Posthumanist rhetoric is informed by developments in the sciences and the humanities which suggest that mind and body are not distinct from each other and, therefore, claims of humans’ superiority over other animals based on cognitive differences may not be justified. Posthumanist rhetoric, then, seeks to re-imagine the human and its relationship to the world. Though “post-” implies after, like other “post-” terms, posthumanism also coexists with humanism. This dissertation develops a concept of posthumanist rhetoric as questioning humanist assumptions about subjectivity while remaining entangled in them.

The destabilization of the human subject means that new identifications between humans and nonhumans are possible, and the ethical implications of the rhetorical strategies used to build them have yet to be worked out. Identification, a key aim of rhetoric in the theory of Kenneth Burke and others, can persuade an audience to value others. However, it can also obscure the realities of who does and does not benefit from particular arguments, particularly when animal suffering is framed as human-like trauma with psychological and cultural as well as physical effects. I argue that a posthumanist practice of rhetoric demonstrates ways of circumventing this problem by persuading readers not only to care about others, but also to understand that our ability to comprehend another’s subjectivity is limited and that acknowledging these limitations is a method of caring.
This dissertation locates instances of resistance to and/or deployment of posthumanist critique in recent works of literature; identifies language commonly used in appeals that create identifications between humans and animals; and analyzes the implications of these rhetorical strategies. To that end, I have selected texts about human and animal suffering that engage particular themes of identification that recur in posthumanist rhetoric. The chapters pair texts that develop each theme differently. Most undermine human superiority as a species, but many reify the importance of certain qualities of the liberal humanist subject by granting them to nonhumans. The points of identification created between humans and nonhumans will inform how we re-imagine the human subject to account for our connections, and therefore our responsibilities, to other beings.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation could not have been completed without the help of many people. I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Killingsworth, and my committee members, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Palmer, and Dr. Robison for their support. Their feedback has been invaluable, and I appreciate the time they have invested in guiding my preliminary exams and subsequent research and writing. My thanks also goes to my friends and colleagues and the department faculty and staff. I would like to express my appreciation for the advice and encouragement of Lacie Osbourne, Marina Trninic, Claire Cothren, Lisa D’Amico, and Sarah Hart. I am also grateful to my parents, Lee and Susan Larsen, who taught me the importance of education and pursuing my dreams. I thank the entire Larsen, Hayter, and Young families for their love, unwavering support, and optimism. Finally, I express my gratitude to Dustin Young for his endless love, patience, and encouragement.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Descriptions</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II EXPANDING THE REACH OF HUMANIST MORALITY THROUGH EMPATHETIC IDENTIFICATION</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanist Morality and Modern Ethics</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathetic Identification in <em>Elephants on the Edge</em></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathetic Identification in <em>Reason for Hope</em> and <em>The Age of Empathy</em></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating Moral Change through Humanist Appeals</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathetic Identification in <em>The Lives of Animals</em></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III ANALOGIES BETWEEN HUMANS’ INSTRUMENTALIZATION AND EXTERMINATION OF ANIMALS AND THE ABUSE OF HUMANS</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical Listening to Trauma Analogies</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“It’s Like the Holocaust of Analogies!”: Analysis of PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate”</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses to “Holocaust on Your Plate” and other Holocaust Analogies</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivor Agency and Historical Specificity in Analogies to Colonialism, Slavery, and Racism</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisters and Sistahs: Rhetorical Listening in Collections by Women Writers</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summation of Analysis: The Rhetorical Risk and Potential of Analogies</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticisms of Speciesism in <em>Maus</em> and <em>The Rabbits</em></td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV DEHUMANIZATION AND REHUMANIZATION IN TWO GRAPHIC NARRATIVES ABOUT THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanizing Language in Rwandan Media</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representations of Hate Media in <em>Deogratias</em> and <em>Smile through the Tears</em></td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Duty to Preserve Trauma in <em>Deogratias</em> through Empathetic Unsettlement</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Duty to Resolve Trauma by Locating Culpability in *Smile Through the Tears*. 179
Developing Ethos to Convey the Duty of Memory .................................................. 191

CHAPTER V Rhetorics of Trauma in Memoirs about Life After War ................................................................. 195

Consubstantiality in Depictions of Trauma ................................................................. 200
Consubstantiality across Species ............................................................................. 204
Consubstantiality with the Self ................................................................................. 214
Consubstantiality with an Audience ........................................................................ 231

CHAPTER VI Conclusion .......................................................................................... 240

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 254
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In J.M. Coetzee’s novella *The Lives of Animals*, the fictional novelist Elizabeth Costello delivers a lecture to a university audience and introduces a comparison between the “horrors” of the meat industry and those of the Holocaust by telling her audience “I will take it that you will concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force” (19). The character Abraham Stern refuses to concede to this rhetorical move and claims the analogy is offensive. The use of the Holocaust to endow animal suffering with moral relevance recurs in animal rights discourse, but the strategy risks alienating listeners who perceive how the animalization of certain humans has led to their victimization. Costello’s audience is unified in rejecting her rhetoric, with various characters bringing up objections to her claims that identify humans with nonhumans. However, Costello’s arguments have resonated with the audience of the literary text. *The Lives of Animals* is published with four essays of commentary, and in *Philosophy and Animal Life* (Cavell et. al.), five distinguished philosophers reflect on the implications that the novella’s literary representations of philosophical arguments have for the discipline.

*The Lives of Animals* incites such commentary because it engages critiques of liberal humanist subjectivity that are current in both academic and popular discourses. Costello rejects the Cartesian split between mind and body that allows for the enthymeme asserting we can do whatever we want to nonhumans, including people we have dehumanized, because they lack a mind. The premise supporting this abuse, that
differences in cognition make objectification acceptable, is brought to light by developments in the sciences and the humanities which suggest that mind and body are not so distinct after all. Posthumanism seeks to re-imagine the human and its relationship to the world. For example, N. Katharine Hayles goes beyond contesting the mind-body split to argue that human cognition is “distributed” among the mind, body, and technical and natural environments. Donna Haraway finds promise in our “entangled” relationships, seeing the diffused subject not as devoid of agency, but as more able to perceive and perform its duties to others (When Species Meet 5).

The destabilization of the human subject means that new identifications between humans and nonhumans are possible, and the ethical implications of the rhetorical strategies used to build them have yet to be worked out. Identification, a key aim of rhetoric in the theory of Kenneth Burke and others, can persuade an audience to value others. However, it can also obscure the realities of who does and does not benefit from particular arguments. I argue that a posthumanist practice of rhetoric demonstrates ways of circumventing this problem by persuading readers not only to care about others, but also to understand that our ability to comprehend another’s subjectivity is limited and that acknowledging these limitations is a method of caring. This project develops a concept of posthumanist rhetoric as questioning humanist assumptions about subjectivity while remaining entangled in them. For example, texts aimed at popular audiences often affirm humanist notions about individual agency by extending it to nonhumans. While rhetoric that bestows “human” qualities on animals can increase identification between humans and animals, it can also reaffirm misconceptions about human superiority.
The objectives of this dissertation, as a work of rhetorical criticism and theory, are to

- locate instances of resistance to and/or deployment of posthumanist critique in recent works of literature and popular nonfiction;
- identify language commonly used to convince an audience to “concede to” the appeals, analogies, and tropes that are most often used to “bring home” identifications between humans and animals;
- analyze the political implications of these rhetorical strategies.

I have selected texts about human and animal suffering that engage particular places of identification that recur in posthumanist rhetoric, such as the perceived connection between the Holocaust and factory farming. Animals’ ability to suffer is repeatedly invoked in discourse surrounding their treatment, from arguments by Jeremy Bentham to PETA. When this suffering is coded as trauma, as it is in Costello’s Holocaust analogy, it is used to increase the moral relevance of nonhumans. Whereas descriptions of suffering generate empathy, descriptions of trauma make a stronger call for action by arguing that nonhumans experience long-term physical and psychological effects that have implications that, like human trauma, extend beyond the individual and his or her “kind.” The chapters compare texts that develop points of identifications differently, some affirming the liberal humanist subject and others undermining it. Each text also takes a different approach to persuasion. Though the distance between writer, text, and reader is always a factor in persuasion, texts that have looser arguments and more ambiguity value this distance by drawing attention to the distributed cognition of
the reader. In contrast, more straightforward texts operate as though this distance either
does not exist or is bridgeable and imagines the writer, subject, and reader as unified
subjects rather than posthumanist, distributed ones.

How these texts create identification between writer, subject, and reader affects
who benefits from textual engagements with posthumanist critiques. This dissertation is
concerned with what the term identification has come to mean for rhetorical studies’ and
trauma studies’ conceptualizations of the human and how these models relate to the ones
proposed in posthumanist theory. According to Burke’s theory of rhetoric, all persuasion
happens with identification by the speaker and the audience with each other’s interests.
Therefore, “there is no chance of our keeping apart the meanings of persuasion,
identification (‘consubstantiality’) and communication (the nature of rhetoric as
‘addressed’)” (Rhetoric 46). Because identification entails a form of persuasion, texts
that do not fit within the traditional purview of rhetoric can be analyzed for attempts at
identification or consubstantiality. Even if texts are not persuading the audience to make
a specific decision or take a specific action, they do introduce their audience to new
concepts and use identification to make these ideas comprehensible and perhaps
convincing.

Burkean identification allows for two individuals to be identified with each other
yet not completely persuaded to share a course of action or adopt the other’s beliefs
wholesale because identification does not actually erase an individual’s uniqueness. This
relationship is expressed in the term consubstantiality because an individual becomes
“substantially one” with the other with whom she identifies, but “substance” is not an
intrinsic quality (21). “Substance” etymologically refers to “something that stands
beneath or supports the person or thing,” that is, its context (Grammar 22). These
foundations are inherently unsteady because to define a thing by its context is to define it
by what it is not. For example, Jacques Derrida explains that man “follows” the animal
(17). Humans did not exist as such until they named the animal and thereby separated
humanity, or at least “man,” from what was now its Other. Rhetoric can transform
substances to build or break consubstantiality.

Consubstantiality can be used to create identifications between humans and other
species, which destabilizes the Human/Animal categorization that Derrida argues
undergirds Humanism by creating the appearance of human exceptionalism. This
illusion is being undermined more and more frequently in western thought by what Cary
Wolfe calls the present “decentering” of the human by recent trends in philosophy and
the life sciences (What is Posthumanism? xv). Antihumanists and animal liberationists
critique the human in philosophy’s continental and analytic traditions. Developments in
primatology undermined human exceptionalism in popular consciousness as did the
rhetoric of molecular biology that described DNA as a universal “code” for life that can
be translated into digital code. Posthumanism is also informed by technoscience, and
Hayles and Haraway consider cybernetic research on machine consciousness as well as
science fiction that explores the implications of a world in which machines and humans
are inseparable or indistinguishable.

Though “post-” implies after, like other “post-” terms, posthumanism also
coexists with humanism. Rather than making claims about what comes “after” the
human, posthumanism joins or resists the critique of humanism, which may be informed by popular or scientific decenterings of the human. It seeks to understand the conditions in which humanism emerged and those in which it has been contested, its consequences for a variety of life forms, and how other systems of thought with different consequences can be developed. While not all posthumanist thinkers engage all three topics, a consistent point of identification among them is a definition of the human that recognizes its biological embodiment as well as its embodiment in various technological and cultural networks (Wolfe, *What is Posthumanism?* xv). Sylvia Wynter calls such a being the “human system-ensemble” because it institutes itself through autopoiesis. Although the system-ensemble auto-institutes itself as a unique subject, it also identifies with a group or groups and adjusts to match the “normative mode of the Subject” as defined by the group (22).

Trauma studies implies a model of the human that is a system-ensemble, shaped by interactions with her community, those she defines as “Other,” and by her own memories. At the same time, trauma studies recognizes that an overly diffuse sense of self can make operating in the world and relating to others difficult. For example, Judith Herman and James Pennebaker argue that a coherent self-narrative is part of healing and leads to better relationships between survivor and community (Herman 68, Pennebaker “Telling Stories” 5-7). Herman theorizes that “commonality,” in which a survivor sees her experiences as part of “the human condition,” is key to recovery (235). There is likewise room to recognize connections in posthumanist theory. Wolfe, like Wynter, conceptualizes the relationship between self and the world through systems theory. The
principle of “openness from closure” envisions the subject as self-referential, but explains that this autopoietic closure actually is “generative of openness to the environment” because self-referentiality results in more complexity in the system and, therefore, more possible contacts with and dependencies on the environment (What is Posthumanism? xxi).

The uniqueness of each individual is also central to Burke’s understanding of consubstantiality because identification is not the discovery of an essential sameness, but the building of common ground between differences. However, Krista Ratcliffe critiques consubstantiality for promoting compromise over difference without examining the “coercive function of common ground” that occurs when an empowered party decides not only what differences need to be resolved, but also the terms of consubstantiality, which can result in the marginalized party losing differences important to them (58). While Burkean identification often happens unconsciously, Ratcliffe recommends that we practice “rhetorical listening.” This conscious practice entails listening to others’ desires for disidentifications and respecting these points in order to make limited identifications that are not exploitative.

Trauma studies also encounters problems with identification between victims and those who, when writing or reading about them, experience empathy for the victims that sometimes overwhelms victims’ experiences and drowns out the voices of survivors. Dominick LaCapra provides an alternative to the totalizing identification that happens when one projects oneself onto a victim: empathetic unsettlement. This form of empathy results from the “virtual” not “vicarious” experience of trauma in which one imagines
oneself in the victim’s position “while respecting the difference between self and other and recognizing that one cannot take the victim’s place or speak in the victim’s voice” (125). According to LaCapra, identification without empathetic unsettlement restricts the “ethics and politics to the horizon of the disempowered witness to abjection” (142). Such identification may also “conceal the ways survivors are not simply victims but may themselves become effective political and ethical agents” (142).

While LaCapra is suggesting that unsettled empathy be deployed in the relationship between trauma victim and the historian, writer, or filmmaker who attempts to tell their story, I believe the term can be applied more broadly to situations in which one feels compelled to speak about and/or on behalf of another for various reasons, be it because the other is dead or living without access to particular institutions or discourses. Incorporating empathic unsettlement into the process of identification not only provides a way to correct for some of the imbalances in power between two parties, but also to extend consubstantiality beyond the human species. Acknowledging symbolic and material differences among species, while realizing that these differences do not make humans superior, enables one to envision compromises that are not exploitative.

Haraway claims that recognizing connections to others is what makes us “worldly” (When Species Meet 287). We develop new responsibilities to those with whom we are connected and how we shape those relations is how we shape worlds. Posthumanist rhetoric suggests that its audience become worldly by creating identifications between humans and other species, though it does not always spell out what our new responsibilities are.
In rhetoric, posthumanism can be practiced by creating limited identifications. Using examples of consubstantiality (be it illusory and coercive or more attuned to difference) and empathetic unsettlement, I consider what is gained or lost by the texts’ attempts at identification. I selected texts about human and animal suffering because trauma narratives have the potential to undermine or reaffirm the humanist subject and to encourage or limit empathy. Each chapter therefore analyzes texts that build and limit identification through appeals to empathy, arguments about extending moral concern to animals, and analogies between human and nonhuman suffering. Because identification is central to persuasion, the texts reflect varied models of persuasion, from straightforward arguments to more ambiguous constructs that draw attention to how language and other symbolic forms create realities.

To outline what posthumanist rhetoric is, I build on the criteria that Wolfe argues qualifies academic work and other nonfiction texts as posthumanist and that which Ursula K. Heise and Hayles use for fiction. Wolfe defines posthumanism as a practice that can be applied to a discipline (What is Posthumanism? 123). He develops a two-dimensional graph where “external relations” are charted on the y-axis and “internal disciplinariness” on the x-axis to explain different applications of posthumanism. Someone who works in a field typically concerned with the human, such as history, and theorizes about animals produces posthumanist thought in their external relations because they are insisting their discipline respond to discourses outside their field that argue we should take nonhuman subjects seriously. However, this person may retain much of the humanist methodology and assumptions internal to their discipline, in which case they
practice “humanist posthumanism.” Diagonal to this quadrant is “posthumanist humanism” in which disciplinary practice is posthumanist and the external relations accept a human/animal hierarchy by, for example, excluding nonhuman animals from the questions of subjectivity (What is Posthumanism? 124). Wolfe places Foucault here for his critiques of disciplinarity and his archaeology of humanism (xx, 125). Atterton and Calarco would likely agree that most work by Continental philosophers fits in this category as they state that the Continental tradition “still has some way to go” in questioning human privilege and have attempted to spur it on with readings of selections from Continental philosophy that do address “the animal question” (xvii). Wolfe’s posthumanist posthumanism quadrant contains thinkers such as Derrida and Haraway who take a posthumanist approach to their disciplines and to the external world about which they theorize (What is Posthumanism? 125).

