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RELATIONS AMONG STATUS, POWER, AND ECONOMIC REWARDS
IN SIMPLE AND COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS*

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INTRODUCTION

Weber (1946) distinguished three basic dimensions of stratification: status or prestige, power or the ability to carry out one's will irrespective of the resistance of others, and class or economic position. It was not until the nineteen forties that one of the more interesting implications of this perspective was systematically considered. Benoit-Smullyan in a brief section of a paper (1944) advanced the idea that there is a tendency for individuals to equilibrate or equalize their ranks on the dimensions of stratification identified by Weber. In this paper we shall attempt to do two things. First, we shall attempt to advance our understanding of the relations that may obtain among these dimensions of stratification in both simple and complex social systems. By a simple system we mean a part of a complex system. Definitions of both types of systems will be given later. Second, we shall attempt to show how efforts by the members of a simple system to increase the ranks of their system at the complex system level may affect its internal stratification.¹ It will be helpful for us to adopt at this point a standard set of labels. We shall follow Weber in using the term status to refer to prestige. We also shall employ the term power in the sense that he did. Finally, we shall use the term economic rewards to refer to roughly what he meant by class.

STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Before considering the dimensions of stratification and the ways in which they may be related, it is necessary to define certain structures of social systems. Any social system is viewed as having a cultural and a behavioral structure.² The cultural structure is viewed as consisting

of goals and norms. A goal is defined as a desired state of affairs. A norm is defined as an expectation for behavior.

The behavioral structure is viewed as consisting of all of the behavior which is relevant to the norms of the system. Behavior is viewed as divisible into segments, each of which is relevant to a single norm. It is considered possible for any segment of behavior to vary with respect to the degree to which it is in conformity with the norm to which it is relevant.

The cultural and behavioral structures considered as a single, more complex unit are viewed as divisible into two additional types of structure. One of these shall be referred to as the task structure. The other shall be referred to as the non-task structure.³ The task structure is viewed as consisting of task norms and the behavior relevant to them. By a task norm is meant a norm which defines either productive behavior or behavior related to the control or coordination of productive behavior.⁴

The concept of non-task structure is, as the prefix non suggests, a residual concept. In general, we view this structure as consisting of all of the norms and the behavior relevant to them which are not included in the task structure. Little has been done toward conceptualizing this structure in a non-residual way. We shall identify two types of non-task norms here. One shall be called an equality norm. The other shall be called a representational norm. An equality norm is viewed as a norm which defines behavior which every member of a system owes to every other member of that system.⁵ Norms defining courtesy of various kinds are examples of equality norms.

A representational norm is viewed as a norm which defines behavior which every member of a system is expected to display toward every member of one or more other systems.⁶ Norms defining secrecy concerning various kinds of activities within one's own system are examples of representational norms.

An important difference between task and non-task norms should be noted here. If task activities are divided in a system--and we assume that they always are, at least to some degree--then, task norms will not apply to all members of the system. Certain members will have responsibility for certain activities, and certain other members will have responsibility for certain other activities. Conversely, non-task norms--at least those we are considering--do apply to all members of the system.

None of the concepts presented thus far specifically relates the structures we have considered to the individual. We use the concept of position to do this. A position is viewed as a set of norms which includes both task and non-task norms and which applies to an individual or class of individuals.

In a later section we shall modify this general conceptualization of the structures of social systems so as to distinguish between simple and complex social systems.

DIMENSIONS OF STRATIFICATION

We may now turn to a consideration of the dimensions of stratification. Let us consider status first. The structures described in the previous section lead clearly to a conception of status as a set of different

kinds of evaluations. We stress the term kinds to prevent confusion between differences in members' evaluations of a single base of status and differences in members' evaluations of different bases of status. The former differences represent variation in evaluation which results from a low degree of consensus on the criteria of evaluation and/or incomplete knowledge concerning the individual being evaluated.⁷ The latter differences represent variation in evaluation which results from the existence of different bases of status. In this section we shall assume both a relatively high degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation and relatively complete knowledge concerning the individual being evaluated and shall focus on variation resulting from the existence of different bases of status.⁸

The different kinds of evaluations making up an individual's status shall be referred to as specific statuses. All of the specific statuses making up an individual's status shall be referred to as general status. Evaluation of the task norms included in an individual's position is viewed as one kind of specific status. The term task status is used to refer to this specific status. The criterion employed in evaluating task norms is considered to be the difficulty of the activities to which the norms refer. Evaluators are considered to arrive at some conception of the average difficulty of these activities.⁹

Evaluation of the degree to which an individual conforms to the task norms included in his position is viewed as another kind of specific status. The term performance status shall be used to refer to this specific status.¹⁰

If we assume that an individual's performance is evaluated, it seems reasonable to assume that skills and motivations which are deemed relevant to his performance will also be evaluated. Such evaluations are viewed as additional kinds of specific statuses. Evaluation of skills relevant to performance shall be referred to as skill status. Evaluation of motivations relevant to performance shall be referred to as motivational status.

