

SOCIAL MOBILITY, NORMLESSNESS AND POWERLESSNESS
IN TWO CULTURAL CONTEXTS*

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the effects of occupational and educational mobility in two Latin American countries, Costa Rica and Mexico, and the United States. We hypothesized that the mobile person in Costa Rica or Mexico will experience more normlessness (anomia) than non-mobile persons from his class or origin and his class of destination; but in the United States, where mobility is expected, the socially mobile individual will experience no more normlessness than non-mobile persons in his class of origin or class of destination. Powerlessness was expected to be a function of occupational level and downward occupational and educational mobility.

We found: Some evidence that (1) educational and occupational mobility produces intense normlessness in the more ascriptive societies but not in the United States; (2) downward educational mobility produces an intense sense of powerlessness in all three countries; (3) there are large differences between the United States and the Latin American countries in terms of both normlessness and powerlessness; and (4) the negative relationship between normlessness and occupational level does not appear in Latin America.

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More and more, sociology turns itself toward the study of social mobility. Much work has been done on its rate (Carlsson, 1958; Fox and Miller, 1965), its stimulation (Potter, 1968) and on its political consequences (Lipset and Bendix, 1956; Lopreato, 1967; Allardt, 1963). But little research has been done on its individual or social consequences. When men move socially, they must adjust to a new social environment, and regardless of whether this adjustment is successful or not, mobility has consequences for the individual and his integration into society (Sorokin, 1959; Blau, 1956). Furthermore, as Germani (1966) points out, the consequences of mobility depend on the social characteristics of the mobile person before moving, the social structure, the cultural context and the nature of the move.

This paper focuses on the effect of mobility in two cultural contexts: first, in a more ascriptive system which Germani (1966: p.371) describes as a society in which mobility is not "expected and institutionalized," and secondly, in an achievement oriented system where mobility is expected and institutionalized. We hypothesized that upward and downward mobility will have a different impact on 'normlessness' and 'powerlessness' in these two contrasting cultural contexts. However, because of the complexity of our central hypotheses and because of the paucity of research on normlessness and powerlessness outside the United States, we must do the preliminary spadework of describing the relationship

between occupational level and our dependent variables before we proceed to the question of mobility. Hence, this paper investigates: (1) the relationship between occupational position and normlessness and powerlessness in both an achievement oriented society and an ascriptive society; and (2) the impact of occupational and educational mobility on normlessness and powerlessness in both types of society.

The Consequences of Occupational Mobility

Despite the paucity of research on this topic, the consequences of occupational mobility have been discussed by a number of early investigators, i.e., Durkheim (1951) and Cooley (1909). To the man, these early investigators emphasized the 'negative' aspects of mobility. According to Sorokin (1922) occupational mobility increases mental strain and the probability of mental disease, increases superficiality and impatience, favors skepticism, cynicism, and "misoneism," increases social isolation and loneliness, and facilitates the disintegration of morals. All of these consequences stem from the loss of investment in standards, values, and social objects associated with the mobile person's class of origin. In essence, encountering new standards leads to no standards. And, if one severs ties with his class of origin, he may never again have meaningful ties with anyone.

Such extreme negative consequences seem unreal to the American experience. Still Warner and Abegglin (1955) report extreme upwardly mobile executives to be socially isolated, and Ellis and Lane (1967) find that 'lower class' students at an exclusive school seem very socially isolated; Struckert (1963) finds that physical and occupational

mobility reduces contact with family of origin. Unfortunately, neither Warner and Abegglin nor Ellis and Lane compare their mobile sample with class of origin members and therefore neither study can determine whether social isolation is caused by, or comes with, mobility.

While occupational and educational mobility may have 'negative' consequences for some individuals under certain circumstances, it need not have serious consequences for all people under all circumstances. Blau (1956) identifies three consequences of mobility: social uncertainty, acculturation, and over-conformity. Summarizing the literature on social mobility, Blau (1956) argues that occupational mobility creates a dilemma for the mobile individual which has consequences for his "...integrative social bonds" (p.291). The upwardly mobile person must decide whether to sever social ties with his class of origin and seek social acceptance in his class of destination or to remain a part of his class of origin. If the upwardly mobile person is successfully integrated into the class of destination, he becomes acculturated and thereby adopts the standards and behavior which are compatible with his new companions' outlook. If he fails, and in the process loses his ties with his class of origin, he will become socially insecure. And, when the upward mobile person is partially accepted by his class of destination, he may over-conform to what he takes to be the class of destination;s standards and values.

Most studies of mobility's effects show the mobile person to have attitudes and behavior intermediate between the class of origin and the class of destination. This pattern implies Blau's acculturation.

Berent (1952) found that the upwardly and downwardly mobile average fewer children than the non-mobile lower class and more than the non-mobile middle class. Also, voting behavior in Europe (Lopreato, 1967; Lipset and Bendix, 1954), union membership (S.M. Lipset and Joan Gordon, 1954) prejudice (Hodge and Treiman, 1966) and authoritarianism and autonomy (M. Simpson, 1968) all follow the similar pattern of the mobile group's characteristic, being intermediate between its class of origin and its class of destination.

