INTERTECT

Displaced Persons in Civil Conflict

DISPLACED PERSONS IN CIVIL CONFLICT

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

It has been estimated that there are approximately 20 million internally displaced persons worldwide. These are persons displaced by *man-made* rather than natural disasters. Most have fled from warfare or other types of violence, repression or persecution. They are called *internally displaced persons* because, unlike refugees, they remain inside their own countries. By region, it has been estimated that there are more than:

1. 9 million in Africa — principally in the Horn — in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan; in Southern Africa — in Angola and Mozambique — and another 3.6 million forcibly resettled in homelands in South Africa;

2. 500,000 in Central America — in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala;

3. 4 million in Asia — in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Burma, Lebanon and Iraq; and

4. 500,000 in the Soviet Union.

The causes of displacement reflect the growing instability of many countries. In most cases, the people have been displaced by civil conflict or separatist wars within their country. In some cases, they have been forcibly resettled by their governments. These relocations are often carried out inhumanely and brutally by a government to break the power of a tribal or ethnic group. Others have been displaced because of ethnic strife or persecution.

The flight of the displaced to other parts of their country may fail to provide them with the protection they need. Often the host population fails to accept their presence and they may find themselves in other zones of conflict or highly volatile situations where they are viewed with mistrust by the host community. The displaced are often subjected to

further forced relocations. Sometimes they are deliberately starved or food is used as a weapon to try and bring them under control.

Unfortunately, displacement is usually not temporary; the situations that cause displacement often go on for years without resolution.

B. DEFINITIONS

In this document, *displaced persons* will be defined as "individuals and families forced to leave their homes because of the direct or indirect consequences of *conflict* but who remain inside their country".

Displaced persons are differentiated from refugees by the fact that they have remained inside their country; whereas refugees are civilians who have sought safety by leaving their homeland and seeking asylum in another country.

The term "displaced person" is often used in a broader context. Some organizations refer to people who are forced to leave their homes as a result of drought or famine as displaced. Others include people who have been forcibly resettled by their government if the resettlement is ethnically, tribally or racially motivated. While each of these groups is in a difficult situation, this paper will only focus on people displaced by war or civil conflict who remain in their own country.

C. REASONS FOR CONCERN

The international humanitarian relief system has largely failed the displaced. The 15 million people who have crossed international borders generally fall under the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or other UN agencies and receive protection and assistance. They are eligible to receive food, shelter and medical assistance as well as health, rehabilitation and training; and the UNHCR helps them to integrate in the country of asylum, helps them to relocate to a third country or facilitates their voluntary return. For the displaced, there is no such system. While they may flee for the same reasons as refugees, because they remain within the borders of their own country, they are not afforded the protection that refugees receive. They must look to their own government, not the international system, for their protection even in those cases when it is their own government that is the source of the problem. International human rights organizations and relief agencies are often unable to provide suitable protection or assistance. The

obstacle of national sovereignty is one of the most formidable aspects of the problem.

In 1988, the United Nations General Assembly called on the Secretary General to study the need for the creation of an international mechanism to coordinate assistance programs for internally displaced people. In his report to the General Assembly in 1989, the Secretary General considered the mandates and roles of the different international agencies and authorized the United Nations Development Programme resident representatives to be the focal points for coordinating relief to internally displaced persons.

While relief and assistance are critical to the well-being of the displaced, they must also be protected from human rights abuses. Often these violations are overt; others are a result of government policies that restrict or impede assistance and relief from reaching them. To date, no new resolution has called for specific measures to protect the displaced's human rights.

The Secretary General's report also called for preventive measures and pre-emptive action to avoid displacement, including the addressing of "root causes". Protecting and assisting the displaced is a major challenge. Successful actions can reduce conflict and help lay the groundwork for successful reconciliation, rehabilitation and, indeed, the further development of the country. Inadequate attention to the problem, however, can prolong conflicts, make achievement of peace more difficult and create long-term dependencies that may be difficult to overcome long after the conflict.

II. CIVIL CONFLICT

A. THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT

Conflict within a society may be created by many different factors. In the advanced stages of conflict, especially wars, it is often difficult to identify the underlying causes or motivations of the combatants. It has been noted, however, that wars are the sum of many individual factors, some of which are rather fundamental and which, if thoroughly understood, can provide opportunities for conflict reduction. There are two important things to remember. First, most conflicts are rooted in economic disparities. Later they may be cloaked in ideological, racial or even religious overtones but, at the most fundamental level, they represent a contest for control over economic assets, resources or systems.

Second, most combatants would rather not participate in the conflict. If given suitable alternatives and an honorable way out, most would choose to return to productive enterprises rather than continue to risk their lives.

These two factors give development agencies an opportunity to make a contribution to conflict reduction. By targeting development assistance in such a way that competition for resources is reduced and job opportunities are provided, it is often possible to "drain away" substantial numbers of people who otherwise would be drawn into the conflict. It is also possible to target development assistance so that it draws warring parties away from each other and engages them in activities which decrease the likelihood that they will enter the conflict.

Some of the more important causes of conflict are as follows:

1. Competition for Resources: Most conflicts are, at their most basic level, a competition for resources. This competition may be manifested in disputes over land, water rights, grazing rights, or jobs.

2. Ideology: Of all the causes of conflict, ideology is the most difficult to deal with. In most cases, however, ideology is a later development and is often superimposed on more basic causes as a justification or as a means of organizing people for a common

purpose. An example of an ideologically-based conflict is the war in El Salvador between Marxist rebels and the conservative government.

3. Racism: Racism, tribalism, or other manifestations of discrimination are key causes of conflict. Racism is difficult to temper and, in many cases, even after people have lived side-by-side for generations, a sudden spark fueled by latent racism can lead to violence. Generally, however, racism is superimposed over an economic conflict, for example in Guatemala where the economically dominant Ladino population is fighting to maintain hegemony over the more numerous *indigena,* or Indian, population. If all sides have equal access to jobs and opportunities, to land and other resources, conflict can be contained.

4. Religion: Religion or religious intolerance is another cause of conflict that is difficult to address. Sometimes, religious differences are the fundamental cause, such as in India and Pakistan in the 1940s. But in many cases, this too is superimposed on a more fundamental dispute with religion being a means of rallying people to one side or the other. For example, the conflict in Northern Ireland is often seen as a dispute between Catholics and Protestants; yet at a more fundamental level, the conflict there is a continuing struggle for economic justice and elimination of the vestiges of the colonial period.

5. Foreign Intervention: Many conflicts are caused by foreign intervention. In some cases, there may be outright meddling by a foreign government. In others, conflict may be caused by the presence of foreigners (such as refugees or guerrillas operating out of bases or sanctuaries in the country) who create conflict as an adjunct to their own agendas. For example, in eastern Sudan, conflicts between the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) have often been carried out in the Eritrean refugee camps and even in the town of Kassala. Both parties have attempted to involve Sudanese in their dispute, and the increasing level of violence has created resentment against the refugee population. In addition, the refugees are perceived by the

host population as competing for scarce resources, especially land, water and jobs, and creating strains on the society.

Foreign intervention can also fuel a conflict. For example, in the tribal conflict in western Darfur, the Libyan government has provided arms to the Arab tribes which has increased the level of violence and set off a small-scale arms race in the region.

6. Poverty: Poverty and injustice are major factors fuelling conflict in the Third World. Increasingly, conflicts are seen as a war between the haves and the have-nots. When people perceive that there is no end in sight to their economic hardship, they are likely to take up arms. When stuck in a quagmire of economic oppression and social injustice, large numbers of the poor can be enticed into taking a more activist stance and demanding more concessions and preferential assistance to alleviate economic hardships. The demand for bread has toppled more than one government. It is often said that the poorest of the poor are too poor to start a revolution, and that revolutions are the product of students and the middle class. That may be true, but it is important to recognize that, during the great Sahelian famine of the 1970s, every government affected by famine fell, more than half of them as a result of revolutions or military coups.

7. Cultural Conflict (Leading to Separatist Aspirations): In many cases, two distinct cultures find it difficult to live in harmony. If the two cultures live in separate and distinct geographic areas, it is not uncommon that aspirations for independence arise. Separatism, however, is usually an end-product of a failure of economic systems to provide equal opportunities for all citizens and the consequent establishment of major economic disparities between regions.

   Once a conflict has reached a point where separatism is demanded, it is extremely difficult to resolve. For the most part, separatism is a futile exercise. There have been hundreds of separatist movements since the end of the colonial period and only one has been successful. That was Bangladesh, which was separated from Pakistan by more than a thousand miles of India, and was accomplished only with a full-scale invasion of the Indian forces. Separatist wars are virtually impossible for rebels to win for several reasons. First, the war will be carried out in the homeland. They

will suffer the greatest number of deaths, economic loss and population displacement. Second, the national government does not have to pursue the war vigorously in order to win. As long as the government refuses to recognize the new state, it is unlikely that any other country will extend recognition, especially in Africa where the Lome convention specifies that borders established during the colonial period are inviolable. The inherent fear of every African country that it, too, could degenerate into tribal war prohibits any country from recognizing a separatist state breaking away from its neighbor. Without international recognition, no country can survive, for it cannot obtain hard currency, establish trading patterns, nor obtain vital trading capital from major donors or international financial institutions. For this reason, separatist wars such as the conflicts in Eritrea, southern Sudan and Sri Lanka, to mention but a few, are stalemated and will continue to be so for many years to come.

8. Displacement: Displacement is a major cause of conflict. Displacement may result from a variety of factors including: environmental degradation; the collapse of an economy; food insecurity; localized conflicts over resources; and, inadvertently, the establishment of large-scale development projects such as dams and reservoirs, irrigated farming schemes, new colonization of virgin land, establishment of range reserves, etc. There are few large-scale, capital-intensive development schemes that do not create some degree of displacement. At a minimum, many people may be forced to migrate to other areas in search of work. In the worst case, people that are uprooted may resort to violence to resist being displaced or, in the case of nomads, may alter their migration routes around the development schemes.

It is important to recognize that one conflict will often generate others, especially if the original conflict is prolonged. This is due to several factors. Governments may become weaker and less able to control events in other areas and dissidents may see an opportunity to exploit the government's weakness. The general proliferation of arms that usually accompanies conflict often leads to a breakdown of law and order, especially in areas adjacent to the conflict zone, and local grievances may flare up. Conflict may also arise from the migration of people and competition for resources in the areas of

influx. Even within one conflict there may be several sub-conflicts. For example in Sri Lanka, the principal struggle is between the Hindu Tamils in the North and East and the Buddhist Sinhalese in the South. However, the violence in the East has also sparked a conflict between the Muslim population along the coast and the Tamils, principally over fishing rights.

It is important to try to identify the underlying causes since many of them may be fairly easy to resolve. For example, if a major cause is competition for resources, such as water or pasture, programming development assistance into those areas to increase the resource base may help to reduce tensions and the level of violence. This is an important role for UNDP; no other UN agency has the ability to help resolve conflict with development aid. Agencies like UNICEF and UNDRO focus on relief, i.e., food, shelter, medical supplies.

Sudan is an example of a country where conflict has spread to other areas. The principal struggle is a major civil war in the South. Southerners are demanding more autonomy for their people, who are ethnically and religiously different from the North. Table A at the end of this chapter lists these conflicts and identifies the underlying causes. While these are obviously subjective, they do indicate that some of the conflicts may be attenuated by the targeting of development aid. For example, the Darfur conflict is essentially a conflict arising out of competition for scarce resources. By selective targeting of development aid — such as improvements of pasture, use of range reserves and installation of additional water points — it should be possible to reduce conflict in the region.

Another reason for identifying the underlying causes of a conflict relates to resettlement planning. For example, there are proposals in Sudan to move large numbers of the displaced from Khartoum where many have sought refuge to areas outside the capital where the government believes there are opportunities for work. However, by examining the table, we can see that several areas where the government has proposed to send people (Damazin and Kenana) are already experiencing levels of conflict which could be exacerbated by sending additional displaced to the area.

B. PRESSURE POINTS AND HOW TO IDENTIFY THEM

Pressure points can be defined as zones where demographic and economic changes are occurring, usually rapidly, that lead to possible conflict. These zones exhibit certain characteristics. Among the places where conflict can be expected are:

1. Geographic Zones Experiencing Environmental Degradation: Changes in habitat such as desertification, deforestation, declining rainfall, etc., force people to migrate in search of better land, pasture and water. These migrations may put pressure on resident populations in the areas where the migrants settle, leading to increased competition for available resources. This competition, if acute, can lead to violence.

2. Areas of Chronic Food Insecurity: Food insecurity is normally related to available resources. If the resources are only marginal and periodic shortfalls in food production occur, people are forced to migrate in search of food or work to earn the income needed to procure food. Migrants often saturate local labor markets, driving wage scales down and creating tension between the local workers and the migrants.

3. Labor Poles: Labor poles, i.e., areas where large numbers of day laborers are employed (such as large-scale agricultural schemes) are often areas of tension during crisis-induced migration. Thousands of displaced may migrate to these areas in search of work, drastically lowering the wage scale and making it difficult for the resident workers to find work at a decent wage. In many cases, secondary migration occurs: either the incoming workers continue onward when it becomes clear that they can't find jobs, or the resident workers are forced to migrate to maintain their income level. Experience has shown that incidents of violence may occur around these labor poles as people compete for increasingly fewer jobs.

4. Overpopulation: Conflict often occurs in areas that become overpopulated as a result of migration. Overpopulation may occur at garrison towns where DPs may double, or even triple, the normal population, at villages in transition zones, or in squatter settlements

that quickly become overpopulated with the new arrivals. Conflict generally breaks out because of tensions created by overcrowding or competition for scarce resources in the settlements, especially water.

5. Large-Scale Development Programs: Large-scale development programs such as irrigated farming, dams and reservoirs, etc., often displace significant numbers of people, change the economics of an area or force changes in traditional migration patterns. All of these factors can create conflict in or around the development schemes.

Table A

Conflicts	Competition for Resources	Ideology	Racism	Religion	Foreign Intervention	Poverty	Cultural Identity/ Separatist Aspirations	Development Project-Induced Displacement
The War in the South	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
The Darfur Conflict	X	X		X			X	
Red Sea Hills	X				X			
The Eastern Region*	X			X				
Kenana	X	X	X				X	
Khartoum	X	X	X		X		X	

*Includes Kassala, Damazin, Girba, Etc.

III. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A. ROLES OF UN ORGANIZATIONS

In 1989, the Secretary General effectively designated UNDP as the lead agency for coordinating relief to the displaced. Formally, he designated the UNDP Resident Representative in his role as the UN Resident Coordinator to be the focal point for coordination and relief. In part, this reflects the growing awareness that assistance to the displaced requires the application of development resources to the many problems faced by the displaced. For example, when many DPs move into urban areas, the problem becomes largely an urban planning and economic development issue. If large numbers of the displaced remain in rural areas and seek work as farm laborers, agricultural development programs must often be expanded. While DPs often have very acute relief needs in the initial stages of displacement, as time goes on continuation of relief may not be appropriate. Furthermore, as residents of the country, they are entitled to development benefits and equal opportunities for development assistance as their fellow citizens.

To provide assistance, the UNDP Field Offices have devised a number of staffing models. In exceptionally large emergencies, such as in Ethiopia, Mozambique and the Sudan, the UN has established special emergency units in the UNDP offices and mandated the staff to focus exclusively on problems caused by the emergency. In other situations, the UNDP has simply created a special post for an "emergency officer" to advise the ResRep and prepare plans and projects in cooperation with the host government and the donors.

In several cases where the emergency situation has been deemed to be of extraordinary importance, the Secretary General has appointed a high level, special representative to serve as coordinator. For example, as a result of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the Secretary General appointed the head of UNICEF to initiate the program and then designated Michael Priestley as Assistant Secretary General and Special Representative to Sudan to administer the project.

In 1990, UNDP created the Office of the Emergency Coordinator at its headquarters in New York. The purposes of this office are largely to support the Field Offices with technical assistance and coordination

support during emergencies. A large part of the work of the Emergency Office will be focused on displaced persons.

Other United Nations organizations that often become involved with displaced persons include:

1. UNICEF: Because of UNICEF's unique mandate to assist children anywhere they are in need, the organization often becomes involved in providing assistance to the displaced in areas outside of government control. For example, in southern Sudan during Operation Lifeline Sudan, UNICEF was the principal UN organization responsible for assisting persons in the zones controlled by the insurgents; UNDP focused its attention on assisting people in government-controlled areas and in the garrison towns.

   UNICEF may also be called on to provide assistance to displaced persons in government-held zones. Building on its strengths in child care, feeding for vulnerable groups, family reunification and the provision of clean water and sanitation, UNICEF is often involved in helping the displaced in the settlements and temporary camps where they have moved.

2. World Food Program: The role of the World Food Program is to provide food to governments or in some cases to non-governmental organizations assisting the displaced. If the displaced are in government-controlled areas, emergency food aid may be provided through the government channels. If, however, the people are residing in areas outside government control, the food will normally be provided through UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross or NGOs.

   WFP has established an emergency unit at its headquarters in Rome. This unit provides assistance to the WFP representative in determining emergency needs, managing international logistics and coordinating with donors at the international level.

3. World Health Organization: WHO is the medical and public health arm of the UN system. Their representatives help the local Ministry of Health or public health authorities to formulate and execute programs to ensure that the displaced receive proper medical attention and public health support. One of their most important functions is establishing epidemiological surveillance over the

displaced population so that disease threats can be properly identified, detected and controlled. In Latin America and the Caribbean, WHO's Pan American Health Organization has proven to be extremely effective in helping develop medical and health interventions for the displaced.

Both WHO and PAHO have established emergency sections in their headquarters in Geneva and Washington, respectively. These offices can provide technical support and information during emergencies.

4. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: While the mandate of the UNHCR does not extend to displaced persons specifically, it has been able to provide relief and protection in a number of cases, particularly when the agency has been involved in helping returning refugees in the same area. For example, in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s, UNHCR accepted responsibility for assisting returning displaced persons as well as refugees repatriating from India. When the conflict flared up in the midst of their operations, UNHCR continued to provide relief and other forms of assistance to the displaced until they were forced to withdraw their personnel from the conflict zone. In some cases, UNHCR has been able to extend assistance under a clause of its mandate which permits it to use its "good offices" to help persons affected by conflict at the request of the government of the country in which the people reside. For the most part, however, UNHCR does not provide extensive support or protection to the displaced.

5. Other UN Organizations: From time to time, other UN agencies may become involved in providing assistance to the displaced. For example, the International Labor Organization (ILO) may be called to develop projects to provide employment to the displaced (e.g., under its Special Public Works Program). The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has often been asked to assist the displaced in establishing agriculture or livestock projects to provide income support. Employment generation has often been studied by groups such as the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) or the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).

B. THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

The ICRC is mandated under international agreements to provide assistance to civilians in conflict zones outside of government control. The mandate of ICRC is both unique and specific. Its functions are spelled out under various Geneva accords which have been signed by the majority of the international community.

In order to remain neutral and even-handed, the ICRC usually provides assistance for non-combatants on both sides of a conflict. Therefore, ICRC may be operational in many of the same areas in which UNDP is providing assistance to the displaced in government-held areas and in the garrison towns.

C. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The NGOs are often the front-line implementing agencies providing assistance to the displaced. NGOs are principally service agencies; i.e., they have certain specialties such as nutrition programs, medical care, social services, etc., which they can provide quickly and effectively, even in remote areas. NGOs are often the source of innovative approaches to dealing with the problems of the displaced and their flexibility permits them to experiment with new ideas that may be tailored to specific needs.

Donors such as USAID, the European Community and many European governments prefer to implement their programs through international NGOs.

D. DONORS

Several of the larger donor countries have specialized agencies that deal with the problems of displaced persons. For example, AID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance in Washington often provides funding and technical assistance to USAID missions to develop and support programs for the displaced. However, in most cases, the donors channel their funds through the host government, NGOs or UN system.

Donors may provide aid in the form of cash, equipment, technical assistance or food.

E. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION

The IOM (formerly the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration) is an international organization which has become increasingly involved in the problems of displaced persons. Their mandate is to assist governments in dealing with the problems of migrations, both internal and international. In recent years, they have conducted a number of studies on the impact of crisis-induced migration and have provided assistance to some governments in dealing with large-scale population movements caused by conflict.

IV. CAUSES AND PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

A. CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT

The migration of people out of a zone of conflict may be triggered by several different factors. These factors may occur independently or simultaneously.

1. Military Operations: Ground operations by combatants are a major trigger to migration out of a conflict zone. Ground operations could include invasions of an area, military sweeps, sustained military occupation, foraging or widespread impressment/conscription. It should be noted that aerial bombing rarely causes widespread migration out of rural areas, although if towns or cities are attacked and urban dwellers have open escape routes, many may evacuate.

2. Destruction of Crops or Economic Assets: If military activities destroy standing crops, livestock, harvested grains, or the economic assets of villagers on a wide scale, people in the affected area are likely to migrate.

3. Food Shortages: Conflict can disrupt both agricultural production and food marketing creating both a shortage of food and a lack of income for people in the food production and supply chain. As food shortages increase, migration will increase proportionately.

4. Collapse of Agricultural Systems: In most Third World countries, agricultural systems are extremely vulnerable to conflict. Conflict can cause a break anywhere in the production sequence, thereby causing a substantial reduction of output. If this production loss is substantial, the agricultural system can break down and create food shortages and, more importantly, loss of income for large numbers of people. When that occurs, famine is likely to break out and large numbers of people will be forced to migrate.

5. Collapse of the Economy: Conflict can cause the collapse of an economy in many ways. It can destroy or disrupt the marketing systems. It can destroy the economic assets of a community. It can

push the cost of doing business to a level that destroys profitability for even the most basic enterprises. It can deplete the labor market. And it can establish a cycle of migration that strips the economy of both labor and purchasers. As people begin to migrate out of the conflict zone, businesses will gradually find the number of buyers declining, and, at some point, will find it unprofitable to continue; thus they will close their shops and, in many cases, join the migration stream.

B. GROUPS MOST LIKELY TO FLEE

In the initial stages of civil conflict, the people most likely to flee are people who live in the countryside, such as farmers, pastoralists and rural laborers. This is not only because armies and insurgents maneuver in the field, but also because cultivation is one of the enterprises most vulnerable to disruption by warfare. Furthermore, rural people living isolated on farms or in remote villages feel their vulnerability more acutely.

C. TYPES OF MIGRATION

Migration and conflict can be classified as sudden, precautionary, or economically induced.

1. Sudden Migration: Sudden migration usually occurs as the result of military operations. Sudden migration is often characterized by people fleeing out of fear when sudden, unanticipated events occur that force them to abandon their homes and move out of harm's way.

2. Precautionary Evacuation: Precautionary evacuation occurs when people decide to move as a precaution against violence, to avoid an aspect of the conflict (such as conscription), or to leave while they can still sell their assets and evacuate in an orderly manner.

3. Economically-Induced Migration: In sustained conflicts, studies have shown that the majority of people leave for economic reasons. These factors could include substantial increases in the cost of living due to shortages of basic commodities, collapse of local economies, collapse

of the macro-economy, the unavailability of work or alternative income, or the lack of buyers for goods produced.

Identifying the predominant types of migration helps to determine the types of resources that need to be applied at different points in the migration stream. For example, people who migrate suddenly as a result of conflict usually have few assets when they reach areas where relief agencies can provide assistance. Therefore, their assistance needs are more likely to be of an emergency nature.

People fleeing as a precaution normally have time to convert their assets to cash and usually require less in the way of immediate assistance. Furthermore, their pattern of migration will be substantially different from those making a sudden evacuation.

Economic migrants, too, are likely to have more assets than those who evacuate rapidly. However, if they have been holding out until the last possible moment, the relative amount of cash or convertible assets that they are bringing may be less than those making a precautionary move.

D. PATTERNS OF MIGRATION

The actual pattern and direction of migration may be influenced by several factors.

1. Original Location: The first factor is their original location. People who live on the periphery of a conflict zone are more likely to migrate out of the zone. In Sudan, most of the migrants coming to the North lived in Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Upper Nile provinces. People living in the southern regions such as Equatoria are more likely to move south, becoming refugees in Uganda or Zaire. People living in the central zones are more likely to move to towns. In short, migration routes are highly influenced by the choices available.

2. Seasonal Migration Patterns: Precautionary and economic migration tends to increase at the end of the harvest season and peak two or three months afterwards. At the end of the harvest, farmers calculate how much grain they have harvested and make a rough estimate of whether or not they can survive until the next crop is

harvested (making allowances for the amount of seed that must be held in reserve). If they cannot survive on the amount of grain they have gathered, and do not have other assets such as animals that could be converted to cash or bartered for food, and if there are insufficient alternative income possibilities, such as temporary labor in the nearby markets, the families will be forced to migrate.

If the harvest has been marginal, cultivators may decide to attempt to remain in the area and see how the next harvest season unfolds. They will usually stay in the area until they can see if the climatic factors, especially rainfall, are favorable. If rains are late, migration will increase midway through the planting season.

3. Influences of Migration Types: People who are forced to evacuate suddenly generally have fewer assets and therefore tend to migrate in stages, first moving to an area of safety and regrouping, then to a nearby town in search of work. As the family accumulates assets, they then move on to a larger town or labor pole where they accumulate more assets and then begin moving on toward the larger cities.

   People who migrate as a precaution usually tend to go farther in their initial move, sometimes moving directly to a labor pole or, in some cases, directly to the capital city.

   Persons moving for economic reasons also tend to go farther in their initial move, depending on the amount of cash they have been able to generate by selling their assets.

4. Influences of Local Conflicts/Pressure Points: Migration routes, especially in Africa, are highly influenced by traditional rivalries and conflicts. For example, people of one tribe will often adjust their migration routes by hundreds of kilometers to avoid passing through an area where traditional rivals live. In areas where tribes or clans have a history of conflict over pastures, water or land, or where cattle raiding, kidnapping or village raiding has occurred, migrants may take great pains to avoid potential conflict zones. In some cases, transit routes have been established to permit nomads to pass through cultivated areas without incident. Migrants may follow these traditional routes but, if an incident occurs, conflict could spread quickly.

Localized conflicts during times of drought or famine might also trigger migration. This occurs when people migrating from one area in search of more secure resources come into conflict with people who are settled along the migration route. Clashes between the migrants and the resident population can lead to displacements of both groups.

Conflicts can also arise in the locations where the migrations terminate. The migrants may bring traditional rivalries into their new community or conflict may develop as a result of competition for scarce employment opportunities. If an incident occurs, word will quickly spread to others who are still in the process of migration, and migration routes may be adjusted to avoid the pressure points.

E. PHASES OF DISPLACEMENT

Displacement can be broken down into five general phases: the preliminary phase, the evacuation/emergency phase, the migration phase, the settlement phase and the return phase.

1. The Preliminary Phase: During the preliminary phase, pressures build within the community that cause people to consider leaving their homes. These pressures can include insecurity, declining access to food (either from declining income or declining sources of food), loss of job opportunities, conscription, and increasing competition for available resources. With a general breakdown in law and order, localized conflict may increase.

2. The Evacuation/Emergency Phase: There are three elements to consider in this phase: the triggers that force a decision to evacuate, the evacuation itself; and the arrival of the family at a sanctuary.

   A decision to evacuate can be triggered by many different events. Among the more common are: military activities; violence; threat of imminent danger; loss of a family member; loss of access to food, income or credit; or the imminent threat of conscription. In some cases, the decision may be precautionary — the head of the family notes the general trend of events or the gradual decline of security or the economy and decides that it would be better to leave while assets can still be converted to cash.

In some cases, the evacuation may be stimulated by the departure of others (sometimes referred to as the "herd instinct") and, in some cases, the evacuation may be decided by others in the community, e.g., village elders, tribal chief or political leaders.

Moves occur at the end of a poor harvest season, if families recognize that they do not have enough food or other convertible assets to permit them to survive until the next harvest. For this reason, evacuation often occurs in waves with seasonal peaks.

Once a decision is made to evacuate, migrants must decide where and how far to go to reach a place where they will be safe. That point, or sanctuary, may be in a nearby town or area held by a friendly party in the conflict, such as a rebel-held area or, more commonly, a garrison town, or it may be a point outside of the conflict zone.

The choice of which destination to seek is often influenced by: the location of the nearest point of sanctuary; the escape routes that are open and safe; location of other family members, friends, relatives, clan members, tribes or language groups; the location of perceived income opportunities; and the location of markets where the breadwinners' skills can be used.

