary of State John Bolton would add Libya, Cuba, and Syria to the list and called these nations "rogue states." A certain pattern emerges from this list of national security threats. Five of these six states were classified as personalist dictatorships by the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset (Geddes et al. 2014).[5] What is to be done in response to these personalist regimes? In regards to North Korea, President Trump has saber-rattled and has tried to bully China into taking a large role in solving the issue. He has threatened China, that if it does not increase pressure on North Korea, that the United States will go

[5]Iran is a theocracy. Technically, Cuba and North Korea are party-personalist hybrids, but they have been coded as highly personalist regimes by other datasets, see Magaloni et al. (2013). Moreover, by stripping the state of institutions, when these dictatorships do collapse, they create power vacuums that allow for terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State to gain strength and pose even greater global security threats. Such processes can currently be observed in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

it alone, potentially using any available foreign policy option, including military intervention. Is this the right approach? It is difficult to say. So far, there has been little research on the incentives and motivations of personalist dictators. Without knowing what motivates these leaders, it is almost impossible to say which incentives (carrots) or coercive tools (sticks) will change behavior in the desired manner.

At first blush, predicting dictators' behavior appears problematic. Much of the literature considers these rulers as madmen, who are driven by personal impulses and psychological disorders, which cause them to display erratic behavior (Glad 2002; Post 2004). There is good reason for these claims. Much of the behaviors exhibited by dictators is so extreme that it can be considered insane.

In the same April *The Economist* article, Kim Jong Un was labeled a "bellicose junior god-king" whose "vile, blood-drenched dictatorship" has had "children imprisoned for their parents' thought crimes and his [Kim Jong Un's] own relatives murdered on a whim." The piece also outlined a bizarre story where Kim conducted a large parade for his deceased grandfather's (Kim Il Sung) 105th birthday, including having warplanes skywrite "105" in the air.

There are also various accounts of Kim's extreme bloodthirst, including that he had his uncle Jang Song-thaek, who assisted Kim in consolidating power after his father's death (Kim Jong Il), purged from the government. Jang Song-thaek was made to witness his deputies killed by anti-aircraft machine gunfire, and then killed himself by being fed to hungry dogs (although, the last part is likely fabricated or greatly exaggerated). Kim has also been accused of having his half-brother (Kim Jong-Nam) assassinated in a peculiar incident where two women ambushed Jong-Nam at a Malaysian airport and sprayed poison in his face.

Depictions of personalist dictators, like the one of Kim Jong Un, often convey that these leaders are irrational and psychologically imbalanced. However, perhaps, this is not the case. A parade for the nation's deceased eternal president makes sense when you consider that the Kim family legitimizes their rule through familial connection to Kim Il Sung's specialness and divinity. Overkill and gratuitous violence can serve a purpose: instilling a deep fear in elites and the populace in order to undermine coup attempts and revolution.

Therefore, I ask: Are personalist dictators rational? Can their actions be predicted and rationally explained? In response, I answer that personalist dictators often act rationally given the environment in which they exist. Personalist dictators are in a precarious position, where one false step can lead to their removal, an exit usually associated with their execution. Since those closest to the leader pose the greatest threat, the dictator must be suspicious of all those around him. As a result, most dictators' behavior can be explained by a desire to minimize the risk of coup d'états and other potential removals from power.

1.2.2 Misperception, Regime Type, and War

Misperception has long been used to explain conflict (Jervis 1968, 1976, and 1988). In his seminal book, *Misperception and Perception in International Politics*, Jervis highlights the fact that leaders do not give similar responses to the same set of information. Major foreign policy decisions are the product of individuals' perceptions. For instance, in order to choose the best policy option, one must assess the other side. A leader has to form an "image of the other" by answering a series of questions about his opponent: What is the other side likely to do? Why are they doing what they do? How resolved are they in their actions? To what lengths will the other side go? These answers are vital to eventual decisions. Different conclusions lead to different policy responses.

One avenue of this research has focused on psychological explanations, i.e. the role of emotion (McDermott 2004), personality traits of leaders (Hermann 1980), and leader backgrounds (Horowitz and Stam 2012). The key underpinning of all these arguments is that war occurs because individuals have psychological biases and/or deficiencies, i.e. war is the product of irrationality. One particular line of this research focuses on personalist leaders. This research argues that madmen often instigate wars; leaders such as Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and Napoleon spark conflict due to their incessant narcissism, delusions of grandeur, and megalomania. These leaders see themselves as vastly superior to mankind, and therefore, view their rightful place as ruler of all. The result is wars of conquest and expansion (Glad 2002; Post 2004)

Theoretically, I argue that war is often the product of misperception, particularly errors committed by personalist dictators. However, my argument does not rely on psychological factors. I assert that war is the result of a particular kind of error—underestimation of one's adversary—but that this error occurs even when states act rationally, i.e. choose actions with the highest utility, given the information at hand.

In my theoretical argument, I make many of the assumptions given by Fearon (1995): wars are costly, and therefore, states are always better off reaching a peaceful settlement than engaging in war. Moreover, leaders choose war when the expected utility of war exceeds the utility associated with any other available option. I also assume that the construction of a state's expected utility of war is primarily calculated using two pieces of information: the probability the state assigns to winning the war, which itself is determined by the assessment of one's own military capabilities and that of the other's, and the expected costs of war (level of resolve).

Therefore, my theoretical framework asserts that war is the result of bargaining failure. In that, I assume that wars are an outcome of crisis bargaining.[6] Conflicts are sparked by a triggering event, which creates a crisis. For instance, the assassination of Austria-Hungary's heir apparent Archduke Franz Ferdinand (WWI), Hitler's invasion of Poland (WWII), or Saddam's annexation of Kuwait (Gulf War) are all events that trigged a crisis that eventually led to war. But, after the crisis and before war occurs, there is a period of time where the disputing states bargain; each side offers settlements, short of war, that provide for some distribution of the policies, territory, or issues at stake.

Finally, I start with a theoretical assertion that war is the production of incomplete information (Fearon 1995). In particular, I assume that the two components that comprise a state's expected utility of war, probability of victory and resolve, are private information. States do not definitively know the balance of military capabilities between each other or what costs each other are willing to bear for the issues at stake.

Moreover, each side has a strategic incentive to misrepresent this information. By bluffing, a state can claim that it is stronger or more resolved than it actually is and may convince the other side to give up more at the bargaining table in order to pacify the bluffing state. Therefore, it is almost always in states' interest to project themselves as militarily strong and exceedingly resolved over disputed issues. Consequently, talk is "cheap" during negotiations. States do not trust what the other has to say. This mistrust can make it difficult to find acceptable settlements. States must gauge for themselves which bargains the other side will accept, and mistakes can be made. If both states hold on to an underestimation of their adversary's strength or resolve, each side will continue to offer unsatisfactory settlements, negotiations can collapse, and war can occur.

[6]There are clearly some wars where this is not the case such as military fait accomplis (see Tarar 2016). My theoretical argument's claims are limited in that it is does not consider these types of wars.

Incomplete information explains why wars occur in general. States can underestimate each other, and negotiation can subsequently fail. However, incomplete information does little to explain variation in war. Under such an explanation, there is no ex ante reason to believe that war will occur more often for any individual state or set of states. However, there is a substantiated empirical record showing certain states are more (and less) prone to experience war. In particular, two consistent empirical findings link regime type to war: the democratic peace — no two democracies has ever fought a war with each other (Lake 1992; Doyle 1986; Russett 1995; Benoit 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997, 2001) — and the bellicosity of personalist dictatorships (Enterline 1998; Peceny, Beer, and Terry 2002; Reiter and Stam 2003; Peceny and Butler 2004; Weeks 2012, 2014; Colgan and Weeks 2015).

Therefore, a puzzle emerges: How is it possible to reconcile the theoretical explanation of incomplete information with the empirical record that establishes a relationship between regime type and war? Why is it that democracies are able to solve the problem of incomplete information with each other but not other states? Why would personalist dictatorships particularly struggle with uncertainty?

There are two basic approaches that one can take when reconciling this theoretical explanation with the empirical record.[7] It could be that certain regimes are more (or less) likely to be *misperceived* or that certain regimes are more (or less) likely to *misperceive*. So far, most of the explanations have centered around the former explanation. In particular, these attempts have focused on explaining the democratic peace by arguing that democracies are less likely to be misperceived.

[7]Of course, one could always assert that either Fearon's claims are incorrect and/or limited or that the empirical record is inaccurate.

Theories for the democratic peace are numerous, but they mainly fall into two camps: institutional (e.g. Morgan and Campbell 1991; Schultz 1998) and normative (e.g. Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994). Although there are notable exceptions, institutional arguments have been favored by most scholars. Currently, there are two leading institutional theories of the democratic peace: audience costs (Fearon 1994, 1997) and selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999 and 2003). Both take as a central assumption, leaders are foremost concerned about retaining power, and in democracies, this means winning elections.

Audience cost theory argues that democracies are better able to avoid war because they can send costlier signals that provide credible information about their resolve. In short, democracies do not bluff. States know that when democracies issue public threats and ultimatums they mean them. The reason why is, democratic states are able to "tie their hands" by incurring a cost if they do back down from threats (Fearon 1994, 1997). This cost is an electoral one. These theorists argue that democratic republics care about their reputation and the credibility of future threats, that they look unkindly on a leader that backpedals from threats, and they are willing to punish this leader at the ballot box for such irresoluteness.[8]

However, the audience costs argument has been accused of various shortcomings. First, it rests on unproven assumptions about democratic public opinion and threat credibility (Snyder and Borghard 2011; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Potter and Baum 2013). So far, there has been little evidence that, outside of an experimental setting, democratic publics care about threat credibility, are informed enough to know when the leader has made a threat and backed down, or if such an effect is long-term and thus hinders reelection. Second, there is little historical evidence that democratic leaders have ever

[8]One variation of this argument is given by Kenneth Schultz (1998, 2001), which suggests that the support of the domestic opposition, motivated by electoral incentives, can signal the resolve of the leader.

incurred audience costs (Snyder and Borghard 2011; Trachtenberg 2011). Finally, the audience costs argument is not supported when the casual mechanism has been directly tested (Downs and Sechser 2012).

Selectorate theory does not rely on the idea of misperception (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003). It argues that leaders are primarily concerned with remaining in office and can only provide their winning coalition, individuals within the states whose support is needed to stay in power, utility through providing private goods (personally doling out the nation's resources) or public goods (producing good public policies). In democracies, the winning coalition is so large (often in the millions) that each person's private share is so miniscule that the leader cannot pursue clientelism (the division of private goods to get support) effectively. As a result, the leader can only survive by continuously providing public goods, i.e. successful policies. One can conclude that democratic leaders would be foremost concerned about their chances of winning a war and would hesitate to enter wars they might lose. Therefore, democratic selectiveness results in a lower propensity for conflict. On the other hand, autocracies, are less concerned with victory because members of the winning coalition can be compensated for policy failure by increasing their share of private goods, and, therefore, autocrats are free to gamble and enter risky wars (the size of the winning coalition is small enough that the leader can buy them off in the case of a defeat).

It is well-established that democratic leaders are acutely concerned about being victorious in conflict (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002) and that democratic publics are willing to punish democratic leaders for poor war outcomes (Mueller 1973; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gelpi, et al. 2005, 2007, 2009). However, selectorate theory's assertion that autocracies are not primarily concerned with conflict success is on shakier ground.

First, as the upcoming case studies in Chapter 5 reveal, autocrats, particularly dictators are usually convinced that they will prevail in conflicts. In fact, most wars are characterized by mutual optimism, i.e. the belief from both sides that they will prevail in a conflict (White 1968; Lebow 1981; Levy 1983; Blainey 1988; Snyder 1989; Van Evera 1999; Johnson 2004; Stoessinger 2005). Second, as I argue in Chapter 2, although the probability of an exit under autocracies, particularly dictatorships may be lower, the consequences of said removals are greater. Despite the small chances of removal, dictators are often more motivated to stay in office than democratic leaders, and therefore, during conflict, they have displayed a willingness to fight until the bitter end in the hopes of staving off potential consequences from poor conflict outcomes (Goemans, 2000a,b; Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004, 2011; Debs and Goemans 2010).

Therefore, current domestic theories of war have so far considered the connection between domestic politics and war from a certain point of view. These theories rely on the idea that certain regimes (democracies) are less likely to experience war because they are less likely to be misperceived. One of the major contributions of this dissertation is to switch this focus to identifying which regimes (personalist dictatorships) are more prone to misperceive. In doing so, I hope to refocus discussion from what pacifistic characteristics democracies possess (a voting public and electoral accountability) to what war-producing characteristics (ministerial cronyism) might be present in the most pugnacious regimes: personalist dictatorships.

1.2.3 Mutual Optimism and Asymmetrical Conflict

As I have stated, a key aspect in an international crisis is that information is often incomplete, imperfect, and ambiguous. Leaders are never fully armed with all the necessary information. Such uncertainty allows for misperception and error. Leaders are

often uncertain about their opponents, in particular, their war-time capabilities and resolve (Levy 1983; Morrow 1989; Fearon 1994, 1995; Van Evera 1999). As a consequence, it is possible for states to overestimate their chances of victory and/or underestimate an opponent's resolve. In such a case, the two sides will hold divergent views on which peaceful bargains are acceptable, given each other's bargaining strength. If diplomatic gridlock persists, eventually war will break out.

An inflated view of one's ability to win a war on each side, often called mutual optimism, is one of the more prominent explanations of war (White 1968; Lebow 1981; Levy 1983; Blainey 1988; Snyder 1989; Van Evera 1999; Johnson 2004; Stoessinger 2005). In fact, in his review of all major 20th century wars, Stoessinger found that in every one, at least one side held an overly optimistic view of its chances of winning. This overconfidence is so prevalent that Blainey (1988, 53) writes:

> It is doubtful that there was any war, since 1700, in which initial hopes were low on both sides. On the eve of many wars both nations or alliances expect the campaign to be short and victorious ... this recurring optimism is a vital prelude to war. Anything which increases that optimism is a cause of war. Anything which dampens that optimism is a cause of peace.

However, mutual optimism is a bit of a misnomer. For war to occur, it is not necessary for both sides to be incorrect about their chances of winning. Even if one side in the dispute accurately assesses its chances of winning, it still might have difficulty finding a resolution if it cannot disabuse the opponent of the notion that it will win the fight. Peace cannot be achieved unless both sides agree to it.

Mutual optimism presents another puzzle. According to Fischerkeller (1998), between 1816 and 1996, there have been more wars initiated by weak states against a stronger power than wars between the major powers themselves. During this time period, Fischerkeller estimates that 54% of wars fit in this asymmetrical category, and that this type

of war is growing in prevalence during the post-WWII period. If war is about unwarranted optimism, in that conflict is possible when the weaker side feels that they are likely to prevail in conflict, then why is the least likely type of conflict to produce mutual optimism—asymmetrical (i.e. conflicts where one side's military capability is substantially weaker than the other's)—the most frequently observed? Mistakes should be more likely when the military balance is more even. In these cases, even qualified military experts might find it difficult to ascertain who would prevail in a conflict. However, that is not what we see. How can it be that weak states are most optimistic about wars where the military balance is more clearly tilted in the other side's favor?

It may be the case that particularly strong democratic states, such as the United States, the world's superpower for the post-WWII period, are choosing to only enter conflicts that they are likely to win (Reiter and Stam 2002), but this doesn't explain why their weaker opponents do not back down once confronted by these military powers. Prima facie, it appears that Saddam could not have believed he would prevail during the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 US/UK Invasion. How could it be that Gamel Abdel Nasser thought he could win the Sinai against Israel, Great Britain, and France?

But these autocratic leaders did wholeheartedly believe they would score military victories in these instances. The reason why is that they formed incorrect assessments of their opponents. By appointing unqualified military advisers, these leaders restricted their ability to ascertain reliable information and expert analysis. Incorrect perceptions about the world can form in such an environment; in particular, such leaders will be more prone to underestimate their opponent. Put simply, I argue that even the weak will fight, if they are constantly assured that they are the strongest and the most resolved in the room.

1.3 Organization of Dissertation

My theoretical argument is that miscalculations by state leaders during the crisis bargaining process can lead to war, and that certain regime types are more likely to blunder, and consequently, experience war. The reason why certain leaders are prone to this error-making is that domestic incentives motivate them to build institutional structures that hinder their ability to receive accurate, honest, and independent information during a crisis. Supplied with inadequate information and incorrect judgments about their opponents from advisers, who are assumed to be experts on the subject, these leaders are likely to underestimate their opponent and overestimate their ability to prevail in conflict resulting in an unwillingness to accept reasonable peace terms. This false sense of self eventually causes war; and even worse, since these regimes are entering wars based on judgment errors, they are more likely to be the weaker parties in the conflict, and to experience military defeat.

The regimes that are most inclined to experience these misperceptions are personalist dictatorships. This dissertation will outline, in turn, the three main links in the theoretical chain that causes these dictatorships to exhibit a higher propensity to experience international conflict. Chapter 2 will demonstrate that personalist dictators base their legitimacy on charisma, in that they legitimize their authority by convincing their domestic audiences that they alone possess the necessary personal characteristics to lead. Unlike other regimes, where leaders based legitimacy on law or tradition, the dictator's claim on authority poses a threat to his usurpers' power even after his disposal and persists so long as the dictator lives. As a result, dictators are more likely to experience negative post-tenure fates (exile, imprisonment, death) after their removal than leaders in other regimes.

Chapter 3 theorizes that given the potential high cost of removal for personalist leaders, and the main source of this threat—a coup d'état orchestrated by military heads—

personalist dictators are the most motivated to pursue coup-proofing strategies. One popular strategy for personalist dictators is *ministerial cronyism*, i.e. filling their inner circle, particularly positions in military elites, with cronies and relatives whose loyalty is ensured through bloodlines and long-standing friendships. Using a newly constructed dataset on defense ministers from 1945 to 2005, not only do I demonstrate that personalist leaders are more likely to pursue ministerial cronyism, but I also show that this cronyism is associated with coup risk and the use of other coup-proofing strategies, providing suggestive evidence that this practice is intended to insulate these leaders from removal. Finally, I test whether the use of ministerial cronyism is effective, in that it decreases the occurrence of leader removal, particularly by reducing the probability of a successful coup d'état. Results confirm this expectation.

Chapter 4 will show that by packing their inner circle with cronies and relatives, the dictator sacrifices competency for loyalty. As a result, these regimes are less able to cope with the imperfect nature of information during crisis bargaining. Consequently, these regimes are more prone to overconfidence, resulting in a proclivity for conflict. Empirical evidence support these claims as ministerial cronyism is associated with an increased occurrence of militarized interstate disputes as well as war, particularly once a crisis has already occurred. Specifically, these regimes will be shown to be more likely than their counterparts to enter into asymmetrical conflicts, in which they are the weaker party, and subsequently, more likely to lose their wars.

In Chapter 5, I provide two detailed case studies of the Saddam Hussein (Iraq) and Gamel Abdel Nasser (Egypt) regimes. In each case, I will demonstrate that these leaders' reliance on nepotistic and crony military leaders resulted in unfavorable military outcomes. In the case of Saddam Hussein, nepotism and a culture of fear resulted in advisers being incompetent and sycophantic. In the lead-up to two major conflicts, these advisers were

unwilling and unable to dissuade Saddam from incorrect notions that the United States and its allies were unresolved and incapable of military victory in Iraq. In fact, unwilling to draw Saddam's ire, many of these advisers gave intentionally misleading and overly optimistic information, feeding into these incorrect assessments. The resulting underestimation of his opponents concluded with Saddam entering into two disastrous conflicts: 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US-UK Invasion of Iraq.

For Nasser, the Egyptian dictator appointed his long-time friend Abdel Hakim Amer as military chief in a maneuver intended to disenfranchise the military and protect himself from coup attempts. However, as will be outlined, it resulted in an inability to correctly gauge British resolve during the Suez Crisis, leading to a major military defeat in the 1956 Sinai Conflict, as well as major deficiencies in the lead up to the 1967 Arab-Israel War, particularly in regards to understanding Israel's first strike advantage.

The dissertation will finish with a concluding chapter that summarizes the theoretical argument, the results of empirical tests, contributions made, and suggests a future research agenda based on these findings.

2. WHY PUNISH DEPOSED LEADERS?

2.1 Introduction

"In the late winter of 1945, Benito Mussolini found himself acutely aware that his life had nearly run its course... [H]is mood was black and almost obsessively, he began to speak about his approaching death. He may have clung to a thread of hope that he could survive, but he was in a room without exits."[1]

On July 24, 1943, Italian Fascist leader Benito Mussolini was removed as head of state by a 19-8 vote of the Grand Council of Fascism. At that time, Mussolini had lost so much support that even his son-in-law and closest confidant Count Galeazzo Ciano would vote for his removal. The next day, when Mussolini tried to show up for work, he was brought to meet with King Victor Emmanuel and arrested. Although he would escape in a prison break a couple of months later, Mussolini was rendered powerless and would live in exile for the next two years under the protection of Adolf Hitler.

In exile, Mussolini began to believe his death was imminent and thoughts of his impending demise would preoccupy his mind; the once charismatic and formidable "Il Duce" was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Mussolini knew that Hitler was losing WWII and without his protection, he would be recaptured and almost certainly executed. His fears would turn out to be justified. When Northern Italy was about to be lost to Allied forces in April 1945, Mussolini chanced an escape to Spain. The plan failed as Mussolini and his mistress Clara Petacci were caught by Italian Communists just outside of Lake Como. After a night in detention, Mussolini and Petacci were placed against a wall and executed by machine gun fire (Hoyt 1994; Bosworth 2002; Moseley 2004).

[1] Moseley 2004, 1

Why was Mussolini killed? Prima facie arguments for why autocrats are punished were not present in this case: there was neither militarization of government (Debs 2011), nor a lack of viable means for nonviolent removal (Iqbal and Zorn 2006; Chiozza and Goemans 2011), nor a history of punishing deposed leaders that would legitimize leader punishment (Wiking 1983). Mussolini's Communist successors held military experience due to the World War, but none were career officers and many returned to civilian life after WWII. No previous Italian leader had been exiled, jailed or executed, so a culture-based explanation falls short. Finally, at the time of his death, Mussolini had already been removed. No violence or military coup was required to dislodge him from power.

A logical argument is that Mussolini's successors sought retribution (Goemans 2000a, b; Iqbal and Zorn 2006). Mussolini and his inner circle had turned Italy into a police state, assassinated rivals, allied with Hitler, and were at least partially responsible for a world war. Although the nature of Mussolini's execution is disputed, the most credible story was that communist leader Luigi Longo ordered his subordinate Walter Audisio to kill Mussolini. Audisio claims that Longo gave him this exact order: "He [Mussolini] must be killed immediately, in the worst way, without trial, without theatrics, without historical phrases" (Moseley 2004, 281). These precise directions are revealing. Longo explicitly stated that Mussolini's execution was to be swift, brutal, and private. If Mussolini's executioners wanted justice and to deter future attempts at dictatorship, then why kill Mussolini on the side of the road with no trial? Why not make it public and clear that Mussolini was answering for his crimes? What is the harm of a trial, theatrics, or "historical phrases?"

The argument in this chapter provides an answer to these questions, and in doing so, answers a more important and general question: Why are some deposed autocrats exiled, imprisoned, or killed while others are allowed to walk away? The story of Mussolini is in many ways illustrative of the types of post-tenure fates that autocrats often face. As Table

2.1 shows, Mussolini did not need to be prescient to know that life after being “Il Duce" would not be pleasant. Nearly half of all autocrats face a negative post-tenure fate upon removal from office: exile, imprisonment, or death (Goemans, et al 2009). These ends are not rare fates for autocrats, but they are also not ubiquitous. It is therefore possible that there is some defining characteristic of certain autocratic leaders that make them more likely to face these negative post-tenure fates than their counterparts.

Table 2.1: Cross-Tabulation for Autocracy and Post-Tenure Fate

		Autocracy	
		0	1
Negative	0	612 (88.95%)	274 (54.80%)
	1	76 (11.05%)	226 (45.20%)

χ^2 = 178.15, p<0.001

I argue that this defining characteristic is personalism. The more personalist the regime, the more likely that the leader will face a negative fate after being removed from power: exile, imprisonment, or death. The underlying logic is that for a leader to hold authority he must base his rule on some source of legitimacy. Using acclaimed sociologist Max Weber’s typology, I argue that there are three main sources for a leader’s legitimacy: legal, traditional, and personal. Democracies and some institutionalized autocracies tie legitimacy to the office through legal means. By codifying that leaders only have legitimate claims to rule when they occupy a certain office, these leaders no longer have legitimacy to rule after being removed from office. However, monarchies and personalized autocracies tie legitimacy to the person. Here, birthright or some claim of superior personal character gives a person the right to rule, a source of legitimacy that remains even if the leader is

removed from office. Therefore, since legitimacy to rule lies in the person, the deposed leader maintains his legitimacy, thus threatening the legitimacy of his successor. In order to counteract this threat, successors often exile, imprison, or kill their personalized predecessors.

Answering why some leaders are punished after removal from office is of substantial importance. The starting assumption for many regime-based theories of international relations and comparative politics is that leaders are primarily motivated by a desire to stay in power (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Many scholars have based theories on the idea that variations in the probability of removal can explain state behavior (e.g. Weeks 2012, 2014). Most of these theories attribute the difference in behavior between autocratic and democratic regimes (as well as personalist regimes versus other autocratic regimes) to the greater chance of removal for democratic regimes. However, such arguments are incongruent with despots' preoccupation about their own demise. Although the probability of their removal is smaller than their democratic counterparts, many autocrats, particularly personalist leaders, are often paranoid about being removed because the costs of removal are so much higher (Goemans 2000a, b). Therefore, the expected utility of policy choices not only involves the probability of removal but the cost associated with said removal. If such costs are predictable in that some regimes are more prone to face higher costs of removal than others, then we can use this pattern to provide better predictions of leaders' decision-making, and therefore, richer regime-based theories.

The rest of this chapter will proceed in the following manner. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 outline the importance of including post-tenure fates in leaders' decision-making. Section 2.4 details the argument on how legitimacy influences post-tenure fates. Section 2.5 reviews rival arguments for the occurrence of negative fates. In Sections 2.5-2.8, quantitative tests are employed on a cross-sectional dataset of leaders to test hypotheses generated from

the theory. In the final section, the theoretical argument is used to explain why Nicolae Ceausescu was killed while several of his counterparts in other small, Eastern European satellites survived the fall of the Soviet Union.

2.2 The Importance of Post-Tenure Fates

A fundamental assumption that underlies many leading theories in international relations and comparative politics is that leaders are motivated by a desire to stay in office. In the case of international conflict, several theories for the democratic peace are grounded in the idea of leader survival. The audience cost argument rests on the claim that democratic leaders differ from their autocratic counterparts in that they must have the support of the public to survive and that support wanes when the leader backs down from his threats (Fearon 1994, 1997). This idea was further expanded to explain variation in autocrats' conflict behavior (Weeks 2008). Democratic leaders' greater vulnerability for removal has also been linked to their selectiveness about entering into conflict as well as their propensity to fight harder and longer (Reiter and Stam 2002). Elaborating on this idea, variation in leader stability was used to account for similar autocratic conflict behavior (Weeks 2012, 2014). The assumption that leaders are motivated by a desire to stay in power is also prevalent in the field of international political economy, e.g. trade protection (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Kono 2006).

In comparative political studies, leader survival has been theorized to cause certain autocracies to hold elections, engage in conflict, set up legislatures, misuse foreign aid, disperse their population, and create other domestic institutions (Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008; Myerson 2008; Svolik 2009, 2012; Ahmed 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013; Wallace 2013). These are just a few of the applications of this assumption. Although the theories differ in their casual mechanisms and the behavior they seek to explain, they all assume

that leaders pursue certain behaviors that will enhance the probability of remaining in office and avoid those that decrease it. Very few theories consider the leader's *post*-tenure fate in the decision calculus.

It is plausible that we see that the fear of the *consequences* of removal can also constrain leaders who have firm holds on power. If the potential cost of removal is high enough, then the leader would seek to avoid increasing the probability of removal even when that increase is small. However, such a process assumes that the leader can anticipate a bad outcome from removal. It is easy to envision that democratic leaders know that failed wars will decrease their chances at reelection, and factor this into their decision-making. However, it is not as intuitive that autocratic leaders can anticipate their post-tenure fate and factor this into their decision-making. The following section argues that dictators not only consider these negative fates but also are paranoid and obsessed about their possible occurrences.

2.3 The Anticipation of Post-Tenure Fates

The effect of post-tenure fates has been considered in a few works. Some have argued that semi-repressive, moderately exclusionary (or mixed) regimes are more likely to fight longer wars in order to "gamble for resurrection" (Debs and Goemans 2010; Goemans 2000a,b). The idea is that such regimes are not repressive or exclusionary enough to fight off removal, but these regimes' past repression and exclusionary practices results in leader punishment upon removal. Therefore, there is no additional cost for losing disastrously and thus they fight on in hopes of a resurrection. Here the argument is that repression causes a need for retribution and deterrence against future repression.

Supplementing this work, Chiozza and Goemans (2003, 2004, 2011) argued that negative post-tenure fates are highly correlated with the probability of irregular exit, meaning

illegitimate means of removal such as a military coup. They go on to argue that regimes at risk of irregular exit are motivated to start conflict either to remove internal military threats or to show competence in order to dissuade would-be usurpers.

However, the primary focus of these works was to show how post-tenure fates can influence conflict behavior, and not to predict these fates.[2] Although these works argue that the degree of repression and the probability of an irregular exit increase the chances that removal will lead to negative fates, there is not substantial theorizing on why these relationships exist. It is important to understand this relationship, because if it is not clear why leaders are being exiled, jailed or killed, then it is hard to fathom that these leaders can anticipate these fates and thus be motivated by them.

But, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that dictators, particularly those in personalist regimes, i.e. those regimes where power is mostly invested in one person, are preoccupied by thoughts of their death. Studies on autocracies find that most personalist dictators are motivated by the same basic forces: fear and paranoia (Tullock 1987, 2005; Chehabi and Linz 1998; Wintrobe 1998; Brooker 2009). In fact, Wintrobe (1998, 22) asserts that “instead of trust or love, the tyrant’s life is governed by fear" and that this fear is “inherent in any dictatorship." It is claimed that Saddam Hussein would put his closest advisors on buses with blacked-out windows and have the drivers zig-zag across Baghdad before meeting with them so that they had no idea where he stayed (Woods 2006). It is also theorized that Stalin’s death was accelerated by his constant fear and paranoia. By the early 1950s, Stalin allegedly saw plots against his life everywhere, even accusing Kremlin doctors of trying to kill him. In fact, some members of the Politburo used these fears to have opponents purged or killed by convincing Stalin that they were plotting against him (Montefiore 2003).

[2]Escribá-Folch (2013) is a notable exception

2.4 Legitimacy of Authority

Dictators, particularly personalist ones, believe that if their rule ends, it will end badly. Historically, autocratic leaders have been much more likely than democratic leaders to experience exile, imprisonment, or death. But why do about half of all autocrats exit office without negative consequences? Why do Khrushchev and Gorbachev get to walk away while Saddam and Mussolini do not? I contend that the leaders most likely to experience a negative post-tenure fate are those that lead personalized regimes. I define a personalist regime using Geddes, et al (2014, 319) definition: "autocracies in which discretion over policy and personnel are concentrated in the hands of one man, military, or civilian." The key distinction between a personalist regime and other autocracies is that power is concentrated not in a few hands but just one. Personalist regimes are absolute dictatorships; a leader can dictate policy without fear of obstruction by any other party, i.e. any veto player.

In his work *Economy and Society*, renowned sociologist Max Weber (1978) argued that authority, or "the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons," is based on legitimacy. People follow orders from people they feel are in a legitimate position to give them orders. If President Trump commands the Seventh Fleet to sail through the Taiwan Strait, the United States Navy is likely to obey such a command. If Bono gave a similar edict, he would likely be ignored. Who is Bono to give such an order? The problem is that Bono has no legitimacy in this matter. President Trump can legitimately give such an order because he is the elected President of the United States and the US Constitution, a legal document, gives the holder of that office the authority to be Commander-in-Chief and to issue military orders. This is the first source of legitimacy: legal. Legal legitimacy is usually a case where some law or rule, which is generally accepted by those tasked to obey it, gives authority to a person to

make decisions and dictate policy because they hold some sort of position or office. It is important to note that in this case, legitimacy is tied to the office and not the person. As soon as President Trump abdicates the presidency, he will no longer be able to give orders to the United States Navy that will be obeyed.

Traditional authority is the basis for leadership in many monarchies or patriarchal societies. Power is usually based on familial connections, clan membership, or bloodlines. An absolute monarch rules because some tradition states it is his birthright.[3] Charismatic authority is the basis of most non-monarchical personalist regimes. A dictator's rule is often justified through personal characteristics, i.e. claims that the leader possesses some special wisdom, courage, strength, etc., often divinely given, which bestows on them the sole right to rule. It is precisely this need to legitimize rule that makes personalist regimes form a "cult of personality." These leaders line the street with banners depicting their faces, raise statues of themselves, and go by names such as "Il Duce" or "Great Chairman Mao." Some element of this behavior is perhaps a function of the leader's own narcissism, but it serves a practical purpose as well. These actions form a persona that cannot be replaced. There is only one Stalin, Mussolini, or Mao, and therefore no need to replace the leader or develop institutions to allow for such a removal.