While the upwardly mobile individual who is not fully integrated into his class of destination may experience negative effects (Blau, 1956), the downwardly mobile individual confronts stress under all conditions. If he maintains social ties with his class of origin, the invidious comparison between their economic position and power will be a continual problem. But if he affiliates with his class of destination, the downwardly mobile person will find it harder to give up his past habits and attitudes and this makes it "...most difficult for him to accept them unequivocally and to become completely accepted among them" (Blau, 1956: p.294). Hence, downward mobility is almost inherently accompanied by stress and a low level of social integration. As yet, however, we have little evidence other than Struckert (1963) that the level of social integration is lower for the downward mobile individual than that of his class of origin.

The Cultural Context of Occupational Mobility

If we assume that occupational mobility's consequences depend on the extent to which the mobile person is integrated into either his class

of destination or his class of origin, then the social acceptability of the occupationally mobile person to the class of destination becomes central for his social integration. Stress in social mobility can come from at least two sources; first, the class of destination stigmatizes the class of origin, or in the case of downward mobility, the class of origin stigmatizes the class of destination, so that no matter how much an upwardly mobile individual attempts to make himself acceptable to the class of destination, he cannot be socially integrated into it. Secondly, stress occurs when the class of destination does not stigmatize the class of origin, but the sub-cultural differences between the two occupational classes are so great that mobile individuals have difficulty learning and internalizing the norms and mores of the class of destination (Durkheim, 1951; Sorokin, 1959).

Both forms of blockage can lead to conflicts in the interpersonal sphere. When an upwardly mobile person encounters a member from his class of destination, their definitions of each other conflict. Due to his accomplishments, the occupationally mobile person (Ego) often sees his life as a member of his occupational class of destination, while Other can see Ego more as a member of Ego's class of origin. Conflict is inherent in this situation. As Bloombaum (1963) points out, occupational mobility is a special case of status inconsistency which theoretically involves conflicts in expectations (Simpson, 1963). In both cases, given that Ego and Other have difficulty anticipating the

responses of each other, they will experience tension and mistrust.'

The Latin American literature suggests that, as opposed to the United States and most industrial societies, in Latin America there is a strong cleavage or stigma between the 'blue collar' and the 'white collar' occupations. Whyte (1962) emphasizes the importance of this cleavage in Peru and concludes that men would work for much less money in a futureless white collar position rather than work at a well paying blue collar job. Summarizing the literature on Latin America Beals (1963) finds that the blue collar/white collar division is the main social cleavage in most racially homogeneous Latin American nations. The distinction between white collar and blue collar occupation will be of extreme importance; mobility between the working class and white collar positions should produce the greatest distress.

Normlessness and Powerlessness

The most important disaffection variable in the sociology literature has been Marx's alienation. Seeman (1959) expanded the concept to five sub-dimensions: powerlessness, normlessness, social isolation, meaninglessness, and self estrangement. Dean (1961) developed scales for powerlessness, normlessness, and social isolation. Waisanen (1963) sees the alienation sub-dimensions as aspects of a social system an individual must acquire if he is to function effectively; hence he

¹Unfortunately, the two types of blockage, stigma and sub-cultural cleavage, create an 'identification problem' (Blalock, 1965). Both predict similar results in that, given a wide sub-cultural cleavage, both schemes will predict blocked social mobility into the class of destination. We have no data with which we could discriminate between stigma and cultural cleavage.

must have as part of his self-system:

1. Familiarity representing a knowledge of the system's rules, norms and goals which allows for personal stability.
2. Sentiments or affective ties with others.
3. Power or productivity for exchange within the system.

If the person lacks familiarity with the system's rules and norms, he will suffer normlessness. If he lacks power for exchange, he suffers powerlessness. And if he lacks affective ties, he suffers from social isolation. Seeman's and Waisanen's normlessness and Durkheim's anomia or anomy are conceptually very close. While it goes under several labels, anomy or anomia represents disaffection from any normative order.

Occupational Class and Normlessness (Anomia)

Past research with the various measures of anomia show a constant but weak relationship between anomia and any measure of social class used (Meir and Bell, 1959; Mizruchi, 1963; Srole, 1956; Dean, 1961; R. Simpson and Miller, 1963). Of course, this research was done in the United States, and, as we noted before, this is a society which emphasizes achievement and a society which expects mobility. According to Merton (1957), anomie² results from a discrepancy between socially

² Anomia is the individual variant of anomie. Anomie refers to cultural or normative confusion within a group or society, and therefore is the property of the group. Anomia refers to normative confusion within an individual, and therefore is a property of the individual.

approved means and goals (the cultural system) and the socially structured capacity of a society's members to act in accord with socially approved norms and goals (the social system). When expectations are out of line, adaptation to the resulting 'anomie' usually takes the form of deviance, that is, taking up new goals or means, and if a sufficient number of such people are in contact with each other, they will form a sub-culture with its peculiar values, goals and attitudes. Applying this scheme to the American scene, Merton noted a discrepancy between the Horatio Alger ethic--'strive and succeed'--and the capacity and resources of the lower class person to achieve his goals. Mizruchi (1963) makes a similar point: A lower class person holds the mobility goals or at least the consumptory part of the goals (houses, cars, etc), but he does not possess the means (knowledge and skills, usually) to reach these goals. In summary, American society has created a discrepancy by emphasizing "...material success and failure to emphasize the means of attaining this goal" (Mizruchi, 1963: p.50).