Task, performance, skill, and motivational statuses are based on the individual's location and participation in the task structure of a system. Evaluations of the individual's conformity to the equality and representational norms included in his position are specific statuses which are based on his participation in the non-task structure.¹¹ Evaluation of conformity to equality norms shall be referred to as solidarity status. The term solidarity is used because it is believed that the receipt of behaviors which indicate various kinds of equality is a major source of attraction of individuals to a system.¹² An individual's solidarity status is thus an assessment of one aspect of his contribution to the attraction of the other members to the system. Evaluation of conformity to representational norms shall be referred to as loyalty status. The term loyalty is used because it is believed that what is generally meant by disloyalty to the members of a system is the violation of such norms.¹³

Let us turn next to a consideration of power. The power of a member of a system derives, we think, from the dependence of the other members of the system on him for the attainment of the system goal.¹⁴ Such dependence stems, we think, from division of task activities which are essential to the attainment of the system goal among the

members of the system. Once such activities are divided, members have equal potential power. This is true, of course, because any member can prevent attainment of the goal by not performing his activities. Given this, how do we explain the fact that the actual power of the members of a system is seldom, if ever, equal? The explanation appears to be that members are differentially replaceable. If a member threatens not to perform his activities, the other members of the system should attempt to replace him. Thus, the actual power of a member depends on how easy it is to replace him. In general, the ease with which a member can be replaced should tend to be aligned with the difficulty of his task location and the skill and motivation which adequate performance of the activities it involves requires.¹⁵

Finally, let us consider economic rewards. An economic reward is viewed as any object which is either potentially or actually useful to the individual in a material sense.¹⁶ An important difference between economic rewards and status and power is that economic rewards are completely transferable whereas status and power are not.¹⁷ Status, as we have indicated, is based in part on the attributes of skill and motivation. Certainly these are at best only partially transferable from one individual to another through learning. Power as we have indicated, is based on replaceability which, in turn, like status, is dependent in part on skill and motivation. Thus, power also is only partially transferable from one individual to another.¹⁸

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG DIMENSIONS OF STRATIFICATION

Having considered the dimensions of stratification in some detail, we may now attempt to specify the relations among them. As we noted

earlier, Benoit-Smullyan held that individuals tend to equilibrate or equalize their ranks on the different dimensions of stratification (1944, pp. 158-161). According to Benoit-Smullyan this may occur in ways he called indirect or direct. By indirect he meant the use of one rank to change another. For example, he discussed such things as converting economic rewards into power by purchasing positions of command or means of coercion. By direct he meant the tendency to perceive ranks on the different dimensions of stratification as equal irrespective of whether or not they are in fact. (1944, pp. 159-160)

The type of equilibration which Benoit-Smullyan referred to as indirect was described by him at a fairly concrete level. In this paper we shall attempt to define more abstract processes which may underlie the specific conversion processes he described. The type of equilibration in question would appear to occur when the members of a system can assign ranks on the different dimensions of stratification with a reasonably high degree of certainty. This is possible in the case of both status and power only when there is a relatively high degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation and relatively complete knowledge of the bases of status. We include power here because, as we have attempted to show, it is based on certain of the factors that status is based on. In the case of economic rewards, we assume that a relatively high degree of consensus concerning what constitutes such rewards and relatively complete knowledge concerning their possession is essential to assignment of ranks with a relatively high degree of certainty.

When there is such consensus and knowledge, power should be aligned with the height of the segment of the individual's general status which is based on his location and participation in the task structure. For purposes of simplicity, we shall henceforth refer to this segment as the segment of general status associated with task structure. By the height of any segment of the individual's general status we mean an average of different kinds of evaluations. The segment of general status which is associated with task structure consists, it will be remembered, of evaluations of task, performance, skill, and motivation. Thus, the height of this segment of general status will be the average of these evaluations. Power should be aligned with the height of this segment of general status because the evaluations of which the segment consists refer to factors which affect the ease with which the individual can be replaced. For example, an individual who has a highly evaluated task location, but who does not have the skill and the motivation to perform adequately the activities it involves is probably more easily replaced than an individual who has the same kind of task location but who does have the skill and motivation to perform adequately the activities it involves.

