Do NGOs Deliver?
The Role of NGOs in Responding to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan

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Introduction

Eleven million Syrians have fled their homes or have been killed as a result of the Syrian Civil War that began in 2011 (Mercy Corps, 2016). The violence, destruction of homes, human rights violations, and lack of access to basic necessities such as food and medication are the motivations for many Syrians to leave their homes and seek refuge in both neighboring countries and Europe. Each year has seen an exponential increase in the number of Syrian refugees; in 2012 there were 100,000 refugees and today there are 4.3 million refugees. This large increase each year contributes to the already significant workload for NGOs responding to the crisis.

NGOs meet many of the basic needs for refugees, from providing food, clothing, and shelter, to medical care and access to clean water. Meeting these needs requires funding for both materials and NGO field staff workers. The massive influx of refugees coming from Syria and increased donor fatigue raises a new set of questions about the sustainability of the NGO response. Without external financial support, UN Agencies and NGOs will not have the ability to provide these services, and the host country governments will face great challenges in providing even a portion of these services.

Since March of 2011, a steady stream of 1.4 million Syrians have crossed into Jordan in order to flee violence, persecution, and conflict (European Union, 2014). With eighty percent of refugees living in host communities, the Jordanian people are feeling the strain on the economic resources and infrastructure. The Jordanian people’s negative perception of the Syrian refugees limits the ability of the Jordanian government to respond with effective policy measures that address the refugee crisis; therefore, the NGO community stepped in to fill the void left by government policies. This research seeks to examine the role of NGOs in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan.
Literature Review

The team conducted a thorough review of existing literature regarding non-governmental organizations responding to humanitarian crisis. After an initial review of the existing literature, the team chose to focus on three main sectors: Food and Shelter, Healthcare, and Water, Hygiene and Sanitation (WASH).

Food and Shelter

Food and shelter have been combined in this review due to the similar nature in responses from emergency to longer-term response programs. Food security “exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2008). Food aid programs therefore respond to food insecurity that arises during and following emergencies, as in the case of the Syrian civil war. The goals of food assistance are to manage wasting and malnutrition and to provide adequate food consumption for its recipients (World Food Programme, 2012; Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Protection, 2012). Jordan was already at risk for food insecurity before the refugee crisis. The increase in population has only exacerbated that risk.

In addition, providing shelter continues to be a challenge for host countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has developed strategies to address settlement and shelter. Settlement is defined as enabling refugees to have access to and live in dignity in secure settlements that improve their social, economic and environmental quality of life as a community. Shelter is enabling refugees to access shelter solutions that provide privacy, security and protection from the elements, emotional support, and a space to live and store belongings in a dignified manner (UNHCR, 2014). Shelter in particular can be difficult for host countries to address as refugees can be perceived to be a security threat or economic threat to different industries (Schmeidl, 2002).

Historically, food assistance programs have been done through in-kind food distribution in camps and sometimes in communities, providing food staples at the beginning of emergency crises. NGOs often have better access to camp refugees than community refugees, which in turn can affect who receives the most effective assistance (Crea et al, 2015). Camps in turn are meant to be an emergency response, satisfying the immediate need for physical shelter, resulting in structures that are not appropriately functional for long-term living (Ros-Garcia, 2014). However, since 2005, cash vouchers and unconditional cash assistance have become some of the most popular ways for NGOs to give aid. Studies concerning Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria following the 2001 invasion of Iraq suggest that cash assistance programs were fairly effective (Doocy, et al, 2011).

Using food vouchers, beneficiaries can select food items according to their preferences and individual consumption needs (Husain, et al, 2014). Unconditional cash assistance can also be used to pay rent as refugees leave the camps and find housing in communities. Unconditional cash assistance can be and has been implemented through numerous NGOs given the nature of the service. The United Nations World Food Programme’s (WFP) food voucher program in Jordan is
implemented through multiple cooperating partners, some of which are Save the Children, International Orthodox Christian Charities, and Catholic Relief Services. However, as the number of refugees continues to increase, a shift in assistance programs will likely be necessary to address the changing dynamic in Jordan regarding both food and shelter.

Healthcare

Refugees in camps and those in host communities have similar health needs, with some differences in urgency and how care is administered (i.e. camp doctor or vouchers). How refugees access medical care or needs can vary, as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have been found to entice more visits to a medical professional, while vouchers are easier to distribute (UNHCR, 2015). A common theme refugees express is that they do not have adequate access to healthcare (Al-Fahoum), or that the services offered have a negative reputation (WHO, 2014; UNHCR, 2015). Building a healthcare framework within Jordan is a pressing matter, as the number of refugees will not decrease in the short term (Bradby, et al. 2015).

Organizations provide primary care, medicines, obstetrics and gynecology services, mobile clinics, and first aid training. The mental health sector is a significant focus of analytical publications, as the percentage of refugees with mental health issues is much higher than a non-refugee population (Al-Fahoum, et al. 2015). Another key part of refugee health care is obstetrics and gynecology, including contraception and natal healthcare. There are many NGOs that focus on maternal and natal care, especially with complicated pregnancies, to decrease newborn mortality, and plan for comprehensive health for mother and child (Krause, et al. 2015).

In regards to training of these specialized NGO workers, there was a common theme for education of cultural sensitivity in healthcare contexts. Additional training for specific healthcare or medical issues of refugees were mentioned, i.e. suicide, though there were very few publications that mentioned particular training methodologies or topics pertaining to health. This sector’s training practices are unique though, as most volunteers or employees are medical professionals. No sources about Syrian refugees in Jordan mentioned special preparation, though there were numerous resources and publications discussing unique refugee health concerns, and respective training. Just as refugees expressed a lack of access to healthcare and insufficient supply of medicines, medical professionals must also learn how to treat patients with restricted supplies.

Water Hygiene and Sanitation

The main focus of WASH programs is to provide refugee populations with reliable sources of clean water which ensures hydration and hygiene. WASH programs take on even more significance in Jordan as it is the third most water insecure state in the world (Mercy Corps, 2014). Most of the programs are targeted at refugees within the camps as they are the most water insecure populations. Refugees living in host communities usually have access to running water through the country’s existing water pipe infrastructure. The host communities also have reliable access to sewage infrastructure. Any WASH projects aimed at host community refugees tend to be macro projects focused on helping the entire Jordanian population as opposed to singling out host community refugees. This is important as much of the infrastructure was in disrepair and leaking.
up to 70% of the water before the refugee crisis started. With this massive influx of people, the entire water and waste system was pushed well beyond its capacity.

There are two main components of WASH: water and groundwater delivery and sanitation promotion. Groundwater projects begin by drilling boreholes in the ground in order to extract water. A distribution system is then set up either in the form of a well at ground level or through a system of pipes to deliver water to secondary locations. Water deliveries are simply programs in which water, in bottles or large tanks, is delivered via trucks to the needy populations. Oxfam is currently working in the Za’atari refugee camp, Jordan’s fourth largest ‘city’ to address water and sanitation needs among the camp. Their efforts currently reach nearly 25,000 camp residents, and are working with other international partners, including UNICEF, to construct a water network in the camp that will ensure that all 80,000 camp residents have access to safe water (OXFAM, 2016). Mercy Corps is one of the only NGO’s that is presently working on the larger water infrastructure. They began on the northern border and are slowly renovating their way towards the south.

The second component of WASH programs is sanitation promotion. Hygiene can reduce the transmission of fecal-oral diseases such as cholera, bacillary dysentery, and hepatitis E and diarrhea. The delivery of clean water allows refugee populations to practice good personal hygiene; however, the water available is often contaminated through contact with the refugees and the local environment. This can be remedied through behavioral training such as: teaching people to wash their hands, clean their houses, or use latrines. Alternatively, some organizations prefer providing chlorine for water disinfection, as it has been proven more effective than behavioral training (Roberts et al., 2001). Oxfam has also implemented a Hygiene Voucher Program in July 2013 and a Water Voucher program in November 2013 in the governorate states of Balqa and Zarqa (OXFAM, 2016). Beneficiaries were able to redeem these vouchers at local vendor shop for various hygiene products as well bottled water. ACTED is present in Zaatari, Azraq, Cyber City and King Abdullah Park (UNHCR, 2015). They are actively focused on increasing water resources within the camps as well as promoting personal and environmental hygiene. The Jordan River Foundation and the Royal Scientific Society are implementing programs in the communities to teach water conservation. These are supported by USAID and Mercy Corps. All of these projects are carried out in collaboration with the various governmental ministries of Jordan.

