FOILED EXPECTATIONS: WHEN DEMOCRACY DOESN’T DELIVER

A Dissertation
by
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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I propose and test a refined theory for the calculus of voting. I accomplish this by building on the classic model that includes the “duty” or “D” term as the primary motivating factor behind voting. I theorize that voters have basic expectations for democracy and how it should work for them in their own local context. I posit that voting then becomes an expressive act by voters as they decide to commit to the regime or not based on how they perceive their met or unmet expectations. My primary empirical focus is on developing democracies. Within that context I focus on the expectation that voters have for property rights. As such I place property rights in the broader theoretical context of voters’ expectations for democracies.

At a basic level this dissertation adds to well-established literatures on micro political economy and voter turnout. On a theoretical and empirical level I incorporate several literatures by drawing on formal models of turnout and employing data from the newest developing democracies. I test my theory and find support for my proposition that property rights can motivate voter turnout. I then move into a discussion of implications for democracies that fail to meet voters’ expectations. In the face of unfulfilled expectations (often manifested through a lack of property rights protection) declining voter turnout may be just the tip of a looming iceberg. These democracies can expect to see several potential phenomena including reduced support for democracy and the regime as well as potential increases in (often violent) social conflict. Ultimately these regimes could experience severe democratic backsliding and potential full collapse.
DEDICATION

This is for those who helped me get here: Brad, Jerry, Jo, Merle, Tom and my entire family. I love you all.
I first acknowledge the support of my family. None of this would have been possible without their sacrifice and love. My friends and colleagues have been second to none. It is truly hard to stumble with such strong surroundings. I have also experienced the fortune of having great mentors throughout my academic career. William McLean and Ross Marlay taught me to love learning and I am proud to call them both friends and mentors. David Levenbach helped me realize the value of a scientific approach to Political Science, thank you. My doctoral studies have been guided and supported by many people and I thank you all. Along the way I owe special thanks to Irvin Reid, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Kim Yi Dionne, Alfred Lokuji, Jude Hays, Blake Garcia, Samantha Chiu and a whole crew of researchers in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique and South Sudan. Charity Chisale, Ashenafi Eshetu and Paul Mwera are as good of friends and colleagues as I could hope to meet. The support staff in our department has been nothing but supportive of my studies, thanks for being there.

My committee has been supportive and nothing but positively critical of my work. Marisa Kellam has always pushed my understanding of theory development. Rebecca Hartkopf Schloss has provided welcome outside perspective. Ken Meier has supported me from day one in more ways than can be named. Few mentors give as much as Ken does. Guy Whitten is the best advisor I could have asked for. He took a chance on me and it changed my future. More importantly he has taught me what political science is and how to meaningfully contribute to our understanding of political phenomena. It should go without saying that any errors in this effort are solely my own.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party (Malawi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EITM</td>
<td>Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models</td>
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<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<td>FH</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Mozambican Liberation Front (Mozambique)</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<td>Logit</td>
<td>Logistic Regression</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares Estimation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>Polity IV Project</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>People’s Party (Malawi)</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance (Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSCS</td>
<td>Time Series, Cross-Section</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In the summer of 2011 I was conducting fieldwork in the newly created country of South Sudan. During this time I was able to interview numerous government officials and local village leaders. Among the more striking interviews was one with a newly appointed deputy governor. We discussed the potential for democratic development in his country, and he said something that, in part, formed the basic motivation for this dissertation project. The deputy was extremely concerned with land and property rights. His concerns included who would control the land, who would own the land, and what protections would exist over these controls and ownership. He made the statement “there will be no peace in South Sudan until it is decided which tribes control the land.” He further elaborated on the need for property rights in a democracy and claimed that democracies simply cannot last if property rights are left unprotected. This eventually prompted a discussion of voting and how in order to be motivated to vote, voters need to feel that democracy is working for the improvement of their well-being.

The importance of property rights for democratic stability is often taken for granted by politicians and scholars alike. We assume that democracies have stable property rights or otherwise they would not be a democracy. But what if property rights take time to stabilize? What are the implications when a regime fails to create an environment in which property rights are protected and the possibility of ownership is neglected? In this dissertation I develop a theory that accounts for the role of property rights as a motivation for voter turnout. I place property rights in the broader context of voters’ expectations for democracies. At a basic level this dissertation adds to well-established literatures on
micro political economy and voter turnout. On a theoretical and empirical level I incorporate several literatures by drawing on formal models of turnout and employing data from the newest developing democracies. I then highlight a potential consequence of declining turnout for newer fragile democracies.

1.2 Adding New Dimensions to Voter Turnout

The comparative voting literature falls short in one key area, turnout decline within countries over time. The question we have thus far been unable to answer is why voters sometimes stop voting despite the fact that the predictors that we use in aggregate turnout models have not changed in a meaningful way. Institutions such as electoral rules and different party structures can easily explain variation in turnout across different polities. However, unless they are in a constant state of flux, and they typically are not, these predictors fail to explain temporal variations in turnout. This is especially the case with respect to drastic instances of turnout decline. An interesting illustration of this is provided by the decline of turnout in Mozambique (Figure 1.1).

The figure shows a case in which turnout has declined dramatically. Mozambique has a proportional representation system that has not changed since the founding election. Moreover, the two primary political parties have not changed since the founding election, and both were around long before then. If voting is primarily a function of “duty” (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), then many Mozambicans have radically shifted their feelings of duty towards the regime. At the least this creates an empirical question. However, if the level of duty has fallen then there should also be some theoretical reason. This points out the second major theoretical problem from the extant literature. Current theories of voter turnout do not easily account for how an individual’s duty (or the contents of the controversial D term in the calculus of voting model) can fluctuate over time. This in turn has led scholars to
Figure 1.1: Voter Turnout by Percentage Registered Voters in Mozambique Over Time
generally not be concerned with declining rates of turnout (downward fluctuations in duty) over time with few exceptions. In some cases scholars have simply accepted that turnout fluctuates, although the predictors used in empirical models do not. At a theoretical level the most commonly accepted premise for an individual’s decision to vote, rational choice theory, predicts that no person should vote. This problem is the main theoretical issue I address in this dissertation.

1.3 Setting the Stage: $D$, Property Rights, and Comparative Studies

Throughout this dissertation I will refer to several important concepts, but two require particular attention. The first of these relates to the concept of duty that I mentioned above. Henceforth, when I refer to “duty” or “$D$,” I am particularly talking about a duty or commitment that voters have for turning out to vote. This stems from the seminal works of Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) which together developed the calculus of voting model. The rational choice paradox that required the addition of this $D$ term has been one of the most-studied concepts in the voting literature although it has yet to be solved. My theoretical goal in this dissertation is to propose an expansion of $D$ that shifts the focus away from the paradox and vague abstractions while positioning $D$ as expressive notion of commitment to the regime based on expectations for democracy. I will delve into the issues surrounding $D$ and formally state my argument in much more detail in the next chapter. I will address property rights and the challenges of comparative analysis in the sections that follow.

1.3.1 Property Rights

Before proceeding further, I pay some attention to the meaning of property rights and the various institutions that protect them, or the lack thereof in some cases. Property comes in many forms, but in this work I am primarily interested in property rights that pertain to
land. The most basic definition of property right is the exclusive authority to determine how the property will be used. For example, a landowner with protected and secure property rights has the right to determine which crops are grown on her land. The protection and security ensure that some other entity, such as the government or a foreign investor, will not take over the land use decisions. The protection of property rights is, in and of itself, an issue in the development of strong political institutions. The process of granting property titles, which many new democracies have failed to fully and freely implement, is one of the most important aspects of property rights protection (De Soto 2003) yet few developing democracies have developed consistent and fair titling institutions.

With particular respect to Africa, Onoma (2010) argues that “...the politics of property rights are vital to understanding the wider political economies of postcolonial African countries.” A large portion of the population of sub-Saharan African countries rely on land for subsistence (Prothero 1972). Recent estimates place as much as 65% of the population of the continent as being employed in agricultural practices (World Bank 2008). This figure of course varies by country, but the general point is that land use through agriculture is hugely important to most citizens of African countries. Increased globalization and foreign investment have been a boom for the young economies, but the average farmer has likely either not been affected, or affected negatively by rising prices and intruding large-scale farms.

The idea that property matters in democracy is far from new. Indeed, the theories of Locke (1821) clearly make a case for the importance of property in the development of Western democratic thought. Failures in property rights protection have been linked to the recent breakdown of democratic progress in Zimbabwe after Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government redistributed much of the arable land in the country (Richardson 2005). Despite these long-standing theories and recent developments, I argue that there
are two critical areas in which property rights have been ignored in political science. First, scholars have generally failed to consider how important the protection of property rights is for democratic consolidation and stability. To the extent property rights are considered, they may be rolled into some vague index that “controls” for a number of democratic development factors in empirical models.

The second absence of property rights in the literature relates to political participation. Again, this idea is not particularly new since the earliest voters in America were required to be property owners. Finally, recent popular and scholarly work in the field of economics makes a case for the importance of property rights (De Soto 2003) for the development of free-market economies, which are most often linked to democratic forms of government. In this dissertation I re-focus on property rights and argue that they play a central role in determining levels of political participation and democratic development on new democracies.

As a final note I need to highlight the distinction between property rights and property ownership. Although these are related, I refer to these terms as distinct phenomena. Property rights refer to the right to both own and/or control land. By control I mean rent or have some level of guarantee that the land cannot easily be take away without recourse. In developed democracies the right to own land is almost ubiquitous. However, in many developing contexts the notion of one person owning land does not exist. On the other hand there are meaningful expectations about land use and the right for that use to continue as long as any contractual obligations are being met. All of these points relate back to the idea that land is very important and it takes some degree of property rights to ensure that land is secure from expropriation or theft.
1.3.2 Contextual Challenges of Cross-National Analyses

The difficulties of comparing across countries and over time cannot be overstated. There are problems that arise with both theoretical and empirical endeavors and my examination of property rights and turnout is not exempt from these problems. In this section I will make the case for generalization while clearly demarcating my perceived boundaries based on both theoretical and empirical grounds.

I opened this chapter with a quote from a South Sudanese government official. This is in part because my inspiration for this project grew from my fieldwork efforts in several African countries. South Sudan is also of course the newest nation in the world and probably the least developed, whether economically or politically. This means that my theory at some level starts with the idea of application for developing countries. Indeed, developing democracies are my focus both theoretically and empirically throughout the dissertation. However, I see no reason why the broader theory cannot be applied to democracies in a general sense. The difference comes with the empirical distinctions of foiled expectations across countries and levels of development.

In this dissertation I focus primarily on developing democracies for several reasons. First, these democracies by definition are the least consolidated and therefore at the highest risk of suffering from major changes in political participation. I also posit that property rights are among the most important expectations that voters have for developing democracies. The availability of property rights data and the importance of property rights protections for citizens in these countries makes this a ripe area in which to test my theory. Importantly, developing democracies provide large amounts of variation on most of the independent variables I employ in this dissertation. Within the context of developing democracies my primary empirical focus is on the newest sub-Saharan African democ-
racies. These cases form an interesting subset of developing democracies and offer large amounts of variation on the explanatory components of my theory.

Despite my focus on developing democracies and property rights I theorize much more broadly, and this accomplishes several goals. First, broadening the theoretical foundation allows me to build on the general turnout models which were almost exclusively designed for the American and/or other OECD contexts. This also allows me to contribute to that broader literature by providing realistic propositions for how $D$ works for actual voters. With respect to property rights, there are numerous ideas about what voters can expect from democracy. Of course these expectations vary by context and time period but the idea that voters have expectations need not be limited in such a way. This makes the second (theory) chapter very broad in applicability while still providing the proper foundation for the empirical chapters that follow.

1.4 Plan of the Dissertation & Chapter Summaries

I proceed with several chapters, one theoretical and three empirical plus the conclusion. In the second chapter I revisit the classical formal theories of voter turnout and expand on them by accounting for the role played by economic concerns and the level of $D$ towards voting for a given citizen. After formally presenting the theory I elaborate on potential shortcomings and competing propositions. In chapter three I present original data from a series of focus groups I conducted in several developing countries during the summer of 2013. This chapter provides the first test of the theory in addition to rich information from actual likely voters in developing democracies. The chapter serves as a nice segue narrative from the theory to the empirical tests in chapter four.

In the fourth chapter I first examine voter turnout at the macro level with a primary focus on property rights. I then proceed to some individual-level and mixed-level analyses
by employing survey data from twenty developing democracies. In chapter five I depart from turnout somewhat by examining some potential implications of declining rates of regime support and increasing rates of social conflict. These include models of support for democracy and spatial models of the spread of social conflict in Africa. In the final chapter I briefly summarize the previous chapters and draw several comprehensive conclusions. The dissertation ends with a list of cited references and several appendices in which I explain the data and detailed methodologies for each chapter.
2. REVISITING THE D IN THE THEORY OF VOTER TURNOUT

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I provide the theoretical background and propositions for the empirical analyses that follow in chapters three and four. I present some additional theories and analyses in chapter five but I only briefly discuss those on this chapter and generally let them stand alone in terms of theory. Despite this, the motivations for chapter five are derived from the theoretical propositions that I discuss here and test in chapter four.

Obviously this is not the first theoretical endeavor to explain voter turnout. Turnout has been examined in the political science literature at least as early as the works of Merriam and Gosnell (1924); Gosnell (1927), which focused on turnout rates in Chicago. The early focus was often on why some people did not vote. This approach defined much of the literature until the penetration of rational choice into mainstream political science.\(^1\)

Almost thirty years later the discussion of turnout began to change from why people do not vote to why they do. This discussion came in the form of a rational choice equation elucidating a basic cost-benefit analysis (Downs 1957).\(^2\) This work was greatly expanded upon by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) in which they added the concept of “duty” as it relates to voting. Despite this transformative addition to the theory and the many works it inspired, most of the major empirical endeavors that followed generally avoided any attempts to measure this concept or further theorize on how it may vary for a given voter over time. I will discuss these issues and other more recent works on voter turnout in the

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\(^1\)A prominent example of an outlier from this paradigm can be found in the sociological approach taken by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) which explained voting from political socialization context.

\(^2\)Rational choice is a broad term that encompasses many works both in and out of political science. The main point here is the idea of the “rational voter” presented in these early works. This voter is able to calculate their expected utility or benefit from voting.
sections that follow. I will then proceed to my theoretical expansions of the basic rational choice theory and then present my theoretical expectations for the empirical chapters.

2.2 Voter Turnout: A Theoretical Background

The rational choice theoretical perspective on turnout began with Down’s (1957) *Economic Theory of Democracy*. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, Downs posited that it is irrational for most individuals to vote most of the time. Down’s framework placed the voter in a decisional context in which she would analyze the potential reward (payoff) of voting as a function of the expected benefit multiplied by the likelihood of a pivotal vote minus the cost. Since the likelihood of a pivotal vote is almost always nearly zero this negates any expected benefit. After subtracting the cost, the resulting conclusion was that a voter should not vote in a rational context. However, voters do vote thus leaving Downs with a paradox of sorts. Profoundly, Downs posited that if nobody voted then the survival of democracy would be threatened. This caused him to speculate on why people end up voting, despite the seemingly irrational nature of the act. His speculation was that the voters simply want the regime to continue to survive, so they vote. Down’s theory was later revisited and expanded upon by Riker and Ordeshook (1968).

Riker and Ordeshook (1968) took the basic proposition from Downs regarding a satisfaction from voting and further formalized it into the “calculus of voting” model. This theory can be written as $R = PB - C + D$ where $R$ is the reward from voting, $P$ is the probability that her vote will be pivotal (i.e., the deciding vote) towards bringing about the expected benefit $B$ from the results of the election, and $C$ is the cost associated with voting.

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3 Scholars have generally assumed the costs of voting to be minimal. This may be true in developed settings but it is certainly not the case in many developing countries. Voters often have to travel long distances with minimal support and information in order to cast their ballots. Although the probability of a decisive vote remains lower, there are contexts where the costs are much higher than elsewhere and thus costs should not be dismissed so easily.

4 The seemingly irrational nature of voting was also discussed at length by Tullock (1967).
Finally, the concept of $D$ was posited by Downs an extension of the cost-benefit model as the reason that people ended up voting (due to the very low value of $R$ otherwise). Downs argued that $D$ was perhaps a manifestation of support for the democratic system. This is where Riker and Ordeshook (1968) picked up. They took Downs proposition and formalized it into $D$ by furthering the scope of potential components of $D$. Primarily $D$ was characterized to be a vector of satisfactions that voters could obtain from the act of voting. These included satisfactions gained from partisan preference, the ethic of voting, support for the system, making a decision, and political efficacy. This general theory, especially the $D$ (also characterized as a civic duty to vote based on the satisfactions offered by Riker and Ordeshook (1968)) term, when considered at the aggregate level of turnout in cross-national studies of voting, is rarely tested. This is despite the notion that most of the “action” in a given voters’ turnout calculus must take place within $D$ itself. Instead, aggregate turnout is typically examined as a function of covariates that vary somewhat across countries, but that rarely vary over time within countries. This leads scholars to narrowly focus on variation in turnout rates across space rather than over time. For example, few studies have examined the role of institutional changes, in the event they occur, and how they may affect turnout.

In this chapter I am going to advance a theory of voter turnout that allows for dynamic changes in $D$ to occur for a given voter over time. This, in turn, can contribute to explanations of how aggregate turnout can trend within a country. I call this a contextual theory of turnout because I propose that the decision of whether or not to vote is heavily influenced by contextual factors. The theory of turnout offered by Downs (1957) and later modified by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) begins with the basic premise that a rational voter will vote if it serves their interest based on the expected utility from the equation above. The addition of the $D$ term, however, puts a kink in the rational basis of the theory because the
expected benefit from voting is almost certainly near zero once multiplied by the probability of the vote being decisive. This just leaves $D$ assuming, as most studies do, that the costs of voting are negligible. Presumably a voter develops their level of commitment to a regime via $D$ over the course of their political socialization. Beyond this presumption there is little discussion of what factors could lead to a significant change in $D$ for a given voter over time. I argue that this potential change lies in the expectations voters have for democracy, which when met, allow $D$ to remain at a sufficiently high level such that the voter decides to vote.

If, however, voters’ expectations are not met, then their commitment to the regime and democracy is lessened. This lessened commitment reduces the $D$ (duty) term from the Riker and Ordeshook (1968) model. This means that the likelihood of voting decreases as voters’ expectations remain unmet. Voters’ expectations can manifest themselves in various forms depending on the polity and time period being examined. In a general sense, expectations refer to the most basic of rights and needs that democracies should inherently attempt to meet. Locke’s theories of natural rights included life, liberty, and property (Locke 1821) with the latter being modified to “pursuit of happiness” for the purposes of the American declaration of independence (United States 1776). These are very basic expectations that voters demand from democracy. Voters likely take much more satisfaction from a governing system that helps bolster these basic expectations. On the other hand a regime or system that diminishes expectations will likely see decreased commitment from potential voters. I discuss potential expectations below.

I posit that voters, especially in developing democracies, care much more about the local levels of economic well-being and opportunity for growth than they do the development of a distant capital or economic figures that do not translate into benefits for them. In this context the voter in a system with continued unmet expectations eventually asks herself
why she should vote if there are no prospects of improvement for life, liberty, property, and even the pursuit of happiness for them and their immediate family and/or neighbors insofar as it can be facilitated by the government. Thus, the hypothetical voter’s sense of civic duty is decreased. This decision calculus helps explain how rates of turnout can vary dramatically within countries over time, especially if there are differences between what potential voters expect their regime will deliver and what actually happens. Extant explanations derived from empirical models in the literature simply fail to explain this variation.