When there is a relatively high degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation of the bases of status and power and on what constitutes economic rewards and relatively complete knowledge of the bases of stratification, economic rewards also should be aligned with the height of the segment of the individual's general status which is associated with task structure.¹⁹ We think this will be so because the height of this segment of general status probably serves as a basis

for allocating economic rewards. The specific process involved is, we think, an equity process similar to Homans' distributive justice (1961, Chapter 12).²⁰ For example, both the height of the segment of general status associated with task structure and the amount of economic rewards received should be lower for an individual who has a highly evaluated task location but who does not have the skill and motivation to perform adequately the activities it involves than they should be for an individual who has the same kind of task location but who does have the skill and motivation to perform adequately (and who presumably does so perform) the activities it involves.

We may summarize the preceding ideas as follows. When ranks on the different dimensions of stratification can be assigned with a relatively high degree of certainty, the individual's power and economic rewards will tend to be aligned with the height of the segment of his general status which is associated with task structure. The height of this segment of general status, in turn, depends upon the heights of the specific statuses of which it consists.²¹

Let us turn next to a consideration of the type of equilibration which Benoit-Smullyan referred to as direct. This type of equilibration would appear to occur only when the members of a system cannot assign ranks on the dimensions of stratification with a relatively high degree of certainty. Not being able to assign ranks with a high degree of certainty probably results from a low degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation of the bases of status and power or on what constitutes economic rewards or from an incomplete knowledge of the bases of stratification or both. Under such conditions, we think a process

occurs in which the members of the system use the rank which can be assigned with the greatest degree of certainty to assess the other ranks.²² For example, it may sometimes be easier to assign an individual a rank on the dimension of economic rewards than it is to assign him a rank on the dimensions of general status and power. In such an instance, rank on economic rewards, if the process operates as we think it does, would be used to assess ranks on general status and power.

When there is a shift from conditions under which it is possible to assign ranks with a relatively high degree of certainty to conditions under which it is not possible to do so, we do not think that only that segment of the individual's general status which is associated with task structure is related to power and economic rewards. Rather, we think that under these conditions ranks on any and all bases of status, including ranks on bases associated with non-task structure, will be used to assess other ranks. This will be true, of course, only if the status dimension is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty. Further, we think that ranks on bases of status associated with non-task structure may be used even to assess ranks on bases of status which are associated with task structure. This should happen, of course, only if ranks on bases of status associated with non-task structure can be assigned with greater certainty than ranks on any other bases, including bases associated with task structure.

SIMPLE AND COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Thus far we have not considered in any detail the distinction between simple and complex social systems. Our treatment of the structures of systems and the dimensions of stratification has focused on the position as the unit of analysis. As we view systems, this unit of analysis is the basic element of simple systems. We define a simple system as a set of positions, the task structures of which are related to a single goal. For example, the research activities of a group of professors would constitute a simple system if they were directed toward completion of a single study. Note that this definition of a simple system does not confuse the system with individuals. The research activities of a single group of professors would constitute two simple systems if they were directed toward completion of two studies.

Having defined a simple social system, we may now define a complex one. Just as we view the position as the basic element of the simple system, we view the simple system as the basic element of the complex system. We define a complex system as a set of simple systems the goals of which are related to a single superordinate goal. For example, two studies being carried out by a single group of professors would constitute a complex system if they were related to an overall project goal. Note that the definition of complex system, like the definition of simple system, does not confuse the system with individuals. Two teaching and two research activities of a single group of professors would constitute two complex systems if they were related respectively to two teaching and two research goals which, in turn, were related

respectively to a superordinate teaching goal and a superordinate research goal.

STRATIFICATION OF SIMPLE AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS

Our treatment of the dimensions of stratification has been relevant only to the simple system level, that is, it has dealt only with stratification of positions. In what ways can we modify our conceptualizations of the dimensions of stratification so as to make them relevant to the complex system level, that is, so as to make them relevant to the stratification of simple systems? Let us consider the dimension of status first. The step from the simple system level to the complex system level involves, we think, a reduction in knowledge. Specifically, it seems likely that at the complex system level only factors directly related to the task structure of a simple system, namely, task locations, performances, skills, and motivations of members will be known. The reason for this would appear to be that the task structure of a simple system is of basic importance to other simple systems within the same complex system because the goals of the simple systems making up a complex system are interdependent. The non-task norms of a simple system and, hence, its members' conformity to them are not/a part of such interdependence and, thus, are not likely to be known. For these reasons the general status of a simple system shall be viewed as some average of the evaluations which are made of the task locations, performances, skills, and motivations of its members.