However, sometimes personalist leaders are removed: Napoleon Bonaparte, Saddam Hussein, and Ferdinand Marcos to name a few. Their legitimacy, which once kept them in power, is now the reason for their demise. Successors realize that such traditional or charismatic leaders will always have some followers and that a claim of legitimacy to rule remains with the deposed despot because it is inextricably tied to the person. Therefore, personalist leaders remain threats to the successor so long as they are in position to regain power, which can be remedied only if they are exiled, imprisoned, or killed.[4]

[3] Limited or constitutional monarchies are more based on legal-rationalist authority.

[4] A similar argument was formalized in Egorov and Sonin (2005).

Unlike cases where the legitimacy to rule is based on a legal framework, where authority is tied to the office and not the office holder, leaders who base their legitimacy on their personal uniqueness are still threats to their successors. For instance, if Mussolini was allowed to live and remain in Italy, his cult of personality would allow him the opportunity to try to take power by force at any moment and still have legitimacy, even if a legal basis for rule was established after his removal. Mussolini does not need to follow the rules of succession; he is “Il Duce." A similar process occurred in 1815 when Napoleon Bonaparte escaped from his exile in Elba and several prominent generals (e.g. Michel Ney) switched their allegiances from Louis XVIII to Napoleon, allowing the emperor to rule again for a hundred days (McLynn 2011).

Those that have not personalized their rule pose far less of a threat to their successors. Certainly, these deposed leaders can return to power. For instance, in parliamentary systems, individuals have been prime ministers several times. However, they can only regain power through institutionalized means. Irregular entry is not an attractive option because they have not personalized their legitimacy. Any attempt to enter office outside of prescribed rules would likely fail because it will not be viewed with legitimacy. For instance, what if Jimmy Carter refused to step down in favor of Ronald Reagan and tried to keep office through force? The people, Congress, and the military would likely not accept this arrangement. Once Carter lost re-election, he lost legitimacy to rule unless elected again.

My argument, then, is that personalist leaders face the highest likelihood of meeting a negative post-tenure fate. Personalist rule is built on the legitimacy of the person and not an institution. In regimes where legitimacy lies in institutions, such as democracies, single-party regimes and military juntas, leaders who are removed from office are not threats to their successors. For these regimes, any attempt by removed leaders to stay in power or remove their successors will not be seen as legitimate, and therefore, would

be a risky proposition. Conversely, in personalist regimes, where legitimacy is tied to the person, deposed personalist leaders will always have legitimacy to rule so long as they live. Therefore, deposed personalist leaders threaten their successors' rule by their very existence, giving successors an incentive to neutralize their personalist predecessor through exile, imprisonment, or death.

2.5 Rival Explanations

In the coming sections, I identify four rival explanations of post-tenure fates, which will be controlled for in the empirical analysis. Personalist leaders may be more likely to suffer negative post-tenure fates for a variety of reasons besides their hold on legitimacy. These leaders may be more likely to partake in repression and are punished more often as retribution. Personalist regimes do not allow an institutionalized means to remove them. Elites cannot vote such leaders from power. Therefore, removal has to be done by force. This force may equate to more violent ends for the leader. Personalist leaders may be more likely to militarize their governments, which may make military coups, and in turn, violent removal more likely. Finally, personalist leaders may simply be more likely to exist in states where leader punishment has been normalized.

2.5.1 Retribution

The idea that justice can be served through retribution is an old one. Concepts of "an eye for eye, a tooth for a tooth" date back to the Code of Hammurabi and early books in the Bible. The precept that crimes cannot go unpunished and that the punishment must fit the crime underpins legal systems across the globe (Tonry 2011; White 2011). The retributive or "just desserts" theory of justice was perhaps best articulated by the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1991, 141) in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*:

> But what kind and what amount of punishment is it that public justice makes its principle and measure? None other than the principle of equality (in the position of the needle on the scale of justice), to incline no more to one side than the other. Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil you inflict on another within the people, that you inflict on yourself.

On the international front, Liberman (2013, 2014) found that the need for retribution was the driving force for American support for punishing and torturing foreign actors for aggressive behavior. Moreover, the creation of the International Criminal Court was based on the idea that political figures that commit heinous crimes must be punished. On the domestic front, a 2014 Gallup Poll shows that 63% of the American public still approve of the death penalty for murder. When the public is asked to indicate why they support the death penalty, the leading responses are: “an eye for an eye, they took a life, fits the crime, and they deserve it." In fact, this justification is given by about half of those who responded in favor of capital punishment, and the percentage of those giving this rationalization has hovered around that mark for decades. Moreover, support for capital punishment appears to be the strongest in areas most populated by dictatorships: the Middle East and Africa (Hood and Hoyle 2015).

Killings, jailing, and disappearances of political opponents are commonplace in many autocracies. To retain rule in an autocracy, repression is a necessity. Ruling through charisma is a precarious form of authority. As Weber explains, all it takes is for one subordinate to no longer believe in your power. However, these victims of political violence have friends and family that demand justice once the leader is deposed. Moreover, those that replace an autocratic leader, whether that be the populace in a successive democracy, or more likely, members of the leader’s inner circle, will want justice for these repressive practices and justice might take the form of the deposed leader’s death or imprisonment.

2.5.2 No Institutionalized Mechanism for Removal

Personalist regimes form when the leader has consolidated all power into his hands. There are no elections and no debates about removal. In fact, personalist leaders often form secret networks of spies and use surveillance equipment on their own staff to ensure that they can get ahead of any potential plot for overthrow. There is also a substantial literature on how the inability to communicate causes a coordination problem that prevents subordinates from overthrowing a dictator (Ezrow and Frantz 2011; Powell 2012). Usually, only those equipped with the necessary tools of violence, i.e. military leaders, have the means to overthrow such leaders. Such attempts often must be sudden in order to the take the leader by surprise, and usually occur when the leader is out of the country.

Therefore, it would not be surprising that the removal of personalist leaders is often the result of a violent clash. Previous literature has found that negative post-tenure fates often follow irregular exits, the majority of these exits being military coups (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). If the leader resists, then in order for the removal to be complete, he either must be killed or detained. Moreover, some dictators may foresee the potential of a violent fight and flee into exile in order to ensure that they do not face a worse fate: death or imprisonment.

2.5.3 Militarization

Several theories of international conflict have focused on the personal background of leaders. Leaders who have a military background (either as a career officer or as a long-time rebel) or preside over military governments have been found to be more likely to initiate conflict. The basis of an argument for why militarization would increase the probability of a negative post-tenure fate is that individuals inside the government either have a proclivity for solving disputes violently or have been socialized to think this way. More-

over, a military leader might be more prone to feelings of honor and will thus choose to fight until he is physically unable to continue, either because he has been killed or captured (Huntington 1957; Welch 1970; Betts 1977; Finer 1988; Weeks 2012, 2014).

2.5.4 Past History

It has also been well-established in sociology and political science that individual behavior is often molded through norms. Countries with weak governmental institutions might suffer from long periods of instability where government changes hands through a constant series of coups and dictatorships. In such cases, the practice of exiling, imprisoning, or killing leaders has been normalized. There might be several mechanisms for how past punishments of leaders might increase the probability of future punishment. The most likely mechanism is that the successors might be freed from a potential backlash from the populace for killing a leader, because the nation has been desensitized. Whatever the mechanism, it is important to control for past behavior to ensure results are not being unduly influenced by a small set of countries desensitized to leader punishment.

2.6 Hypotheses, Data, and Modeling Strategy

The central argument of this chapter is that as a regime becomes more personalized, the leader's legitimacy to rule becomes more greatly tied to his personal traits. These leaders rule because they are believed to be unique in their knowledge, strength, ideological purity, etc. There are numerous examples of dictators making grandoise claims about their superiority. Joseph-Desire Mobutu of the Democratic Republic of Congo changed his name to Mobutu Sese Kukuku Ngbendu Wa Za Benga, which means "the all-powerful warrior who will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake," Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania declared himself the "architect of world peace" and the "hero among the nation's heroes," and Francisco Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea asserted his own

divinity (Chehabi and Linz, 13-14). These despots are not alone in their mythmaking as similar tactics were employed by other prominent dictators: Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, and Kim Il-Sung.

To some degree, the construction of a cult of personality is a reflection of the leader's own narcissism. However, it also serves an important political purpose. Personalist leaders cannot resort to legitimate legal or traditional processes for the source of their authority. Therefore, they must rely on creating legitimacy by making claims of charismatic authority. However, since this legitimacy is tied to the person and not the office, when the dictator is deposed, he may still have some perceived legitimacy to rule. Therefore, these personalist leaders pose an immediate threat to their successors. In order to counteract this threat, successors remove the source of it: the leader. This is usually done by exiling, imprisoning, or killing him.

In order to test this theory of post-tenure fates, I rely on the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset (Geddes et al. 2014) to determine regime type. The dataset divides authoritarian regimes into four groups: *Personalist, Single Party, Monarchical, and Military*. Therefore, four dichotomous variables will represent these regimes in the dataset, as well as a fifth for democracies.[5] My theory predicts that regimes that tie the legitimacy to rule to the leader himself are more likely to have their leaders face negative post-tenure fates than those whose legitimacy is tied to the office. As has been discussed, almost all personalist regimes are based on charismatic authority, which binds legitimacy to the person, i.e. the leader. In contrast, some single party regimes or military juntas develop institutions to regulate leader turnover. For instance, party or junta leadership is typically determined by a vote of elites. Therefore these regimes should be more likely to have leaders whose legitimacy is based on some form of legal grounds. All democracies, by definition, have

[5]The *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset is structured by regimes. Sometimes leaders cross over two different regime types. The leader is coded with the regime present in the nation when the leader left office.

some legal means to determine executive selection; therefore, leader legitimacy is based on law. Therefore, what logically follows is the following hypothesis:

> H1: Personalist leaders should be more likely to face negative post-tenure fates than leaders of single party regimes, military juntas, and democracies.

I do not expect personalist leaders to be more likely to face negative post-tenure fates than monarchs, given that monarchies also tie legitimacy to rule to the person. The right to rule in monarchies is often prescribed through a line of succession based on birthright. Therefore, these royal individuals will always have some perceived legitimacy to rule based on their lineage.

However, the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset is not completely conducive to testing my argument. There are several “hybrid" regimes that show characteristics of several of these regime types. In the dataset, classification into a single type is done in this order of preference: single party, military, personalist, and monarch. Therefore, a single party or military regime with personalized leadership is not likely to be coded as a personalized regime. For instance, Stalin and Mao’s regimes were quite personalized but because their leadership was part of a single-party system (communist state) they are coded as a single party regime.

In order to get around this difficulty, I employed two different measures of personalism. The first is the *Personalism* measure from the *Autocracies of the World Dataset* (Magaloni et al. 2013), which uses the component measure *xconst* (executive constraints) from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2012) to create a 0-2 scale where highly personalist regimes receive a score of “2," moderately personalist regimes a score of “1," and weakly or not personalist regimes a score of “0."[6] The second measure is the *Personalism*

[6]I use the second personalist measure with imputation for missing values. Please see the *Autocracies of the World Dataset* codebook for further details on the measure’s construction.

Scale, developed by Weeks (2012, 2014), which uses the answers to questions classifying regime types for the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset to develop a 0-1 interval scale for personalism. The scale is constructed by dividing the number of affirmative answers to personalist questions by the total number of these questions.[7]

> H2: The more personalized the regime, the more likely that the deposed leader will face a negative post-tenure fate.

These hypotheses are tested using a cross-sectional dataset of leaders from 1946 to 2004. Information on leaders and their post-tenure fate was taken from the *Archigos* dataset (Goemans et al. 2009). The dependent variable is *Negative Fate*, which takes on a value of 1 if the leader was exiled, jailed, or killed within one year of removal.[8]

Figure 2.1 provides a more comprehensive depiction of the relationship between regime type and negative post-tenure fates. The figure shows the percentage of leaders, by each regime type, that experienced the four post-tenure fates: *Okay*, *Exile*, *Imprisonment*, and *Death*. The starkest difference is between democracies and other autocracies. Nearly 90% of democratic leaders are allowed to leave office without punishment, which is more than 20% more than the next safest, single party leaders. For autocracies, single party leaders are the safest followed by military leaders, monarchs, and personalist leaders. In fact, as hypothesized, personalist leaders and monarchs are more likely to experience each negative fate than all other leader types with the exception of imprisonment between monarchs and military leaders. The differences are substantial. Personalist leaders are at least 1.3 times more likely to experience a negative fate than military leaders and 1.8 times more

[7]For scales such as the Magaloni and Weeks measures, where there are yearly measures, I take the maximum value for the measure during a leader's tenure. Results are robust to using average measures.

[8]The variable is coded as missing for cases of natural death or assassination by an unsupported individual since these fates are not post-tenure. Suicide was coded as being killed because all of the cases in the dataset were examples of suicide while the leader was being deposed, and therefore I assume that these leaders killed themselves because they anticipated another negative fate which they wanted to avoid.

likely to face such a demise than single party leaders. Furthermore, in comparison to democracies, personalist leaders are 6 times more likely to be exiled, 4 times more likely to be imprisoned, and 6 times more likely to be killed after removal.

Figure 2.1: Occurrence of Post-tenure Fates by Regime Type



2.7 Rival Explanations and Control Variables

I identified four main rival explanations for why autocratic leaders are more likely to be targeted for negative post-tenure fates than democratic leaders and why some autocratic leaders face these fates and not others: retribution for repression, no institutionalized mechanism for removal, militarization of government, and history of leader punishments.

If leaders are being punished for their levels of repression, i.e. killing, imprisoning, or exiling potential rivals and dissidents, then we should see that the probability of a negative

post-tenure fate increases as the level of repression during the leader's reign increases. Unfortunately, measures of government repression do not cover the full time period for my sample of leaders. The *Political Terror Scale* (Gibney et al. 2014) goes back the furthest, but only extends back to 1976. This measure is a 1-5 scale with higher scores indicating more repression. Since this measure is time-variant, I use the maximum score during a leader's tenure.[9] I also use the maximum yearly count of *Governmental Purges* from the *Domestic Conflict Event Dataset* (Banks 2014). The Banks measure extends back to 1945 and allows me to perform my analysis on the whole sample while still controlling for level of repression. The trade-off for using this measure is that it is a weaker proxy for repression. Purges only counts the number of times that governmental officials were purged from office within the year. It does not measure the amount of repression on the civilian population or give us a sense of how violent these purges are.[10]

Alternatively, leaders might be punished for using illegitimate means for entering office. To control for this possibility, I include a dichotomous variable, *Irregular Entry*, which takes on a value of 1 if the *Archigos* dataset stated, "the leader entered political office in a manner [not] prescribed by either explicit rules or established conventions."

To control for the possibility that post-tenure fates are simply a function of no institutionalized means of removal, I control for the available manners of exit. The variable proxying for this concept, *Means of Removal*, takes on a value of 1 when there are explicit rules that prescribe the selection and removal of leaders, through election either by the public or a small group within government. Data is taken from the *Institutions in Dictatorships* dataset (Svolik 2012). However, many of these elections are just window-

[9]Results are robust to using the average score during the tenure.

[10]As a robustness check, the *CIRI Physical Integrity Index* (Cingranelli et al. 2014) was used as an additional measure of repression. However, the temporal coverage is from 1981 to 2011, so it does not give me any more leverage than the Political Terror Scale. However, results remain consistent when this measure is used to proxy for level of repression.

dressing. These elections are often fixed, giving the leader a large majority of the votes. Therefore, the variable is coded as a 0 if the head of state was elected by more than 75% of the votes.[11]

For the militarization of government, the regime type variable for a military regime from the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset should be sufficient. However, for models utilizing Weeks' *Personalism Scale*, I control for the military nature of the government using a second measure constructed by Weeks: *Militarism Scale*. This scale is constructed in the exact same manner as the Personalism Scale but instead uses the military regime questions in place of the personalism questions. Therefore, the scale ranges from 0 to 1 as well.

Finally, to control for a nation's past history, I included a count of the number of previous leaders in that nation who have suffered a negative post-tenure fate with a variable named *Previous Leaders Punished*.[12]

2.8 Results

Since the dependent variable is discrete, logit models are used to test the hypotheses. Table 2.2 presents the results of the logit models for negative leader fate. The first model includes the Geddes et al. (2014) regime variables with personalist dictatorships as the base category. As expected from Hypothesis 1, the probability that a leader faces a negative fate after removal is smaller if the leader heads a single party, military, or democratic regime than a personalist regime, a difference that is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. On the other hand, the probability of a negative fate is not statistically different between monarchs and personalist leaders, a result that was anticipated. The regime variables are

[11] An alternative measure of means of removal is used: the *NELDA3* variable from the *National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy* dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012), which indicates the allowance of a domestic opposition. Results are robust to the inclusion of this variable.

[12] Models were also estimated with variables for number of previous leaders killed, previous leader killed, and previous leader punished. Results still conform to expectations with these different specifications.

able to explain a fair amount of the variation in post-tenure fates with the pseudo R^2 measure being 0.17 and the model reducing the error from the modal prediction by nearly 9%.

Table 2.2: Logit Models for Negative Fate (Geddes Regimes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Base	Controls	Autocracies
Monarch	-0.26	-0.23	-0.64
	(0.61)	(0.68)	(0.68)
Military Regime	-0.59*	-1.69**	-1.51**
	(0.26)	(0.50)	(0.43)
Single Party	-1.08**	-1.12**	-1.29**
	(0.23)	(0.38)	(0.34)
Democracy	-2.49**	-2.51**	
	(0.25)	(0.42)	
Number of Governmental Purges		0.21	0.02
		(0.17)	(0.06)
Irregular Entry		0.44	0.32
		(0.30)	(0.31)
Number of Previous Leaders Punished		0.04*	-0.02+
		(0.02)	(0.01)
Institutionalized Means of Removal		-0.52+	-0.40
		(0.29)	(0.29)
Constant	0.40*	0.68	1.24**
	(0.15)	(0.45)	(0.42)
Observations	1188	921	244
Log likelihood	-572.12	-385.14	-156.07
Efron's R^2	0.17	0.23	0.10
Proportional Reduction in Error	8.94%	18.09%	31.40%

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country)
Reference category: Personalist leaders

Models 2-3 test Hypothesis 1 with the inclusion of variables meant to capture rival explanations for variation in post-tenure fates: retribution, no means for removal, and past history. Model 2 includes controls for purges, irregular entry, the previous number of leaders punished, and an institutionalized means of removal. Only the proxies for means

of removal and past history are statistically significant (they are also in the anticipated direction). Most importantly, the differences between the regime types hold even with the inclusion of these variables. Model 2 also doubles the accuracy of prediction: proportional reduction in error is 18%. Model 3 estimates this model on a sample of only autocracies. The results also remain when I place this restriction on the model.[13]

Figure 2.2 uses the results of Model 2 (with controls) to plot the change in probability associated from a move from heading a personalist regime to the four other regimes.[14] Deposed monarchs are about 5% less likely to face exile, imprisonment, or death upon removal in comparison to personalist leaders, but since the 95% confidence intervals extend past both sides of zero, we cannot say that this effect for monarchs is significantly different than that of personalist dictators. Both deposed single party and military leaders are less likely to experience these negative fates, as a movement from a personalist leader to one of these types of leaders results in the probability of negative fates dropping by 26% and 37%, respectively. Both effects are statistically significant, and since the personalist leaders' probability of facing these fates is 63%, it means that military and single party leaders face a probability smaller than a coin flip provides (37% for single party regimes and 26% for military regimes). Finally, it is apparent from the figure that democratic leaders face the smallest chance of experiencing these severe consequences: 14%.

However, as was previously explained, the coding in the Geddes et al. (2014) dataset lumps several personalist regimes into the military and single party categories. In order to provide a better test of the theory, I use three alternative specifications in Table 2.3. First, in Model 1, I include two more dummy variables *Personalist Hybrid* and *Military Hybrid*

[13]The proportional reduction in error jumps to 31% when the sample is restricted to only autocracies as Model 3 correctly predicts that the leader will be able to walk away safely 79% of the time and predicts a negative fate correctly 54% of the time. A negative fate occurs in the sample 50% of the time.

[14]The figure generated using Stata's margins command. These are average effects with other regime dummies set to zero.

Figure 2.2: Probabilities of Negative Fate Relative to Personalist Regime



in the model. As was previously stated, the Geddes et al. (2014) dataset places coding preference in this order: single party, military, and personalist. Therefore, when a regime exhibits characteristics of both a single party and military regime, it is coded as a single party regime. However, the dataset also indicates when characteristics of two or more regime types are exhibited. For instance, the previous example would be coded as a single party-military regime hybrid. Therefore, the two hybrid variables (Personalist Hybrid and Military Hybrid) take on a value of one if a personalist or military designation was part of the hybrid classification, respectively. Again, the statistically significant differences between the regime dummies remain. Moreover, as further evidence in support of the theory, leaders for those hybrids that have personalist characteristics are more likely to face negative post-tenure fates.[15]

[15]Results are also robust to excluding hybrid regimes from the model.

Table 2.3: Logit Models for Negative Fate (Alternative Measures)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Hybrids	Magaloni	Weeks	PTS
Personalism Scale		1.78**	2.39**	1.64**
		(0.25)	(0.41)	(0.49)
Militarism Scale		0.58	2.25**	1.27*
		(0.44)	(0.35)	(0.53)
Monarch	-0.20			
	(0.68)			
Military Regime	-2.13**			
	(0.58)			
Single Party	-1.30**			
	(0.40)			
Personalist Hybrid	1.22**			
	(0.42)			
Militarist Hybrid	0.07			
	(0.51)			
Number of Governmental Purges	0.20	0.01	0.04	
	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.06)	
Political Terror Scale				0.49**
				(0.17)
Democracy	-2.51**	-0.02	-0.54	-0.89*
	(0.42)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.39)
Irregular Entry	0.49	-0.65+	-1.07*	-0.84
	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.57)
Number of Previous Leaders Punished	0.04*	0.01	0.02	-0.001
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Institutionalized Means of Removal	-0.50+	-0.28	-0.32	-0.79+
	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.47)
Constant	0.64	-2.64**	-2.02**	-2.47**
	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.69)
Observations	921	721	730	453
Log likelihood	-380.33	-238.13	-241.25	-149.91
Efron's R^2	0.25	0.38	0.35	0.31
Proportional Reduction in Error	21.11%	31.97%	28.99%	15.85%

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country)
Note: Sample begins in 1976 for Model 4

The second approach is to abandon the Geddes' regimes classification and use Magaloni et al.'s (2013) personalism measure. These results are given in Model 2. As anticipated, increases in personalism increase the probability of a negative post-tenure fate. In

fact, when personalism increases from moderately personalist (1) to highly personalist (2), the estimated probability of a negative fate increases 30% from 25% to 55%.

The final strategy is to use Weeks' personalism scale; the results of which are found in Model 3. Again, the sign on the coefficient on the personalism scale variable is in the anticipated positive direction and statistically significant. For this measure, an increase in personalism from a moderate level (0.5) to fully personalist (1), increases the estimated probability of a negative fate by 20% from 34% to 54%.[16] Model 4 replaces the purges variable with the Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS is a better measure of the retribution concept but greatly reduces the number of observations (1149 to 646). When this measure is included in the model, it is significant, giving some greater credence to the retribution argument. Nevertheless, the relationship between personalism remains positive and statistically significant even with the inclusion of the new variable and the smaller sample size. Overall, models from Table 2.3 fit well, reducing the error in prediction by 16-32%.

The results so far indicate that personalist leaders are more likely to face negative fates than their counterparts in single party, military, and democratic regimes. However, it is possible that there are latent, unobservable characteristics, other than the degree of personalism, that differ between these types of regimes, and that it is these characteristics causing the differences in fates between these regimes. In order to guard against this possibility, models were estimated, using the Weeks measure for personalism, on samples of only single party regimes, military regimes, and democracies. The models were first run with no control variables and then the full battery of controls.[17]

[16]The calculation of the substantive effects for Models 2 and 3 keep control variables at their means for continuous measures and at the modal category for dichotomous variables.

[17]Tables for these results are given in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 in the appendix.

Figure 3.3 presents the results in the form of a coefficient plot, where the size of the coefficient on the personalism scale variable is plotted for each model. The models with no control variables are displayed in the top panel and those models with control variables are given at the bottom. The dashed line indicates a coefficient size of zero and each coefficient is displayed along with its 95% confidence intervals. In the models without controls, the coefficients differ substantially in size (with the effect of personalism being strongest for the sample of democracies), but all effects are positive and statistically significant (none of the intervals cross zero). Moreover, when controls are included, the coefficients are remarkably similar in size with all three in the 2.3-2.4 range, and roughly equal to the coefficient from the model on the full sample (Model 3 in Table 2.3). This is strong evidence that the vehicle driving the difference in regime types' proclivities for negative post-tenures is the variation in the degree of personalism present in these regimes.

Figure 2.3: Coefficient Plot of Personalism's Effect on Negative Fate



But, so far, I have only examined the effect of personalism on whether the leader faces a negative post-tenure fate or not; I have not tested whether higher values of personalism makes any one of these negative fates more likely than others. In order to test this possibility, that a higher degree of personalism makes a particular outcome (exile, imprisonment, death, and no punishment) more likely, a multinomial probit model is used and displayed in Table 2.4. My theoretical argument does not result in definitive expectations that personalism causes certain negative post-tenure fates to occur. Exile, imprisonment, and death are all solutions to the legitimacy problem that the successor faces. However, his predecessor's death is the final solution to the successor's predicament. Ghosts do not typically come back to undermine their successors.[18] Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that personalism's effects would be the strongest for the death outcome. Table 2.4 presents two multinomial probit models: one using purges to proxy for repression and another where the Political Terror Scale is used. For both models, all three negative fates (exile, imprisonment, and death) are statistically more likely than the base category for the model: okay. However, the effects between the three negative fates are not statistically different. Yet, the effect is slightly stronger for the death category, providing additional, suggestive evidence in favor of the theoretical argument.

I provide one last empirical test for my theoretical argument. One potential concern about these results is that personalist leaders do not leave quietly. In previous models, I attempted to control for an available, non-violent means of leader removal. However, it may be the case that personalist leaders are more likely to experience irregular exits, i.e. coups, no matter if there is a nonviolent means for removal either because personalist leaders are simply more likely to not accept removal or potential usurpers of personalist regimes feel that removal is more likely to succeed under irregular means. If that is the

[18] King Hamlet being a notable exception.

Table 2.4: Multinomial Probit Models for Negative Fate

	(1)			(2)		
	Exile	Imprisonment	Death	Exile	Imprisonment	Death
Personalism Scale	1.62**	1.71**	2.10**	1.14*	1.09**	1.63**
	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.51)	(0.41)	(0.48)
Militarism Scale	1.61**	1.74**	1.33**	0.62	1.23*	0.71
	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.50)	(0.52)
Number of Governmental Purges	0.03	0.03	0.05			
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
Political Terror Scale				0.47*	0.34*	0.18
				(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Democracy	-0.58+	-0.30	-0.20	-0.72+	-0.43	-0.86*
	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.35)
Irregular Entry	-0.66+	-0.88**	-0.78+	-0.72+	-0.84*	-0.35
	(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.43)	(0.52)
Means for Removal	-0.45	0.10	-0.30	-0.96*	-0.27	-0.35
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.48)	(0.52)
Previous Leaders Punished	0.03*	0.01	-0.03	0.05	-0.003	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Constant	-2.00**	-2.51**	-2.55**	-2.71**	-2.85**	-2.31**
	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.64)
Observations		730			453	
Log likelihood		-374.99			-228.47	

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country)
Note: Base category is no punishment

case, the increased proclivity for personalist leaders to face negative post-tenure fates may have little to do with their claims of legitimacy; instead, personalist leaders are likely to face violent ends because they necessitate violent removal.[19] To account for this possibility, I estimated bivariate probit models, which simultaneously estimate equations for the occurrence of an irregular exit and negative fate.[20]

[19]It is also possible that the regime characteristics of successors may influence post-tenure fates in that personalist leaders are more likely to be punished only because they are often replaced with other personalist leaders. This possibility is considered as I control for successor's regime type. Results still conform to the theoretical argument.

[20]I chose the bivariate probit model over the Heckman probit models and Sartori (2003) estimator because leaders do not have to face an irregular exit to experience a negative fate. As nearly a quarter of those leaders punished were removed by regular means.

Table 2.5 presents the results of the bivariate probit models. Four models are estimated to show that results do not change with different decisions regarding measurement of personalism and repression. In each model, we find that higher levels of personalism increase both the likelihood of an irregular exit and a negative post-tenure fate. Moreover, the correlation between the two equations' errors is approximately 0.9. Therefore, the concern about an irregular exit's effect on post-tenure fate is appropriate. However, even when accounting for the relationship between irregular exit and negative fate, we find that higher levels of personalism increase the probability of a leader facing a negative post-tenure fate.

2.9 Qualitative Evidence: Nicolae Ceausescu

2.9.1 Case Selection

The year 1989 marked a flashpoint for the Soviet Union. The superpower had weakened to a point where it could no longer control unrest in its satellite nations. The result was a wave of revolutions in places like East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. A common thread existed for all these revolutions; these nations casted away aging, long-tenured communist leaders in favor of new democratic regimes. For almost all these power transitions, the process was nonviolent as strongman leaders such as Wojciech Jaruzelski in Poland and Gustav Husak in Czechoslovakia got to ease into a life of retirement. However, one such leader, Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, was not so fortunate. He, along with his wife Elena, were arrested, found guilty of genocide in a kangaroo court, and then swiftly and brutally executed by a firing squad. Why was Ceausescu killed while equally brutal dictators such as Jaruzelski and Husak got to walk away?

The 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe provide a strong testing ground for my theoretical argument for several reasons. First, this event allows me to compare leader removals that are proximate in both space and time, allowing me to minimize spatial and tempo-

Table 2.5: Bivariate Probit Models for Negative Fate and Irregular Exit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Weeks	Magaloni	Weeks	Magaloni
Negative Fate				
Personalism Scale	1.36**	1.03**	0.93**	0.76**
	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.30)	(0.18)
Militarism Scale	1.22**	0.71*	0.33	0.13
	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Democracy	-0.35+	0.04	-0.50*	-0.12
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.24)
Irregular Entry	-0.60*	-0.34	-0.43	-0.31
	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.28)
Number of Governmental Purges	0.03	0.01		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Political Terror Scale			0.29**	0.27**
			(0.09)	(0.08)
Number of Previous Leaders Punished	0.01+	0.01	0.003	0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Institutionalized Means of Removal	-0.17	-0.20	-0.43	-0.54+
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Constant	-1.14**	-1.51**	-1.54**	-1.74**
	(0.23)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.39)
Irregular Exit				
Personalism Scale	1.16**	0.94**	0.70*	0.66**
	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.31)	(0.16)
Militarism Scale	1.79**	1.00**	1.49**	1.12**
	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)
Democracy	-0.28	0.16	-0.12	0.38
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.27)
Irregular Entry	-0.62**	-0.41*	-0.61*	-0.46+
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.31)	(0.28)
Number of Governmental Purges	0.02	0.002		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Political Terror Scale			0.24*	0.20*
			(0.10)	(0.09)
Number of Previous Leaders Punished	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Institutionalized Means of Removal	-0.06	-0.13	-0.49+	-0.58*
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Constant	-1.44**	-1.84**	-1.73**	-2.04**
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.42)	(0.43)
ρ	0.88**	0.89**	0.88**	0.91**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	730	721	453	460
Log likelihood	-370.14	-361.36	-230.97	-228.45

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country)

ral differences. Second, these revolutions were largely the result of the same exogenous event–the crumbling of the Soviet Union–limiting concerns about endogeneity, particularly with regards to why these leaders were being removed in the first place. Third, these leader removals occurred in nations that shared many institutional characteristics, allow-

ing me to reduce the presence of confounding factors. All these nations were single-party, communist nations where leaders gained power through institutionalized means, typically elections within the communist parties, and held onto such power for decades using similar tactics.

Table 2.6 highlights these similar internal characteristics of the Ceausescu, Jaruzelski, and Husak regimes. All three states had low levels of militarization within their governments, with Jaruzelski having the highest level (0.25). The three nations also exhibited similar levels of repression, receiving the same score for the CIRI Physical Integrity Index (6) and roughly the same on the Political Terror Scale.[21] All three also claimed office through regular means and had similar numbers of former leaders experience negative post-tenure fates, although noticeably less for the case of Poland. Yet, as can be seen, the post-tenure fate for these leaders varies with Jaruzelski and Husak experiencing no punishment and Ceausescu being executed.

