A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY SYSTEM'S
SAN ANTONIO CAMPUS INITIATIVE

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

Higher education continues to remain elusive for a significant portion of eligible students in Texas. With the rise in cost for tuition and fees and the decrease in funding by the state government, more students are left to seek access to institutions that are close to home. In many instances, those types of institutions do not exist. This research is an historical analysis of one person’s effort to establish an institution of higher education in a location that would serve a segment of society who has been practically ignored by those who would advocate for equal access and equal opportunity. The research is vital in understanding the course of actions, decision making processes, and identifying various stakeholders needed to establish additional institutions of higher education in Texas in places where higher education is currently unavailable.

The study utilized qualitative inquiry and interpretive phenomenological analysis to develop major themes of the historical analysis of The Texas A&M University System’s San Antonio campus initiative.

The findings of the study indicate that there was a whole host of stakeholders who participated in the decision making processes to establish a new institution of higher education on the south side of San Antonio. The analysis of the research material indicates that there was a strong perception that key individuals felt that they were largely responsible for the development of TAMUSA. While some argued against adding another public institution of higher education, the study showed that Texas will have to find a way to make higher education more available and affordable to reach a growing minority population if the state is going to compete in the global marketplace.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Higher education in the State of Texas is not unlike that in the other forty-nine states. There are public and private institutions, community and technical colleges, and vocational schools. While the goal of providing continuing education past the high school level is the same across the different types of institutions, the missions and focus of each institution can be very different. These differences are more evident among public institutions of higher education where funding is based on the number of enrolled students and what types of courses are offered. Because these institutions are public, a portion of funds used for institutional operations are provided by the taxpayers. These taxpayer funds are controlled by the state legislature, making public higher education, at least partially, a political endeavor.

While each public institution is allocated public funds based on enrollment and course type, some institutions indirectly benefit financially from being part of a collective or system. A few indirect benefits are the sharing of basic operational costs among the members, association with a flagship institution, and advocacy by a central system office. Like funding, the education systems are also creations of the political process; it is the legislators who create a “university system” and assign “membership” within the systems.

In the State of Texas there are only a few independent, public institutions of higher education that have not been absorbed by the five university systems – The University of Texas System, the Texas A&M University System, the University of Houston System, the Texas Tech University System, and the Texas State University System. While it might be
only a matter of time before these schools are absorbed, none of the five university systems have shown much interest in absorbing existing institutions, probably due to their rural location. The real interest for these systems appears to be within major metropolitan cities, such as Austin, Dallas, Houston, or San Antonio, where there is the potential to attract and support a growing population of students and improve their overall academic standing among the general public and the legislators.

**Statement of the Problem**

It has been a goal of The Texas A&M University System (TAMUS) to have a university within the boundaries of one of the major metropolitan cities in Texas. The TAMUS’s interest in developing a campus in San Antonio has been around since the early 1990s; however, as with many higher education decisions, the San Antonio initiative has been caught in the “political coffee grinder.” While it took some time to build the necessary support, the goal has become a reality. Approval to formally establish Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA) was just granted during the 81st Texas Legislative session in 2009.

There are three major stakeholders that have been involved with the development and establishment of TAMUSA. First, there is the collection of institutions and agencies that constitute the TAMUS. These institutions and agencies were, at one point, independent but for various reason either willingly or forcefully joined the TAMUS. The agencies and institutions are typically overshadowed by the land grant, tier one, research institution known as Texas A&M University.
Second, there is the TAMUS administration. TAMUS administration consists of regents who are appointed by the governor and typically have little experience in higher education governance. Below the regents are Chancellor/Vice-Chancellors, executive officers, faculty, and staff who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the member institutions and agencies.

Finally, there are state and local government officials who are elected to serve on behalf of their constituents. Many of these officials’ only experience with higher education are the degrees hanging on their wall; however, each official has the opportunity to influence the outcome of higher education either locally or statewide, or both.

Herein lies the fundamental question – how did three politically charged groups of people (TAMUS members, TAMUS administration, and local/state government officials) agree on a major concept to create a brand new institution of higher education in a major metropolitan city, which is supposed to benefit the citizens of the state of Texas, who will be providing funds through taxation?

Clearly, no one would actively speak out against providing higher education to an underserved area that is the South Side of San Antonio; however, there have been a few to argue against the manner in which TAMUSA was established. While the campus may have started by “following the rules,” it ended up being “fast tracked” into existence.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to tell the story about how TAMUSA was planned, explore the interaction between the major stakeholders and their decision-making processes,
and examine the key events that led to its establishment. The study will require qualitative inquiry that will provide lessons learned of what to do and what not to do when establishing a new institution of higher education in order for any future startup university to avoid making similar decisions.

**Research Questions**

This study is designed addresses the following research questions:

1. What is the role that state government plays in determining higher education administration, funding, and overall governance?
2. What are the influencing factors affecting decisions for administering higher education systems, universities/colleges, and/or overall institutional initiatives?
3. What impact does legislative governance have on the outcome of higher education decision-making either at a systems level or at an institutional level?
4. What were the key factors in supporting and the eventual establishment of another institution of higher education in San Antonio, now known as Texas A&M University-San Antonio?

These four questions will assist the researcher in determining the effect that specific individuals had on the development and establishment of TAMUSA; how key events and the local and state level accelerated the process of making TAMUSA a stand-alone institution; and highlight specific instances in which TAMUSA benefited from the private and public support received at various levels.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter contains three sections. The first section is a review of the literature relating to the historical development of higher education in the United States, largely from the perspective of historian John Thelin. The second section is a review of the literature, from authors such as Robert Birnbaum, Michael Cohen, and William Tierney, exploring current models, theories, and influences that contribute to modern higher education institution governance structures and organizational culture. The third section is a developmental/historical and governance perspective of TAMUSA, which uses sources to support preliminary conclusions from authors highlighted in sections one and two.

Historical Institutional Development

Today’s typical image of the 18th and 19th century higher education institution revolves around the notion of institutions that lacked foresight, taught traditional liberal arts subjects, were frequently closely affiliated with a particular religious denomination, and were racially and economically segregated. While institutions were subjected to low attendance, routine instruction and space limitations, there was a push by state/local governments and private organizations to establish new institutions of higher education as well attract new students to existing institutions (Thelin, 2004).

Although attending college remained a luxury for most Americans during the 19th century, there was a gradual attendance change in economic and gender standards. Thelin
(2003) notes that students from a wide range of income levels began to join their more affluent peers in the college experience. The growing diversity of student attending college had two significant social impacts. First, higher education was providing new opportunities for the “common person” that was previously reserved for the more wealthy members of society. Second, the inclusion of the “common person” was “Americanizing” the higher education experience as more people began to attend and more institutions were established. (Thelin, 2004).

As higher education became more necessary in the late 19th century because of the Industrial Revolution, the emergence of the modern institution began, leaving behind the more traditional institution. Similar to the technological change brought about by the Industrial Revolution, Thelin (2004) notes that America witnessed a dramatic “university movement” between 1870 and 1910, creating a new type of institution that combined traditional liberal arts with technical studies financed by large-scale philanthropy and enhanced by new campus construction. Although the hybrid institution movement was taking hold, the traditional American undergraduate college also soared in popularity as the growing population needed skilled teachers with a liberal arts education as westward expansion established frontier schools (Thelin, 2004).

On balance, the growth of higher education in America at the turn of the twentieth century contributed to the advancement of cutting edge scholarship and research, thanks in part to the rise of the industrial sector; however, Thelin (2003) notes that that at the same time this “advancement” remained second place to the traditional purpose of the undergraduate education. Furthermore, in contrast to the institution of higher education in the
In the decades between World Wars I and II, the state institutions of the West and Midwest finally started to become beacons of education as defined in the Morrill Act. Images of widespread access to these institutions, however, must be kept in context and not exaggerated. Many of the large state universities were still small in size and limiting in course offerings. In fact, even as late as 1940, many state institutions could barely surpass an enrollment of five thousand students. In addition, the institutions lacked advanced programs, graduate studies or research opportunities (Thelin, 2004).

The emergence of the modern state institutions and the multi-campus university system known today developed during the post-World War II era of expanding enrollments, which were spurred by political influences, such as the GI Bill and research investments for military applications. In place of multiple colleges and universities, many states began to combine their numerous institutions into one or more centrally administered education systems. In addition to creating these university systems, the states created coordinating commissions, master plans, and accrediting agencies, while institutional administrators worked to bring their institutions into the 20th century. (Thelin, 2003). Sixty years later, Texas A&M University-San Antonio would be a benefactor of these efforts by being linked to the second largest university system in Texas.

In addition to the high profile state institutions, Thelin (2003) highlights public community college systems that began to emerge as means to get either an applied science degree in a technical career field or become partners with the state institutions whereby the community colleges would offer the first two years of undergraduate education and provide a
smooth transfer to the state university for upper-level work. Sixty years later, Texas A&M University-San Antonio would align itself with the Alamo Community College District’s Palo Alto campus to offer third and fourth year courses.

Throughout its history, higher education has been plagued of periods of growth and retraction. College and university administrators of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s had to contend with a boom in construction and enrollments followed by financial hard times, cutbacks, and national political uncertainties that caused tensions among students and administrators. Thelin (2003) highlights the most significant change to higher education during these three decades - the role of the federal. Federal involvement came through programs ranging from the 1964 Civil Rights Act, financial aid, and the Higher Education Facilities Act.

Between 1990 and 2000 most colleges and universities were able to rebound from the cuts to state funding and the decline in endowment portfolios of the previous three decades. Thelin (2003) notes that this period of improvement, however, did not spare the institutions from continuing concerns about how to reinvent or improve college campuses and experience. Institutions were force to acknowledged the qualitative and quantitative changes of the previous decades and pay more attention to factors such as enrollment patterns, student backgrounds, learning patterns, and student services.

Even though institutions enjoyed the economic prosperity of the 1990s, concerns persisted. At the turn of the 21st century, administrators had to face new challenges and the fact that the demand for non-academic services and employment began to account for a substantial portion of focus – administrative services, campus security, technology
accommodations, campus maintenance, health and wellness programs/facilities, and other programs that expanded the college experience for students (Thelin, 2003).

In recent years, economic and enrollment concerns have dominated every aspect of colleges and universities’ existence – course offerings that are numerically tied to formula funding, deciding between academic success and academic prowess, or use of athletics as a recruiting tool. Vast amounts of money and resources are being spent on amenities designed to attract students and athletes instead of academics and meaningful research that were being emphasized at the end of the 19th century through the middle of the 20th century. Today, there is a debate within society as to the purpose of higher education and what role it should play – is it teaching, research, a combination of either functions, or something entirely different? Certainly the decision to establish new institutions, such as TAMUSA, only adds more fuel to the debate.

Colleges and universities are among the most revered institutions in American society. They can also be the most controversial. Today’s state institutions face taxpayer dissatisfaction, corporate influence on research due to funding, political manipulation/interference, a decline in the arts/humanities, and societal disregard. Although Thelin (2003) argues for “recognizing the existence of observable trends and norms,” he rightfully leaves an aspiring administrator with the impression that “any identifiable trends and norms are highly complex and rife with exceptions,” which is why it is important to apply decision-making and organizational modeling to system/institutional administrative operations.
Institutional Decision Making

Higher education institutions are organizations that consist of competing people, groups, choices, stakeholders, and purposes. These institutions can be viewed as a “collections of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations, solutions looking for issues to be answered, and decision makers looking for work” (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972, 2). Garbage Can Model is one of several methods have been devised to address these and other intricate operational decision-making processes that define higher education.
Garbage Can Model.

Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can model represents a collection point for the issues confronting the institution that are in need of solutions. The garbage can model describes the accidental or random convergence of mass amounts of information, choice opportunities, solutions, participants, problems, and the like. The final decision depends very strongly on time, participation, and content. The garbage can model operates within institutional processes by analyzing the problems, determining the importance of the problems, and then resolving the problems in order of feasibility.

Cohen et al.’s (1972) garbage can model places a significant emphasis on information. The information depends on the mix of stakeholders, on the level of participation of the stakeholders, on what information is being contributed, the timeliness of the information being collected, and the role of the various stakeholders in the final decision. The authors state, “The garbage can methodology process is one in which participants move problems and solutions from one choice opportunity to another in such a way that the nature
of the choice, the time it takes, and the problems it solves all depend on a relatively complicated intermeshing of elements.” (pg. 18)

In addition to the various participants and groups, organizational elements (culture, process, policy, decision style, problem activity, problem latency, decision maker activity, and decision difficulty) influence the outcomes of a garbage can process. Cohen et al. (1972) notes that “organizational elements can affect the time of arrival of problems, choices, solutions, or participants” (p. 18). The elements can also determine the allocation of energy as well as establish linkages among the potential participants.

Organizational extremes can complicate the decisions produced by the garbage can. The garbage can overlook institutional differences even through different points of view from competing stakeholders exist. The garbage can views institutional differences as a way to resolve the issues; however, it provides little assistance on how to deal with the penalty once the decisions are made (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). In the instance of TAMUSA, the garbage can model might not be able to account for the politically charged environment in which it has to operate.

The garbage can decision model is not only the model to explain decision-making processes. There are other types of decision-making models. There are instances in which time does not afford the complexities of the garbage can model. (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992)

Strategic decision-making involves those institutional decisions that are directed to and intended to shape a specific course of action, commit scarce resources, and set organizational precedents. Most often, strategic decisions that critically affect organizational
cohesiveness and operational success are made by top administrators of an institution (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).

Whereas the garbage can model ignores conflict, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) note that strategic decision-making can resolve conflict in two important ways. First, resolution can come through political means – a common approach that is endemic to state-managed institutions of higher education. Second, resolution can come by developing a cooperative style that build commonalities, maintain equity, and evoke satisfaction among the participants or groups - a quid pro quo method of resolution that is endemic to political organizations.

“Strategic planners, similarly, do not believe that the organization must be at the mercy of the environment. Rather, since strategic planning is ‘a conscious process by which an institution assesses its current state and the likely future condition of its environment, planners and administrators can be more confident that the interdependence between the institution and its surrounding environment is consciously planned for and taken advantage of when decisions are made and strategies implemented” (Swenk, 1999, p. 4).

It is easy for decision-makers to get trapped in questions of efficiency, rather than questions of effectiveness. Strategic planning, because it requires an examination of the quality of what is produced, helps counter this tendency because it reminds administrators that the institution's short-term goals can defeat its long-term goals. A well thought out decision-making plan, therefore, accounts for upcoming and sometimes unexpected opposition, indecisiveness, and complacency. Institutions of higher education often use strategic planning to justify its creation, as in the case of Texas A&M University-San Antonio, and continuation.
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) also advance the rational decision-making model. Rational decision-making can be considered the optimal choice for administering an organization or institution when time is not essential. Rational decision-making theorists believe that it is important to understand how the organization comes to know its environment.

Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) provide three basic identifiers for this model. First, decision makers satisfice instead of optimize, meaning the stakeholders gravitate to the solutions that addresses the problem rather than selecting the “optimal” solution. Second, while other models follow basic phases of problem identification, development and selection, rational decision-making cycles through the various processes, often repeating or finding new processes in search of the optimal decision. Third, the complexity and conflict within the decision-making process often requires rationality to influence the course of the decision path.

Rational decision making can be classified as multidimensional. Multidimensional decision making allows stakeholders to be rational in specific situations but not others, which can make them effective, particularly in fast-paced, highly charged political environments. Rational decision makers can adjust their approach to match the problem, rather than picking through the garbage can in search of the right choices given the availability of inconclusive information. “Rational choices are those which select the one alternative from among many considered to be the most appropriate means for reaching the desired ends” (Swenk, 1999, pg 4).

One significant drawback to the rational decision-making model is that final goals become clouded as too much time is taken in the process. Rational decision makers often
spend most of their time searching for solutions, information, and alternatives unsystematically, which contributes to the time consuming characteristic of this model. Analysis of alternatives used by the rational decision maker during the decision making process are limited and, in the end, often reflect the use of predefined procedures rather than a formulated analysis (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).

Organizational Modeling

There are five major models used to describe institutional governance. The models are bureaucratic, collegial, political, anarchical, and cybernetic. At first glance, these models may appear to be at odds with each other; however, each model illuminates certain aspects of an organization while obscuring others. Each of the models can be applicable to a singular institution; however, each is incomplete, meaning that no single model can fully account for all decisions or individual actions or administrative governance. There are no American institutions of higher education that exhibit a single organizational model.

Institutions of higher education should be understood within the context in which they exist – an educational system or organization being pulled by history, culture, politics, leadership, and public interest. Higher education institutions are coalitions of people and groups of people with competing interests. These competing interests arise from differing points of view on events, positional biases, and ambitions and goals. An understanding of these conflicts of interests is important to understanding the organization.

Applying organizational models, such as those advanced by Robert Birnbaum, is one way of understanding competing or conflicting interests. Birnbaum’s models - collegial,
bureaucratic, political, anarchical, and cybernetic – have their own unique characteristics and applications to explain higher education administration/governance structures. The models can help describe how colleges work as organizations, but fall short of predicting behavior. In contrast, the models are used as an attempt to label institutional behaviors/management preferences. By applying Birnbaum’s five governance models, an administrator or casual observer can better understand various organizational functions and governance strategies that define an institution, system, and/or organization as well as its decision-making processes. The use of Birnbaum’s models will assist in understanding the emergence of TAMUSA.

Birnbaum’s (1988) collegial organizational model is managed by power sharing between the faculty and administration. The collegial model emphasizes consensus, power sharing and effective consultation between faculty, administrators and governing boards. The collegial organization is a community held together by shared academic values and a strong tradition of decision-making collaboration often characterizing small, liberal arts institutions.

The collegial model reflects an institution with a shared sense of cooperation and responsibility among the stakeholders. Since participants are viewed as equals, a hierarchy is not very important and no one person is given dictatorial powers. In fact, while a executive office position exists, the position is seen as ceremonial and subservient to the academic needs of the institution, rather than as an independent actor with absolute power (Birnbaum, 1988; Chaffee, 1983).

Another key characteristic of the collegial model is that, while institutional goals are largely obtained through cooperation, strategic decision-making is reached by the interest and
experience of those participating in the exercise. As is the case with many organizational models, institutional goals are not easily made with competing interests and experiences. “Faculty, acting together as peers, reason together toward their common goals--and their goals may not be congruent with the whole institution's goals” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 8).

Birnbaum’s (1988) bureaucratic organizational model represents an institution that is managed by a clear, hierarchical chain of command. Decision-making flows from the top of the organization down to the various administrative and academic departments. The bureaucratic model has defined rules and regulations that control all aspects of operations. Effective, efficient, and timely governance of processes is greatly emphasized.

While this description may be correct for the administrative hierarchy, it is not, however, an accurate description of the organization and culture across the horizontal axes of the institution. A dual and competing institutional hierarchy, the relatively flat communication between groups, and the focus on consensus and expertise are clearly in conflict with this model.

Birnbaum’s (1988) anarchical governance model explains an organization that has loose administrative bonds between participants – faculty and administration. In an anarchical institution, governance appears chaotic with individuals or groups operating independently from the central administration group. The leader’s ability to respond to situations and make tactical decisions is important to the health and stability of the institution. Decision-making is not clearly defined and is often clouded by contentious issues. Within the anarchical organization, goals are ambiguous and uncoordinated.

An example of goal ambiguity is the institutional mission statement. Even though the mission statement is supposed to guide the development of the institution, each discipline has
its own goal that "in actuality often reflect primarily the interests of individual departments and faculty members" (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 155). While the organization’s mission statement focuses on teaching, research, and public service as all-encompassing goals, the goals still leave a broad scope about what can be taught, researched, or considered public service by each discipline (Clark, 1983).

In an anarchical model, most issues have a varying level of importance to each participant. Therefore, participation in decision-making is erratic and fragmented. Since the total system has loose bonds between participants, any action requiring coordination is not likely to be successful (Chaffee, 1983). “What issues are discussed in the context of any particular decision depends less on the specific issues or problems than on the timing of their joint arrivals and the existence of alternatives" (Cohen & March, 1986, pg 206). These are frequently termed “loosely-coupled.”

Birnbaum’s (1988) political governance model requires coordination of many diverse and sometimes conflicting groups, missions, and priorities. A political organization is an institution whose decision-making is decentralized and accomplished by persuasion, diplomacy and mediation. At times, consensus and collegiality may not be apparent and a political model may provide a more accurate description of higher education decision-making. In such instances, power, coalition-building, and negotiation govern decision-making. Instead, power is fought and won, and developing a collegial-type culture of consensus is inhibited by the competing interests of different subsystems and individuals within the institution (Chaffee, 1983).

On the surface, the political model resembles a business model. Unlike many rational-based business structures, however, higher education participants, especially in a
state institution setting, have multiple and conflicting goals that are defined primarily by their self-interests and the (frequently disciplinary) subsystems in which they operate, instead of the overarching goals found at the system level (Chaffee & Tierney, 1983).

In the political model, monetary resources and information are two factors that lead to competition among the participants. Whether it is the desire to receive additional funds that lead to partnering up between different groups or administrative authority restricting funds, funding is used to influence the direction of decision-making. Holding specific information is an asset that gives a person or groups the upper hand in negotiations; it can also aid in building coalitions within the organization (Chaffee & Tierney, 1983).

The political model also involves social exchange in which Birnbaum describes one person or group giving a good or service with the expectation of something in return (*quid pro quo*). Birnbaum (1988) notes that these “blockades, negotiations, and exchanges” may seem to slow the processes and decisions of an institution/organization; however, this “inefficiency” leads to institutional stability (p. 138).

Birnbaum’s (1988) cybernetic organizational model is a balance and consolidation of the political, bureaucratic, collegial, and anarchical organizational models. Consolidating the four models into one model helps maintain institutional governance equilibrium. Because different missions, goals, and stakeholder interests are usually at work behind the scenes, organizational model consolidation is sometimes necessary for operational understanding and planning. The inclusion of all four organizational models minimizes or maximizes effective institutional governance compared to the impact to the institution if only one model was applied.
Birnbaum (1988) asserts that this balance allows the use of multiple sources for detecting changes in the equilibrium of an institution. Subsequently, when levels of all or most of the organizational dimensions are at work, there may be many different types of activities in which different types of administrators/faculty may become involved. These activities are designed to meet department/subsystem needs rather than to exert a common type of influence that would ultimately homogenize the outcomes of the organization.

The presences of all models may simultaneously result in less pressure for administrators/faculty to conform to institutional expectations than other moderate types of organizational environments. As the levels of bureaucracy with the different models increase, the policies, procedures, requirements, and goals that guide campus life would be more applicable to more participants in more situations. Therefore, the low levels of bureaucracy in the casual type of environment inhibit a college's ability to exert conforming pressures relative to other environments that are composed primarily of medium levels of the five dimensions of organizational behavior (Baldridge, 1991).

All preliminary research gathered to date point to Birnbaum’s political organizational model for TAMUSA. There are several factors that support this assertion. First, there are the institution’s participants. These participants - legislators, city officials, and various senior level higher education administrators - are by nature and profession, political. Second, there are legislative and policy processes. Legislative and policy processes are needed for establishment and continued operation of the university.

According to Birnbaum, Cohen et al., and others, more theoretical reasons exist for applying a political model approach. First, while a political model may not be the most suitable, it is applicable because this model can help understand what affect the environment
has on the decision-making process. Second, a political model is a more accurate description of reality for state institutions of higher education. Third, the political model contains elements of competing interest groups, conflict over goals, differing values, play for power and influence, consistent negotiation, and never ending bargaining. Fourth, the political model is comprised of stakeholders who employ tactics such as coalition building and using information to gain an upper hand. Fifth, political organizations are comprised of stakeholders with obvious preferences. Sixth, political organizations have competing coalitions in many decisions making process who contend for scarce resources. Seventh, in a political model policy decisions emerge mostly from competing interest groups, organization conflict, or culture within the organization, which is sometimes attributed to a given political position within the organization rather than a personal attribute.

Within a political organization there will always be competition for prestige, influence, and power; therefore, negotiation and compromise are the best method of keeping a political system functional. Many groups that participate in a political system have multiple relationships and/or associations with other groups that are vying for a share of the power. One group may use another group to reach a goal and then align with yet another group for a completely separate goal. It is this maneuvering and coalition building that makes negotiation and shifting of power possible within a political system (Birnbaum, 1988).

With all the push and pull, the shifting of power, and the building and breaking down of coalitions, it may seem that nothing gets accomplished in a political system. This lack of efficiency, coupled with strong administration characteristics, however, can lead to the best outcome. Birnbaum (1988) insinuates that that behavior within the political system is based on a *quid pro quo* system of checks and balances. The movements and developments in a
political system are usually slow and in small increments because of the varying and conflicting interest involved in the diplomacy.

One major problem with the political model is that the variety of participants and issues are so broad that not all decisions can be reviewed and debated to a rational conclusion. Birnbaum (1988) notes that while legitimate power exists in the form of an administrative hierarchy, power is either shared or bought. This is apparent in the struggle to bring the decision-making process to a successful conclusion.

Decision-making in a political system is best demonstrated by the channels of communication between groups, coalitions, and individuals. This is crucial in such a volatile political environment when there are so many conflicting and varying points of view, and when the decisions are typically made by the most influential stakeholder(s). The most influential decision makers often attempt to change the course of the process by building coalitions of stakeholders, manipulation of information, and the use of external experts (Cohen & March, 2000).

Systems thinking is a good way to view political organizations. Applying systems thinking helps to categorize the political model as a system of interrelated/interdependent concepts, definitions, and generalizations that systematically describe and explain patterns of regularities or irregularities within an institution to form a complex and unified organization. Chaffee and Tierney’s (1988) application of systems thinking lays an excellent foundation for the epistemological exploration of higher education administration systems. A crucial step in epistemological researching is immersion in the culture of the university. The authors stress the importance of getting to know the people, the history, interactions, and behaviors.
Viewed in its entirety, Kast and Rosenzweig (1992) note that the political model can be described as a system with interacting subsystems. These subsystems can be either internal or external forces that compete for power, position, prestige, and resources. The subsystems directly impact and affect the central system and each other. Subsystems affect the quality of work, relationships with other subsystems, and central operations. It becomes the purpose of the subsystems to show the distinction between an organization, the organization's culture, and system.

A political organization can be defined as a partially open and partially closed system that, according to Ackoff, has four essential organizational characteristics. First, some, if not all, of its elements are human beings who have biases and ambitions through politics, academia, administration, or communal. Second, two or more groups with identical goals are necessary to get things done either through coalition building or employing a gang effect. Third, each group is aware of each other's behavior either through interdependency or interaction or competition for resources, or a quid pro quo effort. Fourth, groups have some freedom to choose between perceived outcomes during the decision-making process (Ackoff, 1960).

In response to Birnbaum, Kezar and Eckel (2004) state, “Birnbaum's focus on the necessity of political, collegial, and symbolic processes underscores the importance of the human factors to the way governance operates. Furthermore, Birnbaum’s underlying assumption is that governance varies first by institution (the system) and then by department (the subsystem). Birnbaum’s conclusions reinforce cultural viewpoints in which the local context, history, and values override pre-described strategies for improving governance, and attempts at rational decision-making” (p. 383).
A Historical/Developmental and Governance Perspective of Higher Education

Thelin (2003) documents that more than 15 million students attended postsecondary institutions in the United States at the turn of the 21st century, in contrast to the 5 percent of all Americans who were enrolled in college from 1700 to 1900. This enrollment figure helps explain the paradigm shift of higher education from an exclusive system of yesterday to a system of equal access and equal opportunity. This trend has been characterized by sheer number of different kinds of institutions, in the changing demographic student population, in the way that technology is used the classroom, and in the increase of the overall population who needs postsecondary education in today’s advanced economy. Texas A&M University-San Antonio has the potential to meet these challenges.

The expanded enrollment and institution growth requires a closer examination of 21st century higher education systems. Thelin’s (2004) approach to explaining American higher education in takes the position that today’s 21st century institutions are products of various historical trends. First, there is the “official” history that is chronicled through formal documents. Second, and sometimes more important, is the history associated with legends, lore, sagas, and interrelated events. This history includes the informal yet powerful memories of those inside the institution as well as those outside the institution.

