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LEGITIMACY AND THE SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY COALITIONS*

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*This article is a revision of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association at Atlanta, Georgia in August 1988. The research presented here was supported by NSF grant #SES8420238, Morris Zelditch, Jr. and Henry A. Walker, principal investigators. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kelly Massey in carrying out this research. Address correspondence to Henry A. Walker, Department of Sociology, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242.

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Social theorists have a long-standing interest in political protest. They have investigated its causes, the various forms it takes and the correlates of its success or failure. It might be presumed that an interest in collective protest is spurred by its relatively common occurrence. The overwhelming majority of contemporary political systems are characterized by substantial social, economic and political inequalities. As a result, one might expect collective action against inequality on every hand. However, that is not the case. Collective protest is a relatively rare occurrence. Quiescence and passivity, rather than chaos and protest, are the normal state of affairs in the majority of the world's polities.

The relative stability of political systems with high levels of inequality can be attributed to one or more of several factors. First, the less advantaged may be intimidated by the superior power and resources of the more advantaged. Under those circumstances, the disadvantaged may fail to act because they lack the resources necessary to resolve their dilemma. Second, the less advantaged may not initiate collective action because they are unaware of their true interests as a result of elite control of national cultural and symbolic systems. Finally, others (cf. Stolte, 1983) have argued that the roots of quiescence are social psychological. The disadvantaged are presumed to have lower self evaluations than the more advantaged. As a result the disadvantaged eventually accept the belief that they are deserving of their lot. Put differently, they recognize their disadvantage but accept it as equitable.

Undoubtedly, differences in power, the existence of false consciousness and of low levels of self regard play important roles in reducing collective action against inequality. However, it is also likely that legitimacy plays

an important role in both the initiation of collective action and in its suppression.

It is well known that the actual use of power to maintain inequality is inefficient and potentially destabilizing. As a consequence, most regimes seek to establish the legitimacy of the institutions which create and/or maintain inequality (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Indeed, early theories of collective action (e.g. Smelser, 1963) pointed to the breakdown of legitimacy as an important precondition of collective protest.

More recent formulations (Bachrach and Baratz, 1972; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) point to the positive influence of legitimacy on collective action. They reject the notion that collective action can be sharply distinguished from other forms of social behavior. Collective action is conceived as a rational attempt to mobilize resources for the attainment of collective purposes rather than as a non-rational response to the breakdown of social order. Collective action is generally assumed to focus on gaining control of powerful positions within the polity, i.e. the organization of successful revolutionary coalitions.

When viewed from this perspective legitimation increases the likelihood that a movement will be successful. There would appear to be two distinct but related effects of legitimation on movement success. First, legitimation assists groups in their efforts to define their actions as protest activity rather than as criminal behavior (Gamson, 1975; Lauderdale, 1980). A movement's ability to attract supporters and resources is enhanced if it acquires legitimacy (Gamson, 1975).

Second, collective action is unlikely to occur if its goals or its potential leaders lack legitimacy and/or are unable to obtain it. Potential

adherents will be less likely to engage in movement activities if those activities lack legitimacy. Furthermore, political actors expect that actions which lack legitimacy will garner sanctions from authorities and peers.

While legitimacy proves a useful concept for furthering our understanding of collective action, its use has generated new problems as well. One of the central issues concerns the relative importance of individually-based and collectively-based legitimacy to the recruitment of support for collective action. The research reported here examines the effects of collectively-based and individually-based legitimacy on the support of protest against an inequitable communication structure.

Theory

Weber (1968) discussed two distinct, but related, conceptions of a legitimate order. The first states that a legitimate order consists of "determinable maxims" or rules which are held as binding by the collective. This constitutive function of legitimacy is clearly illustrated in task situations or play. Legitimate rules establish collective definitions of meaningful behavior, i.e. by establishing criteria by which individuals can determine whether an act is meaningful or not. Indeed, there are behaviors in every political system which are not meaningful. They are the options not perceived, and consequently, not chosen--the actions which are politically impossible (Friedrich, 1958).

The second conception points to the evaluative aspects of a legitimate order (Jackson, 1965). That is a legitimate order is also an order which describes desirable models of action (Weber, 1968), i.e. behaviors which are socially appropriate.[1] Members of the relevant collectivity are often rated on the basis of their success or failure in complying with behavioral

standards which are legitimated by the collectivity or for engaging in behavior which group members evaluate as desirable. Although they can be distinguished, the constitutive and evaluative functions of legitimacy are highly correlated in most social orders.

Following Dornbusch and Scott (1975), we have argued that the legitimacy of an institution, position or person can be established from the perspective of any or all of three sources (Walker et al., 1986; Zelditch and Walker, 1984). Individually-based legitimacy, an individual's belief in the legitimacy of an act, person or institution is referred to as propriety. Legitimacy also emanates from the collectivity. Institutions, persons or actions which acquire collective legitimation are said to be valid. It is the validity of an institution or group, not its propriety, which implies the support of others. Legitimation which is sustained by the backing of superordinate agents of the collectivity is called authorization. Authorization can be contrasted with endorsement, the legitimation of acts, persons or positions by lower participants in the collectivity.