The key difference appears to be the level of personalism exhibited in the regime. For all three leaders, the Magaloni measure designates them as moderately personalist (1), but the Geddes classification codes Ceausescu's tenure as a party-personalist regime while considering the Jaruzelski and Husak regimes as having no personalist elements. Moreover, the Weeks personalism scale categorizes Ceausescu as fully personalist and the other Eastern Europeans as exhibiting no personalist characteristics.[22] In the coming section, I

[21]The Political Terror Scale represents the maximum value during the leader's tenure. However, one could reasonably argue that Jaruzelski's regime was the most repressive as the average score for Husak and Ceausescu was 1.7-1.8 while Jaruzelski's average score is about 2.8. In fact, in response to the rise of the Solidarity Movement in Poland, Jaruzelski had declared martial law and had imprisoned many of Solidarity's leaders.

[22]The difference in classification between the measure is likely the result of the fact that the Magaloni measure is a *de jure* index of personalism as it relies on Polity IV's *xconst* which indicates the presence of formal institutional constraints on the leader while the Geddes and Weeks measures includes greater considerations of de facto personalism by asking such questions as "whether access to high government office depends on the personal favor of the leader, whether country specialists viewed the politburo or equivalent as a rubber stamp for the leader's decisions, and whether the leader personally controlled the security forces" (Weeks 2012, 336).

Table 2.6: Summary of Eastern European Cases

	Ceausescu (High)	**Jaruzelski (Low)**	**Husak (Low)**
Personalism			
Geddes	Party-Personalist	Single Party	Single Party
Magaloni	1	1	1
Weeks	1	0	0
Militarism			
Weeks	0	0.25	0
Repression			
Political Terror Scale	4	3	3
CIRI Physical Integrity	6	6	6
Past History			
Entry Type	Regular	Regular	Regular
Past Leaders Punished	4	1	3
Means of Removal			
Exit Type	Irregular	Regular	Regular
Instit. Means	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post-tenure Fate	Death	Nothing	Nothing

argue that differences in personalism resulted in Ceauscescu becoming more threatening to his successors' rule, and that is the reason he was killed while his counterparts were allowed to walk away.[23]

2.9.2 Ceausescu's Demise

Scholars have labeled the Ceausescu regime as "neo-Stalinist, neo-patrimonial, and sultanistic" (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 13-14; Siani-Davies 2007, 16). These terms describe highly personalized regimes, which are characterized by "the chief executive's maintenance of state authority through an extensive network of personal patronage, rather than

[23]The other difference is that Ceausescu's exit was irregular but the means of exit is an unsatisfactory answer for why the Romanian leader was killed. By the time that Ceausescu was apprehended, he was already fleeing the nation, so violence was not required to dislodge him from power. Moreover, when captured, Ceausescu did not resist. Finally, the nature of exit does not explain why Ceausescu, and his wife Elena, were so swiftly put on trial, sentenced, and executed.

through ideology or personal law" (Siani-Davies 2007, 16). Nicolae Ceausescu was a disciple of Joseph Stalin and modeled his rule after the Soviet leader (Brezianu 1989). The Romanian leader consolidated his domestic power by using the populist support he had gained by asserting independence from the Soviet Union (e.g. his rousing criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, calls for greater liberalism, and willingness to engage the West). However, such claims would be little more than a pretense to form a personalist dictatorship in his own image. Little by little, Ceausescu would use his support to chip away at the party structure, so that by the mid-1970s, the communist party in Romania would become "so totally identified with Ceausescu that it no longer retained any separate autonomy" (Siani-Davies 2007, 22).

As part of this process, Ceausescu created a cult of personality. He made claims of lineage to popular historical Romanian figures such as Stephen the Great and Michael the Brave. He also constructed absurd myths: he established world peace, and his wife Elena, despite only having a fourth grade education, was a world-renowned scientist. He had the Romanian people refer to him by such titles as the "Genius of the Carpathians," littered the streets of Bucharest with banners of his image, and had groups sing anthems attesting to his greatness and glory (Brezianu 1989; Gilberg 1990; Ratesh 1991; Siani-Davies 2007; Sebestyen 2009). All this mythmaking had a purpose: "the cult of Ceausescu had become the main technique to legitimate a leadership without a genuine social basis" (Brezianu 1989, 7).

However, this personalization of the regime would eventually lead to Ceausescu's downfall. As part of his consolidation of power, Ceausescu had empowered the Romanian secret police, the Securitate, and used it as one of his primary means of staying in power. The force, beholden to Ceausescu, began to be perceived by the Romanian populace as an all-powerful entity, which could hear and see everything. As a result, Romanians became

paranoid of Ceausescu and his Securitate's abilities, making Ceausescu larger than life. It would be this paranoia that would cost Ceausescu his life.

On December 21, 1989, Nicolae Ceausescu's reign ended as he fled protests at the Central Committee Building. Within hours, a pro-democracy group called the National Salvation Front (NSF), led by Ion Iliescu, took power. When the Ceausescus were apprehended a day later, it was up to the NSF leaders, particularly Iliescu, to decide their fates. The group hesitated for two days. Over those two days, fighting had erupted in the streets, taking the lives of 1,000 Romanians. The fighting pitted protestors against a mysterious force that the NSF called the "terrorists." Although these individuals' purpose is still debated, the dominant theory at the time was that the group consisted of remnants of the Securitate, whose aim was to bring Ceausescu back into power. This claim was buttressed by the fact that former Securitate troops tried to break the Ceausescus out of prison on December 24th.

Largely in response to this attempt at a jailbreak, the NSF held a meeting at 5pm on Christmas Eve to decide the Ceausescus' fates. It is claimed that the meeting was lengthy (three hours) and combative as the group broke into two factions (one lead by Silviu Brucan and the other by Iliescu). Brucan's faction argued that the dictator and his wife had to be put on trial and executed expeditiously to discourage the terrorists and put an end to the fighting:

> But now the soldiers wanted a swift execution. They felt sure that would halt the shooting. If Ceausescu was dead, there would be no rallying point, nothing to fight for. Iliescu was at first doubtful. He did not want blood on his hands... Some voice suggested that holding a kangaroo court in a rush, without proper evidence, would cause derision internationally. But the generals were adamant and Brucan supported them. He said Romania needed to be assured that the Ceausescu dictatorship was dead and gone and there was no better way 'than to show them the body' (Sebestyen 2009, 398).

Iliescu eventually acquiesced, agreeing that only Nicolae's death would stabilize the new regime. Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu were put on trial and faced several counts, the most damning being the genocide of 63,000 Romanians. The trial was chaotic and rushed, lasting less than an hour, in which the Ceausescus' own defense attorneys were making arguments against them. The verdict took five minutes and the sentence was their immediate execution, despite the fact that Romanian law prohibited executions from occurring within 10 days of sentencing. In fact, the execution took place so quickly that the cameraman did not have time to film it (Ratesh 1991; Siani-Davies 2007; Sebestyen 2009).

The speed and lack of publicity for the Ceausescus' executions undermines the argument that their deaths served as some form of retribution. In fact, several prominent Romanian dissidents were troubled by the fact that Ceausescu did not publicly answer for his crimes, leading noted protestor Paul Goma to write that the execution "stole Ceausescu from those that suffered because of him" (Siani-Davis 2007, 142). Moreover, the last order given to the firing squad before the execution was to aim at Nicolae Ceausescu's chest so that he would be identifiable in pictures; no such command was given for Elena as she was shot several times in the head: a fact that reveals that Nicolae Ceausescu's executioners were more concerned about proving the dictator's death than providing retribution for his victims (141).

2.10 Conclusion

When autocratic leaders take office, they are risking their lives. Although democratic heads of states might face failure or be viewed unfavorably in the chronicles of history, they rarely have to face severe consequences (exile, imprisonment, or death) for having led their nations. For autocratic leaders, the odds of facing negative fates after ruling are substantially higher. In fact, for some autocratic regimes, the probability is higher

that they will encounter these fates than not. I argue that one reason for this variation is the personalization of the regime. Tying legitimacy to rule to the leader's personal traits ensures that the legitimacy to rule, particularly outside of institutions, remains even after a removal, causing successors to face an immediate threat to their power. By exiling, jailing, and particularly, by killing the leader, personalist leaders' successors can ameliorate or completely eradicate this threat to their rule.

This argument was supported by tests that controlled for four potential rival explanations: the need for retribution, no institutionalized means for removal, militarization of government, and past history. The findings show that regimes with similar levels of these rival predictors will display differences in leader fates based on the degree of personalism. For instance, Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania was executed, while Wojciech Jaruzelski in Poland and Gustav Husak in Czechoslovakia were allowed to walk away despite have similar levels for these rival predictors. All three ruled small, single party (Communist) regimes in Eastern Europe, during relatively the same point in history and exhibited comparable levels of repression but they differed in their degree of personalism, resulting in a different fate (death) for Ceausescu.

Understanding this variation in leaders' post-tenure fates is important. If leaders are motivated by their survival in office, we should not only examine their probability of being removed, but also the consequences of such a removal (Goemans 2000a, b). So far, many theories have relied on the claims that democracies are more constrained than autocracies (e.g. Morgan and Campbell 1991; Reiter and Stam 2002) or that personalist regimes are less constrained than other autocracies (Peceny and Beer 2003; Weeks 2008, 2012, 2014). However, due to their likely post-tenure fates, democratic leaders are perhaps less likely to worry about their removal and personalist leaders are perhaps the most likely. Then, conceivably, it is the consequences of removal that generates policy, and therefore,

understanding the pattern in leaders' fates might allows us to construct better theories of international relations and comparative politics.

3. THE USE OF MINISTERIAL CRONYISM

3.1 Introduction

Mustafa Tlass met Syria's long-time strongman ruler Hafez al-Assad in the Syrian Royal Air Force Academy in 1952, when both were in their early 20's, at which point the two would become life-long friends. In fact, Leverett (2005, 231) would describe the two Ba'athists as having an "unusually personal bond." When al-Assad was imprisoned in Egypt in 1961, it was Tlass that al-Assad trusted to ensure that his wife and children were able to flee Syria safely.

When al-Assad assumed power in 1972, he placed his best friend Tlass as head of the Syrian military, and it would be this close friendship that would keep Tlass in the military's upper echelons for the next 32 years. Tlass was not an ideal military leader. He was more interested in becoming a poet and a literary scholar, then running an effective military. Tlass would continually embarrass the regime by making outlandish statements, including a 1984 book where he made anti-Semitic remarks and claimed that Jews had killed a Christian priest in 1840 to use his blood for the Passover (Leverett 2005). However, despite his foibles, at no point, was Tlass in danger of losing his position as head of the Syrian Armed Forces because there was no individual that the al-Assad family trusted more. This confidence was warranted. When Hafez died in 2000, it was Tlass who played the vital role in ensuring a smooth leadership transition for Hafez's son Bashir.

Syria is not an isolated example. In Egypt, Gamal Nasser tapped his long-time friend Abdel Hakim Amer to be military chief. Amer was notorious for his military incompetence and was responsible for the massive military defeat to Israel in 1956. Despite this failure, he was able to hold onto his position, only to conduct an even more disastrous military

campaign during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. In Iraq, Uday Hussein was placed in charge of the Republican Guard despite the fact that he did not know the “simplest things about the military" (Sassoon 2011, 56). History is replete with examples of states’ military and political elites being cronies and relatives who were woefully unqualified to hold these positions. In fact, Figure 3.1 shows that the use of crony defense ministers has persisted through the latter half of the 20th Century.[1] Although there have been ebbs and flows throughout that time, the average proportion of states with crony defense ministers has hovered around 25-30%.

Figure 3.1: Percentage of States with Crony Defense Ministers (1950–2000)



Why do so many states fill high-level ministerial positions, particularly in the military, with undeserving relatives and cronies? There are many potential, reasonable explana-

[1]This figure is produced using my own constructed dataset. Details on this measure will be presented in an upcoming section.

tions. Prima facie, it could be that some leaders hold a sense of loyalty to those individuals that supported them before their ascension to power, and these positions are rewards for past support. Alternatively, leaders may feel that these cronies are like-minded (e.g. hold same revolutionary views), and therefore, more likely to assist in bringing about desired policies and outcomes. However, I argue that a leader's appointment of cronies and relatives to high-level ministerial positions, particularly on top of military organizations, serves a particular political purpose: coup-proofing. Bloodlines and long-standing friendships cement loyalty to the leader and decrease the probability that these individuals will organize or participate in any attempts at overthrow. Therefore, by placing cronies and relatives in key, coup-sensitive positions, such as the head of armed forces, the leader ensures that the only individuals with the means to orchestrate a coup are also those elites most loyal to him.

In this chapter, I argue and demonstrate that personalist leaders are the most likely to appoint cronies and relatives to coup-sensitive positions, a coup-proofing strategy I refer to as *ministerial cronyism*. In particular, I show that personalist leaders are likely to appoint cronies and relatives as their defense ministers or military chiefs. The reason for this propensity is that personalist leaders have the most to lose if a successful coup is conducted. For personalist leaders, removal from office is more likely to result in a negative post-tenure fate (exile, imprisonment, and death). Given the extreme consequences for not protecting themselves, personalist dictators are highly motivated to pursue the most effective coup-proofing strategies, even if it comes with a tradeoff: decreased military capacity.

This chapter contributes to both the literature on dictatorships and coup-proofing. Although ministerial cronyism has been discussed as a potential coup-proofing strategy (Quinlivan 1999), there has been no empirical test about its effectiveness as a means to prevent coups and prolong leadership tenure. In part, this gap is due to data availability.

Until now, there existed no cross-national data on the relationship between the leader and key ministers. This chapter helps to fill that void by presenting a cross-national dataset of defense ministers from 1945 to 2005, in which defense ministers were coded as whether or not they were a relative or life-long friend of the head of state. Moreover, with one notable exception (Pilster and Böhmelt 2012), there have not been attempts to investigate whether particular institutional characteristics, or regime type, influences whether or not the leader will pursue coup-proofing strategies. Although this chapter focuses on one particular strategy, ministerial cronyism, it is likely that the theoretical argument translates to other coup-proofing strategies.

The rest of the chapter will proceed in the following manner. Section 3.2 outlines the relationship between regime type, coups, and negative post-tenure fates. Section 3.3 explicates the argument on how these negative post-tenure fates induce fear and paranoia, particularly mistrust of the military elite, in personalist regimes. Section 3.4 reviews different coup-proofing strategies and the practice of using ministerial cronyism to reduce coup threat. Section 3.5 details the empirical implications of this argument. Section 3.6 overviews the construction of the dataset on defense ministers and describe my measurement of ministerial cronyism. Sections 3.7-3.10 employs quantitative tests on a cross-sectional, time series dataset of leader-years to demonstrate that personalist leaders are more likely to use ministerial cronyism, and that cronyism is an effective coup-proofing strategy.

3.2 Coups and Negative Post-Tenure Fates

The risk of a coup is a political reality for heads of states across the globe.[2] Between 1950 and 2010, there have been 457 coup attempts. Nearly half of these challenges were

[2]Coups have occurred in every major geographical region; however, their occurrence is concentrated in the third world with nearly two-thirds of all coups occurring in the Americas and Africa, almost 30% occurring in the Middle East and Asia, and only 3% in Europe.

successful (Powell and Thyne 2011). There are a myriad of reasons for why these violent removals occur. However, in short, a coup requires two necessary conditions: motive and means/opportunity (Finer 1962; Luttwak 1968; Zimmerman 1983; Sutter 2000; Belkin and Schofer 2003).

There are plenty of motives for coups: poverty (Johnson et al. 1984; Londregan and Poole 1990), economic decline (Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000), repression (Iqbal and Zorn 2006), and military grievances (Thompson 1973). Certainly, a leader can work to reduce such concerns by providing for more equitable distributions, reducing repression, and displaying a greater respect for military elites. However, particularly in autocracies, which by definition restrict individuals from political power and economic wealth, there will always be aggrieved parties. Instead, the most certain way for a leader to avoid being displaced by a coup is to limit the opportunities through coup-proofing.

I assert that personalist regimes are the most likely to engage in coup-proofing strategies, particularly the use of crony and nepotistic ministers to safeguard their hold on power. I classify a personalist regime using Geddes et al.'s (2014, 319) definition: "autocracies in which discretion over policy and personnel are concentrated in the hands of one man, military, or civilian." The main explanation for this proclivity is that personalist leaders have the most to lose if a successful coup is orchestrated. Irregular removals, those not prescribed by laws or established conventions (e.g. coups), are not without consequences for leaders. According to the *Archigos* dataset (Goemans et al. 2009), 80% of leaders from 1875 to 2004, that were removed irregularly, experienced a negative post-tenure fate: exile, imprisonment, and death. Extreme consequences are not rare, as 12% paid the ultimate price: their death.

Figure 3.2: Occurrence Rate for Irregular Removal and Post-tenure Killings



Figure 3.2 displays the propensity for a leader, by regime type, to be removed irregularly and to be killed, once removed.[3] The main takeaway from the figure is that personalist leaders should be the most concerned about coup occurrence. Personalist leaders are the most likely to be removed by irregular means (75%), and once deposed, they are the most likely to experience death: 17%. Therefore, not only are coups the most likely manner for personalist dictatorship to lose power, but they are also more dangerous for these autocrats than any other leader.[4]

Having the most to lose, personalist leaders are particularly motivated to ensure that their removal from power does not occur. I argue that the consequences are so large for personalist dictators that they must work to minimize the risk of a coup to zero, using any coup-proofing strategy available to them, no matter the trade-offs associated with these

[3]Geddes et al. (2014) used for determination of regime type, and the *Archigos* dataset (Goemans et al. 2009) for removal type and leader death.

[4]Escribà-Folch (2013) also finds that personalist leaders are more likely to experience post-tenure punishment. He offers a variety of reasons for this proclivity as well.

strategies. This idea that the gravity of negative post-tenure fates motivates leader behavior is not novel (Goemans 2000a,b, 2008; Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004, 2011; Debs and Goemans 2010). A propensity for negative post-tenure fates has been used to explain higher rates of international conflict occurrence as leaders try to "gamble for resurrection," remove internal military threats, divert attention away from domestic turmoil, and demonstrate competency, all in the name of keeping power (Walt 1996; Goemans, 2000a,b; Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004, 2011; Debs and Goemans 2010).

3.3 Inner Circle, Military Elite, and Paranoia

Dictators primarily fear their inner circle, and for good reason, as the individuals are the most likely to dislodge the despot from power (Tullock 1987). In fact, nearly two-thirds of all dictators are removed by their own elites (Debs and Goemans 2010). However, removing a dictator, particularly a personalist one, is a risky endeavor. Few within a country have the means and opportunity to orchestrate a coup. Leaders often rule because they have a monopoly on violence. Either through the nation's military, paramilitaries, secret police, or personal bodyguards, leadership often has well-armed and well-trained individuals protecting them from such removals from power.

For this reason, in autocracies, particularly personalist regimes, the military elite is best positioned to devise a successful attempt at leadership removal. Successful removal requires either the military elite to be the conspirators or that usurpers have these individuals' support (Luttwak 1979; Quinlivan 1999). Therefore, the institution that makes it difficult for the polity to overthrow the leadership and protects the state from foreign threats is the very agent that poses the greatest threat to the leader — a paradox that has been referred to as the civil-military problematique (Feaver 1996, 1999) or the guardianship dilemma (McMahon and Slantchev 2015).

Therefore, the leader faces a trade-off. If he strengthens the military to protect from popular protest or foreign intervention, he may be engineering his own demise by increasing the military's ability to remove him through a coup (Finer 1962). Since the military elite provides the greatest threat to the autocrat's hold on power, a significant amount of the dictator's time and energy must be devoted to managing this tenuous relationship. To survive, the dictator must placate these individuals with policies, gifts, or status, dominate them with a campaign of fear and intimidation, or find some other way to cement their loyalty (Horowitz 1985; Huntington 1991; Brooks 1998; Staniland 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2010).

For instance, after the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam gave officers automobiles and lowered criteria for their admission into college. He also doubled salaries after the 1991 Gulf War. In Syria, Hafez al-Assad allowed military officers to reap the profits from opiate trafficking (Brooks 1998, 27). As for fear and intimidation, Saddam Hussein killed ministers in meetings, spied on his military chiefs, and had Ba'ath Party members execute their compatriots (Sassoon 2011). Nicolae Ceausescu convinced his populace that his secret police, the Securitate, was all-knowing and all-seeing (Siani-Davies 2007), Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier's personal paramilitary force Tonton Macoute was literally named after the bogeyman (Von Tunzelmann 2011), and Stalin "murder[ed] anyone he suspected was or might become an enemy" (Robins and Post 1997, 267).

Given the high cost of being wrong about military elites' support, personalist dictators are obsessed with the intentions of these individuals within their regime. In fact, the loyalty of his inner circle, particularly military leaders, is the paramount consideration in the dictator's life. For most dictators, this concern morphs into full-scale paranoia. It is common for personalist leaders to see threats everywhere and go to extreme lengths to guard themselves against their closest advisers.

Historical records of personalist leaders such as Joseph Stalin, Idi Amin, Joseph Mobutu, and Pol Pot show that these leaders were possessed by feelings of insecurity and mistrust. Stalin was “haunted by the fear of an attempt on his life" (Bullock 1991, 364-365), and the despot would even credit his “holy fear" for keeping him alive (Montefiore 2003, 56). In the case of Idi Amin, “fear and hatred of educated people . . . were both the most characteristic and unpredictable aspects of his tyranny" (Robins and Post 1997, 267). To protect his life, Saddam Hussein hired body doubles, food tasters, blackened out his vehicles' windows, and constantly kept high-level officials in the dark about his whereabouts.

3.4 Coup-proofing and Ministerial Cronyism

Coup d'états are extraconstitutional removals of leaders. Coups exist outside of the law and are criminal acts. Therefore, it is no surprise that the two forces that underlie crime—motive and opportunity (means)—also predict coups. Military and political elites orchestrate coups when they have reasons and means to do so (Finer 1962; Luttwak 1968; Zimmerman 1983; Sutter 2000; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012). Therefore, if leaders seek to prevent coups, i.e. coup-proofing, they must either alter the incentives of or undermine the ability of would-be usurpers.

Although coup orchestrators often establish legitimacy for their actions through claims of justification and sociotropic concerns (Welch 1970; Wiking 1983), coups are often the result of individuals seeking personal gain. Leadership brings a host of benefits including power, status, and economic rents (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Therefore, leaders often buy off military elites with “toys" such as increased military spending, arms purchases, promotions, lucrative salaries, or bribery (Huntington 1991). Scholars have also found that ceding power to elites through political institutions also decreases coup occurrence (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Svolik 2009, 2012). Finally, leaders may undermine

the military's desire for political power by increasing its professionalization and respect for civilian leadership (Huntington 1957).

However, studies on coup-proofing have mainly focused on leaders' attempts to undermine their military's ability and means to overthrow the leader. In his seminal investigation of coup-proofing efforts in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria, Quinlivan (1999) identified three additional coup-proofing strategies: (1). Placing relatives or loyal co-ethnics in sensitive, coup-critical positions, (2). Counterbalancing, i.e. the creation of overlapping security organizations, and (3). Creating paramilitaries and personal security forces to rival the nation's armed forces (e.g. Republican Guard in Iraq or the Ton Ton Macoute in Haiti). Recent empirical investigations have primarily focused on the effectiveness of counterbalancing and paramilitaries as coup-proofing strategies. Theoretically, counterbalancing would increase leader stability by creating a disorganized, overlapping system of security organizations that allows leaders to have organizations spy on each other, to employ divide-and-conquer strategies, and to introduce coordination and collective action problems for coup organizers. As for paramilitaries, they provide a loyal, last line-of-defense against the nation's military. Empirical tests show that paramilitaries do protect the leader from removal while counterbalancing does not (Powell 2012), although subsequent research has argued that this null result is due to a curvilinear effect or measurement error (Böhmelt and Pilster 2015; De Bruin 2017).

To my best knowledge, no studies have investigated the effect of Quinlivan's (1999) first coup-proofing strategy: nepotistic and crony appointments to coup-sensitive positions, a strategy I refer to as *ministerial cronyism*. This is a significant oversight for two reasons. Crony and nepotistic appointments to key security posts are pervasive. Fidel Castro's brother (Raul) was Minister of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces for nearly fifty years, Chiang Kai-Sheik's son, Chiang Ching Kuo, was head of his secret police

for over a decade, and before seizing power from his uncle in 1979, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo was in charge of the National Guard, the armed forces of Equatorial Guinea. Moreover, Gamel Nasser and Muammar Gaddafi placed their life-long friends, Abdel Hakim Amir and Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr, on top of their military organizations and kept them there for decades, despite displays of gross incompetence.

The second reason for the significance of neglecting this strategy's importance is its potential effectiveness. Placing cronies and relatives on top of security organizations works to undermine both the motive and opportunity for coup orchestrators (Chehabi and Linz 1998). Bloodlines, kinship, and long-standing relationships establish loyalty to leaders the same way it does for criminal organizations (e.g. gangs, mafia, and crime families). Removing a blood relative or life-long friend from office and potentially imprisoning or killing said leader comes at a personal cost. It is not easy to betray one's father, brother, or best friend, even for those who grew up with the violence inherent in dictatorships.

Ministerial cronyism also thwarts opportunity (means). First, for those members of security organizations who may wish to topple a leader, they now must not only find a way to circumvent the watchful eye of the leader but must also plan a coup without drawing the attention of the crony on top of their organization. Second, by using loyalty as the main qualification for heading security posts, the leader trades off the competency of these organizations (Brooks 2006; Egorov and Sonin 2011; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Gaub 2013; Talmadge 2015; Brown et al. 2016). The reason for this trade-off is that, by restricting the group of candidates to only those individuals related to or life-long friends of the leader, the head of state has now decreased the probability that the most qualified individuals remain in the selection pool. In many cases, this decrease in military competence is a desired effect as it lowers the likelihood that the crony minister can organize a successful coup. For instance, Barzan abd al-Ghafur was selected to head the Special Republican Guard in

Iraq because Saddam Hussein did not feel that his cousin was intelligent enough to lead a coup (Woods et al. 2006).

3.5 Empirical Implications

Theoretically, I argue, that amongst leaders, personalist dictators are the most fearful of coups. Given that a successful coup has a high probability of resulting in the personalist leader's exile, imprisonment, or death, the despot is highly motivated to ensure that such coups do not occur. Therefore, personalist dictatorships are the most likely to pursue coup-proofing strategies such as bribery, counterbalancing, and paramilitaries. However, I argue that one particular strategy would be attractive: ministerial cronyism, i.e. appointing relatives and life-long friends to head security organizations. The reason that this particular strategy would be enticing is that not only does it remove coup motives for military elites but also reduces the means and opportunity to partake in this irregular removal.

> H1: More personalized regimes will be more likely to exhibit ministerial cronyism.

Appointing friends and relatives to high-level, military posts does not preclude personalist leaders from using other coup-proofing strategies. In fact, one rival explanation for why personalist leaders may have crony military elites is that when power is consolidated into one person there is nothing to stop the leader from giving positions and rewards to friends and family members. Therefore, perhaps such a practice is not motivated by the crony's loyalty to the leader, but by the leader's loyalty to the crony. If fear and paranoia is motivating ministerial cronyism, than the practice should also be associated with coup risk and other coup-proofing tactics.

> H2: Higher levels of coup risk will make ministerial cronyism more likely.

H3: Ministerial cronyism will increase the likelihood of leaders using other coup-proofing tactics.

My theoretical argument rests upon an assumption that ministerial cronyism makes leadership removal, particularly by a coup d'état, less likely. If ministerial cronyism is not an effective coup-proofing tactic, then it is unlikely that the practice is a response to the personalist leader's paranoia regarding successful coups.

H4: Ministerial cronyism will decrease the probability of leadership removal, particularly the likelihood of a successful coup d'état.

3.6 Measuring Ministerial Cronyism

To measure ministerial cronyism, I focus my efforts on the relationship between the defense minister (i.e. head of the armed forces) and the head of state.[5] I first constructed a list of defense ministers' names and length of tenure for all those that held this portfolio between 1945 and 2005 using three reference texts: *Europa Year Book, The Statesman Yearbook*, and *The International Statesman's Who's Who*. I focused on defense ministers because, as has been previously discussed, the heads of the military organizations provide the greatest coup risk for the leader, and therefore, the most likely position to be filled by a crony.

Evaluating the level of cronyism of defense ministers required detailed biographical information, which was taken from biographies included in the series of reference books called *Historical Dictionaries of [said nation]* (38%), national encyclopedias (24%), texts on nations' civil-military relations and political histories (19%), obituaries from major periodicals, e.g. *New York Times, The Guardian, The Independent* (12%), with the re-

[5]Not all nations call this position by the same title. I had to use my judgement about which minister or internal staff member filled that role, or if that role belonged to the leader.

maining 7% coming from various governmental or non-profit websites. Additional tests were conducted to ensure that there was no systematic relationship between document length and ministerial cronyism as well as between source type and cronyism. No relationship was found between document length and cronyism, but a defense minister was more likely to be coded as crony if the source was a book and less likely if the source was a national encyclopedia. This difference was statistically significant. This is likely because defense ministers from well-established democracies (US, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe), which are less likely to have crony defense ministers, were more likely to have reference materials in English than those in other areas of the world. However, this tendency did not appear to influence the forthcoming results.

From these sources, 2,329 defense ministers were identified. Of them, sufficient biographical information could be ascertained for 1,556, or about two-thirds, of the total. To include the minister in the final data set, I required that the source give biographical information that detailed more than just a list of positions, or directly indicated the reason for the defense minister's appointment. Figure 3.3 provides the geographical coverage of the coding. Lighter shades indicate a greater degree of missingness. Since it was easier to find biographical information on longer-tenured defense ministers, 85% of the *attempted* country-years were able to be coded.[6] Latin America was the region with the least amount of coverage (70%) while the North America/Western Europe and South Asia had the greatest: 94%[7]

The main variable of interest for the upcoming analysis is *Ministerial Cronyism*, which is a dichotomous variable that is coded as 1 if one of two conditions were met. The first

[6]Coverage in the sample is actually just over 70%. The lower rate is primarily due to some nations not have standing armies, and therefore, no military chief, and the fact that a set of small nations were not included in three primary texts from which I constructed the list of defense ministers.

[7]90% for the Middle East/North Africa, 89% for East Asia/Pacific, 83% for Sub-Saharan Africa, and 78% for Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

Figure 3.3: Spatial Coverage of Defense Minister Coding



condition is the defense minister was a relative, either through blood or marriage, to the leader.[8] The second condition is if any of the following questions could be answered in the affirmative. Does the defense minister have a close friendship with the leader that began before or very early in their political or military careers? Was the defense minister promoted rapidly through military ranks or political office during the leader's tenure? Did the defense minister have no or very little political, military, or administrative expertise before achieving this position? In the description, is there any mention of cronyism, favoritism, or closeness leading to their high placement in the leader's administration? Did this defense minister replace a predecessor who was removed due to disloyalty? If neither condition was met, the variable was coded as a zero.

Although not a perfect measure, it is important to note that *Ministerial Cronyism* is meant to capture a high level of cronyism. Surely, almost all ministers are cronies in the sense that they tend to hold some allegiance to the leader and likely have long-lasting personal and professional relationships with him. Leaders choose advisers they trust. How-

[8]Leaders were determined using the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al. 2009).

ever, I seek to identify a particular type of crony: one who was given the portfolio almost exclusively based on a concern for loyalty.

Due to the subjective nature of coding this variable, intercoder reliability was checked on 15% of the sample using an additional coder.[9] Both the nepotism and the crony indicators proved reliable. There was 98.3% agreement for the nepotism condition and 93.6% agreement for the crony condition. Cohen's κ was 0.84 and 0.81 for the nepotism and crony conditions, respectively.[10]

Figure 3.4 provides the geographical distribution of ministerial cronyism, where darker shades indicate a greater percentage of that nation's country-years exhibiting ministerial cronyism. As can be seen, Middle East / North Africa is a hotspot as nations such as Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq have had over 75% of their country-years exhibiting ministerial cronyism, and the region, as whole, displaying a 40% occurrence rate. Moreover, it is striking how little cronyism exists for North America and Western Europe with only Spain, Portugal, and Italy having experienced such cronyism. As a whole, the region displays less than a 5% occurrence rate. Other regions display percentages closer to the world mean (28%): East Asia having a 27% occurrence rate, followed by Latin America (24%), Eastern Europe/Caucasus (20%), and South Asia (11%).

Table 3.1 indicates the prevalence of ministerial cronyism, separated by the use of relatives and friends. Nepotistic defense ministers are relatively rare, with less than 7% of the country-years between 1945 and 2005 experiencing such an occurrence. These occurrences tend to be brothers and sons of leaders. For instance, Fidel Castro's brother Raul held the post of Cuba's defense minister for nearly fifty years; in Gabon, Ali Bongo was his father's defense minister for eight years. However, some cases are more distant

[9] An undergraduate student was used for this process and received course credit for the work.

[10] I provide a more detailed discussion of the data collection effort and the measures' validity in the appendix (Tables 7.5-7.8, Figure 7.1).

Figure 3.4: Ministerial Cronyism by Country



relatives, for instance, Ali Obongo was preceded by Idriss Ngari, his cousin, who headed the armed forces for his uncle Omar Bongo, Ali's father, for 21 years. Some connections are even less direct, as in the case of Hashim Ahmad Al-Tai, whose daughter was married to Saddam Hussein's son Qusay.

