THE CHARACTER OF JOHN LOCKE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

A Thesis

by

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ABSTRACT

In a popular article for *History Today* (2004), Mark Goldie sketches how John Locke was portrayed and received in the British and American contexts as an "icon" for liberty from the time of his death in 1704 to the present. This thesis builds on his work, offering a detailed analysis of the receptions and portrayals of John Locke's 'character' at thirty-year intervals: 1704, 1734, 1763, and 1794. I begin with a discussion of Samuel Johnson's definition of "character" in his *Dictionary* (1755-56), and how he uses that representation definition to sketch out the lives of Milton and Pope in *Lives of the English Poets* (1780-81). From here, I discuss Locke as an "under-labourer" and the religious controversy about his religious that began after he died in 1704. I then discuss how Locke was memorialized as a correct reasoner in the grotto constructed by Queen Caroline at Richmond Park, and how he was depicted in the poetry contest held in 1734 to celebrate its completion. Next, I discuss how Locke was portrayed as an English reformer in 1764, with the publication of Richard Hurd's *Dialogues on the Uses of Foreign Travel*. I conclude with a discussion of how, by the end of the eighteenth century, Locke's character was used as a moral exemplar in both moral and political literature, including by John Adams, who would become the second president of the United States.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In an article in *History Today*, published in 2004, Mark Goldie outlines the ways that John Locke has been received and reinterpreted throughout the eighteenth century and in our own time as an "icon of liberty," being construed as either a hero or a villain depending on how one viewed the liberalism he unwittingly came to represent.

This association of Locke with liberalism in our own time, Goldie points out, is based mainly on the belief "that Locke was the inspiration behind Adams, Jefferson, and Washington," but this Locke is a fictitious one, what Goldie calls "an imagined heritage 'Locke."[1] Goldie further comments that it is for this reason that Locke today "is lauded in the United States far more than in his own country," and particularly by those "right-wing think tanks" that endorse small governments.[2] Written in 2004, Goldie's remarks to this effect are worth repeating in whole:

> The Locke Foundation and Locke Institute teach the virtues of free enterprise and the evils of big government. LibertyOnline offers the *Two Treatises* in its virtual library, where it is placed in a litany of great texts of freedom from Magna Carta to Ronald Reagan's 'evil empire' speech against the Soviet Union. The National Rifle Association cites paragraph 137 of the *Second Treatise* as an authority on

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[1] Mark Goldie, "John Locke Icon of Liberty," *History Today* (October 2004), 31.
[2] Ibid., 31-32.

> the right to carry arms. The Arizona State Court Building, opened in 1991, has inscribed upon it words from paragraph 202: 'Where law ends, tyranny begins.'[3]

Written even before George W. Bush was elected to a second term, Goldie's observation on the appropriation of Locke to advance political causes remains true.

This is not to say that Locke has been absent from the British context, for as Goldie points out, "Locke once had a British icon too."[4] Goldie writes that after Locke died in 1704, "he did not become an icon immediately, however, and he was never an uncontested one," noting that the initial emphasis was on his philosophical ideas rather than his political ones.[5]

For Goldie, Locke's renown in Britain began when Queen Caroline installed a bust of his likeness, along with those of Newton, Wollaston, Clarke, and Boyle, in a grotto she constructed at Richmond Park: "The trend was set round 1730 by George II's consort, Caroline of Ansbach, who commissioned a bust of Locke for her hermitage at Richmond"[6] In the 1750s, Goldie notes that Locke became an icon for moral virtue, insofar as

> Locke as cast as a preacher of social duties and family values. Then, after 1760, he was seized upon by radical movements which, in the wake of panics provoked by the American and French Revolutions, provoked renewed Tory counterattacks against him.[7]

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[3] Ibid., 32.
[4] Goldie, "John Locke Icon of Liberty," 32.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., 34.

Nearly thirty years after this, at the close of the eighteenth century, Goldie notes that "For conservatives, Locke had become a dangerous figure, an icon in need of smashing," due to his perceived endorsement and use by those advocating democracy and popular rule.[8] Goldie's point in making these different observations is that the "icon" of Locke changed not only over time but also in the American and British contexts.

This thesis builds on Goldie's work in exploring how the personage of Locke was received in the eighteenth century. Specifically, it will focus on how Locke's "character" was portrayed and made use of over time, with "character" being understood as both something one would find in a work of fiction, as well as an embodiment of moral worth. The thesis will show that both were made use of in the service of different ends.

I will organize my work in five chapters, counting intervals of thirty years, beginning with Locke's death in 1704. The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of "character" as distinct from the actual person with whom that character is associated. For that, I will discuss Samuel Johnson's life of Milton and life of Pope, explaining how he is careful to separate the character of each from the actual persons they represent. The third chapter discusses both how Locke viewed himself during life as an "under-labourer" and how others received him after death, even questioning his religious sincerity in accusing him of being an atheist. The fourth chapter discusses how Locke was received as a correct reasoner in 1734, with Queen Caroline's construction of her

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[8] Ibid., 35.

grotto at Richmond, and how her reasons for his portrayal there may conflict with what others thought of his portrayal there. The fifth chapter discusses how Locke was received as a reformer in 1764, with Locke being deployed as a fictitious character who argued against sending youth abroad for their education, lest they become even more ignorant. The fifth and final chapter discusses how Locke was received in 1794 at a superficial level, being deployed largely in the service of political causes, including in the American context. I end with some thoughts about future projects stemming from these discussions.

CHAPTER II

THE ‘CHARACTER’ OF LOCKE

In his *Dictionary of the English Language*, Samuel Johnson provides eight definitions for the word “character.” He lists: “1. A mark; a stamp; a representation. 2. A letter used in writing or printing. 3. The hand or manner of writing. 4. A representation of any man as to his personal qualities. 5. An account of any thing as good or bad. 6. The person with his assemblage of qualities. 7. Personal qualities; particular constitution of the mind. 8. Adventitious qualities impressed by a post or office.” [9] Each definition builds on the previous. Johnson’s first definition is a generic one. In its most general sense, a “character” is a representation, and the kind of representation in question will nuance the remaining seven definitions. For instance, a “character” can be a representation in writing, since to represent one’s ideas on paper, one must use words, and those words are comprised of characters. The word can also represent the writer of such marks, or indeed anyone apart from their writings. It can also be nuanced according to the particular qualities of the person or thing in question: qualities of moral worth, distinguishing qualities as if a character in a play, or qualities of mind or personality. Such worth or qualities are, of course, indicated by words—words which are themselves characters.

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[9] Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language* (1755-56), “Character.”

The last definition he gives combines these two senses of “character” as both a mark of writing and of a person. The word “impressed” recalls the act of writing, in which a word is “impressed” on paper as a representation of an idea, just as non-native qualities are “impressed” on an officeholder as a representation of the position held. To clarify this meaning, Johnson includes an example of this usage by Atterbury: “The chief honour of the magistrate consists in maintaining the dignity of his *character* by suitable actions.”[10] Our magistrate, therefore, is compelled by his position to acquire and sustain the qualities expected of his position *ex officio*. In other words, his “character” is how he represents himself to the public, in harmony which how the public expects to see him.

Johnson himself alludes to this relationship between written “characters” of words and the “characters” of persons those words represent as he wrote in the “Advertisement” to his *Lives of the English Poets*:

> My purpose was only to have allotted to every Poet one Advertisement, like those which we find in the French Miscellanies, containing a few dates and a general character, but I have been led beyond my intention, I hope, by the honest desire of giving useful pleasure.

Johnson purports to have intended to give only a “general character” of each poet in his *Lives*.[11] From his *Dictionary*, we may take this intended “character” to be a brief description of the distinguishing qualities of each poet, and perhaps commentary on the

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[10] Ibid.
[11] Johnson, *Lives of the English Poets*, vol. 1 (Dublin, 1780), “Advertisement.”

moral qualities of each. Because Johnson refers to such entries as "advertisements" for each poet, he implies an intended brevity in each consistent with a "character" as a sign, mark, or representation.

The "character" of each poet came to be through a combination of the poet's own words, those of his contemporaries, and the analysis provided by earlier biographers and, of course, Johnson himself. In the "Advertisement" to the *Lives*, Johnson acknowledges that he went beyond these brief representations, presumably through the inclusion of much more than "a few dates" and elaboration. The result is a distinction in each entry between the life or biography of the poet and the character of that poet. The character attributed to each poet is not the same as the actual biography, since the latter was itself formed through the observations of writing from the poet himself, his contemporaries, and later commentators. Johnson's entries on Milton and Pope provide good examples for understanding this distinction.

Johnson begins his "Life of Milton" by acknowledging the vast biographical work that has been done with respect to Milton. He writes:

The life of Milton has been already written in so many forms, with such minute enquiry,

> that I might perhaps more properly have contented myself with the addition of a few notes to Mr. Fenton's elegant Abridgement, but that a new narrative was thought necessary to the uniformity of this edition.[12]

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[12] Johnson, "Milton," in *The Lives of the English Poets*, Vol. 1 (1780), 137.

The “uniformity” of which Johnson speaks is his elaborated “advertisements” is meant to convey the character of each poet, and that of Milton is no exception. Johnson suggests that the character of Milton was initially revealed by the author himself in his writings:

> It appears, in all his writings, that he has the usual concomitant of great abilities, a lofty and steady confidence in himself, perhaps not without some contempt of others; for scarcely any man ever wrote so much and praised so few. Of his praise he was very frugal; as he set its value high, and considered his mention of a name as a security against the waste of time, and a certain preservative from oblivion.[13]

From Milton’s writings, Johnson finds evidence of the poet’s self-confidence, but also a disdain for others. Consistent with this self-confidence, Johnson tells us that it was Milton’s practice to refrain from mentioning others in his work, lest he memorialize the undeserved. This, we see, is an instance of Milton’s conscious fashioning of character, of not only himself but others as well. This is a theme to which Johnson repeatedly returns.

Even early in his life, Johnson tells us that Milton engaged in this practice. A mere sixteen-years old, Milton evidently engaged in what me might call “forensic” self-fashioning, re-attributing dates to earlier work, to give the appearance of emergent genius. As Johnson relates:

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[13] Ibid. 142-143.

He was at this time eminently skilled in the Latin tongue; and he himself, by annexing

> the dates to his first compositions, a boast which the learned *Politian* had given him as, seems to commend the earliness of his own proficiency to the notice of posterity.[14]

Such was Milton's ambition at crafting his character, but his attempt did not escape the notice of Johnson who observes:

> But the products of his vernal fertility have been surpassed by many, and particularly by his contemporary Cowley. Of the powers of the mind it is difficult to form an estimate: many have excelled Milton in their first essays, who never rose to the words like *Paradise Lost*.[15]

Milton's efforts could not erase the realty that the work of other authors, including his contemporaries, surpassed his own at the time. At the same time, Johnson notes that those other authors, although writing superior work at a younger age, nevertheless failed to surpass *Paradise Lost*.

In the midst of the Act of Oblivion, Milton is said to have taken refuge in multiple residences to evade retaliation from the restoration government for his part in Cromwell's administration, as well as his inflammatory political tracts. Johnson finds the scrupulosity of Milton's biographers in recording the places he resided to be noteworthy:

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[14] Ibid., 139.
[15] Ibid.

> I cannot but remark a kind of respect, perhaps unconsciously, paid to this great man by his biographers: every house in which he resided is historically mentioned, as if it were an injury to neglect naming any place that he honoured by his presence.[16]

Evidently, those earlier writers of the life of Milton believed his person to be so important that their scrupulosity in recording his movements was reminiscent of how one would record those of a saint. Nevertheless, this claim of renown by later biographers can be called into question by the circumstances of the Act of Oblivion itself.

Johnson relates that the Act of Oblivion pardoned everyone, "except those whom the parliament should except, and the parliament doomed none to capital punishment but the wretches who had immediately cop-operated in the murder of the king."[17] Milton, of course, had no direct involvement in the regicide and so was spared under this condition, since as Johnson notes: "he had only justified what they had done."[18]

This exception was not to last long, for Johnson relates that even justification of the regicide provided enough reason for prosecution:

> This justification was indeed sufficiently offensive; and (June 16) an order was issued to seize Milton's *Defense*, and Godwin's *Obstructors of Justice*, and burn

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[16] Ibid., 171.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

> them by the common hangman. The attorney-general was ordered to prosecute the authors; but Milton was not seized, nor perhaps very diligently pursued.[19]

Consequently, Godwin was seized and executed, but Milton was not. Here Johnson finds yet another occasion to note the fashioning of character—this time on the part of biographers.

Evidently, Milton's biographers debated the reason for his evasion of capture and execution. At least one biographer attributed his evasion to his being unnoticed by his contemporaries:

> Of this tenderness shewn to Milton, the curiosity of mankind has not forborn to enquire the reason. Burnet thinks he was forgotten; but this is another instance which may confirm Dalrymple's observation, who says, "that whenever Burnet's narrations are examined, he appears to be mistaken."[20]

Johnson briefly considers the possibility that Milton was forgotten, but subsequently dismisses it, citing the lack of credibility of the biographer, as noted by another commentator. Milton, moreover—far from unnoticed—was rather the target of pursuit and prosecution, as Johnson declares: "Forgotten he was not; for his prosecution was ordered; it must be therefore by design that he was included in the general oblivion."[21] Considering an alternative explanation, Johnson tells of an account which was allegedly circulated amongst other commentators on Milton:

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[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 172.
[21] Ibid.

> A very particular story of his escape is told by Richardson in his Memoirs, which he received from Pope, as delivered by Betterton, who might have heard it from Davenant. In the war between the king and parliament, Davenant was made prisoner, and condemned to die; but was spared at the request of Milton. When the turn of success brought Milton into the like danger, Davenant repaid the benefit by appearing in his favour.[22]

Despite the appearance of hearsay, Johnson considers this story worthy of consideration: Milton was spared at the request of Davenant, who had previously been spared by Milton himself. While speaking to the character of each author, the account nevertheless fails to pass the scrutiny of its alleged transmission history:

> Here is a reciprocation of generosity and gratitude so pleasing, that the tale makes its own way to credit. But if help were wanted, I know not where to find it. The danger of Davenant is certain from his own relation; but of his escape there is no account. Betterton's narration can be traced no higher; it is not known that he had it from Davenant.[23]

The provenance of the story in doubt, Johnson speculates its appeal may stem from the "generosity and gratitude" displayed by both men. And while "We are told that the benefit exchanged was life for life," Johnson notes that "it seems not certain that Milton's life ever was in danger."[24] Given the dubiousness of the historical accuracy and

[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid. 172-173.

logical consistency of the account, Johnson suggests that we are perhaps left only with a testimony of Milton's character: "Something may be reasonably ascribed of his abilities, and compassion for his distresses, which made it fit to forgive his malice for his learning. He was now poor and an illustrious enemy, depressed by fortune and disarmed by nature?"[25] Whatever the true reason for Milton's pardon, his destitute and disabled condition made him the object of pity. In the "Life of Milton," Johnson's leaves us with a character of Milton that, through later biography and commentary, came to be very different from the actual life of the poet.

Johnson likewise produced an "advertisement" for Pope. As with Milton, Johnson mentioned Pope's early development, including the books he read. Among them, Johnson tells us, Pope

> translated Tully *on old Age*; and that, besides his books of poetry and criticism, he read *Temple's Essays* and *Locke on human Understanding*. His reading, though his favourite authors are not known, appears to have been sufficiently extensive and multifarious; for his early pieces shew, with sufficient evidence, his knowledge of book.[26]

Pope, however, was not content with simply reading the greats; he desired to be one himself, and poetry in particular. It was at age fifteen that Johnson tells us Pope began to regard himself as a genius:

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[25] Ibid. 173.
[26] Samuel Johnson, "Pope" in *The Lives of the English Poets*, Vol. 2, 274.

> He then returned to Binfield, and delighted himself with his own poetry. He trued all styles, and many subjects. He wrote a comedy, a tragedy, an epick poem, and panegyricks on all the Princes of Europe; and, as he confesses, *thought himself the greatest genius that ever was*.[27]

Again, this is an instance of an author's self-fashioning of character. Pope studied the great authors of the past, wrote his own poetry, and considered himself not only among them, but the greatest among them. Johnson, in turn, comments on this regard Pope had for himself, but (unlike Milton) Johnson seems to agree, writing: "Self-confidence is the first requisite to great undertakings; he, indeed, who forms his opinion of himself in solitude, without knowing the powers of other men, is very liable to errour; but it was the felicity of Pope to rate himself at his real value."[28] For Johnson, Pope was like Milton insofar as he exuded a high degree of self-confidence, which Johnson notes is prerequisite to producing great work. Johnson suggests that unlike Milton, Pope's work was indeed as good as the author himself assessed it to be.