2.3 The (D) of Voting

When developing their theory Riker and Ordeshook (1968) offered duty (D) as a concept of satisfaction and then listed several potential “satisfactions” that voters could attain from voting. These included satisfaction from: the ethic of voting, affirming partisan preference, affirming efficacy, going to the polls, and commitment to the political system. (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). To these I would add the affirmation of commitment based on met expectations. This is a slightly modified version of the commitment to the system suggested by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). The primary difference lies in the met expectations, otherwise the level of commitment to the regime would not easily vary for an individual over time.

In his comprehensive consideration of the rational choice model, Blais (2006) argues that duty is related to a voter’s sense of right and wrong. That is, that not voting is failing to adhere to a norm and thus a neglect of the duty. This neglect, Blais posits, is taken to be wrong by the voter. Blais further notes that the duty is likely taken to be towards the democratic process and a guarantee of rights which include fully enfranchised voting. Therefore the perception is that duty relates to a moral obligation to vote because of an abstract belief in the goals of democracy.
I take a different approach from Blais by positing that $D$ is less related to right versus wrong and more rooted in a voter’s loyalty to a system from which they expect something in return. It is obvious to point out that such a system currently falls under the broad umbrella of democracy when referring to the action of voting. Part of the point here is to push the explanation of duty beyond a sociopolitical abstraction and into something more concrete, such as political economy. The basic economic theory presented by Downs (1957) is based on this premise. The problem is that scholars moved away from this explanation once the concept of duty was shown to be the likely driving force in motivating citizens to vote. I argue that $D$ is made up of components that can much more readily fit into a political economy framework than has previously been considered.

$D$, as it is often conceptualized, is a rather abstract concept that most voters likely do not think too much about. On the other hand, voters do care about local economic well-being. In this sense, rather than expecting benefits, voters choose to vote or not because expectations have been met or foiled. On the surface this may seem like a slight of hand that simply changes $D$ to $B$ but allowing it to count since it is not multiplied by the often tiny $P$. However, there is more to the story than this. If $D$ is generated from a level of commitment or sense of satisfaction these must be a function of something. I argue that it is simply a function of whether or not democracy, as it stands in a given polity, is working for the voter. I theorize that this function, in developing contexts especially, is largely shaped by property rights protection.” With respect to $B$, the main distinction is the difference between a short-term expected benefit from voting for a given party and long-term support for the regime and democracy, which is what I am arguing is manifested within $D$. 

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2.4 Formal Specification of $D$

The importance of the $D$ term in the study of turnout makes it incumbent upon scholars to examine the components of $D$ rather than the other components of the calculus of voting model. Despite the attention that $D$ has gained in the theoretical context, few scholars have attempted to further theorize on how $D$ is formed. Since its original inception scholars have generally either tried to roll all of $D$ into civic duty or come up with an alternative to the seemingly paradoxical $BP - C$ part of the equation and forget about $D$ altogether. I discuss some of these alternatives in detail below.

As mentioned, it is often the case that $D$ becomes entirely represented by the concept of civic duty. Although examining civic duty itself is certainly worthwhile, I prefer to theorize about $D$ as a more general explanation of the action that spurns voters to turn out, which may or may not be affected by civic duty per se. As such, I formally present my theory for the level of $D$ as: $^5$

$$d_{ijt} = \alpha_j + x'_{ijt}\beta + z'_{jt}\gamma + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

where:

- $d_{ijt}$ is the level of $D$ for potential voter $i$ in country $j$ at time $t$
- $\alpha_j$ represents country-level fixed-effects for country $j$
- $x_{ijt}$ is a vector of individual-level characteristics that form the intrinsic components of $D$ as discussed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and my extension to include the role of expectations for democracy with the vector of parameter estimates $\beta$

$^5$Note that in this case I have $D$ notated as a lower-case $d$. This is following the proper notational standards for a Scalar. Otherwise I still refer to it as $D$ following the convention and use developed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968).
• $z_{jt}$ is a vector of varying country-level attributes that can affect individuals’ level of $D$ in country $j$ at time $t$ with the vector of parameter estimates $\gamma$

• $\epsilon_{ijt}$ is the disturbance term

Note that the above equation is not a theory of turnout (see below). Rather it is a formal statement of how duty can be characterized and estimated for a given voter. This is important because, assuming a framework based on Riker and Ordeshook (1968), turnout is mostly driven by the level of $D$ for the voter. This differs from Blaise and Achen’s (2012) point of view which states voters either have $D$ (in their case civic duty) or they do not. I argue that duty, rather than being discrete, is something that can occur at levels which then factor into voting calculus.

2.5 The Decision to Vote

In Figure 2.1 I present a basic depiction of my theory. That is, there is a positive relationship between voters’ expectations for democracy and their decision to vote. Once the level of satisfaction from met expectations is sufficiently high, voters affirm their commitment to democracy in their country and decide to vote.

Achen (2006) makes a related argument by positing that voters do not make instrumental voting decisions but rather normative. That is to say voters do not vote because they believe they will influence the election but rather because they feel like they get something out of voting. In reality this ends up relating closely with the basic argument behind the $D$ term which, by definition, becomes something different than a pure rational choice approach. The name rational choice has probably stuck because of the economic context in which Downs (1957) originally framed the theory. The basic difference here is between instrumental and expressive variables with the former being those variables that relate to
citizens voting to affect the outcome of the election versus the latter which relates to the discussion of $D$ above.

The question at this point becomes how the economic origins of the voting theory can be melded with the normative road it has taken. The lack of this possibility is one of the reasons that the $D$ term drew so much criticism in the first place (Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974); see also Barry (1970)). I posit that the normative decision for commitment to the regime is rooted in the economic concept I describe as expectations, whether foiled or met. I argue that voters do not vote because they think there will be some immediate benefit. Rather, the system is working for them or it is not, and based upon that, they decide whether or not the regime is something to which they desire to remain committed. This remains an expressive sort of notion that occurs with the formation of the $D$ term, but the decision is, in part, an economic one. This in essence makes the real economic action of the theory
take place within $D$ as a precursor and contributor to the final normative decision. This potentially represents a step in the direction of solving the paradoxical nature of the rational choice approach that has long plagued the literature (Grofman 1993).

Before moving to a discussion of alternatives to the calculus of voting model it is necessary to present the modified version of the theory in a testable format. As it stands, the model expressed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) is without an obvious statistical analogue. This is a necessary step in the EITM framework which I employ in this dissertation (Granato, Lo and Wong (2010); see also Granato and Scioli (2004)). I formally present the decision whether or not to vote as:

$$\Pr(v_{ijt} = 1) = \Phi(\alpha_j + d_{ijt} \gamma + x_{ijt} \beta + \epsilon_{ijt})$$

where:

- $\Pr(v_{ij} = 1)$ is the probability of voting in a given election for voter $i$ in country $j$ at time $t$
- $\Phi$ represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function
- $\alpha_j$ represents country-level fixed-effects for country $j$ in which voter $i$ resides
- $d_{ijt}$ is the level of $D$ as discussed above with parameter estimate $\gamma$
- $x_{ijt}$ is a row vector of individual-level characteristics not related to $d$ that predict turning out to vote for voter $i$ in country $j$ with a vector of parameter estimates $\beta$
- $\epsilon_{ijt}$ is the disturbance term

In the equation above I represent $D$ for an individual as $d$. The $x$ in this case represents other potential motivations for voting including potential estimations of $B$ and $P$ as well
as calculations and components that could influence a voter’s expected level of $C (E(C))$. However, in many cases these will be non-impactful assuming the voter makes the rational calculations offered by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), which just leaves the decision to vote in the expressive nature of $d$. I empirically test this theory in chapter four.

2.6 Alternative Explanations for Voting

As I mentioned above, the calculus of voting is not the only formal theoretical attempt at explaining turnout. Scholars have devised a number of alternatives in attempts to solve the paradoxical problem in the voting calculus model. This generally means that $D$ is excluded. In this section I discuss some of those alternatives. The rational choice framework spawned numerous theoretical attempts at solving the paradoxical question of why people vote. As I demonstrate in chapter four there is a rich and well-established empirical literature for examining aggregate turnout. However, this literature has generally ignored the individual-level theory of turnout that I discuss above. On the other hand there have been numerous theoretical designs that offer competing explanations to the duty-based, calculus of voting models.

The minimax regret model in Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) represents one of the early attempts to solve the paradoxical problem. In this framework the voter is faced with the uncertainty of the election and is said to select the route which minimizes regret in the situation in which the outcome of the election is as bad as possible for the voter. Their goal was to eliminate the problems caused by the realities of $P$ while also eliminating the need for proposing a $D$ term. The minimax model was extended by Tideman (1985) to include the emotional reactions of “remorse” and “elation.” However, as Blais (2006) points out, this model has failed generally under empirical scrutiny whereas in general survey based models have found support for the presence of different types of $D$ within potential voters.
While the calculus of voting and minimax regret models are derived from decision theory, other models have been presented in a game theoretic framework (Aldrich 1993; Geys 2006).

The game theoretic context offers an additional element to the equation by allowing voters to also consider the decisions of others as they formulate their voting intentions (Geys 2006). Aldrich (1993) provides a basic example of this concept in that a voter could recognize that nobody should vote because \( P \) is so low yet in that scenario the expected \( P \) for that voter would be much higher since they assume that they are among many fewer other voters. If most people made this calculation then this explains why turnout is sometimes quite high. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983), Ledyard (1984), and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) all have proposed equilibria-based game theory approaches. However, Aldrich (1993) and Geys (2006) both argue that these models should only perform well in relatively small electorates because of diminishing returns on strategic interactions in large groups.

These alternative models have presented interesting takes on solving the turnout paradox. However, almost all of them suffer from similar criticisms as the calculus of voting model in that firstly they rely on estimations from voters with wholly incomplete information. Most suffer in some way from the notion that the probability of a given vote counting is almost always tiny, or in the case of Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), little empirical support (Blais 2006). Thus, we are left with abandoning the enterprise altogether or returning to the \( D \) term. Since we are left with the \( D \) this term means any theoretical endeavor and subsequent analysis must theorize on what composes \( D \) and test the resulting empirical propositions. As Blais (2006) argues, the calculus of voting model is still “more theoretically satisfactory than the alternatives.”
2.7 Final Note on the $D$ Term

The $D$ term suffers from one final flaw which I must address. As originally conceived by Downs, the $D$ term simply meant support for the democratic regime. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) expanded this greatly to include a list of items voters could be gaining by the act of voting via $D$. Others have collapsed $D$ into various interpretations of the concept of civic duty (Achen and Sinnott 2007; Blais and Achen 2012). I, too, place my theory within the context of $D$. This makes any conjuring of $D$ a proverbial buffet of potential components. The use of $D$ in my case is less an attempt to reinvent and more an effort to frame my theory within a generally accepted framework. I also frame $D$ to be based on very tangible expectations for the voter. Perhaps $D$ then becomes the vessel for anything that a voter weights when making their decision. Either way, whether in $D$ or some other additive term, the theoretical point remains, and that is that $D$ matters.

Finally, it is important to point out that other individual and contextual factors remain important for explaining turnout. Relatedly, my theory builds on the established contextual importance of institutions and voter satisfaction. Beyond this, however, I am making an argument for “popping the hood” on what we already know about turnout. We know that institutions matter and voters must get some satisfaction from voting or otherwise they would not directly benefit from the act of voting. At the least I am making an argument for determining just how institutions, especially those beyond electoral rules and systems, affect an individual’s decision whether or not to vote. I am also making an argument for understanding how voters get satisfaction from the act of voting. This relates to my primary theoretical proposition which is that voters retain a level of commitment to democracy and the regime and voting brings them satisfaction, but only when their expectations are met.
2.8 Forms of Foiled Expectations

So far I have only mentioned the idea of foiled expectations without talking much about what I mean by that phrase. In the preceding introductory chapter I briefly alluded to the concept of property rights in developing democracies being essential for democratic consolidation. Relatedly property rights represent an important expectation of citizens in developing countries. Property rights are no less important elsewhere but they are probably taken for granted in most advanced democracies. In countries with lower levels of development, however, the citizens are acutely aware of the need for control of land and guarantees for property. This will become more clear in the empirical chapters. If a citizen is living in a regime with no guarantees of property rights and then that country democratizes the citizen likely expects that their options for owning and keeping control over land will improve. Of course in theory this improvement should be a natural by-product of the democratization process. In reality, however, things are not always so simple.

Many developing countries have to adjudicate between a long-standing form of traditional property rights and those that are more western in style. If the United States had attempted to do this with the understanding of Native American property rights the meaning of land ownership might have ended up being much more complicated and contentious. There are also logistical issues such as property surveys and demarcation, which might be especially challenging to a developing nation. Finally, if all property has worth then there are questions of who originally owns said property at the time of transition and what the value is. All of these things amount to potential expectations that citizens, and more importantly voters, could have about property rights. When these issues are not resolved, I posit that voters eventually decide democracy is not working for them and, as such, they become disillusioned with the prospect of democracy as they know it in their country and gradually stop voting.
Property rights are the primary expectation that I discuss and test in this dissertation. However, it is not difficult to imagine other forms of expectations. For example, in the advanced democracies citizens have expectations for security, infrastructure, health care, and defense among many others. If, after enough time, these expectations are continually not met then voters would decide that elections are insufficient in being able to bring about meaningful improvements on basic deliveries of these expectations. Of course priorities vary widely over time and across contexts. This highlights the need for placing all these specific items under the broader theoretical umbrella of expectations.

2.8.1 Long- Versus Short-Term Expectations

The expectations of voters can come in at least two forms. For my purposes I want to distinguish between long- and short-term expectations. Although related in practice, there is at least one distinguishing factor. Short-term expectations are those that take place from one election to the next and largely captured by the $B$ term. For example, it is likely that some Republicans expected that George H.W. Bush follow through on his “no new taxes” promise. In the end he did not and many of these voters either abstained from the election or shifted their votes to Clinton or Perot (McFaden 2008). These sorts of short-term, partisan expectations can foil voters from voting in a given election. However, these are distinct from the expectations I am discussing here.

Long-term expectations on the other hand refer to those expectations that voters have for the regime or democracy as a whole. This sort of expectation is potentially more salient in developing democracies because many, if not most, of the voters in these regimes are old enough to remember life under the previous regime. This means that the regime change came with a new outlook for future life in the country. Most citizens are likely aware of this and placed some level of expectation for how life should be under democratic rule.
In cases where their expectations have been met then they likely keep participating at a relatively high level.

2.9 What Happens When Expectations are Foiled?

So far I have discussed why people choose to vote (or not) and what I mean by foiled expectations. In addition to the testable propositions, this discussion generates several other theoretical questions with potential propositions of their own. First, why do we care about voter turnout? Aldrich (1993) aptly claims: “Turning out to vote is the most common and important act citizens take in a democracy and, therefore is, one of the most important behaviors for scholars of democratic politics to understand.” Despite this, turnout is relatively low in the United States when compared to other democracies yet it consistently ranks as one of the most consolidated democracies in commonly accepted measures.6 Other democracies around the world, notably several in Latin America among others, require compulsory voting among their citizenry so by default turnout would seemingly not be an issue in those countries.7

Leaving aside the countries with compulsory voting for a moment, Achen (2006) listed several reasons why low turnout is undesirable in a democracy. First, Achen argues, low turnout delegitimizes the winners of the election. Low turnout elections are also potentially not representative of the broader population (Achen 2006; Lijphart 1997; Griffin and Newman 2005). Finally, low turnout fosters an unengaged citizenry which could potentially be mobilized by demagoguery. This means that elections can produce winners that are detrimental to a democratic regime. Achen (2006) lists Huey Long and Adolf Hitler as extreme examples of this potential phenomenon. I would add that low turnout in general

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6On the other hand, the indirect nature of the electoral college makes the United States an outlier in this particular discussion.

7IDEA has an explanation of compulsory voting along with a list of countries requiring it which can be found here http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm.
creates a potentially severe regime legitimacy issue. Consistently low turnout means that either citizens are extremely apathetic or that they feel there is no good that can come from voting. Although these issues may seem trivial or unlikely, at certain levels that could significantly affect the governing conditions within a country. A number of these issues could also easily apply in the event of compulsory voting, although turnout itself would not technically be part of the problem.

Democracies do not develop in a vacuum. The challenges faced by developing democracies today are far different than those of the advanced western democracies in their own time. The levels of education and development are, for the most part, much lower among the new democracies. On the other hand globalization naturally produces more economic competition and potentially higher internal expectations. This means that newer democracies possibly face a shorter time horizon to consolidate and become stable. Many citizens in these countries are also acutely aware of the alternatives to democracy and, as I will show in chapters three and five, a minority actually prefer those alternatives because they believe their immediately surrounding economic conditions were better off.

In the sections above I outlined commitment to democracy as being an aspect of the voting calculus that goes into the $D$ term. I also presented an equation for the component parts of $D$. These include both country-level characteristics and individual circumstances. When contextual conditions are such that an individual’s commitment to the regime lessens, this is likely do to some expectation not being met. This in turn produces several potential outcomes. First, the potential voter could lessen her support for the regime in particular thus creating the low-turnout situation and consequences I discuss above. Second, she

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8It is not my goal in this dissertation to make a normative case for democracy, property rights, or voting. Rather, I am pointing out some major issues that new democracies face including fairly securing property rights and severe declines in turnout. Property rights are important in all democracies as is voter turnout, as I pointed out above. This makes the fundamental issue one of what is “good” or “right” for democracy but not what is “good” or “right” in the abstract. Simply put, the merits and values of democracy as quality system of governance is outside the scope of my efforts in this work.
could lessen her support for the regime and/or democracy creating at the least an unhappy populace and at the worst adding a destabilizing element to the governing situation of the country. Taken together these developments can together create a series of events (reduced turnout, reduced democracy, increases social conflict) that could lead to significant threats to the staying power of democracy and the regime. I discuss and test these possibilities further in chapter five.

2.10 Overcoming Theoretical Hurdles

The theory I have outlined in this chapter has broad applicability. However, I recognize that every theory has a competing explanation and I endeavor to briefly highlight some of these for my theory in this section. I have identified several potential critiques and address them in turn.

2.10.1 Level of Democracy

One potential critique of my theory is that I am applying it only to nascent democracies. An argument here may be that I am studying countries with less than full democratic consolidation and thus they are suffering from some of the problems that come with that status. There is no doubt that a number of the countries I include in my empirical chapters are classified as “developing” or “transitional” in nature. This means that they have some level of imperfection in their democratic practice. An easy rejoinder to this critique would be that no democracy is free from flaws. I argue that the theory I present above applies generally to citizens in all democracies. The differences are in the details of the foiled expectations and the ability of the regime to withstand consistently disappointing voters in the first several elections. Nevertheless an argument could be made that I am simply examining parts of the democratization process and/or “growing pains” rather than phenomena that actually afflict fully consolidated democracies.
2.10.2 The Chicken or the Egg?

In a somewhat related argument to my above discussion on level of democracy, Przeworski (1991); Przeworski et al. (1996) argue that solid institutions and economic stability are the keys to success in new democracies with success being defined as a democracy that endures. Implicit in this argument is that institutional protections, such as property rights, must be solidified before a country can proceed to becoming a fully consolidated democracy. This relates to a somewhat common problem in the democratization literature whereby scholars debate the distinctions between dichotomies and scales when it comes to democratic consolidation. The question that is difficult to answer is whether fully consolidated democracies exhibit fully protected institutions or whether once institutions reach a certain level of protection and stability the country in question then becomes a democracy. Without dismissing this debate out of hand, it is difficult to apply in my case. If taken to mean democracy or not, then naturally many democratizing countries are excluded from the process. If taken to mean level of democracy then the process of institutional development can be much more easily considered.