Propriety is an important determinant of action. An individual is expected to comply more readily with rules which she or he believes to be legitimate. Similarly, an individual ought to be more likely to take action against policies or procedures which do not possess propriety. On the other hand, it is not clear that actors will commit their resources to collective action simply because the goals of the movement are consistent with their own or because they believe its leaders are behaving legitimately. Our own research (Walker et al., 1987) demonstrates that propriety is neither necessary nor sufficient to persuade individuals to initiate collective protest.

Proposition 2.: For any two actors, P and O, O's support of P's protest action, A_p, varies directly with the validity of A_p or the objectives of A_p.

Propositions 3 and 4 specify the relationship between propriety and validity and the imposition of sanctions against those who initiate collective protest. It might be expected that group members would be willing to commit personal resources to bolster actions which they believe to possess propriety. Alternatively, group members might be expected to expend their own resources to punish those who take actions which do not possess propriety. However, it is not clear that the propriety of actions [or the violation of propriety] is a sufficient ground for exercising collective sanctions.

As an example, any individual may believe that P's actions lack propriety. It is unlikely that collective resources will be utilized to punish P or that collective action will be directed against P for violating the sensibilities of any individual.[2] Collective sanctions are substantially more likely to be employed if the relevant actions are judged on the basis of their validity.

Proposition 3.: For any two actors, P and O, O's support of collective sanctions against P's protest action, A_p, is unrelated to the propriety of A_p or the objectives of A_p.

Proposition 4.: For any two actors, P and O, O's support of collective sanctions against P's protest action, A_p, varies inversely with the validity of A_p or the objectives of A_p.

We report the results of two experiments in the present paper. Each investigation is concerned with the effects of variation in the sources of legitimacy on the support of collective action and on the imposition of sanctions. The investigations share a number of common features. First, the

studies use the same task and the same centralized communication system. Second, all experimental subjects occupy peripheral positions in the centralized structure. In each study, the experimenter establishes the possibility of changing the communication system and a set of mechanisms for doing so. An experimental confederate proposes to change the communication system on the first of an expected ten trials. The primary dependent variable is whether a subject allies with the confederate in the attempt to change the communication system (a measure of support).

The first study examines the relative effects of authorization and propriety on the support of collective action. Authorization of the communication network is varied by making it clear to the subjects that changing the network would damage the objectives of the experiment or by omitting that part of the instructions. Propriety is varied by introducing inequality into the situation.

The second experiment examines the effects of endorsement and propriety on the support of collective action. Propriety is varied, as in Study 1, by introducing inequality into the situation. Endorsement is varied by introducing a balloting procedure to establish the group's preference for a communication structure to be used in the study. Group preferences are communicated to the subjects by the experimenter who provides feedback which purports to be the group's vote.[3]

The research design permits us to use Study 1 to test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1.1.: Compared to S's for whom use of the communication structure is improper, S's who believe the structure possesses propriety are less likely to support attempts to change it.

Hypothesis 1.2.: Compared to S's for whom use of the communication structure is not authorized, S's for whom use of the structure is authorized are less likely to support attempts to change it.

Hypothesis 1.3.: Compared to S's for whom use of the communication structure is improper, S's who believe the structure possesses propriety are just as likely to sanction group members who initiate attempts to change it.

Hypothesis 1.4.: Compared to S's for whom use of the communication structure is not authorized, S's for whom use of the structure is authorized are more likely to sanction group members who initiate attempts to change it.

We expect similar results from Study 2 as follows:

Hypothesis 2.1.: Compared to S's for whom use of the communication structure is improper, S's who believe the structure possesses propriety are less likely to support attempts to change it.

Hypothesis 2.2.: Compared to S's who believe that the majority of their group voted against the communication structure, S's who believe that the majority voted for the structure are less likely to support attempts to change it.

Hypothesis 2.3.: Compared to S's for whom use of the communication structure is improper, S's who believe the structure possesses propriety are just as likely to sanction group members who initiate attempts to change it.

Hypothesis 2.4.: Compared to S's who believe that the majority of their group voted against the communication structure, S's who believe that the majority voted for the structure are less likely to sanction group members who initiate attempts to change it.

Study 1: Authorization, Propriety and Support of Collective Protest

Subjects and Procedures

The subjects in this investigation were 100 undergraduate males who served as paid volunteers. Twelve subjects were dropped from the study due to their failure to understand the instructions or because they expressed suspicion about the experimental procedures. Statistical analyses are performed on the data for the remaining 88 subjects.

Setting and Procedures

The research utilized a standard experimental setting (see Walker et al., 1986). Each participant was seated alone in an experimental room immediately upon arriving at the laboratory in order to minimize contact among the subjects. Each room was equipped with a desk, chair, audio speaker, signalling device, and a variety of messages slips.[4] All instructions were transmitted by prerecorded audio tape.