Let us consider power at the complex system level next. The task structure of a simple system and the skills and motivations relevant

to adequate performances of the activities it involves should relate to the replaceability and thus the power of the members of a simple system within a complex system in the same way that the task location and the skill and motivation relevant to adequate performance of the activities it involves relate to the replaceability and thus the power of the individual within a simple system. For this reason the power of the members of a simple system shall be viewed as dependent upon some average of the replaceabilities of its members.²³

Finally, let us consider the dimension of economic rewards at the complex system level. Such rewards should be allocated among the simple systems within a complex system on the same basis that they are allocated among individuals in a simple system, namely, the height of status.²⁴ For this reason a simple system's rank on the dimension of economic rewards shall be viewed as some average of the economic rewards of its members.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG DIMENSIONS OF STRATIFICATION IN COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS

One important difference between the simple system level and the complex system level is that collective action on the part of the members of a simple system is possible. The collective action which seems most important for present purposes is action which would affect the replaceability of the members of the simple system. Any action which would make it more difficult to replace the members of the simple system should increase their power.

How can the members of a simple system make it more difficult to replace them? They can do this, we think, by threatening to withdraw en masse if any one of their members is removed. The threats often made by labor unions to strike if any one of their members is fired are examples of this kind of threat. The threat of mass withdrawal increases power because at any one point in time, loss of the membership of a simple system usually has much greater effect on attainment of the goal of the complex system than does loss of a single member of a simple system. The reason why this is so is that if the members of a simple system are replaced one at a time, it is usually possible to carry on, although perhaps in a somewhat less productive way, the task activities of the simple system by having certain of its members carry out, in addition to their own task activities, the task activities of a removed member pending his replacement.

We have considered how the members of a simple system through collective action can make it more difficult to replace them. We must now consider when and why they can be expected to do this. As to when, we think that the potential for increasing power that exists at the complex system level is actualized when simple systems cannot be assigned ranks on the dimensions of stratification with a high degree of certainty. As we noted earlier, inability to assign ranks with a high degree of certainty probably derives from a low degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation of the bases of status and power or on

what constitutes economic rewards or from incomplete knowledge of the bases of stratification or both.

The question of why the members of simple systems use collective action to prevent replacement requires consideration of generalized aspiration for high ranks for the simple system qua system. If we assume that the members of a simple system wish their system to have high ranks on all of the dimensions of stratification, it seems likely that when ranks cannot be assigned with a high degree of certainty, they will act collectively to prevent replacement if they perceive that the increase in power in which this results can be used to obtain higher ranks. How can the increase in power be used to obtain higher ranks? The general process is, we think, as follows. First, the members of the simple system obtain through the use of their increased power a higher rank on the dimension of stratification on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty. This is accomplished by threatening to block attainment of the goal of the complex system. This threat takes the form specifically, we think, of threatening to stop or to curtail productive activities. Second, obtaining a higher rank on the dimension of stratification on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty should initiate the process described earlier whereby evaluators--in this case the members of other simple systems--assess other ranks in terms of the rank which can be assigned with the greatest certainty.

The above considerations raise the question of whether or not the bases of one of the dimensions of stratification are generally associated with greater consensus and/or knowledge and therefore constitute a

scale along which ranks can generally be assigned with greater certainty. We think not. It would seem just as easy for there to be a lack of consensus about what constitutes an economic reward as it would be for there to be a lack of consensus about how difficult the activities constituting a task structure are. Similarly, it would appear to be just as easy to limit knowledge of economic rewards as it would to limit knowledge of the activities constituting a task structure.

If we are correct in assuming that the bases of any of the dimensions of stratification can constitute the scale along which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty, it becomes necessary to consider the specific ways in which the members of a simple system can employ the additional power which derives from collective action to prevent replacement to obtain higher ranks for their system on all of the dimensions of stratification. It is to these processes that we turn in the next section.

MODES OF INCREASING THE RANKS OF SIMPLE SYSTEMS ON THE DIMENSIONS OF STRATIFICATION

Since the bases of general status and power are the same at the complex system level,²⁵ we must consider them jointly. When these bases constitute the scale along which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty and when there is generalized aspiration for high ranks for simple systems, members of simple systems should attempt to use the additional power which derives from collective action to prevent replacement to increase their rank on this scale. They can do this by threatening to stop or to curtail productive activities unless they

are allowed to move as a group to another task structure which is believed, although be it with limited certainty, to consist of more difficult activities. This mode of increasing general status and power ranks we shall call system mobility. A similar mode of increasing general status and power ranks is what we shall call merging. This involves the members of a simple system combining their task structure with the task structure of a more highly ranked simple system. This would raise the general status and power ranks of the members of the simple system in question because evaluators would then assign the newly formed simple system new general status and power ranks which would be some average of the general status and power ranks which the two simple systems had prior to the merger.

System mobility and merging are likely to be very difficult to effect. System mobility involves displacement of the entire membership of another simple system, something which is not likely to be easily accomplished. Merging will result in the reduction of the general status and power ranks of the simple system which had the higher general status and power ranks prior to the merger, a fact which is likely to make the members of that simple system strongly resist it.