Wolfe uses academics as the examples in his graph, though he does state that these two dimensions can be applied to other types of discourse. Bradshaw’s Elephants on the Edge, as a nonfiction work that uses some humanist strategies to make an argument about elephants fits onto this graph fairly easily in the “humanist posthumanism” quadrant. Though Bradshaw sees herself as building a new discipline, trans-species psychology, rather than adhering to the conventions of an already established one, this text applies human psychological analyses to elephants rather than critiquing these methods. It is more difficult to apply this graph to memoirs and fictional texts because they do not have the same structures of internal disciplinarity as academic
writing, though they do have generic conventions. Therefore, I develop my own criteria for these kinds of texts in relation to those defined by Heise and Hayles.

Fiction and memoir are traditionally concerned with humans, but animals play significant roles in several of the books I am analyzing. For example, a large portion of *The Lives of Animals* is made of Costello’s lectures about animal consciousness, but Costello’s and her son’s strained relationships to humans make up another significant part. Cora Diamond argues that Costello’s lectures should be read as part of a literary exploration of the character’s distress when faced with human indifference to animal suffering, rather than as stand-alone philosophical arguments about the relationships between humans and animals. The book both follows in the humanist vein of fiction about humans and makes a posthumanist intervention by combining genres. Diamond emphasizes it is a literary work, and Ian Hacking describes it as both a “philosophical dialogue” and a text about “philosophical writing” (142). *The Lives of Animals* also defies Heise’s categorization of posthumanism.

Heise provides an overview of several novels and films that “portray posthuman contexts in the sense that they approach questions of species identity in a field of widely varying forms of technological and biological consciousness,” but determines that the majority of them are not “genuinely” posthumanist (505). For her, a posthumanist text must portray human consciousness as just “one mode of being among others” without making any claims of human uniqueness (505-6). This phrasing echoes Wynter’s, who charts the major shifts in the West’s “mode of being of human,” from one mode that defined the human through Christian theology to another that centered on secular
rationality, and the current crisis of this mode brought on by cultural studies (“Ceremony” 22). Wynter articulates the importance of literature when she explains “we,” autopoietic subjects who are also sensitive to norming influences from our social environments, are the “function” of literature as it is through literature’s “great feats of rhetorical engineering that we come to imagine/experience ourselves, our modes of being” (Ceremony 50).

_The Lives of Animals_ presents the crisis in the rational mode of being in the debate between Costello and a philosophy professor as well as in Costello’s daughter-in-law’s private criticisms of her. The novel does not “affirm,” to use Heise’s term, that human consciousness is or is not unique nor does it affirm that consciousness is or is not central to being human. Costello claims that it is not, but other characters bring up counterpoints, leaving the readers to decide for themselves. Heise’s one dimensional “graph” means that she exiles many texts from posthumanism and makes the rather humanist move of valuing consciousness over all other qualities. While Heise does show that some texts are not as posthumanist as they might at first seem, her brief interpretations of them gloss over the ways in which they do undermine human uniqueness.

Her first reading is of one of the earliest science fiction texts to heavily focus on the android animal: _Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep_? Heise argues that this text affirms human uniqueness through human affection for nonhuman animals, both real and electronic. In contrast, “replicants” (androids) are cruel to animals. However, Heise dismisses the significance of both the fictional context of the novel, a post-apocalyptic
world, and the literal one, a world in which animals, even domestic ones, have little value and are often treated cruelly by humans. Humans’ affection for animals in this novel is clearly a cultural product, not something innate, and is a manifestation of the book’s larger interest in empathy. Empathy for animals is important to this fictional society only because earlier generations did not value animals or each other, which is why “World War Terminus” occurred and destroyed the planet. Moreover, the novel contains examples of humans who lack empathy or do not practice it enough and suggests that androids can experience empathy.

Hayles claims that the android Rachael manifests empathy for her fellow androids and perhaps for the human android-hunter Deckard. Hayles even reads Rachael’s cold-blooded killing of Deckard’s pet goat as evidence of her ability to care about others, claiming Rachael may have destroyed the goat because she jealously believed Deckard loved it more than he did her (173). While Rachael’s motives are ambiguous, I agree with Hayles that the novel explores how cybernetics “radically destabilizes” the human rather than affirming it (24). However, more importantly to this project’s methodology, Hayles recognizes that works of speculative fiction “embody assumptions similar to those that permeated the scientific theories at critical points” (21). Thus, rather than dismissing texts that have hints of humanism, she makes arguments about why these assumptions existed at a particular moment and how they gradually shifted to new sets of assumptions. While Heise discounts texts that support humanist ideas, Hayles argues that “older ideas are reinscribed as well as contested” in literary texts about the posthuman just as they are in the field of cybernetics (24).
According to Hayles, “change occurs in a seriated pattern of overlapping innovation and replication” (24). She applies the seriation chart, used in archeological anthropology to map the evolution of an artifact, to the conceptual evolution of cybernetics. This chart illustrates how certain ideas coexist because the old ones wane while the new wax and spark ever newer ideas (14-15). This model is more nuanced and realistic than Heise’s because it acknowledges that multiple versions of the human and of human/animal relationships can exist simultaneously in a society and in a single text. Similarly, Wolfe’s graph allows for three different ways to practice posthumanism and does not privilege one over the other.

I consider Heise’s criterion that human consciousness be treated as “one mode of being among others” in determining if a text is using posthumanist rhetoric, but do not immediately exclude texts that do not fit her definition. Texts that address both the similarities and differences between human and nonhuman consciousness, even if they may ultimately affirm human consciousness is unique and/or superior raise the question of posthumanism with their audience. Similarly, texts that credit nonhuman species with qualities normally reserved for human consciousness encourage posthumanist thought. Because all posthumanist rhetoric remains entwined with humanist thought, each chapter compares two or more texts that make appeals to humanist values and undermine humanism. In comparing and contrasting the texts, I focus on their attempts to encourage or limit identification with the audience and any examples of communication in the texts that model limited identification. Although I do, like Heise, focus on one quality, identification, I do not exclude a text from posthumanism if it uses humanism to achieve
identification. Instead, like Wolfe, who points out that “humanist posthumanism” in the style of Tom Regan and Peter Singer would be a better choice for a newspaper editorial than a Derridean posthumanist posthumanism, I recognize that humanist moves also have value and may be the most effective rhetorical strategy for a text’s context of use.

The texts that most thoroughly undermine humanism do significant work in introducing the reader to new ideas, but often do not show the reader how to translate ideas into behavior. Some uses of humanism productively increase the audience’s identification with the human or nonhuman subjects of the text and provide guidelines for incorporating posthumanist thought into their everyday behavior, though there is the risk of merely reiterating humanist thought. Texts that rely most heavily on humanism share the goal of changing the way their readers operate in the more “humanist” realms of the world such as democratic governments and humanitarian or conservationist organizations. They encourage their audience to change their behavior based on their acceptance of some posthumanist ideas, but not to question the value of democracy, humanitarianism, and conservation. The other texts do question these larger structures and therefore provide fewer, if any, guidelines for behavior.

Texts that investigate the relationship between humans and animals, particularly human and animal suffering, deploy and limit identifications with the effect of both undermining human superiority as a species and reifying the importance of certain qualities of the liberal humanist subject by granting them to nonhumans. The points of identification created between humans and nonhumans will inform how we re-imagine the human subject to account for our connections, and therefore our responsibilities, to
other beings. While rhetorical listening, and the limited identifications and empathetic unsettlements that arise from it, can help us identify responsibilities to others in an ethical way, neither humanism nor posthumanism is necessarily predisposed to this practice.

**Chapter Descriptions**

Chapter II, “Expanding the Reach of Humanist Morality through Empathetic Identification,” develops a rhetorical model that relates a texts’ approach to persuasion to its understanding of human and nonhuman subjectivity. It proposes that texts which are more “posthumanist” in their approach to subjectivity value the ambiguity that results from the distance between writer, text, and reader. In contrast, texts that retain many characteristics of the humanist subject, as described by Hayles, minimize these distances by creating identifications between human readers, nonhuman subjects, and the writer. When these texts display rhetorical listening to their animal subjects and limit identifications by explaining a unique need of the animal, they show readers that moral consideration is not formulaic and that rhetorical listening is vital for determining what actions one should or should not take.

The chapter discusses how G.A. Bradshaw’s *Elephants on the Edge*, Jane Goodall’s *Reason for Hope*, and Frans De Waal’s *The Age of Empathy* claim certain animals fit the criteria of the humanist subject in order to generate empathy for them. These writers bring elephants, chimps, and other primates into the realm of moral concern by arguing that they possess qualities traditionally seen as unique to our species and describing them anthropomorphically. The chapter concludes by relating these
approaches to identification to those found in Coetzee’s novella *The Lives of Animals*. As a fictional work, this text does not share the other threees’ goal of directing readers to take specific actions, and therefore makes fewer humanist appeals. Instead of arguing that certain species should be valued because they have “human” qualities, the fictional Elizabeth Costello states that the human/animal split is based on unimportant qualities and empathy can be extended to *all* species. While *The Lives of Animals* introduces its readers to posthumanist thought, the nonfiction texts depend on humanist thought to promote specific actions to ease the suffering of some species.

Chapter III, “Analogies Between Humans’ Instrumentalization and Extermination of Animals and the Abuse of Humans,” analyzes these rhetorical strategies. These analogies can add moral weight to a struggle the public would otherwise deem insignificant, but also risk appropriating others’ suffering and offending, rather than persuading, an audience. Ratcliffe’s theory of rhetorical listening is central to this chapter as both those who make these analogies and those who respond to them may succeed or fail at this practice. The chapter identifies the major risks of these analogies—1) they may exploit a group of victimized people and reiterate dehumanizing discourse similar to the kind used to justify the mistreatment of these people, 2) viewers may be alienated by controversial analogies 3) the analogy may obscure perpetrators’ culpability and victims’ agency—and argues that rhetorical listening is a way to circumvent them.

This chapter first considers the use of the Holocaust by PETA, identifies successes and failures of rhetorical listening in responses to this campaign, and compares
them to Costello’s Holocaust analogy and her audience’s responses in *The Lives of Animals*. It continues by contrasting PETA’s appropriative use of racism with the more productive ones made in *Elephants on the Edge*. The essay collections *Sistah Vegan* and *Sister Species* also make analogies between speciesism and racism or sexism. In all these analogies, limited identification is crucial to avoid appropriation. The chapter concludes by analyzing how two illustrated narratives, *Maus* and *The Rabbits*, which intend to critique racial discrimination also draw attention to speciesism. *Maus* models an acknowledgement of the limitations of these analogies.

Chapter IV, “Dehumanization and Rehumanization in Two Graphic Novels about the Rwandan Genocide,” compares Rupert Bazambanza’s *Smile through the Tears* with J.P. Stassen’s *Deogratias: A Tale of Rwanda*. To some extent, these two graphic novels have the same exigence: to educate the West about the Rwandan Genocide. They also both use associations between humans and other animals to make arguments about dehumanization. However, the texts present starkly different views about the relationships between humans and nonhuman animals. *Smile* makes a political argument that the West did not intervene in the genocide because they did not and do not see Africans as of human value; therefore, it seeks to “humanize” Tutsis for its readers. While *Deogratias* also attempts to generate empathy for genocide victims, it complicates concepts of guilt and innocence rather than assigning blame.

As in the first chapter, the text that makes a stronger call to action, *Smile through the Tears*, is more “humanist” than the other. *Smile*’s structure is that of a conventional narrative and its content promotes a humanist view of the world in which individual
agency is clear and history is comprehensible. By outlining the causes of the genocide, *Smile* is able to call for individuals to take actions that will prevent similar atrocities. *Deogratias* lacks this persuasive force and presents the genocide as an incomprehensible trauma for which responsibility cannot be clearly assigned. Like *The Lives of Animals*, *Deogratias* introduces a critique of humanism without endorsing this critique. *Smile* affirms humanism, but the solution it offers to end racial tension may not be sufficient as it places all responsibility on the individual without explaining what they can do to affect social change.

Chapter V, “Rhetorics of Trauma in Memoirs about Life after War,” compares Doug Peacock’s memoirs about life after the Vietnam War, *Grizzly Years* and *Walking it Off*, to Jay Kopelman’s memoir about his return from Iraq, *From Baghdad to America: Life Lessons from a Dog Named Lava*. These texts use the writers’ experiences with trauma to both seek and resist identification. Writing, and the consubstantiality that it entails in these books that make calls for social action, is a means of recovery because the writer engages with their own past, present, and future and also considers his or her relationships with others. While both authors use this interplay of identification and disidentification with themselves and their readers, their political aims differ, and the depth of the change they seek affects how their texts create identification.

Peacock makes connections between individual trauma, the destruction of people, and the destruction of wild animals and their habitats. He criticizes government, war, and conservationist efforts that put human convenience over animal lives. In contrast, Kopelman insists that there are “bad guys”; therefore, he trusts that war has a
positive effect that outweighs the destruction he witnessed. He criticizes government policies about military pets and military culture that make it difficult for soldiers to seek psychological counseling, but does not question the government and military in general.

Thus, Kopelman’s text takes a relatively humanist approach to activism and creates humanist depictions of human/animal relationships. The book values pets because they can improve soldiers’ mental health, not because animal lives are valuable in themselves. It builds identification with readers by affirming the humanist relationships with pets that both civilians and soldiers experience through Kopelman’s description of his relationship with Lava and the inclusion of letters from several veterans who adopted dogs during wars. In these relationships, the humans purport to have a clear understanding of the dogs. Peacock’s books critique humanist relationships to animals, so identification is sought in different ways, such as a narrative structure that evokes traumatic flashbacks and analogies between public memories of the Vietnam War and his own memories. Rather than trying to bring humans and animals close together in a material sense, like *From Baghdad to America*, these memoirs encourage humans to leave animals alone. To make that argument, identification with grizzly bears is kept in the realm of empathetic unsettlement; the bears are shown to be capable of some communication with humans but are never fully understandable.

Chapter VI, “Conclusion,” reviews the posthumanist rhetoric used in the texts in the preceding chapters and describes strategies for limiting identification while also being persuasive. It outlines how the context of use affects the degree to which a text pursues posthumanism to consider how both humanism and posthumanism can be used
to move an audience. It suggests that where and how posthumanist rhetoric locates agency, and therefore, responsibility may be an area for continued research.
CHAPTER II

EXPANDING THE REACH OF HUMANIST MORALITY THROUGH

EMPATHETIC IDENTIFICATION

This chapter locates instances of resistance to and deployment of posthumanist critiques in three works of nonfiction written for popular audiences and one novel. Rather than considering the scientific justification for the writers’ depictions of animal subjectivity, it develops a rhetorical model that accounts for how the subjectivity of nonhumans is considered in these texts and how this attitude towards nonhumans relates to the identification created in the text between the three positions of subject, audience, and writer. Texts that identify human readers with nonhuman subjects aim to increase empathy for those subjects. However, disidentifications are also important because they allow writers to be specific about the needs of the nonhuman species and respect certain readers’ resistance to a wholesale identification with nonhumans at the expense of human uniqueness.

The nonfiction works analyzed here claim that individuals of certain species deserve moral consideration because they are capable of not only suffering, but also sophisticated cognition and reciprocity. Bradshaw develops “trans-species psychology” in *Elephants on the Edge* to argue that human action has traumatized many elephants and, therefore, humans should change their behaviors. Goodall’s *Reason for Hope* and de Waal’s *The Age of Empathy* state that both humans and chimpanzees have resources for anti- and pro-social behavior. For Goodall, this means readers should foster their pro-social tendencies by purchasing eco-friendly products and supporting her youth
organization. De Waal similarly claims that humans should respect their empathetic urges more because, for example, they will be happier in societies with a more equal distribution of wealth.

As I will argue, when the nonfiction texts develop a subject that corresponds to the liberal humanist one for both their readers and some animals, their calls for action seem clear and plausible. I use Hayles’ definition of the liberal humanist subject as a “coherent, rational self” with a right to autonomy, a sense of agency, and a belief in enlightened self-interest (85-6). Depicting readers as subjects capable of rational thought and agency is a method of encouraging action. As a point of contrast, J. M. Coetzee’s novel *The Lives of Animals* also considers empathy in the relationships among its characters and in the treatment of animals, but it imagines the subject as more diffuse than the nonfiction works and rejects express political aims. Instead, it encourages readers to theorize on their own about ideas the fictional novelist Elizabeth Costello presents and her interactions with other characters. While the novel does not advocate specific actions, it does seem to aim at effecting an attitudinal shift.

The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that one approach to the subject is better or worse than the other, but to develop a rhetorical model that includes how these texts account for nonhuman subjectivity and consider the implications of how subjectivity is imagined in each text. Because these texts argue that a certain nonhuman subject has agency and deserves moral consideration, they should recognize these qualities in their treatment of nonhumans. They can do so by creating limited identifications among the three positions of subject, audience, and writer. The rhetorical
model that emerges from my analysis of these texts modifies the sender-receiver model. This model has been described in various ways throughout the history of rhetoric and communication studies. The principle that a sender transmits a message and a receiver accepts it has already been productively unsettled in rhetorical studies with critiques that account for the interaction between sender, message, receiver, and their context.¹ This chapter further revises this model by introducing a third party, the subject about whom information is being communicated, and making all three positions, sender, subject, and receiver, mobile. The writer, audience, and subject can be drawn together when the text calls for identification and pushed apart when it draws attention to differences.