Pope was not without his quirks, however. In a particularly salient anecdote, Johnson tells of Pope's construction of a "grotto" within his garden at his residence at Twickenham:

> Here he planted the vines and the quincunx which his verses mention; and being under the necessity of making a subterraneous passage to a garden on the other side of the road, he adorned it with fossile bodies, and dignified it with the title of

[27] Ibid., 273.
[28] Ibid., 273.

> a grotto; a place of silence and retreat, from which he endeavoured to persuade his friends and himself that cares and passions could be excluded.[29]

According to Johnson, Pope constructed his “grotto” out of necessity in order to link the two sides of his property divided by a road. Evidently, Johnson tells us, Pope tried to cast this “subterraneous passage” as a meditative retreat with the “dignified” name of a “grotto.” To Johnson, however, Pope’s recasting of this passage also speaks to the psychology of the author in dealing with personal defects.

Johnson continues to relate that at the time, possession of a grotto was perceived as a frivolous object of concern for English gentleman, who could occupy his time with other matters; moreover, Johnson notes that recasting the tunnel as a “grotto” was completely unnecessary on Pope’s part, as it would have been sufficient to simply leave it as a means of transit. Pope’s motivation for doing so, however, can be attributed to his character, as Johnson comments:

> A grotto is not often the wish or pleasure of an Englishman, who has more frequent need to solicit than exclude the sun; but Pope’s excavation was requisite as an entrance to his garden, and, was some men try to be proud of their defects, he extracted an ornament from an inconvenience, and vanity produced a grotto to where necessity enforced a passage.[30]

Although the public may view the grotto as a trivial occupation of Pope’s, unbefitting his stature as one of the greats of English poetry, Johnson suggests it was actually yet

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[29] Ibid., 323.
[30] Ibid., 324.

another instance of Pope's ingenuity. The grotto represented Pope's attempt to "try to be proud" of his defects. While the public would expect someone like Pope to cover up his defects, or at the very least ignore them, Pope instead chose to defy public wisdom and exacerbate them:

> It may be frequently remarked of the studious and speculative, that they are proud of their trifles, and that their amusements seem frivolous and childish; whether it be that men conscious of great reputation think themselves above the reach of censure, and safe in the admission of negligent indulgences, or that mankind expect from elevated genius an uniformity of greatness, and watch its degration with malicious wonder; like him who having followed with his eye an eagle into the clouds, should lament that she ever descended to a perch.[31]

As Johnson explains, at least two possibilities exist for why someone of Pope's caliber would seek to pronounce his defects. One possibility is that the author, already having proven himself superior to ordinary people, feels privileged to dally in mundane things, which would otherwise be out of character. The other possibility is that the people, used to seeing their celebrities aloof, find entertainment in their occasional failings. Whatever the case, Johnson makes it clear that Pope's concern for public acclaim was an enduring aspect of his character.

Johnson remarks that "Pope may be said to write always with his reputation in his head."[32] The account Johnson provides of the Pope's *Essay on Man* is a good

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[31] Ibid., 324.
[32] Ibid., 347.

example of this. This text of Pope's is comprised of a single "epistle"—a text which Johnson notes the author "persuaded himself to think a system of Ethicks.'[33] When the *Essay on Man* was published, however, it was done so with neither Pope's name, nor the person to whom he dedicated the work. The effect of this, Johnson notes, was that the *Essay on Man* became yet another tool for Pope's self-fashioning, remarking: "Those who like only when they like the author, and who are under the dominion of a name, condemned it; and those admired it who are willing to scatter praise at random, which while it is unappropriated excites no envy."[34] In other words, publishing the *Essay on Man* anonymously evoked either the condemnation of critics who never praise works unless they highly regard the author, or the sincere praise of critics whose opinion would not attract jealousy of rival authors, since their praise was directed at no one in particular.

According to Johnson, some of Pope's acquaintances knew he was the author and leveraged this environment to his advantage: "Those friends of Pope, that were trusted with the secret, went about lavishing honours on the new-born poet, and hinting that Pope was never so much in danger from any former rival."[35] Pope's friends, of course, were conferring their praises on the author of the *Essay on Man*, whilst his identity was still unknown to the public. This fostered the attitude that whoever the author was, must

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[33] Ibid., 347.
[34] Ibid., 348.
[35] Ibid., 348.

be great indeed. Evidently, Pope himself also had a hand in this fashioning. Johnson tells us that:

> To those authors whom he had personally offended, and to those who opinion the world considered as decisive, and whom he suspected of envy or malevolence, he sent his essay as a present before publication, that they might defeat their own enmity by praises, which they could not afterwards decently retract.[36]

By soliciting their praise of malevolent critics before revealing his identity as the author, Pope managed to put them into an impossible situation of simultaneously harboring prejudice against his person privately, while publically praising the work. Because they would be perceived as insincere in any retraction, their praises would stand.

The reality of the reception of the *Essay on Man* was less grandiose than perhaps either Pope or his friends anticipated, although it was certainly a respectable one nonetheless. Pope had purported his work to express a "System of Ethicks" or a "System of Morality," but readers were not so sure.[37] Johnson explains: "this design was not discovered in the new poem, which had a form and a title with which its readers were unacquainted. Its reception was not uniform; some thought it a very imperfect piece, though not without good lines."[38] The *Essay on Man*, in other words, was perceived as an unusual form for the purported subject matter: it was neither an "essay" nor was it about morality. Johnson's own analysis corroborates this sentiment, as he remarks that

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[36] Ibid., 348.
[37] Ibid., 347, 348.
[38] Ibid. 348-349.

> the Essay abounded in splendid amplifications and sparkling sentences, which were read and admired, with no great attention to their ultimate purpose; its flowers caught the eye, which did not see what the gay foliage concealed, and for a time flourished in the sunshine of universal approbation. So little was any evil tendency discovered, that, as innocence is unsuspicious, many read it for a manual of piety.[39]

While Pope may have thought he was writing an "essay" on ethics or morality, his readership perceived the *Essay on Man* as neither; rather, they perceived it as a poem about piety. This is an important anecdote included by Johnson, because it shows how even the author's self-fashioning can fail either because of a miscalculation of how one's work will be received by the others.

Lastly, Johnson tells an anecdote concerning how Pope's character was directly saved by one of his former enemies. Johnson tells a story of two men, Crousaz and Warburton, engaged in a personal spat that directly affected Pope's reputation. "Crousaz," Johnson relates, "was a professor of Switzerland, eminent for his treatise of Logick," and "He was accustomed to argument and disquisition, and perhaps was grown too desirous of detecting faults; but his intentions were always right, his opinions were solid, and his religion pure."[40] Crousaz, then, was an individual evidently prone to argument and finding faults, while nevertheless being of righteous character.

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[39] Ibid., 350-351.
[40] Ibid., 351.

By contrast, Johnson tells us that Warburton "was a man of vigorous faculties, a mind fervid and vehement, supplied by incessant and unlimited enquiry, with wonderful extent and variety of knowledge, which yet had not oppressed his imagination, nor clouded his perspicacity."[41] Warburton's intellectual skills were also the source of his abrasive character, which Johnson tells us was marked by "an haughty confidence, which he disdained to conceal or mollify."[42] It was this haughtiness that also caused a high degree of vigilance against criticism, for "his impatience of opposition disposed him to treat his adversaries with such contemptuous superiority as made his readers commonly his enemies, and excited against him the wishes of some who favoured his cause."[43] The wantonness of Crousaz towards exploiting weaknesses in favor of religion, and tendency of Warburton to respond in force to criticism set the scene for a dispute over Pope.

Evidently, Crousaz did not see the *Essay on Man* as a mere poem about piety, as did everyone else; rather, he saw it as spreading religious heterodoxy, "favouring fatality, or rejecting revelation."[44] Regarding Warburton, Johnson relates that a letter surfaced revealing his true feelings about Pope, in relation to other poets, specifically: "Milton *borrowed by affectation*, Dryden *by Idleness*, *and* Pope *by necessity*."[45] Warburton's assessment was that while Milton borrowed material for his work out of

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[41] Ibid., 352.
[42] Ibid., 352.
[43] Ibid., 352-353.
[44] Ibid., 354.
[45] Ibid., 353.

vanity and Dryden from laziness, Pope borrowed because he had no other choice. In other words, in the eyes of Warburton, Pope was not even a good poet.

It was Warburton, however, who was responsible for vindicating Pope from the accusation of Crousaz. Johnson relates that "whatever his motive," Warburton "from month to month continued a vindication of the *Essay of Ma*, in the literary journal of that time, called the *Republick of Letters*."[46] Moreover, with the benefit of retrospect, Johnson himself suggests that Crousaz's objections were ultimately ungrounded because Pope's only mention of his religion was in *Kyrl, the Man of Ross*. In Johnson's assessment, "This is the only piece in which the author has given a hint of his religion, by ridiculing the ceremony of burning the pope, and by mentioning with some indignation of the inscription on the Monument."[47] Thus, we that the conception of Pope's religious beliefs was formed by an interplay between what he actually wrote, how his contemporaries perceived what he wrote, and how later biographers such as Johnson analyzed everything in retrospect.

Lastly, it is worth telling yet another anecdote of Pope that conveys his self-fashioning. Johnson remarks that Pope enjoyed a good reputation during his lifetime, largely avoiding any trouble due to any personal wrongdoing or prejudice: "Pope lived at this time *among the great*, with that reception and respect to which his works entitled him, and which he had not impaired by any private misconduct or factious partiality."[48]

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[46] Ibid., 354.
[47] Ibid., 359.
[48] Ibid., 357.

As we have seen, Pope's efforts to avoid personal altercation did not prevent it from being precipitated by others. Johnson tells is that "It was said, that, when the Court was at Richmond, Queen Caroline had declared her intention to visit him."[49] Admitting this to be "only a careless effusion," Johnson relates that "the report of such notice, however, was soon in many mouths."[50] Apparently attempting to evade any personal embarrassment to himself if such an offer were never made, Pope left his home, as Johnson continues: "Pope, pretending to decline what was not yet offered, left his house for a time, not, I suppose, for any other reason than lest he should be thought to stay at home in expectation of an honour which would not be conferred."[51] Even though he made this effort to avoid any negative publicity, Pope was unable to evade the notice of Swift, who Johnson tells us "represents him as *refusing the visits of a Queen*."[52] Pope was therefore "angry at Swift" for misrepresenting the situation, since "he knew that what had never offered, had never been refused."[53]

Johnson's portrayal of the lives of Milton and Pope serve as guides for thinking about the life of Locke. As a celebrated intellectual, Locke too has invited the same kind of reception and commentary, which may differ from the actual man. Our interest here, of course, is his character and how it was received over time. Therefore, it is appropriate to begin at the death of the actual man, before discussing the ways the character of the man was received.

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[49] Ibid., 357.
[50] Ibid., 357.
[51] Ibid., 357.
[52] Ibid., 358.
[53] Ibid., 358.

CHAPTER III

LOCKE AS UNDER-LABOURER, 1704-1705

John Locke died on October, 28 1704 and the epitaph on his tombstone at Christ Church Cathedral at Oxford fittingly quips: "I know there is truth opposite to falsehood, that it may be found if people will, and is worth the seeking." Composed by Locke himself in a letter to William Molyneaux, such words would be fitting for the memory of any philosopher. Immediately following them, however, in the same letter to Molyneaux, Locke declares that with regard to this truth,

> I am no more troubled and disturbed with all the dust that is raised against it, than I should be to see from the top of an high steeple, where I had clear air and sun-shine, a company of great boys or little boys (for it is all one) throw up dust in the air, which reached not me, but fell down in their own eyes.[54]

Those who protest the truth blind only themselves; it is the philosopher who sees above the dust that falls and settles. This sentiment, no doubt revelatory of Locke's wit, is also suggestive of his self-ascribed role as an "under-labourer," who not only cleared the dust raised against the truth, but also led people to the clarity of truth.

In the *Essay*'s "Epistle to the Reader," Locke compares himself to an "under-labourer" tasking himself with "clearing the Ground a little, and removing some of the

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[54] "Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux, Jan. 10, 1697-8" in *The Works of John Locke*, Vol. 9 (1812), 447-448.

Rubbish that lies in the way to Knowledge."[55] Specifically, this refuse that must be cleared is, in Locke's eyes, the "frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences."[56] The "rubbish" or gibberish to be cleared, in short, is the inappropriate use of words relative to the ideas they are intended to reference, whether those words are too crude ("uncouth") for complex ideas, too sophisticated ("affected") for less complex ideas, or altogether nonsensical ("unintelligible") for any ideas at all. As an "under-labourer," Locke takes it upon himself to correct these mismatches between words and ideas, which once cleared will open "the way to knowledge," as he further anticipates in the Epistle.[57]

Commentators have suggested these remarks to mean that Locke saw himself as undertaking a merely negative project in the *Essay*. One commentator on Lock's religion, for example, claims that "he intended the *Essay* to fulfill this initial concern of laying a basis in the extent and limits of human understanding for morality and revealed religion."[58] Another commentator on Locke's relation to philosophy of law notes that "whilst their task is to clear the rubbish, it is for the master-builder rather than for the under-labourer to decide what counts as 'rubbish' and as 'clearing the ground.'"[59] Yet another commentator merely classifies the remark as "a classic piece of

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[55] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (New York: Oxford, 1975), 10.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] John C. Biddle. "Locke's Critique of Innate Principles and Toland's Deism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37 (1976): 411-412.
[59] R. A. Duff. "Philosophy and 'The Life of the Law'," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 26 (2009): 247-248.

understatement."[60] Commenting on Locke's epistemology, still another commentator observes that "he also intends his epistemology to contribute to scientific knowledge of nature" besides morality and the revealed religion.[61] Lastly, finding a place for Locke in a discussion of management, another commentator notes that "It is because of Locke that philosophy, in relation to scientific questions, is sometimes said to play one of two broad roles. The first role, in keeping with the traditions of empiricism, is as an under-labourer for science" and "The second role that philosophy can play in relation to scientific questions is to support critique."[62] Whatever the context, Locke's words have been understood to indicate a negative philosophical project, when in reality his project was much different

Locke, however, was not the first to use the term "under-labourer:" that distinction belongs to Bishop Jeremy Taylor, who in 1667, used the term in a sermon with reference to the role of the religious minister.[63] Taylor was a bishop in the Church of Ireland who sided with the royalists during the Civil Wars.[64] According to the Harrison-Laslett catalogue of Locke's personal library, Locke indeed possessed a work of Taylor's titled *Symbolon theologikon* (1657), suggesting that Locke was aware of

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[60] Laurens Lauden. "The Nature and Views of Locke's Views on Hypotheses," *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1967), 211.
[61] Antonia Lolordo. "Locke on Knowledge and Belief" in *A Companion to Locke*, ed. Matthew Stuart (Blackwell Publishing/ John Wiley and Sons, 2016), 297.
[62] Kevin Morrell, Mark Learmonth, and Loizos Heracleous. "An Archaeological Critique of 'Evidence-based Management': One Digression After Another," *British Journal of Management* 26 (2015): 532.
[63] "Under-labourer," *Oxford English Dictionary* Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[64] John Spurr, "Jeremy Taylor (*bap.* 1613, *d.* 1667)" in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2004).

him.[65] While Taylor does not utilize the term "under-labourer" at all in this particular work, he does discuss ideas similar to those he captures by the term in his later sermons, regarding the role of the clergy. In a chapter on "An Apology of Liturgy," he utilizes the term "under-servant" to indicate those who do the work assigned to them by the "general stewards" of Christian society:

> The very Occconomy of Christs Family requires that the dispensations of be made according to every mans capacity. The general stewards are to divide to every man his portion of worke, and to give them their food in due season, and the under-servants are to doe that work is appointed them.[66]

Likewise, in another chapter titled "Episcopacy Asserted," he continues to discuss laboring, claiming that "All Ministers of H. Church did not preach, at least not frequently" because "labouring in the word does not signifie only making Homilies or exhortations to the people, but whether it be by word, or writing, or travelling from place to place, still, the greater the sedulity of the person is, the difficulty of the labour, the greater increment of honour is to be given him."[67] Both points regarding the auxiliary nature of labor and its diversity of function find their way into his 1667 work under the name "under-labouring."