Given the difficulty of system mobility and merging, it seems likely that the members of a simple system may sometimes be forced to employ a mode of increasing ranks on the general status and power dimensions which does not involve use of the additional power which derives from collective action to prevent replacement and which, thus, rather than involving a threat to stop or to curtail productive activities involves just the opposite, namely, increasing productivity. This

mode of increasing ranks on the general status and power dimensions we shall refer to simply as increasing productivity. One might ask why this mode is not used before system mobility or merging is attempted. The basic reason would appear to be that it is likely to involve a relatively small change in a base of general status and power, namely, performance. System mobility and merging, by contrast, are likely to involve relatively large changes in a base of general status and power, namely, task structure. In the case of system mobility, it is possible, in addition, that the members of the simple system will, in time, elevate their skills and performances so as to make them more adequate to the new task structure.

Regardless of how the members of a simple system increase their ranks on the general status and power dimensions, such increases should increase the rank the members of the system receive on the dimension of economic rewards. This should occur, of course, only if the bases of general status and power constitute the scale along which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty.

When the bases of economic rewards constitute the scale along which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty and when there is generalized aspiration for high ranks for simple systems, members of simple systems should attempt to use the power which derives from collective action to prevent replacement to increase their rank on this scale. They can do this by threatening to stop or to curtail productive activities unless they are given a larger proportion of the economic rewards accruing to the complex system. They would do this,

of course, with the hope that their receiving an increased proportion of economic rewards would become, at least in a limited way, known. Note that we use the term proportion of economic rewards rather than amount. The reason for this is that since the absolute amount of rewards available to the complex system may vary, it is the proportion of rewards received which determines a simple system's rank. An increase in rank on the dimension of economic rewards should result in increases in both general status and power ranks. This should occur, of course, only if the bases of economic rewards constitute the scale along which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty.²⁶

EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF INCREASING RANKS OF SIMPLE SYSTEMS ON THE STRATIFICATION OF SIMPLE SYSTEMS

We come now to the second major purpose of the paper, namely, a consideration of how efforts by the members of simple systems to increase the ranks of their system may affect its internal stratification. We begin by noting that the modes of increasing the ranks of a simple system on the dimensions of stratification appear to have two kinds of effects on its general status stratification. Increasing task performance should result in increased weight being given to those bases of individual status which are associated with task structure. Since the members of a simple system are differentiated in terms of their location in the task structure, any increase in the weight given to bases of status related to this structure should increase general status stratification within the system.

How should an increase in general status stratification affect power and economic reward stratification within the simple system? The determining factor here would appear to be whether or not conditions within the system are such that individuals can be assigned ranks on the dimensions of stratification with a high degree of certainty. If they are, the increase in general status stratification should result in increases in power and economic reward stratification. This should occur because under these conditions power and economic rewards are aligned with the bases of status which are associated with task structure, and it is these bases which receive greater weight in the process under consideration.²⁷

If conditions are not such that individuals can be assigned ranks with a high degree of certainty, an increase in general status stratification should result in increases in power and economic reward stratification only if the status dimension is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty.

All of the other modes of increasing the ranks of a simple system-- system mobility, merging, and obtaining a larger share of economic rewards--should result in increased weight being given to those bases of individual status which are associated with non-task structure. This effect is more complex than the one just discussed and thus requires more extended treatment. Why should more weight be given to bases of status which are associated with non-task structure when the members of the simple system use these modes of increasing ranks? It will be remembered that all of these modes involve threatening to

negatively affect attainment of the goal of the complex system. It will also be remembered that this is likely to be effective only if the members take collective action to prevent being replaced one at a time.²⁸ Both of these factors would appear to make it necessary for the members of the simple system to present a united front to the members of other simple systems. This, in turn, would appear to make certain kinds of representational norms much more important. Specifically, norms prescribing secrecy concerning any dissention within the simple system relative to its threat to negatively affect attainment of the goal of the complex system and relative to its threat to withdraw en masse if any one of its members is replaced are likely to become very important, and more weight is likely to be given to conformity to them.

What about conformity to equality norms? Asking a member to expose himself to the possibility of having to withdraw from the complex system as part of a mass withdrawal by the members of his simple system would appear to require some kind of reward. We think this may take the form of greater equality. If this is the case, equality norms should become much more important and more weight should be given to conformity to them.