Ratcliffe calls the consideration of difference “rhetorical listening” because the listener consciously limits identification. She identifies two forms of identification: metaphorical and metonymic. Metaphorical identification is unlimited, which prevents listening because it imposes identification without concern for differences that may be important to the other side. In contrast, metonymic identification allows for a variety of identifications and disidentifications. The argument that there are no significant differences among humans or between humans and other species is an example of metaphorical identification. Metonymic arguments may define particular qualities, such as the capacity for suffering, as significant to both humans and other animals; however, they also acknowledge species differ. Writers can also seek metonymic identification with their readers by acknowledging and accepting that readers’ definitions of the

---

¹ Jenny Edhauer explains how the consideration of context in Bitzer’s development of the rhetorical situation and the responses of his critics both productively and “permanently troubles sender-receiver models” (3).
relationship between humans and nonhumans may differ from the writer’s in important ways through the use of remonstrative language.

Texts that argue for metaphorical identification between humans and nonhumans risk alienating readers who perceive this move as too radical. The potential damage to the writer’s ethos that can occur if readers perceive them as extremists can be mitigated through the deflection of emotion, by professing a humanist devotion to moral codes based on logic. However, arguments that ignore the role of empathy in morality may not critique the assumption that morality is universal. Instead, they tacitly accept the idea that morality follows a logical code that can be applied across all situations and cultures. Texts that create metonymic identification are not guaranteed to critique universality, but they do lead readers to consider specifics by investigating what moral consideration entails for a particular group of nonhumans. The risk of this strategy is that the audience may not be asked to reconsider many humanist ideas about species differences. Texts that demonstrate rhetorical listening to both the audience and animal subject perhaps do the most to prevent over or under identification to determine which differences matter and which might be glossed over to create limited identification.

**Humanist Morality and Modern Ethics**

In *Elephants on the Edge: What Animals Teach Us about Humanity*, Bradshaw argues that the elephant psyche is like the human one; therefore, they deserve moral consideration. By psyche, Bradshaw primarily means elephants’ recognition of themselves as unique individuals. She depicts elephants as liberal humanist subjects who possess self-consciousness, agency, and the ability to experience and act on moral
impulses. Bradshaw also depicts her readers and herself as such a subject by constructing both scientific and emotional appeals with the explicit aim of awakening a moral impulse in readers that leads them to aid elephants. Therefore, the three positions of writer, audience, and nonhuman subject largely overlap in this book. Bradshaw unsettles the identifications between them in order to establish her authority as a scientist in contrast to lay readers and to provide specifics about what moral consideration for elephants as elephants entails.

In the first chapter, Bradshaw establishes her specialized credibility as a psychologist while also bringing together elephant and human species for her readers. Bradshaw supports her claim that elephants are self-aware by describing the four stages of the Mirror Self-Recognition (MSR) test and explains that the MSR test is accepted among psychologists as indicating “self-awareness” in humans who demonstrate that they recognize their reflections, typically around the age of eighteen to twenty-four months (2). Then, she describes the studies in which elephants have passed some or all of the MSR stages. According to Bradshaw, all elephants that were tested at the Bronx Zoo passed stage 3, recognizing their reflection and using the mirror to investigate themselves, which means they should be considered self-aware according to this metric.

For readers who are not convinced the MSR sufficiently demonstrates elephant subjectivity, Bradshaw compiles qualitative evidence to argue that elephants meet all of psychologist William James four criteria of the self, which he calls the “I.” James identified the necessary features of the “I” as agency, a feeling of coherence and embodiment, the ability to “feel and show” emotions, and the “possession of one’s
sequence of experiences, a history and sense of continuity” (Bradshaw 8-14). Bradshaw brings up examples from elephant ethology, such as their use of tools, mourning behaviors, and long memories to argue that elephants fulfill all four of James’s criteria.

Though Bradshaw extends liberal humanist subjectivity to the elephants by insisting they are self-conscious, she productively unsettles the identification between her human readers and elephants by being specific about what moral consideration for elephants as elephants entails. LaCapra proposes the technique of unsettled identification for relating to other humans. He explains that even well-intentioned identification with a victimized person can overwhelm that person’s voice. This can result in an over-simplification of their suffering which then limits the possibilities for activism (History in Transit 142). An example of humans considering the specificity of elephants’ experiences with beneficial results for those elephants is the Sheldrick Trust. According to Bradshaw, keepers raise orphaned elephants according to the social mores of herds, then transition the orphans into the wild herds in Tsavo National Park. The keepers sleep next to their charges each night, teach them what vegetation is edible, and instruct them in elephant behavior. In short, they become allomothers (140). Though “allomother” is a term sanctioned by elephant ethologists, not a term coined by Bradshaw, it enhances her efforts to anthropomorphize the elephants. When used by ethologists, it implies adult female elephants’ behavior is “mothering,” and when used by Bradshaw to describe the male keepers’ learned behavior, it implies a method of mothering that is cultural and learnable, rather than purely instinctual.
According to Bradshaw’s description, the trust assumes the truth of the liberal humanist subject and extends it to the elephant, treating each one as an individual who must learn to be “self-sufficient” (141). Yet, this extension of humanist moral standing to elephants does not lead to a harmful projection of the human’s desires onto the Sheldrick elephants by, for example, allowing humans to “adopt” the orphans as domesticated workers, zoo animals, or circus animals. Instead, it results in a limited empathetic identification with the elephants that also encourages a respect for the elephants’ own way of life as shown by the trust’s success with raising orphans by mimicking allomothers and integrating those elephants into wild herds.

The section on the Sheldrick Trust paints elephants as capable of suffering and response to others’ acts of communication, which positions them within the humanist moral community by making the controversial claim that they are capable of empathy for others and can reciprocate kind actions. Bradshaw writes that some elephants who have integrated into wild herds visit their old keepers to introduce their offspring. She describes these events as “family reunions” that are “joyous” and blurs the lines between human and elephant expressions of joy by referring to the reunions as an event full of “trunk caresses, smiles, embraces, and laughter of old friends and family” (141). Even the elephants that never return are depicted as displaying gratitude, giving “one final gesture of love and appreciation” when released into the wild, though Bradshaw does not specify what this gesture looks like (141). While a display of appreciation is not identical to reciprocating an action in kind, Bradshaw’s work is significant for its depiction of elephants as capable of both compassion and reciprocity. She quotes Daphne Sheldrick
who says, “[Elephants] have a sense of compassion that projects beyond their own kind and sometimes extends to others in distress. They help one another in adversity . . .” (24). Bradshaw also notes elephants’ long memories to claim that they facilitate elephants’ ability to take revenge as well as return kindesses.  

Because psychological trauma, and more specifically, elephants’ recovery from that trauma by establishing caring relationships, is the focus of Bradshaw’s book, the text combines two questions about the Animal that Derrida identifies as significant in the history of philosophy. He identifies these questions as “Can they respond?,” rather than only react on an instinctual level, and “Can they suffer?” Bradshaw’s book implicitly asks “Can they respond to another’s suffering?” when she seeks to convince readers that elephants can heal from trauma through their relationships with humans and other elephants. Derrida credits a dramatic shift in philosophical argumentation about the animal to Bentham. Whereas the question had been “[Can] the animal think, reason, or speak?” Bentham said the primary question should be “Can they suffer?” (Derrida 27). This question turns the conversation from logos and the capability to take a particular action to the experience of powerlessness. However, questions about logos remain popular. Derrida lists similar questions that have been used to define the relationship between humans and animals: “‘Does the animal think?’ ‘Does the animal produce

---

2 According to Bradshaw, elephants can conceive of revenge and enact it. She cites researchers who have called elephants’ killing of cattle owned by the Maasai people as “revenge” on this tribe that kills elephants. She also states that the elephant Black Diamond acted out of revenge when he attacked his abusive trainer. She is less certain that revenge is historically part of elephant society and states that it could be a response to human pressures (9, 15, 144-5).

3 While the experience of suffering is not always only about powerlessness, a momentary loss of power is involved. For example, while athletic training is done to gain strength, exercises that are done to the point of muscle failure result in a temporary loss of power. Suffering that is taken on voluntarily may still involve such a loss of power.
representations?’ . . . Does the animal have not only signs but a language . . . Does it play? Does it offer hospitality? Does it offer? Does it give? . . .” (63). This line of questioning is based on the assumption that “the animal” is a legitimate category, so Derrida introduces the term animot to disrupt it. This portmanteau of animaux and mot evokes the “extreme diversity of animals that ‘the animal’ erases, and which, when written, makes it plain that this word [mot] ‘the animal’ is precisely only a word” (Mallet x). Bradshaw, Goodall, and de Waal are highly aware of the multiplicity of animals. However, instead of rethinking the previous line of questioning, these three writers merely apply it with restraint by seeking these abilities in cognitively sophisticated species with complex social systems. The writers remain invested in proving that some nonhuman species can reason and respond, while also stressing that these animals can suffer.

Although this approach to nonhumans does not forget suffering, it becomes simply one more quality in the list instead of the first, unique question. Of the three nonfiction writers discussed in this chapter, Bradshaw gives the most weight to suffering because she devotes much of her book to proving that elephants can experience trauma. However, she also argues that they possess many other capacities Derrida lists. Goodall and de Waal spend no more time discussing suffering than they do other abilities. All three writers argue that the species with which they are concerned can respond to other’s suffering, or experience empathy and act on it. Their arguments bring the members of a species into the realm of humanist moral consideration because it implies that they are capable of individuality and sophisticated cognition that includes a long enough sense of
history to reciprocate both kind and cruel acts well after they have immediately occurred. While *The Lives of Animals* poses critiques of some forms of ethical philosophy, with Elizabeth Costello urging her audience to read poetry and walk with animals through a slaughterhouse rather than read philosophy, the nonfiction texts do not suggest we need to investigate or restructure our ethical codes (Coetzee 65). They are more concerned with how these ethics translate to behavior and affect readers’ stance on specific moral issues.

According to Hayles, the pursuit of liberal humanist values, including enlightened self-interest and the rights of autonomy and freedom, can benefit others (85-6). For example, they led one of the founders of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, to oppose lobotomy and nuclear weapons. However, this version of the subject undoes itself. As Hayles explains, because the liberal humanist subject is defined as “self-regulating,” the concept of this subject undermines human superiority when we imagine machines that are capable of sophisticated enough self-regulating processes to become conscious and rational (86). She refers to the now classic novel, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep*, in which human society “solves” this problem by changing the defining human trait from rationality to empathy. The humans in the novel assume that because androids cannot feel empathy toward others, humans should not feel empathy towards them.⁴

---

⁴ The humans’ lack of empathy for androids is motivated by both selfishness and fear. They benefit from android slaves, who are given to humans as an incentive for moving to space colonies, and justify enslaving them because they are afraid of what intelligent beings can accomplish when they do not feel empathy.
Such reciprocity as an aspect of empathy, along with rationality and individuality, is fundamental to some forms of modern ethics. In the three nonfiction works discussed in this chapter, arguments for humanist morality are based in what Zygmunt Bauman identifies as modern ethics because of their belief in a universal morality that transcends even some species lines, as long as these Others are capable of reciprocity. Bauman’s definitions of modern moral philosophy and the postmodern approach to ethics he proposes hinge on his distinction between morality and ethics. He calls ethics “a moral code, wishing to be the moral code, the one and only set of mutually coherent precepts that ought to be obeyed by any moral person” (21). Bauman believes that a universalizable moral code is not achievable, so his postmodern morality is a morality without set ethical rules.

Bauman states that the conviction that a universal ethical code could be determined “drew its animus from the faith in the feasibility and ultimate triumph of the humanist project” because it assumed that there was a formula for a harmonious, stable world which humans were capable of discovering (9). “Reciprocity” is one of the attributes that Bauman identifies which “morality should have possessed in order to be universalizable—but which it does not” (54). That is, a decision could be labeled universally moral if it promises to benefit the actor, either by direct reciprocity from the recipient or in a more diffuse, delayed way. However, for Bauman, moral decisions are not ones that result from calculating costs and benefits to oneself.  

Bauman does no describe how utilitarianism fits into his definition of modern ethics as this approach is concerned with the greatest good, rather than individual benefit.
Bauman’s “postmodern ethics” rejects the belief in a universal ethics to declare that morality cannot be imposed and following one standard too strictly always leads to immoral ends (11). Postmodern ethics does not depend on rationality because Bauman’s definition of the Self is Levinasian rather than in accordance with liberal humanist subject identified by Hayles. For Emmanuel Levinas, responsibility to the Other precedes self-consciousness; therefore, the moral impulse exists before socially codified morality. Suffering is important to Levinas’s conceptualization of the Other, and the opposition to suffering is central to his ethics. He writes that the Other “calls to me and orders me from the depths of his defenseless nakedness, his misery, his mortality” (202). All suffering is “useless” for the sufferer; however, suffering for another’s suffering has meaning because this compassion shows that one recognizes one’s duty to relieve the Other’s suffering (100).

Though Bauman and Levinas argue that the ethical relationship exists prior to the social and to “being” respectively, it remains in the realm of human beings for both of them. Therefore, Wolfe critiques Bauman’s postmodern ethics and Levinasian ethics for retaining reciprocity at the same time that they deny it. Both claim that the rejection of the expectation of reciprocity is fundamental to an ethical relationship, but this rejection implies the Other has the capability to reciprocate and limits the moral community to beings who possess it (What is Posthumanism? 141). Coetzee addresses the difficulties of an ethical relationship with those who lack the ability to reciprocate in The Lives of Animals, but arguments about more cognitively sophisticated species in the nonfiction
texts sidestep these difficulties by granting the ability to reciprocate to certain nonhumans.

In the three nonfiction works, arguments for humanist morality are based in what Bauman calls modern ethics because of their belief in a universal morality that even transcends species. They are not concerned with Others that are incapable of reciprocity. The texts extend moral consideration to certain animals by showing how well they fit the requirements of the liberal humanist subject. Even though humanist morality as it is practiced in these texts does not absolutely depend on morality as rational and calculated, the ability to reciprocate is fundamental. The nonfiction texts discussed in this chapter extend the reaches of morality by arguing that specific animals deserve moral treatment because they are capable of practicing moral behavior to both others of their species and humans. Wolfe would classify such works as “humanist posthumanism” because though they discuss the animal subject, they do not question humanist disciplinary norms (What is Posthumanism? 125). Because they take their readers to be liberal humanist subjects, they assume they can be persuaded according to modern ethics along with some description of animal suffering to stir the empathy that is established by depicting animals as humanist subjects.

While Bauman and Levinas place the moral impulse before other “human” qualities such as rationality, Goodall and de Waal insist on locating pro-social relationships that include empathy, reciprocity, and altruism biologically prior to the human, in our primate ancestry. In doing so, they argue for a human nature that includes pro-sociality instead of imagining that humans have a “beastly” nature they are
constantly struggling to repress through the devices of civilization. These writers collapse the distinction between pro-social and moral behavior by arguing that specific actions, such as sharing food, are a demonstration of conscious choice rather than instinct. Furthermore, Goodall and de Waal use anthropomorphic language to describe such actions. For example, de Waal states that capuchin monkeys “barter” with researchers when they submit plastic tokens to feed either only themselves or both themselves and their favored companions (112).

In this way these texts seemingly differ from modern ethics because they reject the idea that the human can “emancipate itself from . . . the ‘animal’ or not-sufficiently-human, ignorant, dependent, ‘other side’ of their selves” (Bauman 23). However, their politics benefit from retaining vestiges of modern ethics and Cartesian dualism when the works direct their audience toward moral choices. For example, Goodall supports human uniqueness and the ability of the mind to control selfish desires when she claims that humans are capable of self-directed “moral evolution” that can lead to a more just world. De Waal also believes empathy can be consciously encouraged by both personal efforts and social institutions. Bradshaw’s stories of elephants’ who “reach out” to humans establish this empathy project as one that species can work on together (247). In contrast to much other animal rights discourse that paints nonhumans as passively suffering victims, like PETA’s analogy between concentration camp prisoners and farm animals in its “Holocaust on Your Plate” campaign, these three authors create empathetic identification between humans and nonhuman by positioning their readers as empathetic individuals who can help other empathetic individuals.
Empathetic Identification in *Elephants on the Edge*

This section defines empathetic identification and its relationship to rhetorical theory and trauma studies using *Elephants on the Edge*. The following one analyzes examples of empathetic identification and empathetic unsettlement in texts about primates by Goodall, the popular press, and de Waal that attempt to bring nonhumans into the realm of humanist morality by presenting them as self-aware, emotional, and rational subjects but also, at times, support a belief in human uniqueness. While empathy has been defined in multitude of ways, for this analysis I will consider the empathy felt by the reader for the nonhuman subject or the writer apart from every day “mindreading,” in which one understands the thoughts and emotions of another (Stueber 5.1). The thoughts and emotions of the writer, particularly in Goodall’s memoir, are sometimes spelled out clearly in the texts; likewise, the internal life of the animals is often stated as a matter of fact rather than something the readers must deduce. Rather, empathy as it is discussed here entails that the reader either consider how she would feel if she were in a similar situation to the nonhuman (or writer) or share in the nonhuman’s (or writer’s) experience of joy, distress, or other emotional state as it is depicted in the text. For me to claim that a nonhuman is depicted as displaying empathy, the text must imply that the nonhuman differentiates between itself and the other, has performed some act of mindreading, and as a result shares the other animal’s joy, distress, etc.