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[65] John Harrison and Peter Laslett, *The Library of John Locke* (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press), entry 2841, p. 244.
[66] Jeremy Taylor, "An Apology for Liturgy" in *Simbolon Ethikopolemikon: Or A Collection of Polemical and Moral Discourses* (1657), Sec. 99, p. 96.
[67] Jeremy Taylor. "Episcopacy Asserted" in *Simbolon Ethikopolemikon: Or A Collection of Polemical and Moral Discourses* (1657),: Sec. 6, p. 271.

There, in *Dekas emboilmaios*, in a sermon tilted "The Ministers Duty in Life and Doctrine," Taylor remarks that the minister's role is to be a mediator between the people and God. Directing his remarks to fellow clergy, Taylor exhorts: "you are the Ministers of Christ's Priesthood, Under-labourers in the great Work of Mediation and Intercession, *Medii inter Deum & Populum*; you are for the People towards God, and convey Answers and Messages from God to the People."[68] The ministerial "under-labourer" is someone who intervenes between God and the people: that is, someone through whom God and the people communicate with each other. Taylor then lists the qualities expected in the character of such a ministerial "under-labourer," which are remarkably similar to what early commentators have noted about Locke's own character and interactions with the people.

Taylor notes that the duty of the under-laborer encompasses both "Holiness of Life" and "Integrity of Doctrine," and he outlines what this requires. Remarking first upon "Holiness of Life," Taylor advises his clergy that "For your Life and Conversation, it ought not only to be good, not only to be holy, but to be so up to the degrees of an excellent example; *Ye must be a pattern*."[69] Indeed, Taylor insists that the under-laborers are to be exemplars in all aspects of their lives, both in private and when interacting with the people. This means that they are to exemplify action, rather than discussion of superfluous concepts. Taylor instructs:

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[68] Jeremy Taylor, "The Ministers Duty in Life & Doctrine" in *Dekas emboilmaios* (1667), 179.
[69] Ibid., 180.

> Ye must be patterns, not only of Knowledge and Wisdom, not of contemplation and skill in Mysteries, not of unprofitable Notions, and ineffective Wit and Eloquence; but of something by which mankind shall be better; of something that shall contribute to the felicity and comfort of the world; *a pattern of good works*.[70]

For Taylor, the under-laborer is to be an exemplar in both intellect and action, but even the intellect is to have a practical aim. In this regard, he advises that in matters of the intellect, under-laborers are neither to dwell on "Mysteries," nor "unprofitable Notions," nor "ineffective Wit and Eloquence;" rather, in their intellectual pursuits, they are instead to contemplate reality, profitable ideas, and effective ways of presenting those ideas. As it turns out, Locke also accepted this intellectual discipline for himself.

Two of Locke's earliest biographers, Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736) and Pierre Coste (1668-1747), offer accounts of his life that depict the character of a man who could easily meet Taylor's rigorous expectations for an "under-labourer." Le Clerc and Coste were not only contemporaries of Locke's, but also men who interacted with him during his life. Le Clerc and Locke were purportedly great admirers of each other—to the extent that Locke, along with Joseph Addison, attempted to help him secure a position in the court of Queen Anne.[71] Le Clerc, a philosopher in his own right, reciprocated such admiration by dedicating his *Logica* (1692) to both Locke and Robert Boyle.[72] Locke's

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[70] Ibid., 180.
[71] Marja Smolenaars, "Le Clerc, Jean (1657-1736)" in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
[72] Ibid.

relationship with Coste, however, could be characterized less as mutual admiration and more by mutual respect.

Unlike Le Clerc, Coste was a Cartesian—a persuasion that colored his relationship with Locke throughout his life. Coste translated many of Locke's works into French, including the first part of *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (published in 1696), the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (published in 1700), and the second part of *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (published in 1703). Because of Coste's repute as a scholar, Locke recommended him to be the tutor to the daughter of Francis Masham and Damaris Cudworth, and granddaughter of the philosopher Ralph Cudworth, Francis Masham. Coste also stayed with one of Locke's pupil's, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, from 1709-1710. Despite the apparent mutual respect between the two men, their disagreement in matters of philosophy loomed over their relationship, caucusing Coste to not translate some of Locke's works, including the *Two Treatises on Government*.[73] Despite their different relationships with Locke, Le Clerc and Coste alike offer anecdotes indicative of man engaged in "under-labouring"—a man who dwelt neither on "Mysteries," nor "unprofitable Notions," nor "ineffective Wit and Eloquence." They portray, rather, someone engaged in intellectual pursuits, the contemplation of reality, profitable ideas, and effective ways of presenting those ideas.

With respect to avoiding "contemplation and skill in Mysteries," Le Clerc wrote that Locke complained "that he lost a great deal of Time, when he first applied himself

[73] J. J. V. M. De Vet, "Coste, Pierre (1668-1747)" in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

to Study, because the only Philosophy then known at *Oxford* was the Peripatetick, perplex'd with obscure Terms and stuff'd with useless Questions."[74] Aristotelian ("Peripatetick") philosophy, in Locke's eyes, occupied those who were detached from the concerns of the world, and their discussions having no real weight on its improvement. Locke's distain for such practitioners was duly noted by Coste, who wrote that "Mr. Locke was so far from assuming those airs of Gravity, by which some folks, as well as learned as unlearned, love to distinguish themselves from the rest of the world; that on the contrary, he looked upon them, as an infallible mark of impertinence."[75] Among such intellectuals who Locke regarded as "impertinent" were those who engaged in public debate, a peculiar dislike of Locke's noted by both Le Clerc and Coste.

Le Clerc notes that," Locke "was ever adverse to these, and always look'd upon them as no better than wrangling, and that they served only for a vain Ostentation of a Man's Parts, and not in the least for the discovery of Truth, and advancement of Knowledge."[76] Coste likewise notes that Locke, "Cared yet less for those professed Disputants, who being wholly taken up with the desire of coming off with victory, fortify themselves behind the ambiguity of a word, to give their adversaries more trouble."[77] Evidently, Locke disliked public debate because of its association with Aristotelianism and scholasticism. By prioritizing victory over an opponent through the

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[74] Jean Le Clerc, *The Life of Mr. John Locke, &c.* (1706), 2.
[75] Pierre. Coste, "The Character of Mr. Locke" in *A collection of several pieces of Mr. John Locke* (1704), xi.
[76] Le Clerc, *The Life of Mr. Locke*, 3.
[77] Coste, "The Character of Mr. Locke," xvi-xvii.

inappropriate use of words, the disputants invariably perpetuated mysteries rather than the truth, that is: the mismatch of words and ideas, rather than their proper ordering.

Such distaste for debate is consistent with the role of an under-laborer, as Taylor defined it, because an under-laborer is to avoid "unprofitable notions," which Locke saw as permeating debates. Le Clerc and Coste are also explicit in establishing Locke's penchant for only useful ideas. Le Clerc notes that Locke

> was able to reason on the common affairs of Life, as well as on the most abstracted Subjects; and that he was none of those Philosophers, who spend their whole Lives, in the search after Truths purely Speculative, but by their Ignorance of those things which concern the publick Good, are rendred incapable of serving their Country.[78]

Le Clerc noted that it was Lord Ashley (who later became the Earl of Shaftesbury), who encouraged Locke to shift his focus from medicine to public service, urging Locke to "apply himself to the study of those Matters, that belong'd to the Church and State, and which might have some relation to the business of a Minister of State."[79] Clearly seeing public service as a better use of Locke's abilities, Coste notes that "Mr. Locke chiefly loved Truths that were useful, and with such fed his mind, and was generally very well pleased to make them the subject of his discourse."[80] Locke preferred only profitable ideas, as Taylor indicated under-laborers should. Whether Locke applied himself to

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[78] Le Clerc, *The Life of Mr. Locke*, 19.
[79] Ibid., 6.
[80] Coste, "The Character of Mr. Locke," viii.

religion, medicine, or government, he always aimed at their improvement. Indeed, nowhere was was this most evident than in Locke's interpersonal interactions.

Such social interaction is seen in the expectation that under-laborers avoid "ineffective Wit and Eloquence." Coste, concerned primarily with Locke's character, claims that Locke achieved renown for precisely this reason, recalling one instance, in which:

> when an occasion naturally offered, he gave himself up with pleasure to the charms of a free and facetious Conversation, He remembered a great many agreeable Stoics, which he always brought in properly; and generally made them yet more delightful, by his natural and agreeable way of telling them. He was no foe to Raillery, provided it were delicate and perfectly innocent.[81]

Coste reveals Locke to be an effective communicator able to bring even the sophisticated thoughts of the stoics to an understandable level, and such tasteful presentation of ideas is a hallmark of Locke's social interactions. In another anecdote, Coste recalls that Locke "always remembered this maxim of the Duke of La Rochefoucault, which he admired above all others, *That Gravity is a mystery of the Body, invented to conceal the defects of the Mind*."[82] Coste notes that Locke recalled this maxim whenever he "wou'd divert himself with imitating that study'd Gravity" of the haughty intellectuals he disdained.[83] What Coste calls a "maxim" is, of course, a joke. "Gravity" describes both a

[81] Ibid. 8.
[82] Ibid. 11.
[83] Ibid. 11.

concept and a demeanor. As a concept, gravity "conceals the defects" of theory. As a demeanor, gravity "conceals the defects" of intelligence. This double entendre suggests that those of weak intelligence are pretentious in both the way they theorize and in the way they carry themselves.

Under-laborers, although tasked with ministering to the people, are warned by Taylor to guard against becoming like those people, acquiring their demeanor and way of speaking. Furthermore, under-laborers must also guard against the negative influence of the populace, who may discourage them from their ministry:

> the Ministers of Christ must not be framed according to the peoples humour, they must not give him rules, nor describe his measures; but he should be a rule to them; he is neither to live with them so as to please their humours, or to preach Doctrines *populo ut placerent quas fecissent fabulas*.[84]

Even in his use of wit and "raillery," Locke was able to maintain the dignity expected of his social standing. When socializing amongst the genteel, Le Clerc notes that "Mr. *Locke* had a serious Air and always spoke to these Lords in a modest and respectful manner; yet there was an agreeable mixture of Wit in his Conversation."[85] To this point, Le Clerc tells of a time in which Locke was socializing with some lords, including Ashley. Unhappy with their vulgar conversation they had while playing cards, Le Clerc writes that Locke jotted down their dialogue. When questioned about what he was doing, Locke wittily said that he "set down the substance of what has been said within this hour

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[84] Jeremy Taylor, "The Ministers Duty in Life and Doctrine," 180.
[85] Le Clerc, *The Life of Mr. Locke*, 6.

or two" because he had "the Honour of being present at a Meeting of the wisest and most ingenious men of the Age." Le Clerc writes that the "noble Lords perceiv'd the banter, and diverted themselves a while with improving the jest; they left their play and enter'd into Conversation more agreeable to their Character and so spend the rest of the day."[86] In this case, Locke managed to preserve not only his dignity, but also that of his associates, without letting any of them fall into vulgarity. Surely capable of interjecting levity into seriousness, Locke was equally capable of bringing seriousness to the vulgar.

This latter capacity speaks to the second aspect of the under-laborer, Taylor requires them to possess: "Integrity of Doctrine." Among the qualities of such doctrine, Taylor requires that it be "pure" with "no Heretical mixtures," void of "vain and empty notions, little contentions, and pitiful disputes," and "not feeding the people with husks and drosse, with Colocynths and Gourds, with gay Tulips and useless Daffodils, but with the bread of life, and medicinal Plants."[87] The doctrines preached by the under-laborer, therefore, must be aimed solely at the improvement of lives and not distract the people from their edification: it must retain its seriousness in light of vulgarity.

In his other interactions, Coste describes Locke as a benevolent counselor. Coste relates that Locke at one time thought that the maxim "*good Counsels are very little effectual in making people more prudent*" to be "very strange; but that experience had fully convinced him of the truth of it."[88] As Coste recounts, Locke would regularly give

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[86] Ibid.
[87] Taylor, "The Ministers Duty in Life and Doctrine," 180-81.
[88] Coste, "The Character of Mr. Locke," 6-7.

unsolicited advice to people who, in his opinion, wanted it; however, he soon realized that people would only take his advice if they asked for it first. From that point on, according to Coste, Locke practiced self-restraint in giving only solicited advice.

At the same time, Coste reports that Locke would indeed at times give such advice anyway, because of "his natural Goodness, the aversion he had to Disorder, and the interest he took in those about him." In such cases, Locke would present "with solid arguments" the advice which he thought "most likely to reclaim them."[89] Coste describes Locke's approach to giving advice as "modest," since he insisted that the force of his advice stem from rationality and argumentation, rather than his own authority or celebrity as an intellectual.

Locke was not a member of the clergy, so the religious origin of the term "under-labouring" and its associations with the ministry are worth noting, especially in light of accusations from his contemporaries that he was an atheist. One particularly vitriolic line of this accusation came from William Carroll, a bishop in the Church of Ireland.

Carroll was concerned that Spinozism was being surreptitiously imported into the British Isles through the work of philosophers such as Samuel Clarke, Anthony Collins, and John Locke. Spinozism, which endorsed substance monism, was seen as a threat to Cartesianism, which endorsed substance dualism. The Anglican Church had already rejected Scholasticism (which, as we have seen, Locke rejected too, under the name "Peripatetick"), because that was the philosophy of the Roman Church.

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[89] Coste, "The Character of Mr. Locke," 7.

Cartesianism was viewed as an appropriate alternative, because in endorsing the existence of two substances, it preserved a distinction between the God the creator and the creation. Spinozism, because it endorsed the existence of only one substance, denied any distinction between God and creation.[90] The Spinozists could nevertheless insist that God existed, provided that "God" be understood as that one substance which has always existed. This insistence led Carroll to contrast "a God" of Spinozism with the "One Only True God" of religious orthodoxy.

In 1705, Carroll wrote *Remarks Upon Mr. Clarke's Sermons* (1705) in which he accused Clarke of surreptitiously endorsing atheism. Clarke, Carroll claims, professed to demonstrate God's existence, yet "those Sermons are so far from *Answering* that *End*, that they *absolutely cut off all possible Means of attaining it*, and do rather *Establish*, than *Destroy*, that which they *apparently* take to *Confute*" (1).[91] Carroll's accusations are threefold. The first involves Clarke's claim that "What the Substance or Essence of that Being, which is Self-Existent, or Necessarily-Existing, is; we have no Idea, neither is it possible for us in any measure to comprehend it."[92] Carroll names this the "skeptical hypothesis," and his first accusation is that Clarke cannot simultaneously profess ignorance concerning the attributes of any substance, whilst rejecting the atheist's claim that there is only one.[93] His second accusation is that Clarke likewise cannot simultaneously adhere to the "sceptical hypothesis" and purport to prove the existence of

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[90] Stuart Brown, "Carroll, William (fl. 1705-1711," in *Dictionary of Irish Philosophers*, ed. Thomas Duddy (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2004).
[91] William Carroll, *Remarks Upon Mr. Clarke's Sermons* (1705), 1
[92] Samuel Clarke, *A demonstration of the being and attributes of* God (1705), 74.
[93] Carroll, *Remarks Upon Mr. Clarke's Sermons*, 4.

God. Indeed, Carroll asserts that the skeptical hypothesis precludes even the possibility of proving God's existence. His third accusation is that Clarke, through his endorsement of the skeptical hypothesis, actually "establishes" and "confirms" the very atheism he purports to refute, which Carroll identifies as "Spinozism."[94]

Although Clarke makes use of the "sceptical hypothesis," according to Carroll he is hardly the first. Spinoza, he writes, "is the first to that ever reduced *Atheism* into a *System*, and Mr. *Locke* is the Second; with this Difference, that the latter has only copied the former as to the main, *Spinoza* having, as he imagined, established the Existence of his One single Substance, and cut off the Means of perceiving and proving, that there is more than One."[95] Indeed, Carroll claimed that "Mr. *L.*'s Essay, in the Main, is but *Spinoza* translated into, improved in the *English* Language, and set off more Subtilly under another Dress and Sett of articulate Sounds or Terms."[96] So, while Clarke may have utilized the "sceptical hypothesis," Carroll finds its origins in Spinoza, and Locke, who imported Spinozism into the British Isles.