Suffice it to say it is incumbent upon scholars to fully understand the democratization process and how it differs across space and over time. Even if both of the above arguments can be supported, I see little reason to dismiss the study of voters’ expectations during the democratizing process for new democracies. It is likely that these countries face a unique set of challenges when compared to the time, and timelines, enjoyed by the advanced democracies.

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9 This also relates to the Level of Democracy subsection in that there is an ongoing debate on the “best” measure of democracy whether it be a dichotomy or scale.
2.11 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented a theory for how foiled expectations can be a major component of voter turnout. By theorizing on the meaning and role of civic duty $D$ in turnout I have offered an explanation for how turnout varies over time at a theoretical level. This variation can come in the form of expectations that voters have for democracy. When these expectations are diminished voters change their level of commitment to the regime and thus duty is decreased ultimately driving rates in turnout down. A situation in which low turnout occurs is one in which the foundations of the regime are much more threatened. Together these issues form the theoretical narrative that I am testing in this dissertation. I have also made a consistent case for why this topic is important for developing democracies. These countries face a unique set of challenges and their citizenries are at risk of growing wholly impatient with the level of democratic development. I present further evidence on this point in the chapters that follow.

Figure 2.2 displays a causal diagram of my theoretical narrative. The theory begins with foiled expectations of democracy. When voters’ basic expectations fail to be met over multiple elections they increasingly become disillusioned with the system. This leads to a reduction in commitment to the democratic regime in which the voter finds herself. The disillusionment and foiled expectations are ultimately expressed via decreased participation and less support for democracy. Finally, I posit that long-term trends of declining participation and support for democracy can ultimately lead to failure of the regime. Without a moderate level of support, which can often take the actionable form of voting, democratic systems lose legitimacy and begin to suffer the risk of not being sustained. The ultimate consequence of sustained decreased participation and support is regime instability and possible collapse. I will further discuss the latter parts of the process depicted in the figure in chapters five and six.
In the next chapter I examine some qualitative evidence for my theory using data from a series of focus groups in three developing democracies. I then empirically test my theoretical propositions in chapter four using cross-national time-series and survey data. In chapter five I further elaborate on the potential implications of failing meet to voters’ expectations.
3. FOILED EXPECTATIONS: PRELIMINARY CASE STUDIES

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I provided a theoretical framework for explaining variance in
voters’ expectations across space and time. In this chapter I provide the first empirical evi-
dence by presenting results from interviews with voters that demonstrate how expectations
can fluctuate in developing democracies. I am most interested in situations in which ex-
pectations have not been met, but I did not limit the data in such a way as to only highlight
those cases. My goal for this chapter is to further contextualize the argument I make in
chapter two on the importance of property rights in the lives of everyday citizens.

3.2 The Approach

This chapter serves as the first test and discussion of the “real-world” implications of
the theory I outlined in chapter two. I present results from a series of focus group dis-
cussions in three distinct cases: Ethiopia, Malawi and Mozambique. My primary goal for
the focus groups was to get some direct individual-level discussion of voters’ expectations
for democracy in developing settings. This information is useful because it provides some
context and discussion for the theory as it applies in actual settings. Before presenting the
focus group results I provide brief backgrounds on each country. I also include a brief dis-
cussion of the status of property rights within each country based on the reports compiled
by USAID.¹ These are not be taken as comprehensive country reports but rather they set
the stage for contextual differences in which the focus groups took place.

¹These reports can be found here: http://usaidlandtenure.net/country-profiles.
Figure 3.1: Approximate Locations of Focus Groups in Each Country
I conducted the focus groups during the summer of 2013 (June-July). I conducted six focus groups in each country, making every effort to recruit as ethnically, regionally and otherwise diverse groups as possible. The approximate locations are shown in Figure 3.1. Six participants were included in each group. In most cases these were balanced by gender and age, but I was limited in a few cases based on available subjects. Ideally I could sample the entire populations to determine which citizens would participate in the focus groups. This was simply not possible with limited resources. Despite this, the results I provide below tell a rich story from real voters’ points of view. In each case the focus groups were conducted by trained local supervisors and research assistants in several native languages. I only remained as an observer and did not participate in the groups at all. I include the full protocols, exact locations, questionnaires and other relevant materials for the research methodology of the focus groups in the first appendix section.

3.3 The Cases

I chose these cases because they provide important variation on my key explanatory variables. Each of the cases comes from a unique colonial background with varying times for independence. There are also some variations in economic development, experiences with communism and civil war, ethnic heterogeneity, population and land use practices. I present a summary of relevant country attributes in Table 3.1 below.²

3.3.1 Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the least democratic country among the three countries selected. The most recent Freedom House (FH) ranking placed Ethiopia in the “not free” category because of

²Economic and population data are from the CIA World Factbook estimates. The Fractionalization data are from the Alesina et al. (2003) Herfindahl index: \( FRACT_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_{ij}^2 \). The property rights #1 data are from the international property rights index where a score of 10 indicates the most secure and free property rights. The property rights #2 data are from the 2014 index of economic freedom.
Table 3.1: Case Study Country Attributes in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Purchasing Power</td>
<td>$118.2 billion</td>
<td>$15.02 billion</td>
<td>$28.15 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>$1,300</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>96,633,458</td>
<td>17,377,468</td>
<td>24,692,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.7235</td>
<td>0.6744</td>
<td>0.6932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Rights #1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Rights #2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data from multiple sources, see footnote below.*

lack of press/civil liberties freedom and the oppression of EPRDF opposition movements. The combined Polity score for Ethiopia is only one. However, Ethiopia provides some key variation not found elsewhere on the African continent. To begin, it is only one of two countries in Africa not colonized by European countries despite two major attempts by Italy to impose colonial rule.³ Ethiopia also experienced a period of extreme Communist rule under the Mengistu regime from 1975-1991 and absolute monarchal rule prior to that under Haile Selassie I. The communist rule was marked by large amounts of land redistribution and mass societal upheaval. Although these experiences alone make it a case worth investigating, Ethiopia is also a cultural and political leader among countries in Africa, making it an important case for considering democratic transitions.

³Liberia is the other non-colonial country. However, it was founded by freed American slaves and thus experienced much American influence in terms of governing structure. Ethiopia, on the other hand, is organically independent and quite unique in that regard.
Property rights and land tenure are the least free in Ethiopia. The state controls all land and farmers can gain or lose their tilled acreage at the whim of various levels of government. This makes for poor outlooks by most citizens on the prospects of further democratization. It is very difficult for a farmer to get any sort of long-term guarantee on use of a given plot of land. On the other hand, recent surges in economic growth have been coupled with long-term land contracts for outside investors. This has created an atmosphere of distrust amongst many local farmers. This also makes for a very unproductive road as the USDA reports classify smallholder agriculture as the most important component of the Ethiopian economy. Despite this importance local land use is still very much in a state of insecurity, especially when compared with the other two countries I discuss below.

3.3.2 Malawi

Malawi has probably experienced the least severe political history among the three cases. In modern history Malawi was under the colonial control of Great Britain with the colonial name of Nyasaland. During this time the British implemented legal systems generally modeled after their own. After gaining independence from Great Britain in 1964, Malawi remained under one-party rule until 1994 when Hastings Banda succumbed to pressure to end his life-presidency. Since the founding election Malawi has held generally free and fair multiparty contests every five years. Malawi received a score of six in the most recent Polity IV index indicating a somewhat functional democracy. Freedom House gives Malawi a partly free status because of harsh government responses to protests in recent years, although this is likely to improve after a recent change in leadership.

Property rights in Malawi are more secure than either Ethiopia or Mozambique. There are many small farms and technically any citizen should be able to obtain land. However, this is not always easy to do, and attempts to standardize titling and protection of rural
property rights have yet to come to fruition. This makes small tenants of land in Malawi susceptible to their land being taken away and given to a more powerful tenant or foreign investor. This continues a system that existed under colonial rule in that the priority seems to be focused on appeasing large farmers with foreign wealth rather than the more than millions of small plot farms scattered across the country. This makes for lower trust in government and some level of dissatisfaction with life under the struggling democratic rule. As of 2013 state capacity was still listed as relatively weak in terms of ability to guarantee property rights protections.

### 3.3.3 Mozambique

Mozambique was at least partly under the control of Portugal for nearly 500 years before gaining independence in 1975. The Portuguese were not particularly helpful in developing a foundation for governance and legal systems. Moreover, the separation was much more volatile than that of Malawi and the British. This left Mozambique in one of the least developed starting places of any African nation. Scarcely two years after independence, the country was embroiled in one Africa’s most harrowing civil wars between the communist-leaning FRELIMO and right-leaning RENAMO. The governing structure from 1975-1994 was strictly communist with significant amounts land redistribution and reorganization of traditional societal structure into communes. Gradual reforms began in the late 1980s and continued until the end of the war. The civil war ended in 1992 and Mozambique has experienced four multiparty elections since the founding election in 1994. This period has also been marked by significant economic growth, although it is unclear how much of this was simply “catch-up” following the civil war. Mozambique potentially has the “highest ceiling” for economic development among the three countries. This is mostly due to the large land to population ratio (roughly 30 per square kilometer compared to 90 and 150 for Ethiopia and Malawi respectively), and the significant amount of natural resources and
Indian Ocean coastline. Despite these advantages most Mozambicans live in an extreme state of poverty and depend upon subsistence agriculture.

Like Malawi, Mozambique has attempted to implement land use laws and property rights protections since the founding election in 1994. These attempts have largely been unsuccessful as many citizens have remained ignorant of their rights and abilities where land is concerned. The history of tribal governance followed by communism followed by democracy serves to severely complicate the situation. Along these lines there have been attempts to implement community-based property rights that become controlled at a local level. However, according to the USDA reports these attempts have been slow and somewhat ineffective.

3.4 Results

I have divided the results into a summary table and then more in-depth discussion. I begin this section by highlighting recurrent themes among participants across the groups and countries. I then focus on some particularly interesting responses that can help inform the more systematic studies I conduct in the chapters that follow. I present a basic summary of results in Table 3.2. This table contains the number of people in each group (out of six) who indicated that the issues in the table columns are important.

There was some interesting variance across the groups within countries. For example there were large amounts of variance in Ethiopians between rural areas versus those in the capital city of Addis Ababa (groups 1 and 2). There were also interesting differences between rural and urban voters in Mozambique (group 5 - Beira, group 6 - Maputo.) This indicates, at least at some level, that there are potential important distinctions for property rights and voting based on whether the citizen is from an urban or rural area. In general there seemed to be large amounts of support for democracy in the abstract. On the other
Table 3.2: Categorizations of Results by Focus Group (Number of People Indicating Important Issues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Property Rights</th>
<th>Duty to Vote</th>
<th>Preference for Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopia</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malawi</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Group 2</td>
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<td>Group 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mozambique</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group 2</td>
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<td>Group 3</td>
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<td>Group 4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The numbers indicate how many people in each group indicated the particular issue was important.*
hand several citizens provided rich discussions when asked if they were better off under democracy than before. This seemed to garner the most interest in Malawi where “before” was much less of an existential threat when compared to the harsh conditions of Ethiopia’s Mengistu regime and Mozambique’s civil war. I will now address each of the columns in more details with some quotes from participants.

3.4.1 Duty to Vote

A majority of respondents in most groups and countries generally believed that citizens have a duty to vote. However, in Ethiopia and Malawi the discussion eventually led to several respondents arguing that the duty to vote was only something that voters have in the face of meaningful returns from democracy. One respondent in Malawi stated: “why should I have a duty to vote when I get nothing from what I vote for?” Unsurprisingly, the Ethiopians were most inclined to have the view that voting was getting them nowhere. Only a few of the respondents indicated that duty to vote was something that is fixed and unchanging through time and across elections. The Mozambicans in group two were more ambivalent on the duty to vote but the discussion never turned towards duty or diminishing returns. These discussion highlight the need for the expanded formal theorizing of the duty to vote in chapter two. It is not enough to say that duty exists and therefore drives turnout. Rather the formulation of duty itself is something that can vary based on context and that variation in turn contributes to a voter’s calculus when she decides whether or not to vote.

The discussions also produced some very interesting quotes. One Ethiopian man proclaimed: “when we have democracy and I can have my own farm then I will vote and feel duty.” A young Mozambican university student said: “It’s a right as well as a duty so we can legitimate the government power. Now, if the tendency along the years will or not change for the better, I think it’s less probable that duty can last.” One Malawian farmer
elaborated their position further than most: “The level [of duty] can change. Some people say ‘If candidates do not give me money or something I won’t go and vote.’ Some have lost hope after comparing how life was in the past and now. They think that their vote can not change anything and lose their duty.” I do not think the person was talking about bribes so much as sociotropic improvements. They further mentioned: “We expect the person we voted for to bring development in our area like a bridge or road because these assets will be used by our children after we are gone.”

3.4.2 The Importance of Property & Land Ownership

Property rights were important to almost all respondents with the only consistent outliers being the younger women in urban Ethiopia. For example, two Malawians equated having no control of land to “being a dog” or “not human.” Ethiopians and Mozambicans in rural areas expressed similar sentiments although less severe in language. Interestingly, Malawians for the most part expressed that the property system was more fair and stable under the previous autocratic Banda regime. This is probably, at least in part, a function of the fact that land now often comes at a price of some sort whereas it did not then, although it was state controlled. Inheritance was another issue that arose in Malawi but not the other countries. Several older citizens preferred the old system as land would simply revert to the broader family in the event of death. The current system is more Western in style in that it is typically passed to an heir but not without some sort of official transaction. Ironically in this case the preference may have been for a systems where the property rights were technically less secure, albeit under markedly less de facto risk of external appropriation. It is also my impression that there are large amounts of variance from one village to the next in Malawi with respect to who gets what land. This relates to a problem that many developing countries face in that there are major difficulties adjudicating between traditional and secular (or modern government-based) property rights. In some cases a fairly robust
property protection system may be “on the books” but the de facto situation on the ground (or in the village) works much differently with the local village head having control over the land rights of the village.

In terms of interesting quotes one rural Mozambican stated on property rights: “It is a question more related to the law, obviously, merely a property right law. I think that, more than in our country, the property rights are related to human life, nobody can live without a good system, without the right to possess land for growing, something that is really yours, a house and land.” This was a quote that stood out as an articulation of the real importance of land to citizens in these countries. Another stated: “The land is everything for us, it is one of the few assets that we have through which we can make our self sustainability, differently from the citizen’s of South Africa and Zimbabwe who do not have this right to apply they own creativity in the land, we have it already, we have the land, and we have the right to do something in the land.” She was wrong about South Africa in the abstract, but the point of land importance remains. Relatedly, an Ethiopian farmer stated that: “we must have land to survive outside of Addis [the capital]. Without land we have no hope.” In Malawi (where all rural participants claimed to be farmers) one man stated: “When these people [assuming government or outsiders] take the land then they are abusing our rights, land is all we have.”

3.5 Discussion

The focus groups bore out several common themes. Chief among these is the desire for private property to be stable and available for all citizens. These sentiments highlight the importance of property, and especially land use rights, in developing countries. In advanced societies, citizens are not reliant on land to produce their own food for subsistence. One could easily imagine that having some sort of income to pay for groceries from
a supermarket being equally important to citizens in advanced democracies as land is in developing democracies where cash incomes are rare (Bratton 2006). There was also a consistent argument that there is a duty to vote. On the other hand, numerous participants in all three countries made it clear that their levels of duty have fluctuated based on what they readily felt they were getting from the regime. Language barriers prevented me from better articulating follow-up questions to this particular issue but despite those problems the direction of the conversations was clear.4

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have described and presented results from a series of focus groups in three developing democracies. Clearly property rights are important to citizens in developing countries. If we make the assumption that voters at least in part consider the economy while choosing who to vote for, it stands to reason that voters may also consider the economy in their calculations of whether or not to vote at all. For typical citizens in developing countries, the economy can largely be reduced to access to food and supplies needed for farming. After a number of elections with no change or improvements in these sectors, voters may simply decide to stop voting. In other cases the voters may prefer life as it was under more autocratic circumstances despite the trade-offs in freedoms. This of course varies based on the severity of the autocratic regime as the distinctions between Malawi and the other two cases clearly show. These focus group results are very telling, but more evidence is still needed. In the next chapter I further test my theory using more rigorous statistical tests.

4 Although I was only observing the focus groups there were times that, when someone was immediately translating for me, I wanted to interject and try to include additional questions. However, this would have gone against the “hands-off” theme I wanted to maintain. Otherwise I would have been somewhat concerned that my additional interest would have sparked responses formulated for my benefit rather than reflections of the respondents’ true feelings.
4. A CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND VOTER TURNOUT

“What makes people interested in the rule of law, the first thing that they understand... is that everybody on this earth lives on a plot of land.” – Hernando de Soto

4.1 Introduction

In chapter two I developed a theoretical model for explaining how voters’ expectations can change through time and space. Recall that the basic theory of voting can be stated as: \( R = PB - C + D \) where \( R \) is the reward from voting, \( P \) is the probability that her vote will be pivotal towards bringing about the expected benefit \( B \), and \( C \) is the cost associated with voting (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Blais and Achen 2012). By default, since the probability of a vote being pivotal is almost always nearly zero, the primary action in the act of voting necessarily happens in the \( D \) term. This means that any accounting of voter turnout should focus on those things that factor into predicting \( D \). Thus in chapter two I explain how \( D \) can vary for a rational individual with expectations about how democracy should work for her at a given time and locale. In this chapter I provide a series of empirical tests that property rights and subsequently property ownership can factor into the level of duty, \( D \), to vote for a given voter.

I proceed with several sections. First, I briefly revisit the theoretical ideas on voters’ expectations from chapter two. I then introduce and define several key terms including property rights and the meaning of protection. After reviewing the general literature on voter turnout, I then provide a series of hypotheses and expectations which are followed with a series of empirical tests. I first conduct a cross-national, macro-level analysis that builds on classic turnout models. I then extend my argument somewhat by considering the
role of property ownership on voting at the individual level. Finally, I discuss the results from the empirical models and provide some conclusions for the role of property rights for political participation.

4.1.1 Revisiting the Theory

Recall that my basic model for explaining $D$ can be given as:

$$d_{ijt} = \alpha_j + x'_{ijt} \beta + z'_{jt} \gamma + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

where:

- $d_{ijt}$ is the level of $D$ for potential voter $i$ in country $j$ at time $t$
- $\alpha_j$ is a vector country-level fixed-effects for country $j$
- $x_{ijt}$ is a vector of individual-level characteristics that form the intrinsic components of $d$ as discussed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and my extension to include the role of expectations for democracy with the vector of parameter estimates $\beta$
- $z_{jt}$ is a vector of varying country-level attributes that can affect individuals’ level of $d$ in country $j$ at time $t$ with the vector of parameter estimates $\gamma$
- $\epsilon_{ijt}$ is the disturbance term

Establishing that the action is in the $D$ term is important as this is where any major variations in the likelihood of voting will take place. This also means that studies of turnout interested in explaining variation in $D$ should only consider those predictors which can actually affect the duty to vote for a given citizen. Otherwise any empirical endeavor

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1As I noted in chapter two, $D$ in this case is a scalar and therefore denoted as a $d$. In the text I continue to use $D$ for consistency.
simply becomes a theoretical guessing game in which predictors are thrown in and out of models with seemingly little basis.