The subjects were informed that they were members of a five-person team which would work two practice problems and a series of ten criterion problems. Every team was assigned to work in a "wheel" structure (Bavelas, 1950) with

one central position and four peripheral positions. Subjects were randomly assigned to positions in the wheel by drawing colored tokens upon entering the laboratory.[5]

Subjects in the peripheral positions of the wheel could only communicate with the center position which was occupied by a confederate. Group members in peripheral positions could request the center to forward messages to other peripheral positions and were told that the center was required to pass those messages on. The subjects were also told how to make changes in the communication structure.

Any member of the group could initiate collective action to change the communication structure by making a motion that the group vote to add one or more communication channels to the structure. If a second member of the group supported the call for a vote, the office was required to conduct an election and team members were to vote by secret ballot. If a majority approved the proposal, the new channels were added and the team was assessed a small fee ($.05 for each additional channel) on each trial that the changes were to be in effect.

Each team member was given some information at the start of each problem-solving period which could be used in combination with information held by other team members to solve the task. The solution to each problem was a five-point, multi-line graph (cf. Faucheux and Mackenzie 1966; Mackenzie 1976). Team members were required to use written messages in order to exchange information and to solve the problems. Each subject had to assemble the completed information set and draw the solution graph after a complete exchange of information was accomplished. A problem was completed when the office received an answer from each of the subjects.

There was a three-minute interval between criterion trials during which the results were tabulated. The team members were informed that the team would earn $.50 for each correct answer on every trial.[6] The earnings were to be divided equally among all members of the team at the conclusion of the study.

Creating Propriety

The subjects worked two practice problems after they had heard the general instructions. One-half of the subjects began work on the ten criterion trials immediately after they received the results of the second practice problem. The other half of the subjects heard a message which was designed to introduce inequality into the setting. Team members were told that a bonus of $2.50 would be paid to the team member who turned in the first correct answer on each of the ten criterion trials. The host experimenter justified the payment as an incentive to work faster. The pattern of information flow in the wheel structure ensured that the confederate occupying the center position in the network would always win the bonus and earn substantially more than subjects in the peripheral positions. It was assumed that the bonus would lead subjects to treat the wheel as undesirable, i.e. improper. The remainder of the procedures in this treatment were identical to those given to subjects who did not receive the bonus treatment.[7]

Legitimating the Communication Structure

Use of the wheel structure was validated by authorization. One-half of the subjects (those in the High Authorization treatments) heard a message which linked continued use of the wheel to the scientific purpose of the study. They were provided a fictitious history of research using the wheel structure after they completed the first practice problem. The message

indicated that the rental procedure was included as a feature of this particular study in order to replicate the procedures used in an earlier investigation. At that point, the host experimenter summarized the study's purpose by stating:

> "What we want to study is the detailed pattern of information flow in restricted communication systems. On the eighth problem we will measure the detailed pattern of information flow. To successfully measure this pattern, we need you to continue with the same restricted communication system for at least eight problems after you complete the two practice problems."

This instruction was designed to validate continued use of the wheel structure by emphasizing the legitimacy of its purpose. Put another way, the procedure made change prior to completion of the eighth trial illegitimate. Even though change was still possible under the rules of participation, initiating change prior to the ninth problem would appear to undermine the purpose of the investigation and render it less meaningful. Participants worked the second practice problem after they heard the instruction, completed a short questionnaire, heard the description of the bonus (in the Low Propriety treatment), and then began the ten criterion trials. Subjects in the Low Authorization treatment were not exposed to any additional information beyond a basic description of the study.

Support of Collective Action

The experimenter sent each subject a change proposal after the first criterion trial was completed. Ostensibly, the proposal was from another occupant of a peripheral position in the group.[8] The subject could second (support) the proposal or refuse to do so. After a three-minute interval, the

subjects' responses were noted and the problem-solving session was terminated. All subjects completed a post-session questionnaire, were interviewed, debriefed, and paid for their participation.

Results

The principal behavioral results are summarized in Table 1. Thirty-five percent of all S's support a proposal to change the communication structure. Sixteen (51.2%) of the S's who believed the wheel structure was improper supported change. Only 26.3% (N = 15) of S's who believed the wheel structure was proper supported change. Similarly, fewer S's supported a proposal to change the structure when it was authorized by the experimenter (25%) than when the structure was not authorized (45.4%).

Two-thirds of the subjects supported a change proposal when they believed an unauthorized wheel structure was improper. When the communication structure was authorized by the experimenter only 37.5% of the subjects who believed it to be improper supported a motion to change the wheel. Similarly, slightly more than one-third of S's (34%) who believed the wheel was proper supported a change proposal when use of the wheel was not authorized. Only 18% of subjects who believed the wheel was proper supported change when continued use of the structure was authorized by the experimenter.