Our Research

Despite the extensive amount of research done regarding NGOs and their general effectiveness in providing crucial services such as WASH, food and health, there has not been much research on how training of aid workers in these sectors affects the effectiveness of their program implementation. Studies have noted that disconnects can exist between workers in the field and management headquartered away from the situation. Disconnects can also occur in organizations such as UNICEF whose sole task it to distribute and coordinate the funding. These headquarters and umbrella organizations often lack the in-depth knowledge of ground operations and how programs are actually carried out. The same studies emphasized the necessity of adapting programs as the refugee crises change (Sharp, 2007). Indeed, while advice has been offered as to what training should focus on and who should be qualified to be an aid worker, there does not seem to be research as to how training affects NGOs’ impact (Salama et al, 2004). This research aims to fill the gaps in the literature regarding NGO training and its effectiveness in Syrian refugee aid in Jordan.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The team analyzed multiple viewpoints and theories on best operating practices of organizations responding to crisis. Research has shown that in general NGOs are concerned with the objectives of impact, sustainability and cost-effectiveness (Edwards, 1999). The definition of impact depends on the organization’s mission and goals; this research project has examined organizations that in general seek to respond to the needs of refugees in a crisis situation. Sustainability is defined as the ability of an organization to meet the needs of its targeted beneficiaries over time, while strengthening the capacity of the local people (Edwards, 1999). Finally, cost effectiveness is defined as balancing an organization’s overhead costs with the amount of beneficiaries receiving benefits from an organization’s work in the most efficient way.

The success or failure of these three objectives is a combination of organizational choices and external context (Edwards, 1999). In regards to external context, research has shown that organizations with local knowledge, coordination and good relationships with donors and the host government will flourish. Donors and governments have significant influence on agencies and can determine how much political space there is for an organization to operate; therefore, those that nurture and manage these relationships will perform better (Edwards, 1999). Similarly, and particularly in regards to INGOs, local knowledge and partnerships are crucial for success (MacRae, 2008). Successful INGOs, who lack links to the community, will provide the technical expertise but pair with local NGOs for practical implementation and local knowledge (MacRae, 2008). Research has shown that internal processes and bureaucratic hierarchies often consume INGOs, and so partnership is crucial to actually reach the beneficiaries (MacRae, 2008).

Internally, organizations can make a variety of choices that affect its impact, sustainability and cost effectiveness. Research has shown that organizations that identify, and stick to clear long-term goals are more successful. One example of this is an organization’s willingness to say no to funding from agencies that would require an expansion outside of their goals, which could compromise impact (Edwards, 1999). Another characteristic of high performing organizations is strong inspirational leadership and organization culture. Low manager turnover and fluid relationships between field staff and management are crucial to performance.

In regards to training, research shows that NGOs who foster a culture of learning with content based training will be more efficient and effective with their resources, as well as experience less staff turnover (Schoenhaus, 2002). Content based learning is defined as live classroom training with interactions between trainer, trainee and colleagues, which teaches hands on skills. Distance learning can be used to present standardized material when the organization is spread out geographically.

In contrast to this structured and comprehensive learning, many organizations working in a humanitarian relief context often have an “oral culture” in regards to training. This training tends to be ad hoc, preferring on the job field experience, personal skills, and general knowledge of development and an idealistic organizational culture (Schoenhaus, 2002). The attitude of the organization is often that humanitarian NGOs are “based largely on experience and shaped by dedicated, visionary leaders- a model that can never be replicated in a classroom setting or by distance learning of rote skills” (Schoenhaus, 2002, p.17). There are many reasons for this such as...
the fast paced environment of humanitarian intervention, which leaves little time for training, donor’s unwillingness to fund and spend time on training and hesitancy towards evaluation (Schoenhaus, 2002). But as NGOs seek to be effective in “an increasingly crowded and confused humanitarian aid and development environment” (Schoenhaus, 2002, p.16) institutional learning will be key to their success. Specifically, research has shown that organizations that incorporate classroom and distance training into their mission, create incentives to learn and spend time of self-evaluation will fare much better than those who do not.

Finally, research shows that UN agencies that incorporate both humanitarian assistance and development into their mandate have a more meaningful impact on the lives of refugees and are more sustainable (Crisp, 2007). Increasingly refugees are forced to seek asylum for longer periods of time in host countries and many will settle permanently; for example, the Syrian crisis has been raging since 2011 with no end in sight.

Often refugees spend their exiled years without access to education and livelihoods, straining local resources and deprived of basic opportunities to live a productive life. Historically, displacement and development have been divided into silos; the UNHCR dealt with displacement and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) dealt with development. However, this paradigm is changing as research shows that a merging of the two can bring long-term benefits to refugees and the host communities they occupy (Crisp, 2007). Linking the two objectives has proven to be a more effective way of dealing with the reality that refugees are in Jordan to stay.

One example relevant to this research of effective linkages between displacement and development objectives highlighted in the literature is the Income-Generating Project for Afghan Refugees (IGPAR) of the 1980s (Crisp, 2007). During the early 1980’s more than three million Afghans fled to Pakistan, creating immense strain on Pakistan and terrible living conditions for refugees. In order to solve the problem, the UNHCR paired with the World Bank to establish IGPAR and to provide employment for the refugee population. This 86 million dollar program benefited three-fourths of the refugee population and completed 300 projects in Pakistan.

To sum up, in order to be successful, organizations must have impact, sustainability and cost effectiveness. How an organization chooses to achieve these objectives varies. This research has identified several best practices that effective organizations have chosen.
Methodology

After conducting a comprehensive literature review and constructing a theoretical framework, the team moved to designing the field research portion of the project. The field research presented a host of new opportunities for the team, but also presented a host of challenges and considerations that the team needed to address before conducting field interviews.

Background

This qualitative research study seeks to make methodological as well as substantive contributions to the field of international affairs, studies on international non-governmental organizations, and studies on the current Syrian Refugee Crisis. It does so through careful examination of the existing secondary data and through conducting semi-structured interviews. The aim is to examine the response of international non-governmental along with local organizations serving the Syrian refugee population in the host communities in Jordan. This study investigates training methods and qualifications of service providers, and the coordination of services specific to Syrian refugees within Jordanian host communities.

Ethical Consideration

Prior to conducting fieldwork in Jordan, in compliance with the Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board, researchers attended a training session administered by the Capstone Project Leader surrounding cultural sensitivity topics and best practices for conducting in-person interviews while in Jordan. Researchers were made aware of the current sentiments towards Syrian refugees in Jordanian host communities, societal norms of Arab culture, and methods for exercising the utmost respect to interviewees during the interviewing process. Researchers were instructed to obtain verbal consent from interviewees before tape recording or taking notes on at the beginning of any interview. Researchers were also instructed to inform interviewees of their rights to refrain from answering any questions that he/she did not wish to answer. Researchers were trained on how to inform interviewees of the anonymity clause in this given research that would not link any specific answers to the interviewee, and that all recordings would be stored securely in a locked drawer at Texas A&M University.

Researchers were also taught proper salutations in Arabic such as the greeting ‘as-salaam-alaikum’ (peace be upon you), ‘shukran’ (thank you), and ‘ma’a salama’ (goodbye). Female researchers were made aware of the cultural norm of women not looking men in the eye for an extended period of time. Female researchers were also advised to have a scarf present in case an interviewee felt more comfortable with her hair covered. Additionally, female researchers were instructed to adhere to a strict dress code which forbid low cut tops, tightly fitting bottoms, short skirts/dresses, and sleeveless tops as a sign of respect for the Arabic culture where this sort of dress is deemed as inappropriate. Male researchers were informed that when interviewing males and females, it is best to defer his questions to the male interviewee. Out of respect for cultural differences, male researchers were also advised not to shake the hand of a woman interviewee if she does not extend her hand. In general, researchers were informed that interviewees may become emotional due to the context of the crisis and may show visible signs of stress during the interview. Researchers were prepared to deal with a range of emotions that might arise by assuring the
interviewee that he/she does not have to continue with the interview and does not have to answer any questions that may trigger emotion.

Four separate questionnaires were designed based on the four different types of respondents the team targeted. The four targeted groups were Program Managers/Country Directors, Project Managers, NGO Field Officers/Volunteers, and Refugees. The team devised questions aimed at understanding the various themes proposed by the client in the research question, without using buzzwords such as burnout or training. The team made the decision to avoid using buzzwords in order to avoid bias answers from respondents.