Using an identical approach to that of Thelin, a historical examination of the establishment of Texas A&M University-San Antonio can constructed. Studying the establishment of TAMUSA is an ideal example of 21st century institution building. First, an abundance of documentation is available, which Thelin calls “official” history. Second, a first person account is available to provide what Thelin calls the “legends, lore, and
memories” of the institution’s establishment. By placing an emphasis on historical episodes, Thelin helps to charts a future that “keeps in mind quantitative changes [that] have signaled qualitative changes” (Thelin, 2003, pg 4).

Thelin (2004) often refers to higher education history as being horizontal. This history is the “founding and influence of institutions and agencies that cut horizontally across the higher-education landscape.” The horizontal perspective is a lens that is crucial to understanding the interdependence between the institution’s traditional support mechanisms and the political environment. It also integrates a history of public policies with that of colleges and universities.

Emphasizing key historical episodes, Thelin (2004) writes an account of the origins and progress of public and private colleges and universities, emphasizing that today’s institutions are inheritors to numerous historical trends and topics. Once the historical documentation and verbal histories have been put into context the examination of the organization can start.

State institutions of higher education are reasonably assumed to be political and affected by political imbalances. It is often in a political environment that stakeholders easily move from one coalition to another as influence and decisions shift, especially as resources become scarce, notoriety evaporates, or personal gain is lost. Administrators, faculty and other participants vary their tactics as the situation changes or as decision-making become more clear and/or focused.

There are varying levels of interaction between different groups that strive for power and understanding these interactions is crucial to maintaining an effective political system. Therefore, there is a need to analyze an institution from different angles - “the level of the
environment, the level of the social organization as a system, and the level of the subsystems (human participants) within the institution. Perhaps much of our confusion and ambiguity concerning organizational effectiveness stems from a failure to clearly delineate the level of analysis and, even more important, a failure really to understand the relationships among these levels (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972, pg 456).

Sometimes politics employs the tactic of controlling information by manipulating and controlling of critical information paths. On other occasions, politics employ the tactics of timing and opportunism. And sometimes, politics emphasizes the system/organization in which the institute operates (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).

Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) note that a key characteristic of the political model is that individual choice reflects the influence of power stakeholders. Another feature noted is that individuals engage in politics because they want to enhance their own power to influence a decision. Politically charged decisions frequently do not resolve problems regardless of the decision-making model being utilized. Decisions involving political situations are often made by flight or oversight, lacking the basic rationale of strategic or basic garbage can strategies. Political decision processes are sensitive to events, participants, and goals.

External influences are also a factor in the political decision-making process for many institutions of higher education, especially state institutions. External stakeholders often have conflicting preferences form that of the institution. These external stakeholders often engage in politics in order to gain a favorable advantage, whether it is for a position, financial opportunity, or institutional goals. (Cohen, March & Cohen, 1972).

History does matter, especially when an administrator is trying to understand why an institution of higher education operates/functions (organizational culture or decision-making
complexities, for example) in the manner it does in order to make an informed decision. They must understand that in order to lead and make informed/responsible decisions, they must have knowledge of the past and appreciate that knowledge for the future. Despite the intricacy of higher education in the United States, Thelin (2003) shows through research and example that histories shed light upon current realities, helps make sense of culture, and can assist in the decision-making process.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides detailed information about the selection of a research methodology, collection of primary and secondary sources, determining subject matter experts, collection of subject matter information, and the investigation process used in explaining the development and establishment of Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA). The collection and evaluation of subject matter information was reviewed and approved by the Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board for approval.

Selection of the Qualitative Research Model

A researcher has various methods available by which to conduct the research. Two popular methods are quantitative and qualitative. Basically, qualitative data involves words, describes a problem that is text based, utilizes few or no statistical tests, and does not need a hypothesis to start the research. Quantitative data involves numbers, surveys, requires observed effects of a problem and uses statistical tests for analyses. Additionally, each method treats the role of the principle investigator differently. In the quantitative method, the principle investigator is presumed to be objective, neither participating nor influencing. In contrast, the qualitative researcher is anticipated to participate and be immersed in the problem.

Given the basic understanding of both methods, a qualitative methodology has been chosen for this study. A significant component of this method is participant observation and
participant interviews. It requires that the researcher become an integral part of the problem and accepted as a natural part of the culture in order to assure that the observations are of the naturalist inquiry phenomena. A responsive researcher relies heavily on qualitative approaches to gathering information about the subject. These approaches are extensions of normal human activities – looking, listening, speaking and writing. This means the researcher uses interviewing, observing, taking account of nonverbal cues, and delving into already available documents and records as methods of data collection.

There are arguments for and against the use of qualitative methods. The most common argument against the use of qualitative methods is that the researcher is human and brings a certain level of bias into the study. On the other hand, the main argument for using qualitative methodology is that the method revolves around particular forms of social reality. Numeric and/or statistical measurements do not adequately explain why a decision was made or what external factions may have contributed to a particular decision (Patton, 1990).

Qualitative methodology is inherently naturalistic because the research takes place in a natural setting. Michael Patton explains, "Naturalistic inquiry is thus contrasted to experimental research where the investigator attempts to completely control the condition of the study" (Patton, 1990). Lincoln and Guba (1985) point to axioms to describe naturalistic inquiry. Five relevant axioms that relate to this study are: reality, influence, identity, knowledge, and the role of values.

Reality is the first axiom. Reality, in a naturalistic approach, can consist of multiple, socially-constructed realities, which can be comprehended but not foreseen or managed. The second naturalistic axiom is the subject-object relationship, which make the inquirer and the object of inquiry interact, making each influence the other to an extent where they are
inseparable. The third axiom is the nature of causality, which has an effect of shaping all involved entities simultaneously. The fourth axiom is knowledge, which can be described ideographically as a hypothesis that describes the subject case. Finally, all inquiry is value-laden, regardless if it is dealing with specific values, paradigms, theories, contexts, or personal/groups (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Naturalist inquiry is a method to explain, comprehend or understand life experiences and configurations based on participant observations, which contrasts with research done in the laboratory. Natural inquiry typically focuses on specific individuals or a group of individuals rather than preordained categories. When dealing the individuals or groups of individuals, naturalistic inquiry can account for and take into consideration multiple stakeholders, each with different agendas and interests. Finally, naturalistic inquiry uses descriptive and narrative data, i.e. the interview, to tell the story of an event or events (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

The naturalistic approach is especially appropriate in this research effort because there is no attempt to argue the value of establishing another institution of higher education or to argue the roles that each participant played during the establishment process. The intended purpose of this approach is to develop a “lessons learned” model, and to attempt to discover if there are specific instances of “what not to do” and/or decisions that contributed to TAMUSA’s success.
Instrumentation and Data Sources

The research used a variety of means and methods to tell the story of the development and establishment of TAMUSA; however, the major instrument is the human. Due to the qualitative/naturalistic methodology used, interviews of key decision-makers were conducted, consisting of a mixture of open-ended and follow-up questions. Primary and secondary source information was gathered to support and supplement the data collection through the interview process.

Acquisition of Primary and Secondary Sources

Interviews alone did not tell the story of the development and establishment of TAMUSA. Primary and secondary data sources were therefore needed. Primary sources were those documents obtained during the time of the study. Examples of primary sources include diaries, speeches, manuscripts, and official records. Secondary sources interpret and analyze primary sources. Examples of secondary sources included newspapers articles, commentaries, textbooks, and histories.

The principal investigator (PI) had a distinct advantage in collecting primary and secondary sources – his position as an employee of the Texas A&M University System (TAMUS). TAMUS employment worked in two ways. First, over the course of fifteen years of TAMUS service the PI has built a rapport with peers and senior administrators that allows for candid conversation and familiarity. Part of the challenge in getting information during an interview or asking individuals for information comes from a historical relationship.
Second, the PI had easy access to or knew where to find historical documents collected during the period that is address in this study. In most instances, a non-TAMUS employee would have to submit specific open records requests for the documentation; whereas the PI had direct access and could shift and short at his leisure without the confines of time and content.

When sifting through available documents, it is important to distinguish between primary and secondary sources. Questions to be asked in determining which type of source is being examined include: “(1) How does the author know the details of the content included in their document; (2) Does the content come from personal involvement, eyewitness accounts, or content that someone else has written; and (3) Is the source conclusion based on evidence or conclusions from other sources” (http://guides.library.ucsc.edu/primarysecondary?hs=a)?

The collection of primary source material was anticipated to be extensive. Any progress made in the development and establishment of TAMUSA required Texas legislative and/or Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) approval. Legislative material consisted of legislation bills submitted by legislators for consideration during the legislative session, justification for funding or course approval by TAMUS officials, and briefs filed by TAMUSA supports. The THECB documents consisted of minutes of meetings, official correspondence, and program documentation. TAMUS Board of Regents has similar methods for documenting processes and procedures.

In addition to the documentation produced by various Texas agencies and governing bodies it was anticipated that personal correspondence, diaries, and memos would be available for use through direct requests made during the interviews. These sources provided
additional insight into the decision-making processes, concerns expressed during key events, or reflections on transpiring past events.

Secondary sources filled-in the gaps either missed during the interview process or during the collection of documents. Newspapers and/or journal articles were important in accomplishing this objective. Newspaper articles and journals were also useful in identifying the various individuals who made a substantial contribution during the period being examined and giving an accurate timeline of events and key milestones in the development and establishment of TAMUSA.

Most, if not all, of the documents collect during the interviews and while serving as an employee was provided in confidence. Of course and unless ruled otherwise by the Texas Attorney General, all state documents are subject to open records; however, some of the documents would fall outside of such a request, and the ones that would be subject to open records would be difficult to find by the average citizen. Therefore, protecting the confidentially of the documents collected was made a priority during this study. In instances where confidential information was accessed, the PI cites either his notes or documents.

Data Analysis

“Analysis of data is a process of inspecting, cleaning, transforming, and modeling data with the goal of discovering useful information, suggesting conclusions, and supporting decision making” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_analysis). While there are various methods to analyze the accuracy of the data collected, such as statistical, mechanical and descriptive, the PI chose to employ an interpretative approach.
An interpretative research method works well with researching higher education administration. This is mainly true because those who review higher education administration are most likely to gather data, conduct limited interview (either through questionnaires or in-person), and are seen making observations.

Interpretive research is “based on relating how individuals experience or interpret the world in which they live, observe, and realize.” With this method, the researcher becomes part of the process, seeing and understanding an environment where there are multiple realities. Each researcher, therefore, has their own perception, comprehension, and interpretation of their reality in their own way. (Merriam, 1991)

For this reason, researchers focus is on studying individual lives (in the paper “lives” is replaced by institutions, governing boards, and state government) and their significant events. The goal of this method, in the context of higher education administration, is to understand others' (state & institutional) experiences and relate them to another’s reality. (Merriam, 1991)

Interpretive method contends that only through the subjective interpretation of and intervention in reality can that subject be fully understood. Key to this method is the study of the researched environment, together with the acknowledgement that the researcher cannot avoid affecting that environment being studied.

While there “may” be many competing interpretations of the researched, these interpretations are in themselves a part of the learning processes. Therefore, interpretation credibility is the “degree of facts gathered between the realities of the research area and subjects; how closely the researcher interprets his/her intentions and realities; and how
closely the researcher is associated with the researched subject” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 243).

According to Guba and Lincoln, interpretivism can be narrowed to “…data, interpretations, and outcomes of inquiries [that] are rooted in contexts and persons apart from the [subject] and are not simply figments of the imagination…data (constructions, assertions, facts, and so on) can be tracked to their sources,…the logic used to assemble the interpretations into structurally coherent and corroborating wholes is both explicit and implicit in the narrative of a case…” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 243).

A better understanding of the interpretive method is to understand what it is not – positivist. Positivism relies on one “single, objective, static reality,” (Merriam, 1991, p. 48) showing single truths that rely on facts, experiments and a scientific methodology. Scientific methods are the binding rules for this paradigm, leaving little room for intervention of alternative causes and effects (Kuhn, 1996). Moreover, hypotheses and positions are stated in advance, while the conclusions are based on test and carefully controlled conditions.

Interpretative methodology can form the basis for critical theory, which is critical interpretive theory or social theory. Like critical race theory, critical interpretivism centers social changes as the core of the discussion. As Merriam states: “This paradigm requires researchers to reflect critically upon society and their complicity in reinforcing an oppressive structure so that they and the people they can overcome domination and repression…” (Merriam, 1991, p. 52).

Combined with an interpretivist paradigm, critical theory provides the “critical approach,” calling into question the interpretation of findings. The researcher, therefore, is allowed to scrutinize the social order without taking for granted assumptions that serve those
closely associated with the processes. Critical theory research is, in essence, a “change-enhancing approach to knowledge” (Merriam, 1991, p. 54).

**The Use of Interviews**

Interviewing utilizes open-ended questions that allow for individual constructions. There are three basic types of interviews: informal or conversational; semi-structured; and open-ended (Patton, 1990). This research project relied heavily on these methods for interviewing current and former members of the Texas legislature, senior level administrators of the TAMUS, and community members in San Antonio who played an active role in the development and establishment of TAMUSA.

It was anticipated that the interviews would enhance personal insight into the legislative process, academic decision-making, and local effort to support higher education as it relates to TAMUSA through a process of asking questions, taking notes of response, and discussing the answer. The interview method was especially beneficial in determining participants’ perceptions regarding higher education in general, the role each play(ed) in further higher education’s importance, and the impact, if any, each had/has with the development of TAMUSA.

Interviews, as a research method, have critics and supporters. There are academics that assert the reliability of interviews is lower because a researcher might identify and utilize only a small number of people to form an in-depth description of a narrow topic (Babbie, 2002). In contrast, other academics contend that the lack of contribution by interview participants is offset by the high measure of interaction between the researcher and
interviewee. Dialogue allows the respondents to have ambiguous questions clarified, which in turn allows the interview to explicitly address the intended topic area of the researcher (Berg, 2004).

Another advantage to using interviews to aid in research is through relationship building or building upon pre-existing relationships. Familiarity often removes barriers that the researcher might encounter if perceived to be an outsider or novice to the topic. In this study, the PI's experience as an employee of TAMUS, together with a familiarity with the legislative process, helped overcome potential barriers that other PIs might experience.

**Interview Participants**

This research project utilized former and current State of Texas Representatives and Senators, current and former senior level administrators of the TAMUS, and former and current community leaders in San Antonio. The population for the study was selected based on a single criterion: the participant had to have participated in the development and/or establishment of TAMUSA.

At the state legislature level, there are several current and former members; at the higher education level, there are current employees and former employees. Former city council members and private developers make up the participants at the local level. It is worth noting that the one individual most responsible for advancing the concept of an institution of higher education in South San Antonio and approaching the TAMUS to establish a campus died in 2006, making him unavailable for this research.
Potential participants were initially contacted by email. The researcher introduced himself, offered background information, and explained the educational purpose of the study. The potential participant was asked to participate in the study.

As noted earlier, the participants were recruited based on their involvement with higher education at the state level, institution level, or community level. The main criterion was that the participants had knowledge and/or some interaction with the development and decision-making process to establish Texas A&M University-San Antonio in South San Antonio, Texas. This resulted in identifying twenty-one participants.

Typically, a researcher would assign pseudonyms to the participants in an attempt to maintain anonymity. Participant pseudonyms would be chosen that shows a clear interaction between the individual and the research. This research, however, makes it almost impossible to protect the identities of the individual participants. All participants who were interviewed for this study have been identified based on preliminary inquiries of newspaper articles, legislative actions, and informal discussion with TAMUS officials.

Table 1 provides a participants list of Texas senators and representatives (shown with an “S”), TAMUS Board of Regents and senior administrators (shown as an “H”), and San Antonio city officials and community leaders (shown as a “C”) that were identified as individuals to be interviewed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Level Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royce West</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Ratliff</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Wentworth</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland Gutierrez</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Ogden</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judith Zafirini</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Uristi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leticia Van de Putte</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl Nye</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Cisneros</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greg Garcia</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Sayavedra</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Aviles</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike McKinney</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Perez</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Garza</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Lampman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Madla III</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Oliver</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlie Turner</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Macon</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – Identified Participants

**Participation in the Interview**

Each participant was asked to sign a consent form agreeing to be interviewed. The consent form included provisions allowing: what the participant will be asked to do; if there are risks and/or benefits involved; who will know about the participants’ involvement; and where to go for more information about participants’ rights. Since face-to-face meetings
were utilized, the participants were given an opportunity to read the consent form, ask questions, and sign before being asked any of the interview questions.

The Interview Approach

Before addressing the specific questions, information was first collected about the participants’ role in the development and establishment of TAMUSA prior to the interviews. This information-gathering exercise served the purpose of establishing a higher level of rapport with the participant and relieving any upcoming interview anxiety.

The interview questions were designed to collect data that would assist the researcher in addressing the principal research questions of this project. The interview questions represented an effort to develop a better understanding about the participants’ role and/or contribution to the development and establishment of TAMUSA.

Participants were asked a series of fairly open ended questions in order to collect data relating to their perception and experience of higher education governance. A second series of questions were asked of the participants related to the interaction between the Texas legislature and institutions of higher education. A final series of questions were specifically related to the participants’ involvement with TAMUSA. In addition, it was projected to be the need for other follow-up questions in order to clarify answers or assist the researcher in collecting the relevant data. The interview questions were:
1. Describe the role that state legislature plays in determining higher education administration? In funding?
2. What are some of the influencing factors with administering higher education systems, universities/colleges, programs, and/or overall higher education initiatives?
3. What is your higher education experience?
4. What is your current role in higher education governance?
5. What have been some of the challenging decisions that you have made in recent years?
6. Describe a beneficial relationship between state legislature and higher education administration.
7. When institutions of higher education are competing for funds from the state, what factors influence your decision in the distribution of those funds?
8. How can the State of Texas meet the higher education needs of future generations? What are some of the key decisions that need to be made to meet future challenges?
9. Is there such a thing as too many institutions of higher education in the State of Texas?
10. What impact does state governance have on the outcome of higher education?
11. What were some of the key factors in supporting an San Antonio campus for TAMUS?
12. What are some of the key factors in supporting and/or expanding a “university system” concept in Texas?
13. Was there any quid pro quo for your support of Texas A&M University-San Antonio?

Recording and Other Interview Methods

It was decided that a recording device would not be used. In addition, the researcher did not attempt phone interviews or send questionnaires to the participants. Recording devices may be seen as intrusive, which would likely put the participant on guard to avoid any statements that may contradict an “official” version of the facts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Therefore, recording the interviews provided no distinct advantage of capturing data any more than written notes.
Phone calls had been ruled out because it is doubtful that the researcher would have the participant’s undivided attention given their inherent responsibilities. Questionnaires have also been determined to be of little use. It is perceived, mainly from personal experience, that any questionnaire submitted to the participants would either not be returned or would be answered by support staff on their behalf.

**The Analytic Process**

Interview notes for each participant needed to be reviewed as soon as possible upon the completion of the interview. The review process was to develop as much familiarity as possible with the participants’ accounts. Each review should assist in identifying key phrases, preliminary interpretations and connections or contradictions with each participant’s account. In addition, the notes helped identify emerging themes associated with key events that captured the essential meaning of the answers. The resulting transcripts were reviewed against the notes taken during the interview in order to highlight developing themes and tie the note to documented facts and/or events.

When appropriate, developing themes were further categorized to create subordinate themes. Categorizing developing themes together required rechecking the source material in order to ensure the subordinate themes were consistent with the participants’ statements. Those themes which did not fit well into the logical structure of narrative were set aside (Wilig, 2001).
Criteria of Evaluation and Reflexivity

This study had the potential to be influenced by the researcher’s personal experiences as a higher education administrator at a state university system. This influence could be compounded by the additional fact that the researcher has been employed in the higher education system for fourteen years, and that within the past five years has been increasingly exposed to state legislative processes and legislators themselves. The end results, therefore, are based on perspectives of personal and professional experience.

An additional influence was that participants’ statements could be influenced by the researcher’s presence during the interview process if they are made aware of the researcher’s association to the subject matter being investigated. Participants’ knowledge of the researcher’s current position could either harm or help. On the one hand, knowing that the researcher had knowledge of higher education administration could mean that they will be more willing to share legislative stories relating to their experience. Lincoln and Guba (1985) point to the increased credibility of a study wherein the investigator has personal experience and high levels of familiarity with the subject matter. On the other hand, the knowledge could inhibit a candid response from the participants.

Throughout this study the researcher used the reflexive journal to record thoughts, perceptions, ideas, and notes about participants, interviews and other information that was relevant to the research topic. Lincoln and Guba (1985) described the use of the reflexive journal as a “tool in establishing credibility. The reflexive journal provides not only an insight into the activities of the researcher, but also into the thoughts and views experienced during the study” (p. 327).
Summary

This chapter has summarized the qualitative methodology used for the study. The chapter also included a review of applicable literature, use of primary and secondary source information, and a list of participants to be interviewed. In addition, the chapter set forth the criteria utilized to ensure baseline credibility.
CHAPTER IV
PARTICIPANT ANALYSIS

This chapter introduces and provides insight from the interviews conducted for this study. The first section of this chapter reviews the interview process and discusses the researcher’s decision to introduce the study’s participants, who are also key historical figures, in this Chapter. These processes are discussed here because the introduction of key figures and the note taking process is intended to assist the reader in better understanding the development of the historical analysis in subsequent chapters. A synopsis development process is included to assist the reader in developing a deeper appreciation of the data collected during the interviews.

The second section of this chapter provides an introduction/biography of each participant associated with Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA) and a brief synopsis of the interview. The purpose is to provide material needed to develop thick descriptions, as described by Lincoln and Guba (1985). This section helps to fulfill the researcher’s obligation to provide a sufficient base of understanding for readers to transfer the information to the historical setting.

The third section contains a discussion of the major themes identified during the interviews and derived by observations of individual reaction to questions. The themes are not present in fact-based history; however, are useful in analyzing the collected facts. Because of the lack of consistency in personalities, the researcher recognizes that overlaps, connections and distinctions will be identified by readers when comparing these themes to additional historical knowledge not included in the study.
Section One: The Interview Process and Synopsis Development

During the interviews, the researcher asked the participants various questions and listened to the responses. The responses were written with additional information as deemed appropriate. The researcher then prepared written synopses of the interviews. The technique of note-taking during the interview and development of the interview synopsis were taken from academic and professional training following years of applied interview experience.

Interviewing is a key tool in fieldwork for understanding aspects of observing human behavior and anthropological and sociological inquiry activity. It is a primary data collection technique for gathering knowledge and understanding about "lived experience." (Lincoln, 2001).

“Rapport” is one interviewing technique that allows the researcher to achieve sufficient sympathy or empathy with the participant, which results in the participant sharing critical or intimate data with the researcher. As with other fieldwork methodology, the interaction between a mandate to achieve rapport and the acknowledgement that conflict accompanies pluralism must be taken into account in fieldwork (Lincoln, 2001).

“Rapport” was utilized in this research study with the understanding that the interviews were interactive and the researcher was making an attempt to get the participant to divulge details during the session. After all, Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe the purpose of the interview is to gather information.
Section Two: Participant Interviews

This section contains the biographies for each participant. There is no particular correlation between the orders in which they are presented to the order of the actual interviews. Each participant is identified by their name and occupation. As noted earlier, the participants were recruited based on their involvement with higher education at the state level, institution level, or local level, mentioned during the course of preparation and examination of facts, and appearing in newspaper articles. The main criteria for selection was that the participants have firsthand knowledge and/or some interaction with the development and decision making process to establish TAMUSA in South San Antonio, Texas. This resulted in identifying twenty-two participants. The participants that were chosen to be interviewed for this study were identified based on preliminary inquiries of newspaper articles, legislative actions, and informal discussion with Texas A&M University System (TAMUS) officials.

Typically, a researcher would assign pseudonyms to the participants in an attempt to maintain anonymity. Participant pseudonyms would be chosen that shows a clear interaction between the individual and the research. This research subject, however, makes it almost impossible to protect the identities of the individual participants due to their public profile, statements made in first and secondary sources, and recorded associations made with the subject matter. (Lincoln & Guba, 1985)

Table 2 provides a list of participants who were identified to be interviewed. The list represents State of Texas legislators (shown with an “S”), higher education administrators and officials (shown as an “H”), and local government officials and members of the
community (shown as an “C”). At the end of the interview period, fifteen out of the twenty-
two identified individuals were successfully interviewed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Level Type</th>
<th>Interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royce West</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Ratliff</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Wentworth</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland Gutierrez</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Ogden</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judith Zafirini</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Uristi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leticia Van de Putte</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl Nye</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Cisneros</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greg Garcia</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S/H</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Sayavedra</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Aviles</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mike McKinney</td>
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<td>H</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Perez</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Garza</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Lampman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank Madla III</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Oliver</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S/C</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlie Turner</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Macon</td>
<td>F</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louise Agnese</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Interviewed Participants

**Senator Royce West – Texas Legislator**

Senator Royce West is a democratic member of the Texas legislature, a practicing
attorney with West & Associates, LLP, and active participant within the community he
represents. He received a bachelor’s and master’s degree from the University of Texas at Arlington, and a juris doctorate from the University of Houston. Senator West was interviewed on November 21, 2009 at his law office in Dallas, Texas by the principal investigator (PI).

Senator West was elected to the State Senator for Dallas County, District 23, in January 1993. He has represented the 23rd Senatorial District from the 73rd through the current 82nd legislative Sessions. Senator West is Chairman of the Intergovernmental Relations Committee and is a member of the Senate's Committees on Education, Finance, Health and Human Services and Higher Education. (West, n.d.)

Senator West’s has been credited for a number of initiatives during his tenure. Those initiatives include creating equal access and equal opportunities college students, helping to establish the University of North Texas at Dallas, enabling the a new law school in Dallas, and providing a funding source for the Texas Juvenile Crime Prevention Center at Prairie View A&M University. (West, n.d.)

Mr. Bill Ratliff – Former Texas Legislator

Senator Bill Ratliff was a Republican member of the Texas legislature from 1988 until 2003. He is currently a lobbyist in the firm Ratliff Company and active participant within the community he represented. He received a bachelor’s from the University of Texas at Austin, where he studied civil engineering. Senator Ratliff was interviewed on February 9, 2010 at his place of residence in Mount Pleasant, Texas by the principal investigator.

Senator Ratliff was elected to senate in 1988 to represent Titus County in northeast Texas. He was appointed chairman of the Senate Education Committee in 1992. From
1997-1998, he was the President Pro Tempore of the Texas Senate during the 76th Legislative Session. During his tenure, he supported notable initiatives such as the "Robin Hood" education program, which transfers funds from wealthier schools to poorer schools in order to provide a more equitable education funding, reforming the methodology that funded higher education by using a formula based on courses and students attendance, favoring "patients' rights" in medical malpractice cases, and suggesting raising taxes to close budget shortfalls. (Ratliff, n.d.)

**Senator Jeff Wentworth – Texas Legislator**

Senator Jeff Wentworth was a Republican member of the Texas legislature. He was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1988, and then to the State Senate in 1993. In 2012, he was defeated by a member of the Tea Party. Currently, he is a practicing attorney and realtor, and active participant within the community he once represented. He received a bachelor’s degree from Texas A&M University, and a juris doctorate from Texas Tech University School of Law. Senator Wentworth was interviewed on March 24, 2010 at his local government headquarters in San Antonio, Texas by the principal investigator.

During his service, he represented more the citizens of District 25, which consists of Comal, Hays, Kendall and Guadalupe Counties as well as north Bexar County and south Travis County. His most notable contribution to the state was sponsoring the TEXAS Grant Program, which provided scholarships for eligible Texans who complete college preparatory work and maintain a 2.5 grade point average in college. Senator Wentworth was the chairman of the Senate Committee on Jurisprudence, served on the Administration, Transportation and Homeland Security Committee, and the Intergovernmental Relations
Committees. He also served on the Board of Directors of the Natural Resources Foundation of Texas, the Board of Directors of the Austin Community College Center for Public Policy and Political Studies, the Texas Judicial Council, and the Board of Trustees of the United Way of San Antonio and Bexar County. Among his other public service opportunities were serving as a regent for the Texas State University System, a county commissioner in Bexar County, a city attorney for San Antonio, a Congressional assistant, and a counterintelligence officer for the US Army. (Wentworth, n.d.)