How much consideration is given to each of these factors usually depends on whether or not the evacuation is precautionary, occurring after careful deliberation, or whether the move is sudden and unplanned.

The actual evacuations also follow a common pattern. In the case of sudden evacuations, whole families are usually forced to move. As long as there is an imminent threat of danger, it proceeds swiftly, but haltingly, with families travelling only at night, generally avoiding other settlements and staying off the main roads. If the family is walking and not using pack animals, the amount of food that they can carry is limited. If the distance to the sanctuary is long, the family's nutritional status may decline during the evacuation.

If the evacuation is precautionary, the families will generally carry more assets and convert them to cash or food as they go along. The fact that they are carrying their assets may attract attacks from bandits along the way. For this reason, they, too, often travel only at night in small groups. However, if they manage to keep their

assets as they go along, they are more likely than others to venture into communities along the way to sell or barter for more food.

Another characteristic of precautionary evacuations is the sending of breadwinners and working-age males first, then gradually bringing other family members out of the conflict zone.

One point should be recognized: precautionary evacuation tends to follow established migration routes as long as these migrations are uninterrupted. For example, if the evacuees have a tradition of migrating as seasonal agricultural laborers to areas outside the conflict zone, families making precautionary moves will usually follow the same migration routes.

The sanctuary, i.e., the first safe place that the displaced stop after leaving the conflict zone, is usually the first point where humanitarian assistance can be provided. In many cases, the people arriving are in terrible shape. They may be malnourished, sick and exhausted from their evacuation. They may have been traumatized by attacks upon them during their journey. And in some cases, they may have passed through endemic disease areas for which they had no resistance. Typically, large numbers of people will arrive without any visible assets, and families may be separated from or have lost family members.

In these conditions, emergency assistance and relief are required. Typically, large percentages of the people will accumulate around a health post, a water point or other rallying place, and a camp will evolve.

Some of the new arrivals may be able to find work in nearby towns or on local farms, especially if resident farmers have a tradition of employing migrant labor or establishing temporary sharecropping relationships.

Operationally, the emergency phase can generally be said to last as long as there are new arrivals into the sanctuary and as long as malnutrition, morbidity and mortality rates are above normal. From the migrants point of view, however, the emergency phase lasts either until they can be assured that their families can live on the assistance being provided or they have accumulated enough resources to move on to an area where they can find steady employment. In the initial stages of a conflict, it may be possible for the early arrivals to find employment opportunities near the sanctuary. But soon, these openings will be taken and the job market saturated to a

point where the wage scale is sufficiently depressed so that subsequent arrivals must move outward in search of jobs and income. It can thus be said that the emergency phase ends when onward migration begins.

3. The Migration Phase: At the point where people begin moving out of the sanctuary, the pattern of movement quickly develops the characteristics of normal, though accelerated, migration. The ultimate destination for many of the people will be the large cities or capital of the country. In the early years of these migrations, much of the flow of people from the sanctuaries towards the cities will be segmented. In other words, people will stop as soon as they are able to secure adequate income possibilities. Close to the sanctuary, spontaneous settlement in nearby villages and or on farms will occur. But progressively, as each labor market becomes saturated, subsequent arrivals must move further "up the line".

   In many countries, there are large labor poles such as mechanized farming schemes, large-scale irrigated agricultural schemes or industries such as mines that can employ large numbers of additional short-term laborers. Thus, much of the migration will be towards these labor poles. However, as they too become saturated and wage scales begin to decline, more and more families will go directly to the urban centers.

   At the labor poles, the influx of new and cheap labor may force many of the earlier arrivals to quit the area and move on towards the urban centers. This secondary displacement is a major cause of conflict in these areas.

   In the early years, migration is likely to be more segmented with migrants dropping out of the stream as it progresses toward the cities. In the later stages there is less segmentation, with people moving greater distances in their first move with many going directly to the cities without an intermediary stop. Later migrations are probably also influenced by the fact that the earlier migrants will have already established themselves in the cities and, therefore, the new migrants can expect some support when they first arrive.

4. The Settlement Phase: When migrants reach a destination where they can remain without expectation or fear of having to move onward, the settlement phase begins. (Some observers claim that the

settlement phase begins when people begin to build a shelter that is more or less permanent.) In towns and cities, most migrants tend to move into squatter settlements located in the marginal areas of the city environs, or on the periphery of the metropolitan area. Outwardly, these settlements are indistinguishable from other squatter settlements and, indeed, many of the displaced may move into areas where other migrants, not displaced by conflict, have already settled. One characteristic, however, should be noted. That is, the displaced tend to move to areas where they have friends, relatives or clansmen. In Sudan, for example, many of the settlements in Khartoum with a high percentage of displaced persons closely resemble the ethnic make-ups of the areas from which the people fled. It is not uncommon, for example, to find Dinka and Nuer living in the same settlements. Further analysis shows that many migrants reconstitute their village structure in the urban settlements.

Many agencies treat the arrival of DPs in a city as an emergency, often setting up programs to provide food, medical attention and other types of assistance generally classified as relief. With but a few exceptions, these new urban migrants are generally indistinguishable from other urban settlers and they quickly assimilate. For this reason, it may be wrong to approach the arrival of the displaced as an emergency problem beyond a certain point.

The one cause of concern that distinguishes displaced persons from other urban migrants is the high infant mortality rate that this group experiences during the first six months after their arrival in the cities. This is particularly pronounced during the later years of crisis-induced migration when the process of migration is less segmented. Studies of Khartoum, for example, noted that the infant mortality rate of newly displaced was four times higher than that of other urban migrants arriving at the same time, and was almost ten times higher than the infant mortality rates of people who had lived in the same squatter settlement for one year or more. For this reason, intervention soon after families have arrived is required, although the type of intervention should generally be immediate economic assistance rather than traditional relief. If people can obtain income and employment, they will generally be able to take care of their own health and food needs.

5. The Return Phase: As in any migration, a certain number of people will return when conditions permit. When and how many will return are dependent on many factors including the relative degree of security in the people's homeland, the amount of time between the original displacement and the time when a return is possible, the level of indebtedness incurred by families desiring to return, and the availability of work and income-generating possibilities in the place of origin.

Because crisis-induced migration is virtually indistinguishable from other rural-to-urban migration patterns, it is unlikely that large numbers of people who formerly lived in rural areas will ever return, even if a full settlement of the conflict is achieved. For example, following the 1972 Addis agreement ending the Anyanya war in southern Sudan, there was only a five percent increase in population during the first year of the cease fire. Many of those may have been refugees returning from Uganda. There is very little evidence that substantial numbers of Southerners who fled to the North returned to the South.

The one group of migrants who are most likely to return are former urban dwellers in the conflict areas. Merchants, white-collar workers, teachers and government officials are generally more likely to return if a settlement can be achieved.

It is important to recognize that a certain amount of spontaneous return occurs during lulls in the conflict. Few studies have been done about these spontaneous returns, but it is likely that they resemble patterns of spontaneous repatriation of refugees. In those cases, studies have shown that:

- the persons most likely to repatriate are those living closest to the border. Translated into crisis migration terms, people living in or near the transition zone and in garrison towns are those most likely to return. This is because they will be better able to maintain contacts in their original communities, and they will be aware more quickly of opportunities to return safely.

- people who have retained rural agricultural skills are the most likely to return during ongoing conflicts because they fear loss of their land.

- spontaneous returns may be influenced by an inability to move to other areas due to lack of capital, lack of job opportunities, or lack of a support structure in other communities. In other words, the best option is to return.

F. SECONDARY DISPLACEMENT

Migration that results from civil or separatist wars may create pressures that expand the conflict and produce areas of tension that can erupt into localized conflicts. This is due to several factors. First, as mentioned earlier, the displaced may establish a smaller version of their society in the cities, bringing with it all the inherent conflicts.

Second, the movement of people from one zone to another can increase competition for available resources and lead to resentment against the newcomers by the host population.

Third, the arrival of large numbers of unskilled workers in a labor market serves to depress wages and causes resentment among local workers.

Fourth, new migrants can increase pressures on available services and infrastructure. For example, in many communities, large numbers of new migrants may lower the average amount of water available to a village or settlement.

In reviewing the entire phenomenon of crisis-induced migration, it is important to recognize and attempt to identify the points of conflict that may arise.

G. MIGRATION AS A PRESSURE-RELIEF MECHANISM

It is often difficult to predict when displacement will occur and what type or pattern of migration will follow. Even when all the indications are present, populations may remain in place longer than anticipated. This has led some observers (Cuny, *et al*) to theorize that crisis-induced displacement is largely a self-regulating pressure-relief mechanism. In other words, out-migration of people during periods of stress often relieves or eases the pressures that force migration. For example, in conflicts that are created as a result of competition for resources, out-migration of substantial numbers of people reduces the competition for those resources and thereby lowers the level of conflict.

H. PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT

For the majority of displaced persons, movements of individual families can best be characterized as sequential or as following a "stepping stone" pattern.

For victims of violence, the first move is usually into the bush. Families may flee into areas near their homes where they can hide in relative safety and where members of the family separated by the violence can regroup. How long they remain in these bush settlements is usually a function of the presence and movement of combatants. If combatants remain in the area, the family will only pause long enough to regroup, acquire some supplies, and then move on. When the combatants withdraw, the family may choose to remain for a period of time to test whether or not they can return home. If it becomes apparent that the family cannot return in safety, they will move to a new area in search of sanctuary.

The next stop is normally a town or a small city. Who controls the town is not usually as important a factor in their choice as the likelihood that food and relief supplies will be available. The displaced often feel that towns are less violent than rural areas. They also know that relief systems will operate close to major communications links. Since a government must keep communications open to its administrative centers and ultimately has a greater capacity to feed people, families are more likely to head to the cities controlled by the government than to areas held by insurgents. In other words, no matter what political sympathies are held by the people, they instinctively feel that their best chance of survival is in government-held towns.

Whether or not the displaced remain in the town of first refuge is a function of two factors:

- the ability of the community to absorb the migrants and offer them at least minimal jobs and services; and

- the amount of relief that can be provided by government authorities.

There are no hard and fast rules about what rate or percentage of increase can be sustained by a community before subsequent arrivals must go elsewhere. In El Salvador in 1984, it was observed that displaced populations in the smaller towns tended to hover at about 15

percent of the normal population and did not increase above this level until relief supplies were provided by the government. At that point, the population in some towns grew to 50 percent or more of the original population. (At the same time, in the capital and larger cities, the influx of displaced persons swelled those populations from 75 to 125 percent above normal.)

While there are no corresponding studies of displaced African societies, it is clear that, if relief assistance is minimal in the towns nearest the conflict, families must move on to larger cities where broader economies promise a higher likelihood of jobs and resources to support them. As populations swell in the regional centers, DPs who arrived earlier may fear that the increase in new arrivals represents a reduction of the support available for their own families. Therefore, as soon as they can acquire the resources, they often decide to move on to larger cities. This process may be carried out in stages, with the breadwinner and older males leaving first; only if time and circumstances permit planning and accumulation of ample resources to make the journey will the entire family leave together. The sending of breadwinners and males to the cities first is another contributing factor to the high percentage of women and children in the regional centers.

It is clear that, if a government wants to contain the displaced outside the capital, it must focus its efforts on the regional centers and camps near the towns of first refuge.

I. SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Because relief programs for displaced persons tend to focus on the areas in which they reside, it is important to understand the characteristics of the settlement types usually encountered. In general, there are three physical settlement patterns: camps, spontaneous settlements, and pockets within existing squatter settlements.

1. Camps: Sometimes referred to as welfare centers, relief camps or distribution centers, emergency camps for the displaced are normally those locations where relief supplies are distributed and which become the focal point for the delivery of emergency services to persons in the first stages of displacement. These camps can vary in size from several dozen families to many thousands. Their growth will ultimately be decided on the basis of the amount of assistance

that can be provided to sustain the population, the security of the area, and government policies relating to the size of the camps.

Assistance in camps generally follows the same lines as assistance in refugee camps. A full range of food, shelter and health programs needs to be provided along with water, sanitation and other site improvements.

Governments often try to contain displaced persons exclusively in camps. In these cases, caution should be exercised, for such restrictions necessitate an escalation in the levels of service that must be provided. Since camps are normally in more remote locations, assistance will probably require substantial transport investment and result in higher *per capita* costs. The only way to keep costs manageable is to permit DPs to work and participate in the local economy to the greatest extent possible.

2. Spontaneous DP Settlements: Spontaneous settlements composed entirely of displaced persons quite often spring up around towns and cities. People with similar ethnic, linguistic or cultural backgrounds to the displaced are often located in smaller towns close to the area of origin; thus, spontaneous settlements may form an extension of an existing community. The primary difference between a new spontaneous settlement and an existing squatter settlement may be in the quality of shelter. Since the displaced initially have neither the resources nor the interest in making a permanent investment in shelter, these settlements can become overcrowded slums unless the government and relief agencies act quickly. Once people have settled, it is very difficult to re-plot the site in order to add basic services and provide sufficient land for reasonable population densities. Thus, once the government recognizes that spontaneous settlement is likely to occur, sites of the government's choice where services can be provided cheaply and equitably should be identified and development plans made so that a settlement can grow along orderly and cost-efficient lines.

In larger cities, where the majority population is culturally or linguistically different from the displaced population, spontaneous settlements may be established near to, but not contiguous with, the urban area. This pattern provides protection from the larger population. Over a period of years, normal growth of the urban area may fill in the territory between the city and the spontaneous

settlement; however, the spontaneous settlement is likely to remain a ghetto, culturally distinct from the surrounding population.

3. Pockets Within Squatter Settlements: If a government demonstrates hostility towards the displaced, they are likely to try to integrate into existing squatter settlements, making it more difficult for authorities to locate them. Most squatter settlements are considered illegal by the authorities, but the mere fact that they exist demonstrates that a government is powerless to prevent their development. By grafting onto these settlements, some degree of solidarity can be achieved — if not overtly, at least subtly. If the government upgrades the facilities in the settlement, the displaced benefit along with all the rest of the residents. On the other hand, actions detrimental to the displaced may be perceived as a threat to the non-displaced population who, in self-defense, may unite with the displaced against the government actions.