Qualitative Portion

A content analysis was used to explain the causal relationship between the measurements of the response of NGOs in Jordan to Syrian refugees in host communities (dependent variable) and factors such as the preparation of staff through training and experience, and the effectiveness of NGOs performance (independent variables) in the specific sectors of food security/distribution, health, and W.A.S.H. These specific sectors were identified by the research team through needs assessment data published online by various NGOs as necessities for survival, and three of the most pressing sectors for emergency response in crisis situations. NGOs performance in these sectors were made measurable through specific interview questions created by the research team.

This information is based on interviews conducted in both Arabic and English by the research team with country directors, program managers, field officers, volunteers, and refugees between the ages of 18 and 65 in Amman, Azraq, and Irbid, Jordan between the dates of March 15, 2016 and March 22, 2016. All information provided was strictly voluntary and consensual. Approval to conduct this research was granted by the Texas A&M University Internal Review Board in March of 2016.

Method of Measurement

The content analysis approach was made possible by the transcription and coding of in-person interviews. Thirty-two interviews were conducted consisting of seventy-four people total. Interview recordings were assigned a reference number, which was also used during transcription and record keeping. All responses to interview questions were coded using theme words relevant to each question. Responses were allowed to have more than one theme for accuracy. All codes were accompanied by the corresponding quote, which were reviewed by members of the data team to ensure accuracy and uniformity. After all interviews were coded, theme words for each question were tallied for interpretation. All questions with numerical responses (i.e. years working with Syrian refugees, size of household) were analyzed to find the mean answer, as well as the minimum and maximum responses.

Limitations

As expected, conducting qualitative research with human subjects possess many limiting factors and various obstacles. Members of the research team were initially encouraged to have one team member make contact with organizations to secure interviews while in Jordan. However, in

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1 Found in the appendix section of this report
the process researchers realized that NGOs that we contacted via email and through formal email introductions through networks were very slow to respond, or did not respond at all.

Another obstacle faced was that after making contact with Program Directors of NGOs identified in one of the three given sectors, the team was later informed that they were not willing to participate in the research after being provided with the survey questions and learning more about the research goals. These factors served as limitations for the amount of NGOs that the research team was able to conduct interviews with while in Jordan. Not only did this limit the amount of NGOs researchers were able to interview, it also limited the number of Syrian refugees within Jordanian host communities that researchers were able to interview as well. A provision from the Texas A&M Internal Review Board stated that researchers must only interview Syrian refugees in Jordanian host communities who were identified as beneficiaries of services by that specific NGO. This limited the surveyed population.

Additionally, researchers originally set out to with the intention of interviewing Syrian refugees inside of refugee camps, but were unable to obtain a security clearance to enter refugee camps due to the overwhelming amount of researchers who had already been interviewing in camps. This was due to the dates of research that were scheduled for the potential timing of a ceasefire to be signed by the Government of Syria. UNHCR, the coordinating body of refugee camps throughout Jordan believed that researchers’ safety may be at risk, and that refugees were experiencing fatigue from constant interviews. Also, the language barrier of not being able to communicate in Arabic without the presence of translators limited the amount of interviews that researchers were able to conduct. Most NGO staff were fluent in English, but refugees, some volunteers, and very few field officers were not. This language barrier created the need for the constant presence of translators, which limited the amount of interviews that researchers (who were not fluent in Arabic) were able to conduct at one time.

Furthermore, since the refugee population that researchers were able to interview was designated by the NGOs interviewed, Field Officers, or an individual associated with the given NGO was present at all times while interviewing refugees. This served as a possible limitation of collecting unbiased responses from refugees who may have inferred that the services that they currently receive would be affected based on the answers to questions concerning the quality of services received by that given NGO. There is no way to tell if the answers collected were honest, or unbiased which served as a limitation to the research as the team worked within the confines of the regulations of the governing institution. Despite these limits, the team was still able to collect rich data, which has provided a basis for important findings.
Findings

Data from interviews was organized into several themes. These themes were developed to address the wide range of data and assist the team in guiding the analysis and developing the final recommendations. Some themes were separated into subcategories to help conceptualize the more complex nature of the findings.

Operations

Monitoring

The trend is that organizations monitor their projects upon completion through satisfaction surveys, word of mouth, and meeting with beneficiary families. The organizations interviewed visited their beneficiaries between one to three times a month during the period that they received services. Many INGOs use a database system to keep track of the beneficiaries served. However, many CBOs use various methods to track the information. One of the common themes in the interviews was the difficulty of monitoring food security programs. Organizations struggled to implement food voucher and e-voucher systems; namely, some of the greatest challenges to food security programs are food waste, repeated voucher fraud and lack of an e-voucher electronic network were common in the interviews.

Location

The team discovered that location is a key factor, which influences the effectiveness of an organization’s programs, as well as their overall impact. Organizations that work in rural communities have different challenges and needs than organizations working in urban centers. Organizations working in rural communities stated that disproportionate funding, resources and attention was often given to urban communities, affecting the effectiveness of their programs in rural areas. One rural program manager stated, “We have a problem, we are afraid of budget cuts from the government budget for our village. We have more refugees than the other villages but we don’t get the same share as the others get - for example the budget for infrastructure.” One field officer expressed that a large number of beneficiaries were being overlooked, saying, “So the suggestion is to work in the rural areas and in the villages that are far from the cities. I think those areas contain a huge number of beneficiaries, that are interested in coming to attend our sessions.” Another characteristic of location is capacity building in rural areas. Without strong local partners in rural areas, large humanitarian organizations may spend a lot of money on large projects that the community lacks the capacity to absorb or maintain. This means that these organizations are spending money without creating sustainability for their projects.

A second factor in location is proximity to the border, which affects the services offered to refugees. When working on the border, organizations are present for a refugee’s first encounter in Jordan. It requires greeting and immediately resettling freshly arrived refugees who are in need of everything, as opposed to working far away with refugees who have been in country for a while. One local CBO working on the border described organizing teams to welcome refugees as they crossed the border and provide for their immediate needs such as food and instruct them on where
to register. Health services offered at the border differ as well, as organizations cited the need for life saving surgeries and trauma centers. At times working on the border poses a security threat for organizations. When describing a distribution on the border one program manager said, “More or less it is well known as a conservative space where also supporters of ISIS are there, who have demonstrated in support of ISIS. But we didn’t have troubles with them, but in general it’s a tribal region where different tribes who try to take over whatever comes to the region. So we had also some shooting over there, in the air, because they would like to take a truck full of aid kits for themselves. We had a police presence there, however, not even police presences would help much.”

One particularly striking finding from working on the border was the difficulties with the makeshift refugee camp amassing at the Ruqban border crossing. Organizations highlighted the difficulty of reaching these refugees because of security concerns, “You have a lot of people - 40,000 - stuck on the border, sixty percent of whom are women and kids. [The Jordanian Government] are refusing people access who are fleeing war, which is problematic.”

A number of Program Managers cited positive relationships with CBOs, and preferred working with CBOs to provide aid instead of working with the Jordanian government. A Program Manager stated that “usually we come with project[s] that serve the community and, this is the main purpose of having the CBOs to serve the community so we just help them to implement what they are there for.” While others stated that they work with CBOs in some regions where they do not have established offices, and others work with CBOs because of their established reputation in Jordanian communities.

Emergency vs. Development

The team discovered that the framework of an emergency situation versus a long-term crisis also affects the areas of impact for organizations. Organizations that viewed the situation as a long-term crisis focused more on longevity, sustainability and less on humanitarian relief. For example in the field of health, organizations that view the crisis as long term one have opened clinics that focus on reconstruction as opposed to life saving care; as a project manager noted, “Here in Jordan we have a reconstructive hospital which has been here for ten years and has more than 50% patients. This is a long-term hospital for what we call cold cases. This is not lifesaving surgery.” Another example from the field of health is focusing on maternal health and delivering healthy babies as a long-term priority as opposed to emergency care only.

Referral Process

According to our research word of mouth is an important part of the referral process. Many interviewees discussed hearing about the organization through a friend or relative. Once they have reached out, the organization will conduct an assessment on their needs before they enroll in a service.