### 4.1.2 Property Rights: A Foiled Expectation

In chapter two I discussed how foiled expectations for democracy can diminish a given voter’s level of duty over time. Conversely, this implies that movement in the opposite direction can boost a voter’s confidence in the regime to deliver on democracy and thus increase her level of duty. As I discussed in previous chapters, property rights represent my primary test for the impact of foiled expectations on voter turnout. This of course does not rule out other potential foiled expectations for nascent democracies but for the purposes of this dissertation I remain focused on property rights. The evidence from my study in chapter three suggests that, at least qualitatively, property and property rights are very important for citizens in developing democracies and any polity in which private property is valued and expected to be governed fairly.

I have discussed property rights at some length in the previous chapters. However, before proceeding with a review of the extant literature and statistical hypothesis tests involving property rights measures I want to define what I mean by the terms I use. In his seminal work on the importance of property rights for economic development, De Soto (2003) argues that “clear and formal” property rights are the key to prosperity. I adopt this logic for political development as well as economic. At a basic level property rights refer to the ability of an individual to control or maintain land with some sort of guarantee that holdings cannot be simply expropriated, or taken away.\(^2\) Property rights freedoms refer to the ability for any citizen of a given polity to secure land ownership or use as long as they have the economic means to do so. Property rights protections refer to the institutional governing structures for ensuring property rights remain free and protected from expropriation.

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\(^2\)There are also intellectual property rights which I consider beyond the boundaries of this dissertation.
ation by governments or foreign investors. These concepts combine to create the property rights measures I use in the sections that follow. I discussed all of these concepts in more detail in the preceding chapters. In the next section I review the general literature on voter turnout before returning to property rights as they relate to the analyses in the empirical sections.

4.2 Voter Turnout

For years scholars of political behavior have debated the various explanations of voter turnout. As a result, more questions are often produced than answers. In this section I address several of the more dominant themes in the extant literature, and place voter turnout into the proper perspective for discussing the elections I will use in the analyses. My empirical focus continues to be on the newly-formed and transitional democracies of sub-Saharan Africa. These cases provide unique variation on a number of explanatory variables and, as such, make for a useful laboratory in which to consider and further test my theory. I focus primarily on the empirical testing of turnout as I discussed the primary theoretical underpinnings both in chapter two and the summary above.

4.2.1 Turnout in Industrial Democracies

Most of the turnout literature to date has focused on industrial democracies, and indeed a large portion of that focus is on western Europe and the United States. No examination of turnout in newer democracies should be undertaken without first acknowledging the seminal works in respect to industrial states, and considering the explanations given.

Traditional studies of voter turnout focus on several key points. To begin, voter turnout is often discussed in relation to institutional factors in the country of interest. These include party structure, election laws, and government types. Powell (1986) found that institutional factors were the dominant component in predicting turnout, although cultural and socioeco-
onomic factors were still influential. Further, Jackman (1987) found “where institutions provide citizens with incentives to vote, more people generally participate.” Jackman (1987) also found the opposite to be true in that “where institutions generate disincentives to vote, turnout suffers.” In more recent studies it has been shown that executive related institutional factors such as run-off elections can influence turnout (Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009) in presidential elections. Jackman (1987) and Norris (2002) also found that electoral systems also play a role in turnout. Their findings indicate that countries with unicameral legislatures experience higher rates of turnout.

Other explanations given in the turnout literature involve group membership and motivations. Gray and Caul (2000) posit that declining levels of group memberships in advanced democracies are responsible for declining rates of turnout. They determine that institutions alone are not sufficient explanations for turnout, and with declining membership rates, turnout falls while institutional factors remain constant (Gray and Caul 2000). Further, others such as Putnam (1993, 2000) predict turnout and possible declines based not on institutional factors, but rather individual-level motivations.

In his seminal works concerning social capital, Putnam (1993, 2000) argued that civic engagement and social capital are significant predictors of turnout. Many western democracies have suffered a declining rate of turnout in over the later part of the 20th century (Gray and Caul 2000). Additionally, many of the third and fourth wave democracies have experienced sharp declines in turnout after founding elections (Fornos, Power and Grand 2004). Putnam (2000) argues that, at least in the industrialized countries, this is due to a decline in civic engagement. Further, Putnam’s works directly correlates civic associationism and social capital with voter turnout (1993, 2000). In Bowling Alone Putnam posits, “Not to vote is to withdraw from the political community,” and that “declining electoral participation is merely the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement from commu-
nity life” (Putnam 2000). However, little cross-national empirical work has been carried out that examines the influence of civil society and civic engagement on voter turnout at the macro level.

4.2.2 Turnout in Transitional Democracies

As mentioned, voter turnout is often examined in democratic countries, and much of the literature focuses on western and particularly American elections. The literature is lacking coverage of more transitional democracies and less developed states where democratic institutions are particularly fragile and turnout declines have been particularly steep. The bulk of extant turnout studies in these so-called third and fourth wave democracies has been focused on Latin America and Eastern Europe. Fornos, Power and Grand (2004) found that “that voter turnout in Latin America is largely driven by institutional and political process variables, with socioeconomic variables having a surprisingly small effect.” They also found that turnout was strong in founding elections, especially those in which the populace demanded elections, and that it subsequently decreased in later elections (Fornos, Power and Grand 2004). This was also the finding of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) in which they posited that founding elections would likely have the highest rate of turnout with subsequent elections experiencing a decline. In contrast, a report from the International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance concluded that there “is no significant difference in voter turnout between the first election and subsequent elections in new democracies” (IDEA 2009). However, in a study of Latin America and Eastern Europe, Kostadinova and Power (2007) found that electoral disproportionality and unicameralism are the main institutional predictors of turnout in Latin America. They concluded, “in the new Third Wave Democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America, founding elections are dramatic contests of great historical importance, but that voter disengagement from electoral participation begins almost immediately thereafter.” Pérez-Liñán, (2001) found
that Jackman’s (1987) models are not easily replicated with significance in Latin America, although with modifications the models performed quite well (Pérez-Liñán 2001). This finding has led scholars to search for other possible explanations of turnout in developing democracies.

4.2.3 Turnout in Africa

Despite this, the literature on turnout in Africa is incomplete at best. This is due to several primary factors including data availability and reliability, and that elections have only consistently taken place in the recent period of democratization. However, the literature is rapidly growing, and thanks to surveys like the Afrobarometer, we now have a wide range of individual-level data from which to base studies of turnout, civil society, and other behavioral factors. Using the Afrobarometer data, scholars of turnout in Africa (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005) have consistently found that institutional factors play a large role at the individual-level. Institutional factors, however, were not the only predictors of turnout. Kuenzi and Lambright (2005), found that membership in voluntary organizations was significant and had a positive relationship with voter turnout while controlling for institutional and various socio-economic variables. They also concluded that higher education rates and urbanization were influential on turnout, although urbanization had a negative impact.

These findings largely support those of Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005), and indicate that turnout can be predicted at the individual-level by strong party identification, social capital based factors such as levels of associationalism, and SES factors such as education, age, urban/rural populations and gender. Individual-level studies, however, are not without possible data constraints. First, they suffer from the classic survey data problem

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3 The Afrobarometer data and a series of working papers can be found though ICPSR, or the Afrobarometer website: .
of over reporting of turnout. Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) found that Africans in general “felt the need to associate themselves with voting,” which leads to an over-reporting of data. Further, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) warranted caution when considering voter turnout from the data in the Afrobarometer.

There are strikingly few cross-national, macro-level studies of turnout in Africa, especially when compared to the breadth of turnout scholarship that focuses on Latin America and Eastern Europe. Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) provide the most comprehensive study thus far. They focused on legislative elections in Africa’s multiparty regimes, and determined that institutions are also strong predictors of turnout in African elections. Their findings indicate that institutional arrangements such as concurrent legislative and executive elections as well as proportional representation all affect turnout. Contextually, they found that urbanization has a negative (although not strong) relationship with turnout. Last, the number of radios per capita is found to be significant. The implications of this are quite obvious in that those citizens who are more well informed are more likely to vote. In the sections that follow I begin to test the role of property ownership on the likelihood of voting.

4.3 Property Rights and Turnout at the Macro Level

In this section I extend the analyses to the macro-level and include a measure of property rights in a standard model of macro turnout. This endeavor is also not without hurdles due to data constraints, which I discuss in detail below. My basic empirical question in this dissertation is whether property rights can influence voter turnout. More specifically I am interested in whether differing levels of property rights protection and freedom can help explain variance in voter turnout across countries and over time. In chapter two I broadened the theoretical argument somewhat by considering the potential for foiled expectations in
general. These expectations can be for a range of variables but property rights is one of the most basic expectations for citizens in democracies. For now, however, focusing on property rights, my theoretical expectation is that more property rights freedoms and protections will lead to increases in voter turnout. This implies that reductions in property rights freedoms and protections will lead to decreases in turnout, which relates back to the declines in turnout I discussed in the introductory chapter.

4.3.1 Data

The voter turnout data come from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) database which provides voter turnout data on most all national elections in the world since 1945. There is much debate in the macro turnout literature on how best to measure turnout. Norris (2002) uses voter turnout as a percentage of the voting age population. Obviously, this measure includes all those citizens in countries who could possibly vote notwithstanding issues of getting to the polls, registration, etc. Others (Fornos, Power and Grand 2004; Jackman 1987; Powell 1986) have used this measure as well. Conversely, some studies (Kuenzi and Lambricht 2007; Powell 1986) have employed a measure of turnout by registered voters. It is difficult to determine which measure is best as there are inherent flaws in both registration rolls and census counting. I employ the turnout as a percentage of registered voters in this case simply because those data are currently more complete than the voting age population measures. However, I do not have any theoretical expectations for the results to be different if I were to use an alternative measure.

As mentioned, property rights are defined in multiple ways and often difficult to measure. This creates data reliability issues, especially in developing countries. To begin, property rights data are scarce for developing countries. In cases where data do exist the
measures are often highly invariant over time, which most likely reflects poor measurement, especially of the *de facto* situation on the ground. Worse yet, these data have only recently become available. Finally, some of the indices are created by clearly partisan organizations around the world with varying economic interests and reputations. These issues present significant difficulty for carrying out any analysis of property rights and turnout in developing countries. I employ a measure of property rights from Heritage Foundation (2014) which captures “the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. It measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts.” The measure is scaled from 0-100 where higher values indicate more secure property rights.4

I also include measures of the economy by including change in GDP growth and the natural log of GDP per capita which account for development and affluence. These measures were also considered by Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) and Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer (2009) (see also Powell (1986); Jackman (1987); Gray and Caul (2000)). Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer (2009) find that economic growth leads to decreases whereas affluence and development lead to higher rates in turnout due to lower information costs among voters that are higher educated and more economically well-off. I also consider the level of political development by including the Polity IV autocracy-democracy measures as compiled by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2012).5 I include this a control variable for differing levels of democratic consolidation. Although I expect more voting freedom in more

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4The EIF data are primarily taken from measures compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit and US Departments of Commerce and State to form their aggregate property rights assessment.

5I have also run similar models including Freedom House measures with little change in the variables of interest.
consolidated democracies, there are conceivable reasons why turnout could be higher in countries with lower Polity scores.

Finally, I include two contextual variables, one historical and one institutional in nature. For a control of potential colonial legacy effects I include a variable that indicates whether or not the country was a colony of Britain. This variable has long been considered for analyses of a wide range of phenomena in developing countries. The general expectation is that former British Colonies fair better in terms of economic development (Agbor 2011) often because of more developed political administration due to different types of colonial practice (Clague, Gleason and Knack 2001). In some cases colonial heritage has been directly linked to the implementation of stronger property rights institutions (Fails and Krieckhaus 2010). This also applies in other areas related to property rights such as common versus civil legal systems (Joireman 2001) or agriculture (Fulginiti, Perrin and Yu 2004). This of course at least partially relates to the potential for more developed property rights institutions. I also include whether or not the election was concurrent with a legislative election, which is an accounting for electoral arrangements also considered by Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) and Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer (2009). The expectation is that turnout will be higher during concurrent elections.

The final dataset covers 55 elections in developing democracies in Africa for the 1990-2012 time period. I limit the elections to those where an executive post is at stake. Most of the countries included are presidential systems and those that do not have systems in which the chosen executive wields much power and is a foregone conclusion prior to votes being cast for a given party. The variables, expected relationships, and coding are shown in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Explanatory Variables, Expected Relationships and Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property Rights</td>
<td>+ More property rights freedoms leads to higher turnout</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>– Economic growth leads less turnout</td>
<td>GDP Growth (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affluence</td>
<td>+ Wealthier countries will experience higher turnout</td>
<td>GDP Per Capita (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Legacy</td>
<td>+/- Control variable</td>
<td>1 = British Colony, 0 = Not a British Colony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>+/- Control variable</td>
<td>-10–10 (Polity IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Election</td>
<td>+ Concurrent executive and legislative elections lead to higher turnout</td>
<td>1 = concurrent, 0 = not-concurrent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.2 Method

Given that the dependent variable is continuous I employ OLS estimation. The data vary across both space and time and, because of the different numbers of elections and varying gaps between them, they produce a series of unbalanced panels given the differing numbers of elections per country and gaps between elections. This makes estimating any time component notably different. It also disallows the use of panel-specific considerations of the error structure such as panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). As such I follow Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer (2009) and employ OLS with the standard errors clustered around countries. Much like the process involved in robust or panel-corrected standard errors, clustering helps account for unit-specific effects (heterogeneity) in the error term. I first estimate a basic model as described above. I then move to more stringent consideration of country-level effects by including country fixed-effects (country dummy variables). The estimated model is given as $y_{it} = \alpha_{it} + x'_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{it}$ where $\alpha_{it}$ accounts for the fixed-effects for each country $i$. The results are presented in Table 4.2.\(^6\)

\(^6\)I estimated an additional model that included a lagged dependent-variable thus making it a model of change. However, the coefficient for the lagged-term was relatively small suggesting that there is not a
4.3.3 Results

I begin by presenting in Figure 4.1 a scatterplot of mean property rights and mean turnout for each country over the time period. This is a somewhat crude representation of the relationship as many countries experience high turnout during their first elections with a subsequent drop. Nevertheless the relationship is apparent for most countries. I will now move on to a discussion of the models which go further to account for the variance in turnout and property right in these countries over this time period.

Figure 4.1: Relationship Between Mean Property Rights and Mean Turnout 1990-2010

[Graph showing a scatterplot with countries plotted on the X and Y axes.]

powerful auto-regressive nature to these elections during this time period. I would speculate that including more elections over a longer-time period would yield more time effects. This will be a next step in the follow-up work to the dissertation. My purposes now are only to provide a critical test for my theory by employing the property rights measure in the models.
The models each perform as expected with the coefficients for property rights being positive and significant. The only other variables to achieve statistical significance at commonly-accepted levels were economic growth and British colony, although the latter effect went away in the fixed-effects model. Given the relatively low number of cases in the dataset there would likely be diminishing returns on adding more variables to the analyses. These models at the least show that property rights can be an important predictor of turnout in developing democracies while controlling for other potentially confounding contextual factors such as economic and political development. At best the models demonstrate the need to further contextualize theories of voting based on voters’ expectations for democracy.7

4.4 Individual-Level Considerations of Property and Turnout: An Extension

In the previous section I focused on the effects of property rights on macro-level turnout, which provided the best empirical test for my theory. In this section I extend my argument somewhat to include the effects of property ownership on turnout at the individual level. Political Science scholars have long studied the phenomenon of economic voting. That is, voters reward or punish based on the performance of the economy. This basic notion has been extensively tested in the advanced democracies of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) yet much less so in developing democracies. As such, the theories have expanded far beyond the basic premise stated above to significantly account for variation in political contexts (Powell and Whitten 1993). According to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2008) the basic economic voting model at the individual-level can be given as:

7I also ran models using a lagged dependent variable. The property rights variable was in the expected direction but did not achieve significance at commonly accepted levels. This also excluded the first elections for each country, which was undesirable given the relatively few number of cases to begin with.
Table 4.2: The Effects of Property Rights on Voter Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property Rights</td>
<td>.405** (.171)</td>
<td>.824** (.348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>-1.17*** (.435)</td>
<td>-1.19** (.532)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affluence</td>
<td>.741 (1.58)</td>
<td>.903 (2.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colony</td>
<td>8.74* (4.83)</td>
<td>-17.1 (18.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>.357 (.697)</td>
<td>-.126 (.809)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent Elections</td>
<td>-3.84 (4.88)</td>
<td>-4.33 (8.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>42.9*** (9.05)</td>
<td>41.9*** (14.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses (two-tailed, despite directional hypotheses)
Heteroscedasticity-robust clustered standard errors are reported underneath OLS parameter estimates

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Incumbent Vote = f (SES factors + Partisan Identification + Economic and Noneconomic Issues)

In recent years the general economic voting literature has extended beyond this traditional model and trended towards a consideration of “patrimony” for vote choice. This can be highlighted by the works of Michael Lewis-Beck and colleagues (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011, 2012; Bellucci, Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault 2013; Lewis-Beck and Ratto 2013; Lewis-Beck and Whitten 2013; Lewis-Beck et al. 2014; Nadeau, Foucault and Lewis-Beck 2010, 2011; Stubager, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau N.d.). Collectively, the authors of these works generally define “patrimony” as the effect of ownership on vote choice. Ownership in the developed world context is typically operationalized to include items such as stocks, bonds, second homes, businesses and other distinguishing assets. In practice most of these studies have been carried out employing survey data and are thus somewhat limited by the items of ownership measured by the survey. With minor variations, the basic models of these articles can be summarized for individual $i$ in country $c$ as:

\[
\text{Vote Choice} = f (\text{Ownership} + \text{Partisanship} + \text{Economic Evaluation})
\]

This equation places ownership in an additive model with the traditionally studied economic voting variables. Newer iterations of this model have been expanded to include a control for the riskiness of the assets owned by the voter but the basic premise remains the same. That is that voters that have higher amounts of patrimony (material assets) are more likely to vote for the party that will most benefit the security or return on their invest-
ments. Which party that is depends on the riskiness of the assets as right-leaning parties are more prone to create conditions that favor risky assets (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault 2013).

Until very recently any link between this literature and turnout was wholly absent. The notable exception so far is the recent work of Nadeau et al. (2013), which examines the effects of patrimony on turnout in France over time. The authors found that patrimony indeed influences turnout and, in terms of explanatory power, actually rivals more traditional indicators. Further, they found that patrimony may “subsume, even replace, the traditional class effects from income, occupation, and education” (Nadeau et al. 2013). This study accomplishes at least two things. First, it provides a bridge spanning the longstanding gap between economic voting and the study of turnout. It also extends the argument that ownership can influence voting beyond vote choice as was the case in most of the patrimonial voting works I discuss above. However, like much of the economic voting and almost the entire patrimonial literature, this examination of ownership and turnout has been confined to only the most-developed democracies.

In the next section I extend the examination of patrimony and turnout to developing countries. Returning to my basic theory that property rights influence turnout, I start here with the basic premise that property itself also influences turnout. If property rights are important for sustaining political participation, then it stands to reason that property ownership is also a potential influence on turnout. My basic expectation in these models is that higher levels of ownership will lead to a higher likelihood of voting given that the property owner potentially has more at stake in an election than their “have not” counterparts. This was certainly the finding of the Nadeau et al. (2013) article. This will provide a first basic test for the role of property ownership in developing democracies.
4.4.1 Data

The primary data for my individual-level analyses come from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer (henceforth AB) surveys of African democracies. The Afrobarometer surveys report the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, civil society, and other aspects of development.\(^8\) The fourth round of AB surveys was conducted in 2008 in 20 African democracies. I limited the analyses to presidential systems as it does not seem useful to include presidential and legislative elections in the same analyses. This yields a dataset that includes 16 countries. The full list of countries in the dataset and elections considered can be found in the appendix.