Table 3.1: Notable Examples of Ministerial Cronyism

Relatives	**Friends**
341 Country-years (7.02%)	1041 Country-years (21.4%)
Raul Castro (Cuba 1959-2008)	Abdel Hakim Amer (Egypt 1956-1967)
Hashim Ahmad Al-Tai (Iraq 1995-2003)	Choe Hyon (North Korea 1968-1976)
Yu Dawei (Taiwan 1950-1951, 1954-1965)	Juan Ponce Enrile (Philippines 1970-1986)
Humberto Ortega Saavedra (Nicaragua 1979-1990)	Sa'id El-Mufti (Jordan 1950, 1955, 1956)
Hector Trujillo Molina (Dominican Republic 1942-1952)	Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr (Libya 1970-2011)
Teodoro Obiang Nguema (Equatorial Guinea 1976-1979)	Mustafa Tlass (Syria 1972-2004)

Friends are more prevalent crony ministers, encompassing 21% of the country-years. Prominent examples of cronies include Abu-Bakr Junis Jabr who was a boyhood friend

of Muammar al-Qaddafi and held the post of Libya's defense minister for over 40 years; Juan Ponce Enrile of the Philippines, who was Ferdinand Marcos' personal lawyer before becoming the nation's defense minister for 15 years; and Pavle Bulatovic, Slobodan Milosevic's college friend, who remained defense minister throughout the Yugoslav Wars, despite the fact, "he did not make public statements, he only came to work to be seen, and no one knows what he did in his office other than sit in his chair and look out of the window" (Stevanovic and Filipovic 2002, 175).

3.7 Modeling Strategy

In the forthcoming sections, I present three sets of results. The first set of results tests Hypothesis 1: Regimes with higher degrees of personalism will be more likely to employ ministerial cronyism. As the dependent variable *Ministerial Cronyism* is dichotomous, I employ logit models to generate these results. The second set will examine the validity of Hypotheses 2 and 3: The greater the coup risk, the greater the probability of ministerial cronyism and that the use of ministerial cronyism increases the likelihood that other coup-proofing strategies are being used. As the dependent variable remains the same for Hypotheses 2, logit models are used to test this hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 is evaluated by examining whether the use of ministerial cronyism increases the likelihood of one particular coup-proofing strategy: counterbalancing, as measured by Belkin and Schofer (2003). This counterbalancing measure is a continuous index that ranges from approximately -4 to 5, so an OLS model is used for this test.

The final set of results tests Hypothesis 4: The use of ministerial cronyism will decrease the probability of leader failure, and in particular, the probability that the leader will experience an exit through a coup d'état. Since Hypothesis 4 makes claims regarding leader survival, a set of survival models (Cox Proportional Hazard and Weibull Models)

was utilized to test this hypothesis. Finally, to measure the occurrence of successful coups, I relied on Powell and Thyne's (2011) dataset. Again, since coups are events, the dependent variable is an indicator variable, making a logit model appropriate. Heckman probit models are also presented to demonstrate if ministerial cronyism decreases the occurrence of successful coups, because they deter attempts or make attempts less successful. Due to availability of control variables, the samples for these analyses were restricted to the country-years from 1960 to 1998. To account for heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors were used for each model.

3.8 Empirical Analysis for Ministerial Cronyism

3.8.1 Specification

In order to predict ministerial cronyism, I use logit models. My hypothesis is that ministerial cronyism is associated with higher levels of personalism. To measure personalism, I rely on three different measures. First, I employ the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset (Geddes et al. 2014). The dataset divides authoritarian regimes into four groups: *Personalist, Single Party, Monarchy, and Military Regime*. Therefore, four dichotomous variables will represent these regimes in the dataset as well as a fifth for democracies. My hypothesis predicts that more personalized regimes will be more likely to utilize ministerial cronyism than other regimes.

However, the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset is not completely conducive to testing my argument. There are several "hybrid" regimes that show characteristics of several of these regime types. In the dataset, classification into a single type is done in this order of preference: single party, military, personal, and monarch. Therefore, a single party or military regime with personalized leadership is not likely to be coded as a personalized regime. For instance, Stalin and Mao's regimes were quite personalized but because their

leadership was part of a single-party system (communist state) they are coded as a single party regime.

In order to get around this difficulty, I employed three different methods. First, the Geddes et al. (2014) dataset indicates when characteristics of two or more regime types are exhibited. Therefore, when models are estimated using the Geddes et al. measure, hybrid regimes are dropped from the model. The second method is to use the *Personalism* measure from the *Autocracies of the World Dataset* (Magaloni et al. 2013), which uses the component measure *xconst* (executive constraints) from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2012) to create a 0-2 scale where highly personalist regimes receive a score of "2," moderately personalist regimes a score of "1," and weakly or not personalist regimes a score of "0."[11] The final method is to use the *Personalism Scale*, developed by Weeks (2012, 2014), which uses the answers to questions classifying regime types for the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset to develop a 0-1 interval scale for personalism. The scale is constructed by dividing the number of affirmative answers to personalist questions by the total number of these questions.[12]

Three main control variables are included in this model. Ministerial cronyism, particularly in regards to the appointment of the defense minister, may be responding to other factors associated with coup risk. Those states with more capable and larger standing armies may pose a larger coup threat. In order to account for this factor, two measures of military strength and size are included. *Military Personnel per Capita* measures the number of troops under command of the national government divided by the nation's total population while *Logged Military Expenditure* is the log-transformed measure of the

[11] I use the second personalist measure with imputation for missing values. Please see the *Autocracies of the World Dataset* codebook for further details on the measure's construction.

[12] Other institutional characteristics are controlled for in subsequent analysis: revolutionary leader (Colgan 2012), presence of effective legislature (Svolik 2012; Banks 2014), presence of a domestic opposition (Svolik 2012), and legitimacy of political parties (Svolik 2012). Results hold.

state's total military budget. The measure was logged to account for the skewness of the variable.[13] Both measures are taken from the *National Material Capabilities* dataset (Singer et al. 1972).[14]

The third main control variable is *Oil Production per Capita* (Humphreys 2005), which measures the number of barrels of oil produced per person per day.[15] Rents from oil production may make it easier for leaders to implement other, more costly coup-proofing strategies (Quinlivan 1999) or to pay off elite support (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and might make ministerial cronyism unnecessary. Alternatively, it may increase such cronyism as it makes it easier to reward friends and family financially and/or may make a coup more enticing, given the financial rewards. To account for regional differences, regional fixed effects were used for the following geographical areas: North America/Western Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East/North Africa, Eastern Europe/Caucasus, South Asia, and East Asia/Pacific.[16]

3.8.2 Results

Table 3.2 presents the results for logit models of ministerial cronyism. Model 1 tests Hypothesis 1 using the Geddes et al.'s (2014) typology of regimes, but excluding hybrid regimes. The reference category is set to personalist regimes. The estimation reveals that democratic, single party, and military regimes have a lower probability of using ministerial cronyism than personalist regimes, an effect that is statistically significant. Substantively,

[13] A "1" was added to each nation's value to keep those states that spend zero resources on the military at zero.

[14] An alternative measure, *Militarism* (Weeks 2012, 2014), is used in place of these measures. Results still confirm to expectations.

[15] Alternative measures, including logged total oil production, logged value of oil production, logged value per capita, and logged net oil exports per capita were also used. The results were robust to each of these specifications. See Ross 2008, Smith 2004 for complete description of these measures.

[16] Models with country-level fixed effects were estimated in order to account for unobserved unit heterogeneity. The results hold. Additional models were also estimated to account for temporal dependence using a time trend, year dummies, and the method prescribed by Carter and Signorino (2010). Results remain robust.

the model reveals that for a typical Middle Eastern/North African nation, a movement from a personalist regime to a democracy leads to a 40% lower probability of using ministerial cronyism with military and single party regimes having a 28% and 14% lower probability of using this coup-proofing strategy than personalist leaders.[17]

Table 3.2: Logit Models for Ministerial Cronyism

	(1) Geddes All	(2) Geddes No Relatives	(3) Magaloni All	(4) Weeks All	(5) Weeks Autocracies
Personalism			0.63**	2.58**	2.10**
			(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.19)
Military Regime	-1.36**	-1.37**			
	(0.25)	(0.27)			
Monarchy	0.92**	-0.07			
	(0.24)	(0.26)			
Single Party	-0.58**	-0.84**			
	(0.15)	(0.16)			
Democracy	-2.45**	-2.38**	-1.52***	-1.20**	
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	
Military Personnel per Capita	48.78**	22.23**	58.95**	81.71**	117.52**
	(6.85)	(7.05)	(5.73)	(7.89)	(10.95)
Logged Military Expenditure	0.08**	0.05+	0.12**	0.19**	0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Oil Rents per Capita	-0.03	-2.05**	0.35	3.49**	3.71**
	(0.23)	(0.66)	(0.22)	(0.57)	(1.10)
Constant	-2.39**	-1.73**	-4.18**	-5.90**	-4.20**
	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.64)	(0.46)
Observations	2489	2489	2985	2501	1555
Log likelihood	-1105.09	-1041.80	-1408.86	-971.05	-818.11
Efron's R^2	0.21	0.14	0.23	0.38	0.26
Proportional Reduction in Error	10.69%	2.48%	19.75%	40.27%	34.68%

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regional fixed effects are included but not shown

[17]For substantive results, fixed effects are set to represent a Middle Eastern/North African nation, and control variables are set to the mean sample values for nations within region.

One curious result from Model 1 is that monarchs are more likely to use ministerial cronyism than personalist regimes, a difference that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, this result is likely an artifact of laws and established conventions within monarchies that prescribe that high-level positions be filled by members of the royal family. Model 2 re-estimates Model 1 on a measure of ministerial cronyism that excludes defense ministers related to the leader. The key inferences remain from Model 1, except now, there is no statistically significant difference between monarchs' and personalist leaders' use of crony ministers. It is reasonable to state that this result is consistent with the theoretical argument given that most modern monarchies are absolutist (personalist), and monarchs face a similarly high death rate upon removal: 15% of monarchs and 17% of personalist leaders. For Model 2, the decreases in the probability of ministerial cronyism associated with movements from personalist regimes to democratic, military, and single party regimes do shrink slightly to -30%, -23%, and -16%, respectively.

However, as was previously stated, the Geddes et al. measure (2014) is not ideal. By dropping hybrid regimes, several prominent personalist regimes were removed from the sample such as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong's regimes. To circumvent this difficulty, Models 3 and 4 use two alternative measures of personalism offered by Magaloni et al. (2013) and Weeks (2012, 2014). Both models indicate that higher degrees of personalism increase the probability of ministerial cronyism. The Magaloni is an interval variable coded in the following manner: no personalism (0), moderately personalist (1), and highly personalist (2). Calculations, using Model 3's results, indicated that the probability of ministerial cronyism rises from 29% for those with no personalism to 42% for moderately personalist regimes to 56% for highly personalist regimes. The new measure also explains more of the variation in the ministerial cronyism measure as the proportional reduction in error decreases almost twofold from 10.7% to 19.8%.

Model fit is even better when the Weeks measure is used in Model 4 as Efron's R^2 increases from 0.23 to 0.38 and the proportional reduction in error doubles for Model 3: from approximately 20% to just over 40%. The substantive effects also increase in size. Figure 3.5 displays the probability of ministerial cronyism exhibited by regimes with various levels of personalism (along with 95% confidence intervals to account for uncertainty). The Weeks scale is a 0-1 continuous scale where those regimes that exhibit no personalism receive a score of "0" and fully personalist regimes receive a score of "1." The figure shows the probabilities of ministerial cronyism for those regimes at these two extremes as well as those that received a score of 0.5, or a moderately personalist regime. For regimes with no personalism, the probability of ministerial cronyism is 29%, which increases to 58% for those with moderate levels of personalism and as high as 82% for the most personalized regimes. As none of the error bands overlap, these probabilities are statistically different from each other. The last model in Table 3.2 ensures that personalism measures are not just proxying for a democracy/autocracy distinction by dropping democracies from the model. The results hold even with this exclusion.

3.9 Results for Coup Risk and Coup-Proofing

This section provides evidence in support of a key assumption in my theoretical argument: Leaders use ministerial cronyism as a coup-proofing strategy. If this assumption is true, then we should see that greater levels of coup risk increase the use of ministerial cronyism, and that ministerial cronyism is associated with other coup-proofing strategies (Hypotheses 2 and 3). Table 3.3 presents models that provide evidence in support of these two hypotheses. Model 1 displays the same specification as the first model in Table 3.2, except now the equation includes a measure of coup risk on the right-hand side. To measure coup risk, I rely on Belkin and Schofer's (2003) measure. This measure is index of coup risk for countries from 1960 to 2000, which consists of three components: strength

Figure 3.5: Probabilities of Ministerial Cronyism (By Level of Personalism)



of civil society, legitimacy of the regime, and impact of recent coups. For each component, z scores were computed to give each equal weight and then added together for an index, which ranges from -4.55 to 7.68, where higher scores indicate higher levels of coup risk.

As anticipated, higher levels of coup risk do increase the likelihood that a leader will use ministerial cronyism. Moreover, the difference in the use of ministerial cronyism remains the same as Table 3.2: personalist leaders being more likely to use the practice than military, single party, and democratic leaders. In fact, the decrease in the probabilities are quite similar to those from Table 3.2. The inclusion of the new variable also improves model fit as the proportional reduction in error increased from Table 3.2 from 11% to 14%. Moreover, when relatives are excluded in Model 2, the difference between monarchs and personalist leaders no longer remains, a similar result from Model 2 in Table 3.2.

Table 3.3: Relationship between Ministerial Cronyism and Coup Risk

	(1) Min. Cronyism All	(2) Min. Cronyism No Relatives	(3) Counterbalancing All
Coup Risk (Belkin and Schofer)	0.17**	0.14**	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	
Ministerial Cronyism			0.42**
			(0.12)
Military Regime	-1.53**	-1.48**	-0.60*
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Monarchy	1.20**	0.11	0.49+
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)
Single Party	-0.32+	-0.61**	0.07
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Democracy	-2.24**	-2.15**	-1.70**
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.18)
Military Personnel per Capita	47.07**	21.15**	32.64**
	(6.97)	(7.22)	(7.87)
Logged Military Expenditure	0.17**	0.12**	0.37**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Oil Production per Capita	-0.69+	-2.26**	-1.01*
	(0.39)	(0.69)	(0.40)
Constant	-3.41**	-2.49**	-5.44**
	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.40)
Observations	2401	2401	1025
Log likelihood	-1052.65	-1002.79	-1720.68
Adjusted R^2	0.22	0.15	0.47

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Logit Estimation for Models 1 and 2. OLS Estimation for Model 3.

Model 3 tests Hypothesis 3: the use of ministerial cronyism will increase the probability of leaders employing other coup-proofing strategies. The hypothesis is examined by focusing on whether cronyism is associated with one other coup-proofing strategy: counterbalancing. Leaders can guard against coups by creating disorganized military systems with the creation of several military organizations with overlapping responsibilities to create coordination and collective action problems for potential usurpers. Belkin and Schofer (2003) created a measure of counterbalancing for nations from 1966 to 1986 that ranges

from -4.04 to 5.92, with higher values indicating greater counterbalancing. In Model 3, I use this measure as the dependent variable. As anticipated, the use of ministerial cronyism does predict a greater use of counterbalancing, even while controlling for regime type.

3.10 Empirical Analysis for Leader Failure and Coup Occurrence

3.10.1 Specification

Theoretically, I argue that ministerial cronyism will be an effective coup-proofing strategy, in that it should make the leader's removal from office less likely. I use three different dependent variables in order to test this claim. For the first dependent variable, *Leader Failure*, I rely on the *Archigos* dataset (Goemans et al. 2009), which contains information on leaders, including their exits, from 1875 to 2004. However, my main variable of interest, is leadership removals that are irregular, in that they occurred outside of prescribed, constitutional means. Therefore, subsequent models are estimated using *Irregular Exit* as the dependent variable. The *Archigos* dataset codes an exit as irregular when exits were not "prescribed by either explicit rules or established conventions" (*Archigos* Manual, 1). The final dependent variable is *Coup Success*, which indicates an instance of a successful coup as coded by Powell and Thyne (2011).

Hazard analysis is most appropriate for testing ministerial cronyism's effect on leadership tenure (Hypothesis 4). The first choice for estimation would be a Cox Proportional Hazards model as it would not require any assumptions about the underlying hazard function. However, the test for proportional hazards failed, making the model inappropriate. Therefore, I considered five potential hazard functions: Generalized Gamma, Weibull, Exponential, Lognormal, and Log-logistic. In order to choose amongst the distributions, I examined the integrated (cumulative) hazard function, where a 45 degree line indicates a well-specified model. Only the exponential distribution produced such a line. However,

I chose the Weibull model. Given that the Weibull distribution subsumes the exponential distribution, in that the exponential is just a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter of 1, the Weibull gives me more flexibility. Moreover, theoretically, leadership survival likely decreases monotonically over time, making the Weibull more appropriate than the lognormal or loglogistic distributions.[18]

The main independent variable for this analysis is *Ministerial Cronyism*. A number of controls are also included in these models to account for various other factors that might influence risk of coups or irregular removals. Interstate conflict has been found to decrease coup risk as armed forces are too occupied in an external conflict to conduct coups (Piplani and Talmadge 2016). The variable *Fatal MID Onset* (Ghosn et al. 2004) is included in the model to proxy for this external conflict.[19] Coups are more likely to occur when there is domestic instability such as civil war (Piplani and Talmadge 2016). Therefore, an indicator of *Civil War* is in the models (Gleditsch et al 2002).[20] I have also included the main control variables from the previous models of ministerial cronyism: regime type variables, *Military Personnel per Capita*, *Logged Military Expenditure*, and *Oil Production per Capita*.[21]

Previous works have also found that poor economic conditions can increase coup risk (Londegran and Poole 2000). Consequently, two economic measures are included: *Logged GDP per Capita* and *GDP Growth* (Gleditsch 2002).[22] Ethnic divisions make insurgencies more likely, so a measure of *Ethnic Fractionalization* (Alesina et al. 2001) is in the

[18]Cumulative hazard functions are displayed in the appendix (Figure 7.2). The Aikake Information Criterion also suggests that the Weibull provides a good model fit. See the appendix for these results as well (Table 7.9). Finally, the appendix also includes results for estimations using the exponential and lognormal distributions (Tables 7.15 and 7.16). Results still hold no matter the distribution.

[19]Other alternative measures were tested: *MID Onset*, *Ongoing MID*, and *War Onset* (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Results do not change.

[20]An alternative measure, *Domestic Instability Index* (Banks 2014), which is an index of various civil disturbance events (riots, protests, etc.) was substituted for civil war. Results remain robust.

[21]The same alternative measures for these variables were tested. Results still conform to expectations.

[22]A logged version of GDP was also used in models. Results remain robust.

models.[23] Wallace (2013) argues that urban concentration allows citizens to overcome collective action problems and spark revolution. Therefore, I control for a measure that calculates the percentage of the population that lives in urban settings: *Urban Population* (Singer et al. 1972).

Leaders may be more likely to be deposed irregularly if they have entered office through irregular means, older leaders may be more fragile, and leaders may learn and become more stable if they have had previous experience. Therefore, the model also contains variables from the *Archigos* (Goemans et al 2009) dataset: *Irregular Entry*, *Leader's Age*, and *Previous Times in Office*. Finally, leaders may have been less secure during the Cold War period when the world's superpowers were toppling unfriendly regimes, so a dummy for the *Cold War* is also included. This set of control variables appears to predict coup risk well.[24] In the appendix (Table 7.14), I run an OLS model using these control variables to predict Belkin and Schofer's (2003) coup risk measure. The model predicts this coup risk measure adequately with an adjusted R^2 of 0.62 with all variables having coefficients significant at least the 0.1 level.

3.10.2 Results

If personalist leaders are using ministerial cronyism as means to retain power, than it is reasonable to expect that this strategy will work. Ministerial cronyism should be associated with a decreased probability of the leader being removed from office in a given year, particularly by irregular means such as a coup d'état (Hypothesis 4). Table 3.4 displays duration models of state leadership in order to test this last hypothesis. Model 1 displays a Cox Proportional Hazard model for leadership failure. As can be seen, ministerial crony-

[23]Models using measures created by Fearon and Laitin (2003) as well as measures of religious divisions were estimated. Results remain unaffected.

[24]One last robustness check was implemented. I utilized two measures, *Percentage of Neighboring Democracies* and *Democratizing Neighbor* (Gleditsch and Ward 2006), to control for leaders' fears about contagion effects.

ism is associated with a decreased hazard of leadership failure, an effect that is statistically significant, even after controlling for regime type. Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous section, this modeling strategy is not appropriate given that the proportional hazards assumption is not met. Therefore, Weibull estimations are presented in Models 2 and 3. Model 2 provides the same specification as Model 1 with the only difference being the assumption about the underlying distribution. The results remain quite similar. Moreover, the natural log of the shape parameter is quite close to zero, suggesting that the exponential distribution was likely the appropriate distribution (shape parameter equal to 1).

Since the hazard does not stay proportional through time for the Weibull model, Figure 3.6 presents hazard functions from Model 2 for personalist regimes across lengths of leader duration.[25] The two hazard functions represent the hazard across time for those personalist regimes with a crony defense minister versus those without such a minister. As can be gleaned from the figure, ministerial cronyism decreases the leader's hazard throughout time. At the initial stages of the regime, this reduction is equal to about a 50% decrease in the leader's hazard, making it about half as likely for a personalist leader with a crony defense minister to be removed in the next period than one without such a safety measure.

Model 3 substitutes the Geddes et al. (2014) typology with the Weeks (2012, 2014) measure. The stabilizing effect of ministerial cronyism remains despite this new specification. In order to test that this strategy works to keep personalist leaders in power, I re-estimated Model 2 on four different samples of personalist leaders: Geddes et al.'s personalist regimes (including hybrids), Magaloni's highly personalist regimes, those regimes that score a 0.5 or above on the Weeks' measure, and those that scored a 1 on the Weeks' measure. A coefficient plot (Figure 3.7) summarizes these results. The figure provides support for the claim that ministerial cronyism is an effective means for personalist lead-

[25]Regime variables set to personalist and rest of independent variables are set at means for continuous variables and modes for discrete.

Table 3.4: Models of Leader Survival

	(1) Cox Prop. All	(2) Weibull All	(3) Weibull All	(4) Weibull Irregular
Ministerial Cronyism	-0.78**	-0.76**	-0.50*	-0.80**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.31)
Personalism (Weeks)			-2.16**	
			(0.30)	
Military Regime	1.33**	1.31**		0.80**
	(0.23)	(0.22)		(0.28)
Monarchy	-1.20**	-1.16**		-1.25*
	(0.42)	(0.42)		(0.56)
Single Party	-0.14	-0.15		-0.49
	(0.23)	(0.23)		(0.33)
Democracy	1.53**	1.52**	0.80**	-1.20*
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.61)
Fatal MID Onset	0.33+	0.32+	0.30	0.79**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.29)
Civil War	0.70**	0.70**	0.79**	1.01**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.28)
Military Personnel per Capita	-5.24	-2.65	-0.92	-44.75+
	(9.08)	(8.78)	(9.87)	(24.21)
Logged Military Expenditure	0.04	0.04	0.05+	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Oil Production per Capita	0.04	-0.07	0.09	0.58
	(0.61)	(0.63)	(0.80)	(1.29)
Logged GDP per Capita	-0.02	-0.02	-0.08	-0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.18)
GDP Growth	-1.31+	-1.34+	-2.15**	-2.75**
	(0.69)	(0.69)	(0.77)	(0.87)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.31	-0.31	-0.13	-1.07+
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.55)
Urban Population	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Irregular Entry	-0.26	-0.25	0.21	0.06
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.26)
Leader's Age	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Previous Times in Office	0.43**	0.44**	0.50**	0.35
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.30)
Cold War	-0.20	-0.22	-0.23	-0.01
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.31)
Logged Rho		0.02	0.05	-0.12
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Observations	2876	2876	2350	2876
Log likelihood	-2592.44	-1335.38	-1150.66	-464.07

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Robust standard errors in parentheses

ers to keep power. Ministerial cronyism decreases failure for each sample of personalist leaders.

Figure 3.6: Hazard Function for Weibull Model of Irregular Removal



Since I am primarily concerned with irregular removals, Model 4 re-estimated the duration model with irregular exit, and not leadership failure, as the dependent variable. Results remain unchanged. Since for Model 4, regular removals are rival events to irregular removals, a competing risk model was employed, but the effects remained the same. These results can be found in the appendix (7.17).

In order to test that ministerial cronyism specifically decreases the occurrence of coups, I rely on Powell and Thyne's (2011) dataset to estimate models of successful coups in Table 3.5. Model 1 displays the result of a logit model of coup success on a sample of coup attempts. It shows that ministerial cronyism does decrease the probability that a coup attempt will work. Substantively, the average effect size of a move from a personalist regime with no crony defense minister to one with a crony minister is a decrease in the probability of a successful coup by 27%. Models 2 and Models 3 present the results for

Figure 3.7: Coefficient Plot for Weibull Model of Leader Failure



Heckman probit models of coup attempt and success to account for a potential selection bias. Ministerial cronyism still decreases the probability of a successful coup. The average decrease in the conditional probability of coup success, given that an attempt has already occurred, associated with a personalist's leader movement from no crony to a crony for defense minister is 21%.[26]

Prima facie, it is somewhat surprising that ministerial cronyism is not associated with a decrease in coup attempts. However, this result is likely because resource constraints limited the coding of the crony measure to defense ministers. The measure does not display the amount of cronyism throughout the military organizations. Although the personal relationship with the leader would decrease the motive for the military chief to conduct a coup, it gives very little information about the loyalty and motives of lower military

[26]The conditional probability decreases from 56% to 35%.

Table 3.5: Relationship between Ministerial Cronyism and Coups

	(1) Logit	(2) Heckman Probit	(3) Heckman Probit
Coup Success			
Ministerial Cronyism	-1.29*	-0.75*	-0.56*
	(0.53)	(0.34)	(0.25)
Military Regime	0.18	0.02	0.08
	(0.58)	(0.38)	(0.28)
Monarchy	-1.71	-0.94	-0.39
	(1.29)	(0.69)	(0.55)
Single Party	0.41	0.35	0.05
	(0.52)	(0.36)	(0.31)
Democracy	-1.33	-0.65	-0.92+
	(0.99)	(0.67)	(0.54)
Additional Controls			
Constant	6.56*	3.90*	-0.31
	(3.00)	(1.85)	(0.69)
Coup Attempt			
Ministerial Cronyism		-0.03	-0.12
		(0.11)	(0.10)
Military Regime		0.14	0.17
		(0.14)	(0.12)
Monarchy		0.01	-0.26
		(0.23)	(0.20)
Single Party		-0.34**	-0.34**
		(0.13)	(0.12)
Democracy		-0.76**	-0.58**
		(0.20)	(0.19)
Coup Risk			0.11**
			(0.03)
Additional Controls			
Years since Coup Attempt		-0.13*	-0.20**
		(0.05)	(0.04)
Coup Years^2		0.01*	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.005)
Coup Years^3		-0.0004**	-0.0005**
		(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Constant		1.51*	-1.07**
		(0.75)	(0.14)
Rho		-0.32	0.25
		(0.58)	(0.42)
Observations	128	2876	3142
Log likelihood	-75.34	-492.22	-557.77

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Sample for Model 1 is coup attempts
Models include same control variables from Table 3.4, but are not shown

ranks or heads of other armed groups such as paramilitaries. Those who use ministerial cronyism likely face a higher coup risk; yet, at the same time, having a loyal military chief would deter other individuals from launching a coup. The net effect is hard to determine,

a priori. However, what we can expect is that having a loyal defense minister, who can use the nation's armed forces to defend the leader, would make coups more likely to fail, a result we observe in the analysis.

In summation, the analysis revealed that personalist leaders are more likely to use ministerial cronyism than any other regime type, and that the use of ministerial cronyism is associated with higher coup risk and the employing of other coup-proofing strategies. Finally, the analysis confirmed that ministerial cronyism reduces the risk of leader removal and the success rate for coup attempts. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports the claim that ministerial cronyism is a potentially effective coup-proofing strategy for those leaders most interested in protecting themselves from removal: personalist leaders.

3.11 Conclusion

Leaders that fear coups, and particularly the consequences associated with such removals, have many options for coup-proofing strategies (e.g. counterbalancing, bribery, and the establishment of political institutions). In this chapter, I have focused on one particular coup-proofing strategy—ministerial cronyism—which so far has received little attention. By placing cronies and relatives in coup-sensitive positions, the leader ensures that those most capable of overthrowing him are also the individuals most loyal to him. Explicating the leaders' motives for utilizing this strategy is an important theoretical contribution. Cronyism comes with a trade-off: incompetency. Cronies and relatives are less likely to be qualified to hold their high-level positions. In many cases, this is the desired effect: less capable military men are less able to orchestrate coups. However, this loyalty comes at a cost. The practice weakens the nation's military capabilities and severely undermines military advice and effectiveness. This cronyism may translate to other areas

such as foreign or economic ministers, resulting in diplomatic ineptitude and economic backwardness.

By understanding the incentives of leaders, we may be able to predict which regimes will use ministerial cronyism as a coup-proofing strategy, and therefore, suffer from its ill effects. I argue that personalist regimes face the greatest incentive to employ ministerial cronyism, as these leaders are more likely to face negative post-tenure fates (exile, imprisonment, and death) after removal. Since their very life is on the line, these political tyrants must work to minimize the risk of removal. For these leaders, their most likely exit is a coup d'état orchestrated by the military elite. Therefore, the most logical strategy for retaining power is to ensure that military leaders, particularly the defense minister or military chief, are loyal to him. One manner of ensuring this loyalty is hiring a relative or trusted friend for the position.

Using a newly constructed dataset of defense ministers, I demonstrate that personalist leaders are more likely to use ministerial cronyism than democratic and other autocratic leaders. In fact, in fully personalist regimes, I find that nearly 85% of leaders use ministerial cronyism. There is also suggestive evidence that this practice is used as a means of coup-proofing as it is associated with higher levels of coup risk and the employment of other coup-proofing strategies. Finally, I demonstrate that ministerial cronyism does decrease the chance of leader removal, lowering the leader's hazard by as much as 50% and decreasing the success rates for coups by approximately 25%.

On the surface, the appointment of brothers, sons, and life-long friends to be military chiefs appears to be the result of a leader's personal characteristics: narcissism, megalomania, or an inherent sense of mistrust. However, I have shown that ministerial cronyism is a strategic action, and therefore, explainable. For those leaders who face major consequences if removed, coups are too dangerous of a proposition to let there be any chance

that they occur. Therefore, these leaders minimize this risk by filling the most dangerous roles in their administration with the least dangerous people they know.

4. INCOMPETENT ADVISERS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

At 2AM on August 2, 1990, Iraqi tanks rolled over the Kuwaiti border, triggering an international crisis that would result in the Gulf War. Not expecting the Iraqi attack, Kuwaiti forces were not mobilized and little resistance was mounted. Within the course of a day, Iraq had completely conquered its neighbor to the southeast. However, Saddam's invasion drew the ire of the international community and sparked a confrontation with the world's most formidable military power, the United States. This confrontation would have disastrous consequences for Saddam:

> In four days of fighting, the coalition forces managed to achieve what the Iranians had failed to do during eight years of bloody conflict – to reduce the Iraqi army to rubble and to occupy a significant chunk of Iraq's territory, triggering widespread and ferocious clashes in Shi'ite towns of southern Iraq and posing the deadliest threat to his personal rule (Karsh and Rautsi 2007, 266).

The puzzling part of this blunder was that it was easily avoidable. Through the course of five and a half months, Saddam was warned repeatedly through public and private diplomacy by the United States and the United Nations that if he chose to stay in Kuwait, he would face war against a large military coalition, a war that would likely result in his military's destruction and his potential removal as leader of Iraq (Woods et al. 2006, 30). During these months, Saddam made a series of miscalculations, most significantly that the US government was not resolved enough to commit ground troops to the conflict, and that even if the United States chose to commit such forces, the Iraqi military was capable

enough to ensure a protracted and bloody conflict with the UN Coalition, in which Iraqi resolve would outlast that of its opponents.

Saddam would similarly miscalculate when he was confronted by the United States in 2003 over potential weapons of mass destruction.[1] Most evidence suggests that Saddam did not take George W. Bush administration's threats of military force seriously, and that he was convinced of Iraqi military's ability to resist American and British forces (ibid, 25-30). This time, Saddam paid the ultimatum price for his mistake: his life.

Saddam is not an outlier. According to Fischerkeller (1998), between 1816 and 1996 there were more wars initiated by weak states against stronger powers than wars between the major powers themselves. Fischerkeller argues that during this time period 54% of wars fit into this asymmetrical category, and that this type of war is growing in prevalence during the post-WWII period. Why are so many weak states choosing to fight strong opponents?