Needs Assessments

Each of the organizations interviewed has a specific method for identifying the needs of the Syrian refugee population and designing and implementing programs based on those needs.
The two primary forms of needs identification are in-house needs assessments and previously conducted needs assessments. The first, in-house needs assessments are where the organizations themselves conduct a needs assessment specific to the population they will be serving. These needs assessments have the advantage or being tailored to a specific population and creating a much nuanced project. Some organizations also used community institutions, such as mosques or social groups, to gain a better understanding of the community and gain the trust of their beneficiaries in order to get more honest answers to their needs assessment surveys.

The secondary form of needs identification is by using needs assessments that have been previously conducted by reputable humanitarian organizations or government branches. The most commonly used needs assessment is the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), which is a nation-wide needs assessment published by the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. While the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation officially published the JRP many non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations contribute to the JRP’s content.

Training

Preparation of NGO staff varied greatly across the organizations that the group interviewed, highlighting a lack of common curriculum used by organizations in this crisis context. The organizations that do provide training typically provide new-hire training, refresher courses, or both. Training practices were described for field officers and volunteers, but little information was gathered from interviewees about training or preparation of program or project managers. However, managers do typically have years of experience in other humanitarian contexts, and reported that they feel prepared for their programs or projects.

The training that is given is largely done in the field offices in Amman, usually carried out by the program manager. Some have two or three days of orientation, and a few shadow their employees for the first weeks or months. However, the training is not consistent. Although all employees receive a form of basic orientation, actual training is done largely based on an individual’s role and needs. There are some outside training agencies, such as Inside NGO, but participation in the courses requires funding. Most program managers have staff meetings where training is given. This might be based on the assessments that they receive of the volunteers from the actual refugees or on issues that come up from the employees themselves.

Burnout & Psychological Support

Most interviewees spoke of the real risk of staff burnout. They also reported some type of training or orientation as well as a support structure to manage the issue. The burnout results mostly from exposure to traumatic situations, the heavy workload, competing priorities, large number of new staff, and above all the length of the crisis. There was, however, a theme of staff recognizing that Jordan was not as bad of a place to work compared to other countries experiencing humanitarian crises. While working with Syrian refugees in Jordan can be emotionally and physically exhausting, many NGO employees noted that Jordan is not a hardship posting, which many believe decreases burnout.

The most frequently cited support structure for handling stress is on-going communication via phone calls, email, or meetings with program managers. Some NGOs also have a position for
a staff psychologist as well as a human resources department that handles staff issues. In offices that experience burnout in staff more frequently rotate employees from field to office work to offer variety in their stress levels, as well as offer flexibility in hours and telecommuting. Staff retreats are also a common way for organizations to build community and reduce stress among their employees and volunteers.

Sensitivity Training

Training on how to interact with the beneficiaries was a topic that was stressed by some organizations more than others. Not all organizations mentioned training or preparation on how to behave in a polite and professional manner, while others stated that it a large focus of their training and policies. One project manager who was discussing training health officers said that they train their field officers to “talk to the beneficiaries in a good way, see them as [your] clients... don’t talk as if you are superior.” A field officer sharing their opinions on training and possible improvements mentioned improving professionalism, and how this can have a positive impact on deliverance of services: “I think having good capacity helps you in delivering the message in a very professional way and reaching more refugees and assisting them.” This same person went on to explain that learning how to handle the interactions in this humanitarian crisis can improve communication and determine if services are in fact what beneficiaries should be receiving.

This sensitivity also matters for project quality between higher-level management and field officers and volunteers. Given the risk of burnout, ensuring that people in the field can impact the programs by making adjustments as needed is important. Several field officers explained that based on the practices and needs they observe in the field, changes in policies are made in order to better serve the refugees. For example, one field officer provided a specific occurrence stating “the distribution of bread for people is only for 18 years and up, so I suggested to give it to children under 18, for example start at five years old, so we worked on it and now we do that.” This goes to show that the practices in the field are based on the initial protocols outlined in the international agreements, but are subject to changes based on the needs of the refugees. This allows quality to improve based on needs. Another field officer explained the frequency in which these changes are reported stating,

“Every Monday and every Friday the [NGO] makes meetings with every organization’s employees to know what happened and what they do with the problem they faced and to make sure they know how to solve it, but they can’t find a solution for everything such as electricity, so they try to find the solution, talk with the refugees to understand what happened.”

This is not to say that by reporting these results back to their respective organizations that changes are always made to field practices. Often times there are physical limitations that prevent these field workers from doing more, with field officers believing that “if [they] had more resources, then [they] could deliver more”.

Funding

All of the organizations interviewed receive funding from either private donations, (including faith based donations) international donor governments, or a combination of the two. Most of the funding received is earmarked, meaning that it is specified for specific projects which
the organization must deliver. Earmarking makes it difficult for humanitarian organizations to adjust to changing environments, and limits their ability to adapt to the refugees’ evolving needs.

Organizations and funding sources offer a variety of continuous and fixed-term projects. Continuous projects are often emergency service projects, such as food distribution and hygiene services, while fixed-term projects include short-term emergency projects and one-time distributions such as winterization or cash for rent.

Coordination

Interviewees frequently mentioned the lack of coordination among humanitarian organizations, and also between humanitarian organizations and the Government of Jordan. Many interviewees expressed confusion as to who was responsible for coordination, often citing different entities as the coordinating body. One interviewee referenced the Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO) as the coordinating body. The JHCO is a governmental coordination entity for local and international humanitarian aid organizations. It is responsible for instituting criteria that CBOs must meet in order to partner with international humanitarian aid organizations to deliver services to Syrian refugees within Jordanian host communities. Other interviewees mentioned working through other government ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Water. This same Program Manager who referenced the JHCO also stated that there are “various government parts that we work with for different programs. And then we have the national NGOs that we work with, large, very strong national NGOs such as the Jordan Royal Foundation”. Still other respondents said that different UN agencies were leading the coordination among humanitarian organizations. This confusion in who is leading the coordination results in massive duplication, and decreases the efficiency of NGOs operating in Jordan.

Refugee Perceptions

In evaluating the quality of NGO programs, there was a strong focus on the response of refugees to determine whether there was a disconnect between what the NGO workers perceived they were accomplishing and the refugees’ perceptions of those same projects and programs.

The quality of a program ultimately depends on whether refugees feel that their needs are being met and whether the way in which they are being assisted is satisfactory. We received mixed responses when asking whether NGOs were meeting the needs of the refugees. Some responses were adamantly negative, stating, “definitely not, we live day by day hoping God’s faith will help us, we can’t count on it at all.” While other respondents had differing opinions telling the group, “Every group helps on a different level” and “we appreciated all the support.” The qualities of the programs were therefore subject to interpretation based on the expectations of the refugees themselves. As one NGO worker noted, “[Syrians] are used to high standards of care, which has been a bit of a challenge. We have our own standards that we uphold across the board, but sometimes those standards are not as high as people would have expected.” A program that might be of high quality in another area facing a refugee crisis may not be considered of high quality in Jordan.

The most pressing concern for most of the refugees was the ability to pay their housing rent; therefore, unconditional cash assistance or rent payment was often viewed as the most useful
service. While this was the most commonly cited need, other interconnected concerns also weighed heavily on the people interviewed. For example, one refugee who received food and shelter assistance said “the food coupon was help to me, but sometimes by the end of the months the food was finished before the month was over. The other assistance helps me cover the house rent, but I feel I need more help with the other important things like the kids’ needs, the utilities and health insurance.” Many NGOs have instituted programs that utilize a cash assistance system, which gives refugees discretion on spending their cash assistance. Particularly in communities, it is an effective way to address food and shelter concerns.

Providing information to refugees also affects the perception of program quality. Field officers attempt to keep the refugees informed of the services that they are able to provide. One NGO employee explained that their organization provides brochures full of information stating “during the morning, while refugees wait in the bread line we give them a brochure. It’s on a daily basis on organizations, if ever there is something new from other organizations we add it in the brochure just to keep them updated.”

Another aspect that refugees felt affected the quality of the NGOs’ programs was how often they received assistance from an organization. While one NGO worker informed the team that some NGOs only offer one-time assistance, some of the refugees were unaware of this policy or uncertain whether that was the reason they had stopped receiving aid from an NGO. The other major concern mentioned by refugees during the interviews was the continuity of funding. Most of the refugees interviewed had short-term assistance from some organizations and often one-time assistance. One refugee stated that “I want someone who is more serious and responsible to help us from the first day we came.” Uncertainty regarding future aid, in conjunction with a limited capacity for generating income means that refugees living in communities often exist in a stressful state of uncertainty, hoping that the NGOs will choose to continue providing assistance. Multiple refugees stated that NGOs were doing their best to provide quality services, but the constant threat of disappearing funding is stressful for refugees just as much as it is for NGO workers.