The outcome variable for the analyses is whether or not the respondent claimed to have voted in the most recent election.\(^9\) The specific question from the AB is as follows: “With regard to the most recent, -date given- national elections, which statement is true for you?” The respondents were then given a choice among several possible answers from questions that asked why they could not vote if they answered in the negative (see full wording in the appendix). I recoded the answers to a voted/did not vote dichotomy where one indicates that the respondent voted in the last election and zero indicates that the respondent did not vote.

I am primarily interested in the effects of property ownership on the likelihood of voting. The above example of Nadeau et al. (2013) examines ownership in the context of the highly developed French democracy. Given this, the authors were able to employ the traditional patrimony measures of businesses, stocks, rental properties, a home or apartment, \(^8\)This is the official description of the Afrobarometer from their working papers series. Further information can be found at www.afrobarometer.org.

\(^9\)The average level of turnout for the elections in this analysis was around 67%. The self-reported level of turnout from the survey is around 71% indicating slight over-reporting.
a country house or savings. These items work well in developed democracies but are problematic at best in developing settings. Not least among the challenges is the availability of data on ownership. Further, in the less developed countries covered by the Afrobarometer, a relative minority of respondents even have a cash income (Bratton 2006), much less own things such as stocks, bonds or second homes. The Afrobarometer does, however, ask if respondents own radios, televisions, and vehicles. While common in developed economic settings, these items are progressively more luxurious in developing economies. I scaled these items together to create an index of property ownership.

To build upon the analyses above, I include the same country-level property rights measure in two of the models I estimate below. I discuss the multilevel implications of this in the methods section that follows. As mentioned above, this variable is compiled as a component of the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation 2014). The measure captures “the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. It measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts.” The measure is scaled from 0-100 where higher values indicate more secure property rights.

As an additional consideration of property, the AB has a question that asks respondents if they had paid property taxes in the previous year. Presumably positive responses mean they own some sort of property which they pay taxes on. However, the type of property is unknown so this is a rough measure at best. Nevertheless, I include this variable in the analysis as it should theoretically represent a higher level of interest in property for a given respondent.
The literature on turnout has also pointed to the role of strong party ID (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). I create a measure of party ID from a question that asked respondents whether or not they were close to a political party. I also include a variable from the AB that asks respondents about their level of support for democracy. Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) found this variable to be an important predictor of turnout, which is not surprising given the classical theoretical framework offered by Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). My expectation for the purposes of this analysis is that support for democracy leads to an increase in the propensity to vote.

Urban/Rural status is an important consideration because over 60% of Africans live in rural areas. The costs of voting for individuals in rural areas is higher. Gender may also play a role in turnout in Africa. It has been included in previous studies and gender equality varies significantly across African nations (as well as others). Although income has been found to be a strong predictor of both turnout and voting behavior in industrialized democracies, it has generally been found to be a poor predictor of political behavior in Africa (Bratton 2006). This is in part due to the small percentage of Africans that have a steady income or jobs that pay salaries. As such I have no measure of income in the AB or my analyses.

Scholars of turnout at the individual level have also considered the effects of socioeconomic status variables on voter turnout. These variables include age, education level, urban/rural status and gender. Age has long been included in studies of turnout (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Highton 1997; Blais and Achen 2012) but the effects are not always the same across time and space. Education level has generally been found as an important predictor. Typically higher educated citizens are more likely to vote (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Highton 1997; Tenn 2007; Blais and Achen 2012), although this
relationship is less clear in the developing context (Blaydes 2006; Kramon 2009) where vote-buying is present. In Table 4.3 I present all independent variables, their coding for the analyses, and the expected relationships. Full summary statistics for the variables used in the analyses can be found in the appendix.

Table 4.3: Explanatory Variables, Expected Relationships and Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership Index</td>
<td>+ Respondents with more assets are more likely to vote</td>
<td>4 point scale of owning radio, tv, and vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Rights</td>
<td>+ More property rights freedoms leads to higher turnout</td>
<td>0-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Democracy</td>
<td>+ More support for democracy leads to greater likelihood of voting</td>
<td>0 – 3 Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
<td>+ Respondents who are close to a party on the ballot are more likely to vote</td>
<td>1 = close to party, 0 = not close to party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Income</td>
<td>+/- Varies based on political context</td>
<td>1 = has cash income, 0 = does not have cash income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>+/- Varies based on political context</td>
<td>20 point scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>+/- Control variable</td>
<td>Age of respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>+/- Control variable</td>
<td>Level of education attained (9 point scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>+/- Control variable</td>
<td>1 = male, 0 = female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>+ Rural voters are less likely to get to polls</td>
<td>1 = Urban, 0 = Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td>+ Whether or not respondent had paid property taxes</td>
<td>1 = Paid, 0 = Not Paid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4.2 Method

Since the outcome is simply whether or not a respondent voted in the last election, I follow a standard approach and employ logit estimation. I estimate four models. The first model is a simple logit with standard errors clustered around countries. This helps to ac-
count for country effects in the disturbances. As an additional robustness check, I estimate a second model with unit (country) fixed effects. This model ensures that any between-unit variation is being accounted for. I then move to a fixed effects model that includes the measure of property rights that I employed in the macro-level analyses above. Although this model includes country fixed effects, it suffers from a level of analysis problem in that the property rights are measured at the country level although I am modeling voting at the individual-level. Given this, I employ a fourth model that allows for this multilevel variation. This model estimates a random-effects parameter for the country level.\footnote{This model is also known as a multilevel logit. The “mixed” term comes from the inclusion of both fixed and random parameters, which is notably different than the use of fixed-effects (country dummies) like I include in the third logit estimation. Gelman and Hill (2007, 245-246) provide a discussion of this confusion in terms.} This allows for estimation of country-level variables such as property rights. However, I only include this one variable as I am somewhat limited by the relatively few (19) countries at the upper level.\footnote{There is some debate on exactly how many upper-level cases are needed in a given sample. Twenty is often used as a cutoff. I exclude Liberia from these analyses as the property rights measure was unavailable for the year of the survey.} The basic logit models I estimate are given as:

$$\Pr(v_{ij} = 1) = \Lambda(\alpha_j + x_{ij}' \beta + \epsilon_{ij})$$

where:

- $Pr(v_{ij} = 1)$ is the probability of having voted in the most recent national election for potential voter $i$ in country $j$
- $\Lambda$ represents the logistic cumulative distribution function
- $\alpha_j$ represents country-level fixed-effects for country $j$
• $x_{ij}'$ is a vector of variables (see table Table 4.3) that predict turning out to vote for individual $i$ in country $j$ as represented by the components of $D$ above with a vector of parameter estimates $\beta$

• $\epsilon_{ij}$ is the disturbance term

When extending this to a mixed-effects model (multilevel) to include the measure of property rights from above the model takes the following form:

$$Pr(v_i = 1) = \Lambda(\alpha_j[i] + x_{ij}'\beta_j[i] + \epsilon_i)$$

and the second level being given as:\textsuperscript{12}

$$\alpha_j \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha^2)$$

In the mixed model I only employ random intercepts for the countries. This is due to the low number of cases I include in the upper-level sample. I employed a likelihood ratio test that indicated that a model with random slopes for property rights and country intercepts was not distinguishable from a model with random country intercepts alone. Given this, the results are not dramatically different from the simple fixed-effects model.\textsuperscript{13}

This particular situation is discussed at length by Bryan and Jenkins (2013); Stegmueller (2013). The general consensus from these works is that in cases where the number of countries is relatively low (< 20) allowing only for random country intercepts produced the least-biased estimates. This is an alternative to a classic fixed-effects model where

\textsuperscript{12}This can be re-written as $\alpha_j = \mu_\alpha + \eta_j$, with $\eta_j \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha^2)$

\textsuperscript{13}I plan a future project employing more countries at the top level, which would also allow for considering other top level covariates. This would, in essence, allow me to partially combine the macro-analyses above with those presented in this section.
separate intercepts are estimated for each country. These are the third and fourth models presented in Table 4.4 below.

4.4.3 Results

I begin with a discussion of the basic logit model employing only the Afrobarometer data. The results of this logit estimation indicate that ownership and property taxes indeed have an effect on the likelihood of voting. Both of these variables are positive and significant indicating that those respondents with higher levels of ownership and those that paid property taxes were, while controlling for the other variables in the model, more likely to have voted in the previous election.

Education is negatively related with the likelihood of having voted. This corroborates other findings from the African context. Otherwise all of the variables achieved statistical significance in the expected direction except gender and the lived poverty index which are all indistinguishable from zero at the $p = .05$ level. This potentially indicates that, as suggested by Nadeau et al. (2013), these traditional SES variables are subsumed by considerations of property ownership in the model. When I applied the more stringent test of fixed-effects the results hold with little overall change. Moving to the fixed-effects model with the inclusion of the macro property rights measure the results are similar for the covariates from the initial estimations.

In the third model I include both fixed effects and the macro-level property rights measure from the analyses above. The property rights measure is also positive and significant indicating that voter turnout is higher amongst individuals living in countries with stronger property rights protections. Finally, when I ran the mixed model with random country intercepts the results hold. This at least allows for some test of the contextual influence of property rights. It also serves as a useful robustness check on the fixed-effects model. This
Table 4.4: Individual-Level Effects of Property on Voter Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Fixed-Effects</th>
<th>Property Rights</th>
<th>Mixed Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership Scale</td>
<td>.127***</td>
<td>.126***</td>
<td>.124***</td>
<td>.124***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0425)</td>
<td>(.0236)</td>
<td>(.0239)</td>
<td>(.0206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>.109***</td>
<td>.108***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.00287)</td>
<td>(.00671)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid Property Taxes</td>
<td>.197**</td>
<td>.218***</td>
<td>.228***</td>
<td>.228***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0873)</td>
<td>(.0557)</td>
<td>(.0566)</td>
<td>(.0425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Income</td>
<td>.347***</td>
<td>.369***</td>
<td>.377***</td>
<td>.377***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0835)</td>
<td>(.0526)</td>
<td>(.0538)</td>
<td>(.0387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
<td>.598***</td>
<td>.726***</td>
<td>.725***</td>
<td>.725***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.102)</td>
<td>(.0731)</td>
<td>(.0766)</td>
<td>(.0352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.0952***</td>
<td>-.0299**</td>
<td>-.0331**</td>
<td>-.0331***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0221)</td>
<td>(.0133)</td>
<td>(.0137)</td>
<td>(.0111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.0523***</td>
<td>.0565***</td>
<td>.0568***</td>
<td>.0568***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00563)</td>
<td>(.00571)</td>
<td>(.00595)</td>
<td>(.00159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>.247***</td>
<td>.296***</td>
<td>.273***</td>
<td>.273***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0817)</td>
<td>(.0873)</td>
<td>(.0874)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.0346</td>
<td>.0112</td>
<td>.0111</td>
<td>.0111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0622)</td>
<td>(.0631)</td>
<td>(.0654)</td>
<td>(.0342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Index</td>
<td>-.00588</td>
<td>-.00595</td>
<td>-.00658</td>
<td>-.00658*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00805)</td>
<td>(.00497)</td>
<td>(.00521)</td>
<td>(.00393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Public Affairs</td>
<td>.152***</td>
<td>.147***</td>
<td>.154***</td>
<td>.154***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0309)</td>
<td>(.0232)</td>
<td>(.0231)</td>
<td>(.0158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Democracy</td>
<td>.246***</td>
<td>.176***</td>
<td>.184***</td>
<td>.184***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0403)</td>
<td>(.0327)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.0239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.44***</td>
<td>-.974***</td>
<td>-4.23***</td>
<td>-4.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.342)</td>
<td>(.217)</td>
<td>(.291)</td>
<td>(.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>22,733</td>
<td>22,733</td>
<td>21,655</td>
<td>21,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome is whether or not respondent voted in the previous national election. Standard errors in parentheses (two-tailed tests, despite directional hypotheses). Country dummies and random effects parameter are not shown. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
model best demonstrates the effects of both macro-level property rights and individual-level ownership. Adding more countries would allow for testing of other country-level variables, but for the purposes of this chapter the results are clear—property rights and ownership are important factors for explaining voter turnout.

I now turn to two figures that presents the average marginal effects for my primary variables of interest. These effects allow for an easier comparison of the discrete effects for each variable than the coefficients in the table above. Figure 4.2 displays the marginal effects for the base model and indicates that the marginal effect of strong partisanship has the largest discrete impact on the likelihood of voting. This is not surprising as it has consistently been found that partisan status is a highly influential predictor of turnout. Despite controlling for this powerful predictor, the results still indicate that property ownership plays a role at the individual level.
Figure 4.3 shows the average marginal effects for the mixed model. The results are not significantly different from the fixed-effects model so this figure presents similar marginal effects as could be calculated from that model. Again, strong partisanship has the highest marginal effect, but property rights as a contextual variable is still significant and positive indicating that voters in contexts with more free and secure property rights were more likely to have voted.

Figure 4.3: Average Marginal Effects for Variables of Interest (Base Model)

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided the first empirical tests of the theory I outlined in chapter 2. I argued that foiled expectations, or significant variation in institutions and public goods,
can have dramatic effects on the level of duty $D$ to vote for a given citizen. I went on to identify property rights and property ownership as potential examples of these driving forces that can explain variation in $D$ for a citizen over time. I found robust support for my theory across a range of rival technical model specifications. I first specified a macro-level model of voter turnout that focused on property rights as an explanatory variable while also considering other contextual factors such as the economy, colonial legacy, democratic consolidation and electoral arrangements. This model indicated positive and significant effects for the role of property rights in helping to explain variation in voter turnout.

Moving to the individual level, I estimated a series of models that examine the role of property ownership on turnout and found significant and positive results. I then estimated an individual-level model that considered the role of aggregate property rights as a contextual variable for influencing turnout at the individual level. These results were also positive and significant indicating that individuals in countries that have made property rights more secure were more likely to have voted in national elections.

In future iterations of this project I can build on my results here by expanding the number of cases both over space and time. I can also consider other measures of property rights and threats of expropriation. A simple start would be to break the measure I employ from the IEF into its component parts. Expanding to other cases and contexts would also allow for more complete data, both for the predictors and outcomes. Finally, foiled expectations need not be reduced to property rights. I argue that property rights are among the most important components of democratic development in developing countries, but there are also other potential needs that are not being met by the government, whether by intention or neglect. My key reason for selecting property rights was the obvious intersection of institutions and economic development, both which have generally been involved in turnout studies historically. Moving deeper into one or the other of these categories would
involve identifying informal institutions and public goods which can be measured and generalized across countries and over time. Property rights provided a critical empirical test and theoretical “jumping off” point, but the theory extends far beyond that. I discuss other theoretical implications in the next chapter.
5. THE ULTIMATE IMPLICATIONS OF FOILED EXPECTATIONS

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters I have theorized and tested the ways in which voters’ expectations relate to democratic participation. In this context I have shown that when expectations are consistently not met, or foiled, then participation is more likely to decline. This theory and evidence in part explain why participation is falling in some developing democracies but not in others. In this chapter I go one step further to consider what declining participation means for nascent democratic regimes and their potential for consolidation. The chapter is broken into two primary sections. In the first section I develop a modified theory that explains support for democracy in developing countries by building upon my theories and models from previous chapters. I then move to an empirical examination of the spread of social conflict in Africa broadly and what the implications are for democratic survival moving forward.

5.2 An Empirical Analysis of Support for Democracy in Developing Settings

In this section I take the extant theories on support for democracy and modify and test them for developing democracies. Although I build on theories in the extant literature, it is also my goal to demonstrate the importance of property rights (as a foiled expectation) for support for democracy. Like in the previous chapter, my empirical focus is on the African democracies covered by the Afrobarometer surveys. The theory and propositions I develop, however, apply much more broadly. Support for democracy is not theoretically linked to voting in the literature, but it has found its way into some empirical models of turnout. This has happened often only as a control variable on individual-level studies. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that institutions are also major predictors of support
for democracy. Although voting is a behavior and support an attitude, I posit that these
two outcomes can be driven by similar forces beyond the customary institutions discussed
in the literature.

5.2.1 Support for Democracy

Understanding support for democracy is an important endeavor for as it can help ex-
plain why democracy works in some places but not others. Although the study of attitudes
towards democracy is an important endeavor in established democratic regimes, it is prob-
ably most relevant in the nascent, less stable democracies of the third and fourth waves of
democratization (Huntington 1993; McFaul 2002). A democracy can only function as long
as the citizens in the polity are willing participants in the political process (Easton 1965,
1975). The absence of this engagement by the citizenry, or a dissatisfaction with democ-
racy, can eventually compromise a transition to democracy (Rose and Mishler 1996). Dal-
ton (1998) found that there was a growing distrust of democracy across the board while
Bratton and Mattes (2001); Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005); Mattes and Bratton
(2007) have consistently found that support for democracy has declined in Africa’s newer
democratic regimes. This calls for closer examination of what drives variance in attitudes
towards democracy.

So far my focus in this dissertation has been on the implications of foiled expectation
for voter turnout. One of the main theoretical problems was that rational choice expla-
nations of voter turnout, based on the concept of civic duty, have rarely theorized that a
given voters’ level of duty changes over time. Similar problems arise in the literature on
support for democracy. Scholars mainly consider electoral institutions and party positions
or macroeconomics as primary indicators of support. As with turnout, these covariates
mainly vary across space and less over time within individual spatial units. The excep-
tions here are the arguments with respect to the macroeconomy in developing countries with rates of growth. However, data from developing democracies (Afrobarometer 2000-2010) indicate that aggregate support for democracy has fallen even in periods of rather extreme growth. This again leaves the literature without an explanation.

These issues in the literature leave scholars with an incomplete story on cases that experience significant changes in participation and democratic support. Participation in voting and support for democracy are not typically recognized as varying together in the literature. My theory is that declining support for democracy and diminished turnout rates stem from foiled voter expectations. That is, voters typically have high expectations for democracy early in the transition process (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005), and the first election typically experiences the highest levels of turnout for a given polity. Support is typically at its highest in the early post-transition period as well. Voters will continue to optimistically participate and support the democratic system as long as their fundamental expectations from democracy are being met.

5.2.2 Support For Democracy: Background Information

In this section I briefly examine the support for democracy literature and end with some descriptive data of puzzling cases that are not easily explained by extant works. Much of the modern empirical literature on attitudes towards democracy is based on the works of Lijphart (1984, 1994), Przeworski (1991); Przeworski and Limongi (1993); Przeworski et al. (1996) and Easton (1965, 1975). Lijphart (1984, 1994) examined the nature of democratic governance and representation. He further outlined linkages between the government and the populace, and how this affects political majorities and minorities ((Lijphart 1984, 1994); see also Anderson and Guillery (1997)). Przeworski (1991); Przeworski and Limongi (1993), and Przeworski et al. (1996) examined democratic stability
and legitimacy. Their main findings indicate that for democracies to endure, they must prosper economically thereby increasing satisfaction with the system among the citizenry. Easton (1965, 1975) focuses on the concepts of political support and regime legitimation. He further discusses different levels of support, and what they mean for political stability and legitimacy. These theoretical arguments have been further refined by scholars of democratization (see Dalton (1998)), and laid the groundwork for much of the more recent literature.

The series of works by Weatherford 1984; 1987; 1992 take an economics approach, and finds that economic indicators and government performance are the best predictors of support for democracy. These findings are corroborated by the works of Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg (1993) and Kornberg and Clarke (1994) which find in Western Europe and Canada, inflation rates and unemployment rates drive down support for democracy. This is further examined by Cusack (1999) who finds that, in the case of Germany, regime performance on economic indicators was a strong predictor of support for democracy. Evans and Rose (2007) posit that, in Africa, education is the dominant predictor of positive attitudes towards democracy. They take the position of Almond and Verba, that “the uneducated man or the man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education” (Almond and Verba 1963, pg. 315). However, the focus of this paper narrowly was solely on one country, Malawi, during one time period (Evans and Rose 2007).