Anomia, according to the Merton and Mizruchi notion, stems from frustration of ambitions. Two research reports substantiate this view. First, Meir and Bell (1957) found that anomia was high when a person had both high subjective social class standing and low objective social class standing, even after controlling for objective social class. Also, Wilensky (1966) reports that persons who attempted "moving up" and failed (blocked) were more anomic than both persons who either did not attempt mobility or who made a successful attempt. Here we have direct evidence for Germani's assertion that when mobility is expected--

that is, the person has a mobility orientation--and mobility does not take place, the person feels stress.

The relationship between social status and anomia has been tested in the United States, an achievement oriented society. What will this relationship look like in an ascriptive society where most men do not expect mobility, either believing it is illegitimate or not possible? As most 'developing societies' are confronted with modern technology and more modern achievement oriented values, Smelser (1964) sees a clash between the more traditional agrarian status systems and values and modern industrial-commercial values. This clash, independent of occupational mobility, should produce a high level of anomia. If we assume that the upper and middle classes will be involved more with modern technology than the lower classes will, the most moral or 'eunomic' segment of an ascriptive society should be the bottom segment. Therefore, in a more ascriptive society, we do not expect the negative correlations between social status and anomia (normlessness) that others found in the United States; instead, within ascriptive societies we expect a slightly positive correlation between social status and anomia.

Occupational and Educational Mobility, Normlessness, and Powerlessness

Our major hypothesis, broadly conceived, is that in an ascriptive society occupational and educational mobility leads to normlessness. Our assumption is that in ascriptive societies upward social mobility will not follow upward occupational mobility. While the occupationally mobile person may see himself in terms of his highest rank, his

occupational class of destination, others--in particular, persons with high ascriptive status--tend to see the mobile person in terms of his class of origin. This results in partially blocked mobility which Germani (1966) links with anomia. Therefore, for normlessness and upward occupational mobility we expect that:

WITHIN MORE ASCRIPTIVELY ORIENTED CULTURES
UPWARD MOBILE INDIVIDUALS WILL EXPERIENCE
MORE NORMLESSNESS THAN NON-MOBILE INDIVIDUALS.

Because the system will respond less to his achieved and more to his ascribed statuses, the person finds that he confronts conflicting standards and expectations. Socially, he desires and sees as just, social acceptance by those whose attainments equal his, but instead they socially respond to him according to his past statuses--statuses which he cannot control.

We expect quite different results in an achievement oriented society, where class of origin is less likely to block social mobility following occupational mobility. We hypothesize that:

IN AN ACHIEVEMENT ORIENTED CULTURE, UPWARDLY
MOBILE INDIVIDUALS' EXPERIENCE OF NORMLESSNESS
WILL BE A MONOTONIC FUNCTION OF THE LEVEL OF
NORMLESSNESS FELT BY NON-MOBILE MEMBERS OF
THEIR CLASS OF ORIGIN AND CLASS OF DESTINATION.

This normative conflict experienced early in life should have some carry-over into adulthood, and normlessness must be unlearned after entering the class of destination.

As opposed to upward mobility, Blau (1956) argues that men who are downwardly mobile hold values and aspirations that they cannot reach and, in particular, values and attitudes that they do not share

with members of their class of destination, and also their interaction with their class of origin should be painful due to their incapacity to meet exchanges; hence:

WITHIN BOTH ASCRIPTIVE AND ACHIEVEMENT
ORIENTED CULTURES, THE DOWNWARDLY MOBILE PERSON
WILL EXPERIENCE MORE NORMLESSNESS THAN WILL
THE NON-MOBILE PERSON.

Downward mobility in both cultural contexts should result in a higher sense of normlessness.

Powerlessness, as opposed to normlessness, should not vary in its cross-cultural relationship to occupational mobility. But instead, it should be a function of the amount of socio-economic power the individual possesses in relationship to the amount of power held by others in his immediate view. I suggest that cross-nationally the downward mobile persons, due to their knowledge of the socio-economic power held by their class of origin, will tend to experience more powerlessness than non-mobile men of their class of destination; hence:

IN ALL CULTURES, DOWNWARDLY MOBILE MEN WILL EX-
PERIENCE MORE POWERLESSNESS THAN NON-MOBILE MEN.