**Representative Roland Gutierrez – Texas Legislature**

Representative Roland Gutierrez is a Democratic member of the Texas legislature, a practicing attorney, and active participant within the community he represents. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Texas at San Antonio, and a juris doctorate from St. Mary’s University School of Law. Representative Gutierrez was interviewed on April 12, 2010 at his law office in San Antonio, Texas by the principal investigator.

Representative Gutierrez served on the San Antonio City Council between 2005 and 2008. As a member of the council, he helped to create programs to combat substance abuse instead of prison. He worked to limit property taxes for seniors and disabled citizens. He supported positive environmental issues; helped to get funding resources to improve the San Antonio River; and assisted others in the successful attempt to have Toyota locate a manufacturing plant in South Bexar County. While serving the City of San Antonio, Gutierrez chaired the City Council's public safety committee, was a member of the Police and Fire Pension Fund Board, and served as the city's liaison to Brooks City-Base redevelopment program. Gutierrez was first elected to the Texas House of Representatives in
2008, representing District 119, which encompasses part of Bexar County. As State Representative, he continues to be an advocate for public education, affordable health care, public safety, and the Texas economy. (Gutierrez, n.d.)

**Senator Steve Ogden – Texas Legislator**

Senator Steve Ogden was a Republican member of the Texas legislature. He received a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, and an MBA from Texas A&M University. Currently, he continues to develop oil and gas opportunities, and actively participates within the community he once represented. Senator Ogden was interviewed on April 27, 2010 at his state headquarters office in College Station, Texas by the principal investigator.

Senator Ogden was first elected to the Texas House of Representatives in 1990 where he served for three terms. He was then elected to the Texas Senate in 1997 for District 5 until 2012. During his tenure, Ogden was recognized as leader on the state budget, school finance, higher education funding, child protection, transportation safety and criminal justice. Serving numerous times as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, he was in charge of setting and approving budgets, allocating funds to state programs, and prioritizing budget requests. (Ogden, n.d.)

**Mr. Earl Nye – Former TAMUS Board Member**

Mr. Erle Nye is chairman emeritus of TXU Corp. Mr. Nye holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from Texas A&M University, a Juris Doctor from Southern Methodist University, and a Doctor of Science, Honoris Causa from the Baylor
College of Dentistry. His lifelong experiences have been in the engineering, financial, legal, operations and regulatory areas. Mr. Nye was interviewed on January 22, 2009 at a restaurant in College Station, Texas by the principal investigator.

In 1997, Mr. Nye was appointed to The Texas A&M University System Board of Regents by Governor George W. Bush, and reappointed in 2003 by Governor Rick Perry. During his tenure, he served as Chairman, Vice Chairman, chairman of the Presidential Library Committee, chairman of the Committee on Buildings and Physical Plant, and as a member of the Legislative Committee and Health Sciences. In addition, he was the special liaison to the Texas A&M Foundation and the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board. (Nye, n.d.)

General Marc Cisneros – Former TAMUK President

General Marc Cisneros is a retired United States Army officer and former president of Texas A&M University-Kingsville (TAMUK). General Cisneros received a bachelor’s degree from St. Mary’s University and a master’s degree from Shippensburg State University. General Cisneros was interviewed on February 23, 2010, at the offices of the John G. and Marie Stella Kennedy Memorial Foundation located in Corpus Christi, Texas by the principal investigator.

General Cisneros began his service in the army in 1961. His service accomplishments includes: battery commander, 1963-65; U.S. Army, Fort Hood, TX, battalion commander, 1975-77; U.S. Army, artillery commander, 1984-86; stationed in Panama, late 1980s; U.S. Army South, Panama, commander, 1989-90; Investigations and Oversight in the Office of the Secretary of the Army, deputy inspector general 1992-94; and
Fifth U.S. Army at Fort Sam Houston, TX, commanding general, 1994-96. He was president of TAMUK from 1998 through 2001. During his service as president, he committed TAMUK to opening and operating the TAMUS Center at San Antonio, which would become Texas A&M University-San Antonio. He is currently the CEO of the John G. and Marie Stella Kennedy Memorial Foundation. (Cisneros, n.d.)

**Mr. Greg Garcia – TAMUS Employee**

Mr. Greg Garcia was the Associate Vice Chancellor for Government Relations for The Texas A&M University System, representing the legislative interests for Texas A&M University-Kingsville, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, Texas A&M International University, and Texas A&M University-San Antonio. Mr. Garcia received a bachelor’s degree from Texas A&M University. Mr. Garcia was interviewed on August 4, 2008, at the TAMUS Office of Governmental Relations in Austin, Texas by the principal investigator.

Before working for The Texas A&M University System as Vice Chancellor, his work experience was in the private sector. Mr. Garcia achieved the position of Corporate National Sales and Division Manager with his former employer, Superior Surgical Manufacturing Incorporated, a national company with whom he worked for twenty years. His focus was in sales, marketing, national accounts, governmental affairs and management for a four-state region. Additional responsibilities included assignments in the International Sales Division promoting NAFTA initiatives. He also worked as campaign manager for the late State Senator Frank Madla for over fifteen years. (Barwick Notes, 2008)

Currently, Mr. Garcia is a special advisor to TAMUSA President Dr. Maria Farrier. He continues to work to bring funding, special items and programs, and legislative support
both to TAMUSA and the historically underserved South Side of San Antonio. (Barwick Notes, 2012)

Dr. Leo Sayavedra – Former TAMUS Employee

Dr. Leo Sayavedra is a retired higher education administrator, having served for almost fifty years in public and higher education institutions. Dr. Sayavedra received a bachelor’s degree from Trinity University, a master’s degree from the University of North Texas and a doctorate from the University of Texas in Austin. Dr. Sayavedra was interviewed on October 13, 2008, at a restaurant located in College Station, Texas by the principal investigator.

Dr. Sayavedra’s higher education service began at what was then called Texas A&I University in Laredo, a branch campus of Texas A&I University at Kingsville (now Texas A&M University-Kingsville). He later served in the leadership positions of Academic Dean and Vice President and eventually President of Laredo State University as it became known after it broke from Texas A&I-Kingsville. While President he oversaw the incorporation of the Laredo State University within The Texas A&M University System. He guided the expansion of the upper level institution into a four year university, which was renamed Texas A&M International University. Dr. Sayavedra oversaw the design and construction of the new campus, which now serves over 7,000 students. In 1995, Dr. Sayavedra became the Deputy Chancellor of The Texas A&M University System, and then later served as Vice Chancellor for Academic and Student Affairs. As Vice Chancellor, he was responsible for working with the TAMUS members, Texas legislature and the Texas Higher Education
Coordinating Board to develop academic programs and provide academic opportunities for student. (Sayavedra, n.d.)

**Dr. Don Avilés – Former TAMUS Board Member**

Dr. Don Avilés is the principal-in-charge at Avilés Engineering. Dr. Avilés received a bachelor’s, master’s and doctorate degree from Texas A&M University. He also holds the rank of Major General (Retired) in the U. S. Army Reserve. Dr. Avilés was interviewed on March 18, 2010, at his place of business, located in Houston, Texas by the principal investigator.

Dr. Avilés has served in many positions and received a number of accolades during his professional career. He served as the Vice President of the Texas Society of Professional Engineers, honored as the Engineer of the Year for the State of Texas, served on the Board of Directors of the Greater Houston Partnership, and as President of the Coastal Water Authority. He was also appointed to the Texas A&M University System Board of Regents in 1997, where he oversaw the implementation of the TAMUS System Center in San Antonio. (Aviles, n.d.)

**Dr. Mike McKinney – Former TAMUS Chancellor**

Dr. Michael McKinney is a physician, having practiced medicine in Texas for over 16 years. Dr. McKinney received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Houston and a medical degree from the University of Texas Medical Branch in Houston. Dr. McKinney was interviewed on July 13, 2010, at the TAMUS Headquarters Building, located in College Station, Texas, by the principal investigator.
Dr. McKinney began his political services to the state of Texas as a member of the Texas House of Representatives from 1984 to 1991. He then went on to serve as commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission from 1995 to 1998. He was Gov. Perry's chief of staff from August 2001 until November 2002. In 2002, Dr. McKinney served as senior executive vice president and chief operating officer at the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston. He also served in other leadership positions at the University of Texas System, including vice chancellor for health affairs and acting dean of the UT Medical School in Houston. Dr. McKinney became chancellor of The Texas A&M University System in November 2006, serving in that position until July 2011. (McKinney, n.d.)

Mr. Ralph Lampman – Verano Developer

Mr. Ralph Lampman is a land developer and business investor from Nevada. He was one of the principal investors with Verano Land Group, a development company in San Antonio, Texas. He has been responsible for multimillion dollar high, multiple profits in Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Texas. Mr. Lampman was interviewed on June 3, 2010, at a restaurant in San Antonio, Texas, by the principal investigator.

At the time of the interview, Mr. Lampman was involved with the following business ventures (Barwick Notes, 2010):

- **Triple L Management, LLC**: Principal Partner: Land Acquisition, Investment & Project Management. Land holdings, use planning, program and project designs for properties: Texas (2,700 acre Verano Project - $65 million private equity capitalization); Nevada (Clark County) and Arizona (Pinal County, Maricopa County, Mohave County and Cochise County) - $100 million private capitalization. 2003 to present.
• **American Land Holdings, LLC:** Adviser to the Principals, Land Acquisition & Project Management, Acquisition Strategy and Planning Expert, involved in over 20,000 acres in 25 tracts of land valued at over $500 million. 2000 to 2005

• **Fidelity Development, LLC:** Principal, Distressed Real Estate Acquisitions and Investments, Utah, Nevada and Arizona 1992 to Present

Most notably, Mr. Lampman was the co-founder of Verano Land Group, a 2,700 acre multiuse property in south San Antonio. The property includes Texas A&M University at San Antonio (694 acres donated), R&D Parks, Recreational Parks, Rail Served Sustainable Industry Park, Commercial, Sports Complexes and Residential. Currently, Verano is developing major road construction with all utilities infrastructure, land improvements, and maintenance. Verano is strongly supported by Texas A&M University System, the City of San Antonio, Bexar County and The State of Texas. It is projected that Verano will be a $3 billion dollar project in today’s dollars at completion and will accommodate 25,000 to 50,000 students at Texas A&M University-San Antonio. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

**Mr. Harold Oliver – Former Chief of Staff for Senator Frank Madla II**

Mr. Harold Oliver is the Managing Principal of TX Capitol Consulting Group LLC, a consulting firm specializing in legislative, regulatory, and business development. He earned a bachelor’s degree from Incarnate Word College, a master’s degree from St. Mary's University and a Juris Doctorate from St. Mary's University School of Law. Mr. Oliver was interviewed on May 7, 2010, on the campus of Texas A&M University-San Antonio in San Antonio, Texas by the principal investigator.

From 1994 to 2004, Mr. Oliver served as a legislative assistant to the late Senator Madla. A significant part of his time during this period was spent dealing with municipal issues, which included economic development, community enhancement, and private sector
development of former military bases in Texas. In conjunction with his municipal development focus, Mr. Oliver participated in the negotiating efforts to establish the Toyota truck manufacturing plant on the South Side of San Antonio. He also worked closely with San Antonio officials to effect the private development of Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio. As part of his job, Mr. Oliver regularly assisted with drafting and overseeing legislative bills that would be filed by Senator Madla. Senate Bill 800, the bill that created Texas A&M University-San Antonio, was one example of his efforts. His efforts began as soon as TAMUS was selected to host a system center and continued through 2003 when the bill was passed. His work with TAMUSA continues with his service on the board of the Texas A&M University San Antonio Foundation. (Oliver, n.d.)

**Dr. Frank Madla III – Son of Senator Frank Madla II**

Dr. Frank Madla III is the son the late-Senator Frank L. Madla, Jr. Dr. Madla graduated from Texas A&M University in College Station, receiving a Bachelor of Science Degree in Biomedical Science. Dr. Madla attended medical school at the University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio (UTHSCSA), receiving his Doctorate of Medicine. Dr. Madla is board certified in Internal Medicine. Dr. Madla was interviewed on May 7, 2010, on the campus of Texas A&M University-San Antonio in San Antonio, Texas by the principal investigator.

Dr. Madla has worked as an Assistant Professor with the UTHSCSA, responsible for patient care and teaching medical students. He has also served as a staff physician and medical director for the Adult Medicine Clinic at the Texas Diabetes Institute. Currently, Dr. Madla serves as an internal medicine physician at Wellmed Medical Group in San Antonio,
Texas. He also a board member for Texas A&M University San Antonio Foundation.

(Madla III, n.d.)

**Dr. Louis Agnese – President of the University of the Incarnate Word**

Dr. Louis J. Agnese, Jr., is the current president of the University of the Incarnate Word (UIW), having served in that capacity since 1985. He earned a Ph.D. in Counselor Education from the University of Pittsburgh. Dr. Agnese was interviewed on June 7, 2010, at his office on the campus of the University of the Incarnate Word in San Antonio, Texas by the principal investigator.

During his tenure, Dr. Agnese has overseen increased enrollment, an increase in the university's permanent endowment fund, an increase in scholarship assistance, and an increase of the university's physical facilities. With more than 5,200 undergraduate and graduate students, UIW is the largest Catholic university in Texas with over 5,000 students and is the state's fourth-largest private institution of higher learning. (Agnew, n.d.)

**Recruited but Not Interviewed**

The following individuals were identified to be interviewed based on the information gathered at the time the principle investigator was reviewing background information, such as newspaper articles, legislative bills that were filed, and initial conversations with key stakeholders. It was anticipated at the time that most of these individuals would provide specific information on the development of TAMUSA. For example, Senator Zaffirini is a senior Senator, whose district includes a part of San Antonio. Additionally her consistent service on the Senator Subcommittee for Higher Education would have allow the principle
investigator to ask questions about the South Texas Initiative, Texas A&M International University joining The Texas A&M University System, and funding higher education in general. Another example is Charles Turner, the individual who first arrived on the scene to offer land for TAMUSA. The principle investigator would have asked a simple question – “what did you think happened that allowed Verano to be chosen over Terramark?”

Each of the following individuals was contacted on several occasions to participate in this research project. Some individuals did not return the solicitation. Other individuals initially responded favorably, but eventually stopped returning the PI’s correspondence. Some were contacted on behalf of the principle investigator given his relationship or work association.

**Judith Zaffirini**

Senator Judith Zaffirini is a Democrat member of the Texas legislature representing the 21st Senatorial District out of Laredo. Senator Zaffirini is the second highest-ranking Texas state senator and the highest-ranking woman and Hispanic senator in the Texas legislature. She has served as a senator since 1987. Senator Zaffirini earned a bachelor’s, master’s, and doctorate from the University of Texas at Austin.

In addition to her responsibilities of representing the citizens of her district, Senator Zaffirini has served as Chair of the Senate Health and Human Services Committee, served on the Appropriations Conference Committee, served on the Senate Finance Committee, and served on the Senate Education Committee. She has also served on the Legislative Budget Board. (Zaffirini, n.d.)
Senator Zaffirin was identified to be interviewed based on her service on Senate Subcommittee for higher education, which during some those years she chaired. Her committee service allowed her to have direct influence over the decision making process that would affect the course of higher education, especially that of any new or proposed institutions. In addition, Senator Zaffirini’s senate district includes a part of Bexar County, making her input into higher education in that county crucial. The principal investigator (PI) made repeated attempts for an interview, but the request went unanswered.

Carlos Uresti

Senator Carlos Uresti is a Democrat member of the Texas legislature representing the 19th Senatorial District out of San Antonio. He is a practicing attorney, specializing in the areas of Family Law, Civil Litigation, Criminal Litigation, Personal Injury and Wrongful Death. He received a bachelor’s degree from St. Mary’s University and a Juris Doctorate from St. Mary’s University School of Law. He also served in the United States Marine Corps, reaching the rank of captain. From 1997 to 2006, Uresti represented District 118, which includes portions of Bexar County, as a democrat in the Texas House of Representatives. As a member of the Texas House of Representatives, Uresti joined others in the effort to bring the Toyota truck assembly facility to San Antonio. (Uresti, n.d.)

Senator Uresti was identified to be interviewed based on his representation of the district that TAMUSA is located and the senate seat once held by Senator Madla. His service to this district, then and now, would provide an insight to the community and his efforts to bring needed services to the Southside of San Antonio. The principal investigator (PI) made repeated attempts for an interview, but the request was not honored.
**Leticia Van de Putte**

Senator Leticia Van de Putte is a Democrat member of the Texas Legislature representing District 26 out of San Antonio. Currently, Senator Van de Putte is a candidate for Lieutenant Governor. She received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Texas at Austin, College of Pharmacy. Prior to her service in the senate, she was a five term state representative. She has served as Chair of the Veteran Affairs and Military Installations Committee and the Chair of the Texas Senate Democratic Caucus. She has served on various Senate Committees, including Education, State Affairs, and Business and Commerce. At the national level, Senator Van de Putte has been actively involved in many political organizations including: the National Assessment Governing Board, the American Legacy Foundation Board, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators as President. (Van de Putte, n.d.)

Senator Van de Putte was identified to be interviewed based on her past service on Senate Subcommittee for higher education. Her committee service and years of service to District 26 was seen as vital to understanding legislative processes for higher education. Representing parts of Bexar County, she would have also provided insight to the community. The principal investigator (PI) made repeated attempts for an interview and completed the request application as directed.

**Richard Perez**

Mr. Perez is the President and CEO of The Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Richard Perez received a Bachelor’s degree from Texas State University in
San Marcos and a master’s degree from the University of Kansas. His professional career includes services as the Assistant to the City Manager for the City of Laredo, and Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development during the President Clinton administration. After his service to President Clinton, Mr. Perez returned to San Antonio and was elected to the San Antonio City Council for District 4 in 2004. While serving the San Antonio city council, he chaired the San Antonio Military Transformation Task Force and the Transportation Policy Board of the San Antonio-Bexar County Metropolitan Planning Organization. He helped negotiate the relocation of a new National Security Agency (NSA) office to San Antonio. He served on the City’s International Economic Development strategic efforts team. (Perez, n.d.)

Mr. Perez was identified to be interviewed based on his community activism, business relationship, and his service to the city of San Antonio as a district representative. The principal investigator (PI) made repeated attempts for an interview, but the request went unanswered.

**Ed Garza**

A graduate of Texas A&M University, Mr. Edward D. Garza is president and CEO of the urban development and investment firm Zane Garway and a Board of Trustees member for the San Antonio Independent School District. Mr. Garza has also held adjunct professor positions at the University of Texas at San Antonio and St. Mary's University. Mr. Garza's political career includes two terms on the San Antonio City Council and served twice as mayor of San Antonio, Texas. After his service, Mr. Garza helped bring Toyota's
manufacturing facility and Texas A&M University-San Antonio to the city's south side. (Garza, n.d.)

As the former mayor and activist for Southside development, Mr. Garza was identified to be interviewed based on recommendations from other participants, namely Mr. Garcia. Mr. Garza was responsible for the push for the City South Initiative and was a principal investor in the Terramark Espada venture. The principal investigator (PI) made repeated attempts for an interview, but the request went unanswered.

**Jane Macon**

A graduate of The University of Texas at Austin, Ms. Jane Macon has been a partner at two law firms in San Antonio - Fulbright & Jaworski and Bracewell & Guiliani. Currently, she is the chairwoman of Siebert Financial Corporation, serves as the program chair of the San Antonio Bar Association, president of the Southwestern Legal Foundation, director of the Women's Advocacy Board, a director of the Texas City Attorney's Association. She also served as the first female city attorney of the City of San Antonio between 1977 and 1983. (Macon, n.d.)

Ms. Macon was the legal counsel for Verano Land Group. She was directly responsible for making the necessary legal arrangements for the donation of land to TAMUS and lobbied the city of San Antonio for special tax incentives for commercial development of the property surrounding the TAMUSA campus. The principal investigator (PI) made repeated attempts for an interview. Ms. Macon initial response was favorable to an interview, but over time the emails were not answered.
Charles Turner

All that is known of Charles Turner is that he is an investor/developer from Houston under the name Terramark. His initial entry into San Antonio was an attempt to develop a shopping center during the 1990s, which was not developed and eventually sold. Intrigued with Mayor Garza’s South Side Initiative, Mr. Turner began plans for Espada, a 2,000-acre master planned community located along Loop 410 and US 281. At the center of Espada was TAMUSA; however, TAMUSA was given to Verano and plans to further develop Espada were abandoned. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

Mr. Turner would have provided insight into the initial attempts to secure a location for TAMUSA. The principal investigator (PI) made repeated attempts for an interview. Mr. Turner’s initial response was favorable to an interview, but over time the emails were not answered.

Section Three: Summary

This chapter provided a brief overview of the participants who were identified in the historical research of the study. In the first section, an overview was presented of the interview process and synopsis development. In the second section, the participants’ biographies were presented in synopsis form in order to give the reader background information about those who either directly or indirectly influenced the establishment of TAMUSA.
CHAPTER V
HISTORICAL FINDINGS

Prior to the establishment of Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA) in 2009, San Antonio contained one public university (The University of Texas at San Antonio, UTSA), one public health science center (The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio or UTHSCSA), and four independent/private universities - Our Lady of the Lake University, St. Mary’s University, Trinity University, and the University of the Incarnate Word and the Alamo Community College District. Advocates for TAMUSA said the mixture of private/public universities was not enough.

San Antonio had the same challenges that similar cities in Texas were experiencing – how to provide equal access and equal opportunity to higher education for its fast-growing population. Based on population projections, it was generally accepted that in order to meet these challenges, not only in San Antonio but also across the state, more state-supported, four-year institutions would be needed to accommodate more high school graduates and student transfers from two-year colleges. Therefore, Texas would need both to expand existing institutional capacity and create new institutions. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

There were a number of factors that had to be considered if San Antonio was to get another four-year institution of higher education in South Bexar County. First, consideration had to be given to population growths. Second, state and local officials had to address an increase in graduation rates of high school students. Third, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) had to pay attention to the success of their “Closing the Gaps”
program, which was increasing attendance of Hispanic students. Fourth, university administrators had to determine if admission caps to limit the number of students were already in place at existing institutions. Finally, an examination was needed to determine whether or not the existing institutions had the capacities and resources to meet growth forecasts. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Early in the 1990s the THECB began to recognize that something needed to be done to provide more access to upper level and graduate education, especially for non-traditional students. To address these needs, the THECB began to allow the establishment of off campus educational centers that were sponsored by existing public universities and systems. For cities like San Antonio, which was seeing a rapid population growth, the establishment of these off campus centers was a quick way to help provide additional access at specific areas where there was no access. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

State, local and higher education officials knew about population growth from forecasts as early as the late 1980s. It was also known that even if existing institutions were able to handle enrollment increases, the state would still need to add new institutions to meet increasing enrollments. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

It wasn’t that the existing institutions did not want to accept new students, it was that there wasn’t enough space. For example, by the late 1990s public institutions in South Texas reported space deficits of almost 22,000 square feet. These institutions anticipated that the space deficit will continue to grow should enrollment goals be met through the “Closing the Gaps” program. Proponents of new institutions argued that even if institutions, such as UTSA, allowed enrollment increase there would still be a demand that would need to be met by additional public universities. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)
New institutions of higher education, according to advocates like Senator Frank Madla and Senator Royce West, would help to improve access and increase attendance in areas of major metropolitan cities that have been ignored. According to these advocates, providing higher education in these areas, a university system, such as The Texas AM University System or the University of North Texas System, would be likely to meet the goals of the “Closing the Gaps” initiative. “Not only would an institution of higher education on the south side help alleviate enrollment stresses at other public institutions, it would have the potential to promote economic development in the southern half of San Antonio and help provide skilled workers for the Toyota plant” (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Just looking at a map, it is obvious that the population of south San Antonio had limited access to higher educational opportunities. In an effort to provide more opportunities, Senator Madla, with the support of the South San Antonio Chamber of Commerce and other community groups, began the effort of bringing higher education to the Southside region of San Antonio in 1997. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

The THECB approved The Texas A&M University System’s (TAMUS) campus center in 2000. The THECB authorized the center be located on the campus of Palo Alto College, a two-year institution, in South San Antonio, and designated Texas AM University-Kingsville as the supervising institution that would provide academic programs, faculty, administrative staff and funding until there was sufficient evidence that the system center could operate on its own as a four-year institution. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

In 2003, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 800 during the 78th Legislative Session. The bill, authored by Senator Frank Madla, provided for the establishment of Texas
A&M University-San Antonio. The bill stipulated that the campus would be located on the southside of San Antonio and required an enrollment of 2,500 (the THECB required 3,500) before it become a standalone institution. (Barwick, Document Collection, 2008)

By January of 2005, The Texas AM University System Board of Regents began the search for a permanent location for the campus. Several sites were up for consideration - a former U.S air force base, land owned by private businesses, and two sites that had mixed use (business/residential) development potential. During that same year, various attempts were made by the 79th Texas Legislature to lower enrollment and issue tuition revenue bonds. It was during this legislative session that House Bill 153 passed, which lowered the enrollment requirement from 2,500 to 1,500. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

It was until 2007 that The Texas A&M University System Board of Regents selected a site for the new campus. As stipulated by SB 800, the campus would be located on the Southside of San Antonio, near Palo Alto College. The property was donated by a development group who wanted the campus as the center of their mixed use development plan. The same year, there were two attempts to lower enrollment during the 80th Legislative Session. Both attempts were unsuccessful. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Finally during the 81st legislative session in 2009, Governor Rick Perry signed Senate Bill 629 designating Texas A&M University-San Antonio as a stand-alone university by authorizing the lowering of the enrollment criteria from 1500 to 1000 as stipulated by House Bill 153 in the 80th Legislative Session. Once the enrollment was met, tuition revenue bonds were released, allowing for the construction of the first building for the new campus. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)
The complicated process of developing and implementing TAMUSA involved a host of individuals, a multitude of processes, and various methods of financing. In addition to the historical analyses, a review of institutional and governmental processes and other influences is necessary in order to understand the decision-making process.

This chapter includes five sections that examine population needs, reviews the key events that made TAMUSA possible, explains legislative processes necessary for TAMUSA to be an institution of higher education, shows the role that financing plays for higher education, and details political constraints placed on higher education in Texas. The chapter ends with an in-depth examination of key historical influences that affected TAMUSA’s development.

**South Texas Population**

The primary reason for the creation of Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA) was to provide higher education opportunities to the underserved, predominantly Hispanic population of the south San Antonio and southern counties surrounding Bexar County.

Hispanic population growth increases over the last three decades and the various projections of growth for the foreseeable future have serious implications for the state of higher education in Texas and especially in South Texas and for a major metropolitan city such as San Antonio. Recent trends and various projections reveal Texas is becoming an increasingly racial and ethnically diverse state. Since Hispanics comprise the second largest
ethnic group and demographic, shifts in this population have a correspondingly major impact on the state’s education future.

Currently, the Hispanic population makes up about twenty to twenty-nine percent of the state of Texas. It is anticipated to constitute about one-half or greater of the total Texas population by 2025. The Hispanic population is expected to continue to be concentrated in the South and far west Texas regions, but will continue to spread north as better education and economic opportunities materialize. In contrast the Anglo population is expected to decline; current projections show that by 2025 Anglos will only make up roughly 43.6 percent. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

In every scenario, however, the Hispanic population is on its way to increases nearly twice as rapidly as the Anglo population over the next decades. “Even under the slowest growth scenario the population can be expected to increase by at least one million persons during the next 40 years, an overall growth rate of 76 percent for 1985 to 2025.” (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988, p. 47)

In order to meet the needs of higher education as it relates to the projected increase of the Hispanic population in Texas, it is necessary to examine Hispanic high school graduation rates and higher education enrollment trends. These trends will help to find long term and permanent solutions to the economic and educational capacity of South and West Texas. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

Since economic and high school graduation trends constitute the most important factors affecting higher education access and opportunities, South Texas would be especially sensitive to denial of opportunity and access if nothing were done at the state level. Higher education for South Texas and the region’s minorities, therefore, must be viewed as an
Investment. Ethnic shifts make it important for the state of Texas to ensure that all of the state’s minorities succeed in securing in higher education. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

Improving opportunity and access to higher education is necessary as it serves the current students and those who will be needed in the future. Furthermore, improving opportunity and access will enhance the overall economic success of state at all levels, both directly and indirectly. Institutions of higher education, when properly supported by the state, can directly affect the success of primary and secondary students by setting education standards within their families and communities. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

**South Texas Border Initiative**

TAMUSA and public higher education in San Antonio can trace its history back to the South Texas Border Initiative of the late 1980s. There were two landmark circumstances that spurred higher education development in south Texas – the court case of LULAC v. Richards and the 71st Texas Legislature appropriations act.