   DPs who have integrated into squatter settlements are often the most difficult group to assist. Consequently, they often experience high malnutrition rates, especially children under five years of age. In a 1984 survey of squatter settlements with high proportions of displaced persons in the capital of El Salvador, surveyors found the gross malnutrition rate as measured by middle-upper-arm circumference (MUAC) to be around 7 percent. However, when DPs were isolated within the same communities, the malnutrition rate for their children proved to be 27 percent.

   The lesson is that, in determining overall priorities of assistance, it is important to identify specific population groups so that aid may be properly targeted. It must also be recognized that targeting is extremely difficult, as it is socially and politically disruptive to provide food and other services for the displaced and not for other low-income families residing within the larger community. It can be argued that provision of comprehensive assistance to both populations within the same geographic area would have many positive political benefits for the government. Unfortunately, the resources to sustain such an operation are usually unavailable.

V. ASSISTANCE

A. PROTECTION AND SECURITY

Displaced persons must often be protected from serious human rights violations. At present, no international organization has been given a mandate to do this and there is no adequate international system in place to provide protection. Thus, the displaced must look to their own government, not the international community, for protection and security. This can be problematic for it is often their own government that is the source of the problem. In other cases, the government may not have the resources or ability to protect and assist them. While the UN coordinator has a mandate to provide relief and assistance, it has neither the mandate, the resources nor the competence to provide protection or security. Furthermore, UNDP often runs into major problems in gaining access to those in need, principally because the host government places administrative obstacles in the way.

As a result of these obstacles, the UN must rely on an *ad hoc* protection system. A common principal strategy is placing as many international agencies as possible in the areas where the problems are occurring. It has been demonstrated that the presence of international agencies serves to reduce the incidence of human rights abuses. In cases where UN peacekeeping forces are engaged, it is often possible to coordinate humanitarian assistance with peacekeeping operations.

The press can be a powerful ally in helping to reduce protection problems. Few countries want the adverse publicity that the media can focus on human rights abuses. Countries with gross human rights violations have difficulty obtaining the international credit and development resources that are needed for development programs.

The threat of aid termination is often proposed as a means of reducing government human rights abuses. But experience has shown that this threat has rarely been carried out. Generally UNDP staff must work quietly behind the scenes to bring the government into compliance with international standards on the issue. But these quiet efforts must also be strong and carried out in concert with other major donors.

Operational difficulties include lack of coordination, the use of *ad hoc* approaches, obstacles created by governments, and the issue of national sovereignty. In many cases, the UNDP has little leverage since

it is reluctant to use the cancellation of development aid as a threat. It is clear that many governments have recognized that donors can be manipulated. UNDP is particularly vulnerable because of its role as a servant of the member state. Thus, UNDP must be careful not to be drawn into an adversarial relationship with the government and must continually strive to find ways to reinforce and build on the positive steps that governments may take to reduce tensions and facilitate operations. Nonetheless, the United Nations has a higher moral responsibility: it represents the collective moral force of the world community. Actions must never be taken that legitimize a government's ill behavior towards its citizens, or denial of any of their rights guaranteed under the UN's Declaration on the Rights of Man.

B. ASSISTANCE NEEDS

The displacement and movement of civilians during an internal war is often viewed by international humanitarian agencies as principally an emergency management problem. Many organizations that specialize in refugee assistance have become involved in emergency assistance to the displaced. For this reason, they tend to view displacement as a "refugee-like" problem. While many of the initial requirements of the displaced are similar to those of refugees (especially protection and certain emergency services), beyond a certain point the problem requires a very different set of strategies and approaches. The emergency phase is rather short and usually confined to a relatively small geographic zone. Beyond the emergency phase, displacement soon becomes a migration issue. Conflict propels and accelerates ongoing migration, especially internal migration towards cities and transmigration between regions. In many cases, these migration patterns are further aggravated because of economic collapse caused by the conflict. Thus, one of the ways to view displacement should be from a migration perspective.

Displacement is both more fluid and complex. If we approach the problem only from an emergency services perspective, we neglect many long-term needs where development approaches and programs can be applied. Furthermore, if we continue to apply emergency relief beyond a certain point, we run the danger of creating dependencies and establishing inequities in the communities where the displaced take up residence. This, in turn, creates local resentments, elevates tensions and possibly sparks localized conflicts.

Perhaps a better term to describe the process of displacement is "crisis-induced migration". Addressing the entire phenomenon as a whole, then breaking it into its parts, permits agencies to use development assistance and approaches to prevent and reduce conflict, as well as to provide long-term assistance.

Assistance needs change as each phase changes, and within each phase needs may change over time.

Generally, emergency assistance is necessary during the preliminary and evacuation phases, but more developmental assistance is required in the migration and settlement phases. In the return phase, a combination of transport and reconstruction assistance is required.

1. Assistance in the Preliminary Phase: During the preliminary phase, if it is possible to reach the affected area, it may be possible to provide assistance in such a way that displacement can either be prevented or limited. For example, if displacement will result from food insecurity or lack of income to procure food, a combination of short-term work programs to provide jobs and income along with various types of food aid may provide enough support so that people will not be forced to leave their homes.

   If potential displacement will result from localized conflict, such as that arising out of a competition for resources, increasing the resource base with development aid may serve to dampen the conflict or at least contain it. For example, conflict may arise out of access to water. By increasing the number of water points in the competing communities, conflict could be reduced.

   International agencies might also be able to help by providing protection or by serving to adjudicate or mediate local disputes. Sometimes, the presence of outsiders can temper an escalating crisis.

   For the most part, assistance needs can be categorized as economic assistance or projects designed to increase food security.

2. Assistance Needs During the Emergency/Evacuation Phase: Once people have started to move, it is imperative that their emergency needs are met as soon as they reach sanctuary. These needs typically include food, nutritional rehabilitation, medical and public health assistance, water and possibly protection. Relief agencies can expect the majority of the displaced in the worst condition to congregate in relief camps.

3. Migration Phase: During the early stages of migration, assistance will be needed to support smaller communities that are impacted by a high rate of spontaneous settlement, and assistance will need to be provided in and around labor poles. Since the migrants will immediately increase competition for resources and jobs, assistance strategies should focus on providing additional work and income-earning opportunities. Projects to increase water supplies where there is scarcity, especially during times of drought or during the dry season, should be given priority. Increasing access to health services and educational facilities may also help the migrants assimilate into their new communities. It should be cautioned that the displaced should not be singled out for assistance. Rather, assistance should be provided to the entire community, i.e., "whole village" strategies should be used.

   During the migration phase, it is also important that assisting agencies pursue a range of conflict-reduction strategies. By identifying likely pressure points and monitoring situations to detect rising tensions, agencies can often use development aid to limit or contain local conflicts that are caused by migration and rapid population changes.

4. Settlement Phase: Once migrants have reached their destination and have begun settling into their new communities, assistance should be provided to help them assimilate and find adequate sustained employment to help them take care of their own needs. Typically, the types of assistance and inputs that people need are:

   - land;
   - credit; and
   - extension of municipal services (water, sanitation, roads, etc.).

   In larger urban areas where migrants settle in squatter settlements, programs to upgrade the living environment through improvement of living conditions can provide great benefit not only to the newcomers, but to the municipality in general.

   If the rate of influx to urban areas is unchecked and continuous, it may be necessary to investigate the possibility of providing sites and services programs on a large scale. Sites and services programs are projects to rationally develop tracts of land for urban migrants.

Land, serviced by water, roads, electricity, etc., is provided on long-term tenure arrangements and assistance is provided to people to build their own homes on the allocated land.

As mentioned earlier, there might also be a need to provide immediate assistance to newcomers to help reduce the high infant mortality rates that accompany their arrival in urban zones.

5. Assistance Needs During the Return Phase: When families indicate that they are willing to return to their original homes, assistance agencies might wish to encourage that return by providing support. This may include return transport, short-term financial assistance and possibly food aid.

   Once the families have returned to their area, general reconstruction assistance should be provided. This may include: credit, provision of tools or inputs, housing reconstruction aid, etc. There might also be a need to assist families in reacquiring title or access to lands that they have abandoned.

   Crisis-induced migration may have separated families and scattered various family members to different parts of the country. Therefore, it is often necessary to help establish tracing services and family reunification programs. It is generally fairly easy for adults to locate other adults, but if families have been separated from their children, outside assistance can be extremely helpful.

C. VULNERABLE GROUPS

As in most crisis situations, the persons most vulnerable to disease and death are women and small children. In the emergency phases, women and children often receive less food than other members of a family and, therefore, are more likely to be malnourished by the time they come into the assistance system. Small children are more susceptible to diseases, especially if they were living on isolated farms with little contact with others who might have carried communicable diseases. The combination of undernutrition and exposure to disease makes children under five years of age very vulnerable.

It has also been observed that the displaced experience very high infant mortality rates in the first six months after they arrive in cities, especially when they are living in squatter settlements. This is probably because it takes some time for the family to begin to earn enough money

to buy all the food that they need and because drinking water in many of these settlements is of poor quality, leading to high rates of diarrhea.

Women are often vulnerable not only to disease but to exploitation and sexual harassment, especially if no adult male from their family is present. Camps for displaced persons often attract the worst kind of attention from nearby communities and the numbers of incidents of rape, beating and kidnapping are often high. To some extent, this can be reduced by expanding the number of staff in settlements with a high portion of single women, providing proper lighting and avoiding settlement designs or layouts that create dark, remote areas where incidents can easily take place. Without strong support from the local government and security forces, however, it will be difficult to stop.

VI. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

Assisting displaced persons is one of the most politically sensitive activities carried out by the UNDP. In cases where the government is one of the parties in a civil conflict, UNDP is often placed in the difficult position of having to deal with government agencies who are reluctant to provide assistance to people whom they consider "enemies". In many cases, government actions or policies may be root causes of the conflict.

The fact that the UN must provide assistance through the host government often leads to charges that the UN is not a neutral agency. Many liberation groups mistrust the UNDP and most donors and NGOs find the UN's position frustrating. Unfortunately, this is a working reality. When the UN is involved, humanitarian assistance can only be provided within certain limits. However, those limits can be quite broad and UNDP has a major role to play in humanitarian operations which cannot be discounted. In any assistance program for the displaced, all UN staff must clearly understand what these limits are and how to operate effectively within the constraints.

It should be remembered that usually the majority of assistance provided to displaced persons is from the government side since most of the displaced migrate to government-controlled areas. This is for a variety of reasons (normal migration routes, family ties, linguistic reasons, etc.). The main reason, however, is that people move towards viable economies, i.e., where the best opportunities for jobs are found. Displacement is as much an economic survival strategy as flight from conflict. The displaced must earn a living; they cannot rely on international relief and they must go where the economy is functioning. The fact that they are familiar and comfortable with, and have a right to participate in, the national economy is the reason they come to the government's side. They are not, as is often claimed, making a political statement or choosing one side over the other. Thus, despite constraints on the UN during conflicts, the scale of the population that the UN can assist can be quite large and UNDP should always be seen as a key actor in the overall assistance framework.

B. LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES

It is often difficult to reach the displaced with assistance. In many cases, they reside in remote areas where access is difficult and transportation may be poor. The topography may be rugged and seasonable rains may make surface transportation hazardous and difficult. In the conflict zone, security conditions may prohibit or severely restrict travel. In areas adjacent to the conflict zone, security conditions may be marginal at best, especially for the displaced.

In these situations, full attention must be given to advance planning. It will often be necessary to stockpile supplies in, or near, the areas where the displaced are going so that shortages do not occur during times when the areas are isolated by conflict or climatic conditions.

In some cases, the UN may have to rely on extraordinary means of transport. Garrison towns may have to be supplied by aircraft and on-site management may also require the use of small planes to move quickly over vast areas where needs can change instantaneously. Emergency operations are often said to require planning in three dimensions: air, land and sea. However, operations planners should be aware that long-range relief operations, especially when aircraft are involved, are extremely expensive. Emphasis should be placed on procuring as many relief supplies as possible from local or nearby sources. It is often possible to use a broad range of market interventions that can have the same results as bringing large amounts of relief supplies from outside the affected area.

C. "STRUCTURAL" PROBLEMS

Many relief workers talk about the "international relief system". However, no one system exists. Rather, there are groups of organizations that provide different types of assistance at different levels. In any situation, these groups may band together formally or informally to provide relief to the displaced. Some organizations act in the capacity of fund raisers; others act as donors. Some provide funds directly to the displaced while others provide funds to other agencies that will help the displaced.

Within this *ad hoc* structure, there are many difficulties. NGOs are often seen as the primary operating agencies in emergencies. While many agencies have excellent capabilities, most can only provide a fairly

limited range of services. Many of the most important areas where lives can be saved are overlooked. For example, only a handful of agencies have the capability of providing assistance in the sectors of water and sanitation. Few agencies are experienced in setting up and maintaining the "heavy" logistics system required for providing massive food aid and, within the international community, no agency is specifically tasked with providing protection or security to the displaced.

Once the displaced are no longer in an emergency situation, few agencies are in a position to provide assistance to help the people integrate into their new communities and provide the necessary jobs, education and temporary support to enable them to begin to take care of their own needs.

Because of these "structural" deficiencies in the relief system, UNDP often must plug the gaps by arranging for the necessary services either from the host government or NGOs.

The international assistance system is vastly overstretched. The needs have grown far beyond the capability of international agencies to meet all requirements. Experienced personnel are often drawn from one operation to another before their present contracts are complete. For this reason, UNDP should focus its attention on building up cadres of national emergency management personnel, both inside the government and in the private sector, so that the sudden transfer of international personnel will not disrupt an ongoing program.

D. COORDINATION

Coordination is one of the principal roles of the UNDP in assisting displaced persons. Effective coordination is critical, yet it is often difficult to achieve. Coordination requires more than periodic meetings; it requires:

1. Agreement about standard approaches to specific problems;

2. Comprehensive strategies that provide an integrated framework building on the strengths of the different agencies; and

3. An overall conceptual framework, or "vision", of what is needed (i.e., all agencies should be moving towards a common goal).

Due to the nature of a conflict, it is often difficult to get many organizations to share information about their activities. Organizations that have ties to insurgents or who are working with DPs in countries where the government has demonstrated its hostility to the displaced often fear that sharing information with the UN will compromise their work or even lead to harm for the people. It is important that UN coordinators respect the confidentiality of information and ensure that sensitive data does not fall into the wrong hands.