Methodology

Sample: The sample was drawn from the Five Nation Study, a coordinated research project conducted in the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Finland and Japan. For this analysis Finland and Japan were dropped. Both the United States and the Costa Rican samples were national probability samples of the adult civilian population over 21 years old; the United States sample has 1528 cases and Costa Rica 1040. These samples were selected in such a manner that as a group they constitute a close

approximation (within sampling tolerance) of the adult civilian population.

Unlike the United States and Costa Rican samples, the Mexican sample was a stratified sample which over-sampled urban areas. The findings are based on 1126 persons who constitute a close approximation to the population of Mexico living in urban areas of 2500 or more, and a rural sub-sample which includes 288 cases with all the rural samples being taken within 15 miles of an urban area.

Although our sample is too small for a very detailed analysis of mobility, with our present sample sizes we can use three levels. In addition to the white collar/blue collar split, we will include a blue collar skilled and blue collar unskilled distinction (a similar distinction for white collar positions would result in cells with too few cases).³

This breakdown allows both a meaningful division as well as sufficiently large n's for each cell for both head of household and socializer.⁴

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- ³I. White Collar
 - 1. Professionals and Technicians
 - 2. Managers, Officials, Administrators, Public Officials, Small Proprietors and Dealers
 - 3. Office workers
 - 4. Salesmen
 - II. Blue Collar Skilled
 - 1. Farmers (big) and Farm managers
 - 2. Craftsmen and Factory workers
 - 3. Special workers--chauffeurs, technical assistants, etc.
 - 4. Service workers and similar
 - III. Blue Collar Unskilled
 - 1. Small farmers or renters, fishermen, hunters, lumbermen, etc.
 - 2. Miners, stone cutters, etc; manual and day laborers
 - 3. Persons who haven't worked before, housewives, students, etc. (excluding unemployed and pensioners)

⁴Head of household refers to the chief income earner in the household. We reason that the status of the members of a household is determined by the status of the head. Socializer refers to the head of household when the respondent was growing up. The socializer is usually the respondent's father, but this is not true in every case.

For the cross-national comparison of occupational level we will include a fourth category, rural occupations, which includes farmers (big), farm managers, small farmers or renters, fishermen, hunters, lumbermen, and similar occupations. Our educational mobility analysis will involve a three-level classification scheme: 0-5 years, 6-8 years, and 9-20 years.⁵

As we have reason to suspect that women's experience of mobility differs from men's, in particular when mobility occurs through marriage to men who are not mobile but from a higher socio-economic family, we will run a separate analysis controlling for sex. Unfortunately, when the sex analysis is performed, education must be collapsed to two levels: white collar and blue collar, and 0-8 and 9+.

The measures for this study consist of two-item scales which were selected on the basis of pretests using a larger pool of items.⁶

The normlessness items are:

- (1) I often wonder what the meaning of life really is.
- (2) People's ideas change so much that I wonder if we'll ever have anything to depend on.

The powerlessness items used are:

- (1) Sometimes I have the feeling that other people are using me.

⁵No cross-national comparison of educational level will be made; instead we will concentrate on the mobility hypotheses--that is, hypotheses which relate movement within one national context.

⁶After the samples of American and Costa Rican college students took the full alienation scale, the items which best identified the top twenty-five percent on the subscale were included and the items that discriminated best the bottom twenty-five percent were selected.

- (2) There is little chance to get ahead in his life unless a man knows the right people.

These items were cross-translated between English and Spanish in an attempt to make them cross-culturally equivalent. The reader should keep in mind that cross-cultural translation, while aiding in making items conceptually equivalent, does not guarantee that they are, in fact, conceptually equivalent. While several researchers have suggested various ways to cope with the problem of conceptual equivalence (Almond and Verba, 1963; Phillips, 1959-1960; Anderson, 1967), the problem of 'comparative meaning' will plague survey researchers for some time to come. In part, we are protected by the complex nature of our hypotheses: the interactive effects of three variables within a single culture. Whatever causes mobility or status inconsistency effects in Costa Rica, it is not differences in meaning between the items' Spanish or English form. Only Smelser's (1964) hypothesis, which involves a direct cross-national comparison of the levels of normlessness and powerlessness, is vulnerable to 'meaning' differences, and should be treated with caution.

Method of Analysis

Mobility effects, status inconsistency effects, and structural effects have created a number of methodological problems (Hyman, 1966; Lenski, 1964; Blau, 1960; and Blalock, 1967). These constructs involve a "statistical interaction" or an effect which is due to a non-linear combination of two independent variables, and therefore such "effects" must be examined after the main effects have been removed. Duncan (1966)

demonstrates the perils of treating a "mobility effect" as a main effect, that is, dividing the sample into non-mobile, upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile. Three possible solutions are available: dummy regression, and factorial analysis of variance, which are mathematically very similar, and a linear regression model where a hypothesized distribution is compared with extant data (Jackson and Burke, 1965). In each case, any systematic variation in cell size is a problem, in that the larger cells will be over-represented and the small cells under-represented. M. Simpson (1968) concludes that a satisfactory method for testing hypotheses must compare cells' mean median, or whatever measure, without regard for cell size except in determining overall significance. Unweighted means factorial analysis of variance (Winer, 1962) is such a method.