At the end of the treatise, Carroll suggests that Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worchester, correctly assessed Locke "as one Ignorant or Doubtful" concerning God. Carroll comments that "Never was any Man more exactly *Represented*, more like himself, more to the Life than Mr. *L.* thus *Represented* by that Great Prelate" and it was equally evident that "Mr. *L.* did not know what he said, That he was Unreasonable, that

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[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid., 9.
[96] Ibid., 25.

he Reasoned himself out of Reason itself, in his Endeavours to Reason our Great God out of Being, and to establish *Spinoza*'s Hypothesis."[97] Carroll continued his scathing assessment of Locke in a more focused way in another treatise.

There, in *A Dissertation Upon the Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of Mr. Locke's Essay, Concerning Human Understanding*, Carroll singles out Locke's demonstration for God's existence (4.10) as that which "finally and compleatly establishes the Hypothesis" and which "Wherefore we may take this *chap.* to be the very Center, and the Touch-stone, if I may so speak, of the *Essay of Humane Understanding*"[98] Carroll's contention here, consistent with his remarks in *Remarks on Mr. Clarke's Sermons*, is that "Mr. *L.* copied *Spinoza*" insofar as

> the one dream'd, and the other imagin'd after him, that the Nature of things is quite different from what it really is; and from what others know and take it to be; and accordingly have made the chief Words imploy'd by them, to stand for Ideas quite different from those, whereof others take and make them Signs or Marks, that is, take them in a Sense quite different from that, wherein others take and understand them.[99]

Carroll's accusation here is that Spinoza and Locke have perverted the meanings of words to such an extent that to a casual audience they appear to mean one thing, whilst to a more attentive reader (such a Carroll himself), they mean something quite different.

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[97] Ibid., 42.
[98] William Carroll, *A Dissertation Upon the Fourth Book of Mr. Locke's Essay, Concerning Human Understanding* (1706), ii, 3.
[99] Ibid., iii.

Central to Carroll's accusation is Locke's usage of the word "God." As Carroll observes, the title of Locke's chapter at 4.10 is "Of Our Knowledge of the Existence of a God," signaling to the reader that the "God" in question is "a peculiar sort of *a God*, different and distinct from what others call *God* singly."[100] Locke's "peculiar" God emerges, according to Carroll, from the way he understands the word "being" and the attributes associated with that being: "Mr. *L.* after *Spinoza* asserts, That there is an *Eternal, All Knowing, Cogitative Being*. 'Tis the Christian Doctrine, and the Unanimous Vote of Mankind, That there is an Eternal, All Knowing, All Powerful, Cognitive Being."[101] An eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent being is ordinarily understood to mean "God" as a being who has always existed, knows everything, and can do everything; however, Locke uses these words differently with reference to the skeptical hypothesis.

According to Carroll, Locke identifies eternity, omniscience, and omnipotence as attributes of a being, but of common understanding:

> the Word *Being*, is of singular Use to those men of *One Substance*, when they endeavour to establish their Hypothesis somewhat convertly; and 'tis not very easy to distinguish them from others, when they say with others, There is an *Eternal, &c. Being*; and by this *Term*, understand *a Something*, or Substance,

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[100] Ibid., 53.
[101] Ibid., 53.

> infinitely different from the *Something*, or Substance, which others understand by it, when they ascribe the same Attributes to it."[102]

On this reading, the eternal "being" in question is "substance," and omnipotence and omniscience reference the qualities, powers, or properties which inhere in that substance, rather than the abilities to do anything and know everything. According to Carroll, "the Sence wherein he takes the Terms, *most powerful*, and ascribes that Attribute to his Eternal *Being* or *Something*, must be likewise different from that wherein others take those Words, when they ascribe that *Attribute* to the *one only True God*."[103] This "different Sence" of omnipotence is required by the skeptical hypothesis, since it precludes the existence of any more than one substance. This one substance, "which cannot possibly *create* any other *real Substance*," can only create "various *Alterations* or *Changes* in its own *Modifications*."[104] In other words, according to Carroll's reading, Locke's true position is that there is nothing that is not God, because everything is a modification of one substance. From this, Carroll concludes that Locke and Spinoza maintain the position

> That the *GOD*, or *Eternal*, *Thinking Being*, whose Existence those Authors maintain, is nothing else precisely, but the *whole World or Universe*, and the Concomitants of this *Hypothesis*, as for instance; That *all Things are equally Eternal*, various *Changes of Modifications*, only excepted.[105]

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[102] Ibid., 54.
[103] Ibid., 64.
[104] Ibid., 64.
[105] Ibid., 231-232.

The skeptical hypothesis, in Carroll's eyes, requires Spinoza and Locke to be committed to the view that only one substance exists, and all things are really just modes of that one substance. Therefore, everything that exists, has existed from eternity. For Carroll and the other orthodox clergy, this represents a clear instance of heterodoxy, since it dissolves the division between God the eternal creator and the temporal creation.

Toward the end of end of the treatise, Carroll writes that "We have now read all that I intended to publish against the *Essay of Human Understanding*, before Mr. Locke died; to which I shall now add a few observations."[106] His use of the past tense indicates that by the time of its publication, Locke was already deceased. After this point, only 18 pages of text remain in the *Dissertation*, and from Carroll's remark here, they evidently contain material inspired by Locke's passing in that they address the place of the *Essay* and Locke's other texts among the other heterodox authors (including Clarke, as we have seen).

Carroll suggests that the *Essay* was published in a conspiratorial fashion to render the skeptical hypothesis palatable for popular consumption. Seeing the rejection of Spinoza by "Men of all Persuasions," Carroll claims that Locke consciously utilized a more subversive strategy. According to Carroll, "The first Step he made to convey it in Maskerade, was, to have an Extract of it made, and publish'd in the *French* Language, in a Book which runs over all *Europe*, namely, *Mr. le Clerc's Bibl. Univer. Tom. 8*."[107] Carroll here is referring to the *Bibliotheque universelle et historique*, published by Jean

[106] Ibid., 274.
[107] Ibid., 274.

Le Clerc. This periodical contained a redacted version of the *Essay* in French, which in Carroll's eyes was to herald the arrival of the full *Essay* itself. The effect of this abstracted version of the *Essay* was to make the reader believe the full text was about God, when it was really about "the Existence of an *External Being*," by which "the Reader understood the One Only True GOD, and upon this Account was prejudic'd in favour of, and believ'd the Essay of Human Understanding, to be a quite different Book, from what it really is, ev'n before it appear'd. This, you see, was very well contriv'd."[108] Carroll adds that it was only when the *Essay* was published in full that effects of Locke's contrivances could be seen more clearly:

> Now the Prejudices procur'd in favour of that Book, before it appear'd, the Legion of Sophisms and Equivocations which screen'd in its real Sense from the Reader, after it appear'd, and the good Language wherein 'tis writ; have been powerful Instruments of imposing upon the Publick, of passing that Book upon it, for what it really is not, and of compassing Mr. *L*'s Design, of establishing and spreading Spinoza's Hypothesis in Disguise.[109]

As Carroll says, the public was "*dupp'd*"—not into merely believing the skeptical hypothesis, but those authors who employed it, as we have seen in the case of Clarke. Among those other texts that depend on the skeptical hypothesis and its commitments, Carroll lists: *The Reasonableness of Christianity* by John Locke, *Christianity Not Mysterious* by John Toland, and *The Rights of the Christian Church Asserted* by

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[108] Ibid., 274.
[109] Ibid., 275.

Matthew Tindal.[110] As with the *Essay*, these texts also perverted the meanings of familiar words. For them, according to Carroll, the "Christian Church" is "a Society of Reasonable Men," "Christianity" is "the Profession of a Society of Reasonable Men," "Reason" is "a Modification of their pretended One Only Cognitive and Extended Material Substance, of their God," and "Christ" merely has "a larger Share" of this "than to any other."[111] The legacy of Locke, in Carroll's eyes, was to have systemized atheism so as to make it appropriable by other authors:

> And as for that Hypothesis itself, it is the very same that all the *Atheists* which ever were, did establish and maintain; for they were all of them without exception, that is, the few of them we have upon Record, *Materialists*. All that *Spinoza* and M. *L.* have done, is to endeavour to give that Hypothesis a Systematical Consistency.[112]

So, Carroll identifies as an "atheist" anyone who utilizes the skeptical hypothesis in the writings. As we have seen, this includes not only, of course, Spinoza and Locke, but also Clarke, Toland, and Tindal. Additionally, he also identifies Anthony Collins, the author of *An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions*[113], and even Jean Le Clerc.[114]

So, in the immediate aftermath of his death, Locke's contemporaries debated his legacy as a religious thinker. His earliest biographers, Le Clerc and Coste, insisted on his

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[110] Ibid., 276-277.
[111] Ibid., 277.
[112] Carroll, *A Dissertation Upon the Fourth Book of Mr. Locke's Essay*, 289.
[113] William Carroll, *A letter to the Reverend Dr. Benjamin Prat* (1707), and *Spinoza reviv'd* (1709).
[114] Carroll, *Spinoza reviv'd. Part the second* (1711).

religiosity, recalling stories of his pious character. Likewise, adversaries such as Carroll looked to his work and saw evidence of "atheism." This dichotomy as to whether or not Locke was an atheist or theist seems complicated by his professed vocation as an "under-labourer"—a word rooted in the expressly religious texts of Taylor, yet employed by Locke for seemingly secular concerns. In yet another strain, central to Locke's "under-labouring" was the realigning of words with the ideas they represent: a "realignment" interpreted by Carroll as conspiratorial and subversive. Central to all of this debate was Locke's degree of heterodoxy and whether or not that heterodoxy was accepted by the public. If the generation of his death fretted about Locke's "atheism," or at least concerned enough to keep it quiet, in only 30 years that heterodoxy would be celebrated.

CHAPTER IV

LOCKE AS CORRECT REASONER, 1734

In 1733 the *Gentleman's Magazine* held a contest to commemorate the completion of a grotto in Richmond Park, built at the behest of Queen Caroline. The contest solicited poetry submissions from readers of the *Gentleman* in commemoration of the installation of a bust of Robert Boyle at the grotto. Those submitting were asked to send their poetry in a way that disguised their identities:

> The Respective Authors, are desired to send their Performances directed to St. *John's Gate*, and to distinguish their Papers, (after the manner of the Academy of *Paris*) by some Sentence, Token or Device, to be cover'd with white Paper sealed over it, which shall not be taken off until the Prize is declar'd."[115]

The submission themselves were specifically requested to be "*On the* Bust *of the Hon.* Robert Boyle *Esq*; *being set up in her* Majesty's *Hermitage at* Richmond."[116] Queen Caroline's own motivations for constructing the grotto explain why the editors had these expectations. Michael Charlesworth observes that "certain types of garden features were particularly aligned with certain tendencies in religious thought. Deism, for example, was explicitly associated with hermitages by the very famous example built by Queen Caroline at Richmond Gardens in 1732."[117] The Queen's construction of the grotto is

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[115] *The Gentlemen's Magazine*, Vol. 3 (April 1733): 208.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Michael Charlesworth, "Sacred Landscape: Signs of Religion in the Eighteenth-Century Garden," *Journal of Garden History* 13 (1993): 57.

harmonious with her character insofar as "the image of Caroline as a protestant heroine was promoted in Britain" and that "Caroline consciously projected an image of herself as a promoter of enlightened ideas," with the construction of the grotto being just on example.[118]

Evidently, in commissioning the grotto and its busts, Her Majesty thought she was building a monument to deism, which accounts for the sample poems speaking to the themes of the light of reason (precipitated by Boyle) and the natural religion (discoverable by that reason). What the editors received, however, was something quite different, as the submissions themselves shifted the emphasis from religion to nationalism. Rather than speaking to deism and its emergence with Boyle, the poems spoke to a distinctively British way of thinking and its beginnings with not only Boyle, but also Clarke, Wollaston, Newton, and—of course, Locke.

The grotto itself was a structure that contained the busts of Samuel Clarke, William Wollaston, Isaac Newton, and John Locke. As described by a note the magazine, these "4 Busts so often mention'd, stand in Niches at each quarter in the Walls of the Vaulted Dome." It was the addition of a bust of Robert Boyle that prompted the contest, since it suggested the grotto was complete—at least for a time. As the magazine describes: "the Bust of Mr Boyle stands higher than these, on a Pedestal, in the inmost, and, as it were, the most sacred Recess of the Place." The decoration around Boyle's likeness reinforced his place of prominence, but also indicated the relationship

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[118] Stephen Taylor, "Caroline (1683-1737)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

of his likeness with the other bust, since "behind his head a large Golden Sun, darting his wide spreading Beams all about, and towards the others, to whom his Aspect is directed." The rays beaming from Boyle to the others suggest the light of reason emanating from Boyle to Clarke, Wollaston, Newton, and Locke. Without Boyle, the grotto's message would be incomplete, although room was made for additional busts, as the *Gentleman's Magazine* further mention: "To the Dome is an Iron Door by which you enter, on each side of it an Apartment to which are Iron Rails; and each of these Apartments is capable of Receiving more Busts, if her Majesty should think proper in her Wisdom to add any to the Number already there."[119] It is this tableau that the poets were prompted to memorialize in verse, and—as suggested by the samples included with the prompt—they were expected to do so in a way that spoke to Boyle's preeminence among the other men, as well as their shared endorsement of deism.

To indicate their expectations, the *Gentleman's Magazine* included sample poems just before the actual notice of the contest, within which the editors note that with respect to the samples, "We are satify'd this Hint would be sufficient to bring us a Supply."[120] In all, the editors provide five examples to solicit submissions. Because these samples were written prior to the installation of Boyle's likeness in the grotto, the editors of the magazine supplied tentative lines referring to Boyle, offset by brackets and an asterisk. The original five poems themselves spoke to the theme of deism or natural religion, while the inserted material spoke to Boyle.

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[119] *The Gentlemen's Magazine* (April 1733), "Note" at bottom, 208.
[120] Ibid.

The first one describes Newton "Whose spreading Beams enlighten Foreign/ Lands" and whose task it was to "trace the starry Wonders of th' Ethereal Space." The others, Locke, Wollaston, and Clarke follow Newton's lead:

While *Locke* with native Force of Reason charms,
And *Wollaston* by Strokes of *Nature* warms:
While *Piety* and *Learning* both conspire
In *Clarke*, to fan Religion's sacred Fire;
Whose milder Rules, to Souls by Passion driv'n,
Still kindly point the certain road to Heav'n;

These original lines clearly imagine the beam of the sun as the light of reason, as well as include a notable religious tenor. The insertion on Boyle—provided by the editors, and not original to the poem—confirm the appeal of these themes:

[While *Boyle*, whose philosophic Eye cou'd trace
The mystic Lines of Nature's various Face,
Shall, like the Sun, diffusive Beams impart,
Inlight'ning all the mazey Wilds of Art;]*[121]

Boyle, the insertion suggests, could detect the "mystic" appearance of nature, as well as "diffuse" that insight to others. Newton, from the first lines, merely spread this light to "foreign lands." It was Boyle, however, who originated them.

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[121] *The Gentlemen's Magazine* (April 1733), "On the Five Bustoes," 207.

Likewise, another sample poem which asks Queen Caroline to "Let *Hobbs*, the Doubtful, make the set compleat," is answered by an entire stanza set off by a "[*]," indicating it is furnished by the editors and is not original to the poetry:

> Cease envious Muse! to fully thus the Great;
>
> Nor strive the noblest Actions to defeat;
>
> See! *Boyle*, that Sun of Knowledge, claims
>
> the Umpire Seat.[122]

Again, the motif of Boyle as the "Sun of Knowledge" diffusing the light of reason is clearly expressed. What may be less obvious is the religious allusion in this short poem. The original poet, recall, suggests that the Queen include "*Hobbs*, the Doubtful," apparently referencing Hobbes skepticism concerning religion. Hobbes held that religious truth was discovered only by interrogating the will of the sovereign, not through illumination by the light of reason. The rejection of Hobbes' inclusion appears to be on these grounds: Boyle, the preeminent source of the light of reason—the "Umpire Seat"—must reject anyone who teaches that religious truth is *not* found in nature.