Contending with the lack of accessible and quality education, South Texan leaders took advantage of an opportunity to inform state leaders of their plight. At a hearing in Corpus Christi of the Select Committee on Higher Education in 1986, the leaders charged the state that South Texas was seriously deficient in higher education resources and that these deficiencies were a result of the discriminatory funding practices and policies of the Texas
Higher Education Coordinating Board. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas 1988)

At the meeting it was mentioned that the five regional institutions in South Texas – Corpus Christi, Kingsville, Brownsville, Laredo, and Pan American - did not have academic programs equal to that of other regions within the state. South Texans leaders pointed out that the rapidly growing population of South Texas required a broad array of academic programs and that state policies of addressing duplication among institutions needed to be adjusted to accommodate regional demands. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

The Select Committee on Higher Education did not address directly the problems of South Texas in its final report. The committee did reinforce the philosophy that there should be equal access and equal opportunity to higher education for all citizens who seek and qualify for admission. South Texans agreed and submitted that the application of this principle to their region was severely wanting. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

While the Select Committee was hearing from concerned residents of South Texas, the Task Force on Border Economic Development was meeting. In its 1986 report to the Legislature, the Task Force confirmed was the Select Committee had been hearing – “that there was a lack of educational opportunity and that the lack of opportunity was a major obstacle to progress in South Texas and the border region and recommended that the area’s higher education institutions be authorized to substantially expand their mix of degree programs, particularly at the professional graduate, and doctoral levels” (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)
Not satisfied with hearings and reports by the Select Committee and Task Force, regional leaders, along with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), filed a lawsuit on December 2, 1987, in the 107th District Court in Brownsville, Texas. The lawsuit (LULAC v Richards) alleged that South Texas institutions (including San Antonio) were not receiving adequate state funding and core academic programs. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

The suit also alleged that the state failed to provide equal access and opportunity to Hispanic students to traditionally white institutions by denying education counseling, financial aid, and other programs intended to improve college graduation rates of Hispanic students. The lawsuit named the Texas governor, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and the presidents and chancellors of fifteen institutions as defendants. A major point of contention for MALDEF and LULAC was that other public institutions in Texas outside of the border region were allowed to offer better undergraduate and graduate degree programs and getting the necessary funding for better facilities. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

While the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling favor of the plaintiffs, the public debate during the process garnered enough attention from lawmakers in Austin to begin to take action to bring much needed funding and academic programs. In response to the public’s demand for action, Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby and Speaker of the House Gibson Lewis created the Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas in April 1988. The Committee held its initial meeting on May 26, 1988, being charged with mapping a plan to improve higher education opportunities in South Texas with
academic excellence as the committee’s goal. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

Without consensus, people are continually dividing Texas into regions due to the state’s size and diversity; however, no single perspective is able to precisely determine what is East, North, West, or South Texas or how many regions make up Texas. The Joint Committee was no exception. Right from the start the committee had to define South Texas at its first meeting. It ultimately adopted the definition developed by the Task Force and Select Committee in 1986. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

The Task Force defined South Texas as “comprising of twenty-four counties and fourteen million people.” Given the boundaries, the committee determined that there were five senior public universities in the region – Texas A&I University, Pan American University-Brownsville, Pan American University-Edinburg, Corpus Christi State University, and Laredo State University; however, only two of these institutions offered full four-year undergraduate and graduate programs while the other three were only upper level institutions offering junior, senior and graduate programs. As time progressed, the University of Texas-El Paso, the University of Texas-San Antonio, Sul Ross State University, and the University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio also came to be included in the South Texas Initiative. (Legislative Joint Committee on Higher Education in South Texas, 1988)

The 71st Texas Legislature was tasked to implement the South Texas Border Initiative created by the Task Force. Bills were passed to provide funding specifically for designated border institutions. The funds were intended to help these institutions achieve equality with other Texas institutions by improving course offerings and facilities. In
addition to the legislative funding bills, the THECB was tasked to implement new academic programs and courses designed to meet the needs of the population.

In addition to those actions, lawmakers moved the border institutions into the University of Texas and Texas A&M University Systems. The merger included (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 1998):

- Pan American University (now known as the University of Texas-Pan American)
- Pan American University at Brownsville (now known as the University of Texas at Brownsville)
- Corpus Christi State University (now known as Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi)
- Texas A&I University-Kingsville (now known as Texas A&M University-Kingsville)
- Laredo State University (now known as Texas A&M International University)

In the first two years, the five South Texas institutions received more than $60 million in additional funding for academic development and almost $240 million in tuitions revenue bonds for facilities/capital improvements. New academic programs included computer science, chemistry, environmental science, criminology, gerontology, social work, and special education, English as a second language, nursing, and math. (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 1998):

If measured only in funding, the legislative bills made an immediate impact. From 1990 through 1996, the South Texas institutions received $87 million more in annual state funding. South Texas institutions also began to receive a more equitable portion of the state funding. At the time of implementation, the border institutions were only receiving eleven percent of general revenue funding reserved for higher education; by 1996, they were receiving fifteen percent. (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, 1998):
Between 1990 and 2003, the five South Texas Border institutions would receive over $880 million in general funds. During that same period, the five institutions were issued $766.4 million in tuition revenue bonds. This issuance accounted for thirty-six percent of all tuition revenue bonds authorized state-wide during that same period. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2003)

**Texas Legislature and the Higher Education Coordinating Board**

As shown in the previous section, equal access, equal opportunity, and investment to public institutions of higher education rests with the Texas Legislature and the Texas Higher Educating Coordinating Board (THECB). All State of Texas agencies, including public institutions of higher education, are subject to various legislative processes for funding, operations, and rule making authority. As a public institution of higher education, TAMUSA is no exception.

The Senate and the House of Representatives make up the Texas legislature. The Senate consists of thirty-one members. Each senator serves a four-year term with one-half of the Senate membership being elected every two years. The Senate holds the power to approve gubernatorial appointments to state boards and commissions, including the THECB and public higher education systems’ governing boards. (Texas Senate, 2007)

The lieutenant governor, who is elected by popular vote and serves a four-year term, is the presiding Senate Officer, with official title of President of the Senate. Although not a member of the Senate, the lieutenant governor will cast a vote in the case of a tie. The
lieutenant governor’s main task is to appoint senate committee chairs and members, and refer all bills to the various committees. The lieutenant governor is also responsible for scheduling bills for consideration on the senate floor. (Texas Senate, 2007)

The State of Texas operates much like the federal government. There are 150 members of the Texas House of Representatives. Representatives serve two-year. The presiding officer of the House is the speaker, who is elected from the majority political party of House members. The speaker’s main duty is to appoint committee chairs and members. The speaker also has the responsibility of referring all bills to committee. (Texas Senate, 2007)

The Texas Constitution governs legislative procedures for adopting laws and rules that govern each legislative body for each legislative session. In order for there to be a new law, a bill must be introduced. The Texas Constitution requires that a bill must be read on three separate days in each house before it can become effective. (Texas Senate, 2007)

A bill’s first reading is when it is introduced and referred to a committee. There are many bills that are introduced; however, not all get reported to a committee. If the bill is not reported, it is considered “dead” for the session. The second reading is when the bill is heard by a committee and favorably reported back to the rest of the members. Once reported, the bill’s author must move to suspend rules for the members to approve the request for a vote. In order for a bill to be read for the third time, an affirmative vote of four-fifths of the members present is required. If a bill is amended by either the House or the Senate, it is returned to the house of origin for approval of the amendment(s) or sent back to a committee to work out the differences. (Texas Senate, 2007)
When a bill is approved by both the House and Senate, it is enrolled in final form, signed by the presiding officers of both houses, and sent to the governor. The governor has ten days to sign or veto the bill after receiving it. If the governor doesn’t act within the ten days of receiving the bill, it automatically becomes law. If passed within the last ten days of the legislative session, however, the governor has twenty days to sign or veto a bill. The legislators can override the governor’s veto with a two-thirds vote. (Texas Senate, 2007)

In addition to the legislative process, the Texas Legislature empowers and relies on agencies to oversee governmental functions and responsibilities, such as higher education. The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board is empowered by the Legislature for the oversight and administration of higher education in Texas.

Created in 1965, The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) was created to “provide leadership and coordination for the Texas higher education system to achieve excellence for the college education of Texas students.” The THECB is made up of nine members, including a non-voting student representative. The members are appointed by governor to serve for six years. The governor is responsible for appointing the chairman and vice chairman. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2014)

The THECB’s overall primary responsibilities are: monitoring and assessing higher education; recommending enhancement plans to the governor, legislature, and institutions; establishing policies and procedures for the use funds and resources; and, most importantly, ensuring that all Texans have equal access to and equal opportunity for high education. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2014)

In addition to its primary responsibilities, the THECB also (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board 2014)
Ensures that the state is reaching goals of the state’s higher education plan, “Closing the Gaps.”
- Reviews and recommends changes in funding formulas.
- Advises the governor and Legislature on higher education funding needs.
- Approves new academic programs and off-campus and out-of-district course offerings.
- Initiates, consolidates, or eliminates academic programs that are determined to be unnecessary duplications.
- Approves new construction, renovations, and property acquisitions.
- Prescribes changes in the roles and missions of public higher education institutions.
- Approves and monitors postsecondary technical/career/vocational educational institutions.
- Collects and reports data to the governor and Legislature.

A key THECB initiative that helped the establishment of Texas A&M University-San Antonio, as well as Texas A&M University-Central Texas and the University of North Texas-Dallas, is the use of off-campus university centers. There are three types of off-campus university centers: Multi-Institutional Teaching Centers (MITC), University System Centers (USC), and single university centers (UC). A Multi-Institution Teaching Center is a center administered by two or more institutions. A University System Center is a center administered by a single university system or individual institution within a system. A Single Institution Center is administered by an individual institution. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Policies, 2003)

According the rules, off-campus university centers must be “established by the Texas Legislature or approved by the Coordinating Board for the specific purpose of offering academic credit courses and programs from the parent institution(s).” The centers are intended to offer a broader array of upper division and graduate courses and programs at locations that typically have little or no access to a four-year institution. Typically, the
centers develop a partnership with local community colleges for the use of their facilities. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Policies, 2003)

As originally envisioned by THECB, the centers are: “1) funded through the regular formula process and are not eligible to request separate legislative funding; 2) are under the management of the parent institution and system; 3) focus on teaching rather than research; 4) award course credit and degrees in the name of the parent institution; and 5) usually use locally provided faculties often located on or near community college campuses.” (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Policies, 2003)

These different types of education centers have become a means to creating four year, standalone institutions. The THECB’s Supply-Demand Pathway Program, therefore, was a natural outcome. The THECB developed the Supply-Demand Pathway Program in response to legislative request for greater access to higher education in areas that had little or no access to a four-year institution and to offset an immediate cost to the taxpayer to start a new institution from scratch. The center was expected, through its parent school and university system, to partner with a local community college to offer upper division courses. The Pathway Program’s objective was simple - if they come then we will build it. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board Policies, 2003)

The University of North Texas System (UNTS) was the first to benefit from the Supply-Pathway Program. In 1998 UNTS began the process of developing its Dallas campus into a standalone, four-year institution based on the rules and provisions of the Supply-Pathway program. The main provision of the Program is that center must “reach enrollment thresholds and serves as a model to meet academic program needs in geographical areas not
The Supply-Demand Pathway Program is “a developmental approach to providing access which allows for the gradual increase of resources as demand grows, operating under the principle of avoiding over-commitment as well as under-commitment of state resources. The Supply-Demand Pathway Program is a particular way to address anticipated large-scale enrollment demand in a specified region” (Texas Administrative Code, 2009).

The THECB rules laid out the following steps on the Supply-Demand Pathway Program (Texas Administrative Code, 2009):

- **Step 1** - Institutions temporarily test the market both in terms of demand and staying power by providing off-campus courses and/or programs by one or more institutions. Should demand decrease or not materialize, courses and programs can be discontinued and resources moved to areas of greater demand.
- **Step 2** - As demand increases, offerings may be organized through a multi-institution teaching center or as a university system center as a Pathway Education Center. A group of institutions may request that the Board authorize the establishment of a MITC. Alternatively, a university system may request that the Board authorize the establishment of a University system center. In either case, a lead institution should be designated to provide leadership for the center and facilitate the provision of programs and resources from other institutions.
- **Step 3** - After an entity has attained a full-time equivalent upper-level and graduate enrollment of 3,500 for four fall semesters, the parent institution(s) and Board(s) of Regents may request that the Board review the status of the center and recommend that the Legislature reclassify the unit as an upper-level general academic institution or a university. Reclassification may be considered sooner if the center attains a fall semester full-time equivalent enrollment of 3,500 followed the next fall semester by a full-time equivalent enrollment of 4,000. The 3,500 FTSE standard approximates the headcount enrollment included in the current university funding formula as the minimum size needed to achieve economies of scale.
Funding Sources

While the Supply-Demand Pathway Model might be the mechanism for a new institution, funding from both the parent institution and the state were needed for operation and teaching. There are two basic funding sources for a public institution of higher education in Texas – appropriated and non-appropriated. Appropriated is general revenue (basic), general revenue (dedicated: tuition, teaching, course fees, etc.), and other (highway fund, federal funds, PUF, HEF, etc.), while non-appropriated is designated funds (designated tuition, use fees, local funds, grants, etc.), auxiliary income (transportation, food services, etc.), other (collected at institution that are not Educational and General Income), and indirect cost recovery fees (maintenance, utilities, etc.)

Public institutions of higher education receive funds from the legislature through direct appropriations, indirect appropriates, and other sources of revenue. Direct appropriations are “through funding formulas and other direct appropriations based on identified needs.” Indirect appropriations are “those not made directly to an institution in its portion of the appropriations bill, but used to cover costs related to the institution’s staff for health insurance, retirement benefits, and social security.” Other source of revenue, such as the Permanent University Fund and the Available University Fund, are “subsequently allocated to an institution based on classification and law” (Legislative Budget Board, 2011, p. 2).

General Revenue (GR) is the state’s primary source of funding operations and is what is given to fund operations at higher education institutions. General revenue includes state tax revenue, lottery proceeds, investment income, and use fees. Other funds generated by the
Public institutions of higher education receive direct appropriations by means of appropriations requests. The General Appropriations Act, passed by the legislature to fund the upcoming biennium, establishes funding sources that differentiates them from a regular state agency. State statute calls for “each higher education institution to receive a lump sum appropriation for base funding” (Legislative Budget Board, 2011, p. 3). Institutions are not required to spend their general revenue appropriations in a specified manner; however, any amount not spent must be returned at the end of the fiscal year.

Higher education institutions have some limitations on how general revenue appropriations can be spent. For example, they are prohibited, with some exceptions, from using general revenue fund for construction projects. Also, they prohibited from using general revenue for auxiliary operations, such as athletics and parking. (Legislative Budget Board, 2011)

In addition to a lump sum general revenue allocation, institutions of higher education are able to make requests for “special items” funding. Special item requests are “direct appropriations to institutions for projects that are not funded by traditional funding methods, but are specifically identified by the legislature as needing support” (Legislative Budget Board 2011, p. 9). The institution is not required to spend these funds for a specific, identified project; however, most institutions often use the appropriation for the project identified in the request.

Almost fifty-four percent of state funds to institutions are provided by formulas and supplements, which are based primarily on enrollment. The formulas and supplements are:
Instruction and Operations Formula, Teaching Experience Supplement; Infrastructure Formula; and Small Institution Supplement. (Legislative Budget Board 2011)

Formulas were introduced by the legislature in an effort to provide an equitable method for distributing funds for higher education institutions. The formula distributes appropriated funds from general revenue and Educational and General Income (E&G). E&G includes specific tuition and fee revenue. E&G funds are for general operations of the institution and are composed of general revenue (appropriations) and local funds (tuition & fees). (Legislative Budget Board, 2011)

About 83.3 percent of formula comes from the Instruction and Operations Formula and Teaching Experience Supplement. “The Instruction and Operations formula is calculated as follows: Semester Credit Hours X Program/Level Weight X Rate. Semester credit hours (SCH) are a measurement of how many classes and the number of students enrolled in those classes an institution delivers. The formula calculation uses a “base period” of SCH. The “base period” used for the biennium was the combination of the previous summer, fall, and spring FTE or Full Time Equivalent count.” SCH is weighted by discipline or academic degree program and by level (undergraduate, graduate and professional). For example, engineering is weighted more than liberal arts and a graduate student is worth more than an undergraduate. (Legislative Budget Board, 2011)

There are advantages and disadvantages for funding through formulas. Advantages include: funding uniformity, convenience and consistency, objectivity of comparisons among institutions, more adequate support for all institutions; preventing disproportionate allocations to rich and powerful institutions, responding to growth, and acknowledging costs associated with institutional complexity. Disadvantages include: formulas do not
acknowledging inability to curtail costs immediately when enrollments decline, do not encourage improvement of instruction; recognizes inputs, not the quality of learning; and fail to recognize differences between institutions. If adequately funded, however, any formula will work; and overall, formulas are fair to higher education. (Barwick, Personal Documents, 2010)

In addition to general appropriations, some institutions are eligible for other types of funds - Permanent University Funds (PUF) and the Available University Fund (AUF). The PUF is a constitutional-based, land grant endowment totaling 2.1 million acres. The AUF consists of the surface income and investment proceeds from the PUF and only specific institutions from the University of Texas System and the A&M System are eligible for AUF. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2009)

The PUF began in 1876 from land grants given to the University of Texas at Austin and was completed in 1883. The PUF is guaranteed to certain institutions by the Texas Constitution; addition of other institutions would require an amendment to the Texas Constitution. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2009)

The PUF supports twenty-one institutions/service agencies belonging to The University of Texas System (UTS) and The Texas A&M University System (TAMUS). The PUF is managed by UTS, which employs a nonprofit investment consultant, the University of Texas Investment Management Company, to provide day-to-day management. PUF disbursement is done through the AUF. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2009)

The Texas Constitution allows “two-thirds of the AUF to UTS and one-third to TAMUS.” AUF can be used for “capital improvement purposes (debt service on PUF bonds)” for eligible institutions and “for the support and maintenance” of other eligible
institutions. Eligible institutions who receive funds for maintenance and support are the two system offices, The University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M University, and Prairie View A&M University. The AUF is used for three primary purposes. First, it used to “pay interest and principal due on bonds that are issued to provide construction dollars.” Second, it is used to “provide support for a wide range of programs intended to develop excellence.” Finally, it is used to “provide operating expenses for the two system administrative offices.” The boards of regents for UTS and TAMUS get to decide how much of the AUF is allocated to the eligible institutions. (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2009)

All other public universities in Texas, including some institutions within UTS and TAMUS are prohibited by law from receiving PUF and AUF. Instead, these institutions have access to the Higher Education Assistance Fund (HEAF). (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2009)

The HEAF was created by the legislature as a counter to the argument the PUF and AUF was discriminatory. The HEF is supported by general revenue appropriations. HEAF allocations are determined by the Legislature based on recommendations by the THECB and an advisory committee made up of representatives from HEAF eligible institutions. HEAF funds are only allowed to be used for capital improvement purposes; however, HEAF eligible institutions may use this source of funds to pay for debt service on bonds. (Legislative Budget Board, 2011)

Tuition Revenue Bonds (TRBs) are another method available to all institutions for funding capital improvement projects. Established in 1971 under the Texas Education Code, TRBs are fifty year bonds (maximum) issued by institutions for the purpose of “providing funds to acquire, purchase, construct, improve, enlarge, and/or equip any property,
buildings, structures, activities, services, operations, or other facilities, for and on behalf of
its institution or institutions, or any branch of branches thereof.”  (Legislative Budget Board,
2011)

Institutions are authorized and required to pay debt service on its TRBs; however, the
legislature has reimbursed institutions for costs related to debt service.  Although TRBs are
not contingent on appropriations, the legislature must approve the issuance of the bonds.
Upon authorization, institutions are allowed to issue bonds only after approval by the Texas
Bond Review Board.  TRBs may only be used as specified in statute. Generally TRBs are
used to fund new facility construction.  (Legislative Budget Board, 2011)

The process for issuance of TRBs is as follows  (Texas Higher Education
Coordinating Board 2010):

1. If requested by the Legislature, the THECB evaluates the requests for authority
submitted by the institutions in their Legislative Appropriations Request prior to the
start of the legislative session.
2. The Legislature authorizes issuance of the bonds during the legislative session,
sometimes with conditions.
3. The institutions request project and financing approval from its Board of Regents.
4. The institution’s Board of Regents grants approval for the project.
5. The project is submitted to the Coordinating Board for evaluation. (Since the project
was previously approved by the Legislature, the Coordinating Board’s role is to
evaluate the project to determine if it meets the Coordinating Board’s standards).
6. The Coordinating Board approves the evaluation, and a copy is provided to the
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and the Legislative Budget Board.
7. The institution (or system) completes an application for the Bond Review Board.
8. The Bond Review Board verifies that the institution has approval for the issuance of
the bonds, analyzes the project request to determine that the funds are available to
service the debt, and that the financing system is appropriate.
9. The Bond Review Board authorizes the issuance of the bonds.
10. The Attorney General reviews and approves the issuance of the bonds.
11. The institution (or system) sells the bonds and services the debt at a fixed rate interest
payment, also known as coupon payments, which are distributed over the term of the
note.  Tuition, rentals, rates, and other charges of an institution of higher education
may be pledged to the bond payments.
12. Upon completion of the project, the institution includes the facility (if appropriate) in
its facilities inventory.
Regardless of the type of appropriated fund (formula, general, or special), it all comes from revenue collected by the state - sales tax, user fees, interest income, intergovernmental transfers, and sales of assets are few example of revenue that a state receives. The primary source of revenue is taxes. There are many different types of taxes - income taxes, sales taxes, property taxes on houses and land, *ad valorem* taxes for automobiles, and excise taxes (a kind of sales tax on things like cigarettes, alcohol, and gasoline - sometimes referred to as "sin taxes"). Property taxes and sales taxes are the primary source of income for state and local governments in Texas. (University of Texas, 2009)

Since Texas does not have an income tax it must rely on sales, property, and excise taxes for its sources of revenue. Texas gets “less than half of its income from sales taxes. The rest comes from various other non-tax sources, including federal government transfers which account for just slightly more than thirty-five percent of total state revenue. Other big sources of tax revenue come from taxes on vehicle sales/rental and housing sales, motor fuels, franchises, insurance and occupation taxes.” (University of Texas, 2009)

The state sales tax was passed in 1961. At that time, most sales involved tangible goods as opposed to services; therefore, many services, such as legal and medical, were not included to be taxed. More recently, however, the Texas economy has become “so diversified that services have come to represent a much larger share of economic transactions.” As a consequence of not including services as revenue sources, the sales tax, as a reliable revenue source, has not be able keep pace with the state’s growing expenditures. (University of Texas, 2009)

The largest portion of revenue in Texas, about one-third, comes from the federal government in the form of grants or matching funds. Federal funding helps fund programs in
education, healthcare and transportation. Another large source of non-taxable income for Texas comes from licenses, fees, permits, fines and penalties. Because these fees are not technically taxes, it allows the legislature, without voter approval, to increase fees associated with these non-taxable items while claiming that they did not raise more identifiable taxes. The legislatures justify increasing these fees “as paying for a service rather than paying a tax for the use of public resources since not all taxpayers use these resources equally.”

(University of Texas, 2009)

While the Texas economy ranks near the top, the reliance on sales taxes means that it has difficulty responding to recessions other than raising user licensing fees, a reduction in force, or reducing/eliminating services. Keeping taxes low and out of the services industry means that critical programs, such as education, assistance for the poor, health benefits for children, etc., must be cut when budget shortfalls are realized. “Cutting state expenditures carries with it even greater losses to the state because of diminished matching federal funds for many programs.” (University of Texas, 2009)

The basic problem Texas’ reliance on sales taxes and user fees is that these revenue sources do not keep up with the growing demands of the state’s population. Doctors, dentists, lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers, consultants, and advertising agencies, for example, do not pay adequate business property taxes. In addition, their services are excluded from the sales tax or franchise taxes. If the Texas economy is measured by growth in personal income, then the growth in the population and personal income means that there is a greater need for public services. In addition, population and income growth generally changes in the nature of the economy. Growth requires higher skills from workers; higher skills require more of the population to have a higher education, for example. Ultimately,
more money is needed from the state to fund existing and new institutions. (University of Texas, 2009)

TAMUSA History

If there was one person responsible that everyone involved could agree as to getting higher education to southern San Antonio, it would be the late Senator Frank Madla Jr. While there were other influential and notable individual(s), such as Senator Royce West or Governor Rick Perry, Senator Madla was the driving force behind the concept – getting a public, four year institution of higher education on the south side of San Antonio.

Frank Lloyd Madla, Jr. was born in Helotes, Texas, on January 23, 1937. He earned a Bachelor and Master of Arts degrees from St. Mary's University located in San Antonio. He taught junior high school and college, worked as a private consultant, was a life and health insurance agent, and a real estate broker. It was for his thirty-three years as a legislator, however, that he would be most remembered (Texas Archival Resources Online, n.d.).

Senator Madla began his political career in 1972. Elected to the House of Representatives, he would serve in that position for twenty years representing Districts 57 and 117, which included parts of San Antonio and areas west of the city in Bexar County. He was elected to the Texas Senate in 1993, servicing the 19th District, which includes twenty-one counties of west Texas and portions of El Paso and Bexar counties. Senator Madla held his senate set until 2006 when he was defeated in the primary elections by fellow democrat Carlos Uresti who was serving as a Representative at the time (Texas Archival Resources Online, n.d.).
After being defeated in his party’s primary election in March 2006, Senator Madla retired from state politics. Six months later he died in a house fire along with Mary Cruz, his mother-in-law and his granddaughter. Madla had been asleep in his home when the fire started. It was reported that he had tried to escape through the bedroom window; however, the burglar bars on the windows prevented his escape (Texas Archival Resources Online, n.d.).

Senator Madla sponsored and co-sponsored over seven hundred pieces of legislation. He was instrumental in the establishment of the Toyota plant. His signature piece of legislation was Senate Bill 800 in 2003, which kick-started the establishment of Texas A&M University-San Antonio. It was during the 2006 special legislative session that he received support of the legislature and the governor for authorization to spend $40 million in tuition revenue bonds to build the first building on the new campus (Texas Archival Resources Online, n.d.).