Anderson and Guillory (1997) posit that institutional constraints in the form of electoral rules have a strong impact on support for democracy. Unsurprisingly, they find that winners of electoral processes in general are more satisfied than losers. However, losers are more likely to have near-equal levels of support as winners if they are in a more consensual (proportional) system of electoral rules. In a sense, the electoral rules mitigate the
losing sentiments as they still allow for a seat at the table Anderson and Guillory (1997). These findings primarily focused on the role played by national-level electoral systems in advanced democracies.

The developing democracies on the African continent collectively present a puzzle for the theoretical literature. Economic and education indicators have improved while electoral institutions have generally remained constant, but satisfaction with democracy has fallen over time after an initial post-transition euphoria (Afrobarometer 2000-2010; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). This suggests that existing theories fail to explain variation in support for democracy in Africa as the situation currently stands. Bratton and Mattes (2001) find that, in the case of countries used in the Afrobarometer, support for democracy is “a mile wide, but only an inch deep.” They cautioned that this support may dissipate but posited that it would eventually level off. Later works using the Afrobarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Bratton and Kimenyi 2008) indeed show that support for democracy has decreased over time in Africa. Figure 5.1 shows the decline in both support for, and satisfaction with democracy over time in Africa with data from the Afrobarometer (2000-2010) surveys. The leveling off has yet to take place.

There is no current explanation in the literature for why support for democracy has fallen at such a drastic rate. With few exceptions, electoral institutions gave remained constant. The other major explanation offered in the literature, economic growth, does not easily explain the downward trends in the African cases from Figure 5.1 above. Figure 5.2 displays the level of support for democracy among the same group of African countries organized by GDP. This figure indicates that support for democracy is not easily predicted by something as remote from ordinary voters as marco-level GDP. These African examples are not be the only theoretical focus of this dissertation, but they do present unique variation

\footnote{Lesotho is an interesting exception (Cho and Bratton 2006)}
Figure 5.1: Support for Democracy in Africa Over Time

Percentage of Pooled Respondents

Year of Survey

Satisfaction with Democracy
Democracy Preferable to Other Forms of Government

and particularly acute cases of declining support for democracy. In the section that follows I offer a theory that builds on both the extant literature and the theory I develop in chapter two to better explain this variation in support.

5.2.3 Theoretical Approach

In this section I argue that citizens take in a broad range of information in their decision calculus with respect to support for democracy. Specifically I argue that evaluations of the economy at various levels, access to public goods, political power and partisan status, and
socioeconomic status can all interact in the decision-making process. Although many of these various facets have been discussed in the literature, they are often put at odds with one another or left out some discussions while being included in others. My primary departure from the literature is my inclusion of property rights. I have discussed the importance of property rights for voting but it stands to reason that the same importance applies when it comes to support for democracy. I posit that citizens will only continue to support democracy in their country if they are getting from what they expect from it. In this sense my primary interest in this analysis is the similarity of the role played by property rights for support for democracy and voting alike. The rest of the theoretical discussion builds on the common findings from the literature I discuss above.

Any theoretical approach to support for democracy should still make room for the role played by the economy in general. As discussed and shown above in Figure 5.2, economics has long been discussed as an important player in citizens attitudes towards democracy. Part of the inconsistency in the literature is with how the interaction of economics and decision-making are measured. Macro-level measurements of the economy are not aimed at the measurement of citizen well-being, although they certainly can be correlated. Nevertheless, I argue that a better predictor of economic performance as it relates to individuals is the perception of individuals themselves. This same measure has also been employed by previous studies (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cho and Bratton 2006) and they find a difference between sociotropic and “egocentric” (egotropic) evaluations of economic performance. I extend this to include an additional sociotropic measure of performance based on the evaluation of the citizen with respect to their ethnic group, which can be politically relevant information in many African countries (Posner 2004a)

Public goods are also important. To my knowledge this has not been studied in previous works examining support for democracy. The allocation of excludable public goods are
one of the more consistent interactions between citizens and the government. In the case of many developing countries these can include the right to use and control land. I argue that support for democracy in Africa has, at least in part, declined over time in part because of poor public goods provision, or because public goods provision has been undermined in some cases by ethnicity (Habyarimana et al. 2007). Varying levels of access to public goods provide a low-cost methods for citizens to evaluate the government, and I argue that citizens use this in their decision process with respect to support for democracy.

Political institutional factors are just as important for explaining support for democracy as they are for turnout, especially cross-nationally. Notably, scholars (Anderson and Guillory 1997) have found that partisan status relative to the proportionality of the electoral system is an important predictor. Political losers as measured by citizens who are close to a losing political party have been found to exhibit lower levels of support for democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cho and Bratton 2006). The same effect has been found for non-partisans (Cho and Bratton 2006). This is because these political losers feel left out of the system because there is not a party available that fits their political perspectives. These previous studies have found these effects to be quite strong.

Socioeconomic status could also affect support for democracy. For example, high income earners are probably more likely to support democracy because it is working for them in respect to their own economic conditions. Moreover, it has been posited that higher levels of education could also lead to higher support for democracy (Evans and Rose 2007) because the educated person will be more likely to understand their role as a democratic citizen. Lastly, age could also be an important predictor. Citizens who have come of age under democratic rule may be more likely to participate and thus support democracy because they understand the system. Conversely, these citizens may take the system for

---

2The real distinction for institutions is their ability to explain variation in these outcomes over time.
granted because it is all they have known, thus making citizens who lived under a previous, more autocratic regime more supportive of democracy because they know the alternatives. This of course makes the impact of age difficult to theorize but also highlights its importance.

Taken in tandem, these various components make up a wide breadth of information from which citizens can draw upon to make their decisions with respect to support for democracy. I posit that citizens make these decisions based upon their own experiences and information gathering, and thus it is the perspective of the citizens that drives support for democracy. In order to exhibit high levels of support, a citizens must:

- feel that their economic needs are being met or surpassed,
- feel a suitable level of political efficacy,
- and have access to a suitable range of public goods.

My basic theoretical model for individual level support for democracy is as follows: $y_i = f(p_j + e_i + g_i + l_i \times d_{ij} + s_i)$ where $y_i$ is the level of support for democracy for respondent $i$, $p_j$ is the level of property rights protection in country $j$, $e_i$ is a vector of economic evaluations for respondent $i$, $g_i$ is a vector of variables that measure access to public goods, $p_i \times d_{ij}$ is the partisan status of respondent $i$ multiplied by the disproportionality of seat distribution in the country respondent $i$ resides in, and $s_i$ is a vector of socioeconomic variables for respondent $i$. An ideal setting to test this theory would be a context with large amounts of cross-sectional variance on the explanatory variables. As such, my future plans call for cross-national survey data collection in Africa with the goal of collecting data for the various components of this theory. For the purposes of this chapter I use extant survey data from Africa that includes less than ideal measures.
The following testable hypotheses can be gleaned from this discussion:

\( H_1 \): Citizens in countries with better protected property rights will exhibit higher levels of support for democracy.

\( H_{2a} \): Citizens with higher levels of economic outlook for their country will exhibit higher levels of support for democracy.

\( H_{2b} \): Citizens with higher levels of economic outlook for their ethnic group will exhibit higher levels of support for democracy.

\( H_{2c} \): Citizens with higher levels of economic outlook for themselves will exhibit higher levels of support for democracy.

\( H_3 \): Citizens with less access to public goods will exhibit lower levels of support for democracy.

\( H_{4a} \): Citizens who are losers in the political system will exhibit lower levels of support for democracy.

\( H_{4b} \): The difference between political winners and losers will be moderated by electoral system proportionality.

5.2.4 Data and Methods

The primary data for the analyses come from the fourth (2008) round of the Afrobarometer (henceforth AB) surveys of African democracies. This is the same survey I employed in the previous chapter.\(^3\) In addition to the variables included in the AB, I have also coded in data for several measures which are discussed below, including the property rights measure from the previous chapter. The full list of countries in the dataset can be found in the appendix for this chapter.

\(^3\)The AB surveys report the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, civil society, and other aspects of development.
The dependent variable is an ordinal scale of democratic satisfaction. The Afrobarometer asks respondents the following question: *Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [insert country name]? Are you: Not at all satisfied, not very satisfied, fairly satisfied, or very satisfied?* Respondents were also given the opportunity to say that their country was not a democracy (this option was excluded from the analyses) or to say they did not know. This variable is not without its flaws as there are always questions of just how well citizens understand the meaning of this question and the idea of democracy in general.\(^4\) Multiple measures of support for democracy have been used in the literature, but this is the same basic measurement as some previous important works (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Cho and Bratton 2006). Some scholars (Norris 1999; Canache and Seligson 2001; Linde and Ekman 2003) have argued for different measurements altogether, and efforts have been made to better gauge the usage of value-laden terms such as democracy. With respect to the Afrobarometer, Bratton (2010) finds that Africans in general have a good understanding of the intended meaning of democracy as used in the surveys. As such, I proceed with the satisfaction measure, although I recognize issues in making comparisons across countries due to translations and differing conceptualizations of democracy. The final coding for the dependent variable used in the analyses is as follows:

\[ Pr(y_i = j) = f(\mathbf{x}_i^\prime \mathbf{\beta} + \epsilon_i) \]

\(^4\)This variable is of course also a focus on satisfaction and not support in the abstract. I argue that this is a better measure of support for democracy in a citizen’s country because they are retrospectively evaluating how democracy has worked for them thus far. Other questions are aimed much more at an abstract view of democracy which may or may not relate to how the citizen feels democracy is working in their own country.
where:

\[
\begin{align*}
  j &= \begin{cases} 
    1 & \text{if respondent was not at all satisfied with democracy} \\
    2 & \text{if respondent was not very satisfied with democracy} \\
    3 & \text{if respondent was fairly satisfied with democracy} \\
    4 & \text{if respondent was very satisfied with democracy}
  \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

In this case the \( x' \) vector is made up of values for the independent variables displayed in the theoretical equation above and discussed in more detail below. The non-linear parts of the model are not shown but discussed in more detail in the appendix for this chapter.

### 5.2.4.1 Independent Variables

I employ the same property rights measure from the previous chapter. Recall that this is a measure of property rights from Heritage Foundation (2014) which captures “the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. It measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts.” The measure is scaled from 0-100 where higher values indicate more secure property rights.\(^5\)

Both Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Cho and Bratton (2006) used survey questions that ask respondents how they would evaluate the economy with respect to the nation and their own personal situations. Following their lead, I employ similar responses as my primary predictor variables. Moreover, I include a measure that asked respondents how they would evaluate the economic condition of their own ethnic group. All of these variables

\(^5\)The EIF data are primarily taken from measures compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit and US Departments of Commerce and State to form their aggregate property rights assessment.
are coded on a 1 – 5 scale with higher scores indicating higher evaluations of economic performance. I include the exact wording of the questions in the appendix.

Partisan status has been found to be important in previous studies by Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Cho and Bratton (2006). As such I coded a measure partisan status as a function of whether or not the respondent was close to a winning or losing political party. The AB asks respondents if they are close to a political party, and if so, which one. Using this information along with the country of origin, I was able to code dummy variables into the dataset whether or not a respondent was close to a winning or losing party. Further, I coded a dummy variable for respondents who were not close to a political party as non-partisans, which follows the variables employed by Cho and Bratton (2006). This provides additional information about respondents that was previously not available in the AB dataset.

I also control for the socioeconomic variables of age and education measured in years. An additional possibility would be personal income, but this is not included in the AB. There is a suggested index of family well-being (Bratton 2006), however it is not clear if this is a true measure of how well-off a respondent is economically. For now I proceed without an income measure. An additional measure that has not previously been considered in Africa is access to certain public goods. Obviously public goods access can be measured in a number of ways. For now, I include whether or not the respondent has access to electricity as a proxy for this. This also may proxy other things such as urban versus rural, so I argue that it captures various aspects about the quality of life of the respondent. It is coded as a dummy variable where 1=respondent has electricity and 0 if not. Last, I include a measure of interest in politics (Anderson and Guillory 1997) with the expectation that a more informed citizen may feel higher levels of political efficacy and thus be more likely
to support the system. This was coded on a three point scale where higher scores indicate more interest.

I coded two additional contextual variables in the form of GDP per capita and a measure of proportionality that measure aspects about the national environment in which citizens live. The first is simply a measure to control for national-level economic performance, which as I mentioned above is a consistent predictor used in the literature. It is the average GDP per capita for the 5 years prior to the dataset. These data are taken from the World Bank. The second contextual variable is a measure of proportionality that determines how consensual (Anderson and Guillery 1997; Cho and Bratton 2006) the seat distribution is in a given country. I follow the measure of (Rose 2000) that is calculated as an index using the following formula: \( P_i = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)} \) where \( P_i \) is the index score of proportionality, \( v_i \) is the vote percentage, and \( s_i \) is the percentage of awarded seats. The electoral data are taken from the African Elections Database. The full coding and expected relationships for all variables is shown in table Table 5.1. The summary statistics for all variables and exact question wording of the AB variables are in the appendix.

5.2.4.2 Methods

Since the dependent variable of interest is on an ordinal scale, I follow the standard approach of employing maximum likelihood estimation in the form of ordered logistic regression. To begin, I estimated a model that includes the individual level variables of interest. I then regressed the satisfaction with democracy variable on the same predictors with the addition of the contextual variables of proportionality and GDP per capita. I then estimated the contextual model with the addition of the property rights measure. Finally, I estimated the same model but also included interaction terms with proportionality and whether or not the respondent was a non-partisan or loser. The winner category is excluded
Table 5.1: Explanatory Variables, Expected Relationships and Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property Rights</td>
<td>+ More property rights freedoms leads to higher satisfaction</td>
<td>0-100 increasing with better protections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Economic Evaluation</td>
<td>+ Respondents with higher personal outlook will be more satisfied</td>
<td>1−5 increasing economic outlook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group Economic Evaluation</td>
<td>+ Respondents with higher ethnic outlook more satisfied</td>
<td>1−5 increasing economic outlook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Economic Evaluation</td>
<td>+ Respondents in countries with higher GDP more satisfied</td>
<td>ln(GDP) per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>+ Respondents with higher national outlook more satisfied</td>
<td>1−5 increasing economic outlook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>+/- Control variable</td>
<td>Age of respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>+/- Control variable</td>
<td>Level of education attained (9 point scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>+/- Respondents who are members of losing political parties less satisfied</td>
<td>1 =loser 0 =winner or non-partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Partisan</td>
<td>− Respondents not attached to a political party less satisfied</td>
<td>1 = Non-Partisan, 0 = Loser or Winner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality</td>
<td>+ Respondents in more proportional systems more satisfied</td>
<td>index calculated by: $P_i = \sqrt{\frac{1}{\bar{y} (v_i - s_i)}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Public Affairs</td>
<td>+/- Control variable</td>
<td>0−3 scale with increasing interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>+ Respondents with electricity more satisfied</td>
<td>0 = no electricity, 1 =electricity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as the $k − 1$ reference in all models. There may be issues with using these country level variables to examine the attitudes of individuals. However, this method was also employed by Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Cho and Bratton (2006). Future examinations could consider multilevel or mixed models to mitigate some of these inference issues, although as I show in the last chapter these distinctions are not always worth the additional modeling costs.
5.2.5 Results

The results of the estimations are displayed in Table 5.2. In examining the individual level model it can be seen that the evaluation variables are important predictors, especially in the case of ethnic group and national outlook. The personal evaluation may simply be too egocentric for many Africans, who are often embedded in their commitments to their communities and/or ethnic groups. Nevertheless these findings clearly link economic outlooks with support for democracy. It is possible that these evaluations function much like the retrospective evaluations in the economic voting literature. The electricity variable is significant and positive indicating that respondents with access to electricity are more satisfied with democracy. Although this finding would likely hold in any regime type, it adds support to the public goods aspect of my theory that argues that citizens that have lower or no access to public goods will be less satisfied with the government, and thus democracy if that is the system of government.

The partisan status results show that being a political loser has an effect on support for democracy. The negative sign indicates that respondents who belong to a losing political party are significantly less likely to support democracy. Moreover being a non-partisan also has a negative impact. It is possible that these respondents are simply unhappy with the options of political parties and as such they are unhappy with democracy since their political voice is not relevant.

The interest in public affairs variable is also significant and in the expected direction indicating that respondents who are more interested in public affairs have higher levels of support for democracy. Surprisingly, education has a negative coefficient indicating that less educated respondents are more likely to support democracy than their higher educated counterparts. This could mean that higher educated respondents although this could
### Table 5.2: Ordered Logit Estimations of Support for Democracy in Developing Democracies

<table>
<thead>
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<td>.0135***</td>
<td>.0132***</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(.0131)</td>
<td>(.0132)</td>
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<td>.0292**</td>
<td>.0312**</td>
<td>.0315**</td>
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<td>.342***</td>
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<td>(.0122)</td>
<td>(.0122)</td>
<td>(.0122)</td>
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<td>.184***</td>
<td>.172***</td>
<td>.172***</td>
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<td>(.0118)</td>
<td>(.0118)</td>
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<td>(.0014)</td>
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Ordered logistic regression, standard errors are reported underneath parameter estimates (two-tailed tests, despite directional hypotheses).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
conflict with the interest in public affairs hypothesis put forth by (Anderson and Guillory 1997). This also contradicts the findings of Evans and Rose (2007) that argue as education levels increase so should support for democracy. It is also important to point out that education levels have risen significantly in Africa over the past 20 years. Age is significant with and positive. This finding could indicate that those respondents who were coming of voting age around the time of democratization in most of these countries are more prone to be supportive of the system.

The individual-level results do not change much in the contextual model which includes the contextual items of GDP and proportionality. Higher GDP is associated with higher levels of support for democracy while controlling for other relevant predictors. However, these results should be examined cautiously given the extreme disconnect in measurement of GDP and individual level opinion. At the least I can say that more economically well-off countries can expect higher levels of democratic satisfaction whether examined by GDP or individual level outlook on the national economy.

Interestingly, when I include property rights in the model the effects of GDP become indistinguishable from zero. This further supports my theory that GDP, in and of itself, is not directly associated with support for democracy when controlling for variables that affect citizens much more acutely, in this case property rights. The results for the other variables remain largely unchanged.

Finally, Turning to the interactions model, several interesting stories arise. The effects of property rights and GDP remain similar to those in the third model. With respect to the interactions, like Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Cho and Bratton (2006), I find that partisan status is moderated by proportionality. These findings indicate the proportionality is important with respect to citizens deciding their political efficacy status as measured by how many seats that party gets even while losing electoral contests. The variables do not
change significantly from the previous models. For an illustration of this effect, I graphed the predicted values of being most-satisfied with democracy as a function of being a loser moderated by seat disproportionality. This illustration is depicted in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Predicted Values of Being Electoral Loser Moderated by Seat Proportionality

To better illustrate the role that property rights play in satisfaction with democracy, I calculated the predicted probabilities of each category of satisfaction (1 – 4) across the range of property rights values (with variables at their means and modes). This illustration is depicted in Figure 5.4. The figure clearly shows that the probability of being highly satisfied steadily increases across as property rights are further protected and free. This provides strong evidence in support of my theory.
Figure 5.4: Predicted Values of Being Electoral Loser Moderated by Seat Proportionality
Finally, following the recommendations of Tomz, Wittenberg and King (2000, 2003), I ran a series of model-based parameter simulations to produce quantities of interest in the form of predicted probabilities which can better distinguish between the different groups of partisans and varying economic outlooks. I first ran a simulation with all variables held at their means or modes in the case of categorical variables. The output from this simulation is shown in the appendix. I then estimated the predicted probabilities for each range of the dependent variable. This setting indicates that the 3rd selection of “fairly satisfied” with democracy has about a 35% probability. I then ran several more simulations for different combinations of possibilities. I included a setting for respondents who gave poor economic outlooks but were still members of a winning party. I then ran a simulation for respondents who had high economic outlooks but were members of a losing party. Last, I ran a simulation for respondents with high economic outlooks and who were members of a winning party. This last category had a significantly higher probability of being satisfied with democracy than the other groups. These findings are presented in Figure 5.5. These scenarios provide interesting examples of how the economic and political contexts of a country can significantly moderate satisfaction with democracy.