Another sample poem omits the sun imagery, but amplifies the expressly religious message of the grotto, in the form of satire. The poem considers the busts as "Idols four—of Wizzards three,/ And one unchristian Parson." The "idols," of course, are Locke, Wollaston, Clarke, and Newton, and the "unchristian Parson" in question is

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[122] Ibid., "On the Same," Ibid., 207.

identified as Clarke in the subsequent lines: “In praise of *Clarke*—observe the Joke—/ Writes ev’ry Band and Gown.” The “joke” is Clarke’s apparent atheism, or at least deism, that seemed to underlie his sermons (the Boyle Lecture), criticized by William Carroll. Locke himself is associated with the royal courts, despite his writings against them: “And *Locke*’s the Theme of courtly Folk,/ Who lov’d nor Court nor Crown.” In jest, the poet reveals that lest posterity “Leave uninscrib’d this Wall” (referring to the wall of the grotto), if “the honest Stones but speak,/ They’d contradict you all.”[123] This poem is presented as a note found behind the one of the busts in the grotto, which lends it an ominous and urgent character. It is seemingly a note to both the visitor to the grotto (who would have to be in the midst of the busts to acquire it) and to potential poets in the contest (who would be read this before the context prompt on the next page).

The inserted material, again furnished by the editors, augments this message by questioning the character of those who would consider such misrepresentation. On one hand, such a poet should not participate, because the subject matter would be beyond understanding:

> Poor snarling Bard, who e’er thou art,
>
> To scold at Things above thy Reach;
>
> Thus *Reynard* said, the Grapes are tart;
>
> And Vice will Virtue still impeach.

[123] Ibid., “A Paper of Verses found behind one of the Busts in the Grotto at----,” 207.

With the reference to Reynard the Fox, the editors warn that even well-meaning poets (of "Virtue") will still be punished ("impeached" by "Vice") if they attempt to write about the great men represented in the grotto. In other words, such attempts will appear foolish, "Should'st thou go on, thou thoughtless Head,/ Thoul't make these stony Bustoes speak.[124] Any submissions, therefore, must avoid any reckless portrayal.

The last sample poem the editors include is likewise expressly religious. In it, the poet holds that the laws of nature that Clarke, Locke, Wollaston, and Newton have discovered serve to augment human life:

> They all, or sciences abstruse explain,
>
> Check lawless power, and human rights maintain,
>
> Religion's rules on nature built define,
>
> Or christian revelation prove divine:

Nature, then, as discovered by these men, allows religious truth to be accessed, in addition to revealing the political laws governing society. The editors specifically single out these aspects of the original poem, by adding the exhortation to

> Trace reason's rules, abuse of power disdain,
>
> Christian religion as divine, maintain,
>
> And by such models think, and act, and reign.[125]

The editors, then, envision the busts as modeling how one should examine nature to acquire these truths of religion and politics. All of the editions made by the editors

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[124] Ibid., 208.
[125] Ibid., "On the Five Bustoes in Her Majesty's Hermitage," 208.

suggest that they were soliciting poetry submissions that either placed particular emphasis on Boyle, or that were expressly religious in their content.

By contrast, the actual poems submitted to the editors portray Britain as a nation of intellectuals, memorialized by the grotto: the effect of which is to foster aspirations to the life of the mind and the corresponding contributions to the nation.[126] This theme is captured particularly well by Essay VII, which notes the nationalist fervor Queen Caroline inspired "By hon'ring these great names in lasting stone,/ To ev'ry *British* heart thou hast endear'd thine own."[127] As these lines suggest, the "great names" honored in the grotto, however, were not so acclaimed for deism; rather, they were celebrated for the (superior) system of thought they offered compared to the rest of Europe. Indeed, even the great scientists of continental Europe are portrayed as acknowledging the superiority of English thought, in this case embodied in Newton:

> *Huygenius*, *Tycho*, *Kepler*, high in fame,
>
> Bow to the honours of an *English* name.
>
> The system never was from errors free
>
> Till Newton rose and said, *Let darkness flee*.

To be sure, Poet VII acknowledges the contributions made by other European scientists to building the new "system" of science. It was Newton, however, who ultimately

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[126] Because the identity of all but two of the eleven featured submissions remain unknown, I will refer to each submission by the number assigned to it in the *Gentleman*. For example, the seventh submission will be known as "Essay VII." Since the author of that poem is unknown, that writer will be known as "Poet VII." In the two cases where the identity of the author is known, that writer will, of course, be referred to by his real name.

[127] *The Contest* (1734), Essay VII.

brought that system to perfection by purging it of errors which had henceforth been insurmountable.

Poet VII praises Locke in a similar way, noting that in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, "Laborious knowledge teems in every line,/ And *Plato*'s fam'd ideas yield to thine." Poet VII asserts the superiority of Locke's philosophy to Plato's for the same reason that Coste asserted the superiority of Locke's character over those of his contemporaries, namely: his moderation. According to Poet VII, Locke's accomplishments in this regard are to "disembarrass us of prejudice," "mark th' extremes of reason and caprice," and "range in quest of truth without unjust control." In a word, Locke delineated the capacity of our reason, thereby divesting us of "Plato's fam'd ideas," or any fantastical ideas ungrounded in reality, yet nevertheless presumed to be knowledge. By demarcating what reason cannot do, Locke effectively spelled out what it can. As Poet VII further notes, Locke "teachest how by conscious mental act/ We form associate notions, and abstract," which populate "th' original and vast extent/ Of thought, belief, opinion, and assent." Locke's legacy, therefore, was to show that the mind plays an active role in the formation of ideas, and is not a mere passive receiver of "Plato's fam'd ideas," as contemporary philosophers on the continent would otherwise have it.

The contest featured eleven submissions total, and the other poems submitted to the contest refer to this same activity of the mind as "power," evidently using Locke's own term for the active and passive qualities of the mind from his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. In Essay VI, for instance, Poet VI identifies Locke's chief

accomplishment as elucidating "the human soul's extensive pow'rs,"[128] which is its ability to form ideas. Interestingly, Poet VI also identifies this as Queen Caroline's "own great theme" undertaken during "her studious hours." Such elevation of thinking, however, is limited to neither Locke nor Her Majesty; rather, according to the poet, such thinking is open to everybody, since it is the grotto's primary function to inspire "thoughts sublime, which raise the mind/ Above the trifling cares of humankind." The likenesses depicted in the busts represented men who exemplified the life of the mind, lives Queen Caroline now exhorts others to follow.

Essay VIII too identifies Locke as someone "who with *laborious search* defin'd/ The *powers*, and *compass*, of the *human mind*."[129] The author of Essay VIII is known to be the Reverend Moses Brown.[130] As was the case with Essay VI, Brown identifies Locke's chief accomplishment as mapping out the mind's "power," or active capacity. Like Essay VII, Brown too identifies this accomplishment as a "labour," which is not insignificant considering the significance that Locke's self-identification as an "under-labourer" had for his early biographers. More than a mere facet occupation, Locke's "labouring" had, for the poets, become the means by which discoveries of the mind had been made and his place among British intellectuals established. It was the emphasis on reason and the powers of the mind that was taken up by the other poets in their submissions.

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[128] Ibid., Essay VI.
[129] Ibid, Essay VIII.
[130] De Montluzin, Attribution of Authorship in the *Gentlemen's Magazine*, 1731-1868: An Electronic Union List (Charlottesville: Biographical Society of the University of Virginia, 2003).

Essay IX, for example, speaks to this same theme of reason's activity, but rather than speaking to the discovery of the "powers" of the mind as Locke's chief accomplishment, it focuses—like Essay VII—on Locke's dispelling of fanciful ideas which had hitherto counted as knowledge. It was in the wake of Boyle's reform of natural philosophy, Poet IX writes, that

There Locke we view, whose matchless skill
Taught feeble reason how to climb;
And curbing fancy's headstrong will
Makes wit with judgment sweetly chime.[131]

By "curbing fancy's headstrong will," the tendency of the mind to be distracted from reality, Locke enabled reason to go further ("to climb") than ever before. In fact, Poet IX asserts that Locke, along with the other men represented in the grotto, surpass even the gods of antiquity:

Not antient *Rome*'s admired fane,
Where all their fabled gods did dwell,
Equals this small selected train,
Or rivals Carolina's cell.[132]

Poet IX contrasts a shrine from antiquity (a "fane") built as a home for gods, with the Queen's grotto built for a small group of men. The contrast suggested is one of falsity with truth: with the passage of time comes an abandonment of old gods (falsity), but also

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[131] *The Contest*, Essay IX.
[132] Ibid.

the acceptance and celebration of the new ways of thinking represented by the men (truth). It is also worth noting that Poet IX refers to the grotto as "Carolina's cell"—a motif employed in the other essays, and one that has significant import for the discussion of Locke that would take place within the next thirty years in the context of British nationalism.

In addition to Essay IX, Essays I, V, VI, VIII, IX, and XI all refer to the grotto as Queen Caroline's "cell." Essay I, for example, is known to be written by John Duick.[133] Duick exhorts us to "Behold her venerable cell!" Poet V remarks that "Her Grotto venerably wild,/ Seems like *Calypso*'s fabled cell," which "Here Carolina, sapient Queen,/ Revolves the labours of the wise." PoetVI notes that it is in the grotto that "the solitary *Queen*" retreats to "her humble *Cell*, and turns her eyes/ Where the five venerable *Bustoes* rise." According to Brown, the author of Essay VIII, upon a visit to the grotto, the Queen's "*venerable* Cell survey,/ And to its *honour'd guests* our *solemn visit* pay." Poet XI, lastly, refers to the grotto as "Carolina's contemplative cell." As we have seen even in the mentions of Locke alone, Her Majesty was depicted as partaking in the same intellectual life as the men she memorialized within the grotto. We have also noted that Locke, Wollaston, Newton, Clarke, and Boyle were interpreted by these same poets as representing different aspects of newfound British way of thinking; however, as a structure comparable to a shrine or temple, it was a place people were expected to visit, in order to be inspired by such thought. In this same light, as a "cell" of the Queen, it

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[133] De Montluzin, Attributions of Authorship in the *Gentlemen's Magazine*.

was a place of isolation, solitude, and private contemplation, a place removed from the rest of the world.

On a national level, this decidedly monastic language portrays Britain as an incubator of intellectualism, a point made salient by an anecdote alluded to by Brown. The poet addresses Her Majesty directly:

> Yet if, *illustrious Queen*, her fond request
>
> The *muse* might offer, to thy *gen'rous breast*,
>
> When with *like favours* thy *unwearied hand*
>
> Prepares a-new to *bless* a *grateful land*,
>
> Thy *Milton*, oh! thy *Britain*'s *Orpheus* grace,
>
> And *introduce him* to the *sacred race*;

In alluding to "Thy *Milton*," Brown recalls an anecdote found in Voltaire's *Letters* in which Queen Caroline is said to have taken care of one of Milton's daughters when it was discovered that she was impoverished. As Voltaire writes, "'Tis she, who being inform'd that a Daughter of *Milton* was living, but in miserable Circumstances, immediately sent her a considerable Present."[134] Brown compares the Queen's care for one of Milton's daughters to the Queen's care for Britain's intellectual heritage. By memorializing the nation's intellectuals within the grotto, she ensured the survival of their future memory, just as donating to Milton's daughter ensured her own survival and a very much living part of England's preeminent poet.

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[134] Voltaire, "Letter XI," in *Letters Concerning the English Nation* (1733), 79.

Within a single generation after his death, Locke had become an integral part of England's intellectual heritage, and Queen Caroline memorialized this in the grotto, ensuring his perseverance as such. Locke's status as one of England's most brilliant intellectuals endured well into the next generation as well.

CHAPTER V

LOCKE AS REFORMER, 1764

In 1761, seemingly confirming the premonitions of the grotto, Oliver Goldsmith wrote in his *Memoirs of Monsieur de Voltaire* that "England, about this time, was coming into repute thro' Europe, as the land of philosophers. Newton, Locke, and others began to attract the attention of the curious, and drew hither a concourse of learned men from every part of Europe."[135] A mere three years later, in 1764, Goldsmith suggests that their reputation had become firmly established, writing, "That spirit of philosophy which had been excited in former ages, still continued to operate with the greatest success, and produced the greatest men in every profession."[136] Among the philosophers mentioned by Goldsmith are three of the five men featured in the grotto: Newton, Clarke, and Locke. Among all the English philosophers, Goldsmith identifies Locke as the greatest since it is he "who may be justly said to have reformed all our modes of thinking in metaphysical inquiry."[137] What in previous generations had been identified as "under-labouring" or "correct reasoning" had now come to be called "reforming."

As a reformer, Locke and his philosophy had come to acquire a decidedly historical character as responding to the theoretical issues of the day, as Goldsmith writes,

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[135] Nicholas Cronk, ed. "Extract from Oliver Goldsmith's *Memoirs of M. de Voltaire*," in *Letters Concerning the English Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): 162.
[136] Oliver Goldsmith, *An history of England, in a series of letters*, vol. 2 (1764), 137.
[137] Ibid.

> Though the jargon of schools had been before him arraigned, yet several of their errors had still subsisted, and were regarded as true. Locke therefore set himself to overturn their systems, and refute their absurdities; these he effectually accomplished; for which reason his book, which, when published, was of infinite service; it may be found less useful at present, when the doctrines it was calculated to refute, are no longer subsisting.[138]

Two generations after his death, Locke's philosophy was already viewed as dated, although still regarded as important in the establishment of the now-celebrated English way of doing philosophy. Remarking on the grotto, which by this time had become a distant memory, Benjamin Martin remarked that with regard to Locke:

> His Character has been often attempted, particularly by Mr. *Peter Coste*, his Companion and Amanuensis: But the highest Elogium upon him was certainly that of the late Queen *Caroline*, who erected a Pavilion in *Richmond* Park in Honour of Philosophy, where she placed our Author's Bust on a Level with *Bacon*, *Newton*, and *Clarke*, as the four principal *English Virtuosi*.——But this Parallel will not meet with much Approbation from those who best understand Nature and Science.[139]

It was Boyle's likeness, of course, which was featured in the Grotto, not Bacon's; however, Martin's point still is clear: unlike Queen Caroline, who regarded the grotto as monument to deism, or those submitting poetry to the contest, which regarded it as a

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[138] Ibid, 137-138.
[139] Benjamin Martin, *Biographia philosophica* (1764), 392.

monument to Englishness, Martin instead understood it as a monument to natural philosophy. Because of this, Martin suggests that the inclusion of Locke among the great natural philosophers may not be as appropriate as it may once have been, at least by the standards of contemporary science. Martin's observation compliments that of Goldsmith, since both note Locke's historical importance in establishing England's intellectual legacy, while downplaying the relevance of his ideas in 1764.

While his ideas may have been antiquated, Locke himself was anything but obsolete. Regarded now as perhaps 'England's philosopher,' he was injected to the center of a mid-eighteenth-century foreign policy debate. In 1764, Richard Hurd published *Dialogues on the Uses of Foreign Travel* in which he relates a series of conversations between a fictitious "Mr. Locke" and a fictitious "Lord Shaftesbury."[140]

Richard Hurd was born in 1720, sixteen years after the death of Locke, and so had no memory of the actual man. He was a member of the clergy in the Church of England, eventually becoming a bishop.[141] His dialogues are narrated by "Lord Shaftesbury" as a series of conversations he had with "Mr. Locke" as to whether or not travel outside of Britain is necessary for the development of an English gentleman. Presented as found text, the dialogues are dated as being from the year 1700; however, within the text itself we also get some indication as to their intended context. In his

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[140] For clarity, I refer to the characters in Hurd's dialogues as "Mr. Locke" and "Lord Shaftesbury" (with quotation marks), to distinguish them from the actual Locke and actual Shaftesbury to whom they are analogue.

[141] G. M. Ditchfield and Sarah Brewer, "Hurd, Richard (1720-1808)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

preamble, “Lord Shaftesbury” remarks that omitting the circumstances of their conversation is entirely permissible, because such

> punctilios of decorum are thought too constraining, and, as such, are widely laid aside, by the early moderns. the very notion of Dialogue, such as it was in the politest ages of antiquity, is so little comprehended in our days that I question much, if these papers were to fall into other hands, than your own, whether they would not appear in a high degree fantastic or visionary.[142]

These offhand remarks serve the twofold purpose of presenting the dialogues as “found” and explicitly situating the conversation itself within the “early” modern period, which “Lord Shaftesbury” evidently regarded as an age in which philosophical discourse was confined to peers. “Lord Shaftesbury’s” reference to the “early” modern period is significant, as it only meaningful relative to the “modern” period, which is Hurd’s own.