I argue that dictators are more likely to engage in asymmetrical conflicts against militarily superior and highly resolved opponents, often resulting in devastating military defeats. To explain this behavior, I use the bargaining model of war: wars are costly and therefore states are better off finding a peaceful resolution for their dispute (Fearon 1995). In this framework, incomplete information can cause crisis bargaining to break down, resulting in war. I argue that dictators have a domestic survival incentive to appoint cronies to their inner circle, and by doing so, they trade off advisory competence for loyalty. Crony advisers provide poor assessments and advice in crisis bargaining, increasing the likelihood of bargaining breakdown. I argue and empirically show that states with crony advisers are more likely to experience international conflict, especially asymmetrical con-

[1]The United States was joined in this confrontation by the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland.

flicts against stronger opponents—the types of conflicts where competent advice would usually be to make a bargain and avoid war.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I first outline the nature of the puzzle by reviewing the literature on crisis bargaining and the connection between regime type and the propensity to experience conflict. Next, I provide justification for the key assumptions that underlie my theoretical argument. In particular, I argue that (i) leaders who employ more independent and competent advisers are more likely to experience efficient information processing and decision-making, (ii) the likely negative post-tenure fates of autocrats make them paranoid about the intentions of people in key positions within their regime, particularly those in high-level military offices, and (iii) to counteract this potential threat from regime insiders, autocratic leaders typically fill such positions with cronies and relatives, whose incompetence undermines the state's ability to effectively bargain in crisis settings. Finally, I construct an original dataset of over 1,500 defense ministers from 1945 to 2005 and empirically test the hypothesis that regimes with crony (or nepotistic) advisers are more likely to experience international conflict, especially asymmetric conflict against stronger opponents—the types of crises where competent advice would be especially valuable.

4.2 Incomplete Information, Regime Type, and War

A major theoretical explanation of war is that it results from incomplete information. In particular, leaders are often uncertain about their opponents' war-time capabilities and/or their willingness to go to war (Levy 1983; Morrow 1989; Fearon 1994, 1995; Van Evera 1999). As a consequence, states may overestimate their chances of victory and/or underestimate their opponents' resolve. In such scenarios, the two sides will hold divergent views

on which peaceful bargains are mutually acceptable, given each side's bargaining strength. If bargaining gridlock persists, eventually war will break out.

However, there has been relatively little theorizing on the *generation* of incomplete information. What causes the frequent underestimation of opponents and overestimation of oneself? Are some states more prone to these types of miscalculations? The few works on the subject tend to point to irrationality and cognitive errors for the reasons why some leaders "misperceive" the situation (Jervis 1976; but see Meirowitz and Sartori 2008 for a rationalist approach).

While theoretical explanations for war often focus on informational problems, the empirical literature on conflict has identified a number of patterns between regime type and war. In fact, investigation into the link between regime type and war has produced the field's only empirical law (or the closest it has; Levy 1989): the democratic peace, the finding that there has never (or hardly ever) been a war between democracies (Doyle 1986; Russett 1995; Oneal and Russett 2001). Other studies find that democracies are more selective about wars they enter and are more likely to win the wars that they do enter (Reiter and Stam 2002). Moreover, by using sophisticated typologies of regime type, scholars have found that there are systematic differences in the conflict propensity of different autocratic regimes as well. Namely, that less institutionalized autocracies, such as personalist dictatorships, are considerably more conflict-prone than their more institutionalized autocratic counterparts such as single party regimes (Weart 1994; Enterline 1998; Peceny et. al. 2002; Peceny and Butler 2004; Weeks 2012, 2014; Colgan and Weeks 2016).[2]

Therefore, there has been consistent evidence that regime type influences a state's propensity to experience war, its ability to select into more advantageous conflict situa-

[2]Some recent work has also argued that personalist regimes, such as Saddam Hussein's, are more prone to lose wars than more institutionalized regimes such as the Communist Party of North Vietnam (Talmadge 2015).

tions, and its tendency to prevail on the battlefield. The evidence appears to indicate that personalist regimes tend to perform the worst on these measures, while democracies seem to be the most successful. However, it is not clear exactly why. If wars primarily occur due to incomplete information, it is not obvious why informational problems would be more applicable for some regimes (or dyads) than others.

Two possibilities exist: some characteristic of a regime makes it more or less likely to be misperceived *by* others, or there is a regime trait that makes *itself* more or less likely to misperceive others. So far, the conflict literature has tried to reconcile the informational explanation for war with these empirical findings by focusing on the former. Most of these explanations argue that democracies are more transparent and/or are better able to credibly signal their true capabilities and resolve, thereby reducing the other side's possible misperception about them. The most prominent of these explanations is the "audience cost" argument (Fearon 1994).

While it is possible that some regime types are better able to credibly signal their private information, I argue that certain regime types are especially prone to misperceiving their opponent and thus do not perform competently in crisis bargaining. My argument does not rely on any alleged irrationality or fickleness of autocrats but instead provides a rational explanation for why (certain types of) dictators are prone to make miscalculations at the international level. Strongly motivated by a domestic survival incentive to coup-proof the regime, these dictators only elevate loyalists to key advisory positions, thereby compromising their ability to get competent advice in crisis settings.

4.3 The Effect of Advisers on Leaders' Decisions

For some time, scholars of American foreign policy-making have pointed to the influential role that advisers play by giving valuable information and by sensitizing decision-

makers to certain considerations that should be made in foreign policy choices (Redd 2002). In particular, national security advisers have been key players in American presidents' foreign policy decisions (Garrison 2001). Case studies of US crises have shown that advisers played the deciding role in Eisenhower's decision to not enter Indochina (DeRouen 2001), that air force generals were able to assure George H.W. Bush that victory in the Gulf War would come with minimal casualties (Mintz 1993), and that Clinton likely would not have entered Kosovo without the urging of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (Reed 2005).

This literature emphasizes certain points. First, structure matters. The manner in which the leader structures his advisory group greatly influences how information is received, and subsequently which decisions are made (George 1972; Burke and Greenstein 1989; Hermann and Herrmann 1989; Stern and Sundelis 1994; Haney 1997; Hoyt and Garrison 1997; Preston 2001; Mitchell 2005a, 2005b). Moreover, better decision-making processes and structures during crises have led to these crises being less likely to devolve into conflict (Herek, Janis and Huth 1987; Schaefer and Crichlow 2002).

These works mainly build on the "Governmental Politics" (or "Bureaucratic Politics") decision-making model (Allison 1971). This model asserts that foreign policy is the result of an internal bargaining process between actors who are part of the leader's inner circle. These actors usually lead bureaucracies or ministries, and their input tends to reflect their organization's major goals and objectives ("where you stand depends on where you sit"). For instance, the transcripts of the famous Executive Committee meetings during the Cuban Missile Crisis indicate that Secretary of Defense McNamara saw his role as providing advice on the different military courses of action, while Secretary of State Dean Rusk's contributions focused on discussions about the best way to approach talks with Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev (Trachtenberg 1985). A similar pattern emerged during

the Iran Hostage Crisis (Hollis and Smith 1986) and the lead-up to the Gulf War (Mintz 1993).

Strong advisory structures bring a host of benefits. Advantages include more thorough analyses, fuller consideration of the values and interests at stake, more imagination in identifying options, more accurate estimates of costs and benefits, greater alertness to indications of failure, and readiness to learn from mistakes. These advantages produce better decisions (Allison 1971). However, group-based decision-making also has pitfalls. The most notorious is groupthink, the tendency for cohesive, undiversified groups to develop an “espirit de corps," a strong in-group distinction that compels them to seek unanimity in their decision-making and leads to feelings of invulnerability. This “spirit" has been known to cause groups to be overoptimistic, incapable of critically evaluating their favored options, unwilling to seek out new information, unable to consider contradictory evidence or opinions, and demonization and underestimation of out-groups and opponents (Janis 1972).

The make-up of a leader’s entourage is a key factor for whether positive outcomes will emerge from group decision-making. A cadre of sycophants or like-minded individuals will be more prone to groupthink than a team of rivals. In his multiple advocacy model, George (1972, 1980) argues that in order to overcome groupthink, power and influence should be shared amongst the group members, members need to be competent and informed, and members have to feel free to provide opposing views. It points to the last condition as being the most vital. Conflict and disagreement is necessary for good decision-making. Due to groupthink, even democracies, which allow for many of these conditions, may exhibit poor decision-making. Mitchell and Massoud (2009) have shown that the inability of senior advisers in the George W. Bush administration to feel free to

offer criticism resulted in poor planning and inaccurate predictions before the 2003 Iraq War.

Some previous works have argued that biased advisers actually improve decision-making (Calvert 1985; Myers 1998). The underlying logic to these arguments is that when an adviser deviates from a known bias, e.g. a hawkish defense minister advising against military action, this provides a strong signal to the leader and causes them to place greater weight on this advice compared to a moderate or dovish adviser making the same recommendation. Most of these findings emerge from theoretical models or historical cases such as Mussolini's influence on Hitler's plan to invade Czechoslovakia, or General Ridgway's opposition to the invasion of Indochina. However, this type of "bias" is not the same as the mechanism I focus on. In my theory, the mistakes of crony-filled governments in crisis bargaining are not caused by advisers with known biases towards certain crisis responses. Instead, these miscalculations are due to an inability and/or unwillingness to give accurate assessments of the situation, as a byproduct of their incompetence or fear of being perceived as disloyal.

4.4 Dictators, Cronyism, and War

Most dictators are motivated by the same basic forces: fear and paranoia (Tullock 1987, 2005; Wintrobe 1998). Dictators are paranoid because the individuals closest to them pose the biggest threat. Statistically, the most common way for despots to lose office is through coups orchestrated by their own elite (Tullock 1987; Brooker 2000; Svolik 2009). In fact, 60-67% of all dictators are removed by their inner circle (Svolik 2009). Moreover, their removal often leads to the most dreadful of outcomes. Debs and Goemans (2010) show that the two most common fates for deposed dictators are exile and death. The extreme consequence of being wrong about their officials' loyalty produces a fear

in autocrats that leads them to inherently distrust senior officials, particularly competent ones, as they are the most likely to be able to pull off a successful coup.

The loyalty of his inner circle is a paramount consideration in the dictator's life. This persistent anxiety causes dictators to fill positions with the most loyal individuals possible–blood relatives and life-long friends and associates–even if that means they are woefully unqualified to hold such positions (Peceny and Beer 2003; Peceny and Butler 2004; Egorov and Sonin 2011; Svolik 2012; Weeks 2012). Extreme cases include the Philippines' Marcos promoting his personal driver to Chief of Staff and the Central African Republic's Bokassa promoting a lieutenant to general for slapping a man who offended him (Chehabi and Linz 1998). The same effect has been outlined in historical analyses of many of the world's most dictatorial regimes, such as those of Stalin (Conquest 1968; Montefiore 2003; Gregory 2004), Trujillo (Hartlyn 1988), Pol Pot (Kiernan 2004), and Mobutu (Young and Turner 1985).

Moreover, the dictator often works to ensure loyalty through a campaign of intimidation and fear, often killing or dismissing officials whenever he has the slightest suspicion of their untrustworthiness. Thus, officials in dictatorships enjoy little job security. They are promoted and dismissed at the whim of the leader and operate in a climate of insecurity and paranoia themselves (Chehabi and Linz 1998). This practice creates an atmosphere of fear where advisers are terrified of being the bearer of bad news or providing opposing viewpoints, because this might suggest disloyalty and lead to their demise (Montefiore 2004; Svolik 2012; Weeks 2012).

Therefore, there are two reasons to believe that dictators will receive poor advice from their advisers. First, by restricting himself to a pool of candidates that he inherently trusts, the dictator has greatly reduced his odds of finding a competent minister, creating a loyalty-

competency tradeoff (Egorov and Sonin 2011).[3] Second, since the adviser is typically given his post due to his perceived loyalty, he is acutely aware that his post is dependent on this perception and will be careful to avoid appearing to undermine the leader, e.g. by providing pessimistic outlooks on the leader's plans.

This is problematic because free-minded and competent advisers play a key role in providing independent and accurate information to leaders, which Reiter and Stam (2002) have referred to as the "marketplace of ideas." Leaders that are armed with such information can make more realistic assessments about the prospects of victory and the resolve of their opponents. Moreover, independent advisers, i.e. advisers who feel free to express a dissenting opinion or provide a negative outlook about the likelihood of military success, are able to play devil's advocate and disabuse the leader of overly optimistic assessments, as well as prevent decision-making from falling into groupthink. For these reasons, I argue that leaders with less competent, crony advisers–primarily dictators–are more likely to suffer informational problems in crisis bargaining and hence wind up at war, especially asymmetric conflicts against stronger opponents.

4.5 Empirical Implications

Theoretically, I argue that dictators will be more likely to have overly optimistic war expectations, either by incorrectly determining the balance of military capabilities as tilting in their favor and/or by underestimating their opponent's resolve. These miscalculations will cause optimistic leaders to set too high of a reservation value in crisis bargaining, resulting in greater disagreement between these leaders and their opponents about the location of the bargaining range. This increases the likelihood of war.

[3]This does not mean that a loyalist can never be a competent minister. For instance, Robert Kennedy was certainly a nepotistic choice for Attorney General. However, his political acumen and sound advice during the Cuban Missile Crisis has been praised by many analysts.

Dictators are the most likely to fill high-level ministerial and advisory roles with cronies and relatives because they face a higher risk of irregular removal, particularly by those who hold key roles in the administration. Since the key qualification for advisory positions is loyalty, we can expect that these advisers will be less competent on average than their counterparts in regimes in which loyalty is not the paramount concern, i.e., democracies or more institutionalized autocracies. They are less likely to be able to accurately size up their opponents or to realize the true capabilities of their own forces. Moreover, these cronies are aware of the fact that their positions are based on their perceived loyalty, and are therefore more likely to be sycophants. So even if they do know that victory is unlikely, they are usually unwilling to disabuse the leader of delusional beliefs out of fear of the potential repercussions (removal, imprisonment, torture, or even execution).

This theoretical argument generates specific hypotheses. I predict that certain autocracies are more prone to conflict not because they have a proclivity for violence, are less constrained, or are revisionist (Glad 2002; Post 2004; Colgan 2010, 2013; Weeks 2012, 2014), but because they are less able to deal with the incomplete nature of information in the international system, and therefore are more likely to exhibit unwarranted optimism at the crisis bargaining table. Consequently, my theoretical argument suggests that states with incompetent advisers should be more prone to conflict whether they are the initiator or the target. If war is the result of crisis bargaining breakdown caused by one or both sides being overly optimistic about the outcome of war, the overly confident party, i.e. the state with the incompetent adviser, can be either the initiator or the target of the dispute.

> H1: States with incompetent (nepotistic or crony) advisers will be more likely to experience militarized conflict than competently-advised states.

I have argued that poor-quality advisers increase the probability of conflict by making (at least) one side in crisis bargaining more likely to be overly optimistic. In situations

where the crony state is stronger than its opponent, then optimism is justified and we should expect that conflict would not be any more likely than if the state had competent advisers. As long as the opponent can adequately deal with incomplete information and form accurate assessments of the situation, it should realize it is the weaker party and make the necessary bargain to avoid war. Therefore, we should expect that incompetent advisers cause states to be more likely to experience a particular type of conflict: asymmetrical conflict against a stronger opponent.

> H2: The conflict-enhancing effect of incompetent (nepotistic or crony) advisers will be higher when the state is weaker than its opponents.

Finally, my argument about autocratic conflict propensity focuses on the probability of war after a dispute takes place. That is, I assume that there is a crisis bargaining situation in which both sides exchange offers in hopes of finding a peaceful settlement. War only occurs when such bargaining breaks down. Previous works that link autocratic regimes to more aggressive military behavior have relied on dispute initiation as their dependent variable. This selection is appropriate because it aligns with the underlying theoretical claims that the leader's risk propensity and freedom from institutional constraints leads to a greater proclivity for violence. However, this dependent variable is not the most appropriate one for testing the causal mechanism I outline in this chapter. Adviser incompetence is most felt after a crisis occurs, in that crony states are more likely to experience war because they are more likely to have crisis bargaining break down.

> H3: States with incompetent (nepotistic or crony) advisers will be more likely to have their crises result in war than competently-advised states.

4.6 Dependent Variables and Modeling Strategy

I rely on three different data sources to test my hypotheses: the *Dyadic Militarized Interstate Dispute* dataset (Ghosn and Bennett 2003), the *Correlates of War Inter-state Wars* dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), and the *International Crisis Behavior Project* dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfield 2000). My analysis primarily relies on non-directed dyads of all countries from 1950 to 2000. The time coverage is based on the availability of data for the main independent and dependent variables, while the use of non-directed dyads is congruent with my argument that crisis bargaining fails when either the initiator or target (or both) sets too high of a reservation value.

There are five dependent variables (*Fatal MID*, *Fatal MID Initiation*, *COW War*, *ICB War*, and *ICB Crisis*) in the analyses. *Fatal MID* is a dichotomous variable where a 1 indicates that the dyad experienced a militarized interstate dispute within year t that resulted in at least one casualty. I focus my analysis on fatal MIDs because the MID dataset includes a number of low-profile events (e.g., shots exchanged over demilitarized zones or fishing boat seizures) that likely were not ordered by political leaders. The *Fatal MID Initiation* variable is used in empirical tests on directed dyads. It takes on a value of 1 when State A initiated conflict with State B in year t. The dependent variable *COW War* is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether an interstate war occurred in the dyad in year t. I also create a dependent variable *ICB War* that takes on the value 1 when the *Violence (VIOL)* variable within the ICB dataset is coded as “4" or “full-scale war." This *ICB War* variable is used in models that test whether crony states are more likely to experience war conditional on a crisis occurring. Finally, I create a variable *ICB Crisis*, where a 1 indicates that a crisis occurred in the dyad in year t. This dependent variable is one of two (along with *ICB War*) that I analyze using Sartori’s (2003) estimator, to address potential selection bias issues. Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, I use logit models to estimate the

effects of the independent variables.[4] To account for the correlation between observations of the same dyads across time, the standard errors are clustered by dyad (non-directed and directed as appropriate).

4.7 Main Independent Variables

In order to measure the crony nature of advisers, I use the same measure of *ministerial cronyism* from Chapter 3. This measure indicates whether the defense minister is a relative or crony of the head of state. I focused on defense ministers because of the logic of the bureaucratic politics model that "individuals stand where they sit," i.e., individuals advise according to their role. Generally, the job of sizing up potential military opponents falls to the defense minister. Most defense ministers are part of the leader's inner circle and are often regarded as the foremost domestic expert on the capabilities of the nation's and the opponent's armed forces.

Assuming the loyalty-competency tradeoff, I henceforth call this main variable *Incompetent Defense Minister*. The variable indicates that there is *either* a nepotistic or crony (or both) defense minister in the dyad. When applicable, independent variables (main and control) follow "weak link" coding in that the variable takes on the maximum or minimum value in the dyad, depending on whether the variable is hypothesized to have a positive or negative effect on conflict occurrence (maximum if positive, and minimum if negative). Therefore, if either state has an incompetent defense minister, then the corresponding variable takes on a value of 1 for the dyad. Conflict requires only one side to be overly optimistic; only one of the states (either the initiator or target) needs to have an incompetent adviser for war to become more likely.

[4]However, since the unit of analysis is the dyad-year for all nations for over sixty years, and war is rare (occurs for 0.5% of the observations), logit runs the risk of giving biased results (King and Zeng 2001). Thus, as robustness checks, I ran a rare events logit and a logit on only politically relevant dyads. These robustness checks are consistent with the chapter's findings.

4.8 Control Variables

In order for a conflict to occur, there must be some issue, good, or policy that is a source of dispute. For states that tend to agree on foreign policy objectives, disputes are less likely to occur. I account for this factor by including a control variable *Ideal Point Distance* that measures the distance between the states' ideal voting positions at the United Nations General Assembly (Bailey et. al. 2016).[5] Additionally, states that border each other have more interactions and are more likely to have territorial disputes, which are a potential source of war. Thus, *Contiguity*, a dichotomous variable that indicates that the two states share a border, is included as a control (Bennett and Stam 2000). Allies should be less likely to engage in conflict, so a dummy variable measuring the existence of a *Defense Pact* is added as a covariate (Gibler 2009).

Empirical studies of conflict onset typically find that the balance of states' capabilities is a significant factor in predicting conflict, so I include the difference between the states' capabilities as indicated by their CINC scores (Singer et. al. 1972): *Difference in Capabilities*. In the models using directed dyads, the variable used is the ratio of CINC scores (Initiator's score divided by Target's score). The ratio is logged to account for skewness: *Logged Capability Ratio*. To ensure that my results are not just driven by regime type, I also include *Democracy* in the models, a dummy variable indicating a score of 7 or higher on the Polity IV measure.[6] States that are experiencing *Intrastate Conflict* may externalize that conflict, and so I include a control for the occurrence of an intrastate war, using the *COW Intrastate War* dataset. Moreover, wealthier states may be conflict averse (Gartzke

[5] An alternative to this measure is *Alliance Similarity*, which captures the similarity of foreign policy preferences by calculating the rank-order correlation of the two countries' alliance portfolios (Signorino and Ritter 1999). Results are robust to substituting this measure into the model.

[6] The results are robust to including the lowest polity score in the dyad as well. I also performed robustness checks that control for a variety of institutional features taken from Colgan (2012), Svolik (2012), Weeks (2012, 2014), Geddes et. al. (2014), and Colgan and Weeks (2015). Results stay consistent.

2007), so a logged measure of the states' GDP per capita (*Logged GDP per capita*) is included as well (Gleditsch 2002).

There were a substantial number of cases where the leader held the portfolio of defense minister. In some cases, the constitution stipulates that the leader serves as defense minister; in others, it was a deliberate act to consolidate power. This occurrence is indicated using a dichotomous variable: *Leader is Defense Minister*. Finally, to account for temporal dependence, I include a count of the number of years since the last conflict for the dyad, *Peace Years*, as well as its squared and cubic terms (Carter and Signorino 2010).

4.9 Empirical Analysis

4.9.1 Results for Conflict Occurrence

Table 4.1 presents the results of the logit models for fatal MID occurrence using non-directed dyads. Model 1 estimates the effect of each type of incompetent defense minister (nepotistic and crony), excluding control variables.[7] The coefficients for both incompetent types are in the expected positive direction and are statistically significant. These effects remain when all of the controls are included in Model 2. The two indicators of incompetent advisers appear to exhibit similarly sized effects. In fact, an equality test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal ($p<0.43$). When the control variables are set to the values occurring for the 1956 Egypt-Israel dyad (Suez Crisis), the probability of a fatal MID increases by 9.8% when the dyad goes from not having a nepotistic defense minister to having one, and by 6.6% with a movement from no cronyism to cronyism.[8] When including all of the controls, the effect of nepotism is slightly stronger than cronyism. When the two indicators of incompetency are combined into a single measure in Model 3 (*Incompetent Defense Minister*), the effect remains roughly the same: an

[7]The exception being the use of the peace years variables to account for temporal dependence.

[8]This crisis is chosen to reflect the case study presented in Chapter 5.

8.9% increase in the probability of a fatal MID. This effect is substantively large given that the baseline probability of the occurrence of a fatal MID for the 1956 Egypt-Israel dyad is 18.4%.

Table 4.1: Logit Models for Conflict Occurrence

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Nepotistic Defense Minister	0.48*	0.63**	
	(0.24)	(0.24)	
Crony Defense Minister	0.96**	0.41*	
	(0.19)	(0.20)	
Incompetent Defense Minister			0.51**
			(0.15)
Leader is Defense Minister		0.34	0.31
		(0.21)	(0.22)
Democracy in Dyad		0.56*	0.60**
		(0.27)	(0.16)
Difference in Capabilities		3.39	3.16
		(2.27)	(2.27)
Ideal Point Distance		0.54**	0.52**
		(0.13)	(0.08)
Defense Pact		0.21	0.20
		(0.29)	(0.21)
Contiguity		5.02**	5.07**
		(0.25)	(0.18)
Civil War in Dyad		0.68**	0.72**
		(0.20)	(0.16)
Lowest Logged GDP per Capita		-0.30**	-0.31**
		(0.08)	(0.07)
Peace Years	-0.28**	-0.29**	-0.31**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Peace Years^3	-0.0001*	-0.0001**	-0.0001**
	(0.00003)	(0.00004)	(0.00003)
Constant	-6.14**	-6.70**	-6.60**
	(0.25)	(0.52)	(0.48)
Observations	401379	287392	309877
Log-Likelihood	-2046.74	-982.17	-1040.70
McFadden's Adjusted R^2	0.06	0.37	0.38

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Dependent variable: Fatal MID Onset
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by dyad)

In summary, the models in Table 4.1 provide support for Hypothesis 1: States with incompetent defense ministers are more likely to experience militarized conflict. Hypothesis 2 presents a more specific prediction: An incompetent defense minister especially increases the probability of militarized conflict when the state is weaker than the other side (i.e., when competent advice would usually be to avoid a militarized conflict). To test this expectation, a directional sample is used.

4.9.2 Results for Asymmetrical Conflict Occurrence

Table 4.2 displays logit models for fatal MID initiation using directed dyads. These models test whether the conflict-enhancing effect of an incompetent adviser is mitigated when the power balance shifts towards the crony state. The key variable in these models is the interaction term between incompetent defense minister and logged capability ratio. The hypothesis is tested for both initiators and targets, so when the model is labeled "Initiator," the country-level variables are for the initiator state and the capability ratio is the initiator's capability divided by the target's capability. Everything is reversed in the "Target" model (model 4).

As the logged capability ratio grows in favor of the crony state (becomes more positive), we expect to see the bellicose effect of incompetent defense minister diminish in size. That is, the coefficient for the interaction term should be negative. Models 1 and 2 show the effects of incompetent advisers for initiators without this interaction, including all regime types (Model 1) and just autocracies (Model 2). States with incompetent defense ministers are more likely to initiate conflict; this effect remains in Model 2 when democracies are dropped from the sample to ensure that the effect of an incompetent defense minister is not simply reflecting a democratic/autocratic difference in conflict initiation (Reiter and

Stam 2002).[9] Even among autocracies, those with incompetent defense ministers are more likely to initiate conflict.

Model 3 includes the key interaction for initiators. As hypothesized, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. A similar result for the targets of fatal MIDs can be seen in Model 4. Here, the coefficient on the interaction term is also negative and statistically significant, and roughly the same magnitude as in the initiator model. Military strength mitigates the conflictual effect of incompetent defense minister for both initiators and targets.

Although Table 4.2 shows that the conflictual effect of incompetent counsel decreases as the crony state becomes stronger relative to its potential opponent, it does not tell us if this effect is significant across the entire range of potential power balances, or the size of such effects. In particular, I hypothesized that the conflict-enhancing effect of an incompetent defense minister will be localized to those cases where the crony state is weaker than its opponent. Figure 4.1 provides support for this prediction.[10]

The left panel plots the interaction for Model 3 (Initiators) in Table 4.2. Negative values indicate dyads where the initiator is weaker while positive values indicate stronger initiators. The positive (conflict-enhancing) effect of an incompetent defense minister persists for all cases where the initiator is the weaker party and becomes stronger as the initiator becomes weaker relative to the target. For cases that lie a standard deviation below the mean (-3.2) or are about 25 times weaker than their opponents, the effect of an incompetent adviser is to increase the probability of a fatal MID initiation by about 13%. This effect remains significant, although smaller, for more equal opponents. For instance, when the initiator is half the strength of its target, an incompetent defense minister

[9]Models including a control for the interaction between democracy and logged capability ratio do not change inferences.

[10]The distribution of cases is represented by the histogram underlying the figure.

Table 4.2: Logit Models for Conflict Initiation

	(1) Initiator All	(2) Initiator No Democracies	(3) Initiator All	(4) Target All
Incompetent Defense Minister	0.43*	0.45*	0.49*	0.28
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.25)
Logged Capability Ratio	-0.02	-0.08*	0.03	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Incompetent DM*Logged Capability Ratio			-0.18*	-0.21**
			(0.07)	(0.07)
Leader is Defense Minister	0.11	-0.29	0.12	0.29
	(0.27)	(0.39)	(0.27)	(0.26)
Democracy	0.40	–	0.40	0.44
	(0.25)		(0.26)	(0.34)
Ideal Point Distance	0.55**	0.44**	0.56**	0.55**
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Defense Pact	0.08	-0.14	0.11	-0.05
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.25)
Contiguity	5.09**	5.29**	5.08**	5.11**
	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Civil War	0.57**	0.52*	0.57**	0.43*
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.21)
Logged GDP per capita	-0.20**	-0.17+	-0.20*	-0.20*
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Peace Years	-0.31**	-0.36**	-0.31**	-0.33**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Peace Years^3	-0.0001**	-0.0002**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**
	(0.00004)	(0.0001)	(0.00004)	(0.0004)
Constant	-7.50**	-7.55**	-7.51**	-7.38**
	(0.55)	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.58)
Observations	696857	471939	696857	696857
Log-Likelihood	-1248.36	-883.44	-1244.82	-1239.75
McFadden's Adjusted R^2	0.36	0.38	0.36	0.36

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Dependent variable: Fatal MID Onset
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by dyad)

increases the probability of a fatal MID initiation by 7%. The effect of an incompetent adviser becomes statistically insignificant when the initiator's strength becomes roughly 2.5 times that of its opponent. This result is consistent with the theoretical expectation that

the conflict-enhancing effect of incompetent defense ministers will be stronger in cases where the crony state is weaker than its potential opponent.

Figure 4.1: Effect of Incompetent Defense Minister on Fatal MID Occurrence



The right panel plots the interaction for Model 4 (Targets) in Table 4.3. The graph is similar to that for initiators. The conflict-enhancing effect of an incompetent adviser is statistically significant for almost all negative values of logged capability ratio, losing statistical significance at -0.5 or when the target is about 60% the strength of its opponent. Moreover, when the target is half the strength of its opponent, incompetent defense minister increases the probability of being targeted in a fatal MID by 5%; the size of this effect grows to 12% when the target is 25 times weaker than the opponent, or a standard deviation below the mean for the logged capability ratio measure.[11]

[11]The effect of an incompetent defense minister is negative and statistically significant at values of logged capability ratio of around 8 and higher for initiators, and 4.5 for targets, i.e., when the crony state is approx-

Overall, these results support Hypothesis 2. The largest effect of incompetent advisers is to increase the likelihood of conflict against stronger opponents.

4.9.3 Results for Crisis Bargaining Breakdown

My theoretical argument predicts not only that crony regimes will experience a higher propensity for conflict, particularly when they are weaker than their opponents, but also that this increased propensity occurs mainly as a result of crisis bargaining breakdown (Hypothesis 3). To test this hypothesis linking incompetent advisers with crisis bargaining failure, I now explore whether incompetent advisers are associated with a higher likelihood of *war*, in the sample of all dyad-years as well as in a sub-sample of crisis dyads.[12]

Table 4.3 presents logit models for war occurrence using non-directed dyads, and the "weak link" coding. Model 1 estimates the occurrence of war as indicated by the *COW Interstate War* dataset. Again, I find that an incompetent defense minister is positively associated with conflict. However, the existence of an incompetent defense minister may proxy for some other institutional characteristic. To guard against this possibility, I re-estimated Model 1 on various sub-samples of dyadic pairs. These include the sub-sample of only non-democratic dyads, as well as sub-samples of dyads including each type of autocracy paired with democracies (those with a competent defense minister). I include non-crony democracies as the partner in the autocratic-democratic dyadic pairs to keep the opponent constant and to minimize the possibility that aggression is being displayed

imately 22 times more powerful than its opponent when it is the initiator and 12 times more powerful when it is the target. The negative effect for targets only holds for 8% of the sample (with only 6 fatal MID occurrences), as opposed to the approximately 45% of the sample (around 140 fatal MID occurrences) for the positive effect. We should be even more skeptical of the negative effect for initiators, which holds for 0.8% of the sample with only 1 fatal MID occurrence. Therefore, there is reason to be skeptical of the negative effect as it is based on so few observations.

[12] A reader might suggest that this analysis demonstrates that dyads (and not states) with crony or nepotistic defense ministers are more prone to war, and a more appropriate test would be on a sample of country-years. The results are robust to such tests, which can be found in the appendix (Table 7.25). A dyadic analysis is presented here in order to control for strong predictors that exist at the dyadic level, such as contiguity and similarity of preferences.

by the opponent of the authoritarian regime. The results are shown in Figure 4.2, which uses the autocracy classifications from the *Authoritarian Regimes* dataset (Geddes et. al. 2014), with the exception of monarchies.[13] The strongman classification comes from Weeks (2012), and the revolutionary leader (combined with personalist) comes from the *Revolutionary Leaders and Revolutions* dataset (Colgan 2012).

The coefficient plot in Figure 4.2 shows that the effect of an incompetent defense minister is significant for every sample of autocracy-democracy dyads with the exception of military-democracy, where the p-value is at 0.052. The coefficients mostly range between 1.5 and 2.0 but are substantially larger for revolutionary and strongman.