E. REACHING PEOPLE IN CONFLICT ZONES

Many of the displaced may remain in the areas of conflict. In recent years, donors and relief agencies have shown an increasing willingness to run the risk of providing assistance to people in those areas. Agencies have begun to realize that the people are usually better off remaining in or near their homes where they can remain at least partially self-sufficient. The nature of long-term, low-intensity civil wars often permits people to stay with an acceptable level of risk and, in many cases, the people are safer in rebel-held areas than if they were to flee to government-held zones. UNDP has recently been involved in helping to arrange corridors through which relief aid can pass unmolested (Angola, Ethiopia and Sudan), establishing temporary cease fires so that civilians can be assisted (El Salvador) and establishing cross-line feeding programs where people can come into government-held areas, obtain the assistance they need and take it back to their villages in the conflict zone (Ethiopia).

F. DEALING WITH LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

A major constraint in helping people in rebel-held areas is that organizations must deal with an anti-government group. Officially, the United Nations can only do so with the concurrence of the government. This means that many opportunities to help people caught in critical situations are lost. In some cases, it is possible to get the government's agreement to make limited contact with the insurgents. While the government may not be comfortable with these arrangements, there are advantages to them which they recognize. With patience, it should be possible to establish a wide range of contacts, either directly or indirectly, with rebel groups even in the midst of intensive military

campaigns. Over time, it may be possible to negotiate point-by-point agreements of what can and cannot be done in areas that rebels control, or in which they are operating, which will permit the UN to provide or support assistance in contested areas. It is important, however, to take special care that projects launched from the government side are not co-opted as pacification efforts or come to be viewed by the rebels as supporting pacification. The specific modalities of working with rebel groups, or their supporters, must be undertaken with utmost care and every effort must be made to ensure that all sides approve specific projects or activities.

G. AVOIDING PACIFICATION

A number of programs styled as assistance to displaced persons are actually pacification programs. These include:

1. Relocation projects designed to resettle the rebels popular support base;

2. Programs designed to force neutral peasants to choose sides (i.e., the government's side), or to establish effective control over populations for military or security purposes.

Pacification programs are especially prevalent in Central America. Many relief organizations participate in these projects without understanding the broader issues and implications. Providing development assistance in a way that encourages new settlement patterns or resettlement has many political connotations and must be approached carefully.

The nature of assistance determines if the program is promoting pacification. Relief aid designed to create dependencies and hold people in camps may have different implications in different situations. Relief officials must be very careful in formulating projects and try to understand all the issues that are involved. This is not to say that long-term assistance of a developmental nature should not be provided. However, when governments begin planning alternative housing, new urban development, "peace villages", etc., UNDP staff should be alert to the implications and recognize that they are getting into very sensitive areas.

H. LIMITATIONS OF NGOs

NGOs currently play a key role in providing assistance to the displaced, especially during the emergency period. Using NGOs to provide assistance offers many operational advantages. They can be flexible and innovative in their programs. They are less bureaucratic and generally can move quickly if funds are available. However, there are some disadvantages.

Host governments often consider NGOs a nuisance. In many countries, governments are beginning to restrict NGOs and limit their access to the displaced. Many assistance programs have faltered because governments have restricted NGO operations. In the role of coordinator, UNDP must develop ways to support NGOs in the field. At the same time, it is important to develop alternative approaches that can be activated in case international NGOs are prevented from providing services.

NGOs are also limited in the amount of services they can provide and the number of people they can support. As the number of displaced increase and the problem changes from an emergency to more of a migration problem, the NGOs role typically diminishes. They are generally not effective in dealing with the problems of population movements or providing services in settlements or urban environments.

In a post-conflict period, NGOs again have a reduced role. Initially, they facilitate the return of families to their homes and provide assistance to returnees. However, reconstruction programs are generally the domain of the international financial institutions and the bilateral donors working through the host government. In the reconstruction program in Sri Lanka, total NGO resources amounted to less than 1% of the total funding.

I. APPROPRIATENESS OF AID

As in other fields of emergency assistance, examples can be found of inappropriate aid being provided to displaced persons. Inappropriate aid may be a symptom of an overall problem, i.e., a lack of understanding of the processes at play. Most agencies tend to focus on the emergency period and treat displacement as if it were a refugee-like situation. Thus, most of the aid provided is classified as relief rather than longer-term development assistance. In the emergency period, or

for those remaining in the conflict zone, relief may be appropriate; however, emergency aid should be time-limited and efforts should be made to provide development assistance to people and to the communities where they take up residence as quickly as possible.

Many observers have pointed to the conflict between relief and development aid and have suggested that the distinction between the two be eliminated. Broader strategies that can reach people in the various kinds of settlements and the variety of situations in which they are found should be considered.

J. TARGETING AID

In most emergency situations, donors and relief agencies tend to divide the beneficiaries into categories according to priorities of need. For example, agencies often focus on the people considered most vulnerable such as women and children under five. Even assisting the displaced in general tends to single them out from the rest of the population. This can create resentment and animosity in communities where the displaced are unwelcome and where they are seen to be competing with the local population for scarce resources such as water, food and jobs. In order to relieve tensions, it is important that UNDP quickly program development support to the impacted communities, not just to the displaced. This is a key role for UNDP. Few other agencies have the ability to provide the large-scale development aid that is required. This is known as the "whole community" approach.

K. COST OF ASSISTANCE

The provision of integrated assistance packages to displaced persons is expensive. Costs are especially high when the displaced move to cities and assistance essentially becomes urban development. When the displaced move into existing squatter settlements, it is difficult to ignore the people already there who may have the same basic needs. This means that UNDP must develop broad, popular-based approaches and put greater emphasis on programs that utilize the people's own resources to improve their condition. As situations become static, it is important to recognize that relief cannot go on forever. Grants-in-aid should give way to soft loans and small-scale revolving loan funds should be set up, wherever practical, to help people obtain the funds they need to begin

enterprises that will help them become self-sufficient. Credit has another benefit. It reduces the people's exploitation by money-lenders.

L. DEBT

Unless adequate development assistance is provided, many displaced persons will soon become encumbered by debt. This means that the people will be easily exploited by the populations among whom they live and, if the conflict is resolved, the people will be unable to return to their original homes quickly because of the debt incurred.

M. WOMEN'S ISSUES

The majority of displaced adults are women and most of these are heads of households. In many emergency programs, especially in garrison towns and at the periphery of the conflict zones, women and children make up two-thirds to three-quarters of the population, yet most relief programs have a distinct male bias. For example, many loan programs created to assist the displaced are less effective because women are not eligible to apply. Other programs, such as food-for-work, are often predicated on males being the primary breadwinners.

Women's programs tend to be minimal; few go beyond handicraft projects or small cottage industries. No program of assistance for displaced persons will succeed unless it is designed to involve women in decision-making at all levels.

VII. PROJECT FUNDING

The funding of projects and activities for displaced persons is often difficult. National governments usually view assistance programs as competing with higher priority development projects. In cases where the government is hostile to the displaced, they often fear that assistance will encourage people to stay in areas where the government or host communities do not want them.

A government's reluctance to devote development resources to displaced persons presents special problems for the international humanitarian assistance system. UNDP does not have an emergency fund. Its own funds are linked to the Indicative Planning Figure (IPF). This means that the government and UNDP must reorient the country program and divert funds from development programs (which may be focused on the government's principal supporters). Most governments are reluctant to divert these funds and may insist that funding should come from other sources. This means that UNDP must help the government formulate an appeal for additional funding, a lengthy and time consuming process that may leave large numbers of people exposed until new money is obtained.

Another source of funding is the Special Program Reserve (SPR). UNDP can grant up to $50,000 to a government for an emergency. However, this amount is usually too small to have a significant impact. There is a provision in the SPR that up to $1,000,000 can be used for rehabilitation after a given disaster. In some cases, it has been possible to use the SPR to provide long-term assistance for the displaced, but this too is usually inadequate.

As the Resident UN Coordinator for Disaster Assistance, the UNDP ResRep may formulate appeals on behalf of the government. These appeals are made to UN member countries. The donors may respond to an appeal by giving money directly to the government, by contracting NGOs or other institutions, or by contracting private sector companies to carry out a project on behalf of the government. As mentioned, the formulation of an appeal and procurement of the necessary funds can be a lengthy process. Furthermore, since the appeal is usually projectized (divided into a series of projects that can be funded separately), overall funding may be piecemeal and leave large gaps in the service coverage. It is usually easy to obtain funding for feeding programs, medical

interventions and other emergency assistance, but obtaining funds for long-term community improvements and the development aid needed to help the displaced integrate successfully into their temporary communities is much more difficult.

Another major problem with the appeal process is that, in order to get a government hostile to the displaced to provide assistance, compromises must often be made to provide assistance that meets the government's priorities as well as those of the displaced. But UNDP cannot guarantee that these compromise projects will be funded. Donors will usually respond only to the most urgent needs of the displaced, creating resentment with the government that their priorities were not addressed.

An example of this occurred in Sudan in 1988. Because of disruptions that the conflict had caused to the agricultural cycle in northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, famine conditions developed and hundreds of thousands of people began to flee north. As the people left the South, they came under attack from armed Arab militia in the North. As many as 50,000 people may have died in these attacks. The survivors, emaciated and starving, reached areas where NGOs could provide assistance and sanctuary. Just as the world's attention began to focus on this human rights problem, massive floods struck central Sudan, devastating Khartoum and many towns along the Nile. In the formulation of an emergency appeal for Sudan, the UN reached a compromise with the government: an appeal for reconstruction assistance for flood affected areas would be included with an appeal for emergency aid for the displaced in the South and for the communities to which they were fleeing in the North. The donors, however, chose to concentrate all their assistance on the South and ignored reconstruction needs in Khartoum and the other Nile regions. When it became clear to the Sudanese that Khartoum was being ignored, they began putting obstacles in the way of agencies providing aid in the South. An already-acrimonious relationship between donors and the government grew even worse. This also affected the relationship between UNDP and the government, which accused the UN of failing to honor its commitments.

Obtaining sufficient funding for projects is always difficult. However, there are ways to increase the funding base, especially for activities that require local currency. Since UNDP normally only deals with foreign currency inputs in the regular program, these alternative sources of funds are usually overlooked.

Other sources of funding for projects to support displaced persons are:

A. COUNTERPART FUNDS

Counterpart funds are the proceeds from sales of commodities (and sometimes hard currencies) in the general market. The commodity is given to the government to sell at auction and the proceeds go into an account in the central bank; joint signatures are required to withdraw and use the funds, and expenditures must meet certain criteria set by the original donor. These criteria usually include emergency or disaster purposes. Major holders of counterpart funds usually include the U.S., the European Community, European governments, and the World Bank. Because joint agreement is needed to commit funds, it may be difficult to use counterpart currencies for the displaced.

B. LOCAL CURRENCY ACCOUNTS OF DONORS

Donors often hold large sums of local currency on hand in their own accounts as a result of sales of disposable equipment, etc. These funds can often be used for emergency operations but the amounts available are generally small.

C. BLOCKED CURRENCY

Large corporations doing business in the Third World often have difficulty converting local profits to hard currency due to governmental currency restrictions. In many cases, these corporations have large local currency accounts that they cannot convert to hard currencies. The money in these accounts is called "blocked currency", i.e., the government has blocked its conversion and export. Since inflation may erode the value of the money at an alarming rate, many companies are willing to sell the money at a substantial discount, thus at least recouping some of the value. It may also be possible to persuade a corporation to donate the currency as a charitable contribution; depending on the tax laws of the country where the corporation is based, it may be possible for them to get a tax credit close to the original hard currency value of the account.

International airlines are good places to look for blocked currencies. Many hold large amounts in accounts in countries where they no longer operate.

D. DEBT-FOR-EQUITY SWAPS (DEBT SWAPS)

The term "debt-for-equity swap", or "debt swap", refers to a scheme where non-performing loans held by private foreign banks are sold at a discount to an organization operating in the country that borrowed the money. The organization buys the note in hard currency at a discount from the creditor, presents the note at a special "window" of the country's central bank, then the country buys back the loan in local currency. Often a broker is contracted to work out the details. This is formalized in a "treaty" that sets out the rate at which the buy back will occur and the amount of local currency that will be paid against the face value of the note.

Debt swaps were very popular several years ago but recently enthusiasm cooled when it was evident that large corporations were using the local currency for their operating expenses and not to support new investments in the country. However, most countries have continued to encourage debt swaps where they have been assured that the money will be used for development or emergency purposes. In 1989, UNICEF was able to arrange a debt swap from a consortium of Swiss and Belgian banks that was used to finance a major water program in Sudan. In many cases, banks can be persuaded to contribute a non- or weak-performing loan as a charitable gift and receive a sizeable tax write-off (often at, or close to, the original value of the loan).

Debt swaps are a good way to obtain sizeable quantities of local currency for longer term activities such as reconstruction and development projects.

E. MONETIZATION OF FOOD AID

It may be possible to obtain foreign food aid from a major donor (e.g., the U.S., Canada, EEC) and arrange to sell it to local private traders. The proceeds for the sales would then be used to finance local currency costs of assistance programs.

VIII. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

A. ASSESSMENT

The key to successful intervention in any emergency operation is accurate information about the situation and needs. This information is gathered through the process of assessment. The term "assessment" refers to the process of collecting information to determine the overall situation, the needs, the status of the people, the adequacy of the services being provided, and the conditions in the settlements where the displaced are living. This is a continuing process, for situations change rapidly and an assessment only provides a "snapshot" of events at a specific point in time.

To gather the information needed for project planning, assessments should be thoroughly planned and carried out by competent and experienced personnel. Far too often, assessments develop inaccurate and highly subjective data. At the same time, it is important to avoid collecting too much information; lengthy analyses and the time-consuming process of gathering statistics of doubtful value will slow response. The objective should be to gather information that points to indicators of problems. Assessments should trigger specific actions and feed information to relief agencies that will enable them to plan projects.

There are generally five sets of information that an assessment should develop:

1. Information about the general situation;
2. Data about the people's needs;
3. Information about requirements in specific sectors such as food, health, nutrition, shelter, etc;
4. Information about the resources available to meet needs; and
5. Epidemiological information about disease or public health threats.

Additional information about disaster assessments can found in Appendix A.