Furthermore, the dialogues appear “found” to us, because “Lord Shaftesbury” remarks that he recorded them for benefit of another author, Robert Molesworth. Unlike Hurd, Molesworth was a contemporary of Locke’s, living from 1656-1725. Significant to his role here, Molesworth was appointed as an envoy to Denmark by King William in 1689, an experience which was formative in his political outlook. This time in Denmark engendered him feelings of resentment and hostility toward the Danes, in particular what he perceived as their authoritarian government. His publication of *An Account of Denmark* in 1692 captured his resentment of the Danes, subsequently ending any further

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[142] Richard Hurd, *Dialogues on the uses of foreign travel* (1764), 6.

relationship he might have with them, as well as frustrated foreign relations between Denmark and the king.[143] "Lord Shaftesbury" expressly identifies the purposes of the dialogues to Molesworth as "putting into your hands a faithful account of his sentiments on the conduct and use of *Travelling*: Especially, as you will perceive at the same time what *my* notions are (if that be any importance to you) on the same subject."[144] So, the dialogues are framed as private advice on the uses of travel, and that advice is purported to come through the words of Shaftesbury and Locke.

In his *Account of Denmark*, Molesworth considers the worth of travel outside of England as akin to observing the progression of a disease, thereby acquiring an appreciation for health, without experiencing that disease for oneself, writing: "Want of *Liberty* is a Disease in any Society or Body Politick, like want of *Health* in a particular Person, and as the best way to understand the nature of Distemper aright is to consider it in several Patients."[145] The English in particular, Molesworth contends, not only have an urgent reason to undertake such travel but also have the resources to do so: they, in his words, "may propose to reap greater benefit by *Travel*, and yet none have practiced it less."[146] According to Molesworth, it is the wealth of England that affords the ability to travel, and the instability of England which compels it.

Molesworth observes that England has a history of political turmoil, rendering its constitution precarious and in need of preservation. This, he thinks, can be remedied by

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[143] D. W. Hayton, "Molesworth, Robert first Viscount Molesworth (1656-1725)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
[144] Hurd, *Dialogues on the uses of foreign travel*, 5.
[145] Molesworth, *An account of Denmark, as it was in the year 1692* (1694), 4.
[146] Ibid., 5.

travel: "Methinks a method to preserve our Commonwealth in its legal state of Freedom, without the necessity of a Civil War once or twice every Age, were a benefit worth searching for, though we went to the furthest corners of the world in quest of it."[147] Compelled to travel for so weighty a reason, Molesworth now considers just who is to undertake such a grave journey. Travel, he writes, "is more incumbent on the Gentlemen of *England* than any others," because it is this social class that governs the country.[148] Furthermore, such a task is even more critical, because at this time in 1694, Molesworth notes that, "the eyes of most part of the World are now upon us, and take their measures from our Councils."[149] With the eyes of the world shifting to England, Molesworth turns his attention to England's current travel practices.

Molesworth bemoans England's habit of sending abroad uneducated and immature children. He claims that parents would send their children abroad the intention of receiving a return on their investment; instead, they actually lost more than they gained. Inveighing against this practice, Molesworth comments: "We send them abroad Children, and bring them home great boys," meaning that the children have actually learnt nothing, returning home with equal or perhaps greater immaturity.[150] Molesworth lists the losses incurred by sending such children abroad: "Foppishness" at the expense of their religion, "Pageantry, Luxury, and Licentiousness" at the expense of their government, and "gilded *Slavery*" at the expense of liberty. [151] All of these things, are

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[147] Ibid., 12.
[148] Ibid., 12.
[149] Ibid., 14.
[150] Ibid., 7.
[151] Ibid.

demanded by the youth upon their return, and if not met cause them to "exclaim against their old fashion'd Country-men, who will not reform the Constitution according to the new foreign Mode."[152] If anything is to gained by children sent abroad, Molesworth thinks, it is knowledge of other languages; however, this singular benefit is fall outweighed by the detrimental attitudes and beliefs they bring home upon their return.

Instead, Molesworth argues that it is men who should be traveling abroad, because they have both the education and maturity to make sense of what they observe and experience, without impulsively dispensing with everything from their home country. As Molesworth writes: "the travelling recommended here is that of *Men*, who set out so well stock'd with the knowledge of their own Country, as to be able to compare it with others, whereby they may both supply it where they find it wanting, and set a true value on't where it excels."[153] Thus, in order to make England a peaceful nation that does not continually resort to civil turmoil and war to solve its constitutional problems, travelers are needed to anticipate and correct those problems before they end in social turmoil. To make this happen, travelers must be well-versed in their home country before they observe others—something which Molesworth thinks is best accomplished by philosophers.

Rather than inciting the youth to rebellion, Molesworth believes that philosophers instead encourage patriotism. It is the priests, he claims, that have fostered attitudes of insolence towards liberty. In fact, when the English youth go abroad to the

[152] Ibid., 8.
[153] Ibid., 8.

European continent, they encounter entire countries run by priests. In commenting on these countries, Molesworth writes:

> Had these Countries, whilst they were free, committed the Government of their Youth to *Philosophers* instead of *Priests*, they had in all probability preserv'd themselves from the yoak of Bondage to this day, whereas now they not only endure it, but approve of it likewise.[154]

The priests, in other words, encourage bondage, while the philosophers encourage freedom. Philosophers encourage freedom by teaching civic virtues to the youth, including patriotic duty and respect for the rule of law, as well as moral virtues which support these. In Molesworth's eyes, England faces continual political upheaval precisely because such virtues have not only filed to be instilled, but have increasingly been undermined by the youth returning home: "The managers of our modern Education have not been quite so publick Spirited, for it has been, as I have shewn, for the most part in the hands of Men who have a distinct Interest from the Publick."[155]

Hurd's *Dialogues* are framed as "Lord Shaftesbury's" response to Molesworth, which is in keeping with the work's purported setting, as Locke, Shaftesbury, and Molesworth were all contemporaries. Specifically, "Lord Shaftesbury" purports to be responding to Molesworth's "Letter of Inquiry," commenting to Molesworth that, "it looks as if you wanted to draw from me a confirmation of your own sentiments, rather

[154] Ibid., 22.
[155] Ibid., 24.

than a candid examination of them."[156] Molesworth, in other words, is portrayed as soliciting confirmation from "Lord Shaftesbury" for his own views on travel. Having made these views clear in his *Account of Denmark*, we know that Molesworth's position is that only educated English gentlemen should travel abroad, and when they do, they should keep an eye for improvements of the fatherland.

"Lord Shaftesbury" then relates to Molesworth that he "just then happened to amuse" himself "with recollecting a conversation, which, not many days before, had passed between me and a certain philosopher of great note, on that very subject."[157] That "great philosopher," he had in mind was "Mr. Locke." Describing his opinion of the philosopher, "Lord Shaftesbury" notes that, while his moral philosophy "is too modern for my relish," both he and Molesworth should listen to "Mr. Locke" when it comes to travel, because, "no man is more able, than Mr. Locke, or more privileged by his long experience, to give us Lectures on the good old chapter of *Education*."[158] From this, Hurd positions both "Lord Shaftesbury" and Molesworth as interlocutors to "Mr. Locke." In other words, "Mr. Locke" is positioned as educating them both at the same time.

It is worth noting that throughout his *Dialogues* on travel, Hurd provides hints situating the dialogue within its "early" modern period. This, of course, is understood in contrast with Hurd's own (1764) "modern" period. Both, however, are understood in

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[156] Hurd, *Dialogues on the uses of foreign travel*, 3, 2.
[157] Ibid., 3.
[158] Ibid., 4.

relation to those periods that came before them. From the very start of their dialogue, this is evident in "Lord Shaftesbury's" begging the pardon of Molesworth for the lack of explicit old-fashioned content at the beginning of the dialogues (as one would, perhaps, find in a dialogue of Plato). Writing about his conversation with "Mr. Locke," he explains: "If I composing a Dialogue in the old mimetical form, I should tell you, perhaps, the occasion that led us into this track of conversation;" however, he is not writing according to archaic rules, but rather to distinctly modern ones, since nowadays he notes, "these punctilios of decorum are thought too constraining, and, as such, are wisely laid, by the early moderns."[159] Having laid out the composition of the dialogue, "Lord Shaftesbury" now relates his conversation with "Mr. Locke."

"Lord Shaftesbury" purposes the main question of the dialogue to "Mr. Locke," as to whether travel is the best way to educate England's youth: "And is not travelling then, in your opinion, one of the best of those methods, which can be taken to polish and form the manners of our liberal youth, and to fit them for the business and conversation of the world?"[160] Just as Hurd framed Molesworth as seeking confirmation of his views from "Lord Shaftesbury," he now frames "Lord Shaftesbury" as also seeking confirmation of his own views from "Mr. Locke." Evidently, "Lord Shaftesbury" is of the position that that travel is indeed among the best methods for educating English youth. "Mr. Locke," however, will not agree.

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[159] Ibid., 5-6.
[160] Ibid., 8.

Responding to his assertion, “Mr. Locke” declares: “I think not” insofar “as *travel* is considered as a part of early tutorage and education, I see nothing but mischiefs spring from it”[161] “Lord Shaftesbury” then attempts to argue, perhaps alluding to the experience of Molesworth, that his personal experiences in travel have greatly enhanced his education. “Mr. Locke” replies that in this, “as in other cases, the rule is general, tho’ with some exceptions.”[162] In response to this rebuke, Lord Shaftesbury” reformulates his question, asking:

> Whether, in general, *Travel* be not an excellent school for our ingenuous and noble youth; and whether it may not, on the whole, deserve the countenance of a philosopher, who understands the world, and his himself been formed by it?[163]

“Mr. Locke,” insists that philosophy has always been against travel as a general rule, and that the ancient Greek philosophers that “Lord Shaftesbury” cites as his examples were merely responding to the demands of their era, in which wisdom was accessible only by a select few.

Here, we see yet another contrast alluded to between the “early” modern world and its predecessors. “Mr. Locke” draws such a contrast between those philosophers of the ancient world and those of the present:

> the Sages of those times made a wondrous mystery of their wisdom: a sure sign, perhaps,

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[161] Ibid., 8-9.
[162] Ibid., 10.
[163] Ibid., 10.

> that they were not overstocked with it. It was confined to certain schools and fraternities; or it was locked up still more closely in the breasts of particular persons. Knowledge was not then diffused in books and general conversation, as amongst us; and the way to become wise was to frequent the academies or houses of those privileged men, who, by a thousand ambitious arts, had drawn to themselves the applause of veneration of the rest of the world.[164]

There is a certain nostalgia for the past in what "Mr. Locke" observes. While the ancients confined wisdom to a select few, the moderns "diffused" it to everyone; While wisdom was something that the ancients sought out from a few sages, wisdom was something the modern philosophers sent out to everyone. Furthermore, "Mr. Locke" calls the mysteriousness with which the ancients obscured their wisdom as a mark of their humility. Not only that, but the ancients who traveled were already philosophers, as "Mr. Locke" points out: "They were *Sages*, that travelled: And we are now inquiring, whether this be the way for young men to *become* Sages."[165] Evidently, "Lord Shaftesbury" has forgotten the very question they were trying to answer.

Nevertheless, "Lord Shaftesbury" insists that their contemporary, i.e. "early" modern, philosophers have also traveled. "Mr. Locke," however, notes that their world is really not different from that of the ancients, for "I know what is to be said for the voyagers in Elizabeth's time. We were just then emerging from ignorance and barbarity," and "The state of *Europe* at that time was not unlike what I observed of the

[164] Ibid., 13.
[165] Ibid., 14-15.

old world, when knowledge was in a few hands, and the exclusive property, as it were, of particular persons."[166] In other words, traveling was effective for the "early" modern because England sent her philosophers abroad, and those philosophers knew what to look for to the aid the improvement of the country.

With time, however, "Mr. Locke" relates that "our curious and courtly youth," and not the just the philosophers, were sent abroad and "it is no secret that the civility, we thus acquired, was dearly paid for; and that Irreligion and even Atheism, were, by mistake, packed up with their other curiosities."[167] Thus far, Molesworth would seem to agree with "Mr. Locke," based on his observations in his *Account of Denmark*: sending the uneducated youth abroad is dangerous and harmful to England, while sending the educated abroad is beneficial for the county. It is, however, important to note that Molesworth was neither a sage nor a philosopher, and his travels eventually compromised England's foreign relations with Denmark.

With this in mind, "Lord Shaftesbury's" retort to "Mr. Locke" can also be read as Molesworth's rejoinder: "And so, because Travelling may, by accident, be attended with some ill effects, you roundly determine against the thing itself; as if the national improvement in arts and civility, which unquestionably arose from it, were to go for nothing!"[168] It is at this point that their conversation becomes overtly political. "Lord Shaftesbury" claims that limiting the foreign travels of youth is like a mother confining

[166] Ibid., 17.
[167] Ibid., 18.
[168] Ibid., 20.

her children to the home, weakening their immunity and causing sickliness: "to leave it in that sordid state, for fear of those abuses, is methinks but acting with the weak apprehension of fond mothers; who deny their children the liberty of stirring from the fire-side, for fear of the dirt or damp, air, which, in their field-exercises, may chance to incommode them."[169] In response, "Mr. Locke" claims that the health of the mind is not the same as the health of the body, and it is the health of the mind that is in question: "The allusion would be apt, if the health of the mind, as of the body, depended on the use of such Liberty."[170] Subsequently, in response to "Mr. Locke's" criticism, "Lord Shaftesbury" turns the dialogue to a discussion of virtue and vice, and moral character.

"Lord Shaftsbury" insists that "Mr. Locke's" confinement of people to England will "shut up mankind in absolute and incurable barbarism."[171] Pointing out that his country, England, is not so innocent, "Lord Shaftesbury" chides that with respect to vice, "it will be hard to keep clear of it in any part of the world, that I am acquainted with: Unless perhaps you take this happy Island of our's to be as free from Vice, as a Neighbouring one, they say, is from Venom."[172] In response to this claim that England is not herself free from vice, "Mr. Locke" suggests that there are different degrees of vice that may be further exacerbated, "by rambling into countries where it may chance to rage with greater virulence, or where such modes of it, at least, prevail as are luckily

[169] Ibid., 21.
[170] Ibid., 22.
[171] Ibid., 21.
[172] Ibid., 22.

unknown to us."[173] "Lord Shaftesbury's" argument is that England will benefit from foreign travel, regardless of who undertakes that travel.

To this point, "Lord Shaftesbury" suggests that while all European youth on the continent may benefit from travel, the youth in England would benefit more, given their isolation on an island. "Mr. Locke," he claims would be exacerbating this particular disadvantage by denying them the same experience as their peers:

> The youth of the most accomplished people in *Europe* would have much to correct in themselves, and something, perhaps, to learn, in their voyages into the neighbouring nations; however inferiour to their own, in the general state of knowledge and politeness. What then, must be the case of our English youth, confined in this remote corner among themselves, and indulged in their own rustic and licentious habits?[174]

According to "Lord Shaftesbury," not only are English youth disadvantaged by living on an island, but they are also stereotyped and "stigmatized" as being less civilized than those on the continent. "Mr. Locke," in insisting that foreign travel not be undertaken by the youth, would be denying them a formative aspect of their education:

Our northern climate has never been famous for the civility of it's inhabitants; who have

> rather been stigmatized in all ages, and are still considered by the rest of *Europe*, as proud, churlish, and unsocial. The very circumstance of our being Islanders

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[173] Ibid., 23.
[174] Ibid., 35.

> seems to expose us to the just approach of inhospitality. And if, we this disadvantage of our situation, we cherish, and not correct, those manners which are so apt to spring from it, let us not take it amiss that foreigners distinguish us by such names, as we well deserve, tho' our pride may suffer from the application of them.[175]

In other words, "Lord Shaftesbury" contends that until action is taken to remedy the problem of correcting English mannerisms and (truthful) stigmatizations, those names given to the inhabitants of England will remain justified. In "Lord Shaftesbury's" view, it is the role of foreign travel to correct these deficiencies.