Refugees perceived the program quality to be better if the NGO workers they directly interacted with were sensitive to their situation. In particular, the idea of shame was prevalent. Most of the refugees’ desired work and, as one said, “I feel ashamed to keep asking them for support.” At the time of this field research, Jordan did not allow refugees to work, leading many refugees to enter the informal job market. The informal sector includes construction work, selling produce on the street, or other non-official positions. This is not limited to adults, and it is not unusual to find that a child is out of school and working to try and make extra money for their family. One refugee family noted that they had a better experience with faith-based NGOs because they believed that “when they give, they give from their heart.” Another said that they did not like it when aid workers acted like they were doing the refugee a favor.

NGO Recommendations

NGO employees mentioned many issues with the humanitarian response, and gave suggestions on how to solve them. These recommendations cover both humanitarian and NGO organizational aspects of the response to the crisis.
The issue of income and money was evident in interviews with the refugees, especially in the services that they identified as most useful: cash assistance. This was echoed by the NGO employees, who stressed how a change in labor laws could help the refugees make their own income and help them survive and settle independently in the long term.

The idea of providing more relevant services and conducting checkups with recipients was mentioned many times by NGO employees and volunteers. The first step in improving the services is to establish a stronger referral mechanism so that NGOs can be informed of those with the greatest need, or that services can be sought out. Many employees expressed the desire to interact with the communities to find out what else is needed, or if any services are unnecessary. In order to provide necessary services, there must be an increase in communication between refugees in communities and NGOs.

An overarching theme in grievances and frustrations was the lack of communication between NGOs and the Jordanian government. Many program and project managers expressed a deep need for better coordination between NGOs themselves and the Jordanian government. Better coordination would ensure that there is minimal service overlap, and increased communication between NGOs and the Jordanian government could increase efficiency. Some interviewees mentioned that the government was preventing them from administering services to beneficiaries that they had identified as needy.

The only problem this study found to affect the NGOs internally was the issue of volunteer pay. Pay rates were mentioned by several employees, who noted that there was an array of pay rates and that volunteers often moved from one project or organization to another, based on the pay rate. There is a standardized daily rate, but not all organizations abide by it, which undermines the agreement that determined the standardized daily rate.
Analysis

Findings collected from interviews were examined under the lens of the theoretical framework that states successful NGOs have an impact, are sustainable, and are cost effective. This section will better outline the context of the team’s findings in relation to the attributes of effective NGOs. The four research questions and their respective findings are independently discussed.

‘Impact’ refers to the effects of programs on refugees, and what NGOs are able to accomplish, ‘sustainability’ is sustainability of the projects, development and treatment plans, sustainability of alternatives, and ‘cost-effectiveness’ is simply if the programs and projects are able to make the most of available funding in both the short- and long-term.

How have main NGOs have been responding to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan?

Impact

The NGOs that were studied focused on three of the most pressing needs for Syrian refugees in Jordan, however each organization approaches these needs differently. Some organizations see the emergent needs, but do not work on long term development, while others are focused on long term development. Their impact varies, especially for organizations that tackle emergent needs versus organizations that work with long term development. In both types of organizations their program staff spend many hours ensuring they are in fact having a positive impact on their beneficiaries in the Jordanian communities.

Sustainability

The sector that has adapted to create a long-term impact is healthcare. Aside from providing lifesaving care, they have responded to the need of long term care. From the interview data, few NGOs in the WASH sector are building programs with long term impact, as water and sanitation for host communities lies largely with the Jordanian government. The WASH programs that focus on a long term impact are educational programs that help children and their families learn the importance of water conservation, clean water, and hygiene that prevents disease. Lastly, food security is largely seen as an emergent need, with little programming focused on the long term development of food security for Syrian refugees and their families living in Jordan. Similar to the WASH sector, the long-term strategy for addressing challenges in the food sector is educating youth and their families about nutrition, as it plays an important role in food security.

Cost Effectiveness

One of the greatest challenges to a positive and long-term impact is the funding cycle that determines the length of a particular program’s existence. The funding attached to a certain project is often given a specific short-term time limit, although there are exceptions to this principle. From the interviews, most organizations have a combination of shorter projects with a determined time length and longer projects that are ongoing. For the Syrian crisis in particular, it can be difficult to
use the term “emergency” because truly it is a prolonged crisis. Funding mechanisms look different for an emergency versus a prolonged crisis. This directly interacts with the impact as funding from donor agencies is still geared toward emergency needs and not long-term capacity needs.

Does an NGO’s area of operations and activities have an effect on their performance?

Impact

The needs of refugees living in host communities and refugees living in camps are vastly different. The areas of operations also determine the needs that NGOs work to address as well as the strategy for addressing them. For instance, when approaching the border, many organizations focus on emergent needs of refugees arriving. In border areas, the issue of safety is much more of a challenge than in host communities. Near the borders, NGOs must consider risks such as ISIS supporters in the communities acting out against the Syrian refugees. The danger adds a level of stress to staff and forces programs to include safety mechanisms for the protection of staff, volunteers, and refugees.

In urban areas, organizations address the issue of housing through cash assistance, while in rural settings or refugee camps that is an ineffective approach. Rural programs related to refugee populations are largely focused on capacity building in the communities, as that is one of the most important pieces to having an impact in rural areas. In order to have a lasting impact organizations largely tailor their programs to meet the needs of the community they serve.

Sustainability

The location of each project plays a key role in the performance of the NGO and the delivery of service. The security near borders creates a real challenge for sustainability as the programs are close to conflict, which could negatively affect program implementation. For example, security poses a risk to long-term establishment of housing that will likely be destroyed. Another example of the challenge of sustainability close to conflict areas is delivering food assistance door to door instead of telling refugees to gather at a certain place and time. Door to door service delivery is significantly more labor intensive than a centrally located distribution mechanism, but is necessary for the safety of beneficiaries and staff. In host communities, sustainability is more achievable because organizations are not managing a large security threat while administering programs.

Cost Effectiveness

The streams of funding can be cyclical, which complicates the financial aspect of programs in various ways. The danger for NGOs working close to the border can also cause a higher portion of resources to be diverted to security than in the urban or rural areas more centrally located. As the crisis continues and develops into a longer-term situation, the funding sources can shift away from funding Syrian refugees as new crises appear in the international sphere.
How do NGOs prepare their staff (such as formal and informal training, skill development, and using previous experiences with aiding refugees and/or delivering similar programs) to respond to refugee needs?

Impact

Training and mental preparation of NGO employees and volunteers has a great impact on the beneficiaries, preparedness of the employee, and longevity of careers. There was a range of types and time periods for training and preparation for employees reported by Program and Project Managers, illustrating a lack of standards; this could be due to the fact that most field officers and other employees have already had experience in this crisis, but their actual preparedness likely varies. A concept that became apparent to the team was the demeanor and attitude of field officers when interacting with beneficiaries, especially when distributing goods. Religious organizations were reported as treating with more respect than other employees; with some refugees reporting that they felt like NGO workers were doing them a favor. Though sensitivity training does not change the bottom line of administration of services, it is a major part of the experience that beneficiaries carry with them.

Sustainability

As this crisis will continue well into the coming years, it would be more efficient and sustainable in the long-term to adequately train and prepare employees at all levels for the type of work that they will be presented with. NGOs that prepare their employees for all aspects of the job may experience less burnout or turnover. In addition to the psychological health of employees, proper training will increase the ability of employees to administer services and reporting in the most efficient manner, further increasing the organization’s productivity and sustainability.

Cost-effectiveness

Related to the sustainability aspect of training is the cost-effectiveness. If an employee is trained and mentally prepared, then they may be less likely to leave the organization. Increased training upon hiring will decrease cost of training later on in their career, as refresher training is less costly (both time and money) than complete training. All-inclusive training will also prevent unnecessary mistakes if employees are trained on how to do any type of responsibility they may encounter, rather than a task being done incorrectly and having to be re-done, costing time and money.

Examine the quality of the programs offered by these NGOs.

Impact

Most NGOs interviewed reported that they had timely reporting cycles. In addition to normal counts of beneficiaries or families reached, certain NGOs required more details about the specific services administered and to how many beneficiaries. The total impact is often intended to be aimed at the most needy populations, with targeting measures or referrals either in place, or under development. Other than figures of beneficiaries reached, some NGOs also carry out post-distribution surveys or interviews, though this is not common practice, as it is very time
consuming. For organizations that do not use their own checking system for in progress or finished programs, which is most of them, they seemed to just conduct needs assessment for future projects.