B. PREDICTING MIGRATION ROUTES AND PATTERNS

Migration occurs normally in every country and tends to follow set patterns. There is an element of rural-to-urban migration even in the best of times, and migrants tend to follow defined routes as they leave the rural areas and move towards the larger cities. Migration is usually in segments with people first moving to medium-sized towns and remaining there until the labor market is saturated, then moving on to the larger cities and the country's capital.

In most cases, there are migration "seasons". It is not unusual, for example, to see a significant increase in migration at the end of a harvest season. Farmers who have had a poor harvest migrate, as well as those who have accumulated enough cash to make a longer move.

Nomadic migration routes and patterns are also important to consider. In normal times, their migration should be relatively conflict-free: they tend to follow established routes and well-defined schedules which let them pass through more settled areas without disturbing local agriculture or ecology. It is when these migration patterns change that conflict arises. For example, in Darfur, in western Sudan, Arab nomads leave the northern part of the region and begin to migrate southward in November and December. They normally enter areas farmed by the Fur tribe after the Fur have harvested their crops and before they begin preparations for planting. In recent years, however, drought and increasing desertification have forced the nomads to move much earlier, bringing their animals into the Fur zones while crops are still standing. The nomads' herds graze and trample the crops leading the Fur to take up arms to defend their lands. Thus, during drought and famine conflict increases substantially and periodically escalates into widespread conflict between the two tribes.

Two factors to analyze to determine if nomadic migration could lead to conflict are:

- the routes and how they change during periods of stress; and
- the time, or season, of migration.

1. Normal Migration Routes: Most migration routes can be mapped easily. In Sudan, for example, most nomadic routes tend to go north-south, because nomads must move southward during dry periods to find more abundant pasture and supplies of water.

Migration to cities also tends to follow established routes. For example, people migrating from the north-central part of the South tend to follow the railway. Migration from the eastern regions tends to follow the main paved highway to Khartoum.

In Sudan, which is currently experiencing civil war and is constantly threatened by famine, a number of interesting proposals which can serve as examples have been developed to use UNDP development resources to support the displaced.

The UNDP Emergency Unit in Khartoum has proposed a broad, community-based approach for dealing with the large numbers of displaced persons fleeing the conflict in the South. Previously, most efforts have been focused on providing food, shelter and water to those people living in camps along the primary routes out of the conflict zone. In the new approach, UNDP has advocated treating the displaced as migrants and focusing development aid on the communities where the displaced have congregated. One objective of this approach is to increase employment opportunities so that the displaced can find work to provide sufficient income to take care of their own needs. With an expanded economy, the need for costly relief would be reduced and the people would be able to live a more normal life until they can return to their homes.

The second objective of this approach is to reduce the likelihood that the influx of the displaced would lead to localized conflict. Few of the affected communities had sufficient resources to accommodate large numbers of migrants. Most towns in the semi-arid areas of the Sudan have marginal water supplies, even in the best of times, and agriculture is limited due to the lack of irrigation and technical input. Thus, the existing population quickly came to resent the influx of outsiders, and the potential for conflict and human rights violations was high. The UNDP program was designed to pre-empt conflict by increasing the resource base. Projects were designed to expand water economic opportunities for both the local and incoming populations.

In sum, the UNDP simply used crisis-induced migration as an indicator of where to target and focus development aid. Relief was left to non-governmental organizations while a broader, whole community approach was adopted by the UN system.

Another factor of note is that migration routes tend to follow grain trading routes.

2. Changes in the Routes Due to Crisis: When crisis occurs, normal migration routes may change. For example, in Sudan migration changes significantly from north-south to west-east.

   As people leave established migration routes, conflict may begin to occur. In most cases, it is possible to anticipate what changes in migration are likely. For example, nomads are likely to move towards more secure water points. In times of severe food shortage, nomads may send members of the family or clan to towns or labor poles to find work. (This strategy not only provides income, but reduces the number of mouths to be fed with available resources.) The shedding of family members occurs when the nomads cross a major transit point, such as a road or a railway, where they can get transport to a labor pole.

3. Stopping Points: It is important to identify areas where the displaced are likely to stop during their migration, either to work to earn more money or to try to settle, even if temporarily. As soon as the stopping places are identified, it is usually possible to investigate the absorptive capacity of the community and to determine whether or not the presence of the displaced is likely to create conflict, because of racial, cultural or economic factors.

4. Traditional Animosities: A key factor to consider is whether or not there are existing animosities between the host population and the displaced that might be exacerbated by a sudden influx. Any time "outsiders" come into a community, tensions are likely to increase. If there is a history of conflict between the two societies, a sudden crisis-induced migration is likely to be resented by the host community and flash-points for conflict may be generated.

C. SETTING PRIORITIES

Priorities in programs for the displaced change over time. In or near conflict zones, the top priority is usually protection. A balanced emergency assistance program may also be a top priority in order to save lives. Often protection is dependent on assistance since an international presence in the area must be established to begin the process of reducing human rights abuses.

1. Initial Response: The primary factors that will cause high death rates in an emergency are malnutrition, measles and diarrhea. Each is related to the other. A child that is severely malnourished will not be able to survive a case of measles. Severe diarrhea can quickly dehydrate and kill a malnourished person or someone with measles. In order to save lives, these three threats must be addressed. Therefore, the cornerstones of an effective emergency response are provision of food, immunization, and diarrhea control — which is carried out by providing clean water, oral rehydration and sanitation. Until these three sets of problems are addressed, it will be difficult to prevent increased mortality, especially among women and children.

2. Priorities in Settlements: In the period immediately after arriving in settlements, special attention should be focused on women and children since it has been shown that abnormally high infant mortality rates occur during the first six months after the displaced arrive at their destinations.

3. Priorities During the Settlement Phase: At this stage, the top priority is providing employment opportunities so that families can earn enough money to survive until they can return to their homes.

D. STRENGTHENING COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS

As a provider of technical assistance, UNDP plays a key role in helping governments to develop the capacity to deal with the problems of displacement. In the initial stages of a crisis, few governments are adequately prepared to handle the problems of displaced persons. UNDP can support governments by providing experts, training and financial support.

A great deal of forethought should be given to proposals to create institutions or capacities in government to assist the displaced. The type of institution created often has implications for the way in which assistance will ultimately be provided. For example, if UNDP encourages the government to assign responsibility for displaced persons to an agency that normally provides assistance to refugees, the displaced will likely be treated as a refugee-like problem and more attention will be given to relief than to the development needs of the people. If the

mandate is assigned to regional governments or to a ministry of local government, it is likely that the programs will be much broader and more developmental in nature.

In some cases, UNDP has encouraged the government to establish a separate commission for the displaced to serve as coordinator of assistance and protection and to formulate plans which are executed by the line ministries. This approach can work well as long as the technical assistance given does not encourage the agency to focus more on relief than on development assistance.

Local and regional branches of government are often the most important entities in providing assistance to the displaced. When considering technical assistance and institution building, they should receive high priority. The emergency program for displaced persons carried out in Sri Lanka, which is considered by many experts to be one of the best projects ever designed in this field, was carried out almost exclusively by district officials in, and adjacent to, the conflict zone.

In countries that have weak regional and local governments, there is a tendency to centralize authority and decision-making in the capital. UNDP must devise strategies for moving decision-making into the theater of operations so that "hands on" management can take place.

In large countries where the displaced are located in remote areas, centralized government decision-making can delay operations and affect the quality of decisions. In these cases, it is important to devise strategies that will force the government to send senior officials with the authority to make on-site decisions to the field. One way to do this is to build a large operations base in a central location and endow it with resources. Governments are unlikely to trust such an operation to a junior official and will send a person with sufficient authority so key assistance issues can probably be resolved locally.

E. TASK FORCES

The needs of the displaced are often far too great for any one agency to provide adequate assistance. Furthermore, needs may change dramatically from one location to another. In order to develop the best mix of programs and to ensure the widest possible range of services, it may be possible to create inter-agency task forces in each area. NGOs often form consortia to combine their talents and resources. UNDP coordinators should encourage this, wherever possible, and provide

technical assistance in support of inter-agency efforts. Task forces made up of UN and NGO teams are one of the most cost-effective ways of providing assistance and ensuring that adequate resources are provided in each key sector.

F. SAFETY OF RELIEF TEAMS IN CONFLICT ZONES

As the UN coordinator of assistance for the displaced, resident coordinators bear a special responsibility for ensuring that all personnel operating in or adjacent to conflict zones work in conditions of minimum risk and maximum security. Guidelines and procedures for personnel should be established in conjunction with the host government and, where possible, insurgent groups. UNDP is often charged with the responsibility of notifying relief workers and other organizations about the risks they may face from military operations in or near their relief activities. In this regard, UNDP is often able to obtain clearances for special flights into contested areas on airplanes bearing United Nations markings, to arrange for safe transport through the front lines in specially-marked UN vehicles, and to establish special relief corridors whereby food and relief supplies can be delivered under flags of truce or through designated corridors without undue restraint. It is important, however, that the UN carefully assess the risks before encouraging relief organizations to commit personnel and resources to an operation in a non-secure area. A UN assurance that an area or means of transport is safe carries a lot of weight — and responsibility.

Two of the most important aspects of working in remote and insecure areas are communications and stand-by evacuation support. To the greatest extent possible, UN coordinators should ensure that relief personnel have immediate and 24-hour access to telecommunications facilities and that suitable means are immediately available to evacuate personnel in case of an emergency. This may entail the assignment of light aircraft to be available on short notice to evacuate staff.

G. RELIEF VS. DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES

It is important to recognize that UNDP's strengths lie in development, not relief. This is not an obstacle; rather, it is an advantage for assisting the displaced since most of their needs are long-term.

H. REPATRIATION DURING CONFLICT

It is not unusual for large numbers of people to voluntarily return to their homes amidst a conflict. It has been shown that the displaced usually maintain fairly good communications with those left behind and, when conditions are appropriate, people may choose to return if they feel that it is relatively safe or that the conditions that forced them to leave have been altered.

The return of large numbers of people can provide many clues to a changing situation. Program staff should monitor the returns and try to determine where people are going and what factors motivated their return. Large-scale spontaneous returns often imply that a major change has taken place in the political situation and that "space" has been created whereby many others could go back without undue risks.

UNDP staff should be alert for signs of repatriation since they may afford an opportunity to stabilize areas, reduce conflict and initiate localized reconstruction.

IX. ISSUES IN DEALING WITH THE HOST COUNTRY

A. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

One of the most difficult things for UNDP staff to deal with is human rights violations perpetrated by the national government. Unfortunately, displaced persons are often the victims. Staff should be alert for evidence that human rights abuses are occurring and promptly report any suspected abuses to the Resident Coordinator.

Human rights abuses may be classified as both overt and passive. Overt abuses are acute, violent actions designed to kill, maim or intimidate the displaced. Passive abuses are usually less dramatic, but can lead to very high death rates, especially among women and children. Actions such as denying people food or water, forced relocation into conflict zones, forcible removal of people from urban areas to regions where resources or food and shelter are not available, all constitute examples of passive human rights abuses.

A major problem in dealing with governments is control over paramilitary organizations and unregulated militia. Governments often arm civilian populations to "protect" themselves in, or adjacent to, conflict zones. Often these militia use their new-found arms to settle old scores and to organize raids against their neighbors. UNDP staff should be especially alert for signs that human rights abuses are being carried out by these groups.

B. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

If most of the displaced people are from an ethnic or cultural group different from that of the population majority, the role of a government in providing relief and assistance becomes a delicate issue. No matter who the displaced are, ultimate responsibility for their welfare and maintenance falls squarely on the shoulders of the government. This does not mean that governments can, or should, be involved directly in all cases of assistance. For example, in a civil war, the government is one party of the conflict, and any assistance to the displaced will be viewed within the political context. How and where, then, does a government determine its assistance role?

Several principles should be observed. First, the government must be made to understand clearly that the welfare of the displaced will be a key to any peaceful resolution of the conflict. If the displaced are abused, not properly cared for, starved or permitted to languish without adequate supplies, government opposition will be fueled. One only has to look at parallel experience in refugee assistance. Spontaneously-settled refugees who are working contribute proportionally less money and manpower to insurgent movements than refugees in camps. Therefore, the displaced must be taken out of the conflict equation by ensuring the highest level of services and job opportunities possible.

Second, where the majority of displaced are from cultural or ethnic minorities, a government should provide the overall framework for assistance but remain only indirectly involved in actual assistance to the displaced communities. Since a government cannot be neutral in a conflict, it must often remove itself from the provision of assistance and allow international or other neutral organizations to give direct aid. The Secretary of the Ministry of Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka once remarked that the greatest contribution the government made to assisting the displaced during their civil war was to stand aside and allow NGOs to work.

This principle, however, is somewhat limited since, in reality, few NGOs have the capability to sustain major relief operations over wide areas for long periods of time. In other words, some degree of government involvement will always be necessary. Where then, should a government allocate its resources and where should it rely primarily on NGOs?

The answer is usually found in the geography of the situation. The closer the camps or settlements are to the zone of conflict, the more neutral NGOs should be involved; the greater the distance from the zone of conflict, and in spontaneous settlements in urban areas, the greater the involvement of the government can be.

This principle is also compatible with government and NGO capabilities. Generally, governments are poorly-suited to operate in camps while NGOs often specialize in these types of services. On the other hand, government is always structured to provide municipal services. Extension of water, sanitation, etc., is not only easy, it is also more cost-effective since new mechanisms, structures, ministries, etc., do not have to be formed. Thus, governments should plan to build on

the inherent strengths of their own mechanisms and those of the NGOs, and avoid creating new institutions.

C. RELOCATION OF THE DISPLACED

Sooner or later, every government proposes some sort of relocation program despite overwhelming evidence that such programs are rarely successful and require a major commitment of funding. If a government decides to go ahead with relocation, it is important that criteria be set to ensure that all moves are entirely voluntary. If a government is to avoid controversy, the following policies should be established and observed:

1. All relocations must be voluntary.

2. An internationally-recognized NGO should verify that each move is voluntary.

3. No government-sanctioned relocation should be undertaken if the proposed site is in a zone of conflict.

4. If an individual chooses to relocate on his own to a site that is in or near a conflict zone, financial support for the move should be provided by a non-governmental or international agency rather than by the government.

5. No relocation activities should take place until adequate food, water and public health services are ready on site to service the resettled families.