5.2.6 Conclusions on Support for Democracy

In this section I have built on previous works to develop a more broad theory of why citizens choose to support democracy or not. I argue that citizens take in a full range of information into their decision calculus on support for democracy. Specifically, I have argued that citizens evaluate the regime based on how well it has worked for them across a range of economic and political categories including property rights. These categories also

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6 The simulations were done in the Clarify software package for Stata written by Tomz, Wittenberg and King (2007, 2003) Previous iterations were also done in Zelig for R by Imai, King and Lau (2008).
Figure 5.5: Predicted Probabilities for Satisfaction with Democracy

Note: Scenarios of predicted probabilities of democratic satisfaction. Group 1 is set at means and modes. Group 2 is set with low levels of economic outlook but still in a winning party. Group 3 is set with high levels of economic outlook but in a losing party. Group 4 is set with high levels of economic outlook but in a winning party. All results were obtained using the Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2003) software for Stata in OS X.
include access to political power by their party, economic evaluations of how their country and ethnic groups are doing. I discuss these results further below.

The inclusion of property rights in the models not only made for a significant explanatory variable, they also diminished the role played by GDP. This interesting finding relates to my theoretical point about the use of GDP as a predictor for democratic support. Although obviously an economic measure, GDP does not easily reflect micro-level experiences in developing countries because of the large disconnect between the macro economy and much of the citizenry. My empirical findings further indicate that most predictions from the literature still matter, and the strongest is partisan status of the respondent. However, when interacted with the proportionality of the electoral system, the marginal effect of partisan status is significantly diminished. Moreover, national and ethnic group evaluations relative to the economy are more powerful predictors than personal evaluations in that citizens with favorable evaluations for their countries and ethnic groups are significantly more likely to have higher levels of support for democracy. Citizens without electricity are less likely to support democracy, indicating that public goods matter for citizens evaluation of the governing system.

These also results raise some interesting questions. For example why do more educated respondents have lower levels of support for democracy? Not only does this finding contradict previous conclusions about education (Evans and Rose 2007), it also raises the question of how this could change over time as more and more Africans get higher levels of education. Another interesting question is whether there is a difference in local, regional, or national outlooks on the economy. It seems plausible that a citizen could think that the national economy is doing well while their local economic outlook is less favorable. This would possibly explain why support for democracy as fallen over time despite improvements in national level economic indicators. Much of the development and eco-
nomic investment has been in the capitals or urban areas, and citizens may realize this and make their economic evaluations accordingly. My future efforts at data collection will certainly consider these possibilities.

Natural progressions of this study are to include the upcoming release of the Afrobarometer data to create some leverage over time and also to estimate multilevel models with several more economic variables such as change in GDP over time, GINI coefficients, and inflation rates. Combined with other contextual features, such as the number of politically relevant ethnic groups (Posner 2004b) and the proportionality index, this could produce a more nuanced understanding of the various dimensions from which support for democracy can be affected. Future studies should also combine these findings with further data collection to get more information on local government performance, public goods provisions and how these might affect citizens’ level of support for democracy. Obviously I also plan to push the property rights variable further in these models. The power of property rights has become even more meaningful with the results of this section.

5.3 Social Conflict on the Rise

In the previous section I began with a real-world data example of support for democracy and how it seems to be continually diminishing among many of the developing democracies of the African continent. In this section I examine the rise of social conflict in Africa more broadly. This section builds upon my forthcoming co-authored work (Garcia and Wimpy 2015) that examines more severe forms of social conflict that primarily target violence towards the government.\(^7\) Although related, the goals in this section are distinct from that effort in that I include much more docile, and democratic, forms of political behavior.

\(^7\)One major difference is the types of covariates used in predicted violent forms of conflict versus those that are more inherently democratic. The former draws upon the theories from the domestic armed conflict and civil war literatures whereas the latter also draws from the comparative unconventional political behavior literature.
including protests and strikes. I scale these events with the more violent forms to create an aggregated measure of social conflict. Social conflict in this case includes “protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, government violence against civilians, and other forms of social conflict not systematically tracked in other conflict datasets” (Salehyan et al. 2012).

According to the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012) the average number of events has risen significantly over time. This time period starts in 1990, which is the beginning of SCAD, but it is also the starting point of the mass-wave of democratizing elections that hit Africa in the 1990s. This trend is presented in Figure 5.6. My primary goal for this section is to not only discuss demonstrate how these types of conflicts are on the rise in these developing countries as I am also interested in how these relationships diffuse and vary across space.

These events have taken place all over the continent with few exceptions. There are areas of clustering in particularly contentious regions but the incidence is generally very widespread. In Figure 5.7 I present a map showing the approximate locations of each event with the darker shades indicating more events in that location and country. Clearly the occurrence of social conflict is quite ubiquitous over this time period.

It should be noted that these figures present an aggregate trend which certainly does not hold for all countries in Africa. In some cases, Botswana for example, social conflict has been relatively stable over this time period. This could be because Botswana is among the most consolidated countries on the continent. It also relates to institutional quality and stability and of course regime type and oppressiveness. I discuss these issues in more detail below.
Figure 5.6: Social Conflict Intensity in Africa Over Time
Total SCAD Events 2000-2011

Note: Darker shading indicates more events in a given country. Darker squares indicate more events in that exact location. Data are taken from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD).
5.3.1 Theoretical Background

My goal is not to present an entirely new theory of social conflict. Rather I am modeling commonly discussed predictors from the literature to better explain how, and why, social conflict is on the rise in Africa. Throughout this dissertation I have highlighted the importance of citizens’ expectations for maintaining a legitimate level of political participation through voting. In the section above I expand this to also include citizen support for, and satisfaction with, democracy. Here I am demonstrating the alternative outcome for political behavior when the other avenues are no longer productive for the citizenry. The most important theoretical contribution I am making here is spatial diffusion of social conflict via increasing communications technology connectivity. This builds on the previous work of Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013) and Garcia and Wimpy (2015) which each examine related phenomena with similar theoretical designs.

Social conflict has been treated several ways in the theoretical literature. Traditionally, the social conflict items such as protests and strikes have been considered in a general literature that examines unconventional political behavior. Much of this literature has its roots in the grievance type theories developed by Gurr (1970). These theories suggest generally that social conflict and eventually rebellion is the result of unchecked grievances amongst the citizenry in a given country. Unconventional behavior has been further examined in the literature by Dalton (1998, 2008), who places items such as protests and strikes towards the middle of a behavior spectrum which has voting on one end and more severe forms of behavior on the other. The overall premise of these works is very much relatable to the consistent theme I present throughout this dissertation, which is that citizens can become dissatisfied with a democratic system and significantly change the ways in which they interact with the government. The rest of this section assumes this is a solid theo-
retical foundation for why these social conflict events are taking place and examines the plausibility of the conflicts diffusing from one country to the next.

In (Garcia and Wimpy 2015) we make a case for employing communications technology as a mode of transmission through which the spread of information on violent conflict can flow. This allows the conflicts to spread across different boundaries, and in this case, country boundaries. I take a similar approach in these analyses with respect to all forms of social conflict. I discuss this approach further in the next section.

5.3.2 The Spread of Social Conflict: A Spatiotemporal Analysis

In this section I conduct an analysis that accounts for how social conflict in one country can spread to another as partly a function of communications technology in the form of mobile phones and internet penetration.

5.3.2.1 Data

The data for the analyses that follow are taken from multiple sources. The outcome variable of total social conflict events per country year is taken from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (Salehyan et al. 2012). I am limited in the spatial domain due to the data availability of the dependent variable since SCAD is a dataset unique to Africa. Otherwise there is no theoretical reason why the theory cannot apply more broadly. The combined social conflict variable in its original form catalogued all acts of social conflict in Africa from 1990-2011. I collapsed this to create a count of social conflict events for each country year. Further, since I am interested in the effects of newer forms of communication technology (mobile phones and internet) on social conflict, I was forced limit the data to the 2000-2011 time period due to data availability of these variables.

8SCAD includes data on 49 African countries, I omitted several countries due to lack of available data on my other key variables.
I posit a spatial relationship between the number of social conflict events in one country and that of a neighbor. As such I employ a spatial lag that captures this relationship much as a temporal lag captures relationships between outcomes from one year to the next. This spatial lag is the primary variable of interest. I further discuss how this variable is operationalized and coded in the section that follows. My other primary explanatory variables are the number of mobile phone subscribers and internet usage. Both of these measure modern communication technology that is easily accessed by average citizens. This allows these types of events to spread quite rapidly. Both connectivity variables are taken from the International Telecommunications Union database.

In addition, I include a standard range of control variables typically used in the protest and conflict literatures. I control for level of democracy by utilizing the Polity IV 10 to -10 standard regime type index as well as the polynomial term (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2012). I do this to test for the potential that social conflict is most likely to occur in the most transitional regimes. This is a common practice in the literature examining more severe types of conflict (Hegre et al. 2001). This control is much more important in these analyses than the others in this chapter and the previous chapter in that I am including a number of non-democratic countries. My primary focus throughout the dissertation has been on those countries that are at least transitional in nature with most of the focus being on countries that have undergone a major democratic transition. Despite this, I still posit that social conflict in a neighboring country, even if it is non-democratic, can spill over due to significant and varying modes of connectivity across boundaries.

I control for the level of urbanization with a measure of the percentage of people living in urban areas. I expect that more urban areas increase communication connectivity and thus lead to more potential for social conflict. Ethnic heterogeneity is an important consideration in Africa (Posner 2004a; Hill and Rothchild 1986; Collier and Hoeffler 2002;
Horowitz 1985). To account for this I employ the (Alesina et al. 2003) measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. I include two contextual variables not included in Garcia and Wimpy (2015) which are colonial legacy (whether or not the country was a British colony) and North Africa to account for the differences in culture and ethnic backgrounds as well as the major intervention of the Arab Spring. Finally, I also include standard controls of GDP Per Capita and Population as well as whether or not the country experienced an election in the same year as the social conflict event. These have each been found to be important predictors when using these SCAD data (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). Table 5.3 lists all variables used in the analyses along with the expected relationships, coding, sources and summary statistics.

5.3.2.2 Methods

Models of Spatial dependence are becoming increasingly prevalent in social science research, and the developing literature on these forms of social conflict is no different. However, much of this research has employed relatively basic treatments of spatial connectivity. Beyond simply accounting for residual spatial effects to get unbiased coefficients, researchers can theorize and predict the impact of spatial dependence on the outcome of interest. Franzese and Hays (2008a, b) argue that spatial dependence is more than a nuisance or control, rather it is substantive. I also take this approach and choose to model the spatial dependence, instead of just accounting for it.  

Much attention in the spatial econometric literature is necessarily given to the so-called spatial weights (or W) matrix (Plümper and Neumayer 2010; Neumayer and Plümper 2015). This matrix provides the information on connectivity from one unit to another.

\footnote{An alternative specification here would allow for treating any spatial or contemporaneous correlation in the errors as a nuisance to be washed out. This is typically done with some sort of corrected (robust) standard error specification although a more serious approach would include estimating a spatial-error model. My approach treats these spatial relationships as substance to be modeled and, thus, not a nuisance.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable &amp; Summary Statistics</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Coding &amp; (Source)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Conflict: $\bar{x}=9.79$, $\sigma=15.00$, range=0 – 133, $N=528$</td>
<td>Outcome Variable.</td>
<td>Number of events per country-year (SCAD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Lag: $\bar{x}=46.55$, $\sigma=35.85$, range=1–229, $N=528$</td>
<td>+ Increased spatial dependence leads to more social conflict in country $i$.</td>
<td>$\ln(y_i + 1) \times w_{ij}$ (SCAD &amp; $W_{ij}$ matrix).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile: $\bar{x}=25.41$, $\sigma=30.56$, range=0-171.52, $N=524$</td>
<td>+ More mobile phone subscriptions leads to more social conflict in country $i$.</td>
<td>Number of mobile subscriptions per 100 people (ITU).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internet: $\bar{x}=4.25$, $\sigma=6.72$, range=0.01-51, $N=521$</td>
<td>+ Higher internet usage leads to more social conflict in country $i$.</td>
<td>Percent of population using the internet (ITU).</td>
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<td>British Colony: $\bar{x}=0.389$, $\sigma=0.487$, range=0,1, $N=528$</td>
<td>– Former British colonies experience less social conflict.</td>
<td>1 = British colony event, 0 = Not a British Colony (Bratton et al.).</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Africa: $\bar{x}=0.113$, $\sigma=0.317$, range=0,1, $N=528$</td>
<td>– Former British colonies experience less social conflict.</td>
<td>1 = British colony event, 0 = Not a British Colony (Bratton et al.).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity: $\bar{x}=0.82$, $\sigma=5.10$, range=-1-9, $N=527$</td>
<td>– More democratic leads to less social conflict.</td>
<td>Combined scale: -10 to 10 (Polity IV).</td>
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<td>ln(GDP): $\bar{x}=6.57$, $\sigma=1.09$, range=4.46-9.63, $N=522$</td>
<td>– Higher GDP leads to less social conflict.</td>
<td>Natural log of GDP (WB).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization: $\bar{x}=0.66$, $\sigma=0.23$, range=0.04-0.93, $N=528$</td>
<td>+ More heterogeneity leads to more social conflict.</td>
<td>Herfindahl index: $FRACT_i = 1 - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{s_{ij}^2}{\sigma_{ij}^2}$. (Alesina et al. 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election in Same Year: $\bar{x}=0.22$, $\sigma=0.41$, range=0,1, $N=528$</td>
<td>+ An election in the same year leads to more social conflict.</td>
<td>1 = Election, 0 = No election (IDEA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization: $\bar{x}=38.41$, $\sigma=17.50$, range=8.25-86.15, $N=528$</td>
<td>+ More urbanization facilitates more social conflict.</td>
<td>% Urbanized (WB).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SCAD: Social Conflict in Africa Database
ITU: International Telecommunications Union
IDEA: Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance
WB: World Bank

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(j to i in matrix element $w_{ij}$) that allows the researcher to model spatial dependence. As such, determining the proper mode of connectivity and constructing the weights matrix is far from trivial. Indeed, the information used to determine the interconnectivity of units can seriously condition the results of any analyses (Neumayer and Plümper 2015).

I began the analyses with a binary neighbor connectivity matrix, $W_{ij}$, where a country takes a value of 1 when it shares a border with another and 0 when it does not. Much of the spatial literature stops at this matrix, thus assuming that spatial dependence is primarily driven by geography (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2006). I start with this type of weights matrix because of the unique nature of the African geopolitical system. Alternative specifications to this include both distance-based matrices or a matrix based on some other spatial connectivity besides physical contiguity. I have considered both options. A distance based matrix based on some arbitrary point, or administrate capital, is problematic in Africa because of the large variance in administrative area and capital placement. On the one hand, making the distances too short would underestimate the connectivity of countries such as Sudan, Libya and Egypt, all of which had significant numbers of social conflicts during the Arab Spring, for example. On the other hand, a larger distance would overestimate the connectivity of the smaller western African countries with many non-neighbors being possibly erroneously connected.

From my proposed theoretical framework, an ideal weights matrix would be based on connectivity of communication technology between countries, but to wit such information is not currently available. Nevertheless, I go beyond a simple geographic adjacency matrix by interacting my primary explanatory variables of internet usage and mobile phone subscribers with the spatial lag. This creates a new variable that includes information on both geographic connectivity and the channels of information flow that I focus on in this section. I posit that this treatment of spatial connectivity is an important contribution for
two reasons. First, I am attempting to model the theorized channel of connectivity, in this case the flow of information. Second, in the absence of a global connectivity communication technology matrix this interactive spatial lag allows for a significant improvement on a typical adjacency matrix. The matrix is not row-standardized as I have no theoretical justification for doing so.\textsuperscript{10}

My theoretical focus is on how social conflict can spread with the increased use of communications technology. Specifically, I theorize about how this information is spread from one unit (country) to the other ($i$ to $j$), and perhaps more importantly, the mechanisms through which this diffusion takes place. Much of the spatial literature leaves this particular area of spatial diffusion unexplored. Knowing that diffusion is happening may not be enough. Further, simply knowing or theorizing that $y_i$ affects $y_j$, while more useful than the alternative of assuming no spatial dependence, may also fall short of telling the whole story. I posit that the method of diffusion may condition the impact of the spatial effects. As such, I attempt to model my theory by conditioning the connectivity matrix with my primary explanatory variables.\textsuperscript{11}

5.3.2.3 Model Specification

Since the outcome variable is a count, I follow the standard approach of using negative-binomial estimation. I chose negative-binomial over poisson because of the over-dispersion of the dependent variable (Long 1997; Hilbe 2011). I also follow Neumayer and Plümper (2010) by taking the advice of Hays (2009) suggesting that $W[ln(y + 1)]$ provides a better proxy of the actual event counts opposed to $Wy$. I clustered the standard errors around country to account for any remaining country-specific effects.

\textsuperscript{10}In this case row-standardizing did not bias the results in a significant way, although it can often produce distinct results from a non-standardized matrix (Plümper and Neumayer 2010).

\textsuperscript{11}The inspiration and setup for this type of interactive spatial analysis was born from the aforementioned project Garcia and Wimpy (2015) in which myself and a colleague specifically examine the diffusion of the most severe SCAD event of anti-government violence.
Finally, I follow the advice of Plümper and Neumayer (2010) and also consider the trend and shock effects of time in my analyses. I deal with common shocks by including time fixed effects for each year. For trends I include a time lagged (one year) dependent variable. Both of these approaches are common procedures for dealing with time related issues in the recent spatial econometrics literature (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2006; Franzese and Hays 2007; Neumayer and Plümper 2010, 2011; Plümper and Neumayer 2010). Failure to control for these time effects could over-estimate the spatial dependence I am interested in modeling (Plümper and Neumayer 2010). The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable also makes theoretical sense in that there is likely an autoregressive nature to these events in given countries, whether spatial dependence is present or not. I specify the full model as:

\[ y_{it} = \rho Wy_{it} + \gamma z_{it} + \psi Wy_{it}z_{it} + \phi y_{i,t-1} + x'_{it}\beta + \delta_{i} + \epsilon_{it} \]

where:

- \( y_{it} \) is the outcome vector of social conflict events for country \( i \) at time \( t \)
- \( z_{it} \) is the level of communication technology (mobile or internet) with parameter estimate \( \gamma \)
- Weights matrix: \( W \) (not row standardized) contiguity matrix, that is if countries actually border one another with each element \( w_{ij} \) consisting of one if \( i \) and \( j \) are neighbors and zero if not
- \( Wy_{it}z_{it} \) is the interaction of communication technology and the spatial lag with parameter estimate \( \psi \)
• $y_{it-1}$ is a one year (first-order) lag of social conflict events with temporal autoregressive parameter estimate $\phi$

• $mathbf{delta}$ is a vector of time (year) fixed-effects

• $\mathbf{x}'$ is a vector of control variables (listed above) for each country year with coefficient vector $\beta$

• This matrix is then multiplied by the $y$ vector to create the spatial lag, which is then multiplied by the level of communication technology in $i$, thus creating a modified spatial lag accounting for the flow of information from neighbors $j$ to $i$.