Figure 4.2: Coefficient Plot for Incompetent Defense Minister's Effect on War Occurrence



[13]There were only three monarchies that were war participants with non-crony democracies, causing estimation failure, so they are not included in Figure 4.2

Table 4.3: Models for War Occurrence

	(1) COW Logit All	(2) ICB Logit All	(3) ICB Logit Crisis	(4) ICB Sartori All
War				
Incompetent Defense Minister	1.35*	1.30**	0.77**	0.28**
	(0.53)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.06)
Leader is Defense Minister	-0.05	-0.18	-0.55*	0.11
	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.26)	(0.07)
Democracy in Dyad	0.88+	0.09	-0.21	0.14*
	(0.51)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.07)
Difference in Capabilities	-5.25	2.61	-2.54	-0.83
	(5.30)	(3.71)	(3.10)	(0.52)
Ideal Point Distance	0.67**	0.76**	-0.25*	0.27**
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.03)
Defense Pact	-0.91	0.25	-0.85*	0.34**
	(0.77)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.07)
Contiguity	5.35**	3.87**	-0.29	0.80**
	(0.50)	(0.41)	(0.35)	(0.08)
Civil War in Dyad	1.07**	0.87**	-0.20	0.42**
	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.06)
Lowest Logged GDP per capita	-0.35*	0.07	0.02	0.004
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.03)
Gravity			1.42**	
			(0.18)	
Peace Years	-0.07	-0.34**		-0.12**
	(0.11)	(0.07)		(0.01)
Peace Years^2	0.001	0.01**		0.004*
	(0.005)	(0.003)		(0.001)
Peace Years^3	-0.000006	-0.0002**		-0.00005+
	(0.00006)	(0.00005)		(0.00001)
Constant	-10.25**	-10.00**	-2.14*	-2.87**
	(0.89)	(0.86)	(1.06)	(0.21)
Crisis				
Incompetent Defense Minister				0.44**
				(0.11)
Additional Controls				
Constant				-3.24**
				(0.40)
Observations	309877	295377	579	32049
Log-Likelihood	-190.71	-501.17	-253.73	-1189.70
Adviser Effect on Probability of War	+2.2%	+1.6%	+18.5%	+14.0%

Dependent Variable: COW or ICB War Occurrence
Adviser effect uses Suez Crisis values for controls
Model 4 is estimated on a sample of politically relevant dyads
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by dyad)
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed test

Model 2 in Table 4.3 is identical to Model 1 but uses ICB War rather than COW War as the dependent variable. The results are very similar. Both models show that incompetent defense ministers increase the probability of war by 1.5 to 2%, which is a large effect

given that the baseline probability of war for the Suez Crisis values is 0.6% and 0.8% for the ICB and COW samples, respectively.

Model 3, which restricts the sample to ICB Crisis dyads, provides support for Hypothesis 3. Crises with incompetent advisers are more likely to devolve into war. In fact, the presence of an incompetent defense minister increases the probability that a crisis will result in war by 17%. The model appears to fit the data well, providing a 24% proportional reduction in error.[14]

Previous studies suggest that the onset of crisis and war are not independent events, and therefore selection effects are a potential problem (Smith 1998; Reed 2000). To deal with potential selection effects, I use the Sartori (2003) estimator. Alternative strategies such as Heckman probit models are not appropriate because the onset of crisis and war are likely caused by the same predictors, making it difficult to meet the exclusion requirement and resulting in biased and inconsistent estimates (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995). The Sartori estimator is able to account for this issue by simultaneously estimating the crisis and war equations with identical predictors by assuming that the errors of the two equations are perfectly correlated (ρ=1).

Model 4 presents the results from the Sartori estimator. The specification is largely the same as the previous models, but the control coefficients for the Crisis Onset equation are not shown due to space constraints. The results indicate that incompetent defense ministers increase the probability of crisis onset, as well as the probability of war given a crisis. Substantively, the increase in the conditional probability of war, given the occurrence of a crisis, is 11%. Although my theoretical argument does not necessarily predict that incompetent advisers would make states more likely to experience a crisis, it is compatible with

[14]The proportional reduction in error is presented here and not in the previous models because the previous models estimated rare events, in which it is difficult to improve upon the prediction of no conflict/war for each case. Therefore, the measure would not be informative for these models.

this empirical result. Incompetent advisers may not only offer bad counsel during crisis bargaining, but also about the wisdom of certain foreign policies, particularly aggressive ones that may provoke crises.

4.9.4 Results for War Outcomes

The purpose of the previous analyses was to show that incompetent advisers, namely defense ministers, increase the probability of conflict, particularly asymmetrical conflict in which the crony state is the weaker side, and that this is mainly due to a lower ability to deal with incomplete information during crisis bargaining. A final expectation that I will test is that adviser quality affects not only war occurrence, but war outcomes as well. If incompetent advisers are driving states into conflicts with stronger and highly resolved opponents, then states with incompetent advisers should also be more likely to experience defeat or stalemate in war.[15] Therefore, I hypothesize that states with incompetent defense ministers will be more likely to experience negative war outcomes.

> H4: States with incompetent (nepotistic or crony) advisers are more likely to experience negative war outcomes.

Table 4.4 provides a contingency table between war outcomes (loser, stalemate, or winner) and the presence/absence of incompetent defense ministers. The table uses the sample of wars from the *COW Interstate Wars* dataset, and its determination of war outcomes. I drop all democracies from the dataset given the established finding that democracies perform much better than autocracies in war (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002). The table shows that the probability of losing a war for nondemocracies with incompetent defense ministers is 30% higher than for their nondemocratic counterparts with competent defense

[15] In addition to incompetent advisers' role in involving their states in wars against stronger opponents, this expectation is also informed by the idea that if advisers are incompetent, these shortcomings should also influence their states' performance in conducting the war.

ministers: 57% compared to 27%. Autocracies with incompetent defense ministers were also less likely to achieve a stalemate or to win. These differences are statistically significant and are robust to the exclusion of war joiners, as well as to using the Fisher's exact test to account for low numbers in some of the cells.

Table 4.4: Chi-Squared Test for War Outcome (No Democracies)

	Competent	Incompetent
Loser	10	24
	(27.03%)	(57.14%)
Stalemate	15	8
	(41.67%)	(19.05%)
Winner	11	10
	(30.56%)	(23.81%)
Total	36	42

With joiners: 7.53*
No joiners: 7.76*
Fisher's Exact: $p<0.025$
*$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

4.10 Conclusion

After Saddam was toppled during the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq, soldiers found a cache of hidden tapes. The tapes had recorded years of meetings with his ministers and closest advisers. A striking aspect of these tapes is what they revealed about Saddam's decision-making in the lead-up to the first Gulf War in 1991. Saddam was almost certain that his Iraqi forces would prevail against the United States and gave reasons for why the US's military superiority was overstated. During these meetings, most of Saddam's senior military leadership constantly agreed with his outlandish statements regarding the

US's weak resolve, the unimportance of military technology, and the superior morale and fighting spirit of his Republican Guard.

Saddam also complained about the inability of his advisers to give "correct" military assessments, even using one meeting to instruct his advisers on how to read a US Congressional Report on the US military's activities. After subsequent military failures, his advisers, particularly his Minister of Military Industries Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid (also his second cousin and son-in-law), began to reveal that many of the ministers were scared to reveal any pessimistic assessments they had about confronting the United States, but backtracked once Saddam questioned his conviction and courage (Woods 2008; Woods et. al. 2006, 2011). Kamel would defect from Iraq in 1995, stating, "This is what made me leave the country, the fact that Saddam Hussein surrounds himself with inefficient ministers and advisers who are not chosen for their competence but according to the whims of the Iraqi president" (Sadler 1995, 1). He would return to Iraq in 2006, only to be killed.

The Gulf War is only one example. I argue that dictators are more likely to experience conflict and war because they have substantially incorrect beliefs about their ability to prevail in war, as well as the likelihood that their opponent will concede. The reason for this proclivity is that leaders in these regimes have a domestic survival incentive to surround themselves with cronies and to intimidate these advisers so that they are fearful of plotting an overthrow. While this practice may be beneficial to the leader's survival, it hurts her ability to efficiently interact with other states. This chapter provides evidence for this argument by coding the characteristics of over 1,500 defense ministers, with the empirical results indicating that incompetent advisers increase the probability of conflict by between 10 and 20%.

This chapter not only explains some of the variation between democratic and autocratic conflict behavior but also some of the variation between different types of authoritarian

regimes. Scholars should continue to look into the different facets of domestic politics and dig deeper into the differences between regime types. As we learn how institutional differences within these regimes influence conflict behavior and seek ways to more precisely measure them, we move closer to isolating the causes of international conflict.

5. CASE STUDIES: SADDAM HUSSEIN AND GAMEL ABDEL NASSER

5.1 Case Selection

This chapter provides two case studies. The first case examines the Saddam Hussein regime (1979-2003 Iraq), particularly focusing on how advisers influenced decisions regarding the Gulf War, the potential invasion of Kuwait in 1994, and the 2003 US-UK Invasion. The second case discusses the Gamal Abdel Nasser regime (1956-1970 Egypt) and how his long-time friend and crony defense minister, Abdel Hakim Amer, undermined Egyptian military's decision-making and effectiveness during the Suez Crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The purpose of these case studies is not to empirically test the arguments within this dissertation. The empirical chapters test my key hypotheses and deal with concerns about the generalizability of the theoretical claims. Instead, the case studies are meant to accomplish two different objectives.

The first goal is to provide validity for the causal chain within the theoretical argument. Although the empirical analysis shows that the crony and nepotistic nature of the defense minister is correlated (and that this relationship is statistically significant) with an increased propensity to experience international conflict, it does not reveal whether this association exists for the reasons I prescribed.

In the previous chapters, I argue that dictators fear their removal more than any other type of leader, given the more extreme consequences, (exile, imprisonment, or death), and that this negative, expected post-tenure fate gives the dictator a strong incentive to ensure the loyalty of his inner circle by filling ministerial and advisory roles, particularly within the military, with those he trusts the most: close friends and relatives. By restricting the pool for key high-level positions to only those individuals the leader most trusts, the despot

greatly hinders his ability to find competent advisers. Additionally, since the tyrant still must fear even his most trusted advisers, he instills a sense of terror in his inner circle by demonstrating that any potential opposition, real or imagined, will result in a grim end for such a usurper. Even small acts of defiance or comments that hint at the dictator's fallibility may result in death. Consequently, the dictator's advisers are often a collection of incompetent sycophants who rarely have the intelligence, skills, or willingness to prevent the despot from making poor decisions. In short, within many dictatorial regimes, no one has the courage or wherewithal to tell the emperor when he has no clothes.

These case studies provide evidence for each step of the causal chain: Saddam Hussein and Gamal Nasser were fearful of the consequences of their removal, they employed cronies or relatives to key positions, particularly military posts, within their inner circle to counteract this threat, that this tactic undermined the quality of assistance they received from these officials, and as a result, during crises with resolved and militarily more capable opponents, Hussein and Nasser underestimated their adversaries' willingness to go to war and overestimated their own forces' ability to be victorious on the battlefield.

The case studies' second aim is to control for the most serious rival argument to the author's claims. It could be that incompetent ministers (cronies and relatives) emerge in the worst of regimes: those lead by madmen. In these highly personalized regimes where the leaders have absolute power, crony and nepotistic ministers might be a tool to achieve total control, but have little influence on the quality of decisions. The reason for their inefficacy would be that such leaders are unlikely to heed any advice, particularly that which challenges their viewpoints, whether it is offered by sages or fools. In short, dictators make decisions in isolation, and the quality of advisers is of little consequence. The investigation of these two cases is meant, in part, to assuage those concerns.

These two cases were chosen because they share several similarities but differ in one key area: the power differential between the leader and the inner circle. Both Nasser and Hussein were long-standing Middle Eastern dictators who assumed power in the aftermath of revolutionary movements that swept away monarchial rule.[1] Moreover, both assumed leadership by transforming a dominant political party into a vehicle of personal rule (Ba'ath Party in Iraq and the Free Officers Movement/Arab Socialist Union in Egypt) and purging would-be challengers. Additionally, Hussein and Nasser both held rivalries with militarily powerful, democratic states (Israel in Nasser's case and the United States in Saddam's case) that resulted in multiple wars with these opponents, sometimes when these adversaries were members of powerful coalitions. Furthermore, each conflict for Hussein and Nasser would result in devastating military defeats with these leaders, assumingly, not learning lessons from previous losses. Most importantly, both Nasser and Saddam employed crony and nepotistic defense ministers throughout the periods that these case studies examine.

However, there was a key distinction between the two despots. Saddam's power was complete, while Nasser's was not. Power was not shared within Saddam's regime; his tenure as leader was the epitome of absolutist rule. In fact, Saddam took great pains to build a cult of personality where he was the "Father-Leader." As a result, elites within Saddam's regime were completely dependent on him and few ever rose to challenge him. The *Autocratic Regimes* dataset (Geddes et al. 2014) codes Saddam's regime as personalist, and Saddam received a 1 on Weeks' (2012) personalism scale, the highest score on the continuous 0-1 scale. In contrast, while Nasser's regime had personalist characteristics, his power was far from total. In fact, as the case study will reveal, Nasser did not see himself as the supreme leader of the Free Officers Movement, but the "first among equals"

[1] Both Saddam and Nasser are coded as revolutionary leaders in Colgan's (2012) *Revolutionary Leaders and Revolutions* dataset.

(Vatikiotis 1978, 55). The Egyptian ruler often sought input from key advisers and almost completely delegated military decisions to his friend Abdel Hakim Amer (Gordon 1992). The *Autocratic Regimes* dataset (Geddes et al. 2014) codes Nasser's government as a hybrid of a single party, military, and personalist regime; furthermore, Nasser's regime only received a moderate score on Weeks' (2012) personalism scale: 0.57.[2]

The contrast in the Nasser and Saddam regimes provides insight on whether the main culprit for Egypt and Iraq's poor decision-making is the degree to which the leader was willing to listen to others' views or the quality of key advisers. In the case of Saddam, it is true that he made many unilateral decisions. Regularly, decisions were made with only one or two advisers, often with only his son Uday or his son-in-law Hussein Kamel being consulted (Woods et al. 2006). Moreover, Saddam's power was unchallenged and his willingness to dismiss advice well-documented. In fact, it is hard to find a case where advisers held less power. However, I find that competent advisers can change even the most ruthless dictator's mind for the better as will be demonstrated in the Iraqi case study: Lieutenant General Ra'ad al-Hamdani's ability to convince Saddam to not re-invade Kuwait in 1994. Moreover, Nasser's willingness to listen to others and his reliance on Amer reveals that even regimes with lower levels of leader control are susceptible to cronyism and its negative consequences.

[2]Nasser and Saddam also differ on the degree of militarism within the regime. Nasser was a career officer while Saddam was never in the military. Moreover, Nasser's government was filled with military officers while Saddam's was made up of mostly family members. Therefore, Saddam and Nasser's audiences (elites) were different in that Saddam's were civilians and Nasser's were military. Therefore, Weeks (2012) accurately codes the Saddam regime as a "boss" (personalist leader, civilian audience) and Nasser as a "strongman" (personalist leader, military audience). However, it is not clear why the military nature of Egyptian elites would make them incompetent on military matters; in fact, if anything, Nasser's elites should have been more competent given their military experience.

5.2 Saddam Hussein's Regime (Iraq 1979-2003)

5.2.1 Personalism, Nepotism, and Fear

On July 17, 1968, the Ba'ath Party, led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, launched a successful coup, a political maneuver that would allow the party to dominate the Iraqi state for the next 35 years. The Ba'ath Party had been in power five years prior, but had been removed in a countercoup. In their second attempt at consolidating power, the party implemented lessons learned from their previous failure. In particular, the party would work to weaken the military establishment and ensure that security organizations were structured in a manner to ensure loyalty to the regime.

No individual took these lessons to heart more than Saddam Hussein. As Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Saddam was al-Bakr's right-hand man. He would use his advantageous position to consolidate power. Over the course of the next decade, Saddam's locus of control would grow through pure, unadulterated ruthlessness. The one-time street criminal would use his "tenacious perseverance" and "skillful manipulation" to slowly undermine al-Bakr's rule and to place all power with himself. Saddam's key tactic was the "merciless elimination of rivals" whether they be actual or imagined opponents (Karsh and Raushi 2007, 110). Any potential rival was purged, often killed, sometimes by Saddam's own hand (Bulloch and Morris 1991; Woods et al. 2006; Sassoon 2011).

By 1979, Saddam Hussein was strong enough to remove his cousin and mentor al-Bakr and place himself in charge.[3] The type of regime Saddam would create quickly became apparent. In his first meeting with senior Ba'athist officials, Saddam revealed that he discovered "a painful and atrocious plot" (a likely fictitious one) orchestrated by 66

[3] A man with whom he further cemented his relationship by having his wife's sister marry al-Bakr's son and his wife's brothers marry al-Bakr's daughters, see Rezun 1992,16.

of these officials. He would have each official executed by their eventual replacement. This maneuver would ensure the new officials' loyalty by having them share in Saddam's guilt as well as witness firsthand how disloyalty would be dealt with in Saddam's regime (Woods et al. 2006, 4).

Saddam quickly transformed the Iraqi state into something that was indistinguishable from himself. He constructed the state's institutions as well as the social, military, and economic structures in his image. Cults of personality are common amongst Middle Eastern dictators but Saddam's "was preposterous even by Middle Eastern standards" and "was carried to unprecedented heights" (Karsh and Rautsi 2007, 151). As Kanan Makiya (1998, 114) states, Saddam's authority was not "in the form of 'pure' Weberian charisma, rooted in personal attributes like extraordinary heroism or revelatory powers; it [was] rehearsed, staged, and elaborately organized." Saddam "projected himself as a superhuman and capable of doing all things perfectly" (Sassoon 2011, 176). Saddam made his birthday a national holiday, had his population refer to him as "Father-Leader," rewrote his family tree to demonstrate that he was descended from the prophet Mohammed, fabricated an image as a military man despite never being in the military, and had books written to declare himself a world-class athlete. He erected large statutes of himself and blanketed Iraq with paintings and images of Saddam, some 20 feet high. In fact, a common joke amongst Iraqis was that their population sat at 28 million: 14 million Iraqis and 14 million pictures of Saddam Hussein (Sciolino 1991; Rezun 1992; Karsh and Rautsi 2007; Sassoon 2011). In short, Saddam had transformed Iraq into one of the most personalist regimes the world has ever known.

However, this cult of personality did more than to serve Saddam's ego. Saddam sought to have elites and his inner circle believe that he was "all-seeing" and "all-knowing" in order to demonstrate that any coup attempt would be futile (Sciolino 1991, 34). This

is because Saddam lived in constant fear and paranoia about being killed by those who surrounded him:

> 'I know that there are scores of people plotting to kill me,' Saddam told a personal guest of his shortly after assuming the presidency in the summer of 1979, and 'this is not difficult to understand. After all, did we not seize power by plotting against our predecessors? However,' he added, 'I am far cleverer than they . . . '(Karsh and Rautsi 2007, 3).

To protect himself, he hired food tasters, body doubles, and even had his closest advisers put on buses with blackened-out windows and driven around Baghdad for hours so they would not know the locations of their meetings (Sciolino 1991; Rezun 1992). Saddam also hired bodyguards that he "personally controlled, who would be more loyal than their closest associates but would remain carefully segregated from their inner circles" (Sassoon 2011, 193). Senior officials were not allowed to leave the country (118). Security forces were located in concentric rings with only the most loyal forces allowed to even be geographically proximate to the leader. The vaunted Republican Guard was not allowed inside Baghdad; that right was only reserved for the more loyal Special Republican Guard, who, although they were allowed inside city limits, were prohibited from having maps of the city (Woods et al. 2006).

Although Saddam did implement a system of inducements and rewards, he mainly ensured loyalty through two means: fear and nepotism. As Karsh and Rautsi (2007, 182) explains,

> The rules of the game for Hussein's coterie are simple and straightforward: they give their ruler unconditional loyalty and obedience in return for political prominence and economic advantage. But the footing at the top of the pyramid is treacherous. Should a member of the inner circle find his loyalty called into question, or should he become too popular, his political career will quickly go into decline, whether his former standing and whether a member of Hussein's family or not.

Advisers and Ba'athist officials' fear was often demonstrated in meetings. Elites frequently sat with their hands in their laps, looking downwards, avoiding eye contact with the supreme leader. As Makiya (1998, 112) notes, "Ministers do not turn their backs on Saddam when leaving the room; they shuffle out sideways, inconspicuously." Meetings often involved Saddam berating his ministers for failings such as cowardice and inferior intelligence. Those in high-ranking positions, including military commanders, rarely provided Saddam with criticism, dissenting opinions, or negative reports. Military commanders were keenly aware of Saddam's habit of shooting the bearer of bad news. In 1982, Iraq was dangerously close to losing the war to Iran. In a meeting with key advisers, Saddam suggested that he might temporarily step down, and Riaz Hussein, the health minister, made the mistake of agreeing with this idea. At which time, Saddam dragged the minister into the next room, shot him, and sent the dismembered parts to the minister's wife (Bulloch and Morris 1991).

The dictator modeled his regime after his idol Joseph Stalin and lived by the same mantra regarding his closest confidants: "Near the Tsar, near to death." Therefore, the dictator was the most suspicious of his inner circle. He watched everyone and trusted no one, "but his closest relatives and tribal members whom he would not regard as a direct threat" (Rezun 1992, 17). Saddam was particularly weary of competent officials. Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin and a consummate regime insider remarked, "Saddam was always wary of intelligent people, especially those who made frequent appearances on television" (Woods et al. 2006, 7). A Republican Guard Commander commented after the 2003 US-UK Invasion, "By his decisions [Saddam] throws out the cleaver men, or the cleaver men learn not to involve themselves in any decision making" (ibid). As a result, competent military officials were terrified of being perceived as a threat by Saddam:

> Stories circulated widely in the military about generals imprisoned or shot by Saddam personally for transgressions, which included excessive competence or an argumentative nature. Innocence was not a defense: Saddam would announce that he knew when someone was going to betray him, even before that person himself knew it. In the absence of real ground for punishment, Saddam did not shy away from fabricating charges against those he wished to destroy (ibid).

Even being family did not always protect an individual from Saddam's paranoia. Adnan Khairallah, Saddam's cousin and closest boyhood friend, had been defense minister during the entirety of the Iran-Iraq War. After the conclusion of the war, Khairallah had become increasingly critical of Saddam's decisions, and having been well-liked by the military, was developing into a figure of national standing. Khairallah would subsequently die in a suspicious helicopter accident in 1989. Many regime insiders would later claim the accident was "arranged" by Saddam (Sciolino 1991; Rezun 1992; Karsh and Rautsi 2007; Coughlin 2009). As a result, not even close family members felt secure from Saddam's fury. After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, cousin Barzan abd al-Ghafur confessed that he did not want the position of Special Republican Guard commander, and that the stress of the job made him ill: 'I was on a probationary status for the first six months. I was ordered by Saddam to take the command; I had no choice. I was sick at the idea of being the Special Republican Guard commander. It was the most dangerous job in the regime' (Woods et al. 2006, 58).

However, Saddam's primary method of ensuring loyalty was nepotism: "the centrality of loyalty for Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party led inevitably to a significant reliance on tribal, family, and kin associations" (Sassoon 2011, 11). In a personal interview after the 2003 invasion, Ali Hassan al-Majid (former defense minister and Saddam's cousin) revealed that Saddam was reluctant to trust any military power with someone outside of his family (Woods et al. 2006). Therefore, intelligence services, ministerial posts, and

top military positions were almost exclusively filled with members of Saddam's clan. By the end of the Gulf War, "virtually all key posts were held by a few hundred individuals from his clan" (Bulloch and Morris 1991, 46). Saddam had three times picked relatives for the position of defense minister: cousins Adnan Khairallah (1977-1989) and Ali Hassan Al-Majid (1991-1995) as well as Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Jabburi Tai (1995-2003) whose daughter was married to Saddam's son Qusay. Saddam also placed his younger son Qusay in charge of the Republican Guard, his cousin Barzan abd al-Ghafur as head of the Special Republic Guard, and his second cousin and son-in-law Hussein Kamil as Minister of Military Industries.

Many of these familial appointments were woefully unqualified for their positions. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, whose daughter was married to Saddam's son Uday, was made Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces despite the fact that he never actually served in the armed forces (Sassoon 2011). Actually, incompetent family members were preferable candidates for these positions. Barzan abd al-Ghafur was selected to head the Special Republican Guard because Saddam did not feel that his cousin was intelligent enough to lead a coup (Woods et al. 2006).

This nepotism would have widespread, deleterious effects. In post-war interviews, Wafiq al-Samarrai, the ex-director of the military intelligence services, stated that Saddam Hussein's promotions 'were wholly based on loyalty and sycophancy toward the leader,' and as a result, the upper echelon of the military and intelligence establishment suffered 'from limited education and experience' (Sassoon 2011, 139). Career soldiers were often frustrated by their superiors' incompetence. Defense Minister al-Majid revealed that military officers felt that Qusay was particularly difficult to work for because he did not even know the "simplest things" regarding the military (56).[4] These effects of incompetence

[4]It is interesting to note that Saddam's sons also faced their father with trepidation. When Qusay Hussein was given an assignment by his father to repair military vehicles, but had insufficient means to do so, Qusay

were also present in lower ranks: “By the 1980s, however, loyalty to the Ba’ath became more critical in the cadets’ assessment and by the 1990s, the quality of the recruits, and subsequently the officer corps, deteriorated significantly, as entering and graduating from those colleges was no longer based on capabilities and personal achievements" (11).

Although Saddam’s policies of fear and nepotism would work to solidify his power, they came at a cost: a weakened ability to make sound foreign policy decisions. In the lead-up to the Gulf War and the 2003 Invasion, Saddam’s coup-proofing undermined his ability to accurately assess his opponents’ resolve and capabilities in two fundamental ways. First, military commanders and key advisers were too afraid to provide negative assessments or statements that contradicted Saddam’s over optimism. Second, his policy of placing loyalists and relatives in key advisory positions undermined military expertise and effectiveness. As a result, in both occasions, Saddam believed that his opponents would not pursue military action against him, and if they did, the Iraqi forces would be capable enough to secure military victory or impose enough costs to ensure a political triumph. Joseph Sassoon (2011, 8) summarizes this phenomenon:

> Although Saddam Hussein was astute in dealing with internal affairs, he was less successful at understanding foreign powers. His inability to grasp the implications of invading Kuwait and his belief that the United States and coalition forces would not invade Iraq are two blatant examples of his misjudgment. In a pattern familiar to other dictators, the presentations of intelligence information and ideas by members of the inner circle became colored by the leader’s own view, by the presenters’ anticipation of what he really wanted to hear, or by fear of offending him.

In military briefings, key military officers often lied about Iraqi military capabilities and hid inefficiencies and failures, often representing the military forces as stronger than they were. Lieutenant General Ra’ad al-Hamdani recalls an incident during a 1995 con-

had individuals manually push and park the vehicles on the other side of the street to make it appear that they were functional (Woods et al. 2006).

ference, where air force military intelligence knew that Iraqi air force capabilities were near zero due to economic sanctions; however, when previous presenters provided negative information and drew Saddam's ire, they quickly revised their report and stated that air force capabilities had increased in the past year (Sassoon 2011; Woods et al. 2011). Compounding these lies was the fact that military experts were a rare breed in the Hussein regime: "most of the competent fell by the wayside, retired if they were lucky, dead if Saddam had any reason to distrust them. Military effectiveness, at least in Western terms, ceased to exist [in Iraq]" (Woods et al. 2006, viii). As a result, "Saddam was substantially unaware of the weaknesses of the Iraqi military" (9). This misinformation began to warp Saddam's perception of the world. Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz stated that by the 1990s, Saddam had lost touch with reality and had an unrealistic outlook about the military and political power he held at the international level. This difficulty was not helped by the fact that Saddam fancied himself a brilliant military strategist despite the fact he was "ignorant of military history, logistics, technological changes, and any concept of modern military operations" (Woods et al. 2006, ix).

5.2.2 The Gulf War

On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait, triggering an international crisis that would result in the Gulf War (referred to as the "Mother of All Battles" by Saddam). The illegal act would draw the ire of the international community, and most importantly, would place Iraq into a confrontation with the world's sole superpower: The United States. In the subsequent five and and half months, Saddam would refuse to withdraw from Kuwait, despite international pressure. This decision would become "the gravest miscalculation of his political career" (ibid).

During these months, Saddam made a series of miscalculations, including his assessment of Arab leaders', the Soviet Union's, and France's willingness to block United Nations action. Saddam's key error was that he held onto two misconceptions: that the American government was not resolved enough to commit ground troops to the conflict, and even if the United States chose to commit these forces, that the Iraqi military was capable of outlasting Coalition forces in a protracted and bloody conflict.

Saddam incorrectly assumed that the United States was unwilling to use military force because the public was casualty-phobic. This sentiment was expressed in a February 1990 speech, in which Saddam stated, "we saw that the United States, as a superpower, departed Lebanon immediately when some Marines were killed" and that the United States had displayed "some signs of fatigue" (Woods 2008, 52). During the crisis, Saddam used US Congressional debate in high-level meetings as evidence of US "indecisiveness" and "weakness" (Sciolino 1991, 33). Moreover, he largely felt that his military would be able to adequately confront Coalition forces because true military capabilities were not measured in number of fighter planes and missiles but in spirit. In a meeting with Yassir Arafat, Saddam Hussein gave his military assessment of a potential battle with the Coalition forces:

> [This] battle will develop. It is true someone might do calculations in regards to the nation. I do not calculate the abilities of the nation. I do not calculate them in a classical way. How many artilleries, how many planes ... This is important but what is more important—is that the son of nation be able to touch the future with his fingers, if he stretches his arm [out] while dying? This is what is important to me (Woods 2008, 52).

These misconceptions were also fueled by an echo chamber where incompetent military advisers either supplied Saddam with inaccurate diplomatic and military assessments about his adversaries' resolve and capabilities or wholeheartedly agreed with Saddam's

ill-conceived notions. The General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID) was tasked with assessing the Coalition's military response and often issued reports "without significant analysis" (Woods 2008, 126). In fact, the military's most accurate intelligence information came from Western newspapers such as the *Washington Post*. Moreover, intelligence officials were hampered by the fact that Saddam would not give them the necessary resources, such as detailed maps, since they may be used to orchestrate a coup: "As Brigadier General Hamdani noted, the invasion of Kuwait was conducted primarily on tourist maps and unmensurated overhead imagery" (127). However, some military officials knew that a military confrontation would end poorly for Iraq, but did not dare to risk incurring Saddam's wrath. The last GMID report provided before the Coalition invasion stated that Coalition capabilities could "severely endanger [Iraq's] vital and strategic areas" (172). Nevertheless, as Woods et al. (2006, 13) recounts, "No senior officer had the courage to suggest to Saddam the possibility of a withdrawal before President Bush's January 15th deadline. Such a suggestion might have implied Saddam's original move into Kuwait had been a mistake, and the dictator's response to such impertinence was likely to be fatal."

5.2.3 The 2003 Invasion

In 2003, Saddam would again face off with the United States, this time over potential weapons of mass destruction. Most evidence suggests that Saddam did not take the Bush administration's threats of military force seriously: "from Saddam's point of view, the possibility of an American invasion verged on nonsense" (Woods et al. 2006, 25). In meetings with advisers, Saddam pointed to the fact that United States was a "paper tiger" who withdrew from Vietnam after 58,000 deaths, a number of casualties that Iraq incurred in just one battle with Iran (ibid). Therefore, as former Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz

relates, the dictator became “very confident that the United States would not dare to attack; if it did so, it would be defeated" (28). A decade after his defeat in the Gulf War, Saddam had not learned his lesson; but in fact, a decade of falsely optimistic reports from the civil-military bureaucracy resulted in Saddam becoming more detached from the reality, believing that the military balance between Iraq and the United States was tilted in his favor. Furthermore, after witnessing the United States pull out of Somalia after approximately a dozen casualties, and what he considered a tepid response to the discovery of his attempt on George H.W. Bush’s life, Saddam formed the belief that “the United States and the United Kingdom lacked the stomach for war when confronting ‘the heroic resistance’ of a united Iraqi people" (29). Even if the US and UK did attack, he believed that the two nations would stop short of installing a regime change.

Moreover, Saddam believed that the Iraqi forces were superior to their American and British counterparts because they were provided with a stronger “fighting spirit," and he told his officers that “Allah wanted to insult America by giving his strongest personal abilities to the materially weak Iraqis" and that his forces would put up “a heroic resistance and to inflict such enormous losses on the Americans that they would stop their advance" and that “there was no way the [US] Air Force would win a battle or a war as long as there is an Iraqi infantry soldier left" (29-30). Even as Iraq began to lose the war in late March 2003, Saddam still received reports from the civil-military bureaucracy that the Iraqi forces were winning, and even if they were not winning, they were not losing (32). In the end, it took the American and British forces only six weeks to occupy Iraq; Saddam would be captured and executed, marking the end to the dictator’s reign.

5.2.4 The 1994 Decision to (not) Invade Kuwait

The Gulf War and the 2003 US-UK Invasion are good examples of how Saddam's institutional structure undermined his ability to adequately assess conflict outcomes. However, this is just one side of the story: bad advisers result in bad decisions. To truly assess adviser quality's effect on foreign policy decision-making, we must observe the counterfactual: instances where Saddam received competent counsel and was willing to heed such advice. Fortunately, we can observe this; Saddam was not completely obdurate in his views. Advisers did, at times, change his mind, and a few in his regime had the temerity to tell the emperor when he had no clothes.