The effect of giving more weight to bases of status associated with non-task structure should be to decrease general status stratification within the simple system. The reason this should occur is that non-task norms--at least as we define them--apply to all members of the simple system and thus must not require greater ability than that of the least able member of the system. In short, non-task norms define activities the performances of which require only high motivation. If

we assume that the members of the simple system are motivated to achieve high ranks for their system, it seems likely that all of them will conform to non-task norms. Thus, giving more weight to conformity to such norms makes the members of the simple system more equal with respect to general status and decreases general status stratification within the system.²⁹

How should this decrease in general status stratification affect power and economic reward stratification within the simple system? As in the case of an increase in general status stratification, the determining factor would appear to be whether or not conditions are such that individuals can be assigned ranks on the dimensions of stratification with a high degree of certainty. If they are, the decrease in general status stratification should not affect power and economic reward stratification. This should be so because under these conditions power and economic rewards are aligned with the bases of status which are associated with task structure, and these bases do not receive greater weight in the process under consideration. If conditions are not such that individuals can be assigned ranks with a high degree of certainty, the decrease in general status stratification should result in decreases in power and economic reward stratification only if the status dimension is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty. This should be so because, as we noted earlier, under these conditions ranks on any and all bases of status, including ranks on bases associated with non-task structure, will be used when assessing other ranks.³⁰

SUMMARY OF CONCEPTS AND PROPOSITIONS

In this section we will review the concepts and propositions presented in the previous sections. Our primary aim will be to make clear the logical structure of these sections.

A social system was defined in terms of culture and behavior. Culture was viewed as consisting of goals and norms. Behavior was viewed as being governed by norms but as sometimes deviating from them. This conceptualization of the social system was elaborated by noting that certain norms are directly related to goal attainment. These we called task norms. Generally, we viewed them as having to do with productive behavior. We further elaborated the conceptualization of the social system by pointing out that there are certain other norms that are not directly related to goal attainment. These we called non-task norms. Specifically, we defined two types of such norms: equality and representational norms. Equality norms define behavior which every member of a system is expected to display toward every other member of that system. Representational norms define behavior which every member of a system is expected to display toward every member of one or more other systems.

The various kinds of norms and behavior were viewed as being related to the individual by means of the concept of position. A position was defined as a set of norms which apply to an individual or a class of individuals.

Next, conceptualizations of what we consider to be the basic dimensions of stratification were presented. First, we defined bases

of individual status. These were task location, performance of task activities, skills and motivations relevant to performance of task activities, and conformity to the different types of non-task norms. Evaluation of each of these bases we viewed as a specific status. All of the specific statuses combined we viewed as a general status.

Second, we viewed power as deriving from the dependence generated by the division of task activities among the members of a system. We pointed out that if all activities are essential to goal-attainment, a division of task activities creates a condition of equal power of members. However, we noted that this is offset by the fact that different degrees of replaceability are associated with different task activities and that it is this fact that leads to differential power. Further, we noted that it is the more difficult and thus the more highly evaluated activities for which it is the most difficult to find replacements.

Finally, we defined economic rewards as any object of actual or potential material use. We noted that economic rewards, unlike status and power, are not fully transferable from one individual to another. The reason for this is that status and power are based in part on the attributes of skill and motivation whereas economic rewards need not be so based even indirectly.

Having defined the basic dimensions of stratification, we turned to a consideration of ways in which these dimensions may be related. We hypothesized that those aspects of general status which are associated with task structure determine the individual's power because they determine how easy it is to replace him. We hypothesized further that these

same aspects of general status determine through an equity process the economic rewards the individual receives. All of these relations we qualified by saying that they hold only when there is consensus on criteria of evaluation and on what constitutes economic rewards and complete knowledge of the bases of stratification.

When there is a lack of consensus on criteria of evaluation or on what constitutes economic rewards or a lack of knowledge of the bases of stratification or both, we suggested that relations among the dimensions of stratification are quite different. Under these conditions it should be difficult to assign an individual ranks on the dimensions of stratification with certainty. When this is true, we hypothesized that evaluators assess ranks on the dimensions of stratification in terms of the individual's rank on the dimension of stratification on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty. This dimension can be, we suggested, any one of the three basic dimensions. We also suggested that under the conditions being considered, ranks on any or all bases of status, including ranks on bases associated with non-task structure, may be used to assess other ranks.

At this point, we indicated that our treatment of the relations among the dimensions of stratification was relevant only to the simple system level. We defined a simple system as a set of positions the task norms of which are related to a single goal. Then we defined a complex system as a set of simple systems the goals of which are related to a single superordinate goal. Having defined the two kinds of systems, we suggested that certain changes in the relations among the dimensions of stratification occur at the level of complex systems. These

should be the case because a simple system's non-task norms and, hence, their members' conformity to them are probably not known by the members of other simple systems and, hence, are probably not a base of the simple system's general status. If the combined dimension of general status and power is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty, we suggested that the members of a simple system could increase their ranks on it in at least three different ways. Only two of these involve use of the additional power which derives from collective action to prevent replacement. These are system mobility and merging. System mobility involves movement of all of the members of a simple system from one simple system to another. Merging involves the members of a simple system combining their task structure with the task structure of a more highly evaluated simple system.