Table 1 about here

The results of logit analyses of the data are displayed in Table 2. These analyses treat the categorical variable SUPPORT as dependent (cf. Fienberg, 1980:97). SUPPORT takes the value 0, if a subject decides not to support a proposal for changing the communication structure and 1 when the

subject supports the change proposal. The independent variables are VALIDITY and PROP. VALIDITY takes the value 0 when continued use of the wheel is not legitimated and 1 when the experimenter legitimates it on the basis of the purpose of the study. PROP takes the value 0 when a subject indicates a belief that the wheel structure is not proper and 1 when the indication is that the wheel is proper (see note 7). We employed hierarchical modeling procedures in order to evaluate four models, the saturated model, the main effects model and two single parameter effect models.

Table 3 about here

The best fitting model is the main effects model. It is superior to either of the single-parameter models (compare change LHR chi-square values in column 5). The coefficients indicate that both PROP and VALIDITY have significant negative effects on the log-odds of support. That is, the odds of support decline significantly when continued use of the wheel structure is either proper or authorized. These findings are consistent with an intuitive interpretation of the data in Table 1.

The data support hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. Propriety and authorization have powerful effects on individual decisions to support proposals to change the communication structure. Those who believe that the wheel structure possesses propriety are less likely to support proposals to change it. The support of change proposals is also reduced significantly when continued use of the structure is authorized on the basis of its importance to the goals of the investigation.

Table 3 about here

The data in Table 3 are the numbers and proportions of S's who agree to sanction the group member who initiated collective action to change the communication network. The data are tabulated from responses to an item on the post-session questionnaire which asked S's if they would be willing to work in the same group with that participant in a future investigation.[9] The data in Table 4 are the results of logit analyses of the effects of PROP and VALIDITY on sanctioning.

Table 4 about here

The data in Table 4 indicate that the best fitting model is a single-parameter model with VALIDITY as the sole effect variable. The coefficient for VALIDITY is negative and statistically significant. The odds that an S will sanction a group member who initiates an attempt to change the communication network fall dramatically if continued use of the wheel structure has been authorized by the host experimenter.

Study 2: Propriety, Endorsement and Support of Collective Action

The results of Study 1 imply that the likelihood that group members will support attempts to change a communication network is reduced if they believe that the network is desirable or if the experimenter authorizes its continued use. Study 2 examines the effects of propriety and endorsement (the expressed support of similar others) on support of collective action.

Subjects, Setting and Procedures

Subjects in this investigation were 90 female undergraduate students who volunteered to serve as paid participants in a study of communication processes. Ten subjects were dropped from the study due to their failure to understand procedures or for expressing suspicion about experimental procedures. We report findings for the remaining 80 subjects.

Study 2 employs the standard experimental setting described above but there are several differences in the two investigations. First, in addition to being told that this was a study of group problem solving, subjects were told that the researchers were interested in the efficiency of communication structures. In particular, the present study was reputed to be concerned with comparing the efficiency of the "wheel" structure and the "all-to-all" structure.[10] Diagrams of the two structures were displayed on the walls above the subjects' desks.

Second, as in Study 1, subjects were instructed on the procedures for changing structures. However, the only option available to the group was a change from the wheel to the all-to-all structure. Subjects were not permitted to add "only a few" extra channels. If the group members decided to change from the wheel to the all-to-all structure they were assessed a fee of 25 cents (or 5 cents per person) per trial.

Third, in order to vary the propriety of the wheel, half of the subjects were given the bonus treatment after the first practice problem. The amount of the bonus was reduced by $1.00 (to $1.50) so that it would not be so large as to exceed earnings and produce excessive pressure to change structures regardless of other experimental procedures.

Even though S's were assigned to work in the wheel structure, they were given the opportunity to express their preferences for the wheel or the all-to-all structure. The S's expressed their preferences in a poll which was administered after the second practice trial was completed. Each S's preference was recorded by the experimenter and fictitious results were distributed which indicated that either 4 of 5 group members preferred the wheel or that 4 of 5 members preferred the all-to-all network. After they received the results of the poll, all of the S's completed a brief questionnaire on which they expressed the degree to which they approved of the wheel structure and their perception of its efficiency.

Finally, after the instructions were summarized the S's began the first criterion trial. After the criterion trial was completed each subject received a fictitious change message which they could choose to support or not. After a three-minute interval, their responses were recorded and their participation in the study was terminated. All subjects answered a post-session questionnaire, were interviewed and debriefed and paid for their participation.

Results

The data in Table 5 are the basic data on support of change proposals. Fifty-six percent of all S's supported the proposal to change from the wheel to the all-to-all network. S's who attributed propriety to the wheel, i.e. expressed approval of its use, were least likely to support proposals to change it with 38.8% [19 of 49] supporting a change to the all-to-all network. Among S's who expressed disapproval of the wheel structure, 83.9% (26 of 31) supported the initiative to change to the all-to-all network. There is a similar effect of endorsement (ENDORSE). More than 72% of S's who believed

that 4 members of their group had voted against the wheel supported the proposal to change to the all-to-all structure. The level of support fell to 40% among those who were led to believe that 4 of 5 members of their group had initially voted for the wheel.