Given "Lord Shaftesbury's" insistence on the importance of foreign travel for correcting the behavior of English youth, their conversation turns to what such behavior should look like. "Mr. Locke" points out thus far, "Lord Shaftesbury" has only pointed out the defects of the English youth, without yet describing what kind of character they should develop through travel:

> To speak my mind frankly, my Lord, your defence of foreign travel, as lively and plausible as it seemed, has no solid basis to rest upon. You tell us of many defects in the breeding of our English youth, and you would willingly redress them: But in what way this is best done, can never be known from vague and general declamation.[176]

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[175] Ibid., 36.
[176] Ibid., 72.

Having failed to convince "Lord Shaftesbury" of the dangers of foreign travel, "Mr. Locke" now adopts another approach, which is to solicit from him what his ideal English gentlemen would look like. "Mr. Locke" demands:

> To make this inquiry to purpose, some certain principles must be laid down; some
>
> scheme of life and manners must be formed; some idea of model of the character, you would imprint on young minds, must be described; to which we may constantly refer, as we go along; and by which, as a Rule, we may estimate the fitness and propriety of that sort of breeding, you would recommend to us.[177]

"Lord Shaftesbury," according to "Mr. Locke," has failed to describe the results he expects in the youth as a result of foreign travel. This, "Mr. Locke" thinks, has impeded their conversation, because it is based on vague principles and not actuality.

For example, "Mr. Locke" points out that "Lord Shaftesbury" has been inadvertently advocating not the formation of citizens of England, but citizens of the world, rebuking him that: "Your Lordship, it may be, in your sublime view of things, is projecting to make of your Pupil, what is called in the widest sense of the terms, a *Citizen of the World*."[178] By advocating world travel and the adoption of customs they observe abroad, or at least a correction of their own, "Lord Shaftesbury" has perhaps been causing them to also abandon those things that make them distinctively English.

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[177] Ibid., 72.
[178] Ibid., 74.

"Mr. Locke" therefore asks "Lord Shaftesbury" to hone in on the formation one should expect from foreign travel in the creation of specifically English citizens:

> First, if you please, let us provide that he be a worthy citizen of *England*; and, by your favour, let me ennoble this small Island of our's, with the pompous appellation of the world. It is that world, at least, which our adventurer is to play his part; and for the commerce of which it concerns him most immediately to be prepared.[179]

"Mr. Locke" then lists the characteristics of an English gentleman, directing "Lord Shaftesbury's" attention to the English nobility, because that social class would be most influential in national policy.

"Mr. Locke" suggests that such nobility should strive to become English "senators" as the highest expression of service to the nation:

> An English citizen or, if you will, Senator (for this is the station to which our greater citizens do, and our best should aspire) can never acquit himself of the duties he owed his country, under this character, but by furnishing himself with all those qualities of the *head* and *heart*, which his superior rank and pretentions demand.[180]

Youth aspiring to this social role, in "Mr. Locke's" view, should "be early and thoroughly seasoned with the principles of virtue and religion," "be trained, by be in a strict discipline, to the command of his temper and passions," and "be inured to habits of

[179] Ibid., 75.
[180] Ibid., 76.

self-government, or rather directed, to it's right object, the *public good*."[181] In other words, English youth should be educated to value religion, self-control, and the public good. All of these values, however, are only possible if the youth value their own country, England, which runs counter to "Lord Shaftesbury's" recommendation of foreign travel, which "Mr. Locke" pointed out creates world citizens. It must be emphasized, according to "Mr. Locke," that the English citizen, "Above all, That he have a reverence for the legal constitution of his country, and a fervent affection for the great community, to which he belongs."[182] Given his zeal for England, "Lord Shaftesbury" readily agrees with these points; however, "Mr. Locke" points out that these are not compatible with his recommendation for travel.

More alarming to "Mr. Locke" is "Lord Shaftesbury's" portrayal of England as backward compared to the rest of Europe. "Mr. Locke" chides him: "your Lordship was pleased to tell us a very melancholy story. *England*, it seems, is over-run with barbarism and ignorance; it's inhabitants are rude and uncivilized; and nothing can be learnt among them, which is fit to appears in good company."[183] "Lord Shaftesbury's" desire to develop English gentlemen abroad inadvertently assumes that England is degenerate compared to the rest of Europe. Rather than accept this vision of England, "Mr. Locke" instead accuses "Lord Shaftesbury" of backwardness, in that his "Lordship had forgotten to speak of *England*, as it now subsists, in the close of the seventeenth century."[184] "Mr.

[181] Ibid., 77.
[182] Ibid., 77.
[183] Ibid., 92.
[184] Ibid., 93.

Locke" points out that the English have done much to be already considered "men," contrary to the claims of "Lord Shaftesbury," telling him: "It seemed to me as if the English might now, at least, deserve to be consider'd as *Men*; and that in our courts and camps, if not in our colleges, we might stand a chance of finding what your Lordship would not disdain to qualify with the name of *Gentlemen*."[185] The two interlocutors will retain these same positions with respect to the English nation and the people it produces, even at the end of the dialogue.

Failing to change his mind at the insistence of "Mr. Locke," "Lord Shafterbury," is forced to respond to a prophecy of "Mr. Locke" at the end of the dialogues. Here, "Mr. Locke" prophesizes that "the happy period is not, perhaps, far off."[186] This period, of course, is not only Hurd's own, but also includes the generation after Locke's death. First, "Mr. Locke" prophesizes that "the Universities of *England* will be as respectable, for the learning they teach, the principles they instil, and the moral they inculcate."[187] This first prophecy is a rebuke to "Lord Shaftesbury's" assumption that England is inadequate for the education of youth. Next, "Mr. Locke" prophesizes that "scholastic theology shall give place to a rational Divinity, conducted on the principles and well-interpreted Scripture: When their Sums and Systems shall fly before enlightened Reason and sober Speculation."[188] This second prophecy is an account of the deist sentiments that Locke and his contemporaries were seen to have, which, as we have seen, was

[185] Ibid., 93.
[186] Ibid., 192.
[187] Ibid., 192.
[188] Ibid., 193.

memorialized by Queen Caroline in her grotto. Then, “Mr. Locke” prophesizes that “my prophetic eye penetrates farther. Amidst these improvements in real science, the languages shall be learnt for use, and not pedantry.”[189] He specifies that this includes not only the proper use of words in natural philosophy, but also “respect” for the ancients and “emulation” for their writing styles. Lastly, “Mr. Locke” foresees “a freer commerce” between England and the world,[190] and in a facetious swipe at “Lord Shaftesbury,” adds:

> I cannot be mistaken in one Predication, ‘That the mode of early Travel will still continue; perhaps it’s fury will increase; and our youth of quality be still sent abroad for their education, when every reason shall cease which your Lordship has now alleged in favour of that practice.[191]

In other words, “Mr. Locke” envisions the practice of traveling as continuing to thrive in England, in addition to his other prophecies.

“Lord Shaftesbury” remains skeptical and finds these prophecies unconvincing, retorting that while “This last prediction may, perhaps, be true,” nevertheless, “I have no great faith in modern Prophecy, and see at present no symptoms of this coming age of Gold.”[192] It is here that their dialogue ends. In a closing remark to Molesworth, “Lord Shaftesbury” remarks that his record of their conversation left out the contributions of a few others who were with them, commenting that their inclusion “would, no doubt, have

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[189] Ibid., 194.
[190] Ibid., 196.
[191] Ibid., 197-198.
[192] Ibid., 198.

given something more of life to the sketch, I here send you; as their presence, you may believe, certainly did to the original conversation."[193] In a closing remark to Molesworth, "Lord Shaftesbury" recalls that "it gave me a pleasure to hear the old man indulging himself in the prospect of better days, which, as young as we are, and as warmly as we wish to see them, you and I had always despaired of."[194] This confirms the relationship between Molesworth and "Lord Shaftesbury" suggested at the beginning of the text, namely: that we are to read them as both expressing similar, if not the same, sentiments concerning travel, education, and England and in need of correction by "Mr. Locke." While they are pessimistic about England's future, "Mr. Locke" remains optimistic. The reader is left with an impression of Locke that is not only truly as 'England's philosopher,' but also as 'England's prophet.' This sentiment is one that will be challenged a generation later when England faces the realities of world affairs.

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[193] Ibid., 199-200.
[194] Ibid., 200-201.

CHAPTER VI

LOCKE AS EXEMPLAR, 1794

In 1794, the author of a text called *Literary and Critical Remarks*, commented on Hurd's *Dialogues* on travel, observing that "The early impressions are the most efficacious, is a good observation in favour of early travel; yet with this regard; whether it be more desirable that they should be imbibed at home or abroad? But all nations and all things seem now hastening to an universal sameness of nothingness."[195] The critic's position regarding the sentiments of "Mr. Locke" and "Lord Shaftesbury" is one of indifference. A generation earlier, Hurd had portrayed "Mr. Locke" and "Lord Shaftesbury" as agreeing that English youth needed to be educated, but differing as to whether that education was best achieved domestically or through foreign travel. The critic suggests that this debate is now, in 1794, irrelevant because of the "sameness" now erasing previous distinctions in the world—a blasé that had most likely befallen Europe due, in part, to continuance of foreign travel anticipated by Hurd through the voice of "Mr. Locke."

As if answering the predications of Hurd voiced through "Mr. Locke," Robert Alves published *Sketches of a History of Literature*, in which he commented on the literary sentiments of past eras, as well as the present. In Section VIII, "On the Four Æras of the English Language; and their Characters," Alves writes that his own present

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[195] *Literary and Critical Remarks* (1974), 266.

era is the finest in the history of English: “The fourth and last aera of the English Language is the present,” and this period is unprecedented in that “In no age whatever, has such a profusion of light been thrown upon the human mind, or its different powers, whether of intellect, taste or genius.” [196]According to Alves, these great writers, with Richard Hurd included among them, were all “encouragers of polite learning, liberal sentiment; and revivers of the literature, and of the genuine and elegant simplicity of the uncorrupted ancients.”[197] Hurd, of course, will not die until 1808; however, it appears that he correctly anticipated a revival of the ancients, which evidently endured even a generation later.

In this same section, with the benefit of hindsight, Alves also commented on the period that the actual Locke wrote, identifying it as the one directly preceding his own. He regards this period as the “golden era” of the English language:

> The third aera may be supposed to commence with Dryden and end with Pope, as its most finished and accomplished poets; and to begin with Locke and Shaftsbury, and end with Addison and Swift, as most distinguished for philosophy and morality. This is commonly reckoned the golden aera of our tongue;—the two last mentioned writers, particularly in prose, seem to have carried it to the highest pitch.—Neatness, correctness, and elegance, chiefly borrowed from the ancients, seems to be the proper characteristics of this age.[198]

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[196] Robert Alves, *Sketches of a history of literature* (1794), 151.
[197] Ibid. 152.
[198] Ibid. 150.

So, while it was the period of Locke that "borrowed" from the ancients, it was Alves' own period that emulated them. Propriety was also a concern for not only the writing style of the period, but also of the content of that writing.

Despite his mention of Locke as among the "most distinguished for philosophy and morality," Alves also excoriates Locke as precipitating the present state of skepticism and confusion in which philosophy now finds itself. In Essay IX, "On Plapit, Bars, and Senate Orators," Alves writes:

> An airy, though ingenious fabric had been raised, to which Mr. Locke had unwittingly afforded the first materials; Bishop Berkeley afterwards carried on the work with much art and address; and Mr. Hume, with equal ingenuity, reared it higher still, and at last brought it to its highest pitch. All at once this wonderful pile met with confusion, as it were from above; the winds and the tempests blew, and shook it to the foundations. However, Babel-like, built with labour, vanity, and blind ambition; as it had no stable or secure base, like a building on the sand, it yielded to the first blast; it tottered and fell.[199]

Berkeley and Hume took the philosophy of Locke to its radical conclusion, which was characterized by uncertainty about anything. Alves suggests this to be a direct result of the folly of philosophy: its quest for truth was "built with labour, vanity, and blind ambition," yet with Hume that project was dealt a lethal blow.[200] While in Alves' eyes, vanity may have caused the collapse of philosophy's project, vanity and other vices were

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[199] Ibid. 160-161.
[200] Ibid.

also the topic of choice for the anecdotal literature of the period—which often employed the personages of Locke and his contemporizes of models for correct behavior.

For example, the Rev. John Adams in his *Elegant anecdotes, and bon-mots, of the greatest princes, politicians, philosophers, orators, and wits of modern times*, advertises on his title page that his work is "calculated to inspire the minds of youth with noble, virtuous, generous, and liberal sentiments."[201] That project, however, is also within the context of things devolving into the "sameness" observed by the critic in *Literary and Critical Remarks*, as his anecdotes were lifted from the early biographies of Le Clerc and Coste. They are worth repeating, however, because Adams changes some wording of each, reflecting both his purpose and the times.

Drawing from Le Clerc, Adams relates the card game Locke played with several members of the nobility gathered at Lord Shaftesbury's residence, replacing it for his own purposes. According to Adams' version of the anecdote:

> Mr. Locke having been introduced by Lord Shaftesbury to the Duke of Buckingham and Lord Halifax, these three noblemen, instead of conversing with the philosopher, as might naturally have been expected, on literary subjects, in a very short time sat down to cards.[202]

Adams manages to set up the anecdote so as to suggest that Shaftesbury's guests were expected to converse with Locke on "literary subjects," which they did not, choosing

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[201] John Adams, *Elegant anecdotes, and bon-mots, or the greatest princes, politicians, philosophers, orators, and wits of modern times* (1794), title page.
[202] Ibid. 361

instead to play cards. Le Clerc's version lacks this detail, which has the effect of augmenting Locke's importance and social status relative to the guests, perhaps to heighten attention to the moral failings of the latter. Adams continues:

> Mr. Locke, after looking on some time, pulled out his pocket-book, and began to write with great attention. One of the company observing this, took the liberty of asking him what he was writing. "My Lord," says Locke, "I am endeavouring as far as possible, to profit by my perfect situation; for having waited with impatience for the honour of being in company with the greatest geniuses of the age, I thought I could do nothing better than to write down your conversation; and indeed, I have set down the substance of what you have said for this hour or two."[203]

Again, here Adams tweaks Le Clerc's version. Of particular significance is his account of what Locke wrote. In Le Clerc's version, Locke writes that he had "the Honour of being present at a Meeting of the wisest and most ingenious men of the Age, and enjoying at length this Happiness."[204] In Adam's version, Locke refers to his fellow card-players as "the greatest geniuses of the age" and omits that he was "enjoying at length this Happiness." Adams' Locke, therefore, regards his colleagues as neither wise nor a source of happiness. Adams concludes:

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[203] Ibid., 361-362.
[204] Le Clerc, *The Life of Mr. Locke*, 6.

> This well-timed ridicule had its desired affect: and these noblemen, fully sensible of its force, immediately quitted their play, and entered into a conversation more rational, and better suited to the dignity of their characters.[205]

According to Le Clerc, "There was no need for Mr. *Locke* to read much of this Dialogue, these noble Lords perceiv'd the banter, and diverted themselves a while with improving the jest; they left their play and enter'd into Conversation more agreeable to their Character and so spent the rest of the day."[206] In Adam's tale, Locke consciously "desires" to divert them from playing cards, the lords are "fully sensible" of this desire, and so "immediately" stop playing. There is no "banter" or "improvised" comedy; Instead, there is only "rational" and "dignified" conversation. The effect of all these tweaks and omissions is to give the impression of a Locke that is very much a moralist who both exudes dignity and refinement and expects the same from others. Quite clearly, this is the kind of character one would wish to portray in a work aimed at the edification of youth.

Adams also includes an anecdote lifted from Coste, which tells of Locke conversing with artisans. Adams writes that

> Mr. Locke was fond of conversing with mechanics in their own way, and used to say, that the knowledge of arts contained more true philosophy than learned hypotheses. By putting questions to artificers, he would sometimes discover a secret in their art, which they did not well understand themselves, and by these

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[205] Adams, *Elegant anecdotes*, 361-362.
[206] Le Clerc, *The Life of Mr. Locke*, 6.

> means gave them views entirely new, which they put in practice much to their advantage.[207]

This anecdote that Adams records is actually a derived from Coste's reflection at the end of his own. In his narrative prior to this reflection, however, Coste told of how Locke would converse with a gardener, a jeweler, and a chemist (among others) about their respective occupations, remarking that "the knowledge of the Arts contained more true Philosophy, than all those fine learned Hypotheses," as does Adams.[208] Adams leaves out Coste's remark that these "fine learned Hypotheses" lacked true philosophy because they, "having no relation to the nature of things, are fit for nothing at bottom, but to make men lose their time in inventing, or comprehending them."[209] Adams glosses over this, instead remarking simply that "the knowledge of the arts contained more true philosophy than learned hypotheses," without giving Locke's justification. This omission is significant in light of what other commentators were suggesting about Locke, namely: that his philosophy precipitated philosophy's devolution into skepticism. In other words, what was valued was Locke's usefulness as a moral exemplar, not his philosophical contributions. This explains why, for Adams, the significant part of the anecdote is Coste's reflection on Locke, which he repeats almost verbatim. This part of Coste's account is understandable independently of his philosophy, and instills in youth the importance of humility and service to others.