The way of increasing ranks on the combined dimension of general status and power which does not involve use of the additional power which derives from collective action to prevent replacement is improving task performance.

If the dimension of economic rewards is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty, we suggested that the members of a simple system could increase their rank on it by obtaining a larger proportion of the economic rewards accruing to the complex system. This, like system mobility and merging, involves use of the additional power which derives from collective action to prevent replacement.

Regardless of which of the two dimensions, general status and power or economic rewards, is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty, we hypothesized that if the members of a simple system increase their rank on that dimension, they will increase their rank on the other dimension. This should occur because the system's rank on the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty is used to assess its rank on the other dimension.

In the last part of the paper, we considered how the modes of increasing a simple system's ranks may affect its internal stratification. The modes we considered appear to affect in two ways the degree of general status stratification within the simple system. If the mode of increasing ranks is improving task performance, greater weight should be given to the bases of status associated with the task structure, and general status stratification should increase. This should occur because the bases to which greater weight is being given are those which differentiate the members of the system.

We considered at this point how this increase in general status stratification may affect power and economic reward stratification within the simple system. It should result in increases in power and economic reward stratification when individuals can be assigned ranks with certainty. This should be so because under these conditions the bases of status which are associated with task structure are aligned with power and economic rewards, and it is these bases which receive greater weight in the process under consideration. When individuals cannot be assigned ranks with certainty, the increase in general status stratification

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should result in increases in power and economic reward stratification only if status is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty.

If the mode of increasing ranks is system mobility, merging, or obtaining a larger proportion of economic rewards, greater weight should be given to the bases of status associated with non-task structure. This should occur because obtaining a larger proportion of economic rewards involves threatening both to stop or to curtail productive activities and to withdraw en masse if any member of the simple system is replaced and because these threats, in turn, create a greater need for conformity both to representational and equality norms. Conformity to representational norms should become more important because of the need to keep secret any dissention within the system concerning the threats. Conformity to equality norms should become more important because of the need to reward members for exposing themselves to the possibility of having to withdraw from the complex system. If greater weight is given to the bases of status which are associated with non-task structure, general status stratification within the simple system should decrease. This should occur because non-task norms apply to all members of the system and thus have to be norms that can be conformed to by all members of the system. Conformity to non-task norms should occur because of the members' desires to increase the ranks of the simple system.

We considered at this point how this decrease in general status stratification may affect power and economic reward stratification within the simple system. It should not result in decreases in power and economic reward stratification when individuals can be assigned

ranks with certainty. This should be so because under these conditions power and economic rewards are aligned with the bases of status which are associated with task structure, and these bases do not receive greater weight in the process under consideration. When individuals cannot be assigned ranks with certainty, the decrease in general status stratification should result in decreases in power and economic reward stratification if status is the dimension on which ranks can be assigned with the greatest certainty. This should be so because under these conditions ranks on any or all bases of status, including ranks on bases associated with non-task structure, may be used to assess other ranks.

FOOTNOTES

¹ This problem has been dealt with by Bales in terms of the tendency of stratification within groups to alternately increase and decrease as the group responds first to problems of goal attainment and then to problems of integration. (1965) We shall deal with essentially the same phenomena, but we shall attempt to identify new factors affecting the phenomena, especially factors associated with the stratification structures of simple and complex systems.

² This is a widely accepted view. See, for example, Williams (1965, Chapter 3, especially pp. 36-37). The importance of distinguishing between culture and behavior is brought out clearly in some of Homans' work (1950, pp. 125-127, 138-144).

³ The concepts of task and non-task structure are similar to Homans' concepts of external and internal systems (1950, Chapters 4 and 5).

⁴ For a similar conception of task structure see Dubin (1958, Chapter 5).

⁵ The concept of equality norm was suggested by Linton's concept of universals (1936, pp. 272-273).

⁶ The concept of representational norm is somewhat similar to what Blau has referred to as a basic norm. See Blau (1963, pp. 201-202).

⁷ In this section we use the phrases "the individual being evaluated" and "the individual's status." We use these phrases because we think that certain attributes which all individuals have in varying degrees and which are relevant to positions within systems are bases of status. The terms should not be taken as indicative of an interest in individual attributes which are not relevant to positions.

⁸ In a later section we will be concerned with situations in which there is a low degree of consensus on criteria of evaluation and/or incomplete knowledge concerning the individual being evaluated and in which it is consequently difficult to assign rank on the status dimension with certainty.

⁹ See Davis and Moore (1945, p. 244) for a general discussion of difficulty as a base of status.