Empathetic identification is created primarily through emotional appeals that present the other as experiencing the same feelings that the reader would under circumstances that the text presents as similar, as Bradshaw does when she describes the
joyful “family reunions” at Sheldrick. In texts about nonhumans, it is built through language that could be considered anthropomorphic. For example, Bradshaw repeatedly calls the elephants at Sheldrick “orphans,” “babies,” and “infants,” but rarely uses the animalizing term “calf.” She also describes them as experiencing PTSD, writing that one named Ndume “had difficulty sleeping and often we would wake to hear his screaming and shrill trumpeting—a distress signal of a baby—obviously reliving the traumatic events in his dreams” (139). By characterizing his trumpeting, the one exclusively nonhuman act in the sentence, as that of a “baby” she explains it as part of his human-like reaction to the deadly attack on his herd.

The claim that Ndume and other elephants are traumatized also humanizes them. While the ability to suffer would be enough for an animal to qualify for moral consideration under Derrida’s interpretation of Bentham, Bradshaw is writing for an audience who may not believe all forms of suffering are equal (Derrida 27). By showing that the elephants experience psychic as well as physical suffering, Bradshaw creates identification for them with readers who put little value on nonhumans’ physical pain. Her use of names also increases the elephants’ human status. Unlike Goodall, who describes her process of naming the wild chimps she observes at Gombe, Bradshaw does not mention that Ndume was named by Sheldrick keepers. Instead, she refers to him as Ndume even when imagining his life before Sheldrick, implying that his status as a unique and important individual is not dependent on humans recognizing him as such. Although Bradshaw makes arguments for identification that are supported with scientific research, she also makes many subtle attempts to create identification.
In *Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke argued that identification, which is synonymous with persuasion, can be conscious, unconscious, or somewhere in between. De Waal makes a similar argument about empathy. He cites research from primatologists and psychologists who indicate that empathy is “involuntary” and instantaneous, rather than a cognitive decision based on our recall of previous experiences that we then apply to another’s current experience (66). He also argues that humans can learn to extend their empathetic responses to those we have Othered. In rhetorical studies, Jean Nienkamp and Ratcliffe explain how we can learn to use and restrict identification to improve relationships within ourselves and to others. Nienkamp claims that although unconscious identifications shape us, we exert agency through conscious identification (134). Ratcliffe focuses on conscious acts of identification as well as the intentional limiting of identification with her theory of “rhetorical listening,” in which one tries to discern what is important to an Other in order to respect these values.

Nienkamp’s concept of the subject as shaped both by its milieu and its internal reflections on these relationships meshes well with Ratcliffe’s theory because a subject that practices rhetorical listening will have more resources for experiencing empathy and demonstrating behavior to others that is based in this empathy. According to Nienkamp, an individual absorbs discourses from multiple sources which then come into conflict with each other, so the individual tries to reconcile them or determines that one is preferable to another. Thus, agency arises from our ability to put different voices into

---

6 Recent neuroscience research into “mirror neurons” supports de Waal’s theory that some forms of empathy operate on a very basic level. The same “mirror neurons” are activated when we see a person expressing an emotion as when we express that emotion ourselves. However, more complex mindreading, which takes into account social context, involves other parts of the brain (Stueber 4).
conversation with one another, even though the types of voices we have are limited by our experiences (Nienkamp 134).

Nienkamp’s model of the subject is in accordance with the posthumanist ones envisioned by Wynter and later by Wolfe. Wynter names her model “the human system-ensemble.” The human is shaped by both material and symbolic systems. It exists in and is influenced by a larger autopoietic system, but retains some agency through its own internal autopoiesis, which Wynter calls self-troping. That is, though the subject is shaped by its environment, it also repeats what it has internalized in unique and complicated ways. Therefore, this subject can be critical of dominant discourses, even though it cannot effect epistemic change. Like Wynter, Wolfe describes the subject as autopoietic, but explicitly bases his model in systems theory. He theorizes the subject’s relationship to its environment as “openness from closure.” The subject is a “closed” system because it does not have direct access to anything outside of it; however, it is sensitive to its environment. The more autopoietic, or self-referential, it is, the more complex and therefore more open to environmental influences it is. Thus, the more varied one’s internal rhetorics are, the more sensitive one is to new rhetorics. A subject with many internal rhetorics is not more “vulnerable” to persuasion, but is more able to understand another’s position.

A more complicated set of internal rhetorics can give people more resources for practicing rhetorical listening. They can consciously practice or limit self-persuasion, then apply methods used for internal deliberation to their interactions with others. Ratcliffe defines rhetorical listening as a “stance of openness” that a person chooses to
take in “cross-cultural exchanges” or “in relation to any person, text, or culture” (1). It is a conscious choice, which means that a person can use it to discern when another person wishes to build identification with them and when he or she wishes to limit it. Ratcliffe explains that the individual or group in power is usually the one who gets to outline the terms of identification by deciding what differences the other side gets to keep and what they must give up. Although the less powerful side is vulnerable to losing differences that are important to them, rhetorical listening can guide the other side away from forcing such a loss. Ratcliffe stresses that identification should be “metonymic” rather than “metaphorical,” that is, bound by association rather than total identification. Daphne Sheldrick demonstrates how metonymic identification can be practiced across species. Bradshaw writes that “Vital to elephant salvation has been her ability to raise them like elephants” (25). The trust’s model is to learn about elephant society to adapt its own practices accordingly. While the people who work at the trust do their best to simulate elephant society, they understand they cannot fully recreate this environment. Therefore, they let orphans visit wild herds to increase their socialization and eventually release them.

Rhetorical listening helps us be aware of where the Other draws the line between identification and appropriation. LaCapra’s “empathetic unsettlement” serves a similar end, though the method is different. In contrast to rhetorical listening, which is actively practiced by the listener/reader of any text, empathetic unsettlement is encouraged by the author. For example, someone writing about a historical atrocity can direct the audience to empathize with the victims by describing their suffering in terms with which the
audience can identify, but can also unsettle this empathy by describing the historical context that allowed for their specific position as victims, a position that the readers do not share. Context may even be used to show readers their similarities to perpetrators or by-standers by, for example, describing their nation’s passivity toward or complicity with genocide. Though rhetorical listening can be applied to any text, ones that make explicit use of empathetic unsettlement make a call for rhetorical listening by both encouraging and discouraging identification.

Narrative is a common way to create empathy and can also be used to unsettle it, as in Bradshaw’s chapter “Elephant on the Couch: Case Study, E.M.,” a work of creative nonfiction in which she narrates facts about an elephant’s life in the form of a psychological case study. Booth explains that narratives are rhetorical by directing readers’ sympathy and judgment for characters. When the story is narrated through the eyes of a character we become more sympathetic to him or her. Bradshaw’s “case study” includes E.M.’s “history,” which, though it narrates her life in the third person, does recount it from her point of view rather than that of her keepers. For example, we are told that E.M. was brought to the United States and “kept in confinement by a man who had a previous history of using welding torches, chemically treated metal prods on sensitive parts of the body, including the genitals, ropes, deprivation of water and food, beatings, and other forms of torture” (96-7). While some of these practices are more abusive than the usual treatment of captive elephants in the contemporary United States, they are common enough that the man inflicting them may not have perceived his
actions as “torture.” Rather than siding with this man, who perceived E.M. as a dangerous animal he needed to control, readers perceive E.M. as an abused person. The overall thrust of Bradshaw’s book, that elephant and human psyches are very similar and therefore equally vulnerable to trauma, encourages a large amount of identification. There are a few moves to unsettle this, such as the physical descriptions of the elephants which make identificatory appeals to the body through the description of pain and simultaneously unsettle this identification by highlighting the physical differences between the species. “Elephant on the Couch” makes particular note of the damage done to elephants’ feet and joints in captivity.

The case study is “framed” by its title; after all, no psychologist would invite an elephant to literally sit on their couch. Such “carefully framed” sections of experimental writing are one of LaCapra’s suggestions for creating empathetic unsettlement. Bradshaw further frames the case study with an explanation of why she wrote it and what she hopes the readers learned from it. She sent the study to several psychologists who diagnosed E.M. with PTSD, not knowing she is an elephant. Bradshaw hopes these experts’ diagnoses will convince readers that elephants can develop this disorder. Thus, while Bradshaw’s attempts at identification in the case study are totalizing, by which I mean they construct a metaphorical or identical relationship between the human and elephant psyche, the case study itself is contextualized in a book that draws a more

---

7 Bradshaw describes the contemporary treatment of elephants in many circuses and zoos on pp 100-4. Beatings and deprivation of food and water are common. Metal prods, known as ankuses or bull hooks, are used, though they are not usually chemically treated. Welding torches are not common.
metonymic comparison by noting physical differences and admitting that we do not know everything about elephant psyches.

*Elephants on the Edge* also uses narrative when recounting quantitative data. For example, the motives and feelings of both the researchers who conducted experiments and the elephants who participated in them are described. Likewise, statistics on elephant population, poaching, elephants in captivity, etc. are always personalized with a narrative. Bradshaw introduces the chapter on poaching with a brief first person narrative of an elephant who remembers an attack when she was younger and, therefore, is able to lead some in her herd to safety when they are attacked years later. Then, this narrative is contextualized with statistics about the ivory trade and other violence. The book thus combines traditional academic argument with explicitly emotional appeals.

**Empathetic Identification in *Reason for Hope* and *The Age of Empathy***

Goodall relies more heavily on empathy, and thus narrative, than academic ethos and argument in *Reason for Hope*. Because her celebrity has already cemented her primatology expertise in the public imagination, she is able to draw on this credibility to create a book that is more in line with memoir than argument. *Reason for Hope* describes Goodall’s spiritual journey from Catholicism to a theosophical synthesis of various religious and philosophical traditions with modern science. She explains how the Holocaust, her work with chimpanzees, and the illnesses and of her loved ones have affected the way she views the world. Goodall depicts herself, her readers, and her nonhuman subjects in ways that coincide with the liberal humanist subject. All have agency and are capable of rational thought. However, because of her interest in
spirituality, she does not insist on as much overlap between these three positions as Bradshaw does. Though Goodall does not claim humans are unique from nonhumans, she does not insist that human consciousness is merely “one mode of being among others” as Heise requires of posthumanist fiction (505-6). Instead, Goodall leaves room for her readers to hold a belief in human uniqueness because she accepts that some readers object to evolution in favor of divine creation.

In the introduction, Goodall claims that she wrote this book in response to questions from friends, acquaintances, and strangers who ask her how she remains hopeful “in the face of so much environmental destruction and human suffering” (xviii). She frames the book as a guide for others who are struggling with hopelessness, stating that, “If you reader, find some aspect of my own personal philosophy and faith that is at all useful or enlightening to you as you travel your own unique path, then my labor will not have been in vain” (xvii). While Goodall does make a few explicit claims about actions readers should take to help both humans and nonhumans, her aims are much more diffuse than Bradshaw’s. She presents her spiritual discoveries and the actions she has taken as resources for her readers, only making a few explicit suggestions to them.

Goodall’s rhetorical approach may be informed by her interest in theosophy, a Western synthesis of Eastern philosophies and religions with Western traditions in pursuit of “divine wisdom.” Though British theosophy is most heavily informed by Buddhism, the founder did consider Confucius a “great sage” (Algeo), and Goodall’s rhetoric is akin to the Confucian tradition of remonstration as defined by Arabella Lyon in which the speaker presents a point of view without actively trying to persuade the
audience to adopt it. According to a theosophical worldview, all religious, philosophical, and scientific interpretations of the world are manifestations of the same “Ancient Wisdom.” Thus, theosophy encourages tolerance by decreasing the significance of difference. While Ratcliffe might criticize such a worldview for imposing compromise, Goodall presents theosophical tenents such as “there [is] but one God with different names: Allah, Tao, the Creator, and so on” in the same way she presents evolution: as her own personal beliefs, not doctrine that readers must adopt in order to experience hope (xiv). The result is a text that displays Goodall’s efforts at rhetorical listening because she maintains a degree of respect for her readers’ spiritual worldviews. That is, though she ignores some readers’ belief that their religion is the only “true” one, she does not explicitly tell them their religion is “wrong” for denying other religions or tell these readers they should abandon this principle and take up her belief that all the major religions are equally valid.

Goodall’s willingness to let readers retain many of their religious values shows evidence of rhetorical listening. Ratcliffe places rhetorical listening in the first of the five canons of classical rhetoric: invention. If rhetorical listening is practiced during invention, then the rhetoric produced through the other stages and ultimately delivered to an audience may be less likely to be coercive. Thus, rhetorical listening is more likely to lead to remonstration than classical argumentation. According to Lyon, persuasion has a goal—the audience is persuaded—and the speaker is in control. In contrast, remonstration merely shows something and “[t]hose who see it are free to interpret it, heed it, repeat it, or ignore it” (140). The benefits of remonstration are that it places
limits on judging others and emphasizes respect for relationships over the law. I would argue that persuasion in the Western tradition can be understood as more complicated than Lyon describes. For example, the goal of rhetorical education for Quintilian was to create a “good man speaking well” (12.1.1). Persuasion was hoped for, but Quintilian would not consider an eloquent, but immoral man an excellent orator because goodness is an equally central trait for him (12.1.23). For Burke and Killingsworth, both parties are imagined as moving to create identification, rather than the speaker dragging the audience to his or her own position. However, Lyon’s analysis of remonstration is valuable not only for modern Chinese rhetoric, but also for Western practices because it provides a model for texts born of rhetorical listening that do not force identification/persuasion.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of remonstration in *Reason for Hope* is Goodall’s treatment of evolution. Though she is a primatologist and made controversial discoveries about chimpanzees’ similarity to humans, Goodall deemphasizes the importance of identification between species in her discussion of evolution. Goodall frames belief in evolution as a matter of choice, rather than a question of scientific theory, by emphasizing her emotional connection to chimps over data that links our two species. She presents the topic as a personal issue unrelated to her larger message when she writes:

> I do not want to discuss evolution in such depth, however, only touch on it from my own perspective: from the moment when I stood on the Serengeti plains holding the fossilized bones of ancient creatures in my hands to the moment
when, staring into the eyes of a chimpanzee, I saw a thinking, reasoning
personality looking back. You may not believe in evolution, and that is all right.
How we humans came to be the way we are is far less important than how we
should act now to get out of the mess we have made for ourselves. (2)

Goodall is open about her belief in chimps and humans’ shared ancestry in this
quotation and many other times in the book. However, she continually states that this
conviction is not a prerequisite for wildlife conservation and turns the focus to
“ourselves,” explaining how helping others helps us through the diffuse reciprocity that
supposedly results from making the world “a better place.”

Goodall’s remonstration does not ask her religious readers to transform their
understanding of human “substance.” According to Burke, “substance” etymologically
refers to “something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing,” that is, its
category (Grammar 22). These foundations are inherently unsteady because to define a
thing by its context is to define it by what it is not. Therefore, a rhetor can transform
substance to create “consubstantiality,” or identification, between two groups. Burke
calls “familial definition” all strategies of definition that rely on the idea of biological
descent “with the substance of the offspring being derived from the substance of the
parents or family” (26). Whereas de Waal depicts a mammalian family in which many
species share biologically rooted empathetic tendencies, Goodall realizes that some
readers would be alienated by such a drastic attempt to destabilize what they imagine the
human to be. Therefore, she claims that they do not need a familial definition to identify
with and care about chimpanzees.
One of the major ways Goodall encourages her readers, both theistic and non, to identify across the species line is by describing her work with the chimps. She explains that she was unwittingly doing something revolutionary when she gave the ones at Gombe names, rather than numbers. In doing so, she makes herself an appealing figure: the self-taught amateur who had more insight into chimpanzees than professionals did. Such an ethos creates identification with an audience who is also not in the profession of primatology. It encourages the audience to identify with the chimps because Goodall does so in opposition to her discipline. Though many of the chimps’ names are similar to those of domestic pets (e.g. Goblin and Gremlin), Goodall grants them subjectivity in other ways. She carefully explains their biological relationships, friendships, and biographies. She also intersperses their photos with those of herself and her family. Each chapter begins with a black and white photo of chimp. Many are cropped at the shoulders, like a school year-book portrait, which gives a sense of the chimpanzees as individuals as well as a social group. Unfortunately, one photo of a chimp appears twice and is labeled as both “Fifi” and “Faustino.” Though this mistake could also happen with photographs of people, it unfortunately undermines the text’s efforts to portray chimps as possessing unique personalities rather than as interchangeable, biologically programmed animal machines.

Goodall mentions traits such as tool use and tool making that rocked not only primatology, but also popular, philosophical, and theological understandings of the relationship between humans and other primates. However, her main method of creating identification between humans and chimpanzees is not through the number of
similarity between the species, but narrative and visual arguments that show empathy is
instinctual in both chimps and humans. For example, the photograph that begins the
chapter “Compassion and Love” is the mother chimp Fannie cradling her child Fax. She
looks down at him adoringly, while he stares wide-eyed at the camera. The image is
cropped so that they fill the frame, making the composition reminiscent of posed
portraits of new moms.