This study will employ the unweighted means factorial analysis of variance with two independent variables, i.e., occupation of head of household and occupation of socializer, and one dependent variable. The unweighted means analysis gives equal weight to each cell when calculating effects, but considers the distribution of cell size through the harmonic mean, which substitutes for the number of replications. This method does not depend on homogeneity of within-cell variance because the error variance is the sum of the variance within cells.

The hypotheses call for an unusual double comparison. For example, we predict that upwardly mobile persons experience more normlessness in ascriptive cultures than non-mobile persons in either the class of origin or the class of destination. This means that our hypothesis fails if either the class of origin or destination has as high or the same level

of normlessness. If our mobility cell is higher than the cells for the non-mobile class of origin and class of destination, we will call this a mobility effect. And, if the contrasts between a "mobility cell" and the non-mobile cells in both the mobility cells' column and row are both statistically significant ($p < .05$), we will call this a significant mobility effect.

The significance test for the contrasts is:

$$t = \frac{\overline{AB}_{14} - \overline{AB}_{11}}{\sqrt{MS_{w.cell} \left(\frac{1}{n_{14}} + \frac{1}{n_{11}} \right)}}$$

$$SS_{w.cell} = \sum_{i=1}^r \sum_{j=1}^s \quad SS_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^r \sum_{j=1}^s \left(\frac{\sum_{k=1}^{n_{ij}} x_{ijk} - \left(\frac{\sum_{k=1}^{n_{ij}} x_{ijk} \right)^2}{n_{ij}} \right)$$

Again, one significant contrast is not enough for the significant mobility effect; both contrasts must be significant.

Figure 1 - Example Mobility Table

FBC(2)	FWC(1)		
	SWC(1)	\bar{x}_{12}	\bar{x}_{11}
	SBC(2)	\bar{x}_{22}	\bar{x}_{21}

For example, if we wanted to test for an upward Significant Mobility Effect in Figure 1, we must compare \bar{x}_{12} with \bar{x}_{22} and \bar{x}_{11} , and if both of these contrasts are significant then we have a Significant Mobility Effect;

and even if one is significant while the other is not, we do not have a Significant Mobility Effect. But, if \bar{x}_{12} is higher than \bar{x}_{22} and \bar{x}_{11} , although not significantly higher, we have a Mobility Effect.

When we test our mobility hypotheses through the unweighted means analysis, we will test for interactions within each national sample and we will not use nation as a variable. One can construe the mobility hypothesis for normlessness as calling for a nation by occupation of head of household, by occupation of socializer interaction. Yet, even if the three-way interaction proves significant, we must then look within each nation for the interaction between the occupation of head of household and the occupation of socializer.

Results: Occupational Level, Normlessness and Powerlessness

If our measures are to be trusted, clearly citizens of the United States experience less normlessness and powerlessness than Costa Ricans or Mexicans (see Table 1). This, in part, supports Smelser's (1964) contention that "transitional" societies are in normative conflict due to the clash between traditional and modern culture and the social structure. Unfortunately, normlessness could be a product of a traditional society where behavior outside of "loyalty" groups may be poorly defined, and transitional societies may reflect their "traditional base." But this hypothesis can be tested only when a truly uncontaminated "traditional" culture is examined.

Table 1 about here

As hypothesized in the United States, normlessness correlates negatively with occupational level in Costa Rica and Mexico, but normlessness does not correlate negatively with occupational level. Instead, the relationship appears non-linear, with the least 'normless' group being rural occupations in Mexico and the blue collar unskilled in Costa Rica. Clearly, Latin America provides a different context.

Powerlessness appears to be negatively related to occupational level when urban occupations are examined, but, with the exception of Costa Rica, rural workers evidence less powerlessness than unskilled urban workers. The higher powerlessness experienced by urban workers may represent a 'proletariate' effect. Urban workers may experience more situations where power is exercised over them while the rural worker, no matter how poor, may possibly determine his own work schedule and could experience more situations where he exercises power over himself and his family.

The higher normlessness and powerlessness in Latin American resembles Almond and Verba's (1963) finding that trust in others is higher in the United States than in Mexico and Italy. Almond and Verba conclude that a lack of trust has powerful consequences for the degree of participation in the political life of the country. Whatever the consequences, if our measures are comparable and not subject to some form of response bias, United States citizens by far have more of a sense of effectiveness and a deeper trust in the predictability of others than do Latin Americans.

Mobility and Normlessness

We hypothesized that upwardly mobile individuals would exhibit more normlessness than non-mobile individuals in ascriptive cultures, and in all cultures downwardly mobile individuals would exhibit more normlessness than non-mobile persons.