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[207] Adams, *Elegant anecdotes*, 362.
[208] Coste, *The Character of Mr. Locke*, ix.
[209] Ibid.

It is interesting to note that Adams reinforces this message by eliding it with another anecdote told by Coste: that of Locke's favorite maxim:

> He was so far from affecting any airs of studied gravity, that he would sometimes divert himself with imitating it, in order to ridicule it with better success; and upon these occasions he always remembered this maxim of the Duke de Rochefaucault, which he admired above all others, "that gravity is a mystery of the body, employed to conceal the defects of the mind."[210]

Locke's double entendre here remains the same: "gravity" can still be taken either to mean a demeanor of the mind, or a power of matter. The joke, recall, is that an explicable power of matter had to be invented to hide the ignorance of intellectuals, thereby preserving their stature. Because of Adams' preference to deemphasize Locke's philosophical ideas, we can assume that he included this maxim after a discussion of Locke's conversations with artisans, only to urge the youth to dispel arrogance.

Lastly, Adams includes an anecdote found neither in Le Clerc nor Coste, relating to one of Locke's contemporaries, Anthony Collins:

In the latter end of his life, Mr. Locke contracted a friendship with Anthony Collins, Esq.

> to whom he had left a letter to be delivered after his death, which concludes with the following remarkable words: "May you live long and happy in the enjoyment of health, freedom, content, and all those blessings which Providence has

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[210] Adams, *Elegant anecdotes*, 362-363.

> bestowed on you, and your virtue entitled you to. You loved me living, and will preserve my memory now I am dead. All the use to be made of it is, *that this life is a scene of vanity, which soon passes away, and affords no solid satisfaction, but in the consciousness of doing well. This is what I can say upon experience, what you will find to be true, when you come to make up the account. Adieu*."[211]

In this remarkable anecdote, we see a Locke concerned about what his legacy will be after his death. Entailed in this, is a disregard for vanity, as we saw in the other anecdotes included by Adams. Together, Adams' anecdotes portray Locke as an exemplar of moral virtue, as someone who should be emulated for his humility, distain for vanity and arrogance, and mindfulness about how he will be remembered after he dies. These same values were also associated with Locke by other writers within this same genre.

For example, in his "Essay on Pride" in *Interesting anecdotes*, Joseph Addison also comments on the "uncommon diffidence and humility" shared by Locke, Newton, and Boyle—even going so far as to compare their virtue to that of Christ:

> Newton, Locke, and Boyle, who were, perhaps, the sublimest geniuses the world ever saw, were remarkable for an uncommon diffidence and humility. The great Mr. Addison also, it is well known, was remarkable for humility, and an excessive bashfulness. And if such men as these, who raised the human nature to the highest dignity and perfection to which it was ever raised by any, except the

[211] Adams, *Elegant anecdotes*, 362.

> Messiah, were not proud; what can people in general, who pass through life unnoticed, except by a few of their relations and neighbours, and without doing or writing any thing worthy of being handed down to posterity; who are frequently not useless, but pernicious members of society to be proud of.[212]

Here too, Addison utilizes the personages of Locke and his contemporaries to instruct others in modesty. His claim is that if the intellectual greats of England passed through life with little concern for public acclaim (yet are still valued by society), so too can a common person lead a life of humility and still remain valued by society.

Curiously, Locke, Newton, and Boyle were three of the five men represented in Queen Caroline's grotto, noted at that time for their deism and religious heterodoxy. Even in 1794, these men were still closely associated with each other, and the debate concerning their religiosity remained the same, but at a more superficial level. In yet another work of anecdotal literature, *The Beauties of History*, L. M. Stretch purports to write "pictures of virtue and vice, drawn from real life," organized by the moral value in question. In the "Religion" section, Stretch explains that his task is "to consider what has been the faith and practice of the greatest men in our own nation with respect to the revealed religion."[213] His mention of the "revealed religion" is significant, as it contrasts with the "natural religion" with which Locke, Boyle, Newton, and Wollaston were

[212] Joseph Addison, *Interesting anecdotes, memoirs, allegories, essays, and poetical fragments, tending to amuse the fancy, and inculcate morality*, Vol. 3 (1794), 226.
[213] L. M. Stretch, *The Beauties of History; or, Pictures of virtue and vice, drawn from real life; designed for the instruction and entertainment of youth*, 7th ed., vol. 2 (Boston, 1794), 217.

associated two generations earlier. In addition to remarking on the piety of Boyle and Newton,[214] also cites Locke as a model Christian:

> Mr. Locke, whose accurate talent in reasoning is so much celebrated even by the sceptics and infidels of our times, showed his zeal for the Christian religion, first in his middle age, by publishing a discourse on purpose to demonstrate the reasonableness of believing Jesus to be the promised Messiah; and after that, in the last years of his life, by a very judicious commentary upon several of the epistles of St. Paul.[215]

Here, Stretch references Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity* and his commentaries on St. Paul's letters as evidence for his religious piety. Three generations ago, such texts were condemned by William Carroll for concealing Locke's true predilections to deism. Taking these texts at face value, Stretch's assessment is in many respects superficial relative to the analysis done by generations closer to the historical Locke.

Seeming to concur with Stretch, James Hare published *An essay on the necessity of revealed religion* in which he responded to the claim that Christianity could not lay claim to universal truth, because its believers were confined to only some parts of the world, writing:

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[214] Ibid., 217, 221.
[215] Ibid., 219.

> It is objected against the Christian Religion, that its truths are only known in a small part of the globe. The arts and sciences are equally confined to that small part of the globe; but no one, I believe, objects to their truth on that account.[216]

Hare responds that it is enough that the greatest intellectuals of England, including Locke, had read the Christian scriptures and given their approval of them, because they alone could attest to their truth:

> It is sufficient that the Scriptures have been read, and studied, and their truth rigidly examined, by the most enlightened men in the most enlightened part of the world; not only by the clergy, but by Grotius, Pascal, Locke, Newton, Addison, Milton, Boyle, Bacon, and Selden, all laymen; each of them distinguished for learning and genius, and in acuteness of intellect not yet surpassed by any men that have been born; and that these have respectively by their writings borne testimony to their truth.[217]

What made Locke and this group of intellectuals so esteemed and adept at verifying the truth of texts, Hare claims, is their character, encompassing both their intellect and conviction that Christianity is the true religion. It is from these two aspects of their character, Hare contends, that their authority of judgment derived:

> Considering the characters of these men, their superior degree of natural intellect, and the high improvement of that intellect, their firm and unshaken belief in the religion of Christ, after their strict and sever examination of it, is such a proof of

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[216] James Hare. *An essay on the necessity of revealed religion* (Oxford, 1794), 100.
[217] Ibid., 100-101.

> its truth, that if all the inhabitants of Asia, Africa, and South America were to disbelieve it, still it would remain undiminished; for in the investigation and determination of truth, the authority of such competent judges is of infinitely greater weight and consequence, than that of all the collective unlettered men in those religions.[218]

The assessments of Locke and his contemporaries, provided by both Stretch and Hare alike, give the impression of a superficial reading of the characters of those men. In particular, their analyses are based on a mere mention of their works, rather than a close reading of them—as had been in vogue immediately after Locke's death.

Likewise, those reaching the opposite conclusion, that Locke and Newton were really atheists, also made use of this same superficial assessment. For example, the author of *Literary and critical remarks*, who had also criticized the work of Hurd, as we have seen, accused Locke of being a materialist:

> In regard to Locke, most persons seem ignorant, that, exclusive of his contradictions, he was a materialist; and most divines seem to forget, that both he and the Sir Isaac Newton were heterodox. Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity* is a work rarely mentioned by those who seem determined to have all staple writers and perferments on their side.[219]

The critic suggests that Locke is actually a materialist, and that those who think otherwise are "ignorant." In response to those who, like Stretch and Hare, claim that

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[218] Ibid., 101-102.
[219] *Literary and critical remarks*, 88.

Locke and Newton are exemplars of piety, the critic suggests that they overlook the heterodoxy of their texts, choosing to see only what they want. Of course, by suggesting that Locke is a materialist, the critic engages in the same activity for which he condemns other writers, as his assessment is also based on a superficial understanding of the actual Locke. The critic continues this condemnation of Locke by accusing him of not only materialism, but of laying the groundwork for the skepticism of Hume, warning:

> Let the reader consult Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural religion*; the best of his
>
> philosophical works, which by the substitution of sense for inanity, and, as it seems, earnest for jest; are, in comparison with his professed sceptic writings, what Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity* is to *his* sceptic writings, for such I esteem his *Essay on Human Understanding*; the most dangerous, though I will not say intentional ill engine ever put into the hands of ill disposed men.[220]

The critic likens Hume's work on natural religion to Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity*, suggesting these two works, unlike their other philosophical works, express "sense" and "earnestness." For the critic, of course, this means an endorsement of Christianity

It was not only Locke's religiosity that was debated, however: commentators also debated the strength of his political commitments. *The Biographical Magazine*, for instance, calls "John Locke, one of our greatest philosophers"[221] and continues that

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[220] Ibid., 393.
[221] *The biographical magazine* (1794), "John Locke."

"Locke, as a metaphysician, analyzed the human mind, and traced its operations with a marvelous sagacity; and, as a politician, he enforced the principle of toleration, and the love of liberty."[222] Evidently, the *Biographical Magazine* thought very highly of Locke for both his philosophy and politics. As with his religion, the legacy of his political thinking was also contested, and one of its most important critics was John Adams, who would become the second president of the United States.

In *A defence of the constitutions of government of the United States of America* Adams repeatedly mentions that otherwise brilliant philosophers commonly endorse impractical political theories. Among the examples he gives are Plato and More, who, despite their desire to create a perfect society, nevertheless endorsed theories that—if practiced—would precipitate mayhem:

> Chimerical systems of legislation are neither new nor uncommon, even among men of the most resplendent genius and extensive learning. It would not be too bold to say, that some parts of Plato and Sir Thomas More as wild as the ravings of Bedlam. A philosopher may be perfect master of Descartes and Leibnitz, may pursue his own inquiries into metaphysics to any length you please, may enter into the inmost recesses of the human mind, and make the noblest discoveries for the benefit of his species; nay, he may defend the principles of liberty and the rights of mankind with great abilities and success; and, after all, when called

[222] Ibid.

upon to produce a plan of legislation, he may astonish the world with a figural absurdity.[223]

According to Adams, such philosophers should be encouraged to investigate impractical areas of philosophy, such as epistemology or metaphysics, but should not be asked to produce any practical plan for government. Such philosophers can even defend political ideals and rights, but cannot be expected or encouraged to create systems that put those into practice.

With respect to Locke, Adams singled out his *Constitutions of Carolina* as an example of how impractical the political plans of a philosopher can be. Specifically, Adams points out that Locke's plan to establish a nobility was impractical in so small a colony as Carolina, because such an arrangement would reduce the population of any other social classes:

Mr Locke, in 1663, was employed to trace out a plan of legislation for Carolina; and he gave the

whole authority, executive and legislative, to the eight proprietors, the lords Berkeley, Clarendon, Albemarie, Craven, and Ashley; and Messiurs Carteret, Berkeley, and Colleton, and their heirs. This new oligarchical sovereignty created at once three orders of nobility: barons, with twelve thousand, &c.; and landgraves, with eighty thousand. Who did this legislator think would live under

[223] John Adams, *A defense of the constitutions of the United States of America*, Vol. 1 (1794), 365.

> his government? He should have first created a few species of beings to govern, before he instituted such a government.[224]

Locke, he thinks, should have first considered the governed, and only after consider those who would govern. According to Adams, Locke lacked the foresight to see the practical consequences of his political arrangement, regardless of how brilliant he may have been in other areas of thinking.

Furthermore, like Carroll and others from past generations who accused Locke of surreptitiously reasoning people out of Christianity, Adams accuses Locke of swindling people out of liberty. The citizens of the newly-formed United States, however, are in Adams' eyes not so easily duped as their predecessors:

> Americans in this age are too enlightened to be bubbled out of their liberties, even by such mighty names as Locke, Milton, Turgot, or Hume; they know that popular elections of one essential branch of the legislature, frequently repeated, are the only possible method of forming a free constitution, or of preserving the government of laws from the domination of men, or of preserving their lives, liberties, or properties in security; they know, though Locke and Milton did not, that when popular elections are given up, liberty and free government must be given up.[225]

Adams asserts that popular elections are the only safeguard to protect liberties. He claims that not only did otherwise brilliant figures like Locke and Milton fail to realize

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[224] Ibid. 365-366.
[225] Ibid., 369.

this, but that the citizens of his country are actually smarter than those figures were, because they do.

John Adams also said he was "friend to religion," along with Newton. In other words, the new American people, believing in popular rule, would no longer accept ideas simply on account of the person who thought of them.

Adams' account of Locke, like the others we discussed from 1794, indeed captures the sentiment of this generation, expressed by the critical in *Literary and Critical Remarks*, that "all nations and all things seem now hastening to an universal sameness of nothingness."[226] This "hastening" is towards a "universal sameness" now, because according to Adams, everyone is a legitimate critic of important figures of the past. This "sameness" is also "nothingness," because those criticisms are only superficial, insofar as they either repeat those of the past, or do so at an elementary level. In the case of Locke, the same criticisms of his character were repeated from the past, but were in many respects done superficially.

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[226] *Literary and Critical Remarks*, 266.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Having shown how distinctive each representation of Locke's character became at intervals of every thirty years, much is to be gained from such insight. For one thing, it reveals the importance of dispelling common myths of Locke that commonly impede scholarship. For example, commentators have interpreted Locke's reference to himself as an "under-laborer" to mean that he saw himself as only clearing up bad philosophy to make room for the greats, as one would perhaps clean up rubbish. Locke's context, though, reveals an alternative explanation, namely: that he assumed the role of a secular clergy who acted as an intermediary between the greats and their philosophies and the common people and their ways of thinking. This is a very different task from what has been assumed and changes the way one approaches texts such as the *Essay*.

Taking seriously William Carroll's criticism of Locke as a Spinozist and substance monist is also useful, as it opens up new ways thinking about Locke's metaphysics and epistemology, and possibly even his political philosophy. For example, commentators have been perplexed by what is now known as Locke's doctrine of superaddition. The issue of superaddition is really one of origin: it is about how matter comes to think. Arguably, commentators on this issue have treated Locke as a Cartesian, or as at least having Cartesian sympathies. This has led to thinking matter becoming as inexplicable as the mind-body issue. If we take Carroll's criticism seriously, we will think about this issue in a new way that avoids the problems of Cartesianism.

The reception of Queen Caroline's grotto indicated in the essay contest submissions invites us to consider Locke within the context of deism. Because Newton, Boyle, Wollaston, Clarke, and Locke were perceived as advocates for the natural religion, it is worth thinking about Locke's place among them (and other known deists at the time) as not only a philosopher, but also someone with medical training. This would help identify his unique contributions to the deist cause, from a philosophical and medical perspective.

Lastly, we have the portrayals of Locke as a fictitious character talking to a fictitious Shaftesbury, the recycling of anecdotes of Locke in the late eighteenth-century, and his superficial appearance within the revolutionary literature of the America context. These cases remind us that not all later criticism of Locke is informed, or even an accurate reflection of the man to whom they are directed. This should make us aware of our own place as scholars so as to not confuse any portrayal of the character of Locke with the actual man that character is held to represent.

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Knowing the Nature, or of Proving the Existence of the One Only True God, against Hobbs, Spinoza, or any other Atheists whatever. II. That in Reference to God, or Spirits, he reduces Humane Understanding, to the most Incurable State of Scepticism. These Two Particulars are Handl'd and Prov'd Geometrically. III. The Reasons are produced which convince the Author of this Paper, that those Sermons do rather Establish than Destroy, do rather Confirm than Confute Spinoza's Hypothesis. 1705.

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