In September 1994, Saddam had enough of the economic blockade as well as American and British missile attacks and decided that he was going to reinvade Kuwait. Before following through on this decision, he held a meeting with his inner circle. At the meeting, several division commanders summoned the courage to tell Saddam that the military forces were still recovering from the Gulf War and economic sanctions and did not have the requisite strength to fight the Americans. One official in particular, Lieutenant General Ra'ad al-Hamdani, called the move "military suicide." After the meeting, Saddam summoned al-Hamdani and subsequently berated him and threatened to have him imprisoned. However, al-Hamdani told Saddam that he had told the truth and that the military analysis of this decision was as easy as "one plus one equals two." To which, Saddam responded, "you might think one plus one equals two but I have a risala [message from God] and sometimes I can see that one plus one equals ten" (Sassoon 2011, 174). Nevertheless, Saddam decided to listen to his military commanders and scrap his invasion plans as well as to not punish al-Hamdani (Sassoon 2011; Woods et al. 2011), saving his military from a potentially crushing defeat.

5.3 Gamal Abdel Nasser Regime (Egypt 1956-1970)

5.3.1 Nasser's Rise in Power and Cronyism

On July 23, 1952, a group of young Egyptian military officers united under the banner of the Free Officers Movement seized power in a military coup that ousted King Farouk, the last monarch of a dynasty that ruled Egypt since 1805. Although, the group would initially install General Muhammad Naguib as its figurehead, by the end of 1954, a young colonel named Gamal Abdel Nasser would emerge as the central figure in the Egyptian government. Like the Ba'ath Party in Iraq, the Free Officers, which institutionalized itself in the form of the Revolutionary Command Council, would gain power by eliminating potential rivals and purging hundreds of senior military officers (several receiving long prison sentences) and replacing them with those loyal to the RCC.

Though Nasser would consolidate his power by placing "second-rank Free Officers personally loyal to him" in key positions, allowing himself to ascend to the presidency in 1956; his rise to power did not exhibit the same level of ruthlessness as Saddam Hussein (Jankowski 2001, 65). Unlike Saddam, Nasser did not consider the movement "his personal vehicle." While Nasser established a "cult of the chief" and was the "uncontested leader of the [Free Officers] movement," he "did not dictate policy." As Panayiotis Vatikiotis (1978, 55) explains, "the junta functioned as a democratic body with all major decisions put to a vote." Moreover, as Joel Gordon (1992, 189) writes, "Nasser governed Egypt as he had the Free Officers executive, by force of personality more than coercion ... Nasser rarely bludgeoned his colleagues; by soliciting their views he made them feel that they had participated in the decision-making process ... always valu[ing] the counsel of others." Gamal Nasser did not seek to turn Egypt into reflection of himself but instead held a desire to industrialize and modernize his nation. His regime was not a personalist one.

There was no denying that power rested mostly with Nasser; he was “first among equals, a status he recognized, and on occasion abused" (Vatikiotis 1978, 55). Yet, in contrast with Saddam, Nasser “defies being classified as a typical dictator, a brooding, secretive psychopath, or one who thrived on conflict" (Aburish 2004, 56).

Although Nasser’s regime was rather bloodless for an autocratic regime, Nasser still had to be constantly preoccupied about his removal. As the main source of power within the state, the Egyptian military was willing and able to remove Nasser at a moment’s notice. Consequently, the Arab leader knew that his tenure would be short-lived if he did not secure the loyalty of the armed forces: “it was absolutely essential for Nasser’s political arrangements to render the officer corps coup-proof . . . Nasser’s regime needed the military and political guarding of the army, especially internally, so that what Nasser did to Faruq would not happen to Nasser himself" (Vatikiotis 1978, 161). Nasser’s primary strategy for ensuring control and loyalty of the military was cronyism. In particular, Nasser would contain the threat by placing his closest and dearest friend in charge of the military: Abdel Hakim Amer.

By and large, The Free Officers Movement was an old boys club. The movement largely consisted of classmates from cohorts at the Cairo military academy and the Staff College during the late 1930s and early 1940s. As Ferris (2012, 38) explains, the close friendships were necessary because “trust and camaraderie were essential qualities for the successful launch of a conspiracy." These networks of cronies would also be salutary for keeping Nasser in power. However, this cronyism would also have its demerits as the system would prove to be “insufficient for ruling a country of 30 million people" (ibid). In fact, Nasser would later regret appointing Amer as head of the armed forces. His “mostly loyal" friend’s incompetence and lack of discipline would undermine the military

decision-making and effectiveness during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Even before removing Naguib from power in 1954, Nasser had selected Amer “for the all-important task of controlling the armed forces and securing their fidelity" (Ferris 2012, 40). The two friends had been classmates in the Egyptian Military Academy and graduated together in 1938. The close colleagues would go on to share early military posts in Sudan and fight alongside each other during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In 1953, as Nasser was moving to take power from Naguib, he had his friend Amer promoted four military ranks from major to major general in one fell swoop. The move was unprecedented for the Egyptian military: “Not since Enver Pasha’s promotion from lieutenant to minister of war forty years before had the Middle East witnessed such a meteoric rise through the ranks" (ibid). When Nasser assumed the presidency in 1956, he appointed Amer commander-in-chief of the armed forces and defense minister, a position he would hold for the next twelve years.[5]

As head of the armed forces, Amer would set out to transform the Egyptian military into a “separate fiefdom loyal to him" (Aburish 2004, 234). Amer established a promotion system where he placed his own cronies in major military posts who in turn filled positions under them with officers loyal to them. The problem would be that the entire bureaucracy would mimic its leader. Amer’s greatest strengths was that he was social, charismatic, and fun-loving. Subordinates, by and large, liked Amer and that in turn enhanced their loyalty to him. However, the field marshal was also said to be “incompetent," “unqualified," “careless," “lazy," and “not cut out for high military command" (Aburish 2004, 262; Ferris 2012, 40-42). After meeting Amer in Cairo, former Soviet military attaché Sergei Khrakmalov remarked, “Amer’s views . . . struck me as exceedingly primitive. It seemed that in

[5]Eventually, Nasser would promote Amer to the highest of military ranks: field marshal.

front of me [stood] not the supreme commander of a state's armed forces, but rather an infantry battalion commander of mediocre capabilities" (Ferris 2012, 42). In fact, Amer was more concerned with enjoying the spoils of his position—womanizing, drinking, and gallivanting—then instilling discipline in the military bureaucracy. These flaws would trickle down through the entire military as "Amer's generals lacked [necessary] military credentials" and "held no political ambitions beyond considering themselves above the law" (Aburish 2004, 262). They certainly thought "very little of military discipline or of training their troops in using the equipment acquired from the US" (235-236). The lack of leadership had detrimental effects on the lower ranks as "Amer's . . . command eroded the quality of the Egyptian officer corps" (Vatikiotis 1978, 160). Egyptian soldiers, in a general sense, became undisciplined and poorly-trained, to the point that Egyptian soldiers held a reputation within society for being overweight (Aburish 2004, 190).

Amer's incompetence was also problematic for the Egyptian government because Amer was "Nasser's main source of information" and "the voice he listened to" (240). Nasser had largely divorced himself from overseeing the happenings of the military, relying on Amer's assessments and military judgements. It is fair to say that Nasser was largely ignorant of his state's military affairs. Moreover, when he did receive negative assessments of Amer, he dismissed them: "When several of the original RCC members made an issue of Amer's bad influence on the army and unfitness for command, Nasser backed Amer on all but minor points" (125). Nasser was much more concerned about solidifying his domestic power than establishing a strong national security as "the president's fear that what he had done to King Farouk would be done to him trumped his desire to create an efficient fighting machine" (Ferris 2012, 43). This decision would prove grave during the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israel Conflict, which would reveal "rampant incompetence at

the highest [military] echelons and appalling deficit of training at all levels" (7).

5.3.2 The Sinai Conflict

On July 26, 1956, President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, sparking an international crisis with neighboring Israel as well as global powers Britain and France. Throughout the coming months, a series of miscalculations by Nasser and his military command, headed by Amer, would result in the crisis devolving into war on October 29th. Like the Gulf War, Nasser had months to find a peaceful solution and was given numerous diplomatic opportunities to avoid war. Moreover, like Saddam, Nasser underestimated the resolve of his opponents while overestimating his forces' abilities to surmount a viable defense against a much more powerful alliance of states.

When Israeli troops invaded the Sinai, "President Nasser was completely taken by surprise" (Kyle 1991, 350). Interviews with regime insiders such as Sayyid Mar'i, Minister of Agriculture, stated that Nasser saw the peaceful resolution of the crisis as probable and war quite unlikely. In fact, over the course of the three months, "the idea of war was not uppermost in [Nasser's] thoughts and that war itself did not enter his plans as a serious possibility" (James 2008, 158). This sentiment was backed by British Ambassador to Egypt, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, who reported on August 30th that Nasser saw the chance of invasion at 10 to 1 (ibid). Nasser wholeheartedly believed that Israel would be deterred from attack by increasing Arab nationalism and would not undermine its "self-respect" by aligning with colonial powers (Kyle 1991, 350).

Nasser was most steadfast in his belief that Britain would not enter the conflict. Even after receiving the news that Israel had invaded the Sinai, and that the British and French issued an ultimatum to cease fire, Nasser continued to believe that Britain was bluffing and

rejected the demand. Nasser viewed the ultimatum as a violation of British self-interest and that “Britain would be crazy to risk everything when she had so much to lose" (385). To that end, Nasser often focused in high-level meetings on incoming information that confirmed this belief such as British public opinion polls opposing such action (James 2008, 158). The fact that Egypt did not foresee British intervention also resulted in the regime’s overconfidence in an Egyptian military victory if war did indeed break out. In fact, Abdel Hakim Amer was among the most confident in the administration:

> My confidence regarding the safety of the situation is unbounded . . . We started our preparation before the President announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal . . . We shall not be taken by surprise. I can promise you the war against us will not be the picnic some people believe or talk about (ibid).

The strongest evidence that Nasser did not anticipate British and French participation is that he did not order an Egyptian retreat from the Sinai after witnessing the Israeli invasion. In wartime preparation, Egyptian generals advised that if Britain and France invaded, troops would have to be evacuated from the Sinai in order to avoid having them cut off. In fact, after Israel’s invasion, Nasser and Amer sought to reinforce the Sinai. Vice President Abdel Latif Boghdadi later recounts that during this time that Amer exhibited an “excess of zeal" and “nervous attention to detail." In fact, in the course of twenty-four hours, Amer gave one regiment four vastly disparate movement orders (Kyle 1991, 368).

When the British and French did invade on October 31st, Nasser was in a meeting with the Indonesian ambassador. As Cairo was being bombed, Nasser went up to the roof and recognized the British and French bombers. Coming to this realization that France and Britain had entered the conflict, Nasser was on the verge of a nervous breakdown:

> The rout of the Egyptian forces in Sinai was due in part to the lack of adequate preparation first, and the frivolous, off-hand dismissal by Nasser and his advisers of the possibility of a British military response to the nationalization of

> the Canal second. Recently, some of his old colleagues alleged that when the Anglo-French landing occurred in Port Said, it came as such shock to Nasser that he collapsed (Vatikiotis 1978, 161).

He called in his senior advisers and insisted on a complete withdrawal from the Sinai. Field Marshal Amer vehemently disagreed with such action believing that it would "demoralize fighting units which were locked in battle and fighting heroically against the Israelis and refused to give the order" (385). Nasser had to personally get on the phone with regiment commanders and order the withdrawal himself.

Although Nasser would score a political victory when his opponents would withdraw after political pressure from US President Dwight Eisenhower, he would experience a crushing military defeat: losing ten soldiers to every one of his adversaries'. Nasser had pulled a political victory out of the teeth of a military disaster, but "Amer's shortcomings became abundantly evident" (Ferris 2012, 40). Several within the RCC clamored for Amer's removal:

> The inescapable conclusion from the events of October-November 1956 was that Egypt possessed neither an effective army nor commanders capable of reforming it. From the perspective of the national interest, there was no question: much of the high command, including the commander in chief, simply had to go in order to pave the way for major reform (41).

However, Nasser faced a political dilemma. Removing Amer might increase military effectiveness but it would come with a trade-off: increased risk of removal. In fact, by this time, Amer had the loyalty of most senior generals. When Nasser pushed Amer for change, the field marshal threatened to quit and take most of the generals with him. Such a maneuver would have made Nasser vulnerable to a coup, possibly one orchestrated by Amer himself. Nasser decided to back down, and Amer would hold on to his position for a decade until he committed military blunders during the 1967 Israeli-Arab War so grave

that even he could not survive. The fact that Amer held onto his position despite his evident incompetence during the Sinai Conflict is case in point that cronyism served a vital political purpose within Nasser's regime. However, this protection came with significant costs. As Ferris concludes (2012, 41-43),

> But the national interest was not the deciding factor in 1956 ... the question of Amer's future ceased to be a pure professional decision for decision by the political echelon and became tightly bound up in the cliquish politics of the military ... In any event, Nasser's reluctance to settle the issue in 1956 had far-reaching implications. Since no one paid a price for the rank incompetence the war revealed, the army remained complacent in its ineptitude. Incredibly, there was hardly any turnover in the Egyptian senior command in the entire decade leading up to the debacle of 1967 ... The consequence of this scale of priorities was grave: after 1956, the Egyptian military, for all intents and purposes, ceased to be a viable tool of the state.

5.3.3 The 1967 Arab-Israeli War

At dawn on June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on the Sinai Peninsula. This time, the result for Egypt was catastrophic. Within two hours, three-fourths of Egyptian military airplanes were destroyed, and in a matter of days, Egypt had lost the Northern Sinai. Egypt suffered approximately 15,000 casualties while Israel "ended the Six-Day War with maximum lines on all fronts," resulting in as crushing of a military defeat as was possible for Egypt (Aburish 2004, 260-261). Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan attributed the humiliating defeat to Egypt's failure "to appreciate the advantages of launching a first strike ... to gauge the enemy's power and its willingness to use it" (Oren 2003, 311). Members of the RCC came to a similar conclusion and contributed the loss "to Amer's lack of leadership qualities, corruption, and overall incompetence" and "promotion on the basis of loyalty, not expertise, and the army's fear of telling Nasser the truth" (Aburish 2004, 261; Oren 2003, 211). Historians also point to Nasser's overreliance on Amer as the cause of the lopsided affair: "What mattered above all else, what had a

direct effect on the outcome of the battle was [Nasser's] reliance on Amer. The support he consistently gave his close friend after Amer demonstrated a lack of ability and military competence condemned him" (Aburish 2004, 258).

Although the 1967 war officially commenced with an Israeli surprise attack, the conflict was the result of mounting hostilities and increasing military mobilization, which culminated in the closing of Straits of Tiran on May 22, 1967, an action that Israel previously warned would risk war. At this time, some military officials, including future defense minister General Mohamed Fawzi, warned Nasser and Amer that Egypt could not afford a war with Israel. However, Amer saw a potential conflict with Israel as a means to redeem his reputation from the 1956 conflict, stating, "This time we will be the ones to start the war" (Oren 2003, 92). The existing Egyptian military plans for war with Israel called for a defensive strategy called "Conqueror," which Amer scrapped in favor of a new, offensive operation called "Dawn." The plan redirected forces from fortifications and trenches to forward positions. Amer was supremely confident in his new plan, giving statements such as "our goal is the destruction of the enemy's main armed forces. Our army can accomplish that with the immense capabilities at its disposal" (160).

However, Amer's optimism would be unfounded. Subordinates pointed out that the Egyptian Army was ill-prepared for such a drastic change in strategy. Soldiers were not familiar enough with the territory or the mission. Moreover, Egypt simply did not have the resources as years of neglect and ineptitude had undermined military capabilities: 20% of tanks, a quarter of the artillery, and a third of the military aircraft were not fit for action. Sidqi Mahmud, commanding general of the Air Force, criticized Amer for the plan's hubris, "Amer, an attack on Eilat ... an attack on the Dimona atomic reactor ... on the Haifa oil refineries ... Do you think that I'm the commander of the American air force?" (92). When the Israelis did invade, the conflicting plans created confusion and complete

anarchy on the battlefield. This chaos was exacerbated by military commanders' incompetence and sparse combat experience. In the end, the Egyptian military could not even organize an orderly retreat.

When Nasser heard of the Israeli attack, he rushed to Amer to get assessment of the military situation. However, when Amer disdainfully brushed away the leaders' concerns and provided him with unsatisfactory answers, the meeting devolved into a screaming match between the two men. In the coming days, Amer would keep reassuring Nasser and the RCC that Egyptian forces were repelling the Israelis. However, such a result was beyond Amer's capabilities, as Aburish (2004, 262-263) explains:

> The inept field marshal, as unqualified a military commander as had ever lead an army, continued into his self-delusion or lied unashamedly. As with his reaction to the tripartite invasion of Suez in 1956, he suffered what amounted to a nervous breakdown. Even with defeat staring him in the eye, Amer kept doctoring the reports from Sinai and asking Nasser for more time to redress the balance. He had lost track of where most army units were; and his communications with Jordan had broken down because they had adopted a new communications code which both sides could not use. His military coordination with Syria, despite a military alliance which had been in place for nearly two years, never worked. Not only was there no coordination, but the Syrians never forgave Amer for contributing to the breakup of the UAR, and they too were puzzled by Nasser's reliance on him. But more tellingly, even with Israel administering one of the greatest defeats of Arab history, Amer instinctively tried to keep Nasser in the dark by giving him false and vague answers.

The 1967 war was a military disaster for Egypt, one that would finally sever the relationship between Nasser and Amer. Nasser blamed Amer for the military failures, and Amer resented these claims. In September 1967, Amer tried to remove his best friend Nasser from power along with the help of 50 military officers (Ferris 2012). It failed, and Nasser had Amer detained and kept under house arrest. In the aftermath, Nasser would reorganize the Egyptian Army and place another former classmate General Muhammad

Fawzi in charge. Although Fawzi held a strong reputation within the military, having been in charge of the Egyptian Military Academy for seventeen years, his appointment "had far less to do with Fawzi's military prowess than his unwavering loyalty to the president" (Oren 2003, 64). While under house arrest, Amer would commit suicide, and despite Amer's attempt at removing him from power, Nasser felt his friend's death deeply, lamenting the fact that he lost "the person closest to [him]" (Aburish 2004, 277).

5.4 Conclusion

Nepotism and cronyism within autocratic regimes is not inherent; it is deliberately constructed for a political purpose. By surrounding himself with friends and family, the dictator secures his hold on power by making sure that the individuals most able to dislodge him from power are those least willing to do so. In this sense, loyalty becomes the dictator's shield. In this chapter, I reviewed the histories of the Saddam Hussein and Gamal Nasser regimes in order to provide support for these arguments. The survey was meant to accomplish this goal through two means.

First, I sought to deliberately demonstrate that my theoretical mechanism could be observed in the real-life political operations of dictatorships. Dictators fear their removal, particularly because it often leads to negative outcomes, most troubling being the leader's death. This fear causes these dictators to coup-proof their regime, primarily by ensuring their elites' loyalty through the mechanisms of terror, cronyism, and nepotism. These coup-proofing strategies undermine military expertise and effectiveness. In short, cronies and relatives are often incompetent and sycophantic. Therefore, there is a loyalty-competency trade-off with dictatorships. This trade-off was displayed by Saddam's military elites' inability and unwillingness to disabuse the tyrant of his false views regarding American resolve and capabilities during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US-UK Invasion, leading

to disastrous defeats. This incompetency was also found in Egypt, where Nasser's close friend Abdel Hakim Amir was personally responsible for many of the Egyptian military's failings during the 1956 Sinai Conflict and the 1967 Arab-Israel War.

Second, the main rival explanation for my empirical results is that personalist regimes are lead by lunatics who are prone to delusions of grandeur and whose narcissism precludes them from being able to heed any prudent evidence. This section undermines this argument in two ways. First, Saddam Hussein was perhaps one of the most megalomaniac dictators in history. However, even Saddam, sometimes listened to counsel. If it were not for Hussein's generals, the dictator would have re-invaded Kuwait in 1994, forever changing the history books. Second, I outlined how a less personalist leader, Gamal Nasser, whom was open to ideas and willing to incorporate his elites' viewpoints had to place a crony in charge of the military (as a means to safeguard himself), leading to similar negative war outcomes.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary

In this dissertation, I ask, “Why are personalist dictators so conflict-prone?" In answering this question, I assert that domestic incentives cause these dictators to fill their inner circle, key advisory and ministerial roles with woefully unqualified relatives and friends. This is because, in these governments, crony advisers ascend to their senior advisory roles based on their loyalty to the leader rather than merit or political clout. This inferior quality of advisers results in a higher propensity for conflict.

Personalist dictators are obsessed with their own security. Given that their exit from office is usually associated with their imprisonment and death and their close associates are the most likely to remove them from office, dictators are constantly preoccupied with discerning the loyalty of their inner circle and preventing any coup attempts. As a result, these despots are the most likely to implement coup-proofing strategies (e.g. construction of paramilitaries, counterbalancing). The appointment of relatives and life-long friends as bureaucratic heads, particularly for military organizations, is one such strategy — a tactic that I call *ministerial cronyism*.

Personalist dictators pursue ministerial cronyism because it is the surest way to instill loyalty among the military elite. Payoffs, promotions, and fear only go so far. Even in the most violent regimes, one feels a sense of loyalty to kin or to one’s closest friends. Therefore, much like mafia dons or cartel leaders, personalist dictators know that they are safest from removal when they place the most trusted individuals, i.e. family and long-time associates, in the most powerful positions. However, if the only candidates for top positions are close friends and family, the probability that these individuals are qualified

to fill such roles is substantially smaller than a pool of candidates from the population at-large. Therefore, in order to ensure loyalty, the dictators sacrifice competency.

On the world stage, this trade-off is deleterious for the personalist leader. I demonstrate that leaders who employ crony advisers are more likely to experience conflict because the crisis bargaining process is more likely to break down. These leaders often form overly optimistic expectations about war outcomes, because they underestimate their opponents' capabilities and resolve. In short, the use of ministerial cronyism restricts their access to reliable information, which distorts their own sense of strength or that of their opponents.

Free-minded and competent advisers play a key role in providing independent and accurate information to leaders, which Reiter and Stam (2002) has referred to as the "marketplace of ideas." There are two necessary characteristics required of advisers if they are going to enhance the leader's war assessments: independence and competence. Independent advisers (i.e. advisers that feel free to express a dissenting opinion or provide a negative outlook about the likelihood of military success) are able to play devil's advocate and disabuse the leader of overly optimistic assessments as well as prevent the group decision-making from falling into groupthink. Competent advisors are better able to take the imperfect information about the opponent's potential capabilities and resolve and provide accurate assessments.

Leaders armed with competent advisers can make more realistic assessments about the prospect of victory and the resolve of their opponents. In doing so, they are better able to calculate their expected utility from war, and consequently, accurately assess which peaceful deals are appropriate given the balance of military capabilities and the resolve on both sides. Those leaders with incompetent advisers are prone to mistakes. They may overestimate their military strength or underestimate their opponent's resolve. In doing so, these leaders believe they have more bargaining strength than is appropriate.

Therefore, during negotiations, they demand too much and concede too little. The result is that bargaining breaks down and war occurs. Worse yet, these mistakes often result in conflicts where they are substantially weaker and/or less resolved, resulting in worse conflict outcomes.

In order to garner evidence, I sought to empirically test each link in my theoretical chain. First, in Chapter 2, I used various measures of personalism (Weeks 2012; Magaloni et al. 2013; Geddes et al. 2014) to establish that personalist leaders are more likely to experience negative post-tenure fates (exile, imprisonment, and death), even while controlling for rival explanations. Then, in Chapter 3, I demonstrated that these fates do incentivize personalist leaders to use coup-proofing strategies, particularly ministerial cronyism. After constructing a new dataset of defense ministers from 1945 to 2005, which indicates the presence (or absence) of a personal relationship between the minister and the leader, I showed that more personalized regimes are more likely to use ministerial cronyism, that this cronyism appears to be in response to coup risk, and that this cronyism is effective as a coup-proofing strategy.

Chapters 4 and 5 ushered empirical support for the claim that ministerial cronyism creates a loyalty-competency tradeoff. In Chapter 4, I used a variety of measures for conflict occurrence to illustrate that regimes that use ministerial cronyism are more likely to experience conflict, particularly in instances where they are militarily weaker than their opponents. This tendency for asymmetrical conflict also resulted in a proclivity for these regimes to lose conflicts. Finally in Chapter 5, I used two case studies, Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and Gamel Abdel Nasser's regime in Egypt, to show that the use of nepotistic and crony military elites resulted in both regimes entering avoidable and unwise conflicts.

6.2 Theoretical Contributions

6.2.1 Dictators

Surely, Saddam Hussein was a psychopath. How could he be anything else? He had ministers shot in meetings, used chemical weapons on the Kurdish people, and brutally repressed his own populace. However, as I assert through this dissertation, dictators' behaviors are not always capricious. Dictators are often rational. Moreover, if dictators are rational, then it follows that once we know their interests and preferences, we can predict their behavior. One of this dissertation's main contributions is to provide an argument for what these interests and preferences are.

I assert that dictators are primarily motivated by a desire to stay alive. Leadership transitions are a brutal exercise in dictatorships. Despots are usually exiled, imprisoned, or killed upon removal. Moreover, the individuals most likely to push the leader out of power are those in high in the administration. As a result, dictators must view every key decision through the prism of how it might affect the probability of their removal. Consequently, dictators are wary of showing weaknesses and often overly focused on ensuring that they have safeguarded themselves from coups and revolutions, no matter the cost. In doing so, they often sacrifice competency, time, energy, and effort, all of which could have been used to provide public goods, such as avoiding costly conflicts.

In the end, I show that dictators' aggressiveness on the world stage is not simply a function of the leader's ego or plans for world domination. Dictatorships often have ill-guided foreign policies because they are more likely to misperceive themselves and others. In administrations where experts on diplomatic affairs and military campaigns have very little knowledge on these matters, one cannot expect them to perform well on the world stage.

Therefore, dictators' belligerence may not simply be a result of their innate aggressiveness or irrationality, but of their ignorance.

6.2.2 Advisers

This dissertation also brings attention to a seldom discussed, but important, actor in the construction of states' foreign policies: the adviser. No leader is an island, entire of himself. A state's leader must perform several different functions during a single day and make decisions across a wide array of policy areas. He does not have the time or energy to become an expert on all these areas or to fill all the necessary roles so that a state can function. Every leader, no matter how powerful, has to rely on a set of individuals in order to adequately run a nation. Too often, theories of war suggest that leaders, during the decision-making process, are in a vacuum, gathering information, weighing the potential options and implementing their choices without input or assistance from any other individual. This line of thinking could not be further from the truth.

In this dissertation, I espoused a variation on the Governmental Politics (i.e. "Bureaucratic Politics") decision-making model (Allison 1971), asserting that foreign policy is the result of a decision-making process that involves actors who are part of the leader's inner circle. These political leaders usually sit on top of major bureaucracies or ministries. When making decisions, leaders usually rely on the information given by these experts and can be persuaded to choose certain policies, even over their original, preferred option, through the effectiveness of the adviser's argument or as result of the provision of new information. Likewise, leaders can be emboldened to pursue their original policy option when there appears to be consensus in support of such a plan.

By considering not only the leader but also members of his inner circle, this dissertation contributes to the literature by providing a more realistic account of how decisions

are made during crisis bargaining. Moreover, it suggests that scholars should consider the characteristics of the key military and foreign policy advisers when determining which states are likely to experience crisis bargaining breakdowns. By focusing on leader's characteristics, scholars might wrongly assume that the leader only relies on his own faculties to deal with incomplete information when, more often than not, leaders rely on advisers whose jobs are to be experts on these subjects. In the United States, it would be unfathomable to believe that the president would use force without consulting the Secretaries of State and Defense. As this dissertation will show, such a situation would be just as unlikely in the most concentrated of dictatorships. The quality of advisers has real implications for policy outcomes, especially at the international level.

6.2.3 International Conflict

In his seminal work, Fearon (1995) asked, if war is so costly and states are always better off suing for peace, then why do rational states experience war? The most favored explanation from Fearon's examination of war was that states, acting rationally, can choose war when incomplete information hinders their ability to find suitable agreements. Leaders are never fully armed with all the necessary information. Such uncertainty allows for misperception and error. In particular, leaders are often uncertain about their opponent, in particular, their war-time capabilities and resolve (Levy 1983; Morrow 1989; Fearon 1994, 1995; Van Evera 1999). This lack of information is vital to explaining how wars can occur. An inflated view of one's ability to win a war or underestimation of an opponent's resolve can cause a leader to set too high of a reservation level, meaning that he will only accept offers that his opponent will never be willing to give (White 1968; Lebow 1981; Levy 1983; Blainey 1988; Snyder 1989; Van Evera 1999; Johnson 2004; Stoessinger 2005). What results is a narrowing of the bargaining range and the inability to find suitable peaceful solutions.

Although a satisfactory explanation for war theoretically, this idea does little to explain two main empirical patterns regarding international conflict. The first pattern is that most wars are not between relatively equal powers where assessing a potential victor is more problematic, nor are they initiated by much stronger states against weaker ones. Instead, the states taking the most aggressive actions in the current world are those much weaker than their potential adversaries. Why is there a rash of overoptimism? Why are states misjudging their opponents so badly? Is there a rational explanation for this?

Second, there is no ex ante reason to believe that war will occur more often for any individual state or set of states. However, research has shown that democracies are less likely to fight each other (Lake 1992; Doyle 1986; Russett 1995; Benoit 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997, 2001), and that on a whole, personalist dictatorships are more conflict-prone (Enterline 1998; Peceny, Beer, and Terry 2002; Reiter and Stam 2003; Peceny and Butler 2004; Colgan 2010, 2013; Weeks 2012, 2014; Colgan and Weeks 2015).

The current domestic theories of war have considered the connection between domestic politics and war from only certain viewpoints. These theories are well-informed about the decision-making processes within democracies but often falsely assume that such processes do not occur in autocracies: namely, that autocrats do not fear the domestic consequences of their decisions. Therefore, institutionalist theories have focused on what factors might influence leaders' removal and thus their foreign policies, but have not dedicated as much attention to how potential post-tenure fates influence leader behavior. This dissertation brings new perspectives and in doing so provides an explanation for the aggressive tendencies of personalist dictatorships.

6.3 Data Contribution

Within this dissertation, I introduced an original dataset of over 1500 defense ministers from 1945 to 2005. This dataset indicated whether these defense ministers were relatives or close friends with their heads of state. As a direct measure of the use of cronyism, this measure can be used to explain a variety of political phenomena. The argument that cronies are incompetent translates to other issue areas and may explain other events of interest: unwise alliance formations, dramatic shifts in policy (Bailey et al. 2016), or a weakened ability to provide human security or adequate counterterrorism.

Moreover, the dataset can be extended to other key posts within these regimes such as economic, health, or foreign ministers and used to predict other policy outcomes such as economic growth, education levels, or infant mortality rates. Furthermore, more information can be gathered about these defense ministers, such as military background, age, and whether or not they were exiled, imprisoned, or killed. These characteristics could have an effect on conflict occurrence and outcomes.

6.4 Future Research

The political behavior within dictatorships has been underexplored. This dissertation addressed just one question: Why are personalist dictatorships so conflict-prone? However, several other questions remain. One related question is why do dictators consolidate power within themselves? Is there a rational reason? By eliminating institutions and relying on charismatic authority, the dictator has put his life on the line, what incentive would he have for this behavior?

Another puzzle is why dictators hold elections. More often than not, these elections are not free and almost certainly rigged. These leaders usually receive vote totals near a 100%. Why do dictators go through this effort? One possible explanation is that dictators want

to shift their authority from a charismatic base to a legal one. If their hold on leadership is legitimized through a legal process, it might reduce the risk of a negative post-tenure fate. This process might be related to another question: Why do some dictators accept democratization? By holding elections, these dictators might credibly signal that they are willing to accept a nonviolent means for removal, if it comes to it. By doing so, they might be able to convince successors that they are not a threat to resume power, and therefore, be allowed to retire.

Recent work on autocracies has also indicated a particular kind of personalist leader is more likely to display aggression: those who have orchestrated revolutions (Colgan and Weeks 2015). It is not immediately clear why this is the case. Perhaps, these leaders have revisionist preferences, causing them to be more likely to experience disputes, particularly if they draw the ire of states that prefer the status quo. It may also be that these dictators are the most likely to rely on charismatic authority. Revolutions sweep away former institutions. At the initial stages, these leaders may be the most vulnerable and may find it necessary to create cults of personality in order to maintain power. Further investigation is needed on the matter.

Finally, throughout this dissertation, I have alluded to the fear that exists amongst the dictator's elites. For instance, in Chapter 5, the terror that Saddam instilled in his inner circle resulted in sycophantic leaders who were unwilling to provide negative information. Therefore, even if these advisers were competent, they were certainly unwilling to share such pessimistic outlooks. For the sake of space and consistency, I primarily focused on the loyalty-competency trade-off created by ministerial cronyism. However, future efforts should find a way to measure fear within the inner circle, and test the effect of this trepidation, alongside cronyism, on conflict occurrence and outcome.