The planning and vision for Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA) by Senator Madla began in 1997. Together with the South San Antonio Chamber of Commerce and other local community leaders, Senator Madla began to explore the possibility of bringing a four-year, public institution of higher education to the south side of San Antonio. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Senator Madla approached the three major public university systems in Texas to support his vision for a four year, higher education institution in South Bexar County. Those systems were: University of Texas System, The Texas A&M University System and the Texas Tech University System. Each system was approached to partner with the local community, community colleges, and the city to establish an education center to provide
third and fourth year academic classes with the idea of turning the center into a four year institution once enrollment goals were met. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

The University of Texas System (UTS) would have been the most logical choice because UTS already had two institutions operation in San Antonio – University of Texas at San Antonio and the University of Texas Health Science Center San Antonio. UTS, however, only went as far south as downtown San Antonio, seemingly uninterested at any suggestions of opening a center in south San Antonio. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

The Texas Tech University System (TTUS) was interested in Madla’s vision. For a number of years in the 1990s, TTUS had expressed interested in expanding their system outside the panhandle of Texas; however, getting a foothold in San Antonio with “boots on the ground” would be a costly endeavor. TTUS solution was to offer distance education courses, where student would be in an instructorless classroom watching the class a television monitor of the real class being conducted from Lubbock. Distance education was not what Madla had envisioned. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

Finally, Madla approached The Texas A&M University System (TAMUS). TAMUS seemed to be an appropriate decision for several reasons. First, TAMUS was anxious to enter the education market in a major metropolitan city. Second, ties to South Texas existed through Texas A&M University-Corpus Christ, Kingsville and International. Third, TAMUS would be able to commit financial and personnel resources for the “boots on the ground” that Madla wanted. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

After a study of capabilities was conducted, including a survey of community college students and several meetings with the Alamo Community College District and other community members, Senator Madla made the decision to partner with TAMUS to pursue
The system center was established to provide upper level academic course to students in southern Bexar County and neighboring counties to the south who could not access higher education elsewhere. In addition, campus development was to be consistent with the city of San Antonio’s plans to develop the south side and with the education goals of the South Texas Border Initiative. To support establishment of the center, the Alamo Community College District agreed to provide space and the use of Palo Alto College facilities at no cost. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

TAMUS’ initial plans for developing TAMUSA were based on meeting the enrollment methodology of the Supply-Demand Pathway Model. TAMUS calculated that given the anticipated rate of high school graduates in the area, the system center could reach the Model’s enrollment goal of 3,500 within three or four years. Once the enrollment threshold was met, TAMUSA would be eligible for standalone classification. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

The main question from skeptical officials at the THECB was: Why did Senator Madla, local community members, and the A&M System advocate that San Antonio needed two state-supported four-year universities in San Antonio? These advocates determined that San Antonio needed two public universities to meet the needs of state’s growing Hispanic population by delivering accessible, public higher education opportunities in south Bexar county. Advocates noted that in 2000, there were 13,500 high school graduates in Bexar County alone, and without access to higher education fewer than half were expected to enter
higher education, either at a community college or four-year institution. Based on their surveys, those who did not enter higher education most often cited affordability, accessibility, and location. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

The expanding role of San Antonio’s community colleges in higher education was also a consideration point for TAMUSA advocates. Student transfers from local community colleges ranged from nine percent to twenty-five percent between the three established colleges at the time – Palo Alto, San Antonio College, and St. Phillips. It was estimated that in 2000, there were at least 5,500 students transferring each year from those schools to four-year institutions. In addition, it was determined that many of the attendees at those schools were earning college course credits for a four-year degree. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

As soon as the system center was established, TAMUS began a P16 program. The purpose was to work closely with the three Southside San Antonio school districts to improve K-12 students’ preparation and readiness for higher education. By the end of the decade, TAMUS officials hoped that the P16 program would increase the number of students graduating from South San Antonio high school and the proportion of those graduates who would seek higher education at TAMUSA by effectively serving the local community college population and those who sought a four-year institution degree. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

So, what would TAMUSA offer that other private and public higher education could not? The basic answer was additional capacity, specifically targeted at the city’s south side population. Even with Palo Alto College, the city’s south side continued to have limited access to affordable higher education opportunities at the four-year degree level. Locating a
four-year institution, or even a system center that offered upper level courses, on the south side would not only provide four-year degree programs, but would also enhance the area economically. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

It was estimated that Bexar County’s 18-24 population alone would significantly increase by 2015. It was determined that existing institutions of higher education, such as the University of Texas at San Antonio and the University of the Incarnate Word, would not be able to provide all the higher education needs in the San Antonio area, especially on the south side where economic restrictions played a major role in attendance. Demographic studies by the THECB projected a space deficit of 996,000 square feet of education space in San Antonio if “Closing the Gaps” enrollment goals were met. The conclusion among many officials was that even if UTSA allowed its enrollment increase unabated, there would still be more demand than space would allow; therefore, there would still be a need for additional institutions. In essence, San Antonio would need additional capacity to serve its growing population and TAMUSA could serve this need. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Another point that advocates noted was the economic effects of a four-year institution on the south side. It was expected TAMUSA would attract new commercial ventures on the south side. Advocates anticipated that that it would bring major long-term economic benefit to the community through construction, businesses and services to support the students as well as the faculty and staff. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

**THECB & TAMUS System Center**

In May 1999 a special request was submitted to the Legislature to fund academic operations at the newly established Texas A&M University Center at Palo Alto College. The
$1.6 million dollar request was contingent upon approval by the THECB under the Supply-Pathway Program, the approval of the TAMUS Board of Regents (BOR), and the appointment of a parent institution to manage the academic programs.  (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

The TAMUS BOR submitted and received approval by the THECB to have Texas A&M University-Kingsville be the parent institution based on its proximity to San Antonio, its south Texas history, and experience with Texas A&M International University. TAMUS and the THECB agreed that the initial academic offerings would be baccalaureate degrees in business administration management, computer information systems, interdisciplinary studies, nursing, criminology and psychology. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

While the fate of TAMUSA’s four-year establishment rested with enrollment goals and legislative processes/procedures, the immediate focus was compliance with the THECB’s Supply-Demand Pathway criteria. The first hurdle was cleared during a THECB meeting on January 27, 2000. It was during this meeting that the system center’s compliance with the Supply-Demand Pathway Program was evaluated.  (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

In addition to reviewing the system center’s academic and enrollment progress, the THECB meeting requested public comment.  According the meeting’s transcripts, the only public comment was given by a representative from the University of the Incarnate Word (UIW). Being a private institution and well north of area TAMUSA would effect, UIW had very little to lose in speaking out against the system center. UIW receives no money from the state for operations. UIW does not have a constituent base to serve. UIW has negligible effect on the economy of San Antonio.
Even though the UIW representative admitted that the system center did not negatively affect the institution, the representative expressed concern that the center would negatively affect the other already established public institutions, i.e. UTSA, from the standpoint of academic duplication and reduction of available funds. Interestingly enough, no officials from either UTSA or the UT System attended the THECB meeting, nor did they lodge any formal protests against the system center. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Representing UIW was Dr Eduardo Paderon,, then Academic Vice President. On behalf of Dr. Louis Agnese, UIW president, Dr. Paderon spoke to the THECB about the adverse impact on UTSA if the TAMUS system center were to develop into a four-year institution. Speaking about duplication of academic programs and funding competition, Paderon said (Barwick Document Collection 2008):

“What is the wisdom of asking a public university located hundreds of miles away to duplicate academic programs already ready made available by the existing local public universities, UTSA and the [University of Texas Health Science Center-San Antonio]? It is an economic waste that we should avoid and that you can prevent. The most efficient use of tax dollars and the more effective way of responding to the expanding educational needs of South San Antonio would be for UTSA to be the institution who enters into equal collaboration with Palo Alto College.” A collaboration between UTSA and Palo Alto College designed to expand the educational opportunities of the citizens of South San Antonio would be consistent with the spirit and purpose of a university system center and it would let AM play a vital role in the San Antonio educational market by offering degree programs that are not otherwise available.”

Paderon went on to comment (Barwick Document Collection, 2008):

“The thought of UTSA and TAMU going head to head for programs and students in San Antonio is disconcerting. It is something that will harm the efforts of UTSA to establish itself as San Antonio’s premier public university. And what hurts UTSA and UTHSC will hurt the thousands of San Antonio students who would like to go to a public university.”
Dr. Paderon failed to admit that academic duplication already exists between all institutions of higher education throughout the state, especially in large, metropolitan areas such as Dallas and Houston. Fortunately, THECB board members spoke up to defend the system center by stating “that it wasn’t unnecessary duplication because of the importance being placed on using the university system centers, or MITCS, concept as an experiment to try to recruit people and bring people into the educational system that currently are not” (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

During the meeting, community advocates and THECB board members reinforced the idea of the academic needs in Southern Bexar County, citing other identified needs such as that in southern Dallas County and in Killeen. The THECB board also acknowledged that there was a greater need to increase the availability of higher education to the Hispanic community because of the inability of that population to afford the cost of a private institution or attend UTSA due to the distance and number of student already attending. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

At the end of the ninety-minute meeting, the THECB committee unanimously approved continuing the Supply-Pathway Program for the TAMUS system center. THECB staff recommendation was for approval with 3 conditions: 1) The center remain physically located in southern San Antonio; 2) the THECB staff monitor enrollments at area public and independent institutions and report on those enrollments back to the full board; and, 3) that the A&M System report back to the THECB on efforts to resolve any conflicts and establish partnerships with area institutions and the proposed program offerings for the center. The Supply-Pathway Program would remain in place until the TAMUS system center reached its enrollment goals. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)
Legislative Efforts to Establish TAMUSA

Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA) took over five legislative sessions, the 76th Legislative Session through the 81st Legislative Session, to become a standalone institution. There were many efforts to shorten the time and provide funding to build the first facility; however, the lack of land and the shortfall of student enrollment played an important role in delaying legislative action.

The first two sessions, the 76th in 1999 and 77th in 2001, accomplished two milestone elements in TAMUSA’s development. The first milestone was recognition of the System Center (76th session) and approval of Texas A&M University-Kingsville to begin the sponsoring institution (77th session). The second milestone was funding. The Texas A&M University System Center received $1.6 million over the next biennium from the 76th session and received $4.6 million over the next biennium from the 77th session. The startup funding allowed for curriculum development and faculty hiring.

The 78th Legislative Session was responsible for enacting Senate Bill 800, which specifically established TAMUSA as a four-year institution of higher education. The 78th legislature met from January 14 to June 2, 2003 in regular session. There were four special sessions, three called in 2003 and the fourth in 2004. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventy-eighth_Texas_Legislature)

Senate Bill 800 (SB 800) would expedite the establishment of TAMUSA by lowering the enrollment requirement from 3500, as required by the Supply-Demand Pathway model, to 2500 students. By lowering the enrollment threshold, it was anticipated that within a few years the system center could meet a rapidly increasing demand for higher education in southern Bexar County and would help the state meet goals outlined in “Closing the Gaps”
by 2015. Changing the system center into a four-year institution would support the population growth of Bexar County by meeting a pressing need for higher education in the predominantly Hispanic communities without presenting any immediate costs to the state other than the allocation of general revenue and formula funding. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

The bill basically stated that: 1) once that 2,500 student enrollment threshold was met, Texas AM University-Kingsville System Center discontinued existing and TAMUS was born; 2) once the 2,500 student threshold was reached, TAMUS could then begin to construct a campus funded through the issuance of tuition revenue bonds; and 3) once the campus was built, it would then be funded through the Permanent University Fund, formula funding, and general revenue. SB 800 would create Texas AM University-San Antonio in Southern Bexar County as a “general academic institution within The Texas A&M University System, without limiting the institution to upper level status.” (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

SB 800 also stipulated that TAMUSA “would not be allowed to operate as a general academic teaching institution until the THECB certified that enrollment had reached an enrollment equivalent of 2,500 fulltime students for one semester.” The bill brought TAMUSA into the same enrollment requirements as was specified in statute for the establishment of the University of North Texas at Dallas (During the 77th Legislature, Sen. West passed SB 576 relating to the University of North Texas System’s center in Dallas, Texas. The bill lowered the enrollment of 3500 set by the Supply Demand Pathway model to 2500. SB 576 was used as the model for this bill). (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

During the 78th Legislative Session, the THECB submitted an impact study for SB 800, which cited several benefits if the legislation was passed. Among the benefits cited was
that TAMUSA would increase the availability and presence of higher education in south Bexar County population. The THECB noted the efforts by TAMUS offices to coordinate education efforts with the three Southside school districts in a P16 partnership that is focused on improving academic performance at all levels and creating a seamless educational pipeline from kindergarten to higher education. Also noted was that TAMUSA would bring a four year institution to meet a documented need for educational opportunities to the Hispanic community. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

SB 800 would meet a rapidly increasing demand for higher education in southern Bexar County and would help the state meet goals outlined in “Closing the Gaps” by 2015 through programs such as P16. It would support the population growth of this county to meet pressing needs for higher education in their communities without presenting any immediate costs to the state. The bill would allow the A&M System to begin developing plans to meet the educational needs of the population growth while ensuring that a new institution was not established until existing facilities reached sufficient enrollment levels. This would also allow the A&M System to take advantage of current marketplace opportunities, including finding land in southern Bexar County for the campus. SB 800 was also expected to “promote economic development in the southern half of San Antonio.” (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Specific language from SB 800 as authored by Madla, Van De Putte, Wentworth and Zaffirini was as follows (Texas Legislature Online, SB800, p.1):

**SUBCHAPTER K: TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY-SAN ANTONIO**

a. Provides that Texas AM University San Antonio is a general academic teaching institution in Bexar County and a component of The Texas AM University System under the management and control of The Texas AM University System’s board of regents.
b. Authorizes the board to prescribe courses that lead to degrees customarily offered at leading American universities and to award those degrees including baccalaureate, master’s, and doctoral degrees in all fields of study; Prohibits any department school or degree program from being instituted without prior approval of the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.

c. Provides that the board has the same powers and duties concerning Texas AM University San Antonio as it does concerning Texas A&M. Prohibits Texas AM University San Antonio from operating as a general academic teaching institution until THECB certifies enrollment has reached the equivalent of 2500 (note: Supply Demand Pathway Program required 3500) full-time equivalent (fte) students for one semester.

SECTION 7: In accordance with Subsection (c), Section 18, Article VII, Texas Constitution, if this Act receives a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, the institutions created by this Act are entitled to participate in the funding provided by Section 18, Article VII, Texas Constitution, for The Texas A&M University System.

SB 800 passed both houses and was signed into law at the end of the legislative session. With the passage of SB 800, the dilemma for the community and TAMUS officials was that with space limited to portable buildings at Palo Alto College, the system center would not be able to expand to meet enrollment requirements. Therefore, funding for additional classrooms and faculty would be needed. Various studies concluded that it would cost $40 million to build the first building. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

In addition to the passage of SB 800, funding for the next biennium (2004/2005) was sought and received through an appropriations request by Texas A&M University-Kingsville. The funding request was to support current program offerings that included courses in criminology, psychology, business management, interdisciplinary studies, elementary education, computer information systems, bachelor’s of applied arts and sciences, history,
English, mathematics and kinesiology. The allocated amount was $3.6 million. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

The 79th Legislative Session saw multiple attempts to get funding for the first building and further lower enrollment set by SB 800. The 79th legislature met from January 2005 through August 2005 (regular session and two special sessions). The 79th Legislature met again in 2006 for a third special session. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventy-ninth_Texas_Legislature)

By the start of the legislative session, the system center (officially called Texas A&M University-Kingsville System Center-San Antonio) had grown to the point where students were forced to meet in portable buildings in addition to existing classroom space provided by Palo Alto College. Although SB lowered enrollment requirements, the dilemma was that with limited space the campus could not meet the enrollment requirement without adequate space and more teachers. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

TAMUS officials recognized that TAMUSA was not any closer reaching a standalone status or getting the funds to build a new building. TAMUS officials noted that that without immediate funds for a new building, self-imposed targets to establish TAMUSA as a full four year institution would be delayed from a projected opening in 2008/09 to a 2012 opening. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Several bills introduced during the 79th session were meant to remedy both enrollment targets and funding. First, there was Senate Bill 295 (SB 295). SB 295 requested $80 million through TRBs to build the first TAMUSA building. The first building would have classrooms and laboratory space and faculty/staff offices. In addition, the TRB
money would develop infrastructure such as utilities, parking, and landscaping. SB 295 did not include any enrollment stipulations. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Second, there was Senate Bill 296 (SB 296). SB 296 would lower enrollment to from 2,500 to 1,000 full time equivalent students for TAMUSA to achieve standalone status; however, in order the bill to be effective, the legislature would have to approve TRBs. While TAMUS officials publically stated that an enrollment of 2,500 could be reached within three or four years, the THECB reported a more realistic enrollment would be 1,000 FTEs in three to four years based on current conditions and growth patterns. The THECB stated “Given the time required to reach the enrollment threshold, the entering class at Texas AM University-San Antonio would not be likely before fall 2009 under a 1,000 FTE scenario.” TRBs were not authorized during this session; therefore, SB 296 did not have the staying power to be realized. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Another attempt to authorize TRBs without an enrollment stipulation was crafted in Senate Bill 50 (SB 50), which related to the issuance of tuition revenue bonds for Texas A&M University-San Antonio. SB 50 stated that “the board of regents of The Texas A&M University System may acquire, purchase, construct, improve, renovate, enlarge, or equip property, buildings, structures, or other facilities, including roads and related infrastructure, for educational and related facilities for Texas A&M University--San Antonio, to be financed by the issuance of bonds in accordance with this subchapter, including bonds issued in accordance with a system-wide revenue financing program and secured as provided by that program, in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed $80 million” (Texas Legislature Online, SB50, p.1)
Efforts were not limited to the senate. House Bill 2329 (HB 2329) was an attempt to give TRBs to Texas A&M University-Kingsville in order to build a facility for TAMUSA. HB 2320 would get around the enrollment issue by giving A&M-Kingsville 50 million dollars for educational-related facilities. The bill authorized the TAMUS BOR to “pledge irrevocably to the payment of bonds authorized by the Texas Legislature all or any part of the revenue funds of an institution, branch, or entity of The Texas A&M University System, including student tuition charges” (Barwick Document Collection, 2008).

House Bill 153 (HB 153) was also introduced during the 79th Legislative Session. It was the only bill to have longevity. HB 153 related to providing TRBs to fund construction projects once the enrollment threshold was met. The bill stated that, “The Texas A&M University System may not issue bonds under this appropriation for facilities at Texas A&M University-San Antonio until the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board certifies that enrollment at Texas A&M University-San Antonio has reached an enrollment equivalent of 1,500 full-time students for one semester. If that enrollment is not reached by January 1, 2010, the system's authority to issue bonds for Texas A&M University-San Antonio under this section expires on that date” (Texas Legislature Online, HB153, p. 3).

During the 79th Legislative Session, TAMUS officials requested special item funding for the continued operation of the system center. The request was for $5.818 million to operate the center for the following biennium. The funds would provide for continued growth of academic programs, pay faculty, and provide staff support for student services. In support of the request, TAMUS officials offered the following justification: “the campus was to be a major contribution to the goals of “Closing the Gaps,” and the Center serves the
special needs of an older population of students whose average age was 32 years” (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

The 80th Legislative Session saw repeated attempts to lower the enrollment requirements. The 80th legislature met from January 2007 through May 2007. There were two bills related to TAMUSA that passed both houses; however, the bills were eventually vetoed by the Governor. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eightieth_Texas_Legislature)

House Bill 589 (HB 589) was enrolled to change the methodology for counting students. The enrollment change would have established TAMUSA as a standalone, four-year institution if enrollment reached 1,000 students for one semester or 1,000 for an academic year. The academic year enrollment methodology “would have been calculated based on total semester credit hours generated during the fall and spring semesters and the summer session,” not on full-time students for just one semester. (Texas Legislature Online, HB 589)

House Bill 317 (HB 317) was enrolled to remove the statutory enrollment threshold that was required before TRBs could be issued. HB 317 was initially filed to lower enrollment requirements; however, later in the session HB 317 was amended to remove enrollment requirements completely. Under the current law as stipulated by HB 153, 79th Legislature, TAMUS was only to receive TRBs after enrollment reach 1,500 FTEs. The bill would have “allowed TAMUS to issue these bonds in fiscal 2008, rather than after the enrollment requirements had been met.” (Texas Legislature Online, HB 317)

Governor Rick Perry vetoed both of the bills. The following statements were released as reason for vetoing HB 589 (House Research Organization, 2007, p. 23):
• “House Bill No. 589 again would reduce enrollment requirements for three small branch campuses, or ‘centers,’ to become free-standing general academic teaching institutions.

• “These enrollment changes expedite eligibility for independent status and greater state appropriations. The bill thwarts the Higher Education Coordinating Board’s longstanding policy of requiring 3,500 full-time student equivalents necessary to determine when and where to establish new universities. The bill leads to seriously inefficient levels of appropriations to the centers.”

• “Furthermore, it is disturbing that the Legislative Budget Board (LBB) fiscal note stated that there would be no implication to the state from the bill’s passage. This fiscal note is seriously misleading and prevented the legislature from acting with any knowledge of the bill’s cost. The Coordinating Board told the LBB that the bill would cost $7.6 million for the 2008-09 biennium and another $15 million in 2010-11 just for the Central Texas center. Dallas and San Antonio add to this cost exponentially. All of this information was ignored by the LBB.”

• “Taxpayers, members of the legislature, and I deserve to have honest fiscal notes that allow legitimate determination as to the true costs of HB 589 so that realistic consideration of legislation can occur.”

In regards to HB 317, Governor Perry made the following statement (House Research Organization, 2007, p. 14):
• “The TRBs for the centers were authorized during the Third Called Special Session of the 79th Legislature with the understanding that the enrollment requirement necessary for their issuance would be set at 1,500 students for one semester, at which point they would have already become stand-alone institutions of higher education. It is my position that the centers should reach stand-alone status prior to the issuance of TRBs.”

• “Furthermore, the centers have not experienced significant growth. In fact, their enrollment has remained relatively flat. This indicates that the centers are appropriately serving their area’s educational needs without additional facilities. The repeal of the enrollment requirements necessary for the issuance of TRBs would result in greater state appropriations and sets a bad precedent for the future.”

Even though both bills were vetoed, the system center continued to be funded through special requests in the amount of $5.8 million for the upcoming biennium. The special funding allowed the system center to new faculty, academic advisors, and administrative/academic support staff. The funds also allowed for additional classroom space and administrative office space off campus. The justification for the funding centered around “delivering quality higher education to a traditionally underserved population in San Antonio and surrounding areas; contribution to economic development by preparing graduates for high tech jobs as well as filling the shortage of high school and elementary teachers in the area and the state; and contributing to the goals of Closing the Gaps” (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)
The 81st Legislative Session began meeting in regular session on January 2009 and ended July 2009 (one regular session and one special session). As was the case in previous sessions, efforts were made to lower enrollment requirements. The initiative was included in Senate Bill 629 (SB 629). (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eighty-first_Texas_Legislature)

SB 629, authored by Senator Royce West of Dallas, changed the enrollment threshold for the system centers in San Antonio, Killeen, and Dallas in order to allow those centers to operate as four-year institutions of higher education and to issue TRBs for construction of new buildings. Under the previous law, HB 153, TAMUS would only be able to spend TRBs enrollment reached 1,500 for one semester by January 1, 2010. The proposed law, SB 629, prohibited TAMUSA from “operating as a general academic teaching institution until enrollment reaches 1,000 FTEs contingent on the issuance of the TRBs, or 2,500 FTSE in the absence of such bonding authority as specified by SB 800.” (Texas Legislature Online, SB629, p. 1)

“SB 629 amended the statute by allowing San Antonio, Killen, and Dallas to operate as general academic teaching institutions when enrollment reached 1,000 FTEs. SB 629 also removed the January 1, 2010, deadline for the 1,500 FTEs requirement to issue TRBs for all three institutions, thereby allowing bonds to be issued immediately once the 1,000 FTEs threshold was met and verified by the THECB.” The bill passed both houses and was signed by Governor Perry with an effective date of May 23, 2009. The 81st session finally accomplished what Senator Madla wanted, a standalone institution and the release of TRB funds to build the first building. (Texas Legislature Online, SB629)
Location, Location, Location

There was sufficient support for the creating TAMUSA. Not only would TAMUSA increase access to public higher education, but it would also to serve as a major long-term engine for development and growth in the southern sector of San Antonio. Given its proposed location, TAMUSA would complement UTSA to produce economic and educational benefits that would be realized throughout the city and beyond the borders of Bexar County. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

Throughout its development, there were ideas as to where to put TAMUSA and how much land was needed. Some plans included splitting the campus into two locations with another, smaller extension campus. TAMUS officials, however, estimated that about 900 acres would be needed for a full-size campus; other plans included using land from a decommissioned air force base. Everyone agreed, however, that the targeted location for TAMUSA was somewhere around Loop 410 South East between Highway 281 south and West of Interstate 37 south. (Conchas, Express News, 9/22/2004)

There were up to five locations that were discussed for a future Texas A&M University-San Antonio campus. These locations included (Jefferson, Express News, 1/14/2007):

- Triple L site (Verano) - Developer would donate 550 acres No eminent domain issues Campus would be located a half-mile off Loop 410 Master-planned community and light-industrial developments.
- Terramark site near San Antonio River - Developer would donate 400 acres, city would buy and donate another 400. High visibility from Loop 410. Master-planned community Campus would include Cassin Lake and parkland. However, city would have to buy out about 100 property owners and potentially contend with environmental cleanups.
- City's second site - Roughly 1,000 acres owned by San Antonio Water Services City. The city would have to buy land near the existing police academy.
• CEED site - A nonprofit called the Corporation for Education and Economic Development (CEED) offered to give 550 acres south of Terramark's property to A&M.

• Brooks City Base – a former US Air Force base that was acquired by the City of San Antonio for use as a science, business, and technology center. Land would be donated but infrastructure would been needed to accommodate the campus.

**Brooks City Base**

Brooks City Base was one of five sites propose to TAMUS for the TAMUSA campus. Brooks was a former US Air Force installation that was acquired by San Antonio after a realignment exercise by the federal government. Suggested as a low cost option to other proposed sites, the Brooks site did have a few advantages. First was location. The Brooks site was just inside Loop 410 near interstate 37, providing visibility from the highway. Second, TAMUS already owned roughly 98 acres abutting Brooks City-Base where the H.B. Zachry Training Center of the Texas A&M Engineering Extension Center was located. (Burket, Express News, 6/26/2005)

While the City of San Antonio was willing to offer land on the former air force base, a report delivered to the City Council show a high cost of infrastructure associated with developing the Brooks property if the campus was located at this site compared to other suggested sites. The report put the cost over $48 million. The cost included road construction, environmental cleanup and development, and utilities. (Jefferson, Express News, 8/1/2005)

Roads, both in and around the campus, would be the largest expense at over $39 million. Assistant City Manager Jelynne Burley stated that the $39 million "is an estimate of the total traffic infrastructure required so that transportation functions smoothly…. [it] is basically the internal circulation for the campus itself. That's assuming no one drives on or
off the campus." Burley continued by stating, "The issue as it relates to the A&M campus is
that the $39 million addresses not just the infrastructure for the campus but for infrastructure
throughout Brooks; however, road construction will be a continuing cost as the campus and
surrounding development continued to grow" (Jefferson, Express News, 9/1/2005, p. 01B).

So why was Brooks not considered? Reports indicated that the Brooks site lacked an
investment company and who all benefits from the campus location. First, the Brooks site
fell outside the plans for south side development being championed by former San Antonio
Mayor Ed Garza. Second, south side development was tied to an investment firm out of
Houston called Terramark. (Burkett, Express News, 6/26/2005)

The final nail in the coffin came from Mr. Lowry Mays, a San Antonio resident and
then member of TAMUS Board of Regents. Mays wrote in a letter dated Aug. 1: "Texas
A&M is interested in the city pursuing the preferred site [Terramark] for TAMUSA, not (the)
Brooks Air Force Base alternative" (Jefferson, Express News, 9/1/2005, p. 01B). TAMUS
officials wanted TAMUSA to have its own campus and identity.

SAWS

Another proposed site, 112 acres, centered around property located near the San
Antonio Police Academy and Mitchell Lake Wildlife Refuge. The property was just off
Loop 410 and owned by the San Antonio Water System (SAWS). The proposed site would
include part of Mitchell Lake and a wildlife refuge that surrounds the lake.

Discussions began between SAWS and TAMUS officials in 2004 to reach an
agreement as to exactly where the property was and how it could be donated for use in the
planned TAMUSA campus. SAWS officials saw their donation as part of a south side
community master plan being developed by Terramark Communities of Sugar Land. The development plan would tie Terramark, the City of San Antonio, and SAWS into a land deal of 600 acres being donated for the new TAMUSA campus; however, the main Terramark development was on the other side of Loop 410 from the SAWS land. Because of the size and the main part of the campus being on the other side of the highway, use options were limited to an extension center, administrative offices, or a parking lot. (Conchas, Express News, 9/22/2004)

In the end the SAWS site was determined to be too remote for use. Further complicating the issue was the wildlife refuge and the expense of cleaning up the contamination from the abandoned dump. It was reported that site had been used for dumping of sewage for more than 50 years. (Conchas, Express News, 9/22/2004)

CEED

The Corporation for Education and Economic Development (CEED), a local nonprofit composed of business professionals, offered another land option for the TAMUSA campus. CEED was organized specifically for advancing the development of educational and economic opportunities needed in order to bring a Texas A&M to San Antonio.