**Sustainability**

The programs implemented by the selected NGOs have different levels of sustainability. Most have short-term funding periods, three or six months, which limits how much of an impact can be had. Also depending on the sector that organizations work in, their projects and efforts may or may not contribute to long-term development. As stated previously, health and medical organizations’ development efforts vary by location, either focusing on immediate emergency care, or long-term chronic issues and regular medical care. Most other projects however, use their own needs assessments, or that produced by Jordan, to determine which services are needed the most. Their efforts were found to be focused on immediate issues, even when the interviewees stated that the crisis was prolonged. This is to be expected, as immediate needs cannot be disregarded in the interest of longer-term development projects; however, there is a definite need to address the sustainability and long-term suitability of humanitarian projects.

**Cost-effectiveness**

Many organizations mentioned employee training for budgeting and report writing, which keeps them accountable. Managers and directors also had different methods of budgeting and crosschecking, so that the services that they provide are as close to the projects that were proposed budget-wise. In regards to the cost-effectiveness of existing programs, there was not a lot of mention of continuous needs assessment during the program to ensure that the current efforts were indeed necessary. Increased needs assessments during programs, even if they are three months long or short-term, could increase projected cost-effectiveness of the organizations’ efforts to remedy the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan.
Main Challenges and Successes

Based on the data analysis, the team was able to identify three primary successes and challenges that NGOs addressing the Syrian refugee conflict in Jordan face.

Successes

Program Quality Control Systems

Almost all NGOs interviewed that worked directly with refugees and implementing partners had quality control systems in place for their programs. These systems allowed for detailed monitoring and reporting of projects that informed donor funding decisions. For example, Program and Project Managers stated, “We have close monitoring for the implementation of the project activities.” NGOs also used a variety of quality control systems, which included satisfaction surveys, meetings, daily and weekly updates and performance reviews. Program and Project Managers stated,

“We were looking for the most vulnerable families and then delivering the items to the beneficiaries and we conduct satisfaction survey... There is a whole system in place in regards to monitoring the implementation of the work, which is related to daily and weekly updates and then quarterly updates, meetings together with the collecting of the information... The sections go through all the programs to ensure that everything is okay. We review performance every six months”

Having these quality control systems in place allowed the NGOs to focus their efforts more effectively and efficiently to make full use of limited funds.

Individual and Targeted Needs Assessments

Most of the NGOs interviewed either conducted individual and targeted needs assessments or acknowledged the need for assessments. The most commonly used needs assessment was the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), which is a nation-wide needs assessment published by the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation with non-governmental and intergovernmental organization input. The NGOs who used the JRP used it as a starting point to determine general area needs. Those that did not use the JRP conducted more targeted needs assessments through community outreach and a need ability framework. Program and Project Managers stated,

“There is a needs ability framework done by the UNHCR and NGOs as well so we know which areas are vulnerable. For instance, East Amman is more vulnerable than West Amman so we have decided to go into East Amman... We conduct community and outreach services by going out into the community, speaking to the community, identifying their needs and using it also to improve the services.”

Internal Reporting Mechanisms

Many NGOs had internal reporting mechanisms for employees, which allowed field officers and volunteers to communicate information from the ground to the office and offer suggestions as to ways that programs could be improved or changed. For example interviewees stated,
“Every Monday and every Friday the [NGO] hold meetings with every organization’s employees to know what happened and what they do with the problem they faced and to make sure they know how to solve it...The distribution of bread for people is only for 18 years of age and up, so I suggested to give it to children under 18, for example starting at the age of five, so we worked on it and now we do that.”

Challenges

Coordination

Coordination was difficult for many of the interviewed organizations. One NGO employee stated, “If you go to any humanitarian crisis one thing people always talk about in NGOs...they hate being coordinated, they don’t like working together unless it is useful for them. So yes communication, coordination should be better.” NGOs also struggled to determine the salary of volunteers. Coordination was also difficult between NGOs and the Jordanian government; this difficulty is partly due to bureaucratic measures that characterize any government. One interviewee stated, “Leaders from the Mosque were getting involved... they wanted to get approval from the ministry of Islamic affairs. But also in the school they asked if we had permission from the ministry of education to do this? Which we didn’t, and we couldn’t have anticipated the other. They are very conditioned on ministries and approvals here.”

Another NGO program manager said that as a member of a larger NGO, they are able to talk with government officials and wade through the bureaucracy, but that smaller NGOs don’t usually have that bandwidth. It is difficult for some NGOs to gain access to information from the government.

Psychological Preparation and Training

The area of Psychological preparation and training can be divided into two areas: risk of burnout and sensitivity when interacting with the refugees. Organizations interviewed showed that they are concerned with burnout, but they did not experience high rates of burnout. Interviewees stated a reduce rate of burnout due to Jordan being less stressful than other conflict areas. However, most recognized the high-risk burnout presents. For example, an interviewee stated, “With the refugee thing here, experience is a bit of a tricky one because it’s a very intense work environment in the camps and people burnout pretty quickly, someone who’s already spent two years working in refugee camp probably needs a breather.”

Many of the NGOs interviewed had programs in place to address the psychological stress of the job, sometimes bringing them in from the field for a while or having a staff counselor available to speak.

As to the issue of sensitivity, it is in terms of sensitivity of NGO workers that interacted with refugees. Some interviewed refugees stated that, some NGOs acted like they were doing them a favor and not being sensitive in their approach. For example, one interviewee stated, “Talk to the beneficiaries in a good way, see them as [your] clients… don’t talk as if you are superior.” However other organizations interacted with the refugees...
differently. “Religious organizations, they are so kind, when they give, they give from their heart.”

Response Tactics

Response tactics were a challenge for NGOs as they decided if this crisis required emergency response measures or long-term development projects. Multiple NGO workers stated that many of the programs for Syrian refugees are short-term. For example, a program manager noted, “The way that assistance has been provided, it’s just to help people overcome their current needs for this month. It’s not a solution to their problems.” This has led to a lack of capacity building within Jordan to help the refugees begin the process of rebuilding their lives. One interviewee stated,

“INGOs often conduct their operations in such a way that they create a society dependent on aid. They drop a lot of money for infrastructure or other obvious projects but do not develop the community… projects leave communities without the capacity or resilience to handle things on their own.”

Which sector the NGOs were operating did have an impact on this, as the food and shelter sector is largely emergency response based while health was somewhat focused on longer-term recovery for patients. We therefore determined that transitioning from short-term emergency response measures to recovery and longer-term development projects focusing on capacity-building was a challenge that NGOs faced.
Recommendations

The team’s final recommendations are based on the three main challenges that were identified in the data analysis. The recommendations aim to provide tangible solutions to these challenges, and hope to better the services provided by NGOs in Jordan.

Moving from Emergency Aid to Development

To address the challenge of emergency aid versus long-term development the following recommendation has been devised: there should be a shift in focus from emergency assistance programs to mid-range or long-term development programs. That is not to say that emergency-type aid is not still necessary; for example, providing unconditional cash assistance has been invaluable in assisting refugees meet housing needs. However, capacity building should begin to comprise of a larger percentage of the programs being implemented. As noted before, the Jordanian government has made progress in this direction by offering the three-month grace period for Jordanian employers to obtain work permits for Syrian refugee employees in the sectors previously mentioned. This is a step in the right direction; however, NGOs will have to play a major role in developing programs and projects that can assist in building refugee capacity to self-sustain.

Providing Psychological Support and Training

There are various ways to try to support NGO staff members, especially field officers. One that this paper recommends be implemented by every NGO is specific training dealing with the psychological risks involved with this kind of work and how the workers can mitigate those risks for themselves. This should include sensitivity training to help them understand better the perception of the refugees that they work with. It is important that this training be given not only to employees at the UN agencies and the large INGOs, but that it be extended to the local Jordanian NGOs and especially the CBOs and refugee volunteers. Many times these latter two categories are simply sent out, without taking into consideration the fact that this will have an impact on them too.