¹⁰ The concept of performance status is similar to Davis' concept of esteem. See Davis (1949, pp. 93-94).

¹¹ Reference is not made to the individual's location in this structure because the term location is meaningless with respect to equality and representational norms. This is true, of course, because these norms--at least, as we define them--apply to all of the members of a system.

We should note here that we do think there are certain additional kinds of representational norms which do apply to some members of a system and not to others. Such norms are probably related to activities which facilitate the carrying out of task activities. Such norms also probably apply only to members occupying more difficult positions.

If this is the case these members' conformity or lack of conformity to them should only increase or decrease differences in status which are based on activities that are directly related to goal attainment. In the interest of simplicity, we shall not consider these additional kinds of representational norms in this paper.

¹² Cf. Homans (1961, Chapter 15).

¹³ Cf. Blau (1963, Chapter 10).

¹⁴ This conception of power is similar to conceptions advanced by Thibaut and Kelley (1959, Chapter 2) and Emerson (1962, pp. 32-33).

¹⁵ These ideas were suggested by Davis and Moore's concept of scarcity of personnel. See (1944, p. 244). For empirical evidence concerning the effect of replaceability on power see Wilensky (1956, Chapter 11, especially pp. 226-230).

¹⁶ We do not intend to imply here that economic rewards have only material uses. Quite the contrary. In a later section we shall consider some important implications of the symbolic aspects of material rewards.

¹⁷ For a similar distinction see Parsons (1953, p. 95).

¹⁸ In addition to being transferable in part because skill and motivation can be learned, status and power are also transferable in part because task location can be ascribed and because such location makes, at least temporarily, some contribution to status and power, even if the individual does not have the skill and motivation to perform the activities it entails.

19 It might be argued that in the case of economic rewards we should include all segments of general status, i.e., include conformity to non-task norms or what we have referred to as solidarity and loyalty statuses. We would like to leave this question open. At present we are inclined to think that economic rewards are determined primarily by task location. Economic rewards for conformity to non-task norms are given, we suspect, by ascribing task locations. This is a very complex process. It probably explains in part how inconsistencies among the specific statuses defined in this paper develop. We intend to discuss it further in future publications.

20 For a general discussion of equity processes see Adams (1965).

21 For a theory of the equilibration of the specific statuses which constitute the segment of the individuals' general status which is associated with task structure, see Kimberly (1966; 1967).

If the propositions involved here prove to be correct, desires for greater power and economic rewards could be viewed as sources of pressure toward equilibration or disequilibration of the specific statuses which constitute the segment of general status which is associated with task structure. We say equilibration or disequilibration because some specific statuses such as skill status may not be changeable (see Kimberly, 1966, p. 223), and whether a desire to raise the height of this segment of general status will lead to equilibration or disequilibration will depend both upon whether the specific statuses are presently aligned and whether one or more of them is unchangeable.

..22 This process was suggested by Parsons' discussion of the symbolic meaning of possessions (1953, p. 105).

23 In the next section we shall consider how the necessity of simultaneously replacing all of the members of a simple system as opposed to successively replacing single members of the system affects its power.

24 Note that at the complex system level we do not specify height of the segment of general status associated with task structure as we did at the simple system level. The reason for this is, of course, that at the complex system level status consists only of evaluations of factors related to task structure.

25 This, it will be remembered, is because conformity to non-task norms tends not to be known at the complex system level and therefore tends not to be a base of general status.

26 The development of ideas presented in this section were stimulated by Merton's work on anomie (1957, Chapters 4 and 5).

27 A note concerning the specific mechanisms which are probably involved here is in order. As greater weight is given to the bases of general status which are associated with task structure, task locations are evaluated in an increasingly differentiated way. This should affect power because it should affect assessments of the ease with which different individuals can be replaced. A fact which we did not consider previously in order to simplify presentation is that while it is true that status evaluations reflect objective factors that

determine actual ease of replacement, such evaluations are never completely objective, and it is always perceived differences in task locations and perceived ease of replacement that determines power.

Evaluating task locations in an increasingly differentiated way, should also affect economic rewards because, as we just indicated, such evaluations are never completely objective, and it is always perceived differences in task locations that affect economic rewards.

²⁸ The fact that all of these modes of increasing a simple system's ranks involve use of the power resulting from collective action to prevent replacement was called to the author's attention (which was somewhat fixated as a result of being too close to the problem) by Joann R. Kolmes, an undergraduate, in a final examination.

²⁹ The effects outlined here are similar to the common observation that external threat produces internal cohesion. For reviews of some studies which seem to show that groups in threatening environments develop strong socio-emotional structures which serve to mitigate effects of the environments, see Marcus (1960) and Litwak (1961, p. 171).

³⁰ See page 10, above.

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