Table 5 about here

Among S's who approved the wheel, 56.5% supported change when the wheel was not endorsed. Only 23.1% of S's who approved the wheel and were subsequently told that it was endorsed by a majority of their group supported the change proposal. For S's who disapproved the wheel, 94.1% supported change when the wheel structure was not endorsed by a majority of the group members. Support dropped off to 71.4% when the wheel was endorsed by the group.

Table 6 about here

The data in Table 6 are the results of log-linear analyses of the data. The analyses permit comparison of the goodness of fit of four models. The dependent variable, as in Study 1, is SUPPORT, the subject's decision on whether to support the change proposal. The independent variables are PROPER, S's approval or disapproval of the wheel, and ENDORSE, whether a majority of the team voted for or against the wheel. PROPER takes the value 1 when an S approves or approves strongly of the wheel. All other responses are coded 0. ENDORSE is set at 0 when an S is told that 4 of 5 group members voted against the wheel and 1 when the vote was for the wheel.

The main-effects model best fits the data in this investigation.[11] Both PROPER and ENDORSE have significant negative effects on the likelihood of support. Subjects who believe the wheel structure is proper and subjects who are told that a majority of the group supports the wheel are less likely to support a proposal to change to the all-to-all network.

Sanctions

One item on the post-session questionnaire asked S's whether they would recommend keeping members of their group in future studies or if they would recommend dropping them. Only 3 of 59 S's who answered the item pertaining to the group member who initiated the change proposal were willing to sanction her by excluding her from further studies. This finding is surprising, inconsistent with the responses reported in Study 1, and with our hypotheses. We will explore potential explanations for this finding in the discussion section.

Discussion

The compliance findings from both investigations are consistent with our hypotheses which are generated from previous work on legitimation processes. S's in both investigations are less likely to support proposals to change a communication network which they believe to possess propriety. Additionally, S's in Study 1 are less likely to support change when continued use of the communication network is legitimated through authorization by the host experimenter. Finally, S's in Study 2 are less likely to support change proposals when the communication network is endorsed by their coworkers.

The findings on compliance reported here parallel some of our earlier work concerning the effects of legitimation processes on the initiation of change proposals (cf. Walker et al., 1986 and Thomas et al., 1986). That

research demonstrates that the propriety of actions, and whether actions are endorsed and/or authorized all have important effects on the likelihood that public attempts to pursue them will be made.

Some collective action theorists (cf. McCarthy and Zald, 1977) have argued that movements which are able to legitimate their goals and tactics are more likely to attract adherents and their resources than movements which lack legitimacy. Similarly, we have argued (Zelditch and Walker, 1984) that an important function of legitimating institutions and movements is the effect of legitimation on the likelihood of social support.

The research reported here would appear to be consistent with an extension of those arguments. Three different forms of legitimacy have important effects on the likelihood that experimental subjects fail to support proposals to change a communication network which creates disadvantage for them. By agreeing to support a change proposal the subject is committing him or herself to a coalition which could effect change. Finally, subjects are also required to give up some (modest amount) of their resources if their coalition is successful in creating change. Our findings indicate that legitimating inequality substantially reduces social support for movements designed to reduce or eliminate it. Our findings suggest that attempts to initiate collective action are less likely to acquire public support if they are not legitimated. When coupled with our findings on the initiation of collective action, our work suggests that legitimation processes impose important limiting conditions on the emergence and ultimate success of social movements.

The studies reported here also permit us to test, in a rudimentary fashion, hypotheses concerning the relationship between variations in the

propriety or validity of actions and the exercise of sanctions against the relevant actors. The initial findings on this issue are puzzling.

In Study 1, 57% (N=29) of the S's who responded to the questionnaire item sanctioned the source of the change message. That is, they indicated that they would be unwilling to include that particular group member in a future study. In contrast, only 5% (N=3) of S's in Study 2 were willing to sanction the source of the change message. We would like to address two plausible explanations for those findings, gender differences in behavior and differences in the source of validation.

The gender-role stereotypes which predominate in Western society suggest that females and males are socialized to conform to very different gender-role expectations (Parsons, 1955, 1970). For example, it is assumed that males learn to be assertive, task oriented and active while females are more likely to be deferential, socially oriented and passive. Under the assumptions of that perspective, it is possible that males and females have quite different experiences of the task situation. Additionally, the measure of sanctioning in these investigations required S's to state their unwillingness to work with another group member. Such behavior is both aggressive and potentially disruptive.[12] It is possible that women who comprise the sample of S's in Study 2 are less willing to exercise sanctions than the males who were assigned to the task in Study 1.

The gender differences explanation is rendered somewhat less plausible when the two groups are compared with respect to variables which tap the character of their experiences. First, the men in Study 1 are less likely to respond to the sanctioning item than women in Study 2 [58% to 74%]. Second, men are less likely to support change than women [35% to 56%]. However, men

are slightly more likely to attempt other means of changing the task situation than women [16% to 12%].