Leveraging Existing Technology to Increase Coordination

Existing technology can be leveraged to improve the coordination among all humanitarian organizations responding to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. Current coordination databases are often limited to only a subset of humanitarian organizations, for example UN Agencies, which help those bodies coordinate but do not incorporate INGOs or local CBOs. Expanding these databases can help reduce the duplication of services by different humanitarian organizations, and government bodies. Additionally, this database can also grow to incorporate needs assessments and other useful studies that can help humanitarian organizations better serve Syrian refugees. Finally, one humanitarian organization or government agency should be charged with maintaining and updating this database to ensure it operates as efficiently as possible.
Conclusion

The Syrian refugee crisis is already in its fifth year. Both refugees and those that help them are losing hope as they see the war in Syria continue unabated. Their homes and jobs in Syria have been destroyed and their new lives in Jordan are tenuous and uncertain. Jordanians, both at a governmental level and individual level, are trying to cope with this 30 percent increase in population. International non-governmental agencies have stepped up to help meet many of the refugees’ needs, yet there is criticism that the response is uncoordinated and ineffective. This research team traveled to Jordan to look at the NGO response to the Syrian refugee crisis, investigating operations, performance, preparation and programs.

There were many difficulties in carrying out this fieldwork. The camps were off-limits due to security concerns and an excess of researchers and journalists. The time-difference and limited connectivity in Jordan made communication with NGOs slow and laborious. Some were unavailable due to their limited personnel or calendar conflicts, while others were wary of collaborating with the research once they saw that it would be investigating their performance and preparation. Some simply did not respond while others did grant at least a Skype interview. A certain selection bias was inevitable since the Internal Review Board did not allow the team to interview refugees that were not connected with one of the contacted NGOs. Despite these challenges, the team was able to conduct a significant amount of interviews with a range of people from country directors down to volunteers, including refugees themselves. This research covered all the areas of host communities with refugees from Amman to Irbid in northern Jordan out to the Eastern desert of Azraq.

The findings revealed positive points. For example, most NGOs have monitoring and evaluation systems in place already. They also used various needs assessments to determine what their programs should address. Finally, almost all NGOs already have internal reporting systems for workers to send information up the chain of command to make improvements to the programs and request assistance when needed.

The interviews also revealed some major challenges that NGOs face. The first challenge is to increase coordination between NGOs and also with the Jordanian government. The second is to prepare workers better psychologically. This allows them to mitigate the risk of burnout as well as understand how their sensitivity or lack thereof, when interacting with beneficiaries, can affect the quality of their programs. Lastly, the findings show that the response tactics need to gradually shift from short-term relief into long-term development aid given the ongoing nature of the crisis.

The recommendations are both specific, yet still flexible enough to be accepted by all interested parties. They flow directly from the findings and the analysis that was conducted. They have been fine-tuned after receiving feedback from fellow students as well as faculty at the Bush School of Government and Public Service.

As this research project concludes, there are many areas for further consideration. Refugees around the world currently number more than 60 million, according to figures from the UNHCR. This research seeks to contribute in some way to raise awareness and encourages the readers to remember that this is just a microcosm of a much larger problem.
Works Cited


Doi: 10.1080/09614520801898970


Appendix 1: NGO Contact Letter

February 17, 2016

To Whom This May Concern,

My name is Silva Hamie, PhD. I am a Lecturer in International Affairs with a focus in International Development at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. In conjunction with the USAID Conflict and Development Center at Texas A&M University, I am leading a group of nine second-year master’s students in a semester-long Capstone Project entitled “The Role of NGOs in responding to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan”. At the request of the USAID Mission in Jordan, we are examining the response of local NGOs to the needs of Syrian refugees living in Jordan. In particular we will examine the efficiency of NGOs’ humanitarian response to basic needs (W.A.S.H., access to healthcare, and food security), the preparation of NGO staff, and the perceived efficiency of the services delivered. We will conduct field research in the form of interviews in and around Amman, Jordan from March 15, 2016 through March 22, 2016.

Furthermore, I have permitted and encouraged my students to contact local NGOs in Jordan who are working in the aforementioned sectors to gather background research and ask interview questions beyond the scope of general internet research. If you are being contacted then your organization has been identified as one that is instrumental in providing aid to Syrian refugees in Jordan. This Capstone Project provides the best option for students to merge their learning with real world experience on one of the most pressing topics today. I hope that you are able to assist students by answering their brief questions or connecting them with someone in your agency who can.

If you have any further questions or would like to know more information about our research please contact me via email at silva.hamie@tamu.edu.

Kind regards,

Silva Hamie, PhD.
Lecturer
Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A&M University
silva.hamie@tamu.edu
Appendix 2: Interviewee Consent Form

The Role of the NGOs in responding to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan

You are being asked to take part in a research study on the role of NGOs in responding to the Syrian refugees in Jordan. We are asking you to take part in this study. Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to take part in the study.

What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to learn about the role of NGOs in responding to the Syrian refugees in Jordan.

What we will ask you to do: If you agree to be in this study, we will conduct an interview with you. The interview will include questions about what drove you to come to Jordan, your situation, and your future plans. The interview will take about 45 minutes to complete. With your permission, we would also like to record the interview and take notes.

Risks: There is the risk that you may find some of the questions about your situation and conditions to be sensitive, but your answers will be confidential. The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report we make public we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you. Research records will be kept in a locked file; only the researchers will have access to the records. If we tape-record the interview, we will destroy the tape after it has been transcribed, which we anticipate will be within two months of its taping.

Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any questions that you do not want to answer. You are free to decide to take part, to skip some of the questions, and to withdraw at any time.

If you have questions: The main researcher conducting this study is Dr. Silva Hamie. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have any questions or concerns whether now or at a later stage, you may contact Dr. Hamie at silva.hamie@tamu.edu or at 1-979-458-8034.

Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study.

Your Signature __________________________ Date ______________

Your Name (printed) __________________________________________

In addition to agreeing to participate, I also consent to having the interview tape-recorded.

Your Signature __________________________ Date ______________

Signature of person obtaining consent __________________________ Date ______________

Printed name of person obtaining consent __________________________ Date ______________
Appendix 3: Nondisclosure Agreement

Mutual Nondisclosure Agreement

This Mutual Nondisclosure Agreement ("Agreement") is between [Institution], a member of The Texas A&M University System, an agency of the State of Texas ("Institution"), and [Company], a [state of formation] [entity type] ("Company").

Company and Institution wish to exchange certain information, certain parts of which may be proprietary, confidential, and have value to that party. The parties wish to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure or use, so Institution and Company are willing to disclose and receive this information on the following terms and conditions.

1. Definitions
1.1 “Confidential Information” means information that is:
   (a) Disclosed by Discloser to Recipient during the Disclosure Period;
   (b) Proprietary, confidential, and has value to the Discloser; and
   (c) Either:
       (1) Marked at the time of disclosure to show its confidential nature; or
       (2) Unmarked but treated as confidential at the time of disclosure and described in
detail and designated to show its confidential nature in a writing delivered to
Recipient within 15 days of the disclosure.
1.2 “Discloser” means the party disclosing information to the Recipient.
1.3 “Disclosure Period” means the period beginning on the Effective Date and lasting [term].
1.4 “Effective Date” means [effective date].
1.5 “Exception” means, as to each particular item of Confidential Information, that the particular item:
   (a) Was known to Recipient before disclosure by Discloser;
   (b) Is publicly known or readily ascertainable by proper means;
   (c) Is rightfully obtained by Recipient from a third party without a duty of confidentiality;
   (d) Is independently developed by Recipient; or
   (e) Is disclosed by Discloser to a third party without a duty of confidentiality on the third party.
1.6 “Protection Period” means, as to each particular item of Confidential Information, the period
beginning on the date that particular item is disclosed by Discloser to Recipient and lasting either
[term] or until that item satisfies an Exception, whichever is earlier.
1.7 “Purpose” means [purpose].
1.8 “Recipient” means the party receiving information disclosed by Discloser.

2. Recipient’s Obligations
2.1 During the Protection Period only, Recipient:
   (a) Must use at least the same degree of care to maintain the confidentiality of Confidential
Information as Recipient uses in maintaining the confidentiality of its own confidential
information, but always at least a reasonable degree of care.
   (b) May use Confidential Information only for the Purpose.
   (c) Must restrict disclosure of Confidential Information solely to those employees of Recipient
having a need to know Confidential Information to accomplish the Purpose.
   (d) Must advise each such employee, before he or she receives access to Confidential
Information, of Recipient’s obligations under this Agreement, and require each employee
to maintain those obligations.
2.2 Despite any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, Recipient may disclose Confidential Information as required by law. “Required by law” includes, but is not limited to, disclosures compelled by lawful subpoena, court order, or demand, or any other lawful process; provided, however, that immediately upon receipt of such a subpoena, order, or demand, Recipient must notify Discloser of the impending disclosure to allow Discloser an opportunity to prevent the disclosure. Recipient is not required to pursue any claim, defense, cause of action, or legal process or proceeding on Discloser’s behalf.