### 5.3.2.4 Results

The results of the estimations are presented in Table 5.4. The results for mobile are in the first column and internet in the second. A cursory glance at the parameter estimates reveal several interesting findings. First, interaction terms are significant, which indicates some amount of interaction between social conflict spread and communications technology. I discuss this particular finding in more detail below. The former British colony variables were each significant and indicate that being a former colony of Britain leads to less social conflict when controlling for the other variables in these models. This highlights the findings from the previous chapter for this variable as well. Interestingly the coefficients for North Africa and Polity were all indistinguishable from zero. This indicates that regime type and cultural differences are not playing a role in social conflict as it is modeled here. Having an election in the same year is associated with more conflict, which is not surprising given the findings from previous works (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). Otherwise the only other significant variable was population, with higher populations experiencing more conflict.
Table 5.4: The Spatial Dependence of Social Conflict in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Mobile</th>
<th>Internet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Lag ($\rho$)</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.017***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Lag $\times$ Mobile ($\psi$)</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Lag $\times$ Internet ($\psi$)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.046***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_{t-1}$ ($\phi$)</td>
<td>0.031***</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colony</td>
<td>−0.011***</td>
<td>−0.042***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity$^2$</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP)</td>
<td>−0.034</td>
<td>−0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Population)</td>
<td>0.202**</td>
<td>0.200*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.623)</td>
<td>(0.636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election in Same Year</td>
<td>0.196**</td>
<td>0.169*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−1.308</td>
<td>−1.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.756)</td>
<td>(1.773)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Wald $\chi^2$                        | 818.88       | 915.07      |
| Log Pseudolikelihood                 | −1372.201    | −1357.528   |
| $N$                                  | 473          | 470         |

Note: Negative binomial estimation results. The outcome variable in both models is the number of social conflict events. Clustered (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Yearly time dummies were included in estimation but are not shown. Significance: *** - $p < .01$; ** - $p < .05$; * - $p < .10$.  

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In Figure 5.8 I present a graph that better illustrates the interactions between communications technology and the spatial dependence of social conflict. These graphs show the predicted count of social conflict events as a function of the spatial dependence from one country to a neighbor while being moderated by communications technology. The graphs show that increased communications technology has a strong increasing impact of the spatial lag on social conflict. Both graphs are trending towards insignificance (90% confidence bounds headed towards zero) on the high end of communications penetration which could indicate a level of correlation with consolidation and development that eventually would wash out these effects. In essence, the movement is from the beginning to the middle with eventual diminishing returns.

Figure 5.8: Graphs of Spatial Lag Effects on Social Conflict Moderated by Technology

The parameter estimates from a negative binomial estimation are not easily interpreted in terms of substantive impact, especially with these types of interaction terms. As such I turn to the method suggested by Hilbe (2011) which is a series of scenarios produced using incident rate ratios. These ratios calculate the percentage increase or decrease of an event occurring based on information from the estimated coefficients. These scenarios are
calculated from a series of estimations in which I center the interaction terms and move the moderating variables by interesting quantities to produce changes in the likelihood of SCAD events occurring. These results are presented in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Substantive Impact on Social Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Change in Spatial Lag</th>
<th>Movement in Modifying Variable</th>
<th>Effect on SCAD</th>
<th>95% Confidence Intervals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile Subscribers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 1 s.d.</td>
<td>$= 0%$</td>
<td>$-1.83%$</td>
<td>$[-1.01, 0.21]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$0% \rightarrow 5%$</td>
<td>$+3.24%$</td>
<td>$[1.72, 4.76]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$5% \rightarrow 10%$</td>
<td>$+10.16%$</td>
<td>$[6.42, 13.90]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\bar{x} \rightarrow +1$ s.d.</td>
<td>$+28.55%$</td>
<td>$[21.31, 35.79]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internet Usage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 1 s.d.</td>
<td>$= 0%$</td>
<td>$-2.11%$</td>
<td>$[-4.24, 0.02]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$&lt; 1% \rightarrow 2%$</td>
<td>$+5.27%$</td>
<td>$[2.47, 8.03]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$2% \rightarrow 5%$</td>
<td>$+13.68%$</td>
<td>$[9.39, 17.97]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\bar{x} \rightarrow +1$ s.d.</td>
<td>$+21.87%$</td>
<td>$[16.32, 27.42]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The percentage impacts are the exponentiated coefficients (Incidence Rate Ratios) of the negative binomial estimations with centered interaction terms.

The first scenario for each type of technology is the effect of the spatial lag when mobile and internet are equal to zero. In both cases the results are not distinguishable from zero, which highlights the importance of modeling the method of spatial diffusion and not just diffusion itself. In the second case I move from zero to five percent of the population having mobile phones and it can be scene that this creates a 3.24 increase in the likelihood of a social conflict event occurring. In the case of internet moving from less than one percent of the population subscribing to just two generates a 5.27% increase of the likelihood of an event. The table presents other scenarios that follow the same pattern with each internet and mobile eventually moving from the mean to plus one standard deviation resulting in
a 29% percent increase in the likelihood of social conflict for mobile and about 14% for internet.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined two distinct phenomena that may be pre-cursors to democratic failure in many developing democracies. I first examined a concept that I consider related to the willingness to actively participate in a democratic system, support for democracy. Despite its early links to turnout in the theories posited by Downs (1957); Riker and Ordeshook (1968), this concept has traditionally been treated as distinct from voter turnout in terms of the literature although it has occasionally been included as a control in empirical models. This disconnect represents a common problem with both literatures. Scholars have often ignored earlier theoretical work in search of high-performing empirical models primarily based on institutional characteristics or macro-economic indicators. These indicators often miss any variation that takes place over time or are at least somewhat disconnected from what average citizens actually care about when it comes to expectations for democracy.

I have also demonstrated that there could severe potential problems for developing democracies in which citizens stop participating in conventional behaviors and begin practicing more extreme forms of behavior. This, along with decreased support for democracy, could place a given country’s future at democracy in severe jeopardy. I found that social conflict is not only on the rise in the developing countries in Africa, it is also more likely to spread as communication’s technology continues to increase. Without significant improvement in the mostly informal institutions like property rights protections, these countries could be headed for significant democratic breakdown.
6. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK

6.1 Foiled Expectations & Democratic Participation

In this dissertation I have proposed and tested a theoretical expansion on the calculus of voting model. I have argued that democratic participation can be significantly driven by the expectations of voters for how democracy *should* work for them, and, from election to election, how it *has* worked for them. Traditional explanations of voter turnout have long labored over the importance of the controversial $D$ term conceived by Downs (1957) and formalized by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). I have taken $D$ and moved beyond a narrow concept of civic duty and the vague notions of satisfaction. Taking these steps allowed me to propose an environment in which the economy of a given voter factors into $D$ and thus allows them to make a voting decision based on real information and far less normative expectations.

In the first basic test of this theory I employed a series of focus groups in several developing democracies to gauge the expectations for democracy of a small sample of citizens. I also generated discussions based on changes in motivations to voter over time and the importance of an important, albeit basic, expectations voters have from democracy: property rights. At the least these focus groups highlighted the importance of expectations needing to be met for sustainable voting. More generally these findings suggested some serious malcontent among voters in developing democracies about how well democracy has met their basic exceptions for it.

Moving to more critical tests of my theory I first ran a series of aggregate voter turnout models which suggested that property rights is linked to voter turnout in developing democracies. I then employed recent survey data from twenty democracies and determined that
indeed this basic expectation is an important predictor of turnout, which supports my theory. There are obvious next steps for these analyses which I discuss in more detail below.

6.2 Democratic Survival

In chapter five I addressed what I called the ultimate implications of foiled expectations. Beyond decreasing turnout and the trouble that could spell for democracy, a situation in which citizens stop supporting the regime is likely to bring about one of two results. The first is a wake-up call of sorts that could correct the issues that are related to unmet expectations of the citizenry. Governments and leaders could see a spike in more unconventional types of political behavior and move to address the grievances of the populace. This would in turn potentially cause turnout to return to a higher level and the regime could endure. The other potential outcome is much more bleak for the prospects of democratic endurance. The unmet expectations of the citizenry could allow them to permit a return to a less-democratic form of governance in which they feel they may be better off. Another, similar outcome would be severe apathy among the citizenry could allow a more oppressive regime to take over whether the citizens prefer that or not.

It is much too early to say that some of the newer democracies will fail. Indeed some of them are obvious success stories in many ways. On the other hand, success can be deceptive on the surface. In 2010 there were articles in several major news outlets describing the democratic success story of the African country of Mali. By this time the country had enjoyed twenty years of democracy and four elections with several transfers of power. These are all signs of a continually consolidating democracy. Less than two years later after a military coup and de facto civil war, French troops were on the ground attempting to restore order. The success stories had failed to mention the extremely-low turnout in the previous election.\footnote{Turnout has been low in all of Mali’s elections, despite their other relative “success” prior to the coup.} Obviously this was not the only contributing factor leading to the
full and sudden regime collapse, but clearly the citizens had mostly stopped voting long
before these events took place. Such low turnout is certainly not a symptom of successful
democratic development. Other countries could experience similar fates if the citizens give
up on democracy, no matter how great it appears on the surface or from afar.

6.3 Future Work

I plan to continue the work I have begun here by expanding both the theoretical devel-
opment and empirical coverage. The obvious first steps in continuing are to further develop
the theory and expand the scope of covered countries. I also plan to develop surveys for
at least the countries in which I conducted focus groups and potentially more. The goal
will be to get systematic, individual-level data on attitudes towards property rights, voting
and support for democracy. So far I know of little survey work that covers property rights.
I will also expand the macro-level analyses to include all developing democracies in the
world and potentially even all democracies period. That would certainly provide a more
critical test for the theory. Finally, and following the suggestions of Blais (2006) I see a
panel study of voters’ over time as a another important next step. Only a study designed
to gauge voters’ commitment to the regime and their expectations for democracy can sig-
nificantly further the empirical tests of the the theory I have proposed in this dissertation.

6.4 Conclusion

Voters’ consider issues that affect the well-being of themselves and their local surround-
ings. They are less worried about the macro-economy or the development of some distant
capital city. Rather, they are concerned with major issues that significantly affect their
well-being. As long as their expectations for well-being are met they show commitment
the regime by voting. When democracy fails to deliver, however, and voters’ expectations
are foiled, then their commitment diminishes. A continuation of this trend over time puts
the prospect of survival for many nascent democracies in jeopardy. This has happened in the case of several African democracies and should be an important consideration for the incubating democratic upstarts in North Africa and the Middle East.
REFERENCES


**URL:** [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)


URL: www.afrobarometer.org


URL: www.afrobarometer.org


**URL:** [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)


URL: http://www.heritage.org/index/property-rights


URL: [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)


57(3):748–761.


URL: http://gking.harvard.edu


United States. 1776. “Declaration of Independence.”.


**URL:** [http://web.worldbank.org](http://web.worldbank.org)
APPENDIX A

Focus Group Methodologies

In this appendix I provide further details on the cases, focus groups locales and methodologies.

*Human Subjects Research*

The focus group study was approved by the Human Subjects Research Committee (*IRB*) at Texas A&M University under study number IRB2013-0133.

*Case Selection*

The cases were Ethiopia, Malawi and Mozambique. I selected these cases based on colonial, ethnic, geographical and historical variations. This ideally provides a large amount of variation on my independent variables of interest such as property rights and development. There were convenience issues in that I had previously developed research contacts in each country but that was still with this project in mind. Each country had entirely distinct colonial and historical legacies with only Malawi and Mozambique sharing a border and some related ethnic groups (although the responses differed markedly for the same group in each country.)

*Locale/Participant Selection*

Within each country I considered several issues when selecting the locale and participants. Obviously without significant resources it is impossible to generate a proper sample of regions, towns and participants. However, I did attempt to maximize variation within
these areas as well. My main desire was to maximize variation on ethnicity, region, urban/rural status

Training

All of the research assistants and supervisors were trained for several hours in human subjects research practices. Particular emphasis was placed on privacy and sensitivity concerns. It was my goal to make sure no person was asked to divulge information that could potentially harm them or even make them feel uncomfortable. Fortunately all of the research assistants and supervisors had experienced similar training before and were all very professional in their conduct during the focus groups.

Introductory and Closing Scripts

The following scripts were read before and after each focus group.

Pre-Script

Thank you for taking the time to participate in our discussion. Only the people in this room will know anything you say. We do not represent the government or any official organization in Mozambique [Ethiopia, Malawi]. Please feel free to answer the questions honestly and tell us your true beliefs about the topics we are discussing. We are not interested in talking or hearing about particular politicians, leaders, or political parties and affiliations. We are simply looking to talk about general issues in democracy and voting rather than a particular political interest. If, at any point, you feel uncomfortable about a questions please feel free to not answer. We can also stop and allow you to leave the discussion at no penalty to you. Please make yourselves comfortable and once you are ready will begin our discussion.
Post-Script

Thanks again for discussing these issues with us. We hope you enjoyed the discussion, we certainly did. We will now give you your payment for participating and wish you all the best. If you have any concerns or questions please see us privately after we are done.

Questionnaire

The following is the basic questionnaire that we employed in the focus groups. In some cases relevant follow-up questions were asked to further probe interesting comments from the participants.

1. What are your general thoughts about the state of democracy in Mozambique (Ethiopia or Malawi)?

2. How many of you voted in the last election?

3. How many of you voted in the first election?

4. In your opinions, why do people vote in elections when the probability of their vote counting is so low?

5. Do you feel that citizens have a duty to vote? If so, can the level of duty change over time?

6. Would it matter if nobody voted?

7. In your opinions, why have less people voted in some elections than others?

8. Do you think people vote because they expect to get something in return?

9. How important are property rights in your country?
10. Do you think the property system is fair here?

11. Was the property system better or worse here before the first election?

12. How important is land to you?

13. Should all citizens in democracies have the right to own land?

14. What are the most important problems facing your country today?

15. If you could change one thing about democracy in your country what would it be?

16. Looking back, is the country better off under democracy than it was before?

17. What could be done to make democracy better?

18. If things do not get better, should citizens keep voting?

19. Do you ever vote based on economic issues? If so, what economic issues are most important?

20. Do you think people with more economic interests (more money, land, businesses) are more likely to vote?

21. Should the government provide land to farm or should people be able to buy it freely without government interference?

Recording and Translation

Each focus group was recorded by two devices (iPhone and iPad) that captured the full conversations. The recording started after respondents introduced themselves and no records exist that identify individual respondents beyond their voices. These recordings were then translated from the local languages to English by two translators fluent in both
languages. The translators then collaborated on resolving any discrepancies and created final transcripts of the focus group conversations. All of the information in chapter three regarding the focus group came from these final, translated materials.
APPENDIX B

Methodology for Chapter 4

Countries and Elections Included in Macro-Level Analyses
Table 6.1: Countries and Elections Included in Dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Included Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2006, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2005, 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: African Elections Database*
Information for Individual-Level Analyses

Figure 5: Countries in the Dataset

Afrobarometer Questions Used in Analyses

**Question Number:** COUNTRY

**Question:** Country

**Variable Label:** Country

**Values:** 1 – 20

**Value Labels:** 1=Benin, 2=Botswana, 3=Burkina Faso, 4=Cape Verde, 5=Ghana, 6=Kenya, 7=Lesotho, 8=Liberia, 9=Madagascar, 10=Malawi, 11=Mali, 12=Mozambique, 13=Namibia,
14=Nigeria, 15=Senegal, 16=South Africa, 17=Tanzania, 18=Uganda, 19=Zambia, 20=Zimbabwe²

**Question Number:** URBRUR  
**Question:** PSU/EA  
**Variable Label:** Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit Values: 1 – 2  
**Value Labels:** 1=urban, 2=rural  
**Note:** Answered by interviewer

**Question Number:** Q1  
**Question:** How old are you?  
**Variable Label:** Age  
**Values:** 18 – 110, 998 – 999, -1  
**Value Labels:** 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know, -1=Missing data

**Question Number:** Q13  
**Question:** How interested would you say you are in public affairs?  
**Variable Label:** Interest in public affairs  
**Values:** 0 – 3, 9, 998, -1  
**Value Labels:** 0=Not at all interested, 1=Not very interested, 2=Somewhat interested, 3=Very interested, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data  
**Source:** SAB  
**Note:** Interviewer was instructed to prompt if necessary with “You know, in politics and government”

**Question Number:** Q23D  
**Question:** With regard to the most recent, 2004 national elections, which statement is true for you? (date varied based on survey location)  
**Variable Label:** Voted last election  
**Values:** 0 – 6, 9, 300, 998, -1  
**Value Labels:** 0=You were not registered or you were too young to vote, 1=You voted in the elections, 2=You decided not to vote, 3=You could not find the polling station, 4=You were prevented from voting, 5=You did not have time to vote, 6=Did not vote for some other reason, 9=Don’t know/Can’t remember, 300=You could not find your name in the voter’s register, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data  
**Source:** Afrobarometer Round 3  
**Note:** Last national election was 2008 in Madagascar, 2007 in Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal; 2006 in Uganda and Zambia; 2005 in Cape Verde, Liberia and Tanzania; 2004 in Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South

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²The analyses in this paper did not include Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Liberia, or South Africa.
Africa and Zimbabwe.

**Question Number:** Q30  
**Question:** Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?  
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.  
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.  
Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.  
**Variable Label:** Support for democracy  
**Values:** 1 – 3, 9, 998, −1  
**Value Labels:** 1=Statement 3: Doesn’t matter, 2=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 3=Statement 1: Democracy preferable, 9=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, −1=Missing data  
**Source:** Latinobarometer (LB)  
**Note:** Interviewer was instructed to “read the question in the language of the interview, but always read ‘democracy’ in English. Translate ‘democracy’ into local language only if respondent does not understand English term.”

**Question Number:** Q79  
**Question:** What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group?

**Question Number:** Q85  
**Question:** Do you feel close to any particular political party?  
**Variable Label:** Close to political party  
**Values:** 0 – 1, 8 – 9, −1  
**Value Labels:** 0=No, (not close to any party), 1=Yes, (feels close to a party), 8=Refused to answer, 9=Don’t know, −1=Missing data  
**Source:** Zambia 96

**Question Number:** Q89  
**Question:** What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
**Variable Label:** Education of respondent  
**Values:** 0 – 9, 99, 998, −1  
**Value Labels:** 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school/high school, 5=Secondary school completed/high school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate, 99=Don’t know, 998=Refused to answer, −1=Missing data  
**Source:** SAB

**Question Number:** Q101  
**Question:** Respondent’s gender  
**Variable Label:** Gender of respondent  
**Values:** 1, 2
Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female
Source: SAB Note: Answered by interviewer
APPENDIX C

Additional Technical Information for Chapter 5

Figure 5: Countries in the Dataset

Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Table 6.2: Ordered Logit Estimations of Support for Democracy in Developing Democracies with Turnout as Predictor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Contextual</th>
<th>Property Rights</th>
<th>Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>.0283</td>
<td>.0277</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000938)</td>
<td>(.00104)</td>
<td>(.00112)</td>
<td>(.00112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>-.381***</td>
<td>-.385***</td>
<td>-.38***</td>
<td>-.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.0327)</td>
<td>(.0327)</td>
<td>(.0327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Evaluation</td>
<td>.112***</td>
<td>.111***</td>
<td>.113***</td>
<td>.113***</td>
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Ordered logistic regression, standard errors are reported underneath parameter estimates (two-tailed tests, despite directional hypotheses) * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$