Goodall claims that chimpanzees are capable of empathy and reciprocity when
she writes that those observing chimp communities “see frequent expressions of caring,
helping, compassion, altruism, and most definitely a form of love” (137). The “most
definitely” and “a form of” undercut each other. However, the expression goes further
than academic writing, which would replace the term love with something like
“bonding,” though, as de Waal points out, popular discourse has adopted this term to
describe human-human relationships (12). The qualifier “a form of” retains a difference
between humans and chimps, allowing for readers to believe that humans’ love for each
other is somehow more sophisticated or spiritual than chimpanzees’ love. Yet, Goodall
narrates her examples of chimp love in ways that make them seem the same as humans’.

Her description of the adult male Spindle who took care of a young, unrelated
orphan named Mel depicts Spindle as capable of not only reciprocating empathetic
gestures, but also transferring appreciation when the original benefactor is no longer
present. Spindle and Mel’s mother died in the same epidemic, making Goodall ask “Is it
possible that Spindle’s loss of his mother left an empty space in his life? And that the
close contact with a small dependent youngster helped to fill that space? Or did Spindle
experience an emotion similar to that which we call compassion? Perhaps he felt a mixture of both” (140). The rhetorical questions and terms like “possible” and “perhaps” are typical of Goodall’s remonstrative style. Of course, Goodall is not simply laying out information for her audience to adopt or reject as they please. She gives the readers only three options, and all options require that they accept chimpanzees as cognitively and emotionally sophisticated.

The first option, that Spindle took care of Mel because this filled a hole in his life after the loss of his mother, implies that Spindle was able to reciprocate his mother’s affection, mourn her, then displace the loss of a relationship in which he was the one taken care of not with a parallel relationship, but with one in which he is the benefactor. Interestingly, Goodall presents this as the simplest option even though such behavior in a human would probably be seen as an excellent example of “working through” one’s trauma by reintegrating into the community. Herman, a psychiatrist, writes that this reconnection is vital to recovery; a survivor “must develop new relationships” in order to “reclaim” her world (196). She suggests one effective way to do this is by bonding with other survivors in group therapy and aiding other victims through activism (73, 207, and 214). When Spindle helps Mel, he shows a willingness to act against the norm for the good of a community member by following female behavior in the way he carried Mel.

Though Goodall avoids words like “love” and “mourn” when describing Spindle’s relationship to his mother, she uses “empty space in his life” which is popularly used to express an emotional void. The second option explicitly attributes emotion to Spindle, though, as she did with “a form of love,” Goodall qualifies her
statement as “an emotion similar to that which we call compassion” (140). The third option, that Spindle was both trying to fill an empty space in his life and felt compassion for Mel, attributes an even more complex psyche to Spindle. All three options could be suggested for a human who loses a parent and starts taking care of a child. For Goodall, the suggestion that Spindle is operating through an instinct as mechanical as that of Descartes’ “animal-machines” is not possible (44). It is not even a question that can be asked. Whether or not nonhumans experience emotions remains an open question in scientific and popular discourses, but Goodall forecloses it in an effort to redefine possible relationships between the human and nonhuman.

The article by Katherine A. Cronin, et.al. “Behavioral Response of a Chimpanzee Mother Toward Her Dead Infant,” was published in February 2011 in *The American Journal of Primatology*, and both the academic article and the popular reaction to it show how whether or not chimpanzee’s experience emotion remains a controversial topic outside of Goodall’s text. Cronin’s team filmed a mother whose infant died. They conclude “the behavior of the mother toward her dead infant not only highlights the maternal contribution to the mother–infant relationship but also elucidates the opportunities chimpanzees have to learn about the sensory cues associated with death, and the implications of death for the social environment.” This article does not contain the word “mourn”; it sticks to academic language that describes chimp behavior without anthropomorphism and therefore resists any identification between chimpanzees and the researchers or their scholarly audience. However, the press release from the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics introduces the word with the headline that asks “Do
chimpanzees mourn their dead infants?” News outlets picked up on the theme of chimpanzee mourning with headlines like the Daily Mail’s “A Mother's Grief: The Startling Images Which Show How Chimpanzees Mourn Their Dead Just Like Humans,” which uses sensationalism to appeal its tabloid readership, and the Scientific American’s more skeptical “Do Chimpanzees Understand Death?” (Harmon).

When Cronin’s team released another video of chimps responding to a community member’s death in May 2011, National Geographic asks/states “Chimps ‘Mourn’ Nine-year-old’s Death?” The headline puts “mourn” in quotation marks, which is usually used to indicate a news story is adopting the language of an individual or institution, but not endorsing it themselves. It is unclear where “mourn” comes from in this case, but perhaps National Geographic took it from the February press release. By putting only mourn into quotation marks and presenting the question mark as their own, National Geographic transforms the press release’s question into claim. However, none of the researchers interviewed for the press release or the National Geographic story called the behavior mourning. Instead, the journalist brings up the topic and provides sound bites in which the scientists give a soft denial, with phrases such as “I am reluctant to use that word . . . because it doesn’t give any extra explanatory information.” and “Whether we can call that ‘mourning’ or what that entails exactly based on what we know in humans as mourning is difficult to say for anybody, I would say.” The researchers thus indicate that it is not their job to determine whether or not chimps can mourn. Though the question lurks in their research, they speak as if the question is not conceivable within the bounds of their discipline.
The *National Geographic* story itself leads the audience to conclude that the animals are mourning, but, like the researchers, refuses to explicitly say this. Similarly, the *Telegraph* headline “Chimps ‘mourn their dead infants’” looks as if it is citing a scientist associated with the project, but the quotation is actually a manipulated fragment of the press release’s title that also transforms that question into a claim. Though all these news outlets have different reputations to uphold, as a general science magazine, newspaper, or tabloid, all manifest a desire to declare that chimpanzees mourn, but also show deference to scientific discourse that does not allow such for such claims it deems anthropomorphic. Hinting at identification between human and chimp responses to death in the headline draws in readers, but by limiting the degree of identification and professing skepticism, the publications make themselves and the researchers appear credible. However, while this distance between humans and chimps and between professionals (journalists and scientists) and laypeople (the readers), is meant to convey credibility, some readers react negatively to it and express a desire for a closer identification between humans and animals than is professed in these articles.

Based on reader comments, the response to the articles is surprisingly similar over such a diverse range of publications. Many commenters claim that they already knew chimpanzees, or animals in general, have emotions and can mourn. Some provide anecdotal evidence of pets who mourned for dead companions and/or scoff at the researchers for being slow to “discover” something they perceive as common sense. However, other commenters insist that the chimps are not mourning, claiming the chimps return to the corpse because they do not realize the individual is dead and are
curious as to why he or she is not reacting. Cronin herself leaves the possibility open as she never says “mourn” in her article. The press release quotes her as saying “Whether a viewer ultimately decides that the chimpanzee is mourning, or simply curious about the corpse, is not nearly as important as people taking a moment to consider the possibilities.” While some news outlets included this quotation, even those that did not had commenters who suggested the chimps were not capable of mourning, which shows that chimpanzee emotion remains a contested topic outside of the academic community as well.

While the majority of commenters describe chimps as compassionate creatures only, Goodall describes them as both compassionate and intentionally hurtful to others. However, she uses chimpanzee violence not to unsettle identification between her human readers and chimps, but to increase it. In the chapter “The Roots of Evil” she uses remonstrative language to state that the Gombe chimpanzees “were heavily engaged in what amounted to a sort of primitive warfare” (115). After describing the violence at Gombe in anthropomorphic terms, she shifts to a more authoritative tone to declare that chimpanzees, “. . . like us, had a dark side to their nature” (117). This metonymic identification ends up affirming human superiority because Goodall concludes that humans’ more complex brains can liberate us from our aggressive genes. She asks the rhetorical questions “Surely we, more than any other creatures, are able, if we so wish, to control our biological nature? And are not the caring and altruistic aspects of human nature equally part of our primate heredity?” to transition to the next chapter on compassion in chimp societies, including the story of Spindle and Mel.
De Waal makes this same argument—that both our ability to empathize and commit violence come from primate ancestry—in *The Age of Empathy*. Like Goodall, he theorizes that we can foster empathy to lead humans to take more moral actions. De Waal states that if he could change one thing about humankind, he would “expand the range of fellow feeling” so that we could empathize with people we have identified as outsiders (203). Where de Waal differs from Goodall is in his depiction of the subject. Despite her insistence that empathy and violence are rooted in all primate bodies, Goodall generally depicts the human subject as transparent to itself because she clearly articulates what her feelings and thoughts were at each moment in her life. However, de Waal’s version of the human subject is influenced by its environment in ways of which it is not aware, and it also lacks complete access to its own mind and body. For example, he claims that income gaps and social gaps increase violence among individuals and “[induce] anxieties that compromise the immune system of both the rich and the poor” (198). As a result, his calls for change are more focused on the institutional level than the personal. Goodall and Bradshaw’s use of the more traditional liberal humanist subject enables them to encourage readers to take immediate actions in their personal lives; however, de Waal’s version of the subject is useful for illuminating systemic issues.

While de Waal genuinely believes empathy is innate, his argument itself works to spark the change he desires. We can encourage empathy on a cultural level by promoting the idea that it is natural. Though de Waal cannot state this rhetorical aim because it would undermine the objective tone he uses to give the argument its authority, he does
briefly imply this use. He states that “fostering empathy isn’t made easier by the entrenched opinion in law schools, business schools, and political corridors that we are essentially competitive animals. Social Darwinism may be dismissed as old hat, a leftover of the Victorian era, but it’s still very much with us” (204). He also states that conservatives “love” to think “nature is filled with competition and conflicts of interest” (205). By showing how this definition of the human is promoted by a culture that claims it is natural, he implies that the other definition can be popularized by the same argument.

Like Goodall, de Waal uses identification to convince his audience that empathy is innate. He names all of the primates he writes about; however, he does not mention that this was once a revolutionary act. Instead, as Bradshaw does with elephants, he forecloses the possibility of identifying the primates any other way by not drawing attention to how the animals received their names. He also increases identification by describing their empathetic behavior in elevated language. The passage in which he describes chimps who attempt to rescue their compatriots from drowning despite their own fear of water is dense with such language. One chimpanzee “lost his life” trying to save another; another fell into the water with the victim, “whereupon” they “drowned together”; and the rescuers “abandon all caution” to practice “heroism” (106). He compares these exploits to a story of a woman who unthinkingly jumped into a pond to save her son, adding moral weight to the ape’s action while simultaneously showing that human acts of empathy are at least in part instinctual (107). By claiming altruism is uncalculated, de Waal extends Bauman’s concept of the moral impulse to nonhumans.
Another way he encourages identification between readers and nonhumans is through the criticism made in the popular response to chimpanzee mourning: scientists ignore “common sense” and let their devotion to objectivity get in the way of their research. Though de Waal positions himself as a scientist who has the authority to interpret ape behavior for us, he also positions himself outside the scientific community. He writes that if “we” see a dog wagging its tail and another growling, “[w]e call the first dog ‘happy’ and the second ‘angry,’” even though many scientists scoff at the implication of mental states. They prefer terms such as ‘playful’ or ‘aggressive.’ The poor dogs are doing everything to make their feelings known, yet science throws itself into linguistic knots to avoid mentioning them” (206). Here, de Waal makes accusations similar to those made by the readers of primatology news articles and aligns himself with his lay readers in opposition to scientists. He uses the very in-group/out-group divide that he wishes we would learn to empathize across to dissociate himself and his audience from scientists. The result is that scientists’ cautious methods of description are reduced to either poor style or intentional deception. De Waal leads the audience to identify with the “poor dogs” by convincing the audience they are able to understand the dogs’ feelings. This claim also flatters the readers by imbuing them with more authority than the scientists.

De Waal establishes identification between his readers and other animals by showing that nonhumans are capable of reciprocity. For example, he describes a study his team conducted that found chimps are more likely to share food with those who groomed them earlier in the day. This pattern was less consistent for chimps who were
“good friends” because pairs that groomed and shared food regularly did not keep a careful account of favors. The phrase “good friends” sets the reader up for de Waal’s subsequent claim that “The same distinction [between close and distant relationships] is found in human society” (174). He then tells two anecdotes about men who deviated from the reciprocity pattern. One kept too close of an account of reciprocity with his wife, while the other neglected to reciprocate to a more distant acquaintance. He concludes that “stories like this make us uncomfortable,” again aligning himself with the audience through pronoun use. This group identity also reinforces his claim that pro-social behaviors are innate in humans because “we” all share the same response to these men who are presented as aberrations.

It is rare that de Waal tries to unsettle empathy. However, he does sacrifice empathy with apes for humor when this increases the audience’s trust in him. He describes being “shower[ed]” with chimp feces after a hunt, a tactic that makes him appear humble while also establishing his credibility by reinforcing his dedication to his work with claims like “I am not complaining about the smelly state I found myself in, because it was a real thrill to watch all of this and follow the division of meat” (173). This scene, in which chimps hunt a fellow primate, the red colobus monkey; dismember it; and devour it raw, certainly has the potential to unsettle the reader’s empathy for them. De Waal’s description is brief, but words like “carcass,” “prey,” and “fertile females” remind the reader of the “animal” side of the chimps by evoking the scientific discourse associated with objectivity rather than the metaphorical, anthropomorphizing language de Waal usually favors. The result is that readers are reminded of differences
between chimpanzees and humans, but retain their trust in de Waal and, therefore, in his general argument that all primates share the capacity for empathy.

De Waal’s argument about empathy relies on evolution. Unlike Goodall, he does not discuss the ramification evolution might have on his readers’ spiritual beliefs or even entertain the idea that they might not accept it. Rather, his imagined readers agree with evolutionary theory and have a fairly good grasp of it. His purpose is to persuade them that what he calls the Social Darwinist perspective, in which competition, hierarchy, and violence are a natural part of human nature, is not accurate. For example, while Goodall is dismissive of Richard Dawkins’s controversial *The Selfish Gene*, de Waal explains the book’s thesis to show readers that, despite the sensationalist title, it is not arguing that altruistic behavior is essentially selfish. De Waal argues that though empathy, and the altruism that often accompanies it, “serves the actors” by promoting a peaceful society, it is not technically selfish because it is not a calculated behavior (184).

De Waal argues that apes and monkeys understand reciprocity, which extends the circle of humanist morality to them. He differs from what Bauman describes as humanist ethics because de Waal does not argue that reciprocity is inherent to empathy. Rather, he argues that empathy grew out of more primitive behaviors like mimicry. Such behaviors would have been present in species that had not yet evolved the ability to remember favors in order to rationally reciprocate them. De Waal would, on a surface level, agree with Bauman’s claim that “I am moral before I think,” but not for the same reasons Bauman proposes it. He treats empathy as a quality that exists on a continuum of sophistication among a variety of species, with simplistic acts like mimicry on one end
and altruistic behavior on the other. When De Waal claims “We may not be able to create a New Man, but we’re remarkably good at modifying the old one,” he is referencing humans’ ability to create social change (210). However, the statement also resonates with Hayles’s posthumanist argument that the metaphors that we call “human” change (290). Arguments that position empathy as a mammalian quality rather than a specifically human one redefine our relationships to others of our own species as well as other animals.

Creating Moral Change through Humanist Appeals

Bradshaw, Goodall, and de Waal seek to change behavior by extending the moral community, not by redefining the subject. Therefore, they can identify actions their readers should take based on what is defined as appropriate treatment of human beings. They believe that moral behavior can be identified and fostered because they assume their readers are liberal humanist subjects. Goodall calls this increased inclusivity “moral evolution,” though it does not entail a development in what is considered morally relevant, only the recognitions that some species have qualities already considered morally relevant in humans. Goodall names social movements and individual do-gooders in order to convince her audience the phenomenon of moral evolution exists and can be fostered by individual actions. All three writers explain what actions their readers can take. Goodall has a few pages of suggestions and promotes her youth organization Roots and Shoots, Bradshaw includes an appendix of “Ten Things You Can Do to Help Elephants,” and de Waal suggests that we work to decrease economic disparity.
Like de Waal and Goodall, Bradshaw believes humans have a “built-in” empathetic instinct and that we can control it. In her conclusion, she tells readers that they participate in the same “doubling” practice that Nazis did in which they separate their “humane self” from their “Auschwitz self” (246). She refrains from further accusatory language, however, and blames the media for encouraging this partition due to its short attention span for ecological issues. She also provides a way out, stating that “To feel too much endangers the doubling partition” and encourages readers to identify with animals whose suffering they see represented in the media. However, unlike Goodall and de Waal, Bradshaw does not portray the next step as small. Whereas Goodall stresses that readers can incorporate easy actions into their life, Bradshaw claims that “The breach of Adam’s Wall demands not only a reimagining of human identity but the relinquishment of the psychological, and hence, practical mechanisms and abilities considered necessary for survival in modern society” (247). Therefore, Bradshaw shifts from accepting the humanist subject for readers and elephants in the majority of the book, to a calling for readers to re-imagine the human and restructure human societies by learning about animal ones (251).