2.3 Company acknowledges that Institution must strictly comply with the Public Information Act, Chapter 552, Texas Government Code, in responding to any request for public information. This obligation supersedes any conflicting provisions of this Agreement.

3. Publication. Institution, as a state institution of higher education, engages only in research activities compatible, consistent, and beneficial to its role and mission. Therefore, significant results of research must be reasonably available for publication. The parties acknowledge that Institution may publish data, information, and results relating to the same subject matter as Company’s Confidential Information. However, during the Protection Period for any specific item of Company’s Confidential Information, Institution will provide Company 30 days to review and comment on any such proposed publication. During the applicable Protection Period, Institution may not include any of Company’s Confidential Information in any published material without the advance approval of Company.

4. Effect of Disclosure. Confidential Information, including any documents, drawings, sketches, designs, materials or samples supplied, remain the property of Discloser and no rights are granted to Recipient in those materials except the limited right to use Confidential Information for the Purpose.

5. No Warranties. Neither party makes any representations or warranties, written or oral, express or implied, as to Confidential Information, including without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose.

6. Exports. The Recipient may not export, directly or indirectly, any technical data acquired from Discloser or any product utilizing any such data to any country for which the U.S. Government at the time of export requires an export license or other governmental approval, without first obtaining that license or approval.

7. Miscellaneous

7.1 Institution is an agency of the State of Texas and nothing in this Agreement waives or relinquishes Institution’s right to claim any exemptions, privileges, and immunities as may be provided by law.

7.2 The laws of the State of Texas govern and determine the validity of this Agreement and all matters related to this Agreement, including but not limited to matters of performance, non-performance, breach, remedies, procedures, rights, duties, and interpretation or construction. Venue for any claim arising under this Agreement will be as provided under Texas law.

7.3 Headings appear solely for convenience of reference, are not part of this Agreement, and may not be used to construe it.
If a court of competent jurisdictions holds any provision or provisions of this Agreement to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable, the validity, legality, and enforceability of the remaining provisions will not in any way be affected or impaired.

Any notices required by this Agreement must be delivered to the following addresses:

If to Institution: [address]
If to Company: [address]

This Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties as to the confidentiality of Confidential Information, and supersedes all other written and oral agreements between the parties as to those matters. The parties may execute other contracts, but those other agreements will not change or alter this Agreement unless expressly stated in writing.

[Institution] [Company]

By: ____________________________  By: ____________________________
[Name]  [Name]
[Title]  [Title]
Date: ____________________________  Date: ____________________________
Appendix 4: Field Interview Questions – Program Manager/Country Director

Program Manager/Country Director
Large NGO
1. How long have you been working in Jordan?
   a. When did you start working with refugees?
   b. When did you start working with Syrian refugees in Jordan?
   c. How have your past experiences prepared you for this program?
2. What programs have you been implementing for the refugees? (WASH, Food, Health)
   a. What are these programs in specific?
   b. What communities have you implemented them in?
   c. How long do you think these programs will be available? (why?)
3. Who handles relations with donors?
   a. Where does your funding come from?
   b. How much was received for this program?
   c. How is the funding used in this program?
4. How many beneficiaries does your program reach?
5. How do you implement your programs? (Work directly or through local partners?)

Working Directly
6. How do you select your beneficiaries?
7. How do you make sure that your program reaches the beneficiaries?
8. How do you manage any problems, if any, that arise?
9. How do you find your program staff?
10. How do you monitor and evaluate your program?
11. Can you tell us about a time, if any, when something went wrong?
12. In your opinion, what do you think can be changed to improve the program?
13. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Working through Local Partners
5. How do you select your local partner (NGO) to implement your programs?
6. How do you make sure that the program reaches the beneficiaries?
7. How would you define your relationship with your local partner? (Harmonious, trustworthy, etc.)
8. How do you manage problems, if any, that arise with the program?
9. How do you monitor and evaluate your program?
10. Can you tell us about a time when something went wrong?
11. In your opinion, what do you think can be changed to improve the program?
12. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Follow-Up
13. How does your organization support field workers?
   a. What support do you receive from your directors?
   b. What recommendations do you have to improve support?
Appendix 5: Field Interview Questions – Project Managers | Large NGO

Project Managers
Large NGO

1. How long have you been working in Jordan?
   a. When did you start working with refugees?
   b. When did you start working with Syrian refugees in Jordan?
   c. How did your past experiences prepare you for this project?

2. What projects have you been implementing for the refugees?
   a. What are these projects in specific?
   b. What communities have you been implementing them in?
   c. How long do you think these programs will be available? (Why?)

3. Who handles relations with donors?
   a. Where does funding come from
   b. How much was received for this program
   c. How is the funding used in this program?

4. How many beneficiaries does your project reach?

5. How do you implement your projects? (Works directly or with local partners?)

Working Directly

6. How do you select your beneficiaries?
7. How do you make sure that your project reaches the beneficiaries?
8. How do you manage any problems, if any, that arise?
9. How do you find your program staff?
10. How do you monitor and evaluate your projects?
11. Can you tell us about a time, if any, when something went wrong?
12. In your opinion, what do you think can be changed to improve the projects?
13. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Working through Local Partners

5. How do you select your local partners (NGO) to implement your projects?
6. How do you make sure that the project reaches the beneficiaries?
7. How would you define your relationship with your local partner? (Harmonious, trustworthy, etc.)
8. How do you manage any problems, if any, that arise with the project?
9. How do you monitor and evaluate your project?
10. Can you tell us about a time when something went wrong?
11. In your opinion, what do you think can be changed to improve the project?
12. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Follow-Up

13. How does your organization support field workers?
   a. What support do you receive from your directors?
   b. What recommendations do you have to improve support?
Appendix 6: Field Interview Questions – Project Managers | Local NGO

**Project Managers**

**Local NGO**

1. How long have you been working in Jordan?
2. When did you start working with refugees in Jordan?
   a. When did you start working with Syrian refugees in Jordan?
   b. What projects do you implement for the refugees?
3. How did you get involved in this project with your partner?
4. How did you prepare for this project?
5. How do you recruit field officers and volunteers?
6. How do you update your partner about the project?
7. What are some of the difficulties you have faced while implementing this project?
   a. To what extent do you think your partner understands the cultural context of the current situation?
8. What suggestions would you give to improve the implementation of this project?
9. Is there anything else you would like to add?
Appendix 7: Field Interview Questions – Field Officers

Field Officers/Volunteers

1. How were you recruited for this project?
2. How did you prepare for this project?
3. How did your past experiences prepare you for this project?
4. What are some of the difficulties you have faced while implementing this project?
   a. To what extent do you think your organization understands the cultural context of the current situation?
   b. To what extent do you think your organization understands that depth and scope of the refugee situation?
5. How do you update your organization about the project?
6. Can you share any challenge you have been faced with during this project and how you reacted to it?
7. Do you feel like you are making an impact?
   a. What do you think is needed to make more of an impact?
8. What suggestions would you give to improve the workings within your organization?
9. What are your future plans in this field?
10. Is there anything else you would like to add?
Appendix 8: Field Interview Questions – Refugees

**Refugees (Interviews)**

1. How long have you been in Jordan?
   a. What made you come to Jordan (as opposed to another state)?
2. How many are you in your household? (breakdown)
   a. What are your ages?
   b. What are your occupations? (Previous and current)
   c. What is your household income? (In Syria and now)
3. Do you know which organizations you receive assistance from?
   a. What have you received?
   b. How did they contact you?
   c. When did this assistance start? And do you know when it will end?
4. Do you feel like you are getting what you need?
5. Can you share an instance, if any, when there was a problem with this project?
6. How do you feel about the volunteers and employees of X NGO?
   a. (Are they culturally and situationally prepared?)
   b. Do they understand your needs?
7. How do you interact with volunteers/field officers?
   a. How often do you interact with them?
   b. Where do you see them?
8. Are there any differences between the various NGOs doing similar projects?
9. What has been the most useful service you have received and why?
10. What suggestions for improvement do you have regarding the aid process?
11. Is there anything else you would like to add?