CEED’s proposal consisted of 1,490 acres on the southwest quadrant of Interstate 35 and Loop 410 South. CEED was also proposing to acquire another 500 owned by Bexar Metropolitan Water District. Once all the property was acquired, CEED would donate 800 acres to TAMUS for a main campus and irrigation technology center. (Jefferson, Express News, 3/6/2005)
City and TAMUS officials were quick to decline the offer. City officials said the site would cost too much to develop, had difficult access, and was partially in a floodplain. In addition to City officials’ objections, Lowry Mays, TAMUS Board chairman, echoed the city’s opposition to the site. Mays stated, "It didn't have the access or visibility that we need. It's not a piece of land that we're interested in.” (Jefferson, Express News, 1/11/2005)

In a letter to Chairman Mays, Senator Madla disagreed. Madla attempted to clarify the intent of the donation as being a backup offer in order for TAMUS to better secure necessary TRB funding for construction within the legislative session at the time. Since there were no site assessment studies on the CEED site, Senator Madla felt that Mays’ outright dismissal was premature. Senator Madla “encouraged TAMUS officials not to close the door on the CEED offer prior to the completion of such a study.” (Barwick Document Collection 2008)

**Terramark**

Terramark, a Houston-based developer of housing and mixed-use communities, began exploring opportunities in San Antonio as early as 2004. By 2007, Terramark had secured more than 1,200 acres of South San Antonio property for a master-planned community called Espada. Espada was planned to be a 848-acre development that located housing within close proximity of retail, offices building, community/religious centers, and parks. At the time, it was anticipated by the developers that TAMUS would located the TAMUSA campus within the community through a joint developer-city land donation. The development was planned around former Mayor Ed Garza’s City South Initiative. (Jefferson, Express News, 12/1/2006)
For years Mayor Ed Garza had been trying to get community leaders, politicians, and developers interested in transforming the city’s southern region through his City South Initiative, which encompasses 80 square miles of land. A Texas A&M University-educated urban designer, Mayor Garza envisioned developing the south side by connecting education, business and single-family housing into a pedestrian-friendly development. He was supported by Houston-based Terramark CEO Charlie Turner and Kell Muñoz Architects (now called Muñoz Architects) Chairman Henry Muñoz III, a local architectural firm, whose involvement with Mayor Garza’s initiative was stated to be “rooted in history and relationship having worked on the South Side Initiative with Garza nearly from the beginning.” In fact, Turner stated, “the decision to integrate the development to be called Espada with a campus was cemented during a "brainstorming session" with the Garza” (Jefferson, Express News, 6/5/2005).

Based on location and planning, the Terramark development provided TAMUS with its best option compared to the all other options available at the time. There were two options for putting TAMUSA within the boundaries of Espada. The first option was to locate the campus on the southwest corner of Loop 410 and U.S. 281. The city would donate roughly 400 acres of land while Terramark would donate another 200 acres, which would split the campus into a east/west configuration being separated by railroad tracks. The second option was an equal donation of 400 acres by the city and Terramark. The development would consist of land east of U.S. 281 and outside Loop 410 to include the Villa Coronado neighborhood, San Antonio River, and Cassin Lake. (Jefferson, Express News, 12/1/2006)
The second option was preferred as early as 2005; however, the preferred location was not vacant, already having about 100 property owners consisting of businesses and homeowners. In order to move forward with the Espada and campus development, both the city and Terramark would have to buy out existing property owners and pay for environmental cleanup of salvage yards and illegal dumping sites. If the property owners did not agree to sell at what the city determined to be a fair market value, the city would have to go to court to condemn properties. These plans did not settle well with the property owners. Many feared that the city and Terramark would not pay fair market value. They also complained about the city’s neglect of their neighborhood. (Jefferson, Express News, 12/1/2006)

The city and Terramark made plans to acquire the land and donate it to TAMUS by the end of 2006. City officials estimated that it would cost more than $13 million to buy the land from the existing property owners, clear the land, and clean up the environmental hazards before it could be donated. The city planned to donate the 400 acres in conjunction with the 200 acres being donated by Terramark. As part of the deal, the city and state was asked provide Terramark with approximately $70 million in public subsidies. At the state level, Terramark would get a special taxing district called the Espada Development District; at the city level Terramark would get a tax increment reinvestment zone or TIRZ. These two designations would give Terramark huge public subsidies and one of the largest special taxing districts, which would have repaid the company for its investment in infrastructure. Terramark also asked to be compensated for its building of a major thoroughfare through Espada. The city and state saw the incentives as means to an end – subsidize Terramark’s
efforts to get much needed development on the south side. Terramark needed the incentives because there was no development. (Burkett, Express News, 6/26/2005)

Terramark’s mixed-use Espada development plan had always included a TAMUS campus. Espada would give TAMUS a two campus solution - a west (main) campus and a smaller east campus. The main campus was planned to be the academic core while east campus was planned to be used for research buildings. At some point, Terramark hoped that the city would donate an additional 100 acres by relocating the Police Academy, making a total of 500 acres available for the main campus. Therefore, the amount of land was divided up in the following manner (Barwick Document Collection, 2010):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of San Antonio</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio Water System</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bexar Metropolitan Water District</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terramark Communities</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Gift Subtotal</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Donation</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL PROJECTED GIFT</strong></td>
<td><strong>775</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without the TRB financing during the 79th Legislative Session to build the first building, Terramark's vision of Espada, a pedestrian-friendly village of mixed-income housing, retail, office buildings, churches, schools and parks, came to a halt. Terramark was unwilling to donate more than 200 acres. The city was unwilling to start the process of buying up land when the state wasn’t going to provide funding. The state would not give Terramark its development incentives. The system center had not been able to reach the required enrollment goals set forth by the Supply-Pathway Program.
Verano

The Verano Land Group was the last contender to offer a campus location solution to TAMUS. Verano came to San Antonio between 2005 and 2006 and spent $20 million to buy 1,700 acres north of the Toyota truck plant off Loop 410, just south of Zarzamora. Their initial offering to TAMUS was a donation of more than 500 acres for the TAMUSA campus. Like Espada, Verano’s multi-use development would use TAMUSA as its centerpiece, then build housing, entertainment and retail around the campus. The development would be called Verano at City South. (Jefferson, Express News, 1/14/2007)

Verano’s investors included William McBeath, president and chief operating officer of the Bellagio Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, and William Paulos and William Wortman, co-owners of Millennium Management Group, which operates the Rampart Casino and the Cannery Casino and Hotel in Las Vegas. The investors formed Triple L Management, which finances Verano. (Jefferson, Express News, 1/14/2007)

Verano Land Group LP began in 2005 as a partnership, commonly known as “tenant in common,” from multiple sources/investors with each investor having monetary holdings in the company. A “tenancy in common “ is the default form of concurrent estate, in which each owner, referred to as a tenant in common, is regarded by the law as owning separate and distinct shares of the same property. By default, all co-owners own equal shares, but their interests may differ in size. As each joint owner has an interest in the property, they may, in the absence of any restriction agreed to between the joint owners, sell or otherwise deal with the interest in the property (e.g. mortgage it) during their lifetime, like any other property interest. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concurrent_estate)
Verano decided to get involved with San Antonio based on news reports of Terramark’s development that included an institution of higher education, the tax/development incentives being offered to Terramark by the city and state, the community’s push for an institution of higher education as the anchor for development, and the city’s desire for economic development through the City South Initiative. The Toyota manufacturing plant was also a factor in Verano’s involvement. Even though the Verano investors had never heard of TAMUSA, the potential of a TAMUS campus quickly became integral to overall project appeal and viability, which would facilitate substantial economic development. At build out, Verano representatives estimated that there would be approximately 17,350 permanent jobs between TAMUSA, the City of San Antonio, and the project. Their sales pitch also included a “ripple effect” of job creation to just over 38,000 permanent jobs, as well as 3.8 billion dollars in annual economic activity and 1.4 billion dollars in annual personal income for the City’s south side. (Barwick Document Collection, 2010)

The Verano development site, neighboring the Toyota manufacturing plant, had many advantages over the other site options. First, the city would avoid paying millions of dollars for land it did not own and would have clean up before TAMUS would accept a donation. Second, there would not be an east/west campus scenario. Third, Verano was offering to provide money for scholarships to boost enrollment. Finally, no taxpayer money would be involved in the purchase of property or build out of infrastructure. Most importantly, Verano had ownership of the land; and, because they paid cash, they did not have to appease lenders by pressing for a quick profit. (Jefferson, Express News, 1/14/2007)
The land purchase was seen as an investment opportunity, and with federal assistance/incentives for the purchase of underserved areas, it made land purchases cheap. Additional drivers for land purchase included expectations of growth due to the campus; city population; census projections for Southside; existing and/or promised infrastructure by City Public Services; industrial development (Toyota plant); and the city seen as a land port trade. Initial purchase of the land was $66 million dollars. (Barwick Personal Notes, 2010)

The Verano development was proposed as an “urban village” located on 2,000 acres on the south side of San Antonio. The centerpiece, of course, was the more than 600s acre being planned for the TAMUSA campus. Using “SmartCode” urban planning to provide greater density yields and economies of scale, Verano’s master plan included (Barwick Document Collection, 2010):

- Residential Neighborhoods 555 acres
- Town center 88 acres
- Commercial 115 acres
- Industrial 640 acres
- Sports Complex 92 acres
- Hospital Complex 65 acres
- Texas A&M University – San Antonio 694 acres
  - “Gateway” Property - 10 acres
  - Main Campus - 580 acres
  - Irrigation Technology Center - 104 acres
  - Total: 694 Acres

During the months from May 2005 through November 2006, city and TAMUS officials met with the Verano to discuss their proposal for a campus site located at I-410 near Zarzamora Road. City and TAMUS representatives toured the Verano site in October 2006 and in November, City, CPS, and SAWS staff met with the TAMUS Board of Regents to discuss the Verano proposal. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)
In February 2007 the TAMUS Board of Regents met and selected the Verano site for the TAMUS campus. The selection was based on Verano’s offering 400 acres for the core campus, ten acres along Loop 410 for an A&M Gateway and Visitor Information Center, 104 acres for research facilities, and 180 acres for future expansion. The total Verano Land Group donation would be approximately 694 acres with a value estimated at $20 million. Since all the land being donated was owned by Verano, the city did not have to spend money to buy land and clean up environmental waste. Instead, the $15 million originally earmarked for land and clean up would be used for infrastructure improvements related to TAMUSA. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

The TAMUS Regents reached its decision after considering site access, donation size, physical characteristics, restrictions, infrastructure and image. TAMUS Regents "picked (the site) because they felt like we had the best chance of negotiating a good campus location and perhaps some infrastructure support, and building the campus quicker," said Michael McKinney, TAMUS chancellor at the time. In addition to the land donation, Verano committed to raising money for scholarship programs that were intended to help meet the student enrollment goals required by state statute. (Ludwig, Express News, 2/3/2007)
The purpose of this study was to tell the story about how Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA) was planned, explore the interaction between the major stakeholders, examine their decision-making processes, and document the key events that led to its establishment. Of particular interest was determining the effect that specific individuals had on the development and establishment of TAMUSA; how key events and the local and state level deliberations accelerated the process of making TAMUSA a stand-alone institution; and highlight specific instances in which TAMUSA benefited from private as well as public support.

To obtain critical insight to this study, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews between 2009 and 2012 with select state legislators, higher education administrators, and members of the community, all of whom held specific knowledge of the key processes and events. In addition to the interviews, the researcher relied heavily on newspaper articles that documented updates and offered commentary as TAMUSA progressed from concept to reality. Specifically, the researcher investigated the following questions from the participants identified in Chapter Three:

1. Describe the role that state legislature plays in determining higher education administration? In funding?
2. What are some of the influencing factors with administering higher education systems, universities/colleges, programs, and/or overall higher education initiatives?
3. What is your higher education experience?
4. What is your current role in higher education governance?
5. What have been some of the challenging decisions that you have made in recent years?
6. Describe a beneficial relationship between state legislature and higher education administration.
7. When institutions of higher education are competing for funds from the state; what factors influence your decision in the distribution of those funds?
8. How can the State of Texas meet the higher education needs of future generations? What are some of the key decisions that need to be made to meet future challenges?
9. Is there such a thing as too many institutions of higher education in the State of Texas?
10. What impact does state governance have on the outcome of higher education?
11. What were some of the key factors in supporting a San Antonio campus for TAMUS?
12. What are some of the key factors in supporting and/or expanding a “university system” concept in Texas?
13. Was there any *Quid pro quo* for your support of Texas A&M University-San Antonio? If so, what was it?

The thirteen questions can be grouped into three main categories. The first category focused on the participant’s views regarding the relationship between the state and public institutions of higher education. The second category dealt with effects that public higher education has on the state. The third category dealt with the participants’ views on the development of TAMUSA.

While each participant was asked the thirteen questions, latitude was allowed to reflect the inherent differences in the roles played by each participant in the TAMUSA development process. For example, questions relating to legislative process did not apply to those participants who are not part of the actual process; however, by rewording legislative questions, a community member participant can provide his/her viewpoint of it. As with the other subgroups, interviews were semi-structured, allowing the researcher to ask follow-up questions and seek points of clarification.

The first part of the chapter reports the responses of the participants’ that provide information pertinent to the study’s research questions. The second examines the application of theories and models presented in this document to the researcher’s topic. At the conclusion of each section, the researcher’s key findings are provided.
Findings Related to the Interviews

Legislative Efforts and Involvement

Higher education efforts often take place within the realm of three places – the community, the institution or system to which the institution belongs, and the state political apparatus. In some instances, all three are tied together. While the governor may sign bills and appoint board members, it is the state legislative body that has a direct influence on higher education through direct legislative action, legislative committees, or the coordinating board. Any action – funding, oversight, planning, etc – must be passed and approved by these two offices before it can have a vote in the house and senate. Even with the support of an influential legislator or board members, there is no guarantee that either legislative body will pass the bill or that it will be signed into law by the governor. Because the support of these individuals is essential, institutions of higher education place significant importance on developing working relationships with legislative and board members and their staff, for it is the legislator’s staff that holds the key to access.

Most institutions consider legislative success to be determined by their overall efforts to maintain previous funding levels, ability to gain funds for additional items above the formula, flexibility in setting tuition/fees, and the outcome of bills affecting higher education policy. A key to legislative success, as reported by most of the participants, is the ability to develop, maintain and enhance relationships with senior administration of the institutions or system.

Both legislators and higher education officials rely on these relationships for one key reason: state agencies, including public institutions of higher education institutions, are
restricted by statute from lobbying, meaning that they cannot support or oppose specific legislation or legislative initiatives. Most participants, both legislators and higher education officials, referenced times that they called or were called upon to provide information about the impact a piece of legislation might have.

Operating successfully within the legislative realm requires navigating the political environment. Successful navigation includes understanding the economic conditions that affect state budgets; knowing which member has the political advantage over his/her colleagues; the culture of the state; differences in regional interests within the state; public perceptions of higher education within the state; legislators’ views of higher education; and the interests of key legislators who oversee higher education budgets and policy making.

**Interviews with the Legislators**

The interviews followed a three-staged approach. Interviews began with legislators describing their background with higher education in general, higher education funding, and higher education policy making. Participants were asked questions about the extent to which higher education needs impact the legislative process. Finally, legislators were also asked about their role in the establishment of TAMUSA.

Each of the legislators interviewed for this study either chaired or served on a committee charged with higher education oversight and policy-making or a committee through which higher education is funded, such as the finance committee. Naturally, all legislators spoke of the importance of the need and availability of higher education in Texas. They answered the questions by speaking in terms of being servants of the people, charged
with carrying out the responsibilities of their office in terms of oversight and distribution of taxpayer’s money.

They did not, however, see themselves as micromanagers. Instead, most of the participants claimed to “rely on the governing boards of the institutions and the higher education coordinating board to implement the legislation they passed.” They spoke in terms of a responsibility for “prioritizing the state’s education goals by offering a blueprint of those priorities; of dispensing leadership,” of by “advocating and/or meeting the needs of district constituents while adhering to the overall higher education goals for the state.” (Barwick Notes, 2010)

Beyond asking if higher education impacts the legislative process, the researcher asked the legislators for their views on the relationship between themselves and the institutions to include the institution’s administrators. The legislators answered that they “believed the relationship consists of communication, openness with actions having been taken, and providing information that helps with decision-making.” Most of all, the legislators commented that the relationship had to be “one of respect by the institution’s administrator to the office that the legislative participant held.” (Barwick Notes, 2010)

At the end of each interview, the legislators were asked about TAMUS’ efforts to establish an institution of higher education on the south side of San Antonio. Responses to these questions fell into two basic categories: active or passive participation. Active participation came in the form of the legislative processes and decision making debates. Passive participation came in the form of support of proposed legislation or higher education in general. (Barwick Notes, 2010)
All of the legislators spoke favorably about the concept of expanding higher education by creating new institutions, especially in areas that are underserved by higher education. Since the legislators identified as participants for this research represented underserved districts, this type of support was not hard to understand. If there was concern expressed, it was a concern of funding the new institutions and higher education in the future. All commented that “Texas needs to find alternative means/methods of funding higher education that is not at the expense of the students.” Specifically, there was a lean toward expanding the Texas economy for a broader tax base. None, however, mentioned how to do it. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

**Key Findings from Legislators**

The interviews conducted by the researcher with legislators yielded several key findings. These findings include (Barwick Notes, 2010):

- First, public higher education is an important enterprise that the state of Texas needs to continue to support. While this seems like a “no brainer,” it is an important finding due to the current political climate (and that of the past three or four legislative sessions) where legislators are quick to claim that the government should live within its means but yet refused to acknowledge the current cost of providing basic services, such as education, to a growing population. Consistently over the past session, the legislature and governor has asked public institutions of higher education to reduce their appropriations requests to the tune of 5-10% while freezing tuition. None of the legislators offered viable solutions for funding the future of higher education.
Second, more times than not, the reward of being a legislator is about accomplishments and credits. One legislator took credit for the formula funding method that finances higher education. Another legislator took credit for the Pathway method by which new institutions of higher education are created and approved by the THECB. While the researcher has firsthand knowledge that lobbyists and legislative staff do a considerable amount of work behind the scenes to advance particular legislative initiatives, the researcher will acknowledge that it takes the votes of legislators to make laws and implement policies. Asked if a *quid pro quo* existed, all said “no.” The researcher found no documented evidence to dispute their answers.

Third, the general public needs access to higher education, especially in underserved areas. None of the legislators opposed the three newest institutions of higher education – University of North Texas-Dallas, Texas A&M University-Central Texas (in Killeen) and Texas A&M University-San Antonio. All of the legislators acknowledged that the location of these three institutions met the criteria of serving segments of the population that wouldn’t have the economic or physical means of reaching existing public institutions of higher education. They also acknowledge, at the same time, that in some instances there are too many institutions and that funding existing institutions is already problematic.

Finally, the late Senator Frank Madla received the credit for the establishment of Texas A&M University-San Antonio. Another “no brainer,” but during the course of the interviews with the legislators most were quick to mention their assistance with the establishment of TAMUSA or their influence with getting it through the legislative process. Interestingly enough, one legislator referred to the vote in 2009
as a “sympathy vote due to Senator Madla’s death,” while another referred to it as “being tied to other factors.” Most importantly, another legislator was quick to reinforce that “if it was not for Senator Madla’s vision and persistence, TAMUSA would not exist; and, while others helped, he alone was the champion of the institution.”

**Community Efforts and Involvement**

Higher education efforts, outside that of the legislature, take on a much different rationale. Whereas legislative efforts aim to provide a macro administrative management level, higher education officials and community activist efforts are at the micro management level. While higher education officials and community activists need the legislature to be macro decision makers, these two groups rely on each other to advance enhancements at the micro level. Most public institutions of higher education provide a platform for communal enhancement – a ripple effect of the decision to put the institution in a specific place and time.

An institution of higher education can provide an economic boost to the community in which it is located and to the residents it serves. Institutions in rural locations often serve as the dominant employer, providing jobs for unskilled as well as skilled workers. The workforce requires basic services, such as medical services and food, so in comes health and food service industries. They also need a place to live, so add a housing market. Of course, all this is based upon the institution being able to sustain a stable and growing student population. In order to maintain and grow the institution, the community must provide the aforementioned services.
Operating successfully within the community requires the institution and its administrators to navigate the social environment. Successful navigation for the institution includes understanding the economic conditions that affect the growth of the institution; knowing who among the population would be most likely to attend the institution; understanding the culture of the community the institution is serving; knowing the differences in interests within the community; understanding public perceptions of the mission, goal and aspirations of the institution; conveying the administration’s point of view towards the population they intend to serve; and capturing the interests of the students who are attending the institution.

Both community and higher education officials rely on these relationships for one key reason: educational and economic prosperity. Even with the support of the community and higher education administrators, however, there is no guarantee of immediate economic and student growth. A key to success, as reported by most of the participants, is the ability to develop, maintain and enhance relationships between the community and the institution. All parties have to be involved in the success of the institution. Of course, establishing effective relationships is an ongoing process.

**Interviews with the non-Legislators**

Interviews began with the non-legislative participants describing their background with higher education in general. Participants were asked questions about the extent to which higher education impacts the state and the local community. Finally, these participants were asked about their role in the establishment of TAMUSA.
As was the case with the legislators, all higher education participants spoke of the “importance of higher education in Texas.” These participants reinforced the need of affordable, quality higher education in Texas. They answered the questions by responding in terms of “providing a service to the citizens of the state of Texas and ensuring that taxpayer’s money was being spent wisely.” While there were some differences regarding the need for additional institutions of higher education, these participants did agree that the underserved population(s) deserved equal access and opportunity. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

The differences came from a matter of perspective and self interest. On the one hand, there was a demonstrated point of view that by adding additional institutions of higher education, those new institutions would divert state funding from established institutions. This rationale is plausible in cities where numerous institutions already exist. The counter to this rationale, however, is that state funded institutions of higher education are primarily funded by formulas, not general revenue. Also, the amount of reductions that institutions have taken over the past decade has been a consistent five percent regardless of location, proximity to one another, or the number of students enrolled.

Naturally, the higher education administrators who had the most to gain spoke the most favorably about the prospect of the new institution. For TAMUS, the biggest advantage was the fact that there would finally be a TAMUS educational presence in a major metropolitan location. Other points included the land given to TAMUS and access to the PUF for assisting with the growth of the two campuses. These points help reinforce the selling point that taxpayer funds were not used to establish either the new institution in Killeen (Texas A&M University-Central Texas) or TAMUSA.
In addition to higher education administrators, interviews were conducted with participants who had a long association with the development and establishment of TAMUSA. These participants had a long history with TAMUSA and were able to provide the researcher with the names of key players, events and explanation of facts. For example, through the course of one interview, one participant was able to recall a behind-the-scene strategy meeting that involved prominent politicians, influential TAMU alumni, and key city officials. Another example was for one participant to “set the record straight” as to who really helped establish the campus. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

The land acquisition was a point of contention on several levels, mentioned by all the participants. First, there were location issues. One participant clearly favored a specific location; however, locating the campus there would have split the campus into an east/west scenario and would have come at a great cost to the city’s taxpayers and homeowners. Another participant discussed the land acquisition as an “economic engine that would provide future profits for investors.” One participant made a claim that the chosen location was a result of “back room dealings and influential pressures.” Based on extensive information, Senator Madla did not have an opinion regarding the specific location. Responses obtained from the participants confirmed that Senator Madla’s only concern was establishing the campus, anywhere on the south side of San Antonio, with no offer of land to be discounted. (Barwick Notes, 2010)

**Key Findings from non-Legislators**

Interviews conducted by the researcher with higher education officials and those not affiliated with state service yielded the following key findings (Barwick Notes, 2010):
• Long term, sustained opposition was limited. There were on three documented instances of opposition to TAMUSA – one coming from the San Antonio Express News, one coming from the administration at the University of the Incarnate Word (UIW), and one from a faculty member at the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA). Consistently, the San Antonio Express News printed less than positive reports about the plan, giving a platform to stories that expressed doubts about the viability of TAMUS. For example, one article highlighted a UTSA faculty member criticizing TAMUSA. The article noted that the UTSA faculty member wasn’t critical of establishing new university, but mostly critical of the notion that it was a university belonging to TAMUS. Instead, the faculty member jokingly preferred an “Ivy League presence in Texas over another ‘average’ university.”

By far, however, it was the administration from UIW that took the hardest position against TAMUSA. As documented in Chapter 5, the UIW president seemed to make it his personal mission to derail any attempts to establish a new public institution of higher education on the south side of San Antonio. The researcher inquired as to why there was so much opposition. The response included the documented arguments published in the newspaper, but also included one additional point – the president claimed to be “speaking for those [at UTSA and the UT System] who could not because if they did there would have been consequences.” This statement is corroborated in a letter sent by Senator Madla to the then-UT System Chancellor reminding him of state regulations barring any state agency from lobbying, and
reminding him that future funding for the UT System could be at risk if Senator Madla continued to hear stories of opposition. (Barwick Document Collection, 2008)

- Events did not always happen as was reported. The key to this finding was being able to interview participants who were closely tied to Senator Madla and the events surrounding the development of TAMUS. Most of the published articles included quotes from individuals who made claims that they were at this or that meeting or had this or that personal conversation with Senator Madla. Those stories were refuted by three of the participants, having either been with the Senator at the referenced meetings or having documentation identifying who stayed with and supported the Senator over the years.

- Land acquisition was the deal of the century. Of all the issues surrounding TAMUSA, land acquisition had to be the most contentious. There were competing composition ideas. There was a plan to condemn land and expel residents and inhabitants. There were winners, losers, and losers who turned out to be winners. In the end, it was an offer to donate 700 acres by an out-of-state developer that won. It was reported to the PI that Senator Madla never really cared where the campus was to be specifically located, just as long as it was on the south side and accessible to those who lived there.

In actuality, there were only two serious offers by the time a decision needed to be made in 2006. The big loser was Terramark, who had for years courted the city, county, TAMUS and notable people of interest including a former city mayor, a local architect, and a city council member. The big winner, of course, was a late arrival
from Las Vegas, Nevada named Verano, who “swooped” into San Antonio to buy up uninhabited and neglected property, hire a lobbyist to court government officials, and hire a prominent local attorney to arrange for the land donation to TAMUS. Both Terramark and Verano, however, saw TAMUSA as means to an end, a chance to profit from the ensuing development that an institution of higher education would bring to the south side of San Antonio.

Findings Related to Available Literature

There are many common attributes that tie TAMUSA to the modern American university. Some of the most identifiable include: creating and disseminating knowledge; complex administrative layers; and, policies and procedures that are highly codified and detailed. In short, institutions of higher education are the epitome of the industrial organizational complex, or at the very least a bundle of systems, resources, resistance and constraints that are constantly tugging at one another for a position of dominance and attention. These attributes require a deeper understanding of TAMUSA institutional governance, decision making, and culture.

Governance

Universities are loosely-coupled institutions, characterized by their external and internal fragmentation. In a loosely-coupled institution the external stakeholder, typically government officials in a public institution, can play an important role in the institution’s
governance. The external stakeholder is only counterbalanced by more substantial internal stakeholders when it comes to traditional objectives. (Capano, 2011)

Government’s role in public education is unavoidable because it is in charge of financing and setting policy. Governments also design and implement the systemic methods for the governance of public higher education through a combination of public policy and strategic goals. (Capano, 2011)

A good example is minority attendance. Legislators can decide that an increased rate of minority participation in higher education is a systemic goal, and then chose the method to be adopted, e.g. the Top 10% rule in the state of Texas in which admissions to higher education is automatic. Another example is the establishment of TAMUSA through the policies of the Pathway Program, which, in turns, required a enrollment goal before acknowledging and funding the institution.