Her list of “Ten Things You Can Do to Help Elephants” shows the difficulties of promoting both action and posthumanism effectively. The first of the ten steps is to live a “transspecies life,” which involves learning from animals and not harming them. By suddenly extending her argument from elephants to almost all nonhumans and requiring a “reimagination” of the human, Bradshaw asks much more of her readers in the final ten pages than the rest of the text suggested. Many of the actions on the list are not
directly tied to elephants, so following all ten would entail a thorough rethinking of the relationship between humans and other animals because readers must do more than merely accept one more sophisticated species into the moral community.

Bradshaw proposes a “trans-species mind” which is not only shared by mammals such as elephants, chimpanzees, dolphins, etc., but also animals to whom it is more difficult to relate, such as the octopus (246). For Bradshaw, the trans-species mind does not have to be the same across species (though she argues it is very similar for humans and elephants) for it to be important. Rather, what matters is that many species have “psychological vulnerability to human violence” (246). This language evokes Bentham’s concern with animal suffering, which Derrida defined as a turning point in how we think about animals (Derrida 27). While most of Bradshaw’s book is concerned with proving elephants’ capacity for human-like self-awareness and agency, the conclusion focuses on their vulnerability. Because this trait is shared by much less sophisticated species, Bradshaw’s conclusion deprivileges human consciousness (or human-like consciousness) and claims that it is not required for moral consideration. This concern for the trans-species mind would be served well by Bauman’s postmodern ethics, which requires us to approach moral situations on their own terms. This is because, while Bradshaw seems to propose that respecting psychological vulnerabilities is a general ethical principle, it would be difficult to create a detailed guide for behavior that would function well across diverse species.

I doubt many readers would take the non-elephant related actions based on Bradshaw’s arguments alone. The majority of the text is about showing the parallels
between human and elephant psyches, so it does little to convince readers to be concerned about other species. For readers who are already familiar with arguments about the instrumental use of animals, the list might have more resonance. However, because the book so thoroughly uses identification based on the liberal humanist subject to encourage empathy for elephants, its request that readers help all animals has less impact. The reader must assume the liberal humanist subject for Bradshaw’s identifications between humans and elephants to work then drop it to identify with all other animals.

Unlike Bradshaw, whose goal is to persuade her readers to take specific actions to help elephants, Goodall does not need to unsettle empathy by drawing attention to important differences between humans and chimpanzees. Because she does not directly ask the audience to aid them, the specifics of their lives are not relevant. Instead, her goal is to persuade her readers to take positive actions towards all humans, some nonhumans, and the environment. She does so by depending on the liberal humanist subject, but in ways that discourage political activism at the same time that they purport to motivate it. Whereas Bradshaw provides a list of ten actions readers can take to help elephants, Goodall lists four reasons readers should hope. The first, “the human brain,” and the last, “the indomitable human spirit,” rely on humanist notions of human uniqueness and the ability of rationality to arrive at a universal morality.

The reasons also envision the subject as a consumer rather than a citizen and so place the ethical burden on the individual instead of encouraging collective political action. Goodall writes, “Let us remember, always, that we are the consumers. By
exercising free choice, by choosing what to buy, what not to buy, we have the power, collectively, to change the ethics of business, of industry” (240). However, Goodall does not explicitly encourage organized collective action, such as boycotts that are part of a vocal call for change. Rather, she depicts readers as individual consumers whose shopping decisions do not need to be joined to public criticisms of businesses to be more effective. Moreover, buying green to increase the amount of green products available actually reaffirms the ethics of business; it accepts neo-capitalist arguments that business should be driven by market forces rather than moral considerations. While a system of business ethics is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I would like to point out that Goodall’s point of view is not the only one in circulation. For example, Duska critiques the philosophy that “good ethics is good business” for retaining the “bottom line myopia” endorsed by Friedman’s claim that business’s only responsibility is to its shareholders and a “good” business is a profitable one. He proposes the tautology “good business is ethical” as a new maxim with a more expansive definition of “good.” He then claims that the law should enforce the business practices its society considers ethical (62).

Whereas Duska places ethical responsibility on business and government, Goodall places it on consumers when she states that “British Petroleum has committed millions of pounds to developing a whole line of products that utilize solar energy” and that “unless you and I support [the most ethical] companies, by purchasing their

---

8 What Goodall is proposing is different from the boycotts organized against South Africa in protest of apartheid. The Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) focused not just on consumer boycotts, but also removing South Africa from the Common Wealth and campaigning for economic sanctions (Action for Southern Africa).
products, they will never survive in the competitive marketplace” (235). Since *Reason for Hope* was published, BP solar has continued to manufacture panels, but has not imbued its parent company with a green ethic. When BP closed their solar panel plant in Maryland, CEO Tony Hayward said “we believe there are real business opportunities” in solar energy, but BP would “be pursuing them in a far more business-like way than we did when everyone thought we were ‘beyond petroleum’” (qtd. in Mufson). Less than a month later, BP made the “business-like” decision to save time and money by rushing completion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling site. Perhaps BP had no choice because stingy consumers were not supporting them. However, it is more likely that prioritizing a company’s responsibility to maximize shareholders profits does not sufficiently promote ethical behavior.

Goodall’s other suggestion for readers, that they spend “a few extra pennies” on organic food “to buy the future for our children,” also privileges individual over collective action and is a moment in which she fails to practice rhetorical listening to some (240). While purchasing organic food may be feasible for many in her largely middleclass readership, their actions would do little to nothing to improve the lives of individuals outside of their families, such as those living in food deserts or without the means and access to purchase green products. Goodall is right that increased demand would create a slight decrease in price, but only as more and more large companies buy into the organic sector and apply more techniques from conventional agriculture. Even then, the price will remain prohibitive for many people. Goodall’s complaint is that we suffer from “just me-ism”: we feel that our actions do not matter because it’s “just me.”
However, her solutions promote another form of “just me-ism”: we take easy actions that make us feel better, rather than experiencing empathy for those who do not have access to these actions and considering how we might more effectively help people beyond ourselves.

De Waal, in contrast, is invested in convincing his readers to think about others across not only income levels, but all differences. De Waal does not provide a numbered list or a paragraph-form list of specific actions like Bradshaw and Goodall. However, he does include political arguments about economic structure, stating that income gaps “tear societies apart” (197-8). He believes that empathy is an instinct, but that it can be expanded according to the principles of modern ethics, specifically a rational understanding of reciprocity. According to de Waal, “the firmest support for the common good comes from enlightened self-interest: the realization that we’re all better off if we work together. If we don’t benefit from our contributions now, then at least we will in the future, and if not personally, then at least via improved conditions around us” (223). For de Waal, empathy is important because it perpetuates what is rationally good by “attach[ing] emotional value” to the more diffuse collective benefits such as lower anxiety and a better immune system, making us more likely to help others even when we cannot see a direct benefit to ourselves (223). Thus, though de Waal does not describe the subject as transparent to itself, he does perceive his readers in accordance with a version of the liberal humanist subject who can be convinced to behave morally through rationality in circumstances when empathy does not occur instantaneously.
Though de Waal argues for consciously increasing the range of our empathy to include people with whom we do not strongly identify, he does not consistently model this behavior in *The Age of Empathy* because he occasionally makes snide comments about political conservatives and stereotypes scientists as myopic in order to strengthen his identification with the group of readers he imagines as holding progressive political views and being suspicious of science’s claims to objectivity. Goodall’s evolution-lite appeals that she makes to religious conservatives display more concern for rhetorical listening. These appeals work to establish identification across groups rather than strengthen in-group identification by criticizing outsiders.

Analytic philosophers interested in animal rights movements also contemplate how moral change can be created. Singer bases his argument on logic, specifically analogies between animals and disenfranchised humans. He argues that if we think we should avoid actions that cause human suffering and/or we try to reduce it, then we should act in the same way towards similar suffering in nonhumans or be considered “speciesist.” Analogies depend on identification, and, though Singer states that moral consideration of animals is “demanded by reason, not emotion,” both logical and emotional means of persuasion are always present (iii). For example, Singer compares the use/abuse of animals to that of children, and disabled adults to create empathetic identification between readers and animals that are used in laboratories. When he writes that “The LD50 tests, the Draize eye tests, the radiation experiments, the heatstroke experiments, and many others described earlier in this chapter could have told us more about human reactions to the experimental situation if they had been carried out on
severely brain-damaged humans instead of dogs or rabbits,” he is not entertaining the suggestion that we use such people for these tests (82). Likewise, he mentions that R.G. Frey justifies animal experimentation only by also accepting the possibility of experimentation on certain humans whose “quality of life” is no better than other animals, but does not engage this possibility (242). Instead, he validates the audience’s emotional repulsion to using people, brain-damaged or not, as test subjects. The speciesism argument works not only because of the logic of the analogy, but also because it relies on an instantaneous emotional reaction, a sensation of empathy, that it then claims the audience must consciously apply to nonhumans to be consistent.

**Empathetic Identification in *The Lives of Animals***

By not openly addressing the emotional component of our relationships to others, Singer engages in what Diamond calls the “deflection” of “the difficulty of reality” in her essay for Cavell’s *Philosophy and Animal Life*. The difficulty of reality can be any experience one cannot comprehend and analyze. The deflection of it happens when one attempts to analyze a moral problem that is related to that difficulty. Diamond sees *The Lives of Animals* as doing valuable work by both acknowledging the difficulty of reality that is our instrumental relationships with nonhumans and privileging an emotional response to this difficulty. For the character Elizabeth Costello, humans’ instrumental use of other animals, particularly slaughtering them for food, is a difficulty of reality. When she lectures on this difficulty at a university, other characters attempt to engage her on the question of eating animals, which is a deflection of that difficulty.
Costello is an examination of what happens when one confronts the difficulty of a reality in which humans cause animal suffering without regret. She is a novelist who is invited to lecture at the university where her son teaches. Instead of speaking about her novels, she speaks about animals. She tells her audience that their community, with slaughterhouses on its outskirts, reminds her of towns that had concentration camps outside of them during World War II. She compares her listeners to complicit citizens who ignored the Holocaust. Costello feels alienated from her fellow humans because she associates them with Nazis, or, at the very least, bystanders to the Holocaust. In return, her family and colleagues find her off-putting and irrational. She is criticized for trivializing human suffering in her Holocaust analogy.

Diamond points out that Costello’s emotional reaction to these two “difficulties of reality,” the Holocaust and the meat industry, is similar; therefore, she compares them. The analogy indicates not that she is dismissive of the Holocaust, but that she finds the use of animals and their resulting suffering equally difficult to comprehend. The incomprehensibility of human suffering is important to Levinas’s model of Self and Other. According to Morgan’s analysis of his work, “We become or should become humble before such suffering, so that the only possible and sensitive response becomes opposition and any kind of acceptance or complacency becomes impossible, inconceivable” (33). While Levinas insists upon the uniqueness and the unknowability of the Other, he also acknowledges that witnessing suffering causes suffering (94, 100). Cathy Caruth calls such a phenomenon trauma’s “contagion” (Trauma 10). Costello’s Holocaust analogy is valuable for showing she refuses to be complacent in the face of
human-caused suffering for animals and that she is “wounded” by witnessing this suffering.

When Costello makes this comparison at the university, it does not have a persuasive effect on her audience. Many listeners find her lectures over the course of her visit to their school confusing, vague, illogical, and/or offensive because Costello is not interested in giving principles for behavior. Instead, she critiques the principle of reason. In her concluding remarks at a scheduled debate she states, “I am not sure I want to share reason with my opponent. . . If the last common ground I have with him is reason, and if reason is what sets me apart from the veal calf, then thank you but no thank you, I’ll talk to someone else” (66-7). Costello further distances her values from those associated with the liberal humanist subject when she dismisses all differences between species as unimportant when compared to their “fullness of being,” which can be loosely defined as a bodily experience of joy. While Costello presents herself, her audience, and nonhumans as completely overlapping in her lectures because all experience a fullness of being regardless of their other, varied capacities, other characters do object to Costello’s claims. Therefore, *The Lives of Animals* itself does not endorse one particular view of the subject or value specific points of identification among species.

Unlike the other three texts discussed in this chapter, neither Costello’s lectures nor *The Lives of Animals* itself present suggestions that will, supposedly, lead to a better, more ethical world. Instead, the novel introduces readers to posthumanist ideas. One way that theorizing can occur is through reading fiction because the reader is given permission to entertain unusual, perhaps even threatening ideas because it is not “real”
and there is no authority explicitly endorsing them. Instead, the narration encourages the reader to consider these ideas by directing identification. *The Lives of Animals* guides readers to sympathize with Costello and her son John, who have conflicting points of view. We sympathize with John when his mother’s vegetarianism makes his family life uncomfortable because his wife disagrees with animal liberation. He also worries about how Costello’s decision to discuss animals, rather than the novels that made her reputation, will affect his professional life at the university that invited her to speak. Yet, the narration from Costello’s point of view creates sympathy for her because it shows she is deeply disturbed by human use of other animals. Her analogy between this instrumentalization and the Holocaust is not only a rhetorical move she deploys in her lectures, but also a thought that arises in her mind unbidden. It gives her great distress to wonder if her loved ones are really equivalent to complicit Germans citizens during WWII or if she is over-reacting. The novel shows both the difficulty of having an unacceptable compassion and of witnessing a loved one struggle with this feeling.

Booth criticizes works of fiction that leave moral questions unresolved. He claims those without “a strong didactic effect” are not successful art because they do not order values (293). He does grant that these books can successfully convey values if they retain the message that such a nihilist existence is unpleasant (298). However, texts that refuse to order values are more useful for the ways in which they encourage readers to theorize in academic and/or nonacademic language. Though Wolfe’s chart of the three types of posthumanism is created for nonfiction work, it can be applied to *The Lives of Animals* because of the ways in which the novel reflects on academic argument and its
relationship to literature. As already noted, according to Wolfe, a work can be posthumanist in its discipline, its content, or both.

The content of Costello’s lectures is posthumanist because its main focus is nonhumans and she only brings up humans in ways that reinforce their similarity to other animals. Her lectures set the tone for other characters’ conversation, so even those that do not embrace posthumanist ideas discuss them. The novel is also posthumanist in form. As Diamond points out, the novel raises a critique of philosophy through Costello’s lectures. Hacking describes it as both a “philosophical dialogue” and a text about “philosophical writing” (Cavell 142). The book also experiments with form; Coetzee originally delivered the story in place of a lecture, and most of the text is made up of lectures and a debate rather than a narrative. When the unusual form is combined with characters’ conversations about the relative values of poetry and philosophy, the book also performs a posthumanist critique of literary narrative.

The fictional story is more than just a frame for a philosophical argument. As a work of literature, *The Lives of Animals* also critiques rhetoric by placing Costello’s lectures in context, encouraging readers to critique her arguments as well as other characters’ insensitive responses instead of simply trying to persuade readers to a particular thought or action. The other characters provide varied responses to her arguments. *The Lives of Animals* values readers’ distributed cognition by drawing attention to the various conflicting voices they put into conversation to make decisions about morality. The text refuses to identify what makes an ethical relationship between humans and between humans and nonhumans. Its approach to ethics is postmodern in
that it implies that a universal morality cannot be found, but even this is unclear as some characters do express a belief in ethical codes. For example, the poet Abraham Stern objects to Costello’s Holocaust analogy as “blasphemy” (50), and though her daughter-in-law does not endorse a particular ethics, she does express a need for all moral positions to be based on reason.

Costello expresses concern for the suffering the other but differs from Levinasian ethics when she insists that Other is not ultimately unknowable. She claims “[T]here is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another” (35) because all creatures, even oysters, experience a “fullness being.” Though she never clearly defines this term, she associates it with joy that results from the connection to one’s body. Whereas Nietzsche wrote “But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity” as humans go about their intellectual work in order to devalue the human, Costello makes similar arguments to give value to nonhumans, or, as she sees it, to draw attention to their inherent value. Thus, Costello introduces an even more dramatic shift in the question of the animal than those of suffering and reciprocity. She claims that all animals, from gnats and salmon to mammals such as bats and humans deserve empathy not because they suffer, but because they are “full of being.” The assumption that we can fully access the “being of another,” be it through mind or heart, extends the moral community far beyond species with whom we share cognitive and social similarities.

For Nietzsche, humans can only have anthropocentric understandings of the world. However, Costello implies that we can escape anthropocentrism by trading our
intellectual approach to animals for one based on an empathetic understanding of the fullness of being. She admits that we cannot experience the sensory life of a bat as a bat; however, she proposes that “being fully a bat is like being fully human, which is also full of being. Bat-being in the first case, human-being in the second, maybe; but those are secondary considerations. To be full of being is to live as a body-soul. One name for the experience of full being is joy” (33). Whereas Bentham made a shift from response to suffering, a new shift to joy is occurring in writing about the animal.⁹

Haraway acknowledges the question of suffering is an important one, but asks “how much more promise is in the questions, Can animals play? Or work? And even, can I learn to play with this cat?” (When Species Meet 22). The three nonfiction writers in this chapter all provide examples of animal joy and play, from Bradshaw’s “family reunions,” to Goodall’s descriptions of chimpanzee children playing and de Waal’s examples of “good friends” grooming each other. However, these constructions of joy return questions about nonhumans to the realm of response. As Derrida described, “Can the animal play?” is analogous to “Can the animal respond?” because it is active rather than passive. In contrast to these other writers, Costello frames joy as a solitary experience that can be empathetically shared, but does not have to result from an interaction with another being.