6.5 Concluding Remarks

On the surface, the appointment of brothers, sons, and life-long friends to be military chiefs may appear to only serve the leader's ego. However, I have shown that ministerial cronyism is a strategic action. For those leaders who face major consequences if removed, coups are too dangerous of a proposition to let there be any chance that they occur. Therefore, these leaders minimize this risk by filling the most dangerous roles in their administration with the most trustworthy individuals they know. However, in doing so, these regimes undermine their ability to effectively bargain in a crisis setting, resulting an increased likelihood that disputes will result in war. Therefore, personalist dictator's aggression may not entirely be a product of the leader's idiosyncrasies, but instead be governed by a more powerful force. In the end, my study suggests that personalist leaders are almost universally bad men, but perhaps, not all are mad men.

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APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

A.1 Data Description and Robustness Checks for Section 2

Here, I describe the data and variables I used for the empirical analysis in Section 2. It also provides the full models for Figure 2.3 within the manuscript. Although not shown, I conducted a number of robustness checks for the logit, multinomial probit, and bivariate probit models of negative post-tenure fates. The robustness checks show that:

- the results are robust to alternative approaches to measuring personalism (Geddes et al. 2013; Weeks 2012, 2014; and Magaloni et al. 2013)
- the results remain if hybrid regimes are dropped.
- the results are robust to using the average score for personalism and repression during a leader's tenure in lieu of the maximum score.
- the results remain unaffected when using alternative approaches for measuring repression, institutionalized means for leader removal, past history of leader removal, and irregular entry.
- the results do not change by including different controls for temporal and spatial effects.
- the results are robust to controlling for a leader's successor.

Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Negative Post-Tenure Fate	1,405	0.24	0.43	0	1
Death	1,405	0.04	0.21	0	1
Imprisonment	1,405	0.08	0.27	0	1
Exile	1,405	0.12	0.32	0	1
Irregular Exit	1,556	0.21	0.41	0	1
Autocracy	1,454	0.43	0.50	0	1
Democracy	1,454	0.57	0.50	0	1
Single Party Regime	1,454	0.17	0.37	0	1
Military Regime	1,454	0.12	0.33	0	1
Monarchy	1,454	0.03	0.18	0	1
Personalist Regime	1,454	0.11	0.31	0	1
Purges	1,667	0.57	1.84	0	34
Political Terror Scale	1,024	3.03	1.28	1	5
Irregular Entry	1,726	0.19	0.39	0	1
Means for Removal	1,219	0.89	0.35	0	1
Previous Leaders Punished	1,726	4.29	6.15	0	62
Personalist Hybrid	1,454	0.06	0.23	0	1
Military Hybrid	1,454	0.02	0.16	0	1
Personalism Scale (Weeks)	1,160	0.18	0.35	0	1
Personalism Scale (Magaloni)	1,577	0.62	0.80	0	1
Militarism Scale (Weeks)	1,179	0.26	0.39	0	1

Table A.2: Full Models for Figure 2.3 (No Controls)

	(1) Single Party	(2) Military	(3) Democracies
Personalism Scale	2.08**	1.18*	4.68**
	(0.75)	(0.55)	(0.95)
Constant	-1.31**	-0.64*	-2.55**
	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.23)
Observations	132	133	557
Log likelihood	-75.22	-87.80	-152.11)
Efron's R^2	0.15	0.04	0.20

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country)

Table A.3: Full Models for Figure 2.3 (With Controls)

	(1) Single Party	(2) Military	(3) Democracies
Personalism Scale	2.25*	2.42*	2.33*
	(1.07)	(1.05)	(1.06)
Irregular Entry	-0.41	-1.11	-1.02
	(1.05)	(0.99)	(1.60)
Political Terror Scale	0.61	-0.10	0.75**
	(0.43)	(0.48)	(0.19)
Number of Previous Leaders Punished	-0.03	0.07	0.04*
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)
Institutionalized Means of Removal	-1.80*	-0.70	
	(0.89)	(1.00)	
Constant	-1.44	-0.12	-5.18**
	(1.37)	(2.03)	(0.74)
Observations	50	42	338
Log likelihood	-28.39	-24.94	-81.11
Efron's R^2	0.21	0.13	0.13

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (country)

A.2 Data Description for Section 3

Here, I provide summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical models in Section 3 as well as provide transparency for the coding of my key variable: *Ministerial Cronyism*. A table of goodness of fit statistics is also displayed. The purpose of the table is to assess different potential distributions for leadership duration and to justify my selection of the Weibull distribution. In this section, I provide the following information:

- the coding questions used for *Ministerial Cronyism*
- the prevalence of each document type used for coding of *Ministerial Cronyism*
- intercoder reliability statistics for the coding of *Ministerial Cronyism*
- robustness checks to ensure that coding of *Ministerial Cronyism* was not unduly influenced by document length or source.
- Aikake Information Criterion for the different potential distributions of leadership duration

Table A.4: Summary Statistics for Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Ministerial Cronyism	4858	0.28	0.45	0	1
Crony Adviser	4858	0.21	0.41	0	1
Nepotistic Adviser	4858	0.07	0.26	0	1
Leader Failure	6309	0.15	0.36	0	1
Irregular Removal	6309	0.04	0.20	0	1
Coup Attempt	5518	0.05	0.22	0	1
Coup Success	5518	0.03	0.17	0	1
Personalism (Magaloni)	6311	0.78	0.79	0	2
Personalism (Weeks)	4245	0.32	0.41	0	1
Personalist Regime	5894	0.17	0.37	0	1
Military	5894	0.09	0.29	0	1
Monarchy	5894	0.07	0.26	0	1
Single Party	5894	0.33	0.47	0	1
Democracy	5894	0.34	0.47	0	1
Military Personnel per Capita	6669	0.008	0.01	0	0.21
Logged Military Expenditure	6461	12.31	2.60	0	20.02
Oil Production per Capita	4424	0.03	0.19	-0.004	3.99
Coup Risk	4678	-0.005	2.21	-4.55	7.68
Counterbalancing	1749	0.06	1.72	-4.04	5.92
Fatal MID Onset	6750	0.10	0.31	0	1
Civil War	6750	0.09	0.29	0	1
Logged GDP per Capita	6290	7.43	1.37	3.87	10.90
GDP Growth	6153	0.08	0.10	-0.68	3.05
Ethnic Fractionalization	6645	0.45	0.26	0	0.93
Irregular Entry	6309	0.28	0.45	0	1
Leader's Age	6306	56.62	11.23	17	92
Previous Times in Office	6309	0.15	0.46	0	4
Cold War	6750	0.69	0.46	0	1
Logged Tenure (days)	6309	7.44	1.06	1.79	9.74
Years since Coup Attempt	5518	13.71	12.10	0	44
Coup Years^2	5518	334.26	474.46	0	1936
Coup Years^3	5518	10063.95	18501.63	0	85184

Table A.5: Coding Questions

Nepotism Coding
[Code as a 1 if "Yes" to any of these questions, Code as 0 if "No" to all questions]

N1. Is the minister a blood relative of the leader?

N2. Is the minister married/ [was married] to a relative of the leader?

Crony Coding
[Code as a 1 if "Yes" to any of these questions, Code as 0 if "No" to all questions]

C1. Does the minister have a close friendship with the leader that began before (or very early on) in their political or military careers?

C2. Was the minister promoted rapidly through military ranks or political office during the leader's tenure?

C3. Did the minister have no to very little political, military, or administrative expertise before becoming this adviser?

C4. In the description, is there any mention of cronyism, favoritism, or closeness leading to the minister's high placement in the leader's administration?

C5. Did this minister replace a predecessor who was removed due to disloyalty? Does the description mention that the minister received the position as a reward for loyalty?

Figure A.1: Distribution of Document Types for Defense Minister Coding



Table A.6: Inter-coder Reliability Statistics for Defense Minister Coding

Nepotism

Percent Agreement	Scott's Pi	Cohen's Kappa	Krippendorff's Alpha
98.3%	0.837	0.837	0.837

Number of Agreements: **231 (out of 235)**

Cronyism

Percent Agreement	Scott's Pi	Cohen's Kappa	Krippendorff's Alpha
93.6%	0.808	0.808	0.808

Number of Agreements: **220 (out of 235)**

Table A.7: Relationship between Word Count and Defense Minister Coding (T-test)

Nepotism			
	Observations	Mean	
Nepotistic	14	603.43	
			Difference
Not Nepotistic	221	578.57	-24.86
T-statistic: 0.13			

Cronyism			
	Observations	Mean	
Crony	47	513.91	
			Difference
Not Crony	188	596.58	82.66
T-statistic: 0.75			

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table A.8: Relationship between Word Count and Defense Minister Coding (Median Test)

	Nepotism	
	Less than Median	Greater than Median
Nepotistic	14	6
Not Nepotistic	110	111
χ^2 **Statistic**: 0.59		

	Cronyism	
	Less than Median	Greater than Median
Crony	24	23
Not Crony	94	94
χ^2 **Statistic**: 0.90		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table A.9: Relationship between Word Count and Defense Minister Coding (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test)

Nepotism		
	Rank Sum	Expected
Nepotistic	1581	1652
Not Nepotistic	26149	26078
z-score: 0.29		

Cronyism		
	Rank Sum	Expected
Crony	5482	5546
Not Crony	22248	22184
z-score: 0.15		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table A.10: Contingency Tables for Document Type and Defense Minister Coding

Nepotism

	No	Yes	Total
Historical Dictionary	569	17	586
	(37.58%)	(40.48%)	(37.68%)
Reference	373	2	375
	(24.64%)	(4.76%)	(24.10%)
Book	279	18	297
	(18.43%)	(42.86%)	(19.09%)
Periodical/Obituary	184	5	189
	(12.15%)	(11.90%)	(12.15%)
Other	109	0	109
	(7.20%)	(0.00%)	(7.01%)
χ^2 **Statistic**: 22.58**			

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Cronyism

	No	Yes	Total
Historical Dictionary	485	101	586
	(37.48%)	(38.55%)	(37.66%)
Reference	332	43	375
	(25.66%)	(16.41%)	(24.10%)
Book	213	84	297
	(16.46%)	(32.06%)	(19.09%)
Periodical/Obituary	184	5	189
	(12.13%)	(12.21%)	(12.15%)
Other	107	2	109
	(8.28%)	(0.76%)	(7.01%)
χ^2 **Statistic**: 53.07**			

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table A.11: Goodness of Fit for Different Distribution Choices to Model Duration Dependence (Irregular Removal)

	Aikake Information Criteria
Weibull	3148.49
Gamma	3149.69
Exponential	3241.72
Lognormal	3134.29
Log-logistic	3147.38

A.3 Robustness Checks for Section 3

Here, I demonstrate the robustness of results from the empirical analysis undertaken in Section 3. The results from logit and duration models from Section 3 are shown to remain despite the exclusion of control variables, restricting the sample to only autocracies, using country-level fixed effects, using Carter and Signorino's (2010) method for temporal dependence, and using different underlying distributions. This section also provides the full results used to generate Figure 3.7.

I also estimated a series of other robustness checks that are not shown due to space restrictions. Results remain for the logit models of ministerial cronyism under the following conditions:

- Using Weeks' (2012) measure of militarism
- Controlling for revolutionary leaders
- Controlling for effective legislatures (Banks 2012; Svolik 2012)
- Controlling for the presence of effective opposition or multiple political parties (Svolik 2012)

Results for the Weibull models for irregular removal remain under the following conditions:

- Using MID onset, ongoing MID, and war onset in lieu of fatal MID
- Using Weeks' (2012) measure of militarism
- Using alternative measures for oil dependency (Smith 2004; Ross 2008)

- Controlling for the presence of effective opposition or multiple political parties (Svolik 2012)
- Using logged GDP to measure wealth
- Using alternative measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003)
- Controlling for democratization in neighboring states (Gleditsch and Ward 2006)

Table A.12: Logit Models for Ministerial Cronyism (Table 3.2 without Controls)

	(1) Ministerial Cronyism	(2) No Relatives	(3) Magaloni	(4) Weeks
Personalism			1.00**	2.27**
			(0.04)	(0.10)
Military Regime	-1.05**	-1.05**		
	(0.21)	(0.23)		
Monarchy	0.74**	-0.05		
	(0.15)	(0.15)		
Single Party	-0.47**	-0.47**		
	(0.11)	(0.11)		
Democracy	-2.66**	-2.37**		
	(0.15)	(0.15)		
Constant	-0.35**	-0.63**	-1.86**	-1.87**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Observations	3397	3397	4272	3204
Log likelihood	-1567.66	-1470.40	-2322.66	-1602.49
Efron's R^2	0.17	0.10	0.12	0.17

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.13: Logit Models for Ministerial Cronyism (Table 3.2 without Democracies)

	(1) Ministerial Cronyism	(2) No Relatives	(3) Magaloni	(4) Weeks
Personalism			0.54**	1.97**
			(0.07)	(0.17)
Military Regime	-0.85**	-1.00**		
	(0.22)	(0.24)		
Monarchy	0.49*	-0.09		
	(0.19)	(0.23)		
Single Party	-0.52**	-0.69**		
	(0.14)	(0.15)		
Military Personnel per Capita	55.75**	43.52**	69.51**	117.52**
	(7.31)	(8.71)	(6.47)	(10.95)
Logged Military Expenditure	0.06*	0.08**	0.07**	0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Oil Production per Capita	-0.14	-2.02**	0.11	3.71**
	(0.22)	(0.61)	(0.21)	(1.10)
Constant	-1.48**	-1.84**	-2.63**	-4.20**
	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.46)
Observations	1549	1549	2039	1555
Log likelihood	-934.56	-869.60	-1237.69	-818.11
Efron's R^2	0.10	0.06	0.13	0.26

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.14: Logit Models for Ministerial Cronyism (Country-level Fixed Effects)

	(1) Ministerial Cronyism	(2) No Relatives	(3) Magaloni	(4) Weeks
Personalism			0.63**	2.91**
			(0.20)	(0.46)
Military Regime	-3.71**	-3.86**		
	(0.66)	(0.67)		
Monarchy	2.46+	-0.30		
	(1.30)	(0.96)		
Single Party	-2.48**	-2.17**		
	(0.56)	(0.57)		
Democracy	-3.35**	-3.31**	-0.23	-0.59
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.37)
Military Personnel per Capita	107.50**	12.60	116.46**	83.87**
	(26.94)	(18.45)	(23.17)	(24.17)
Logged Military Expenditure	0.08	0.06	-0.07	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Oil Production per Capita	11.29+	25.82+	18.76**	17.85**
	(6.29)	(13.52)	(5.34)	(5.79)
Observations	1154	1089	1496	1126
Log likelihood	-429.08	-425.32	-617.22	-439.71

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.15: Logit Models for Ministerial Cronyism (Accounting for Temporal Dependence)

	(1) Ministerial Cronyism	(2) No Relatives	(3) Magaloni	(4) Weeks
Personalism			0.64**	1.26**
			(0.13)	(0.24)
Military Regime	-0.13	-0.53		
	(0.34)	(0.33)		
Monarchy	0.39	-0.81**		
	(0.30)	(0.26)		
Single Party	-0.23	-0.55**		
	(0.19)	(0.19)		
Democracy	-1.64**	-1.41**	-0.91**	-1.05**
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Military Personnel per Capita	24.66**	2.20	37.46**	60.40**
	(9.07)	(10.21)	(8.10)	(8.34)
Logged Military Expenditure	0.14**	0.14**	0.18**	0.16**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Oil Production per Capita	-0.03	-2.39**	0.07	3.51+
	(0.25)	(0.70)	(0.25)	(2.04)
Years since Last Crony	-1.18**	-0.97**	-1.18**	-1.07**
	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Crony Years^2	0.06**	0.04**	0.06**	0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Crony Years^3	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Constant	-0.22	-0.56	-1.61**	-1.55**
	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.46)	(0.49)
Observations	2450	2450	2946	2462
Log likelihood	-502.51	-600.53	-636.37	-480.01
Efron's R^2	0.72	0.55	0.73	0.75

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test
Robust standard errors in parentheses

Table A.16: OLS Model for Coup Risk

	(1)
Fatal MID Onset	0.17*
	(0.08)
Civil War	0.40**
	(0.08)
Military Personnel per Capita	46.89**
	(2.54)
Logged Military Expenditure	-0.15**
	(0.01)
Oil Production per Capita	2.11**
	(0.18)
Logged GDP per Capita	-0.61**
	(0.03)
GDP Growth	0.38+
	(0.21)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.78**
	(0.09)
Urban Population	-0.02**
	(0.002)
Irregular Entry	1.22**
	(0.05)
Leader's Age	-0.02**
	(0.002)
Previous Times in Office	-0.10+
	(0.76)
Cold War	-0.51**
	(0.06)
Constant	7.51**
	(0.23)
Observations	3965
Log likelihood	-6707.75
Adjusted R^2	0.64

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Table A.17: Exponential Models for Leader Survival

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Failure	Failure	Irregular Removal
Ministerial Cronyism	-0.76**	-0.50*	-0.84**
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.31)
Personalism		-2.12**	
		(0.30)	
Military Regime	1.30**		0.87**
	(0.22)		(0.29)
Monarchy	-1.15**		-1.29*
	(0.42)		(0.57)
Single Party	-0.16		-0.49
	(0.23)		(0.34)
Democracy	1.50**	0.77**	-1.13+
	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.62)
Fatal MID Onset	0.31+	0.29	0.80**
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.30)
Civil War	0.70**	0.78**	1.03**
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.28)
Military Personnel per Capita	-2.73	-1.24	-46.03+
	(8.75)	(9.78)	(24.42)
Logged Military Expenditure	0.04	0.05+	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Oil Production per Capita	-0.07	0.10	0.67
	(0.62)	(0.79)	(1.28)
Logged GDP per Capita	-0.02	-0.08	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.18)
GDP Growth	-1.34+	-2.16**	-2.75**
	(0.69)	(0.76)	(0.90)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.31	-0.13	-1.10*
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.55)
Urban Population	0.000003	-0.001	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.01)
Irregular Entry	-0.24	0.21	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Leader's Age	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Previous Times in Office	0.44**	0.49**	0.33
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.31)
Cold War	-0.22	-0.22	-0.03
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.31)
Constant	-2.75**	-0.93	-1.05
	(0.71)	(0.71)	(1.41)
Observations	2876	2350	2876
Log likelihood	-1335.49	-1151.34	-465.07

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Table A.18: Lognormal Models for Leader Survival

	(1)	(2)	(3)
			Irregular
	Failure	Failure	Removal
Ministerial Cronyism	0.78**	0.61**	0.96**
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.33)
Personalism		2.12**	
		(0.30)	
Military Regime	-1.39**		-1.11**
	(0.25)		(0.37)
Monarchy	1.08**		1.54*
	(0.41)		(0.60)
Single Party	0.21		0.59
	(0.24)		(0.38)
Democracy	-1.52**	-0.76**	1.27*
	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.61)
Fatal MID Onset	-0.43*	-0.42+	-1.29**
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.39)
Civil War	-0.77**	-0.75**	-1.27**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.32)
Military Personnel per Capita	9.97	5.70	55.85*
	(9.08)	(9.63)	(26.57)
Logged Military Expenditure	-0.03	-0.04	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Oil Production per Capita	-0.11	-0.52	-1.08
	(0.63)	(0.86)	(1.07)
Logged GDP per Capita	0.04	0.10	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.19)
GDP Growth	1.15	1.80*	3.14*
	(0.77)	(0.84)	(1.33)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.53	+ 0.27	1.19+
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.64)
Urban Population	-0.001	0.00003	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Irregular Entry	0.02	-0.43*	-0.29
	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.31)
Leader's Age	0.03**	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Previous Times in Office	-0.41**	-0.44**	-0.61*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.30)
Cold War	0.23	0.18	0.23
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.39)
Constant	2.93**	0.92	1.62
	(0.78)	(0.84)	(1.55)
Observations	2876	2350	2876
Log likelihood	-1335.49	-1151.34	-465.07

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Table A.19: Competing Risk Model for Irregular Removal

	(1)
Ministerial Cronyism	-0.73*
	(0.31)
Military Regime	0.70*
	(0.29)
Monarchy	-1.24*
	(0.56)
Single Party	-0.50
	(0.33)
Democracy	-1.44*
	(0.59)
Fatal MID Onset	0.75*
	(0.30)
Civil War	0.98**
	(0.27)
Military Personnel per Capita	-45.35+
	(24.21)
Logged Military Expenditure	-0.01
	(0.06)
Oil Production per Capita	0.68
	(1.16)
Logged GDP per Capita	-0.07
	(0.17)
GDP Growth	-2.87**
	(0.89)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.02+
	(0.55)
Urban Population	-0.001
	(0.01)
Irregular Entry	0.10
	(0.25)
Leader's Age	-0.04**
	(0.01)
Previous Times in Office	0.27
	(0.28)
Cold War	0.09
	(0.32)
Observations	2876
Log likelihood	-650.74

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Table A.20: Full Results for Figure 3.7

	Geddes	Weeks (>0.5)	Weeks (=1)	Magaloni (=2)
Ministerial Cronyism	-1.27**	-2.02**	-2.36**	-1.82**
	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.91)	(0.36)
Fatal MID Onset	1.06**	0.26	0.60	0.50
	(0.37)	(0.54)	(0.80)	(0.42)
Civil War	1.51**	1.36**	2.28**	0.83*
	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.68)	(0.34)
Military Personnel per Capita	5.30	-31.40	-88.15+	-57.76+
	(23.97)	(31.15)	(49.18)	(30.94)
Logged Military Expenditure	-0.27*	-0.16	-0.15	-0.07
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.33)	(0.05)
Oil Production per Capita	-1.10	0.07	-0.60	-3.32*
	(2.84)	(2.30)	(4.46)	(1.30)
Logged GDP per Capita	0.27	-0.27	-0.43	0.41*
	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.60)	(0.19)
GDP Growth	-2.06	-1.52	-1.45	-1.99
	(1.25)	(1.46)	(1.90)	(1.55)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.16+	-1.28+	-1.44	-1.40*
	(0.61)	(0.76)	(1.55)	(0.56)
Urban Population	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Irregular Entry	0.07	-0.81*	-0.81	0.64*
	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.55)	(0.28)
Age	-0.01	-0.05**	-0.07**	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Previous Times in Office	0.09	0.06	-1.87*	1.12**
	(0.51)	(0.62)	(0.91)	(0.24)
Cold War	0.20	0.02	-0.13	0.73+
	(0.39)	(0.51)	(0.77)	(0.40)
Constant	-1.95	2.25	4.69	-4.13**
	(2.09)	(2.28)	(3.04)	(1.50)
Constant	-0.21+	-0.07	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.10)
Observations	939	789	459	912
Log likelihood	-278.19	-201.54	-97.32	-272.68

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Figure A.2: Cumulative Hazard Functions for Different Potential Distributions for Hazard Analysis



Figure A.3: Survival Function for Weibull Model of Irregular Removal



Figure A.4: Cumulative Hazard Function for Weibull Model of Irregular Removal



Figure A.5: Hazard Function for Exponential Model of Irregular Removal



Figure A.6: Hazard Function for Lognormal Model of Irregular Removal



Figure A.7: Cumulative Incidence Function for Competing Risks Model



A.4 Data Description for Section 4

Here, I outline the summary statistics for variables used for the empirical analyses within Section 4. There are three tables to display this information for three types of samples: non-directed dyads, directed dyads, and crisis cases.

Table A.21: Summary Statistics for Variables (Non-Directed Dyads)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Fatal MID	551,572	0.0006	0.02	0	1
COW War	631,292	0.0001	0.01	0	1
ICB War	499,117	0.0002	0.01	0	1
ICB Crisis	499,117	0.0009	0.03	0	1
Nepotistic Defense Minister	462,787	0.11	0.31	0	1
Crony Defense Minister	477,949	0.30	0.46	0	1
Incompetent Defense Minister	485,236	0.38	0.49	0	1
Leader is Defense Minister	631,292	0.18	0.39	0	1
Democracy in Dyad	549,029	0.58	0.49	0	1
Difference in Capabilities	631,292	0.01	0.03	0	0.38
Ideal Point Distance	558,006	1.03	0.84	0	5.22
Defense Pact	539,803	0.06	0.24	0	1
Contiguity	576,284	0.02	0.14	0	1
Civil War in Dyad	624,698	0.15	0.36	0	1
Lowest Logged GDP per Capita	588,210	7.08	1.17	3.87	10.58
Peace Years (Fatal MID Occurrence)	551,572	18.93	14.04	0	56
Peace Years (COW War)	631,292	20.51	14.97	0	60
Peace Years (ICB War)	499,117	18.61	13.64	0	54
Peace Years (ICB Crisis)	499,117	18.48	13.61	0	54

Table A.22: Summary Statistics for Variables (Directed Dyads)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Fatal MID	1,102,387	0.0003	0.02	0	1
Nepotistic Defense Minister	1,072,013	0.05	0.21	0	1
Crony Defense Minister	1,072,013	0.14	0.35	0	1
Incompetent Defense Minister	1,072,013	0.19	0.39	0	1
Leader is Defense Minister	1,262,584	0.10	0.30	0	1
Democracy	1,128,751	0.34	0.47	0	1
Logged Capability Ratio	1,260,107	-0.009	3.21	-9.21	12.12
Ideal Point Distance	1,116,012	1.03	0.84	0	5.22
Defense Pact	1,079,606	0.06	0.24	0	1
Contiguity	1,152,568	0.02	0.14	0	1
Civil War	1,249,396	0.08	0.27	0	1
Logged GDP per Capita	1,189,334	7.71	1.34	3.87	10.90
Peace Years (Fatal MID Initiation)	1,103,144	18.76	13.98	0	1

Table A.23: Summary Statistics for Variables (ICB Crises)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nepotistic Defense Minister	759	0.16	0.36	0	1
Crony Defense Minister	763	0.47	0.50	0	1
Incompetent Defense Minister	791	0.55	0.50	0	1
Democracy	857	0.51	0.50	0	1
Difference in Capabilities	889	0.04	0.07	5e-6	0.31
Ideal Point Distance	691	1.60	1.42	0.003	5.02
Defense Pact	889	0.25	0.43	0	1
Contiguity	889	0.51	0.50	0	1
Civil War in Dyad	889	0.39	0.49	0	1
Lowest Logged GDP per Capita	847	6.67	1.09	3.99	9.19
Gravity	889	0.88	0.80	0	2

A.5 Robustness Checks for Section 4

Here, I outline the series of robustness checks undertaken for the empirical results contained in Section 4. First, I show that results remain if I drop cases where reference materials or books were used to code the competency level of the defense minister. Previously, I found that there was a relationship between source type and the propensity for a defense minister to be coded as a crony. Specifically, cronies were more likely for source material from books and less likely for reference materials. There was no statistical difference in the propensity for periodicals and the historical dictionaries. Therefore, Table 7.21 shows that results are not influenced by this pattern, as incompetent ministers are more likely to generate conflict when the sample is restricted to only those cases where periodicals and historical dictionaries were used for coding.

I also show that inferences do not change when restricting the sample to only those dyads with a history of cronies or if unit of observation changes from the dyad-year to the country-year. More robustness checks were performed, but are not shown. Results are robust to the following conditions:

- Controlling for trade dependence, alliance similarity, and enduring rivalry
- Dropping Israel, Egypt, Iraq, United States, USSR, and major powers from the sample
- Using a sample of politically relevant dyads or using rare events logit
- Controlling for democratic selectiveness
- Controlling for legislative effectiveness, party legitimacy, and presence of oppositional parties (Banks 2012; Svolik 2012)

- Alternative measures for democracy
- Controlling for revolutionary leaders, strongman leaders, personalist/revolutionary leaders, and levels of personalism and militarism
- Using bootstrapped errors

Table A.24: Logit Models of Conflict accounting for Document Type

	MID Initiation	MID Occurrence	COW War Occurrence
Incompetent Defense Minister	0.61**	0.38	1.91**
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.63)
Leader is Defense Minister	0.31	0.32	0.14
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.48)
Democracy	0.62*	0.50	1.18+
	(0.28)	(0.39)	(0.62)
Difference in Capabilities	-0.01	8.97**	2.88
	(0.04)	(2.46)	(8.16)
Ideal Point Distance	0.73**	0.67**	1.13**
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.43)
Defense Pact	0.30	0.54	0.04
	(0.31)	(0.39)	(1.30)
Contiguity	5.09**	5.10**	5.64**
	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.78)
Civil War in Dyad	0.42+	0.40	1.12+
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.63)
Logged GDP per capita	-0.10	-0.15	-0.97*
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.40)
Peace Years	-0.31**	-0.28**	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.14)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.01**	-0.01
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.01)
Peace Years^3	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	0.0001
	(0.00004)	(0.00005)	(0.0001)
Constant	-8.58**	-8.05**	-9.13**
	(0.46)	(0.71)	(1.44)
Observations	472104	133050	133050
Log-Likelihood	-827.119	-457.575	-71.019
Wald	1155.20	653.56	357.46

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Table A.25: Models for Figure 4.2 (No Democracies and Geddes Regimes)

	No Democracies	Personalist Regimes	Military Regimes	Single Party Regimes
Incompetent Defense Minister	1.91*	1.26**	0.79+	1.96*
	(0.75)	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.84)
Leader is Defense Minister		0.61*	0.25	0.48*
		(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Lowest Polity		0.12*	0.04	-0.16*
		(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Difference in Capabilities	-69.11+	11.24**	6.45*	-14.56**
	(40.17)	(2.59)	(3.00)	(5.10)
Ideal Point Distance	0.58*	1.33**	0.67**	0.96**
	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.13)
Contiguity	5.18**	5.91**	4.50**	5.36**
	(0.59)	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.65)
Civil War in Dyad	1.07**	0.70	0.44+	1.12**
	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.24)	(0.37)
Lowest Logged GDP per capita	-0.27	-0.97**	-0.22	-1.24**
	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.39)
Peace Years	-0.22+	0.06	0.10	0.11
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.22)
Peace Years^2	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.0004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Peace Years^3	-0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	-0.0004
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.001)
Constant	-10.04**	-6.39**	-8.09**	-6.65**
	(1.53)	(1.08)	(1.20)	(1.07)
Observations	204510	84870	41574	99808
Log-Likelihood	-155.980	-117.154	-123.827	-89.339
Wald	305.67	793.79	847.13	943.35

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Table A.26: Models for Figure 4.2 (Weeks and Colgan Regimes)

	Strongman	Revolutionary Leader	Rev, Personalist Leader
Incompetent Defense Minister	7.42**	3.62*	1.15*
	(1.53)	(1.68)	(0.46)
Leader is Defense Minister	-0.86	0.08	0.11
	(0.55)	(0.44)	(0.41)
Lowest Polity	1.54**	-0.21	-0.85**
	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Difference in Capabilities	9.63**	-3.16	-9.61*
	(2.46)	(9.73)	(4.10)
Ideal Point Distance	3.64**	1.73**	4.77**
	(0.92)	(0.18)	(0.44)
Contiguity	8.75**	5.69**	8.07**
	(1.15)	(0.73)	(1.18)
Civil War in Dyad	0.55	-0.11	0.20
	(0.50)	(0.39)	(0.37)
Lowest Logged GDP per capita	-3.34**	-0.68	-2.10**
	(0.70)	(0.46)	(0.51)
Peace Years	1.94**	0.06	0.23+
	(0.46)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Peace Years^2	-0.13**	-0.01	-0.02**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Peace Years^3	0.002**	0.0001	0.0004**
	(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Constant	-1.05	-12.11**	-14.48**
	(1.71)	(1.30)	(4.44)
Observations	31012	50188	29744
Log-Likelihood	-48.536	-69.613	-50.317
Wald	241.40	1281.92	1209.66

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Table A.27: Conflict Models on Sample of Only Dyads with History of Cronies

	MID Occurrence	COW War Occurrence
Incompetent Defense Minister	0.31	1.10*
	(0.21)	(0.55)
Democracy in Dyad	0.61*	0.86+
	(0.25)	(0.50)
Difference in Capabilities	1.95	-5.50
	(2.62)	(5.16)
Ideal Point Distance	0.46**	0.65**
	(0.14)	(0.24)
Defense Pact	-0.04	-0.77
	(0.29)	(0.76)
Contiguity	5.08**	5.20**
	(0.26)	(0.49)
Civil War in Dyad	0.63**	1.03**
	(0.21)	(0.36)
Lowest Logged GDP per capita	-0.23*	-0.26
	(0.09)	(0.18)
Peace Years	-0.32**	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.12)
Peace Years^2	0.01**	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.005)
Peace Years^3	-0.0001**	3.09e-06
	(0.00004)	(0.0006)
Constant	-6.57**	-10.31**
	(0.57)	(0.85)
Observations	217483	217483
Log-Likelihood	-899.30	-188.19

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test

Table A.28: COW War Occurrence Logit Model (Country-Year Data)

	(1)
Incompetent Defense Minister	0.81**
	(0.25)
Leader is Defense Minister	-0.60
	(0.48)
Polity	0.01
	(0.02)
CINC Score	13.40**
	(1.65)
Civil War	0.78*
	(0.31)
Logged GDP per Capita	-0.14
	(0.11)
Constant	-3.74**
	(0.80)
Observations	5856
Log-Likelihood	-394.152
Wald	92.034

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
Two-tailed test