As the data in Table 7 suggest, the two groups compare favorably on a number of other variables including their assessments of the effectiveness of the wheel [NETEFF1, NETEFF2], the degree to which they express approval of the wheel [PROP1, PROP2, PROPER] and the extent to which they express approval of the bonus and of the amount of the bonus [BONEVAL, BONAMT].

Table 7 about here

A second possibility for explaining the sanctioning findings is associated with the source of validation. Our arguments assume that the exercise of sanctions ought to be associated with violations of the sense of validity rather than violations of propriety. In Study 1, the continued use of the wheel is validated through authorization, i.e. by the experimenter's instructions. The host experimenter made it quite clear that changing the communication structure prior to the eighth trial was potentially damaging to the experiment. Consequently, any attempt to initiate change prior to that point violated the experimenter's and, quite possibly the S's, purpose for participating in the study. The circumstances in Study 2 are qualitatively different.

The wheel is validated by endorsement in Study 2. That is, S's believe that a majority of their peers either do not prefer or prefer the wheel. While endorsement may imply continued use of the wheel, the effects of endorsement on that issue are equivocal. Clearly, change does not imply violation of the experimenter's or of the S's purpose for participating in the

study. Additionally, even if the S initially preferred the wheel and continued to do so, it is not clear that another group member should be excluded from further studies for advocating a change which ran counter to her own preferences and the initial preferences of a majority of the group. It is possible that the differences in sanctioning behavior that are observed across the two studies are the result of differences in the effects that authorization and endorsement have on collective action.[13]

In summary, our research suggests that propriety, endorsement and authorization have important effects on the likelihood that group members will offer public support of an emerging collective movement. Our findings with respect to the effects of endorsement and authorization on the imposition of sanctions against those initiate collective protest are equivocal. It would appear that those who initiate protest activities which are not validated run the risk of incurring sanctions from collectivity members. On the other hand, almost none of the S's in the study which examined endorsement and propriety imposed sanctions on protest leaders. We have suggested that the differences in sanctioning behaviors may be due to gender differences in the subject pool, or to differences in the effects of authorization and endorsement. While there are some indications that the gender differences explanation is the less plausible of the two arguments, a definitive answer to the question awaits further research.

Notes

1. The specification of socially desirable behavior permits actors to make inferences about that which is socially inappropriate, i.e. not legitimate. The admonition to honor one's parents implies that dishonoring them is undesirable. Of course, legitimate orders may offer explicit proscriptions as well.

2. There are obviously exceptions to this general statement. If P violates his queen's sense of propriety or that of a dictator, it is highly likely that P will be punished. However, the imposition of punishment, or the distribution of rewards, is problematic even in cases of substantial power differences. Queens who hold their positions as a result of constitutional provisions will find their capacity to employ sanctions on the basis of personal beliefs severely constrained.

3. The preferences of group members were recorded but they were not reported to the group. Whether the communication structure was endorsed or not was established by standardized feedback which indicated that a majority of the group preferred the wheel or an alternate structure. The S's actual preferences can be used as an alternate measure of propriety.

4. A detailed description of the setting and general procedures can be found in Thomas, Walker, and Zelditch (1986) or Walker, Thomas, and Zelditch (1986).

5. An experimental room corresponded to each colored token (blue, green, orange, red, or yellow). The "orange" room was always occupied by a confederate. Consequently, the orange token was never included in the drawing.

6. The subjects are told that the earnings are awarded to the team, rather than to individuals because no member of the team could possibly construct the solution graph without the cooperation of all the team members.

7. The measure of propriety is taken from the subjects' responses to a question on the short questionnaire which asked them to indicate the extent of their approval of disapproval of the communication network. Subjects who responded "approve," or "highly approve" received a score of 1. Responses which were noncommittal or which expressed disapproval were coded 0.

8. The change message always originated from a peer of the subject. In most instances, the message originated from the group member whose color code was "red." However, if the subject occupied the position assigned to "red," the message originated from "blue."

9. The question asked the S whether s/he would include or exclude the relevant member from a group to be organized in the future. Admittedly, this is a crude measure of sanctioning but its importance lies in asking each individual to vote to deny another group member the opportunity to participate in future group activities. Our basic arguments as represented in Hypotheses 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that S's ought to be willing to take such action if the target's actions were not valid. On the other hand, we assume that S's would

be unwilling to do so if the actions simply violated their own sense of propriety.

10. The all-to-all structure is a communication network which permits direct communication between every pair of actors in the network. That is, unlike the wheel structure, the communication channels between every pair of subjects is open.

11. We ran parallel analyses using the S's preference for structures [OWNVOTE] as indicated by her completion of the poll. The results are similar in every respect. We have elected to use the analysis based on questionnaire responses for both theoretical and methodological reasons. First, our previous research (Walker et al., 1988) has demonstrated that post-session questionnaire responses are a more accurate indicator of an S's sense of propriety at the point of action than measures taken earlier in the sequence of events. Second, N's of S's in the two response categories [proper/not proper] are more evenly balanced when PROPER [49/31] rather than OWNVOTE [60/20] is used as an independent variable in the analysis.