When we look at Table 2, which displays the effects of mobility between three occupational levels, we find 'mobility effects' in our two ascriptive cultures, Costa Rican and Mexican. Costa Rica has strong 'mobility effects' between the blue collar and white collar classes. The presence of significant mobility effects and a highly significant interaction lends strong support to both our normlessness and mobility hypotheses.

Table 2 about here

Mexico presents a less impressive picture, for when both males and females are taken together, occupational mobility produces no significant mobility effects. On the other hand, the interaction is significant and four non-significant mobility effects appear: two for upward mobility and two for downward mobility.

In the United States, while the statistical interaction is significant in the occupational analysis (see Table 2), no mobility effects appear. This supports our upward mobility hypothesis, that is: In achievement oriented societies upward mobility will not produce normlessness higher than that experienced by either the class of destination

or the class of origin. However, we find no support for our interpretation of Blau's (1956) downward mobility hypothesis. While downward mobility may increase 'social insecurity' in the United States, according to our data it does not produce more normlessness than experienced by the class of destination.

Since our hypotheses were primarily for men and the consequences of women's mobility through marriage proves problematic, we will analyze males and females separately (see Table 3). To do so, we must collapse

Table 3 about here

the two blue collar categories and make a blue collar/white collar comparison. Costa Rican men and women show a similar pattern of normlessness. Although the interaction is not significant both upward and downward mobile cells produce a mobility effect. The difficulty with Mexico in Table 2 now becomes apparent; the non-mobile females from white collar backgrounds evidence a very high level of normlessness, and for Mexican women the effects of class of origin and class of destination appear additive. Why do Costa Rican and Mexican non-mobile white collar women differ so radically? Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered with either the data available or with our present understanding of social life in these countries.

Another anomaly occurs in the United States data; while no statistical interaction appears for either United States females or males, occupational mobility has a differential sex effect on normlessness.

For men, normlessness is a simple function of head of household's occupation (white collar/blue collar), but for women the two independent variables (head of household's and socializer's occupations) contribute about equally to normlessness. This data supports the socialization (R. Simpson and M. Miller, 1963) theory of anomia (normlessness); that is, instead of being a direct response to normative conflict (Merton, 1957; Mizruchi, 1963), the level of normlessness is a sub-cultural phenomenon and is transmitted from generation to generation unless re-socialization occurs. Mobile men in the work world are forced into interactions which expose them to the orientation of their class of destination. These interactions result in resocialization. On the other hand, women have fewer compulsory interactions with the class of destination and therefore have less exposure to their class of destination's sub-culture. Thus, while a woman's class of destination will have an effect on her level of normlessness, it will not have as intense an effect as it will on a male.

The educational mobility data produces some intriguing results (see Table 4). First, in Mexico, the upwardly mobile (persons who have 9+ years education and whose parents have 0-8 years education) show a

Table 4 about here

mobility effect. This runs counter to the Mexican occupational mobility analysis, where only men evidenced mobility effects. Second, in Mexico short range downward educational mobility (socializer 9+ years--head of

household 6-8 years) produces an increase in normlessness, but the very few (n=2) long range downwardly mobile evidence a 'reversal,' that is, a lowering of normlessness. In itself the 'reversal' finding means nothing, but when we couple it with the fact that this reversal effect also occurs for Costa Rican long range downward mobility (n=7), the effect becomes theoretically important. The reversal could reflect some social idiocy effect. Men and women who fall far short of their parents' educational attainments may be either retarded or socially incompetent. Another similarity appears when we look at short range downward educational mobility. In both Costa Rica and Mexico, short range downward mobility produces a strong normlessness effect. On the other hand, there is only one non-significant upward mobility effect in Costa Rica. Again, no mobility effects appear for the United States in the mobility data.

We can hardly claim strong support from our educational data, but the critical fact still remains: In the United States, normlessness is a negative function of head of household's and socializer's achievements. In Costa Rica and Mexico, whatever else appears, this well established relationship does not hold. While significant mobility effects do not appear consistently in the Latin American data, they nevertheless are there. When contrasted with the United States, where not one mobility effect was found, the Latin American data provides strong evidence for our conception of the relationship between normlessness, mobility and cultural context.

Mobility and Powerlessness

In all three national samples the predicted educational mobility effects appeared (see Table 5). For the downward educationally mobile person there is a more intense sense of powerlessness than that experienced by one who is non-mobile. The Mexican sample does have a reversed cell, long range downward educational mobility, and again this is a very small cell (n=2). Also, both Costa Rica and the United States have powerful main effects, but in the case of Mexico, neither main

Table 5 about here

effect is significant. Occupational mobility produces no mobility effects in the United States, and weak ones in Costa Rica and Mexico. In all, educational downward mobility produces some mobility effects in each nation, which in part supports our hypothesis that downward mobility produces more intense powerlessness than that experienced by non-mobile persons from the class of destination or the class of origin.