Though Costello’s rhetoric undermines some humanist assumptions, particularly the value placed on rationality, it also risks an unethical projection of our own wants and

⁹ While Utilitarianism is also interested in nonhuman happiness, it was suffering that gained the most traction in animal activism discourses, perhaps because the mistreatment of animals is the focus of organizations such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the Humane Society.
needs with the belief that we can ultimately think our way into the being of the Other. Not only objectification but also over-identification has risks. Joanna Zylinska theorizes an alternative ethics that depends on limited identifications, which she calls “nonhumanist bioethics.” While Levinas and Foucault are only concerned with relationships among humans, she uses their work to approach our relationships to animals and machines. Her version of bioethics “takes the form of a conceptual framework or a set of nonnormative ideas which can only be considered and enacted in specific instances. Its driving force comes from a content-free obligation toward other beings and forms of life, some of which we do not even notice, do not comprehend, or are unable to name” (175). According to Zylinska, most of our moral decisions are made instantaneously and semi-intuitively, but ethical quandaries introduce a break in our systems of thought (178). Bioethical events remind us of our obligation to the Other, the Levinasian obligation that Zylinska extends to all forms of life, and therefore we should do our best to remain open to the Other as we struggle towards our ethical decisions. Rhetorical listening, adapted for trans-species communication, would be a useful technique to limit identification when making bioethical decisions. Zylinska’s bioethics is appealing because it is context-specific. It is also exhausting.

This practice is important, but it is not the only type of moral work that is acceptable, and it may lead to non-listening if a person feels overwhelmed by the task. Analytic approaches, such as those modeled by Singer, and emotional appeals that are designed to spark instantaneous empathy rather than contemplation are also useful because more people are able to engage in them more frequently. In Singer’s
introduction to Atterton and Calarco’s *Animal Philosophy*, he states that analytic philosophy has much more impact on animal liberation as a political and social movement than the continental tradition has. What makes these analytical arguments so influential is not that they are “more posthumanist” than the tradition that Zylinska is working out of, but that they use a different form of posthumanism in which they change the focus from humans to animals, but retain humanist disciplinary conventions such as a focus on logical argument.

When Singer’s *Animal Liberation* ignores the role of empathy in morality, it does not critique humanist assumptions about the universality of morality because it seeks to establish a logical moral code. In contrast, Costello’s rhetoric in *The Lives of Animals* introduces a posthumanist critique of moral philosophy to both the fictional audience and the novel’s readers. Arguments such as those by Bradshaw, Goodall, and de Waal introduce nonhumans into the moral community by arguing that they have abilities such as empathy and reciprocity, which preserve the humanist notion that a rational, universal morality can be discovered and taught. It is because these texts do not ask people to rethink their entire understanding of human substance that they can be clear about what actions people can take. However, when these texts use metonymic rather than metaphorical identification, they show an attention to context that evokes Zylinska’s nonhumanist bioethics. By explaining to the reader what a particular species or nonhuman individual needs, they show that moral consideration is not completely formulaic. When these texts model rhetorical listening to their animal subjects, they encourage their audience to do the same. Therefore, they not only give specific
directions for their readers to follow, but also show them how to listen to both humans and nonhumans to determine what other actions they should or should not take.
CHAPTER III

ANALOGIES BETWEEN HUMANS’ INSTRUMENTALIZATION AND EXTERMINATION OF ANIMALS AND THE ABUSE OF HUMANS

As the Holocaust became positioned in Western memory as the supreme atrocity of the twentieth century, it became common to compare it to other, lesser known events. These analogies can add moral weight to a struggle the public would otherwise deem insignificant, but also risk appropriating others’ suffering and offending, rather than persuading, an audience. While Burkean identification provides a theory about how individuals and groups can work together to build common ground by identifying similarities among them, Ratcliffe has explained that identification also comes with risks if it is forced. Analogies between the abuse of nonhuman animals and humans risk reiterating dehumanizing discourses, such as those that fostered Nazi anti-Semitism, at the same time that they attempt to extend “humane” moral consideration to animals. However, the animal rights movement is a hotbed for such controversial and risky identifications because of the liberationist philosophy that drives some factions. While some of these analogies are nuanced, others make totalizing identifications between animal and human victims that often distract from perpetrators’ culpability, disregard agency exerted by victims, and do not specify how an audience can alleviate suffering caused by a particular situation. In this chapter’s study of the rhetorical appropriation of

---

10 In Davis’s etymology of “Holocaust,” she note that though the term “is used in the Israeli Declaration of Independence on May 15, 1948 in reference to the Jewish genocide under Hitler, and in scattered other places…” this usage “did not spread in the United States until the early 1960s” (14). In the 1970s, the term was increasingly used only in reference to this Jewish genocide, “although from the 1980s to the present the word has sometimes been expanded to include the Nazi persecution and murder of both Jewish and non-Jewish people” (15).
human traumas in advocacy on behalf of nonhuman subjects, I argue that
disidentifications and the recognition of the limits of analogy are crucial to making these
analogies non-exploitative. Specifically, animal advocacy rhetoric should be considerate
of the concerns voiced by various human rights activists so that it does not reinforce
racism, sexism, etc. in its efforts to undo speciesism.

In the following pages, I begin by examining why analogies to human trauma
may be desirable to animal rights activists and why the analogy made in the People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals’ (PETA) “Holocaust on Your Plate” was deemed
offensive and appropriative by some viewers. Then, I discuss analogies to racism (as
manifested in colonialism and slavery) and sexism that, though they are not as popular or
as controversial as Holocaust analogies, are fairly frequently deployed in animal
advocacy. In the final section, I analyze how two illustrated narratives that intend to
critique racial discrimination also draw attention to speciesism. The intent of the last
section is not an exhaustive summary of the graphic novels or their use of the animal
figure, but to use these works of literature to reinforce something less obvious in the
nonfiction examples: the acknowledgment of the limitations of these analogies.

Rhetorical Listening to Trauma Analogies

While I argue that some animal rights discourse neglects rhetorical listening, I
seek to practice it myself by considering what values lead these activists to use
Holocaust analogies and other controversial comparisons. Analogies between acts of
violence that are acceptable, whether because we do not know many details about them
or because we do not sympathize with victims, and infamous ones can draw attention to
the lesser known victim and frame that victim as worthy of assistance. Michael Rothberg describes how Holocaust analogies are used to bring more obscure events into public memory. He calls the use of analogies and allusions “multidirectional memory.” While public memory is sometimes perceived as a finite space that groups might fight over to make sure their histories are considered relevant, Rothberg argues that this is a misperception because no memory is the exclusive property of a group, “nor are groups ‘owned’ by memories. Rather, the borders of memory and identity are jagged; what looks at first like my own property often turns out to be a borrowing or adaption from a history that initially might seem foreign or distant” (5). The Holocaust is used by many groups because it is often understood as “the watershed of our times” (Felman xiv) in Western memory as a defining trauma not only for Jews, but also human kind as a whole.

Although Rothberg points out that trauma should not be “a category that confirms [the] moral value” of a person or his/her actions because both perpetrators and victims can experience its symptoms (90), we do often make trauma serve this function by framing victims as martyrs in an effort to memorialize them. Therefore, comparing nonhuman suffering to the Holocaust transforms that suffering into trauma, and thus, seemingly increases the moral relevance of nonhumans by indicating they experience not only temporary pain, but also long-term physical and psychological effects that have implications that extend beyond the individual and his or her “kind.” Framing animal suffering as trauma also has the potential to lead to activism on behalf of individuals and the creation of large-scale changes. Ann Cvetkovich describes how trauma can be used
to create a “hinge” between individual suffering and its systemic causes (12). The hinge can be discovered through the comparative analysis of experiences in a single life and across those of others.

Though the Holocaust is probably the most controversial analogy used in animal liberation discourse, it is not the only controversial one. There is a history of slavery analogies in animal advocacy that extends from the early 1800s to the present (Kim 314). The most notable historical example would be British Parliamentarian William Wilberforce who not only worked to abolish the slave trade, but also founded the world’s first national-level animal welfare organisation, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Garner 43).

According to Rob Boddice, the SPCA and other early organizations based their activism against animal cruelty not so much in a concern for animals’ experiences or innate rights as in the belief that animal abuse would “bring about the demoralization of civilization” and corrupt the character of the person who inflicted it (466). However, this has not stopped modern activists from locating the roots of animal rights abolitionist philosophy in the work of eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers, regardless of these people’s historical beliefs (459). Presumably, PETA would be steeped in this historiographical account that traces abolitionist thought towards animals back to the beginning of organized animal welfare efforts and provides a supposedly historically justified ground for making analogies between human rights abuses and animal rights abuses. While Boddice brings up legitimate objections to using a misinterpretation of history to support animal rights activism, it is also important to understand that this
version is currently central to activists’ understanding of their identity. In recent years, Marjorie Spiegel has supported this analogy in her book *The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery* (1996). While there is not a similarly significant historical overlap between animal activists and groups that counter anti-Semitism, Charles Patterson has argued that the Holocaust has played a significant role in some individuals’ paths to animal activism in *Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust* (2002).  

Claire Jean Kim divides animal activists into two main camps, abolitionists and welfarists, to explain this phenomenon (315). While in practice there is overlap between these two movements, the differences in their ideologies inform their discourse in significant ways. Welfarist organizations, such as the Human e Society, do not use Holocaust analogies because these organizations seek to reduce animal suffering without transforming the ethical status of nonhumans. In contrast, abolitionist organizations perceive animals as having an inherent value and therefore seek to end all instrumental use of nonhuman animals, from fur to meat to laboratory experimentation. The abolitionist wing therefore uses Holocaust and slavery analogies as well as some analogies to sexism. These analogies are important to the “self-understanding” of rights activists (Kim 316). Therefore, they should not be considered a purely sensationalist move that the groups ought to avoid in order to make their cause more palatable to

---

11 See Patterson’s “We Were Like That Too” in *Eternal Treblinka.*

12 Angi Buettner claims that when Steven Wise, who advocates for great apes’ legal personhood, evokes the Holocaust, he does so because he sincerely sees their mistreatment and path towards extinction as genocide (33).
mainstream audiences. However, the analogies can be made in ways that consciously try to avoid appropriation of human suffering.

The more recent analogies to racism and sexism involve the term “speciesism.” “Speciesism” analogizes attitudes of human superiority to racism and sexism as attitudes that lead to oppression and may also result in direct or insidious trauma. While the Holocaust and slavery have both been characterized as traumatic extended events, racism and sexism can be understood as “insidious trauma.” Psychologist Maria Root conceptualizes this form of trauma not as a temporally discrete event, but an on-going experience that, like more direct traumas, results in insecurity and confusion about one’s identity, relationships, and purpose and position in society (Root 241). Richard D. Ryder coined “speciesism” in 1970 and noted that speciesists “fail to ‘extend our concern about elementary rights to the nonhuman animals’” (Dunayer 1). Peter Singer popularized the term with Animal Liberation (1975), in which he defined it as analogous to racism and sexism. This idea that nonhumans are victims of immoral discrimination galvanized what had been a small movement in the seventies and transformed it into the extensive and vocal animal liberation movement that exists today. The term speciesism and the belief that it must be overcome in order to achieve animal liberation continue to be influential within the movement and informed PETA’s Holocaust analogy.13

In Burkean terms, abolitionist groups such as PETA perceive that abuses of nonhumans are the result of a speciesist terministic screen that is similar to ones such as

---

13 However, as Zamir argues in 2007, speciesism-based arguments can alienate a moderate audience who, though they may otherwise be inclined to some liberationist actions because of their opposition to suffering, do believe humans to be more important than nonhumans.
anti-Semitism that led to the abuse of dehumanized people. For Burke, the terms we use to describe reality filter it like a screen, and “terministic screen” evokes both “terminology” and “terminus.” Thus, it indicates that the particular language we use to filter reality can lead us to a particular “end,” specifically, a particular interpretation of reality that excludes other interpretations. As Burke writes, “A given terminology contains various implications, and there is a corresponding ‘perfectionist’ tendency for men to attempt carrying out those implications. . . In so far as any of these terminologies happen also to contain the risks of destroying the world, that’s just too bad” (Language 19). Potentially, people may pursue any terministic screen so far that they commit atrocities. Thus, acts of violence such as genocide can be seen as logical and morally justified by those who adhere to certain screens. Once a different terministic screen becomes dominant, these acts become incomprehensible atrocities. Holocaust and slavery analogies reinforce abolitionists’ belief that one day contemporary treatment of animals will be remembered with similar horror.

Because language affects our interpretation of reality, terministic screens are always a part of how we understand the world. Therefore, despite abolitionists’ intention to criticize both anti-Semitic and speciesist screens, these activists also operate under a particular selection of reality. Under an abolitionist screen, Holocaust analogies may not be perceived as offensive because this screen focuses on similarities and filters out differences. Such analogies between the abuse of nonhumans and the abuse of humans often evoke sympathy for nonhumans in an anti-speciesist audience, but may offend an audience that privileges human suffering. This audience may feel that the speaker is
exploiting a historically victimized people to make a point about nonhumans, and the audience may be right. While the speaker might not intend to take advantage of human victims, she is citing their suffering for her own ends. When she does so without regard for how they may respond to this use, she may use their suffering in harmful ways.

Analogies between nonhuman and human suffering are not inherently appropriative, even though they are often received as offensive, because not all of these analogies disregard the context in which that suffering occurred. In order to further understand why animal activism rhetoric might draw on these analogies between human trauma and animal suffering and how they can do so in ways that consciously try to avoid appropriation of human suffering, it is helpful to look at theoretical discussions about the importance of analogies in constructing human understanding. To invoke some well-known examples, Burke describes language as both a reflection and selection, and, therefore, a deflection of reality (Grammar 59). Nietzsche claims that a process of selection means that our views of the world are “anthropomorphic,” and argues that all our truths are metaphors that have been naturalized (1172) Richards sees metaphor as “omnipresent” in language due to its central role in our thought processes (92, 94). Of course, metaphors work not only through resemblances, but also disparities and direct us to compare only some aspects of the two parts of the metaphor while also realizing their differences (107-8). Hayles likewise believes that cognition and metaphor are “indistinguishable” (275).\(^\text{14}\) Her analysis of how human and posthuman bodies have been interpreted over and over “through metaphors resonant with cultural meanings”

---

\(^{14}\) Hayles credits this idea to Mary Catherine Bateson, an anthropologist interested in the cybernetics movement, who makes a similar point in her 1972 book *Our Own Metaphor.*
(284) shows that metaphors not only create what we know as truth, but also enable us to change it.

PETA sought to change the public’s understanding of “human” and “animal” with their Holocaust analogy, and Burke’s explanation of “substance” shows how a seemingly true concept is changeable through rhetoric. He gives the etymological meaning of substance as that which stands under, and explains that we can only define something by its context, not what it is. Thus, the substance associated with a word can be “transformed” because the relationship to the context can be reformulated, and analogy or metaphor is one way to do this. Transforming substance is not always easy because people have a tendency to create “terministic screens.” These screens regulate what can or cannot be validated as true or good, but there are coexisting, sometimes competing, screens (such as capitalist and socialist manifestations of economic discourse). Though people tend to follow one terministic screen at the expense of others, the fact that there are always multiple screens creates the potential for agency and transformations of substance. Nienkamp explains how conflicts between multiple discourses produces individual agency. Although we internalize some of these discourses unconsciously, we are consciously aware of some of the contradictions within and among them, so we work to reconcile them (Nienkamp 134). There is no guarantee that exposure to varied discourses will result in well thought out values; however, these conflicts do provide the opportunity for rhetorical listening, which may encourage one to think critically about the version of reality selected by a terministic screen.
Analogies can invite us to think about our values in new terms. By presenting a new context, they might transform the substance of a term or make us reconsider the truth of our favored terministic screen. Rothberg argues that analogies between the Holocaust and other atrocities can benefit groups whose victimization is not as well-known as the Jews and others in Nazi Germany. Memory, then, is a source of social change for Rothberg. He writes that “Memory’s anachronistic quality—its bringing together of now and then, here and there—is actually the source of its powerful creativity, its ability to build new worlds out of the material of older ones” (5). Whereas Nienkamp describes how bringing past and present voices into conversation with one another creates agency in the individual, multidirectional memory indicates how individual agency and social change might be linked through public discourses that deploy analogies between memories.

Though these analogies may be productive for an anti-speciesist audience, they risk appropriation if they engage with other discourses about suffering without listening to the groups who have been influential in shaping them. Appropriation happens when analogies do not acknowledge difference along with similarity. For example, they focus on generating empathy for the nonhuman victims, but often neglect to unsettle it by acknowledging species differences. This has the effect of ignoring the agency of human victims who resisted in ways nonhumans cannot and de-emphasizes the cruelty and responsibility of perpetrators.
“It’s Like the Holocaust of Analogies!”: Analysis of PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate”

Comedian Larry Wilmore criticized the right-wing comparison of abortion and slavery on *The Daily Show*, stating “I know these guys want to make a point, but you don’t do it by appropriating the worst thing that happened to other people. Equating anything you don’t like to slavery trivializes centuries of suffering. It’s like the Holocaust of analogies!” Wilmore’s ironic appropriation of the Holocaust mocks the hyperbole of the rather faulty slavery analogy as well as the lack of consideration for others displayed by this faction of social conservatives and the shallow thinking displayed by television newscasters. Yet, Wilmore’s analogy also does some sincere work by highlighting the cruelty of the comparison of abortion and slavery. Though the right-wing analogy is nowhere near as destructive as the Holocaust, which enables Wilmore to mock the hyperbole, it is harmful because it seeks to erase a history of racial oppression and distract from contemporary racism by trivializing black suffering.