12. S's were told that some groups would be invited to return to the laboratory for future studies. S's had to indicate if they would be willing to return and, effectively, to include or exclude other members of their group from future task sessions. While excluding an activist might have instrumental benefits, doing so may have been conceived as disruptive of an intact group. Concern about disruption may have been especially acute under the circumstances of these investigations. The "offenses" of the target member are not significant in either a moral or legal sense.

13. The plausibility of this explanation is strengthened by the result of another investigation in this series (Walker et al., 1989). Male S's were asked if they would exclude superordinate group members who had imposed penalties on them. The procedural rules for assessing penalties either were or were not established by majority vote of the group. S's were more likely to indicate a desire to sanction those superiors whose actions violated the group standards. The effects of the S's support of the rules, i.e. propriety, was not statistically significant.

While majority vote would appear to be similar to endorsement, it is different in one important respect. The balloting process was <u>authorized</u> by the experimenter as a mechanism for establishing the group's operating procedures. In the investigation described here, majority preferences had no effect on the principles of group functioning. Consequently, endorsement of the wheel might be expected to result in effects which are similar to those postulated for propriety--effects which are quite different from those associated with authorization.

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Table 1. Number and Proportion of S's in Study 1 Supporting Change Proposal by Propriety and Validity.

	Wheel Possesses Propriety		
	NO	YES	Row Totals
Wheel Is Valid			
NO	10 [.667]	10 [.345]	20 [.454]
YES	6 [.375]	5 [.179]	11 [.250]
Column Totals	16 [.516]	15 [.263]	31 [.352]



Table 2. Logit Analysis of Support of Change Proposal in Study 1 by Propriety and Validity (Authorization).

Model	Coeff.	Model Chi-Square (prob.)	Change Chi-Square (prob.)
Saturated Model		0.00 (1.00)	
Intercept	-0.496*		
PROPER (P)	-0.588*		
VALIDITY (V)	-0.522*		
P x V	.080		
Main Effects Model		.11 (.744)	.11 (.744)
Intercept	-0.507*		
PROPER (P)	-0.593*		
VALIDITY (A)	-0.509*		
Single Parameter Models			
Propriety		4.74 (.09)	4.63 (< .10)
Intercept	-0.483*		
PROPER	-0.547*		
Authorization		6.21 (.04)	6.10 (< .05)
Intercept	-0.640**		
VALIDITY	-0.458*		

*p < .05.
** p < .01.

Table 3. Number and Proportion of S's in Study 1 Sanctioning Source of Change Proposal by Propriety and Validity.

	Wheel Possesses Propriety		
	NO	YES	Row Totals
Wheel Is Valid			
NO	2 [.400]	8 [.421]	10 [.417]
YES	11 [.846]	8 [.571]	19 [.704]
Column Totals	13 [.722]	16 [.485]	29 [.569]

Table 4. Logit Analysis of Sanctioning of Source of Change Proposal in Study 1 by Propriety and Validity (Authorization).

Model	Coeff.	Model Chi-Square (prob.)	Change Chi-Square (prob.)
Saturated Model		0.00 (1.00)	
Intercept	-0.289		
PROPER (P)	-0.306		
VALIDITY (V)	-0.608		
P x V	-0.323		
Main Effects Model		1.21 (.27)	1.21 (.27)
Intercept	-0.393		
PROPER (P)	-0.377		
VALIDITY (A)	-0.515		
Single Parameter Models			
Propriety		6.64 (.04)	5.43 (< .10)
Intercept	-0.242		
PROPER	-0.137		
Authorization		2.54 (.28)	1.33 (> .40)
Intercept	-0.264		
VALIDITY	-0.601*		

*p < .05.

Table 5. Number and Proportion of S's in Study 2 Supporting Change Proposal by Propriety and Endorsement.

	Wheel Possesses Propriety		
	NO	YES	Row Totals
Wheel Is Endorsed			
NO	16 [.941]	13 [.565]	29 [.725]
YES	10 [.714]	6 [.231]	16 [.400]
Column Totals	26 [.839]	19 [.388]	45 [.563]

Table 6. Logit Analysis of Support of Change Proposal in Study 2 by Propriety and Endorsement.

Model	Coeff.	Model Chi-Square (prob.)	Change Chi-Square (prob.)
Saturated Model		0.00 (1.00)	
Intercept	-0.587*		
PROPER (P)	-1.036**		
ENDORSE (E)	-0.738*		
P x E	-0.038		
Main Effects Model		.09 (.768)	.09 (.768)
Intercept	-0.650*		
PROPER (P)	-1.126**		
ENDORSE (E)	-0.778**		
Single Parameter Models			
Propriety		8.89 (.01)	8.80 (< .05)
Intercept	-0.596*		
PROPER	-1.053**		
Authorization		16.95 (.00)	16.86 (< .001)
Intercept	-0.282		
ENDORSE	-0.687*		

*p < .05.
** p < .01.

Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables from Study 1 and Study 2.

Variable	Description	Mean Study 1*	Mean Study 2
SUPPORT	S supports change proposal	.35[1] [.48][2]	.56 [.50]
ALTENDRS	S initiated change proposal	.16[1] [.37]	.12 [.33]
NETEFF1	First measure of network efficiency	1.88 [1.17]	1.58 [.82]
NETEFF2	Second measure of network efficiency	1.83 [1.17]	1.66 [.87]
PROP1	First measure propriety of wheel	3.99 [1.20]	3.84 [1.08]
PROP2	Second measure propriety of wheel	3.63 [1.41]	3.57 [1.21]
BONEVAL	Propriety of awarding bonus	4.29 [1.25]	4.05 [1.12]
BONAMT	Propriety of bonus amount	3.91 [.88]	3.76 [.89]
PROPER	Propriety of wheel	.65[1] [.48]	.61 [.49]
SANCTDEV	S sanctions source of change proposal	.57[1] [.50]	.05 [.22]

*S's in Study 1 are male undergraduates while S's in Study 2 are female.
[1]Categorical [0,1] variables. Remaining variables measured on five-point scales.
[2]Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.

TABLES FOR

"Legitimacy and the Support of Revolutionary Coalitions"

by

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TABLE 1. Percent of the Baseline Rate of Change Initiated by Peripheral Positions That is Delayed or Prevented by Various Manipulations of Legitimacy and Power[a]

Experimental Condition	N	Percent of Baseline Rate of Change Delayed or Prevented[b]
Inequality is justified by differences in relative contributions to the task	21	63%**
Change would damage the objectives of the experiment	31	67%**
Collective change is politically impossible	20	43%
Peers believe that the existing structure of the communication system is appropriate	40[c]	49%**
A power legitimated by E prefers the existing communication system	24	60%*
A power legitimated by E could sanction S if he preferred the existing system	24	58%**

Notes:

[a]From Zelditch, M.; Harris, W.; Thomas, G.; and Walker, H.A., "Decisions, Nondecisions, and Metadecisions," in Kriesberg, L. (ed.), Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change, Vol. 5, JAI Press, 1983, pp. 1-32.

[b]There are small changes in procedure from experiment to experiment, but each comparision is made to an exactly similar baseline.

[c]Pooled data from two experiments. After being run with males, the same condition was replicated on females. There were no differences by sex.

*$P < .05$

**$P < .01$

TABLE 2. Proportion of Change-Responses Endorsed by Peers under Various Conditions of Validity and Propriety with Statistics of Best-Fitting Logistic Regression.

Condition	N	Proportion Endorsing Change-Response	Statistics of Best-Fitting Logistic Regression			
			Effect	Parameter (antilog)[a]	Chi Square[b]	P
Baseline	22	.27	Grand Mean	-.8718 (.4182)	4.39	.04
Bonus	22	.64	Bonus	1.3369 (3.8072)	4.74	.03
Validity	20	.15	Validity	-1.0682 (.3436)	7.16	.01
Interaction	24	.33	Interaction[c]			n.s.

Notes:

[a]The magnitude of an effect can be read from the anti-log of its parameter: The bonus, which makes the communication network improper, increases endorsement of a change-response by other by almost 4 times the rate of endorsement when there is no bonus. Validity reduces support of change by about a third.

[b]Chi square for the model is 11.87, with 2 df, $p = .003$.

[c]In the best-fitting model there is no estimate for the interaction effect because it is not significant. The second-best model has a significant interaction but is less parsimonious, because there is no validity main effect, thus requiring a more complex interpretation, and fits slightly less well, $p = .007$.

TABLE 3. Rejection of Confederate Who Proposed Change by Validity of Change and Propriety of Structure (Omitting "No Answers") with Statistics of Analysis of Variance.

			Analysis of Variance				
Condition	N	Mean[a]	Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	F	P
Baseline	12	-0.42	Propriety	7.966	1	4.667	.04
Bonus	7	1.29	Validity	2.555	1	1.497	.23
Validity	7	0.86	Interaction	4.923	1	2.884	.10
Interaction	8	1.00	Residual	51.202	30		
Total	34	0.53	Total	68.471	33		

[a]Mean score of S's answer to a question asking if S would want to work again with the individual who proposed change when E brings the group back at a later date. The same question was asked of each other person in the group. Answers were scaled from +2 (very much) to -2 (very negative).

TABLE 4. Proportion of Change-Responses Endorsed by Peers Under Various Conditions of Propriety and Majority Endorsement of Communication Network.

Condition[a]			
Bonus	Endorsement	N	Proportion Endorsing a Change-Response by Other[b]
No	Wheel	20	.05
No	All-All	20	.55
Yes	Wheel	20	.75
Yes	All-All	20	.90

Notes:

[a] A bonus is assumed to make the wheel improper and the all-to-all proper.

[b] $X^2 = 33.47$, 1 df, $P < .0001$.