Summary

Initially, we attempted to show that occupational mobility has a different impact on the mobile individual in different cultural contexts. Despite the 'weaknesses' of the measures used, we find some evidence that occupational mobility in more 'ascriptive' societies, where mobility is not expected or accepted, leads to a higher level of normlessness than that experienced by the non-mobile members of the class of destination or the class of origin. In a society where mobility is expected, such

as the United States, as hypothesized, no such mobility effects appear. Hence, our upward mobility hypothesis is confirmed and our downward mobility hypothesis holds only in the ascriptive countries.

Our analysis also reveals other cultural context effects. The relationship of normlessness with occupational prestige level in Latin America differs from that of the United States. The lower levels of the socio-economic ladder tend to experience less normlessness than the upper and middle levels. This contrasts sharply with the mass of evidence in the United States. Clearly, the Mizruchi (1963) and Merton (1957) "Horatio Alger myth" explanation--that is, that the lower level holds achievement goals but not the necessary means--does not hold up for Latin America. An entirely different set of dynamics is afoot there.

TABLE 1
 NORMLESSNESS AND POWERLESSNESS BY
 HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S OCCUPATION AND COUNTRY

NORMLESSNESS

	United States	Mexico	Costa Rica
White Collar	5.61 (560)	8.06 (359)	7.58 (239)
Blue Collar Skilled	6.33 (614)	7.91 (391)	7.91 (258)
Blue Collar Unskilled	7.01 (185)	8.07 (287)	7.11 (345)
Rural Classes	6.45 (163)	7.52 (377)	7.53 (198)

POWERLESSNESS

	United States	Mexico	Costa Rica
White Collar	5.13 (560)	7.07 (359)	5.96 (239)
Blue Collar Skilled	5.84 (614)	7.41 (391)	6.69 (258)
Blue Collar Unskilled	6.58 (185)	7.60 (287)	6.77 (345)
Rural Classes	5.93 (163)	7.01 (377)	7.07 (198)

TABLE 2

MEAN NORMLESSNESS BY HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S AND SOCIALIZER'S
 (HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IN WHICH RESPONDENT GREW UP)
 OCCUPATION (UNWEIGHTED MEANS ANALYSIS)

Occupation of Head of Household (A)	COSTA RICA			MEXICO			UNITED STATES		
	Occupation of Socializer(B)			Occupation of Socializer(B)			Occupation of Socializer (B)		
	Blue Collar Unskilled	Blue Collar Skilled	White Collar	Blue Collar Unskilled	Blue Collar Skilled	White Collar	Blue Collar Unskilled	Blue Collar Skilled	White Collar
White Collar	7.51* (156)	8.52** (27)	7.30 (56)	7.99 (75)	8.09* (132)	8.07 (152)	6.36 (31)	5.90 (303)	5.46 (226)
Blue Collar Skilled	7.69 (211)	8.02 (64)	8.81** (26)	7.89* (179)	7.70 (356)	8.02 (83)	6.99 (90)	6.34 (583)	5.68 (138)
Blue Collar Unskilled	7.17 (454)	7.93 (28)	7.89* (18)	7.69 (256)	7.93* (130)	8.33* (51)	7.25 (32)	7.14 (97)	6.06 (28)

Factor (B) F=5.81, p < 0.01

Interaction (AB): 7.71; p < 0.001

Interaction (AB):

F=2.92; p < 0.05

Factor(A):F=14.52;p < 0.001

Factor(B):F=15.64;p < 0.001

Interaction(AB):F=10.22

p < 0.001

*This cell mean is in the predicted direction but does not meet the mobility criterion

**This cell meets the mobility criterion and therefore is statistically significant
 (p < .05) from both the diagonal means in its column and row.

TABLE 3
 MEAN NORMLESSNESS BY SEX BY HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S AND SOCIALIZER'S
 (HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IN WHICH RESPONDENT GREW UP)
 OCCUPATION (UNWEIGHTED MEANS ANALYSIS)

Occupation of Social- izer (B)	COSTA RICA				MEXICO				UNITED STATES			
	SEX (C)				SEX (C)				SEX (C)			
	MALE		FEMALE		MALE		FEMALE		MALE		FEMALE	
Occupation Head of Household (A)	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar	Blue Collar	White Collar
White Collar	7.73* (91)	7.61 (31)	7.60* (92)	6.92 (25)	8.07* (86)	7.75 (65)	8.04 (121)	8.30 (87)	5.55 (166)	5.47 (102)	5.88 (168)	5.46 (124)
Blue Collar	7.48 (374)	8.09* (23)	7.35 (383)	8.81** (21)	7.91 (357)	8.16* (44)	7.68 (564)	8.13 (90)	6.42 (400)	6.17 (66)	6.67 (402)	5.85 (100)
	No Signifi- cant Effects		Interaction (AB) p < 0.01		No Signifi- cant Effects		Factor (A) p < 0.05; Factor (B) p < 0.05		Factor (A) p < 0.001		Factor (A) p < 0.001; Factor(B) p < 0.001	

*This cell mean is in the predicted direction but does not meet the mobility criterion.