6. Once relocated, a framework for assistance should be immediately available to help people make the transition to their new life.

A special office should be set up to coordinate any type of relocation or resettlement activity. A typical system should be structured to work more or less as follows:

1. The relocation office should inventory job possibilities in different locations.

2. Relocation caseworkers should then establish office hours at a location in or near DP settlements. Notices regarding relocation opportunities and assistance should be posted or announced in camps or in areas with high concentrations of displaced persons.

3. Volunteers responding to the notices should be assigned to a case worker.

4. The case worker should provide counselling to determine where the family wants to go and what assistance would be required.

5. A specific job should be identified for the head of the family and guaranteed before the registration process continues.

6. Once the source of employment is guaranteed, relocation arrangements can be finalized. A NGO should meet with the family, review the arrangements, and certify that the relocation is voluntary.

7. The move commences upon completion of this verification.

The Limits to Relocation Incentives

Governments often try to force people to relocate by exerting various types of pressure — some subtle, others overt. Widespread debate is currently surfacing about how far governments can go in trying to force compliance with their resettlement objectives. In the worst-case scenario, government troops cordon off a section of a community, round up the people, and physically convey them to the relocation site (often bulldozing or burning their houses to discourage them from returning).

In a less traumatic but still harsh and unacceptable approach, governments have cut off water or food supplies to relief-dependent communities in the hope of forcing the people to move out. Such a move is usually accompanied by an announcement that subsidized food and other relief services will be available at the new site.

In urban areas, governments may take a more subtle approach. As a spontaneous community begins to form, the government simply ignores its existence and neglects to extend municipal services such as water, sanitation and electricity to the new settlement.

That a government has the right to decide on its urban development policies is indisputable. Furthermore, there are often very legitimate reasons for not wanting a community to be established or to grow in a certain area. All governments have the right of eminent domain and the right to use legal methods to plan and guide urban growth. Despite this, the overwhelming evidence shows that virtually all moves to resettle people involuntarily fail. In forced resettlement, the government only alienates the affected population and increases their determination to return to the place from which they were evicted. When families do return, they may take greater precautions to integrate into the host community and find other, more secure sites to settle, making it even more difficult for the government to find them and send them back to the relocation site.

"Carrot and stick" approaches may meet with some success but, ultimately, success will be more dependent on income and employment opportunities than on provision of relief supplies. Few governments are adequately prepared, especially financially, to support displaced persons between the time of the move and the time that they are fully established in new settlements. As soon as the level of service falls, people will begin to abandon the settlement and return to the community from which they were relocated.

Economically, agencies should be cautious with regard to "carrot and stick" approaches. It is expensive enough to supply relief services to DPs in spontaneous settlements; moving DPs to a relocation center escalates the level of support required and, thus, the costs. Governments that try this approach soon realize that its limits are more financial than logistical. Supporting people with any degree of self-help is much better than creating an artificial relief situation that must be maintained for any length of time.

The least successful approach is that of creating disincentives to spontaneous settlements by neglecting to provide urban services. There will always be entrepreneurs who will find ways of supplying needed services (e.g., donkey cart water tankers). In the end, the cost to the government will be higher if services are not provided in a logical and planned manner as the communities evolve. It is always more costly to go back and install utilities in dense, unplanned settlements than to lay out a community in a logical manner and encourage growth along rational lines.

The disease factor should also be considered. By refusing to extend water, sanitation and health services into spontaneous settlements, a government increases the likelihood of communicable disease outbreaks. No government can afford to ignore the adage that "disease knows no boundaries". Conditions of overcrowding, poor sanitation and unclean water are the breeding ground of epidemics that may spread to planned areas.

D. REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Periodically, large numbers of displaced persons may suddenly return to their original areas. Sometimes this is voluntary, at others it may be due to encouragement of the government. In the worst case, it is a result of government pressures or force. In order to develop responses, it is important to understand the various scenarios under which returns take place. They include:

- Spontaneous return;
- Aided voluntary return;
- Passive actions on the part of the government to prevent people from obtaining basic services or economic opportunities;
- Coercion (direct action by government or political forces to threaten and harass people into leaving); and
- Forced removal.

1. Spontaneous Return: The process of spontaneous return is probably the least understood of all migration movements. Even at the height of intensive conflict, significant numbers of people often return. Most go back for non-conflict-related reasons. These may include fears that they will lose their land, concerns about raising children in an alien environment, lack of job opportunities in the areas where they have resettled, both overt and passive discrimination, and dissatisfaction with the circumstances under which they live as displaced persons. In some cases, there is also a positive side.

People are often able to accumulate enough capital to enable them to return and replace lost resources.

Spontaneous returns often encourage or stimulate other types of returns. A small trickle of people returning from San Salvador to the Marzon and Chalatenango provinces of El Salvador quickly triggered massive returns of displaced persons and led to large-scale repatriations of people from Honduras six months later.

Spontaneous returns tend to be self-regulating: people most likely to be successful at reintegrating and finding sustained employment are the most likely to return on their own.

2. Aided Voluntary Return: When assistance is provided to returnees by government or international agencies, the process can be classified as "aided voluntary return". Assistance may include a full range of services, from providing transport and sustenance en route to providing protection and rehabilitation assistance. Assisting voluntary returns under international supervision is the best way to encourage repatriation. However, assistance can also slow return. People may be afraid of registering for assistance; or returnees may try to manipulate the system for greater gain or force donors to increase benefits.

   Aided repatriations have also drawn fire from human rights activists. They point out that the UN, ICRC and other international agencies are often the last to know if areas are secure, and that by working with returnees, they often inadvertently send signals that an area is safe when it is not.

3. Passive Coercion: Actions by governments to encourage the displaced to repatriate usually are unsuccessful. If people are not ready to go, turning off their water may increase their hardships and even force them to relocate somewhere else, but will only rarely lead to large-scale return. However, the cumulative effects of passive government actions may lead some families to explore the possibility of returning and, if they become aware of ongoing spontaneous or aided voluntary returns, the families may choose to return.

4. Coercion: Active measures to threaten or harass people into leaving are usually counterproductive and almost always lead to violence and

repression. If unchecked, this can lead to incidents resulting in hundreds of deaths.

Patterns of harassment to be alert for include:

- arrest and detainment of community leaders;
- disappearances of community leaders;
- aggressive acts against women;
- acts of thuggery against people in settlements; and
- threats and warnings to people to leave.

Coercion usually results in solidifying people's resistance, not in widespread return. If, however, there is substantial spontaneous repatriation already occurring, people may choose to leave.

5. Forced Returns: Forced relocation is usually carried out by military or paramilitary forces. The usual pattern is for the military to arrive at a settlement in predawn darkness, cordon off the area, arouse the community, give them a few minutes to collect their belongings and then put them on trucks to be carried out of the area. If the people resist, the army may resort to destroying the people's shelters to force them to move. This may lead to violence resulting in a large number of civilian casualties.

   Forced relocations require a lot of logistics planning and, more importantly, a lot of resources. For this reason, the authorities usually target small, isolated settlements that can be surrounded and moved quickly.

Roles for the United Nations

Only by understanding the reasons why people are going back, the process of return, and the political, economic and military environment, can accurate decisions be made about possible intervention strategies. Once these parameters are understood, it should be possible to identify strategies of assistance which can help returnees. If the people appeal for assistance once they are home, the UN may consider a range of relief and rehabilitation in the belief that assistance will alter the political situation, and more returns will be possible. This is rarely the case.

If returnees appeal for help, the UN may engage in a wide range of activities to assist. These could include:

- organizing orderly departures and safe transport;
- negotiating safe transit through troubled areas; and
- providing rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance to returnees.

Repatriation should be closely monitored to determine those areas that are relatively safe. Experience has shown that there are many areas where development projects are possible and reconstruction can take place.

A note of caution: If the United Nations, ICRC or other international agency becomes involved in negotiations for safe corridors or in any way attempts to direct the stream of people, there is a possibility that the risks for returnees could be increased. Negotiators must take caution to ensure that the areas of return do not become points for negotiation. Any specification of areas is likely to draw the attention of opposing forces who may not want repatriation to those zones.

If coercion and force are used, the United Nations must act to stop it immediately. Strong protests should be delivered and a coordinated effort among the donors must be mobilized. It is also important to engage the press since news of these events can embarrass the government and often force it to stop.

One of the questions likely to be raised is what conditions the United Nations should place on the government in return for becoming involved in repatriation. The principal condition is that all returns be strictly voluntary. Second, and of equal importance, is that the government set no limits regarding areas to which people can return.

The biggest obstacle to assisting returnees is likely to be human rights violations. The UN should promote disengagement of forces in areas likely to receive large numbers of returnees and, where possible, to discourage actions by militia and irregular forces.

At the present time, the international community is severely constrained and is not in a good position to provide human rights monitoring. Nonetheless, it is important to establish "witness to violence" activities and encourage NGO and ICRC presence in the areas of return.

Safe Corridors for Repatriation

A common proposal is for the United Nations to establish safe corridors through which the returnees can pass. The record is marginal.

Corridors result in compressing large numbers of people into small, defined areas, making returnees easy prey for bandits and irregular forces. It also gives the government an opportunity to regulate the flow of people and screen them. Human rights violations usually increase when corridors are established. Air transport is less problematic, though much more expensive, and the government can still screen and regulate passage without difficulty.

Often governments will encourage people to return to areas without ascertaining whether or not it is really feasible. If the first returnees find difficulty in getting back or reintegrating, others in the pipeline may be stranded en route. In the worst case, people could end up in temporary camps waiting for a resolution to their situation, and relief agencies would be required to initiate programs to sustain them. For this reason, any aided repatriation must be carefully monitored to ensure that people are reaching their destination before the next group is transported.

A summary of information needed to make repatriation decisions is attached as Appendix B.

E. REGISTRATION

At some point in every assistance program, the question of whether to register displaced persons (and how to carry it out) will arise. Registration is a legitimate concern, not only of the government but also of other humanitarian agencies. Overall population statistics are one important by-product of registration, and protection and tracing are good reasons for some form to be adopted. However, it is important that the registration system be secure and that it be designed in such a way that it cannot be used to provide any party with information that might be detrimental to the DPs.

Several options exist for registering displaced persons:

1. Assigning registration to a neutral international organization such as a UN agency or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The primary advantage to this approach is that the neutral body is the only one maintaining lists, and central control can be maintained to discourage misuse of registration cards. Statistics may be provided to the government or other entities as necessary for planning purposes.

2. Designating a lead agency in each community as the registrar for the settlement. Each agency carries out registration using a standard format developed by all the participating agencies and produces over-all information for statistical and planning use. Each organization is responsible for ensuring that errors or duplication are minimized for the communities they serve.

3. Using a multi-organization registration system. A system utilizing the services of a number of assisting organizations can be developed and made secure through random numbering. To do this, a standard registration card is issued to each family bearing the logos of the participating relief agencies. Upon receiving a card, the head of the family goes to the registering agency and is issued a number which is recorded for verification purposes only. The card can be presented at any time to any one of the participating agencies to obtain relief supplies or services. The recording organization is responsible for making periodic inspections of different distribution programs to ensure that duplication is minimized.

It should be remembered that DPs will actively seek to avoid any type of registration, including surveys to enumerate the population and other information-gathering activities. They recognize that they are in a precarious legal position and, in short, do not want to be on anyone's list.

F. HOSTILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

Governments committing human rights abuses or denying the displaced their full rights as citizens will soon be in an adversarial relationship with donors. Eventually, the government is likely to become hostile to the presence of international agencies and accuse them of interfering with the national sovereignty of the country. Non-governmental organizations are likely to bear the brunt of the government's displeasure. In this situation the UN should formulate a comprehensive program framework under which the NGOs can operate and thereby provide some degree of protection for their work. At the same time, the UN should be careful not to encourage the NGOs to undertake activities on behalf of the international community that will

lead to a further eroding of their relationship with the host government. The UN has often been accused of using the NGOs as a "lightening rod" to determine the political limits of a particular program. When the NGO gets in trouble, the UN has not been able to provide adequate help.

G. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

When governments are carrying out human rights abuses, it is often difficult for United Nations personnel to obtain travel and work permits where the displaced have sought refuge. Restrictions on travel and access to the displaced must be vigorously protested and a blanket permission to travel to these areas should be sought. The United Nations should establish its right to visit the displaced wherever they are as a prerequisite for assisting the government.

X. FOOD AID

A. FOOD SECURITY

No discussion of assistance to displaced persons would be complete without examining the need to establish food security and programs to manage imported food aid. Food security is intricately linked to the problems of displacement: it is usually one of the major reasons why people flee unstable areas.

To ensure food security for the displaced, the following are needed:

1. Buffer Stocks: Food reserves should be developed in the communities where the displaced are residing if they are in remote or rural areas.

2. Increased Economic Security: It is important that the displaced be assisted by giving them the opportunity to earn income and participate in the economies to which they have migrated.

Food security requires officials to focus on creative uses of food aid. UNDP project officers can assist their government counterparts in reviewing various strategies. This is especially important when the emergency is over, for continued food relief beyond the emergency can create dependencies and have many negative effects on local markets.

B. ALTERNATIVES TO DIRECT DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD

There are many alternatives to direct distribution of food. They include:

- Food-for-work programs (FFW);
- Food stamp or food coupon programs;
- Payment in Kind (PiK) programs; and
- Cash-for-work.

The value of these programs is that, if properly planned, they are less stressful to individual families than receiving handouts. Much of the

food provided in food-for-work or food coupon programs will eventually be bartered and find its way into the marketplace, thereby increasing the overall availability of food in the community. If proper allowances are made and if the beneficiaries are targeted properly, alternative distribution programs can often serve to help stabilize food prices.

1. Food-for-Work: Typically, FFW projects pay people with food for working on public works or community development projects. Ideally, food-for-work projects are used as a means of improving the land or making improvements that will aid agriculture, such as terracing, building water catchments, erosion control measures, and irrigation. On a larger basis, FFW may be used for community improvements such as building or upgrading farm-to-market roads.

   Food-for-work proponents claim that food-for-work is less likely to create dependencies than direct food aid and is more developmental than direct handouts.

   Food-for-work accomplishes multiple objectives: getting food into the hands of those most in need, and carrying out projects and improvements that serve everyone. Thus, both individuals and communities are served.