There are two governance methods that the government uses to affect the role that higher education plays in society. The first is hierarchical governance. Hierarchical governance is when government set goals, defines methods and means, and imposes directives on the institution with the expectation that the institution establishes how the goals are to be implemented as well as the methods used to achieve the goals. Basically, hierarchical governance means that the institution is limited in determining its own procedures and policies. Designated funding is a good example. Designated funding, such as tuition or tuition revenue bonds, is completely controlled by the government. The government sets a monetary value to a student and the courses they take, which is how formula funding works. (Capano, 2011)
Procedural is the second governance method. Procedural governance allows the institutions to choose their own goals while adhering to the policies and regulations established by its governing board. Procedural governance exists when the state legislature imposes rigid statutory rules on higher education, but leaves them substantially autonomous. These are most identifiable in the litany of government and administrative codes that guide actions. Texas follows a procedural governance model of governing higher education. While statutes and administrative code sets the rules of operation, governing boards determine how best to meet compliance through daily operation. (Capano, 2011)

Administrative code set the parameters for TAMUSA establishment, the TAMUS Board of Regents set the rules for compliance, such as appointing Texas A&M University-Kingsville as the parent institution of the System Center.

There are two other governance methods worth noting - steering-at-the-distance and self-governance. These two methods represent a governance model that has indirect influence, leaving institutions free to determine a course of action that best meets and/or exceeds goals. Whether it is steering at a distance or self-governance, higher education administrators and those outside the institution make decisions among alternatives that are often uncertain and questionable in order to benefit the institution and satisfy the stakeholders.

Instead of the hierarchical or procedural model, steering-at-the-distance makes the government use a “bait-and-catch” approach by using “soft rules, providing financial incentives, measuring performance, and having a board to oversee institutional progress” (Capano, 2011, p. 1627).
In contrast, the self-governance mode, “government chooses to leave the institution almost completely independent. The self-governance model in higher education is, to put it simply, a governance model in which institutions are left free to decide what they want to do, how to do it, who needs to be involved, and when it needs to be implemented” (Capano, 2011, p. 1627).

**Decision Making**

The TAMUSA decision making process was no less complex as that of other institutions of higher education in America. Because TAMUSA brought together groups of external and internal stakeholders, each of whom employed various, related decision making processes to meet their different goals and interests, the process to establish TAMUSA can be considered to be a typical example of a loosely-coupled organization, which multiple decision making processes are used by multiple stakeholders. (Nutt & Wilson, 2010)

The basic decision making process assumes that a single decision maker has complete control. In reality, however, the decision maker has limited influence in selecting solutions because most decisions involve multiple stakeholders. Nevertheless, even with multiple stakeholders, the single decision maker has “some degree of strategic choice even if the wider context contains many players and many choices as it pertains to organizational and program design, strategic planning, or organizational goals, and institutional direction” (Nutt & Wilson, 2010, p. 31).

It is often that decisions are to be made for the benefit the institution and its stakeholders. When these types of decisions are made, they are often classified as strategic. Strategic decision making is typically a choice between alternatives, and can be further
classified as a plan, a ploy, or a pattern. Planned strategic decisions are made well in advance and with a distinctive purpose. The ploy strategic decisions are made to outmaneuver the competition in a not so obvious manner. Patterned strategic decisions are made by taking bits and pieces of information over time from other decision makers and piecing the information together to form a knowledge base. (Nutt & Wilson, 2010)

Strategic decision making can also be characterized as positional or a matter of interpretation. Positional decision making can be one of alignment, meaning that the institution makes decisions to reach objectives to manage the “turbulent and unpredictable set of circumstances, or one of trying to secure competitive advantage over a peer to where the institution solidifies a unique position in its environment” (Nutt & Wilson, 2010, p. 30).

Interpretative decisions, on the other hand, are characterized as a reflection of how the decision makers view the environment. Interpretations results from examining the organizational strategic decision making process. There are two different types of interpretive processes when examining strategic organizational decision making: choice-based decisions and rule-based decisions. The main distinction between the two is “whether the interpretation follows a logic path of dissemination when making choices among alternatives and evaluating the consequences, or whether they pursue a logic of appropriateness” (Nutt & Wilson, 2010, p. 34).

Institutions can exhibit two types of strategic decision making behavior - clarity and consistency, or ambiguity, inconsistency, and chaos. “When decision making is clear and concise, the institution is anarchical and acts as a background for decisions that may not be linear in process and may not be logical in a consistent sense” (Nutt & Wilson, 2010, p. 34).
Because institutions of higher education consist of many stakeholders who have specialized expertise in areas of administration and academia, many of the decisions are made by ambiguity, inconsistency, and chaos instead of a rational or methodical method. For one thing, senior level administrators cannot possibly understand the wide array of skills and knowledge required to operate the institution. The same is true of academics, who generally lack an understanding of how to operate the institution. Therefore, all the stakeholders must use a mixture of judgmental and analytic processes to make strategic decisions that encompass operational and academic management, internal and external stakeholders, and organizational culture instead of relying on interpretation or perspective. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

It is obvious that the TAMUSA decision making process was determined by internal and external decision makers. The process evolved out of a variety of interactive set of circumstances that occurred within the institution, outside the institution, and involving various mixtures of stakeholders from a variety of levels. To help understand the roles that the various TAMUSA stakeholders played in influencing decisions making, the basic decision making process can be broken down into three major phases: identification, development, and selection. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

The identification phase involved the need to diagnose situations and make decisions based on the diagnosis. Decision diagnosis tends to happen more by individual initiative or by senior level dictate rather than from a committee or collective consensus. The development phase requires a search and design method for finding solutions. Stakeholders who have vested interest in the outcome typically perform this phase, tasked with finding solutions to the complex situations. In other less complex situations, the development phase
is the responsibility of committees. The selection phase involves examining, evaluating, proposing, approving and executing the solutions. Unless a solution is needed immediately, the selection process is generally slow, especially in large institutions or complex organizations like TAMUS. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

There was a mixture of routine and strategic decision making process for TAMUSA. Routine decisions included general location of the institution, the name of the institution, the targeted audience, etc. But the more complex decisions, such as specific location, course offerings, enrollment goals, etc., needed to follow a process of identification and diagnosis.

**Organizational Models**

Institutions of higher education have traditionally been identified as one of five organizational models developed by Robert Bimbaum – collegial, bureaucratic, political, anarchical, or cybernetic. In these models, decisions are made by a community of individuals and groups (collegial), by a top down administrative structure (bureaucratic), by stakeholders vying for position (political), by multiple groups or individuals (anarchical), or by a combination of the aforementioned models (cybernetic). (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

Common interest is at the center of a collegiality model, and decision making is, therefore, made by consensus. The collegial model is prevalent when the stakeholders adhere to and accept an organizational ideology or mission. Collegiality is typically exhibited when there are central goals, strong leadership, and equal distribution of funds. Many scholars, such as Baldridge, have suggested that the collegial model doesn’t exist in the current environment of higher education because of the often fierce competition between
stakeholders. When there are competing interests between stakeholders, consensus on common goals and direction is difficult. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

In the contrast to making decisions through consensus, the political model is dominated by stakeholders who seek to promote their self interest over the common good of the institution. The political model is often predisposed to the notion that the existence of fragmented interest alone gives rise to politics; however, in many cases the institution has to exert other characteristics before it can be labeled as a political model. These characteristics include scarcity of funds, shifts in resources for one group to another, and/or some critical issue(s) that would affect forward movement. Clearly in today’s environment, when state financial support is declining and institutions are faced with determining where to apply resources, conditions are ripe for the political model to exist. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose 1983)

The bureaucratic model operates around systems and processes put into place as a result of rational, analytical decision making. This model places an importance on conformity to a well-defined institutional structure where, in theory, consensus and decision making are moved up the institutions’ hierarchy until the issue is resolved or sent back down for further analysis. The bureaucratic model requires a strong leadership mechanism to perform the role of rational analyst and to design effective control systems. (Birnbaum, 1988)

The bureaucratic model is only effective when interference from internal or external stakeholders is kept a minimum or even non-existent. Decision making involvement is generally assigned to specific stakeholders rather than seeking input from multiple groups as would be the case in a collegial model. While politics has a role in this model, the lack of
resources or competition among groups is ignored in favor of the chain of command. (Birnbaum, 1988)

The anarchical organizational model is characterized by problematic preferences, unclear goals, and fluid participation. The organization generally lacks a strong central governance structure and cohesiveness among stakeholders. Goal setting is problematic. In an institution with a large number of stakeholders, each of whom is self-interested, even a generic goal like "enhancing education" is interpreted in competing ways as there are competing groups. Another problem is with choosing a method(s) to achieving institutional goals, and knowing if and when the goals have been achieved. (Birnbaum, 1988)

Birnbaum (1988) raises the issue that participation in an anarchical institution is often fluid. For example, stakeholders who participate in a decision making process one year are more likely to be replaced the next year by new players. The fluid nature of the model, therefore, confounds any attempt at continuity, as found either in a collegial model or a bureaucratic model. A successful leader in an anarchical institution must be able to motivate different stakeholders, while having the characteristic of a competent leader.

The cybernetic organizational model is a combination of the previously mentioned organizational models. Combining the four models allows the use of multiple decision making processes for maintaining equilibrium and operation in the institution. Because different activities, dimensions, and interests are usually at work at the institution, model detection is essential for operational understanding. A significant problem with the cybernetic model is that the presence of all four organizational models and a minimal presence of effective leadership minimizes the effectiveness of the institution to reach goals.
or complete a basic decision making process compared to the potential impact to the institution if only one model was detected. (Birnbaum, 1988)

In general, neither common interest, self interest, administrative interest, nor competing interest will dominate the decision making processes all the time, making the stakeholders rely on a combination of decisions making processes. There may be agreement in reaching overarching institutional goals, but there is usually conflict over how goals should be achieved. Except in the most extreme situations, some combination of all the models is needed to describe the decision making process. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose 1983)

A popular model that has been used to explain the complicated decision making processes at institutions of higher education is Cohen and March’s (1974) garbage can model. The garbage can model is defined as a "collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they may be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer and decision makers looking for work" (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose 1983 p. 420).

Stakeholder behavior is typically unpredictable in the garbage can model. Stakeholder goals are mostly vague and methods to achieving the goals throughout the process are not obvious. Furthermore, stakeholder participation fluctuates because of time, energy, and enthusiasm that is required in achieving the end results. Garbage can decisions are not meticulously resolved; instead, solutions are introduced haphazardly by the stakeholders involved in the decision making process. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)
Most decisions put in the garbage can are not solved. Instead, the organization will encounter the same problem over and over again. Even though decisions might be solved, stakeholders are likely to face the same problems. Even though there is a resurfacing of the same problems, the garbage can model allows these problems to remain active and of interest to the stakeholders in contrast to being dropped by a common interest in the collegial model or ignored by self interest in the political model. “Garbage can decisions are provoked by the concurrent presence of three factors – fluid participation, unclear decision making, and problematic preferences” (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010, p. 114)

The first factor is fluid participation. Fluid participation is when the attention that stakeholder is focused on problems that are that are highly unpredictable. “This notion captures the observation that institutional stakeholders tend to enter and exit decision situations according to processes that are not necessarily related to the problem(s) at hand” (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010, p. 115).

The second factor is unclear decision making. Unclear decision making is when the organization’s problems are “frequently ambiguous and only ex-post facto are reconstructed in the form of well specified means-end chains” (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010, p. 115). Unclear decision making also reveals a sub-layer of stakeholder participation that casually interact without directly communicating to address the problems.

The third factor is problematic preferences. Problematic preferences, or fluid participation, are differences between stakeholders that are identified during the course of the decision making process rather than being pre-defined at the beginning and unchanging during the course of the process. “Institutions characterized by fluid participation, unclear decision technologies and problematic preferences were labeled by Cohen, March and Olsen
These outcomes styles are decisions by resolution, by oversight, and by flight or by passing the buck. (Fioretti & Lomi 2010)

The resolution style is realized when a problem is actually solved or resolved by a rational decision making process. According to the garbage can model, decisions are made by resolution if “the participants to the decision process are (1) sufficiently capable of reaching solution; (2) are able to make a sufficiently efficient solution, and (3) are afforded a problem that is simple to solve” (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010 p. 116).

The oversight style is realized when decisions are made without paying any attention to or wanting to resolve the existing problems already in the garbage can. The decision makers, therefore, are content to be a part of the process but want to take no action to solve the problem. (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010)

The third outcome, flight, is not really a decision style, but more like a decision choice to escape from making a particular decision. “A decision to escape from a difficult problem can only occur by attaching the difficult problem to another opportunity, which amounts to postponing the problem or passing the buck” (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010, p. 116)

Organizational garbage can decision-making is characterized by a number of properties. First, only a few problems using the garbage can are actually solved, and when they are solved it is by oversight. “Decisions by oversight are very common, much more common than decisions made in order to solve problems. This result suggests that the rational mode of decision-making is a very rare case (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010, p. 116).

Second, if opportunities are ranked by order of importance then the easiest problems will likely to be solved first. If there is an organizational hierarchy, senior administrators are not necessarily concerned with solving the problems. Their tendency is to leave the actual
problem solving to lower levels of the administration who actually have a vested interest in solving the problems. (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010)

Third, stakeholders and problems pursue decisions across “choice opportunities.” When pursuing choice opportunities, institutional stakeholders concern themselves with the reoccurring problems. Therefore, the stakeholders face reoccurring problems because the problems were not addressed properly in the first place. (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010)

When decisions are important, participation may cease to be fluid because the cost of not participating would outweigh the cost of doing so. Some decisions are important only to those who are their champion. While other stakeholders may contribute to the garbage can, the champion plays to win, using various methods, such as rational analysis, to steer other stakeholders down a preferred course of action. (Fioretti & Lomi, 2010)

Rational analysis is used to select the best alternative, or at least to distinguish acceptable alternatives from unacceptable proposals. This type of decision making is ideal for an institution of higher education for a number of reasons. First, rational analysis forces the stakeholders into structured deliberation sessions and requires that each stakeholder contribute to the garbage can. Second, even with disagreements, rational analysis is likely to lead to collaboration an collection of more information into the garbage can. Finally, rational analysis encourages the development of critical support to solve the problem, especially when the stakeholder(s) lacks sufficient support at senior administration levels. In the rational decision making process, the argument must be made as clear and credible as possible. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

The rational analysis method can be applied in most organizational models. In the collegial model, where stakeholders are presupposed to be working together, rational analysis
can be used to develop an understanding of the collective problem, to achieve consensus
among the groups who have a vested interest to the organization, to avoid
miscommunication, and to reinforce the institutional goals. Rational analysis can also be
used to highlight the different stakeholder goals and to integrate those goals into the decision
making process. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

In the political organization, where self-interest and competition runs rampant among
stakeholders, rational analysis can be used at all levels of the organization for persuading the
different interest groups to participate in a collective decision making process; however, in a
competitive situation, rational analysis from one interest group is likely to be countered by
another group. The benefit of rational analysis decision making in a political model,
therefore, stems from pigeon-holing the rationale of one group by the competing group.
(Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

In the bureaucratic model, where the institution is hierarchically structured and the
stakeholders fit in a specific place in the organizational chart, rational analysis can be used to
move solutions up the hierarchy and defend the positions taken by the stakeholders. Instead
of a solution by consensus, a more defined solution made by a rational analysis is less likely
to be returned by the leadership than if a solution was presented to be the best that could be
developed at that point in time by the stakeholders in their respective positions within the
organizational chart. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

Rational analysis is hard to develop in the anarchical model because of the many
competing interest groups or stakeholders. Because different activities and dimensions are at
work at the institution, organizational model detection is problematic, making even the basic
decision making process difficult, even when applying a rational analysis methodology to it. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

In the cybernetic model, where there is combination of all four models, rational analysis can easily be applied once the operational model is identified that the stakeholders are utilizing. The application would follow one of consensus building, outmaneuvering a perceived opponent, submitting solutions up the chain of command, or just doing nothing at all. Rational analysis focuses attention on various issues, problems, and solutions being placed in the garbage can. Because participation is fluid and interest is not that important, rational analysis can be unopposed, leaving self interest undetected and even relatively unchecked. (Hardy, Langley, Mintzberg & Rose, 1983)

Analyzing governance behavior and applying organizational models offers guidelines on the driving force behind the institution’s decision making process. In the case of TAMUSA, the many different stakeholders, jockeying for position makes the institution cybernetic in theory. While state supported institutions of higher education are good examples of political and bureaucratic organizationals model in this respect – various internal/external participants interested in higher education as a method of advancing their own career while at the same time having to advance decisions up and down a chain of command, aspects of each model was found to exist, which ultimately led to coalition building against obstacles and detractors. TAMUSA asserts the ideal of individuals or groups forming various coalitions, and through collective bargaining, compromising, and reaching agreements (negotiations) the process was balanced.
**Organizational Culture**

Organizational culture can provide valuable insight into institutional decision making processes, because an institution’s culture is reflected in what decisions were made, how those decisions were made, what decision making process was used, and which stakeholders were involved in the decision making process. Organizational cultural influences institutional decision making at many levels - the department, the institution, the system and the state. Because organizational cultures can affect the decision making processes, a central goal of understanding how organizational culture influences decisions is to understand how stakeholders interact. “Organizational culture, then, is the study of particular webs of interaction between stakeholders within or outside the institution” (Tierney, 1988, p. 4).

Understanding organizational culture may further explain the institution’s strategic goals and operations because it undoubtedly influences stakeholders’ managerial styles and decision making methods (i.e. garbage can, rational, etc.) Analyzing the institution’s culture can expose the conflicts between stakeholders that lead to ineffective governance. It might also help explain difference in administrative decision making processes and organizational/administrative resistance to change. It can identify dominant stakeholders, both internal and external, who might have specific goals for institutional development and growth. It can also help understand the way certain goals are set and directions are taken. (Masland, 1985)

Organizational culture can be tied to unobtrusive organizational control. Unobtrusive control usually operates in combination with two other control mechanisms – explicit and implicit. “Explicit controls represent formal regulations and directives. Implicit controls represent organizational specialization and hierarchy. But when explicit and implicit controls
are weak, the unobtrusive forces, such as organizational culture, become more important” (Masland, 1985, p. 166).

Culture influences many levels of the organization – staff, department, division, and executive. It can exist through analysis of historical events, internal and external circumstances, and interaction between stakeholders. It is also found in the shared experiences of stakeholders working within the organization. Because organizational culture can vary dramatically between levels and individuals, a key goal to interpreting organizational culture is to “minimize the occurrence and consequences of stakeholder conflict and help foster the development of shared goals,” and “identify culture through stories, special language, norms, institutional ideology, and attitudes that emerge from individual and organizational behavior” (Tierney, 1988 p. 5).

Chaffee and Tierney (1988) explained culture’s effect on organization life as well as finding dynamic equilibrium. Key to the explanation is perception, attitudes and the common desire to understand cultural influences within the institution. In addition to outlining culture’s effect, Chaffee and Tierney discuss culture influences on decision making. Knowing institutional culture effect is an attribute to strong decision making; however, decisions that do not understand institutional culture usually become recycled in the garbage can to be put off indefinitely. Therefore, understanding institutional culture is critical for effective decision making.

Finding cultural dynamic equilibrium within the TAMUSA development process was more complex than just recognizing, understanding and acknowledging a culture. First, the PI had to consider cultural dimensions within the system and the subsystems. Second, the PI had to examine cultural dimensions of strategy that moved the concept forward to create a
collective out of the subsystems that played a role. Third, the PI compared and contrasted different aspect of cultural impacts that affected decision-making. Throughout evaluation processes, it was noted that understanding the cultural climate was the key not only as a vehicle to achieve implementation, but also to help institutional cohesiveness. For the future, the institution’s aim then becomes to seek organizational equilibrium by using effective communication and understanding of the organization’s culture.

Research Findings

The purpose of this study was to tell the story about how Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA) was planned, explore the interaction between the major stakeholders and their decision-making processes, and examine the key events that led to its establishment. The study required a qualitative approach that would provide lessons learned of what to do and what not to do when establishing a new institution of higher education.

There four basic questions asked to assist the researcher in determining the effect that specific individuals had on the development and establishment of TAMUSA. In addition, the questions were to determine how key events at the local and state level accelerated the process of making TAMUSA a stand-alone institution, and highlight specific instances in which TAMUSA benefited from the private and public support received at various levels.

5. What is the role that state government plays in determining higher education administration, funding, and overall governance?
6. What are the influencing factors affecting decisions for administering higher education systems, universities/colleges, and/or overall institutional initiatives?
7. What impact does legislative governance have on the outcome of higher education decision-making either at a systems level or at an institutional level?
8. What were the key factors in supporting and the eventual establishment of another institution of higher education in San Antonio, now known as Texas A&M University-San Antonio?

**Review of the Methodology**

The qualitative, interpretative approach was determined to be the appropriate methodology for this research project as opposed to an experimental approach. The study sought to utilize an individual’s perception of reality in developing an understanding of the development and establishment of TAMUSA. This research project utilized naturalistic inquiry to collect the necessary information from individuals who were active in the legislative process, in the area of higher education, and in the local community. These individuals were targeted in an attempt to capture a glimpse of the perceived realities at what Guba and Lincoln (1989) describe as “real reality.”

In addition to the targeted individuals, this study also took into account the researcher’s personal experience in higher education administration. The researcher’s familiarity with higher education administration helped him to navigate through the legislative requirements imposed upon public institutions of higher education in Texas. This familiarity appeared to help gain a level of respect from the individuals who participated in this project by removing potential barriers and also to incorporate the jargon into meaningful dialogue.
Findings to Research Questions

Research Question One - What is the role that state government plays in determining higher education administration, funding, and overall governance?

The main role of the legislature is to establish public policy through the passage of laws that provide for the health, welfare, education, environment, and economic and general well-being of the citizens of Texas. For each of these roles there are oversight committees that collect/review data, hold investigative hearings, and advances bills submitted by legislators that either enhance or diminish these services. Higher education a one of the services is part of this process.

While both legislative chambers (house and senate) have education committees, it is the responsibility of the senate to provide oversight through the Senator Committee on Higher Education. Each session the committee is charged with specific tasks to be accomplished. Most notably, the committee is charged with monitoring the implementation of legislation addressed by the committee and make recommendations for any legislation needed to improve, enhance and/or complete implementation of those requests with assistance from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB), which reports directly to the governor.

During the legislative session and sometimes during the break, the various legislative committees examine data collected from required reports and hold hearings that allow members of the public and agencies to testify about past/current/future activities and make specific requests regarding proposed legislation, such as legislation that funds operations for the next biennium. It is through funding operations that the legislature has the most influence over higher education.
The budgeting exercise for institutions of higher education is a game of give and take that begins with each public institution submitting an appropriations request through the Legislative Budget Board (LBB). The LBB is a “ten-member policy-making board that oversees the agency and includes the lieutenant governor and the speaker of the House, who serve as chairman and vice chairman, respectively. Two senators are appointed by the lieutenant governor, and two representatives are appointed by the speaker. As well, the chairmen of the Senate Finance and State Affairs committees and the heads of the House Appropriations and Ways and Means committees serve as members of the board. The board appoints the budget director, who prepares the budgetary requests of all state spending agencies as well as the appropriation bills for them. At each regular and special session of the legislature the director submits the legislative budget estimates, the results of extensive staff analyses of each agency's budget requests. The Legislative Budget Board maintains a program evaluation section that conducts comprehensive reviews of state agency programs and operations and compiles performance reports for the legislature. The reports help to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of each state agency and aid in budgetary decisions. Staff in the Legislative Budget Office provide support to different legislative appropriations committees, furnish information on revenue and expenditure trends, prepare fiscal notes identifying costs or revenue impact of various legislation, and issue reports about finance laws and proposals” (https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mdl05).

An institution’s budget determines not only administrative operations but also what services it can provide, making the legislature’s power to determine the institution’s course that much more significant. For example, over the course the past decade, 2000-2010, the legislature has consistently asked public institutions of higher education to reduce their
appropriations request by at least five percent. The request typically results in the institution reducing administrative staff, deferring building/equipment maintenance, reducing services, and/or searching for alternative methods of funding.

The legislature can approve specific initiatives but not fund the initiatives. The THECB may determine that an institution is approved to implement a specific academic program, institute or education center, but the THECB cannot appropriate the funds. Therefore, the institute, with support of the THECB, must make their case to the legislature to provide the necessary funds for the initiative. All funding requests are codified in government code at the end of the legislative session either through a house bill or a senate bill, whichever one is responsible for setting the budget for the next biennium.

A final legislative role worth mentioning is that of confirming the governor’s board of regent appointments. Each public university system (there are five) and the few independent institutions (those not belonging to a system) have governing boards made up individuals appointed by the governor to oversee the operations of the either the system or the institution for a specific duration of time. Only the senate confirms an appointment; once confirmed, the senate has little power to direct regents’ administrative duties as they report to the governor. On the other hand, the regents are routinely asked to testify in front of legislative committees or in person to specific representatives or senate members. Power to embarrass or humiliate can be more powerful than having direct control of their actions.

Research Question Two – What are the factor(s) affecting decisions for administering higher education systems, universities/colleges, and/or overall institutional initiatives?

Many factors were discovered through the course of this research project that affected the decision making process. The most important factor was that of relationship building,
both internally and externally, by higher education administrators. This one factor can affect the decisions to appropriate funds, support specific initiatives by the community, and offset negative perceptions.

First, there is working with others within the institution or system to obtain a common strategy, objectives, and identify desired outcomes. The coordinated effort can be between senior administrators, members of a committee, or a combination of both groups. The communication between the participants is important as they identify problems, contribute solutions, and decide on a course of action.

Second is interacting with external stakeholders on issues that transcend common goals to plot a collective strategy. While following the same strategy as an internal process, the interaction with external stakeholders can be more important when the decisions by higher education administrators affect the community both economically and personally. While decisions made by the institution could have a positive socio-economic benefit, it might have a negative impact on individuals or the community at large. For example, the decision to locate TAMUSA on the south side of San Antonio was generally seen as an economic engine to spur growth in businesses and income; however, several of the locations suggested would have displaced both residents and businesses that had been established for years.

Third is interacting directly with legislators and other policymakers in order to understand the legislative process and personalities that are key in accomplishing the goals/objectives, and to develop/cultivate a working relationship with legislative members and their staff in order to accomplish the goals/objectives of the institution or system. This includes being able to provide timely and accurate information, being available for meetings
and briefings, and paying respect to the office they hold. Courting members of the Senate Finance and Higher Education Committee is critical for higher education administrators in Texas. Of course, state agencies are not allowed to lobby, but by providing necessary information regarding academic initiatives and funding requests, and paying respect to the position can go a long way. For example, tying the fate of TAMUSA to the University of North Texas in south Dallas, a Senator Royce West initiative, allowed TAMUSA to bypass unfavorable recommendations by the THECB.

Research Question Three – What impact does legislative governance have on the outcome of higher education decision-making either at a systems level or at an institutional level?

The legislature has very little direct control or influence in the decision-making process either at an institutional level or system level. The legislature’s direct influence, therefore, is with funding, and it may be argued that funding is, in of itself, ultimate control, while indirect influence is with laws, codes, procedures, etc. Without funding, many decisions made at the institutional or system level, such as course offerings or strategic planning, would not be implemented. Without funding, the TAMUSA campus would only exist in a bill, which it did between 2003 and 2009, existing only as a System Center supported and funded by Texas A&M University-Kingsville. Without continued funding, either through formula funding, general revenue or the permanent university fund, TAMUSA would still be located in an elementary school.

The legislature also had direct control over the process of transforming TAMUSA from a system center to a four year institution. By setting an enrollment requirement of 3,500 students in 1998, then lowering it to 2,500, then lowering it 1,000, the legislature affected enrollment decisions both at the institution and the system.
requirement affected decisions related to the location of a future campus, location of teaching
facilities, outreach/recruitment of future students, and course offerings. The enrollment
requirement put TAMUSA in a “Catch 22” position – not hitting enrollment targets meant
not getting direct funding; not getting direct funding meant that land and/or facilities could
not be bought/built; not building facilities or acquiring land meant that student enrollment
would not grow; and, not growing enrollment meant the enrollment cap would not be
reached.