**This cell meets the mobility criterion and therefore is statistically significant
 (p < .05) from both the diagonal means in its column and row.

TABLE 4
 MEAN NORMLESSNESS BY HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S AND SOCIALIZER'S
 (HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IN WHICH RESPONDENT GREW UP)
 EDUCATION (UNWEIGHTED MEANS ANALYSIS)

Education Head of Household (A)	COSTA RICA			MEXICO			UNITED STATES		
	Education of Socializer(B)			Education of Socializer(B)			Education of Socializer(B)		
	0-5 yrs.	6-8 yrs.	9+ yrs.	0-5 yrs.	6-8 yrs.	9+ yrs.	0-5 yrs.	6-8 yrs.	9+ yrs.
9+ yrs.	7.63* (63)	7.96 (23)	<u>7.58</u> (24)	8.27* (66)	8.14* (70)	<u>7.55</u> (44)	6.00 (112)	6.47 (531)	<u>5.51</u> (445)
6-8 yrs.	7.71 (129)	<u>8.14</u> (51)	9.44** (9)	7.93 (422)	<u>8.00</u> (249)	9.00** (18)	6.41 (120)	6.45 (216)	6.18 (30)
0-5 yrs.	<u>7.37</u> (713)	7.57 (21)	6.14 ⁺ (7)	<u>7.63</u> (479)	8.05* (64)	6.00 ⁺ (2)	<u>7.23</u> (52)	6.68 (17)	5.71 (5)

Interaction (AB):
 F=7.02; p < 0.001

Interaction (AB):
 F=5.39; p < 0.01

Factor (A): F=3.35; p < 0.05
 Factor (B): F=9.14; p < 0.001
 Interaction (AB): F=3.62;
 p < 0.01

*This cell mean is in the predicted direction but does not meet the mobility criterion.

**This cell meets the mobility criterion and therefore is statistically significant (p < 0.05) from both the diagonal means in its column and row.

⁺This cell mean is in the wrong direction.

TABLE 5

MEAN POWERLESSNESS BY HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION AND
SOCIALIZER'S OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION (UNWEIGHTED MEANS ANALYSIS)

MEXICO							
Occupation of Head of Household (A)	Occupation of Socializer (B)			Education of Head of Household (A)	Education of Socializer (B)		
	Blue Coll. Unskilled	Blue C. Skilled	White Collar		0-5	6-8	9+ yrs.
White Collar	7.17 (75)	7.13 (132)	<u>6.97</u> (152)	9+	7.42 (66)	6.87 (70)	<u>6.00</u> (44)
Blue Collar Skilled	7.28 (179)	<u>7.25</u> (356)	7.04 (83)	6-8	7.44 (422)	<u>7.02</u> (249)	7.83** (18)
Blue Collar Unskilled	<u>7.29</u> (256)	7.71* (130)	7.53* (51)	0-5	<u>7.29</u> (479)	7.70** (64)	4.00 ⁺ (2)
Interaction (AB): F=2.84; p < 0.01				Interaction (AB): F=10.24; p < 0.001			
COSTA RICA							
White Collar	5.96 (156)	6.44 (27)	<u>5.71</u> (56)	9+	5.86 (63)	5.39 (23)	<u>4.46</u> (24)
Blue Collar Skilled	6.85 (211)	<u>6.14</u> (64)	6.65** (26)	6-8	6.32 (129)	<u>6.41</u> (51)	6.56* (9)
Blue Collar Unskilled	<u>6.71</u> (454)	6.57 (28)	7.28* (18)	0-5	<u>6.85</u> (713)	7.24* (21)	5.89 (7)
Factor (A): F=5.21; p < 0.01				Factor (A): F=5.43; p < 0.01			
Interaction (AB): F=3.50; p < 0.01				Factor (B): F=7.29; p < 0.001			
				Interaction(AB): F=5.07; p < 0.001			
UNITED STATES							
White Collar	5.33 (31)	5.22 (303)	<u>4.94</u> (226)	9+	5.70 (112)	5.60 (531)	<u>4.94</u> (445)
Blue Collar Skilled	6.16 (90)	<u>5.87</u> (583)	5.38 (138)	6-8	6.63 (120)	<u>6.13</u> (216)	6.23* (30)
Blue Collar Unskilled	<u>7.08</u> (32)	6.63 (97)	4.90 ⁺ (28)	0-5	<u>7.19</u> (52)	7.59* (17)	8.00** (5)
Factor (A): F=12.35; p < 0.001				Factor (A): F=19.75; p < 0.001			
Factor (B): F=13.64; p < 0.001				Factor (B): F=5.65; p < 0.001			
Interaction(AB): F=10.81; p < 0.001				Interaction(AB): F=13.57; p < 0.001			

**This cell meets the mobility criterion and therefore is statistically significant (p < 0.05) from both the diagonal means in its column and row.

*This cell mean is in the predicted direction but does not meet mobility criterion.

⁺This cell mean is in the wrong direction.

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