   Projects are not difficult to organize, though paying in food means that a food logistics system must be set up to transport and store the food prior to distribution. The only difference logistically between FFW and direct distribution programs is that final distribution is easier and does not require the same degree of monitoring.

   However, food-for-work has critics. They point out that, unless properly planned, FFW often takes on a life of its own. As more food enters the community, some will inevitably be sold on the local market to buy things that people need other than food. The food is normally sold below the market price, which depresses the prices the farmers can get for the food they have been able to produce — thus, they begin to resent the presence of the displaced.

   The objective of any feeding program is to feed those most at risk and, in famines, those most at risk are children. Critics of FFW point out that it is difficult to establish a correlation between food-for-work programs and nutritional improvement. Usually able-bodied men participate in the food-for-work programs and, because they are undertaking strenuous work, they take a larger portion of

the food. To compensate, more food may have to be given out. This in turn means that more food will be necessary. In a situation where food resources are scarce, it may be more expeditious to continue dry ration distribution than to phase into a more resource-consuming program.

Criteria for Planning a Food-for-Work Program:

Food-for-work programs should be designed to provide short-term work only. To ensure that this happens, projects should be small-scale activities that can be completed in a short period of time. Projects such as road construction that take many months or even years to complete, or that could be intentionally prolonged by workers or program administrators, should be avoided.

In order to ensure that the vulnerable groups receive food, food-for-work projects should be developed for women.

Effective screening procedures should be established to ensure that the men working in food-for-work programs represent the neediest households and those with a high percentage of vulnerable individuals.

2. Food Store and Coupon Approach: A variation on food-for-work is the "food store and coupon" program. This program has been used with variations in several countries with quite a degree of success. A number of experts have suggested that this approach can help to remove many of the negative aspects of both food-for-work and cash-for-work programs.

   Under the program, income-generating projects, similar to those established for food-for-work programs, are identified and organized. However, the workers are paid in coupons which can be redeemed only at a special relief store set up in each community. These stores stock food, but also carry other supplies such as health care items, charcoal, household utensils, and personal articles that can contribute to health and hygiene (soap, toothpaste, etc.). In addition, a limited number of personal luxury items may also be sold at the store, for which cash or a combination of cash and coupons can be used.

   The rationale for this approach is that people will buy only what they need. This serves as a natural "regulator" of the amount of food coming into the community. Also, people will have the ability to buy those things which they would otherwise obtain by selling food. Therefore, food provided by the relief program will not be as

likely to end up in the local market competing with food produced by local farmers.

If the luxury items are procured from the local market by the participating agencies, local shopkeepers will also benefit. The amount of input from the agencies should be minimal and, by having a greater range of items available at the food store, the program should be popular and a greater incentive to work should be promoted. Finally, the range of foods provided at the coupon store can include those that are specially targeted for vulnerable groups, theoretically ensuring that a greater number of those most in need of calorie and nutritional inputs will receive them. With items in the store being controlled by the relief agencies, it will be possible to ensure that the workers principally take home food.

Proponents of the coupon store programs also point out that it is easy to establish nutrition monitoring activities in conjunction with, and physically adjacent to, the relief store. Open hours can be established and redemption days can be printed on the coupons.

3. Cash-for-Work: Cash-for-work, when properly organized, is the easiest means of providing people with food on a widespread basis. Programs are relatively easy to plan and execute, and monitoring is simple. The only major concern is the type of project selected: they must not take people away from normal agricultural activities and should be designed to improve both near- and long-term agricultural prospects.

   In comparison to food-for-work programs which are generally more popular with relief agencies, cash-for-work is less disruptive to the local economy. The program is easier to administer — there are no commodity logistics to manage — and the projects are easier to terminate and to move from one area to another as needs dictate.

   Cash-for-work also can infuse much-needed cash into economies that have been affected by an influx of displaced persons. In some cases, this can stimulate local economic expansion.

   Culturally, cash-for-work is not an alien concept, people normally work for wages. Therefore, the program is the best way to help maintain people's dignity for it removes the stigma of working on a relief program and gives people a choice about how they use the money. Since it is known that some of the food in food-for-work and other food distribution programs is sold in order

to buy household commodities such as soap, cooking fuel, etc., cash-for-work does away with the restrictions imposed by other programs.

Critics of cash-for-work claim that the people do not spend all the money on food, that the purpose of the program is basically to fight hunger, and food is what is needed. However, studies of cash-for-work programs show that most money is spent for food; claims that people spend all their money on alcohol, tobacco and other nonessentials are exaggerated.

XI. WAR'S END

A. IMMEDIATE NEEDS

The conclusion of a war quickly brings many new responsibilities to the UN. A distinct set of short-term assistance programs must be established to help the people return to their homes and complete the process of settling in before reconstruction of the war-torn areas and revitalization of the economy can begin. Examples of some of the immediate needs are:

1. Family reunification
2. Repatriation assistance
3. Restoration of basic services, especially water and sanitation, temporary income support and sometimes, food aid.

B. DEALING WITH THE WAR'S AFTER-EFFECTS

Demobilization of forces presents a number of problems for people in the conflict zone. One of the first is land mines. Land mines are one of the most lethal and senseless weapons of modern warfare. An abundant supply of mines on the international market has made it easy for even the poorest guerrilla force to obtain large quantities and sow them over vast areas. In the demobilization of forces, the people who planted the mines and maintained records on their locations often leave the areas before the mines are cleared. Thus, for many months and even years after the conflict, people, animals and vehicles stumble over the mines and are killed, injured or, in the case of vehicles, damaged or destroyed. Therefore, it is important that UNDP immediately organize a mine-sweeping organization and meet with the leaders of both forces to try to keep the mine-layers in areas where they have sown mines to guide mine-sweepers in their removal.

The second lingering after-effect of conflict is the impact that it has had on youth. Often, entire generations of young people have been denied access to proper schooling and a normal, healthy and supportive environment. The failure of governments and the international community to get these youths mentally demobilized has been cited as one of the major causes of not only high crime rates but also continuing

political instability in the former conflict zones. Special programs must be instigated to help get young people back into productive enterprises as soon as possible.

Another major issue is disarming former irregular forces (both rebels and paramilitary militia). In civil conflicts, small arms proliferate at an alarming rate. Often, virtually everyone in the conflict has access to light, but highly lethal, weapons. Assault rifles, pistols and rocket-propelled grenades are among the types of weapons that individuals can easily hide and that many people will attempt to retain. Innovative ways must be found to disarm the population as a means of bringing stability back into the area. In some cases, such as Namibia, Mozambique and Nicaragua, the UN has offered both cash and commodities to families turning in their weapons. In cases where records have been maintained indicating which individuals have received them, the surrender of weapons may be a desirable prerequisite to obtaining UN assistance.

C. PREPARING FOR RECONSTRUCTION

Reconstruction activities are normally funded by the major donors in the international financial institutions such as the World Bank. UNDP can play two important roles. First, in the provision of emergency rehabilitation assistance, the UN coordinator can develop programs that provide aid in such a way that it will support and lay the foundation for reconstruction activities. For example, in the provision of emergency shelter to help returning refugees and displaced persons, programs can be devised to provide building materials such as corrugated iron roofing sheets, timbers and wood panelling which can be used for emergency shelter and then be reincorporated into a permanent house. Usually, such approaches are cheaper than providing tents or other forms of emergency shelter that will only be used a short period of time and will cost many hundreds of dollars each to procure and deliver to the affected areas. By providing tools and materials in the rehabilitation phase, a contribution is also being made to reconstruction.

A second way the UN participates in reconstruction is by providing technical assistance to government agencies, especially those in the affected areas to help rebuild their capabilities and expand their expertise in sectors that will require priority attention during the reconstruction period.

Once reconstruction commences, it is not unusual for UNDP to provide support and technical assistance to the government to help it execute the reconstruction program. This is a vital role, for often new institutions will need to be created to plan and coordinate the reconstruction program.

Thus, it can be seen that UNDP plays a vital role in preparing a country to return to peace.

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENTS

ELEMENTS OF ASSESSMENT

1. Preparedness Planning: An accurate assessment depends on thorough planning and preparation. Information needs can be identified well in advance; the means of collecting the necessary data and selection of formats for collection and presentation of the information should be established as part of an organization's general emergency preparedness activities. By preparing to undertake assessments well in advance of an emergency, all potential information needs can be identified and adequate procedures and methodologies can be developed. Standard survey techniques, questionnaires, checklists and procedures should be prepared to ensure that all areas are examined and the information is reported using standard terminology and classification.

2. Survey and Data Collection: The gathering of the information must proceed rapidly and thoroughly. In an initial reconnaissance, surveyors should look for patterns and indicators of potential problems. Using the procedures developed earlier, key problem areas are thoroughly checked.

3. Interpretation: Thorough analysis of the information gathered is critical. Those doing the analysis must be trained to detect and recognize the indicators of problems, to interpret the information, and to link the information to action programs.

4. Forecasting: Using the data that has been collected, the assessment team must develop estimates about how the situation might develop in the future so that contingency plans can be developed. Forecasting requires inputs from many specialists, especially persons who have had extensive experience in previous emergencies and who might be able to detect trends and provide insights as to what course an emergency might follow.

5. Reporting: When data analysis and forecasting are complete, it is necessary to report and disseminate the results. Reports should be prepared in a format that enables managers to formulate plans and

projects. Essential information should be presented and structured so that the main patterns and trends are clear.

6. Monitoring: An assessment should not be seen as an end result, rather as one part of a continuing process. The initial assessment should provide baseline data and a basis for further monitoring. Data systems must be set up so that relief officials can determine whether a situation is improving or deteriorating. The systems must also provide a means of measuring the effectiveness of relief activities. Each assessment or survey should be designed so that it builds upon previous surveys and expands the data base.

ASSESSMENT METHODS

Several methods can be used for carrying out assessments. The two most common are:

1. On-Site Visual Inspections by Trained Observers: Qualified, experienced observers can often interview key personnel on site, visually review the people, their condition, and the sites where they are situated and from these observations prepare estimates about the scope and magnitude of the situation.

   The problem with visual inspections is that some major problems cannot be detected by simple observation. Often, what one can't see is more important than what is visible. For example, death rates, which are the most important indicator of stress in a population, cannot be determined from observation. In many societies, childhood diseases and malnutrition cannot be detected without detailed surveys since families routinely keep those children out of sight of strangers. In one classic case in East Africa, a survey team reported that all was fine in a settlement because they saw no malnourished children. A simple survey would have shown that the reason was that all the children had already died!

2. Surveys: Simple surveys based on interviews of villagers in the affected areas and statistical information collected from registration forms of health and feeding centers can provide invaluable data about the situation and provide information needed for planning projects.

Generally, sample surveys are used to determine people's immediate needs and health and nutritional status.

A key assessment activity that must initially be carried out by survey is the first health and nutritional assessment. This survey will provide the baseline data that will be used to establish the baseline data for disease surveillance and for evaluation of nutritional progress.

THE KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL ASSESSMENT

Several factors will contribute to the design of a successful and accurate assessment:

1. Identify the Users. Every element of an assessment should be designed to collect information for a specific user. The potential users should specify their data needs during the design phase. For example, health workers need certain types of information that will only be useful in certain formats, usually tables, while a procurement officer will need quantitative or statistical data.

2. Identify the Information that is Needed to Plan Specific Programs. Too often, assessments collect information that is incomplete or of little value for planning relief programs or specific interventions. In many cases, information is anecdotal rather than substantive. In others, valuable time is wasted collecting detailed information when representative data would be just as useful. Determine what information is key, the method that must be used to develop the data, and how much and how detailed the information needs to be to be useful. The type of assistance an agency usually provides should be considered when listing the data to be collected. For example, an agency that provides food will need to know about availability of transport and fuel, road conditions, etc.

3. Consider the Format. It is important to collect, organize and present the data in a form useful for analysts and program planners. The results must be presented in a form that makes the implications very clear so that priorities can be set quickly. With the advent of lap top microcomputers with integrated spreadsheets and graphics, it is possible to present much of the data in graphic form. By applying

baselines and standards to the presentation, key relationships can be quickly noted. For example, daily death rates should be calculated and compared to the international standard of 1.0 deaths per 10,000 per day.

4. Consider the Timing of the Assessment. Timing can affect the accuracy of the assessment since situations and needs can change dramatically day to day. Various types of assessments need to be timed to collect the necessary information when it is available and most useful. Relief needs are always relative; but as a general rule, initial surveys should be broad in scope and should determine overall patterns and trends. More detailed information can wait until emergency operations are well established.

APPENDIX B

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR REPATRIATION DECISION-MAKING

The following is a summary of the information needed to determine intervention options and begin preparing assistance programs.

A. Demographic Information

This includes:

- tribes
- ages, and
- sex.

B. Characteristics of the Moves

Are people moving individually or by family, social groups, or villages?

C. Destinations

Are people moving back to their original community, nearby, or to an alternate site?

D. Numbers Returning

The total number and:

- the percentage of the total population,
- the percentage of their ethnic group,
- the percentage of their community of residence (their displaced settlement).

E. Points of Departure

Are they leaving from the capital, towns in the transitional zone, from the agricultural schemes or from traditional migration areas?

F. Expectations

What are the people's expectations about their journey and what will they find at their destination?

G. Ricochet Returns

Are there significant numbers of people who immediately leave the areas after reaching their destination? If so, where do they go?

H. Seasonal Aspects

Are returns affected by season? Specifically, is there a relationship between return and rains or agricultural seasons? Are the returns likely to stop once the rains come?

I. Impact

Does repatriation result in an increase or decrease in tensions in the area? Is there increased competition for scarce resources such as water? Have localized conflicts resulted as a result of the return?

J. Monitoring

After people have reached their destination, it will be imperative to monitor their progress and the security situation. Among the items that are important to watch are:

- Conscription/Recruitment: Sudden halts in spontaneous repatriation are usually linked to recruitment or conscription by government or insurgent forces. A key role for the UN is to reach agreement with both sides that returnees not be forced into military service. Efforts should also be made to ensure that returnees are not forced to participate in collective security arrangements such as civil guards, local militia, etc., in their communities.

- Role of Government: Assistance to returnees should be provided by NGOs or the ICRC as much as possible. The government

should only be involved in returning groups that are pro-government. Any tribal group that could be considered to be sympathetic with insurgents should be assisted by the international community or other neutral bodies.