Of course, the legislature has a lot of indirect influence on institutional and system
decision making. There is the embarrassment factor when institutional leaders are called to
testify before legislative committee. In this setting, legislators ask administrators to defend
their funding requests, report on course offerings, or explain areas of interest by specific
committee members that are happening at the institution. In most instances, the hearings
amount to an hour long “give and take” between the administrators and legislators with little
to no effect on institutional operations, but it puts the administrators in the “hot seat” with the
opportunity for embarrassment.

Another problem is the all-too-often request for information. Again, little to nothing
ever results after the delivery of information; however, the request often sends administrators
into panic mode. First there is the initial receipt of the request. Second, there is trying to
figure out exactly what is being requested. Third, there is the collection of the information.
Finally, there is meeting the deadline.

Finally, there is the use of the press by legislators. The use of the press is often
perpetuated by the institution itself – an incident on campus, a bad audit by state or internal
auditors, or an academic failing. Once the incident is made public, the legislator often holds
a press conference highlighting the issues he/she has and takes the institution to task, often
demanding recourse.

Research Question Four - What were the key factors in supporting and the eventual
establishment of another institution of higher education in San Antonio, now known as Texas
A&M University-San Antonio?

Credit must be given to the time and effort that the late Senator Frank Madla devoted
to TAMUSA. Throughout the interviews conducted by the principal investigator, everyone
highlighted Senator Madla’s determination to make higher education accessible to residents
in South San Antonio and the surrounding communities in South Bexar County and beyond.

A key argument that Senator Madla made for supporting the institution was the lack
of accessibility that the residents had to the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA),
which is located in Northwest San Antonio, and to the private universities – Incarnate Word,
Our Lady of the Lake, Trinity, and so forth – not only due to location, but also cost. As the
story was related to the principal investigator to prove his point, Senator Madla got on the
bus on the Southside of San Antonio and after several hours he reached UTSA after many
stops and traffic. His point was that most of the residents are unable to drive themselves or
have job/family responsibilities that prohibit them from spending hours on a bus to take a
few classes at the nearest public university. (Barwick Notes. 2010)

Senator Madla promoted economic growth as another factor for establishing
TAMUSA. The factor inspired then Mayor Garza to propose his City South initiative, which
at its center was TAMUSA. Senator Madla promoted the institution as the centerpiece for
providing an education that would raise standards of living and attract much needed services
to the economically depressed area of South San Antonio. Senator Madla anticipated that TAMUSA would do for the south side as UTSA has done to the northwest.

Economic stimulation and accessibility was not the deciding factor for the 2009 decision to lower the enrollment so that TAMUSA would get a four year designation and the tuition revenue bonds to start construction of the campus. As detailed in Chapter 5, TAMUSA had a long legislative history beginning in 2000 when the legislature approved the concept. Then, in 2003, the legislature approved TAMUSA with the condition of meeting enrollment goals. In 2005/6, there were attempts to lower the enrollment, which didn’t succeed. In 2007, Governor Perry vetoed bills that would lower tuition. Finally, in 2009, the legislature approved the enrollment change and TAMUSA was realized. Senator Madla achieved in death what he could not do while alive.

Being linked to other education issues also contributed to the establishment of the institution. Throughout its legislative history, TAMUSA, Texas A&M University-Central Texas and the University of North Texas at Dallas coexisted through intertwined legislative initiatives that included tuition revenue bonds (TRB) and enrollment goals.

Between 1997 and 2009 legislative sessions, all three campuses sought the release of TRBs to begin construction of a campus through their legislator champion. Also, it was during this time period that all three institutions sought reductions in their enrollment goals in order to become an independent university rather than a university center. For all three institutions, multiple efforts were made during each legislative session to lower enrollment goals in order to achieve both an independent status and the release of TRBs for building construction.
Demographics are another factor to the successful efforts to establish TAMUSA. Senator Madla took advantage of the predominant Hispanic population on the south side of Bexar and surrounding counties to promote the need for an institution of higher education that was within reach of this community of people. While there were existing avenues for this demographic to obtain higher education, namely Palo Alto College, a two year institution, ready access to a four-year institution was unavailable. Senator Madla successfully argued that the existing four year institutions were either too far away, unaffordable, or limited in their enrollment.

An aid for this demographic was emphasized through the South Texas Boarder Initiative during the late 1980s and 1990s. While the focus of the Initiative was to address educational inequities by providing additional funds to institutions of higher education located in counties bordering Mexico, institutions of higher education in San Antonio were also included, primarily based on the demographics of the city. For San Antonio, the Initiative recognized the growing Hispanic presence in San Antonio and the need to provide higher education to an underserved Hispanic community. Since the University of Texas at San Antonio was the only public university in San Antonio, it was included in the disbursement of funds. While TAMUSA did not directly benefit from the funds that the Initiative disbursed, the emphasis that the Initiative place on educating the underserved Hispanic population did.
Summary

In summary, there are the four themes that surfaced during the course of the study: (1) the perception of accomplishments and impact on decisions affecting higher education, TAMUSA, and/or the legislative process; (2) the acknowledgment that the success of TAMUSA was a result of Madla’s hard work; (3) the concern about funding higher education in the State of Texas, being able to fund additional institutions, and being able to make higher education affordable; and (4) the support of higher education as a matter of importance to the state of Texas’s future; and concern for minority populations.

Theme One: The perception of accomplishments and impact on decisions affecting higher education, TAMUSA, and/or the legislative process.

The analysis of the research material indicates that there was a strong perception that key individuals felt that they were largely responsible for the development of TAMUSA when evidence suggests the contrary. The perception is very simple: support was needed to get legislation passed; it was specific programs that paved the way for TAMUSA; and various individuals were needed to pull things together. This was sometimes related to an advantage based on the perceptions of others or an advanced understanding on the individual’s actions.

It is true that many of the stakeholders have had some degree of influence with creating TAMUSA, whether it was through the legislative process or through local initiatives. If it were not the case, they would have not have been chosen to be interviewed.

A self-confidence subtheme developed during many of the participant’s answers to the questions that were asked. This subtheme is most likely driven by their reputation and
tenure in the current role. It was consistently present in all three level types. Only a few of participants refrained from using “I did this” or “I did that.” Several participants admitted that they arrived “late on the scene for TAMUSA” or that “they were ‘too new’ to the process to have an impact” (Barwick Notes, 2010)

Theme Two: The acknowledgment that the success of TAMUSA was a result of Madla’s hard work.

The most consistent finding during the study was the identification of a particular individual who was responsible for establishing not only higher education on the south side of San Antonio, but also TAMUSA itself. The individual identified was, of course, the late Senator Frank Madla II. Even though the majority of participants highlighted their own contributions, in the end Senator Madla was given credit.

Senator Madla was given credit for working with different factions in the Texas legislature. He was described as influential throughout the entire process. He was seen by his peers as dedicated. He was noted for his concerns for minority education. Most interviews ended with the following statement: “If it were not for Madla, there wouldn’t be TAMUSA.” (Barwick Notes, 2010)

Most of the participants and documents collected had positive things to say about Senator Madla. There were a few, however, that did not have many positive things to say. Given the political nature of public higher education in Texas, Madla was sometimes described as playing a typical political game between established institutions and the need to serve a growing Hispanic population.
Theme Three: The concern about funding higher education in the State of Texas, being able to fund additional institutions, and being able to make higher education affordable.

Consistently, the research identified the problem of the shrinking funding for public higher education in Texas and the rising cost of attendance. Because public education is financed with taxpayer money, each had an opinion as to how to fund it at acceptable levels, how to keep tuition at an affordable cost, and how to use funding for equal access and equal opportunity. Respondents from Institution “B”, and to some degree those from Institution “A”, shared their perception of these issues. This theme was repeated in recommendations about how to improve access by participants and documents collected.

As it pertained to TAMUSA, a few participants rationalized that by adding additional institutions of higher education, it strained an already “cash strapped” funding system. The theory goes that the more institutions that are added in the state, the less money there is for the established schools. This theory ignores the fact the formula funding equalizes how much money is given to institutions for the courses they offer and the students they enroll regardless of how many institutions there are. This theory also ignores the basic premise of equal access by claiming that the number of established institutions is enough to support a growing population. Those who favor equal access and equal opportunity generally agreed that there’s a need for new schools to meet the growing population and that funding should be made available; however, it this was true then TAMUSA should have been established and funded in 2003 instead of 2009.
Theme Four: The support of higher education as a matter of importance to the state of Texas’ future; concern for minority populations.

Interviews and analysis of the date collected confirmed a strong commitment to public higher education in Texas. Even the documentation that supported the argument against adding another public institution was not in the state’s or city’s best interest still did not dismiss the fact that Texas will have to find a way to make higher education more available and affordable to compete in the global marketplace.

Another shared commitment within this theme was the realization that the population of Texas is rapidly shifting from a Caucasian majority to a Hispanic majority. Studies, such as the South Texas Border Initiative supports the claim that TAMUSA would have a positive effect in furthering the educational development of Hispanics in South Texas.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The general public is mostly unaware about what is actually happening in the background of institutions of higher education or why institutions of higher education exist outside of traditional education activities. While this is especially true of those who have not gone to college, it is also true of parents of recent college graduates. Despite the lack of specific knowledge, however, most people have a favorable impression of higher education, knowing that the path to a better way of life requires some exposure to higher education. (Harvey & Immerwahr, 1995)

Because of the public’s lack of specific knowledge, there are several issues confronting national and state advocates for an increased availability of higher education, which especially affects public institutions like Texas A&M University-San Antonio (TAMUSA). The first issue is the rising cost. Higher education advocates and public officials have yet to offer viable solutions to counteract the fact that higher education is becoming less affordable for the middle class and increasingly out of reach for the poor. While it fairly easy to say, “make the system affordable” through reducing administrative overhead and capping tuition, the fact is that rising cost of operations and the reduction of government funding makes containing costs practically impossible without affecting academic integrity. (Harvey & Immerwahr, 1995)

The second issue is accessibility. As is the case with affordability, the public view is one of having a college/university within close proximity to home – TAMUSA was created on this very notion. The attendance growth of two-year community colleges and/or junior
colleges is a testament to this reality. Commuter schools (four-year institutions that rely on regional students rather than traditional students who reside on campus or within a ten mile radius) also fall into this point-of-view. Prestige as a tier-one research institution in another city or state often gives way to attendance at a local/regional institutions that can achieve basic accreditation and provide practical degrees for what the public sees as practical education for real job opportunities. (Harvey & Immerwahr, 1995)

Access remains a significant problem for minorities and the poor. While significant progress has been made since the 1960s, a solution to “equal access” remains elusive. Some, such as the late Senator Madla and the current Senator from Dallas, Royce West, advocate for more institutions, such as Texas A&M University-San Antonio and the University of North Texas-Dallas, to be built in areas where these populations reside to close the education gap. Others, such as the University of the Incarnate Word President Dr. Agnese, however, argue against expanded educational opportunities in economically depressed areas and in favor of sending students to overcrowded universities far from home. (Harvey & Immerwahr, 1995)

As is evident in the last couple of legislative sessions in Texas, the general public has little enthusiasm for funding higher education with taxpayer money, especially during economic difficulties. When the taxpayer is helping to fund higher education, the lack of specific knowledge of mission, purpose, and benefit puts higher education in first place for funding cuts. The ability of the government to cut higher education funding without any taxpayer protest reinforces the notion that if the general public has to fund higher education, then it should be done by funding modestly equipped, efficiently administered colleges or universities instead of funding lavishly endowed institutions that have multi-million dollar
athletic programs, professors who focus on research instead of teaching, and sprawling campuses under constant construction. (Harvey & Immerwahr, 1995)

As is the case with the general public, state and local leaders often express their general support for the needs and goals of higher education, but still lacks specific knowledge of higher education benefits outside of economic impacts. Whereas members of the general public often appear indifferent to the content of what is learned, leaders often advocate without supporting data for a technologically educated populace and a professionally trained workforce that can handle the demands of an increasingly complex global economy. This viewpoint is reflected in the methods that the legislatures use to fund higher education, which in Texas shows greater funding weights to engineering and business courses than to a traditional liberal arts education. (Harvey & Immerwahr, 1995)

In contrast to their vocal support in front of the public, these same officials tend to be in step with the general public point of view when money is tight - single out higher education for budget cuts. In Texas, the legislature has repeatedly taken five to ten percent from each public higher education institution over the past five legislative sessions. Reducing funds is followed by comments that the institutions need to operate more efficiently by reducing overhead administrative costs and focusing on teaching versus research. Major metropolitan cities are generally unaffected when the institutions have to reduce staff or reduce expenditures for goods/services; however, for smaller cities and surrounding communities that rely on an institution of higher education as the major economic engine, the reduction of funds and subsequent moves towards operational efficiencies can have a devastating effect. (Harvey & Immerwahr, 1995)
Administrative efficiencies, lack of adequate funding, and location in an economically depressed area of San Antonio has effected TAMUSA’s ability to live up to expectations – become a regional employer, meet growing demand for space, and stimulate the local economy. After the excitement has worn off, it appears that TAMUSA is feeling the struggles of established institutions around the state.

**Implications for the Study**

This study attempted to show how decisions-making processes that involved a significant amount of participants effected a single institution of higher education, TAMUSA, and how those decisions and participants played a critical role in influencing macroeconomic growth opportunities and in establishing a gateway for a specific segment of the population and region to advance from stagnant, socio-economic conditions. This study also attempted to show how higher education decision making can exert significant influences on a regional and local situations, in terms of both economic and civic development.

As was shown in this study, the Texas state legislature has considerable responsibility and influence for preserving and advancing public higher education; however, over the last two decades of the 21st century, the state’s financial support for higher education has diminished. Since a majority of the population is enrolled at public institutions, any decline in the relative funding of the state’s public universities would have significant implications on the future economic success (Kane, Orszag & Apostolov, 2006). The inability of this group to pass tuition revenue bonds (TRBs) since 2003 has negatively affective TAMUSA’s,
as well as other state institutions’, ability to provide adequate space for a growing student population.

A public institution of higher education’s financial goal has always been to maximize state funding. As seen in the last couple of legislative session, institutions will not always make the case for the resources it needs in the pursuit of educational excellence, prestige, and influence. While maximizing state funding is important, budgetary constraints and the environment in which policy decisions are made require higher education administrators to understand the limitations they face when trying to garner legislative support; however, understanding limitations should not be an excuse for not requesting the maximum. Maintaining funding or at the least minimizing reductions, coupled with the policy decisions made by oversight bodies, creates a need for higher education administrators to remain actively engaged in the decision making process (Kane, Orszag & Apostolov, 2006). This study reinforced this concept by showing the struggle advocates, both external and internal, endured to get the necessary support and funding to establish TAMUSA.

Based on the examination of the facts of the study, the following areas have implications for the future of TAMUSA:

Implication One – TAMUSA’s measurement of success is relative to the political and economic environment.

It took Senator Madla many years to maneuver around or overcome obstacles and cynicism that limited the establishment of TAMUSA. The first obstacle was the Pathway Program that was put in place by the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB). The Pathway Program required enrollment goals, continual educational justifications, and institutional/system sponsorship. Overcoming THECB limitations followed TAMUSA from
the 2001 legislative session through the 2009 legislative session when finally there was
enough “cross-aisle” support to lowered enrollment goals and overcome THECB opposition -
Madla had to recruit both democratic and republican legislators support to move the
institution forward from concept to establishment; members of the Senate Committee for
Higher Education had to approve funding mechanisms; the legislative body had to pass the
authorizing bills; and, the governor had to sign the approved legislation. Now that the
excitement has worn off and Senator Madla’s efforts are just memories, can TAMUSA
manage a changing political environment?

The second obstacle was obtaining local/state support and counteracting
internal/external opposition to educating the underserved population of south Bexar County.
People and groups had to be sold on an idea that the city needed another institution of higher
education. Supporters, such as Senator West, outlined expected educational opportunities
that a four year institution would bring to a poor community. Opponents, such as Dr.
Agnese, highlighted the burden that another public institution would bring to the taxpayer.
Will TAMUSA provide access to the South Side population it was intended to serve?

The final obstacle was that the economic environment dictated that TAMUSA’s
financial impact had to be negligible, but at the same time profitable. Initial efforts to
acquire the land, via Terramark’s Espada venture, would have come at the expense of the
local population through eviction and the City of San Antonio through tax dollars for the
necessary infrastructure to get the institution started. The donation of property by Verano
and Verano’s promise of potential economic growth through development solved both issues.
Now that the infrastructure is in place, how long will it take for the Southside of San Antonio
to benefit from the state’s and Verano’s investment in higher education to become a reality?
Implication Two – TAMUSA must maintain a holistic view that moves beyond the traditional approach of justifying higher education.

It used to be that it was enough to advocate that society would be better served with an educated population. While this point of view was part of the justification to establish TAMUSA, it did not make up the whole argument. Local leaders, such as Mayor Garza, advocated that TAMUSA would boost the economically depressed south side of San Antonio by increasing population growth and attracting new businesses and investment in much the same way that the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) appeared to do the northwest side of the city.

In addition and based on demographic studies and equal access efforts, such as the South Texas Border Initiative, Hispanics were an effective group to advocate that TAMUSA would provide access to higher education in a region of Bexar County that UTSA or the private institutions were unwilling to serve. With the Hispanic population set to surpass the Anglo population within the next few decades, institutions like TAMUSA and other border institutions will be poised to meet higher education needs. Will TAMUSA meet the educational challenges of the next couple of decades by educating the new majority in Texas?

Proponents also effectively argued for a four year institution that would be specifically located on the Southside. As the story goes, a bus ride from the Southside took hours to reach the northwest side of San Antonio where UTSA is located, meaning that certain segments of South Side residents couldn’t afford to be that far away from work and family or trying to get to UTSA on time for classes was dependent on a bus ride. While strategically placed community colleges serve educational needs, many see these schools as springboards to a four year institution; however, without an accessible four year institution
the community college then fails to serve its purpose. Can TAMUSA attract the high school graduates and community college transfers by highlighting accessibility, location, and flexibility?

Implication Three – TAMUSA decision making processes should account for internal and external influences.

This study revealed a host of external and internal influences from inception to establishment, so many that any researcher would need a scorecard to keep track of them all. While Senator Madla worked tirelessly to make his dream come true, he consistently had to contend with individuals and groups who opposed and supported his endeavors. Internal stakeholders included legislative and government officials; state agencies, and various higher education institutions or administrators at a system level and institutional level. External stakeholders included the city of San Antonio, Bexar County officials, local businesses, Southside residents, and economic investors.

The one thing that all of the groups had in common was the desire to influence the decision making process. Each group had their own reason. For example, Verano’s commitment to higher education or equal access/opportunity went only as far as a return on their investment. Another example was how local and state politicians tied themselves to TAMUSA’s development to pad their own portfolios even though evidence exists to the contrary. What will be TAMUSA’s future decision making abilities given the degree of influences these groups have had?
Recommendations for Further Study

All institutions of higher education in the United States are being forced to carefully reconsider the traditional role in which the institutions provide academics and interactions with the community; TAMUS is no exception. Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, exploration of organizational culture and the influence of stakeholders are areas recommended for further study.

As TAMUSA confronts the challenges of change due to campus and student growth, a study to understanding its developing organizational culture will be vital at a broader level. “Culture may explicate past influences on decisions and actions. It may provide an underlying rationale for institutional development. This understanding can then provide a better foundation for administrators' decision making” (Masland, 1985, p. 166). The first step is to acknowledge that a culture exists. The second task is trying to understand the culture. The third task is using culture to create cohesiveness among competing organizational systems. Exploration of TAMUSA’s organizational culture may help explain its current state of existence and provide an insight into the institution’s future because managing organizational culture is a difficult task.

As the institution grows, academic culture might fragment from a desired collegial environment to a political or bureaucratic environment. Institutional growth, increased autonomy of organizational units, and specialization within academic disciplines all contribute to a move from an integrated academic culture to a culture of system. Therefore, TAMUSA’s academic and institutional administrators must "manage" competing organizational cultures because an institution derives strength from a collective culture. “A
single institutional culture can relieve some of the pressures and strains that change, or
growth in this case, puts on the social fabric of an organization. It does this because culture
is a force that provides stability and a sense of community to an ongoing social system such
as a college or university” (Masland, 1985, p. 167).

In its academic and administrative tasks, TAMUSA will have to demonstrate quality,
efficiency and effectiveness to a whole host of internal and external stakeholders as the
institution moves towards a multifaceted institution. These stakeholders will expect to be
included in TAMUSA’s decision making process. These stakeholders might have a number
of commonalities, but will have self serving goals most of the time. (Jongbloed, Enders &
Salerno, 2008)

TAMUS is an institution of stakeholders, both external and internal. As is the case
with many of its peers, TAMUSA must be in constant communication them. The push and
pull of so many stakeholders may lead to a number of organizational changes and
complexities in the relationship between the university and its environment that may not be
beneficial to its growth and development. (Jongbloed, Enders & Salerno, 2008)

“The notion of stakeholders redefines the conduct, role, responsibilities and thus the
nature of the interface between competing groups. The term stakeholder identifies the roles
assigned to those who participate in the decision-making process as representatives of either
internal or external constituents. The key to understanding and coping with stakeholders is
to understand that there is diversity among stakeholders, of higher education institutions, and
their missions. As the direct influence of the state is reduced and the autonomy of the
individual universities and the role of the market increases, the university becomes more and
more reliant up on these types of influences” (Jongbloed, Enders & Salerno, 2008, p. 307).
To fulfill its obligation towards educating the next generation while still being accountable to their stakeholders, Texas A&M University-San Antonio “will have to carefully select and identify the 'right' degree of influences.” For TAMUSA, “thinking in terms of partnerships with key stakeholders has important implications for its governance and accountability arrangements” (Jongbloed, Enders & Salerno, 2008, p. 303).

Epilogue

The passage of Senate Bill 629 (SB 629) during the 81st Legislative Session, which lowered student count and released tuition revenue bonds (TRBs), began the fast-paced process of developing the new TAMUSA campus administratively, academically and physically. No longer dependent on Texas A&M University-Kingsville, the new institution needed executive leadership. The Texas A&M University System Board of Regents name Dr. Maria Hernandez Ferrier the president of Texas A&M University-San Antonio on February 12, 2010. Prior to the appointment, Dr. Farrier served as the executive direct of the TAMUS system center and interim president of TAMUSA once SB 629 was passed. A native to San Antonio, Dr. Ferrier received a bachelors and masters degree from Our Lady of the Lake University in San Antonio and doctorate degree from Texas A&M University. (Barwick Notes, 2014)

Prior to SB 629, TAMUSA enrollment averaged 607 students, peaking at 1,193 students in the fall of 2008. The new building, as well as the use of facilities at Palo Alto and Brooks City Base, has allowed TAMUSA to have steady increases in enrollment. As of the fall semester 2013, TAMUSA enrollment was 2,810, down from the previous year of 2,939.
As a historical note, however, TAMUSA advocates expected enrollment to be 5,000 students by 2010 with an enrollment goal of 25,000 students by 2025. If TAMUS had played by the Supply Pathway rules of 3,500, TAMUSA would still be a system center a decade after SB 800 in 2003. (Barwick Notes, 2014)

Having operated in portable buildings, a decommissioned elementary school, and former air force building between 2000 and 2009, TAMUS began transforming the undeveloped land donated by Verano into a new campus. After the completion of a master plan, design and subsequent construction of the first building began in the March of 2010. Chosen to perform the design was Munoz & Company, owned by Henry Munoz, a well-known personality in San Antonio, former advocate of Ed Garza’s City South Initiative and a former investor in the now defunct Espada development of Terramark on the south side. A San Antonio-based construction firm, Bartlett-Cocke General Contractors, was chosen to build the Multipurpose Building. Construction was completed in time for fall 2012 classes. The Multipurpose Building consists of classrooms, faculty and staff offices, a library, and student services offices. (Barwick Notes, 2014)

Currently, a two more buildings are under construction. Costing $75 million combined, the new Central Academic Building and Patriots Casa are the next facilities being constructed on the 700 acre site. Interestingly, the buildings were designed by Munoz & Company. (Barwick Notes, 2014)

The Central Academic Building is a 170,750 gross square feet, four story facility. It will offer classrooms, lecture halls, an auditorium and various administrative offices. The Patriots' Casa is a facility purposed for the military student and is designed to provide academic and support services to assist veterans and their families’ transition from military to
the civilian life through the offerings of a higher education degree. The Central Academic Building and Patriots Case are expected to open for the fall 2014 semester. (Barwick Notes, 2014)

While the campus grows, south side development has grinded to a stop. Lawsuits against the former Verano managers and frustration from the lack of return on their investment have prompted Triple L Investment to sell the 2,500 acre swath of land and leave San Antonio in much the same fashion as Terramark. Meanwhile, community and city leaders are left with an institution of higher education and a Toyota manufacturing plant without any type of associated community revitalization. Gone too is Ed Garza and his City South Initiative, which is now run by the City South Management Authority. (Barwick Notes, 2014)

State budget cuts to higher education, lack of sufficient PUF, inability of the legislature and governor to agree to TRBs, and the public’s demand for affordable education will hamper TAMUSA ability to reach its 2025 enrollment goal. Of course, if fund are not provided, then there will not be enough facilities to accommodate student growth, which then hampers the institution in growing its student body – the old “catch-22” TAMUSA found its self experiencing during the 1990s.
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APPENDIX A

CONSENT FORM

A Historical Analysis of The Texas A&M University System’s
San Antonio Campus Initiative

Introduction
The purpose of this form is to provide you information that may affect your decision as to whether or not to participate in this research study. If you decide to participate in this study, this form will also be used to record your consent.

You have been asked to participate in a research project studying the decision-making and governance process that is required to administer higher education in the State of Texas. The purpose of this study is to understand how key administrative decisions are made that affects institutions of higher education. You were selected to be a possible participant because of holding either a senior level position at an institution of higher education or hold a position in the State of Texas’ government.

What will I be asked to do?
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to answer various questions relating to higher education administration during an interview setting. This study will take approximately one hour during one day.

What are the risks involved in this study?
The risks associated with this study are minimal, and are not greater than risks ordinarily encountered in daily life.

What are the possible benefits of this study?
You will receive no direct benefit from participating in this study; however, your name and responses may be used to complete various requirements for a doctoral study.

Do I have to participate?
No. Your participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time without your current or future relations with Texas A&M University being affected.

Who will know about my participation in this research study?
This study is confidential and will only be viewed by the principal investigator and the co-investigator, and will be maintained solely by the principal investigator.

Whom do I contact with questions about the research?
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact Hugh D. Barwick, Jr., 979-458-6410, dbarwick@tamu.edu or Dr. Yvonna Lincoln, 979-845-2701, ysl@tamu.edu.

Whom do I contact about my rights as a research participant?
This research study has been reviewed by the Human Subjects’ Protection Program and/or the Institutional Review Board at Texas A&M University. For research-related problems or questions
regarding your rights as a research participant, you can contact these offices at (979)458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu.

Signature
Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and received answers to your satisfaction. You will be given a copy of the consent form for your records. By signing this document, you consent to participate in this study.

Signature of Participant: __________________________________ Date: ____________

Printed Name: ____________________________________________________________________

Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: __________________________ Date: ____________

Printed Name: ____________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX B

Interview Questions

Describe the role that state legislature plays in determining higher education administration? In funding?

What are some of the influencing factors with administering higher education systems, universities/colleges, programs, and/or overall higher education initiatives?

1. What is your higher education experience?

2. What is your current role in higher education governance?

3. What have been some of the challenging decisions that you have made in recent years?

4. Describe a beneficial relationship between state legislature and higher education administration.

5. When institutions of higher education are competing for funds from the state, what factors influence your decision in the distribution of those funds?

6. How can the State of Texas meet the higher education needs of future generations? What are some of the key decisions that need to be made to meet future challenges?

7. Is there such a thing as too many institutions of higher education in the State of Texas?

8. What impact does state governance have on the outcome of higher education?

9. Key factors in supporting SA campus for TAMUS?

10. Key factors in supporting “university system” concept?

11. Quid pro quo?