So, what makes the analogy between abortion and slavery wrong and the one between this conservative analogy and the Holocaust right, or, at least, generally acceptable to *The Daily Show’s* left-leaning audience? My answer is that the second analogy works because it acknowledges that it is only partial. Wilmore’s ironic delivery reveals to us that, in fact, the right-wing analogy is not the Holocaust of analogies because such a comparison is ridiculous; however, his analogy simultaneously suggests that the right-wing analogy is a dangerous display of racism that should be taken
seriously. The acknowledgement that an analogy is limited is key to making analogies between the abuse of humans and animals ethically by avoiding exploitation.

Though a multitude of individuals and organizations have made these comparisons, this section will focus on PETA’s 2003 “Holocaust on Your Plate” campaign because it reached a large number of people beyond animal advocacy circles. According to Kim, this campaign “[went] public” with an analogy that, though it had been common in animal liberation discourse for many years was generally used only with a sympathetic audience (318). The campaign serves as a case study of totalizing identification that appropriated suffering and therefore received a largely negative response. Many viewers were offended by PETA’s traveling exhibit consisting of eight large panels that juxtaposed images of concentration camp prisoners with those of factory-farmed animals.15

“Holocaust on Your Plate” traveled to over 100 US cities, in which it was set up in public spaces. While the campaign is not present on PETA’s website, at least four of the images have been reproduced in news stories and blogs. The title panel features an image of a naked, starving man on the left and a starving cow on the right; it states, “During the seven years between 1938 and 1945, 12 million people perished in the Holocaust. The same number of animals is killed EVERY FOUR HOURS for food in the U.S. alone.” Subsequent panels pair men in barracks with caged hens, Jews in train cars with cows headed toward slaughter, naked Jews entering a gas chamber with turkeys, children behind barbed wire with piglets behind bars, and a pile of human

15 See Foxman, CNN, Kalechofsky, and Smith.
corpses with those of pigs. The closing panel includes a quotation from Polish Jewish American author and Nobel prize winner Isaac Bashevis Singer, which states that, “Our grandchildren will ask us one day: Where were you during the holocaust of the animals? What did you do against these horrifying crimes? We won’t be able to offer the same excuse for the second time, that we didn’t know” (Kim 322-3).

PETA spokespersons later explained they intended to compare the mind-sets of perpetrators, a fairly limited analogy, instead of equating Holocaust victims and animals. When the audience is led to identify with victims, historical context and species differences are likely to be blurred. However, if the audience is led to identify with perpetrators, who are human in both examples of abuse, the differences between human and nonhuman victims may be less actively obscured because the audience is given the freedom to create as many or few identifications between the victims as they see fit. Perpetrator analogies aim to create discomfort in audience members’ understandings of their selves which might lead them to change their behavior.

However, other than the use of the second person in the title “Holocaust on Your Plate,” the campaign does little to draw attention to perpetrator mind-sets. Instead, the visual rhetoric equates the victims. The panels each feature a photo of concentration camp victims on the left and a visually similar photo of factory farmed animals of the right, with a red label connecting the two with language such as “Baby Butchers” or “Walking Skeletons” (Sharp). The analogy between prisoners and farm animals is supported visually because the two photos are the exact same size and have no gutter separating them, which implies that they are of equal importance and not distinct from
each other. Also, the selected photographs mirror each other. For example, the panel “Baby Butchers” depicts children behind barbed wire and piglets behind bars. The one labeled “To Animals, All People Are Nazis” sets a photograph of men in concentration camp bunks next to one of laying hens in cages in such a way that the lines of perspective meet in the middle of the panel, where the images are juxtaposed. Though the farm photographs are in color, they have been desaturated to more closely resemble the black and white ones. However, the color red remains relatively strong. In emphasizing red, which links the farm photos more closely to the verbal label, and only providing contextual information about the Holocaust that makes it seem less devastating than factory farming by contrasting the numbers killed, the project diminishes the uniqueness and significance of the Holocaust.

While the PETA campaign relies on an understanding of the Holocaust as a true and horrible event in which millions of people died, it unintentionally evokes some tropes of Holocaust denial. Because the campaign sincerely equates the “worth” of Jewish and nonhuman individuals (with the apparent assumption that viewers will see Jewish people metonymically standing in for all humans and, therefore, not be offended this group has been singled out), it presents the number of people killed as relatively minor when compared with the number of animals killed for food. This brings to mind the Holocaust denials that minimize the number of people killed. Referring to these 12 million victims without specifying that at least 6 million were Jewish or referencing that the Holocaust was an organized genocide against Jewish people likewise diminishes the
important role anti-Semitism played in the Holocaust and the practical difference in intent behind genocide and animal agriculture.16

Responses to “Holocaust on Your Plate” and other Holocaust Analogies

“Holocaust on Your Plate” failed at rhetorical listening to many of the survivors of the Holocaust and those who sympathize with them who believe that certain differences between humans and nonhumans are important. However, some critics unfairly dismiss the very category of the Holocaust analogy and do not consider it may be important to some animal rights activists. In doing so, they also neglect to listen to why this analogy is important to some animal advocates’ understanding of themselves and their work. Some responses, however, provide a more nuanced take on the analogy by creating limited identifications. This section first analyzes a negative response by a blogger who fails to thoughtfully listen to animal advocates. Then, it analyzes two responses that do display an understanding of this analogy’s importance while still condemning its use. Abraham H. Foxman, spokesperson for the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), released a short statement soon after “Holocaust on Your Plate” opened, and animal advocate Roberta Kalechofsky released a book-length essay on the general use of the Holocaust analogy in animal rights discourse a few months later. This section also considers Ingrid Newkirk’s apology for the campaign, which attempts to limit the Holocaust analogy.

The context surrounding both the Holocaust’s position in public memory and PETA’s reputation made rhetorical listening difficult for viewers, and even a campaign

---

16 This difference is not recognized by Davis who claims that factory farming meets the definition of cultural genocide in which the identity of a group is destroyed (56-9).
based on a limited analogy would have likely offended many people. The same cultural attitudes toward the Holocaust that make it a desirable comparison from the abolitionist viewpoint also make others see the comparison as exploitative. While “Holocaust on Your Plate” is a dramatic shift in tone from the “I’d Rather Go Naked Than Wear Fur” advertisements PETA was most known for at the time, both campaigns appear sensationalist. The anti-fur campaign used celebrities and sex appeal in very conventional ways, with print ads featuring young, thin, white, female celebrities “on display for the male heteronormative gaze” (Deckha 42), but the very of use of nudity could be interpreted as shocking. This tactic is meant to entice viewers, in contrast to the confrontational tone of “Holocaust on Your Plate.” A more aggressive action associated with PETA’s anti-fur campaign is that of activists who threw paint on fur-wearing models and celebrities, though in fact these incidents have not been linked to PETA (PETA, “Sex and the City Movie”). Because of these anti-fur campaigns, PETA did have a fairly radical reputation that could predispose some viewers to disapprove of any new campaign, even one that limited their Holocaust analogy or made the comparison of perpetrators, not victims, the central focus.

The brief blog entry “PETA UGA Stunt Reminds Us of Four Other Absurd PETA Stunts” is an example of a response that itself fails to engage in rhetorical listening. Blogger Fidel Martinez classifies “Holocaust on Your Plate” as a publicity “stunt,” rather than a sincere expression of abolitionist thought. He writes that “to draw a comparison between humanity’s darkest moment and cruelty to animals is just wrong. There are some things that should not be touched, and the Holocaust is one of them.”
Martinez’s article is written for the Latino/a centered news and entertainment site Guanabee, and, while the controversy over Holocaust on Your Plate has been covered by a range of media outlets including The National Review (Smith) and CNN, Martinez’s is significant because he and his commenters directly engage with the morality and logic of Holocaust analogies.

Readers are able to post comments in a discussion thread below Martinez’s article. When one reader posts in support of the PETA campaign by stating, “PETA is making the point that all life is equal and sacred, and that animals shouldn’t be seen as being beneath us, but just as important as we are,” Martinez responds by invoking Godwin’s Law. Mike Godwin, an attorney interested in promoting civil liberties in the realm of computer-based telecommunications, created this light-hearted “law” in 1990 after noticing, and being annoyed by, the trend of comparing one’s opponent to a Nazi in Usenet discussions. Because Usenet is one of the oldest currently operating and widely used computer network discussion systems, the law caught on and is now referenced in other online media, including sites that reach a broad audience such as BBC News Magazine (McFarlane). In 2011, over two decades after the law was first publicized, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum interviewed Godwin about it. He has been reflecting on the law in technology related media for much longer.

In a 1994 piece for Wired Magazine, Godwin relates the history of his law. He envisioned it as a “counter-meme” that would “make discussion participants see how they are acting as vectors to a particularly silly and offensive meme . . . and perhaps to curtail the glib Nazi comparisons.” The original law states “as an online discussion
grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one” (Godwin), but subsequent users have added their own value judgments. If a person mentions Nazis, their argument is devalued and even dismissed when another poster in that discussion invokes Godwin’s law. Therefore, Godwin’s law is now also understood as “the law that states that once a discussion reaches a comparison to Nazis or Hitler, its usefulness is over” (Godwin) and “if any poster does mention the Nazis in a discussion thread, Godwin’s law can be invoked, they instantly lose the argument and the thread can be ended” (Chivers). The prescriptive form of Godwin’s Law relies on the Holocaust’s reputation in the West as the worst thing that ever has and ever will happen, and the assumption that all analogies are equations. This leads to the conclusion that all analogies to the Holocaust are fallacious because they equate something to an always incomparable event. Therefore, individuals who make the analogy are dismissed as irrational and not open to productive discussion.

After Martinez invokes Godwin, the discussion thread below his article does not end. A new commenter points out that though there are differences between nonhuman and human victims, this analogy is apt because the industrial approach to factory farming and the Holocaust have similarities and the farmed animals suffer. This commenter indicates that the prescriptive form of the “law” itself leads to an intellectual failure if it is used to immediately dismiss an argument. Admittedly, people have been known to equate opponents to Nazis for trivial reasons, rather than creating a thoughtful

---

17 A Usenet generated FAQ on the use of Godwin’s law, “How to post about Nazis and get away with it - the Godwin's Law FAQ” is available from FAQs.org.
and limited analogy. However, as Rothberg has documented, analogies that are limited and specific are less likely to engage in appropriation.

Whereas Martinez argues the campaign is offensive because it makes a Holocaust analogy, the National Director of the ADL, Foxman, focuses on why this particular Holocaust analogy is offensive. In a short statement condemning the campaign, Foxman acknowledges that “abusive treatment of animals should be opposed,” a display of rhetorical listening to PETA because it is a conscious attempt to make a limited political identification with PETA based on a belief about action they both share. Even though Foxman disagrees with PETA’s abolitionist stance that animals should be brought into humans’ realm of moral concern, he promotes understanding of self and other, the first move of rhetorical listening (Ratcliffe 26) by identifying with PETA’s central cause and also explaining why he objects to their Holocaust analogy. Foxman states that animal cruelty should never be compared to the Holocaust because “The uniqueness of human life is the moral underpinning for those who resisted the hatred of Nazis and others ready to commit genocide even today.” Therefore, Foxman implies that analogic thinking about the Holocaust is not off-limits as long as it is compared to other examples of human suffering that is caused by genocidal thought, which differentiates his response from Martinez’s claim that the Holocaust “should not be touched.”

The strong focus “Holocaust on Your Plate” put on suffering would seem to suggest that PETA believes an opposition to suffering will lead one to resist genocide, regardless of one’s thoughts on human uniqueness. However, the exhibit does not
explicitly engage the question of how a widespread loss of belief in human uniqueness could affect human rights work. Thus, the ADL does not dismiss the campaign simply for making a Holocaust analogy as Martinez does, but for making one that appropriates the Holocaust and may be detrimental to anti-racist efforts that are based on human uniqueness.

Foxman’s other objection is that “Rather than deepen our revulsion against what the Nazis did to the Jews, the project will undermine the struggle to understand the Holocaust and to find ways to make sure such catastrophes never happen again.” He rightly points out that the campaign does nothing to aid understanding of the Holocaust. However, to remove the Holocaust from analogic thinking completely, as Martinez suggests, can also hamper our understanding of the Holocaust because it prevents us from considering the Holocaust’s relationship to past, contemporaneous, and present events in ways that could not only increase our understanding of those events, but also of the Holocaust itself. Patterson seeks to create a Holocaust analogy that both enhances our understanding of this event and factory farming in *Eternal Treblinka* by tracing how speciesism and other discriminatory mind-sets are similar, the historical links between technology used in slaughter houses and death camps, and the role the Holocaust played in inspiring animal advocates such as Isaac Bashevis Singer and others.

PETA cites Patterson’s research as inspiration for “Holocaust on Your Plate,” but does not clearly translate his detailed research to the visual campaign. Lisa Lange, PETA’s vice president of communications, told CNN that “the campaign is appropriate because ‘Nazi concentration camps were modeled after slaughterhouses.’” This fact is
supported by *Eternal Treblinka*, and one of PETA’s panels is labeled “Eternal Treblinka” in reference to both Patterson’s book and the short story by Isaac Bashevis Singer from which Patterson took his title (750). However, PETA’s panels do not provide any of Patterson’s research on slaughterhouses which means that the campaign leaves out not only information about differences, but also similarities it could have used to support the analogy. The campaign also does not clearly express Patterson’s argument that the Holocaust and industrial meat production are linked through not only historical context, but also a transhistorical mind-set. CNN reports that PETA representative Mark Prescott wrote, “The very same mind-set that made the Holocaust possible—that we can do anything we want to those we decide are ‘different or inferior’—is what allows us to commit atrocities against animals every single day.” This analogy between perpetrators is not clear in the campaign. However, even a perpetrator based analogy would still be offensive to some, as is depicted in Coetzee’s novella *The Lives of Animals*.

Many characters in this text object to the thought that these mind-sets are analogous. Elizabeth Costello makes this analogy when she gives a lecture at a university and criticizes her audience for ignoring the slaughterhouses on the outskirts of their community. She compares her listeners to Germans who closed their eyes to concentration camps, which garners a negative reaction from her listeners. Her daughter-in-law claims “hackles [were] rising all around me in the audience” (49). Though the text is fiction, Costello’s argument and other characters’ reactions to it reflect and comment on how such analogies between the abuse of animals and humans operate outside of the novel. The text encourages rhetorical listening by presenting characters
with opposing viewpoints sympathetically. Costello calls her Holocaust analogy a “cheap point” and states, “I know how talk of this kind polarizes people, and cheap point-scoring only makes it worse” (22). A similar accusation was leveled at PETA by Martinez, who saw “Holocaust on Your Plate” as a publicity stunt rather than a sincere expression of abolitionist thought. In *The Lives of Animals*, this accusation of cheapness is made by the faculty member Abraham Stern who attended Coetzee’s lecture and conveys his offense to her in a note. He writes that her analogy “trades on the horrors of the camp in a cheap way” and accuses her of equating Jews with cattle (50). Coetzee’s depiction of the audience’s negative reaction indicates not only that Costello is alienated from most other humans, but also that even well-intentioned Holocaust analogies can offend. The allusion itself can be enough to repel an audience who is not already convinced that animals and humans are relevantly similar.

Even though Costello is explicitly comparing perpetrators, and not equating Jews to nonhuman animals, the implied identification between humans and animals is alienating to Stern. He writes that, “If Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle are treated like Jews” (50). This indicates that for him, anti-Semitism is more than a manifestation of a generalizable hierarchical mindset; its specificity is central to how Jews were treated. Thus, *The Lives of Animals* brings up one of the limitations of the Holocaust analogy. Stern’s phrasing is similar to that of Kalechofsky who deemed PETA’s campaign worthy of a book-length response and published *Animal Suffering and the Holocaust: The Problem with Comparisons* in September 2003. She writes, “The Jew was not treated like an animal, nor is the animal treated like the Jew,” then explains
that “To the Nazi mind, the Jew was treated like a Jew, an anomaly, a mistake, a disease, a contamination, something that could bring disaster to the German people and then to the human race if he were not exterminated” and adds that nonhumans are mistreated for “wholly different reasons” (39-40). She is correct to point out that Nazi ideology was informed by Christianity’s history of anti-Semitism, which is one of the limits of the Holocaust analogy (45). While Stern’s phrasing seems to acknowledge that Jewish people may have been treated like farm animals, a proposition Kalechofsky denies, his conclusion that these animals are not treated like Jews indicates that he believes “Jews were treated like cattle” only on the surface.

Kalechofsky supports her position that the Holocaust victim/abused animal analogy cannot be made in either direction with a quotation from the writer of an anonymous diary found in Auschwitz who claims Jews were not treated like animals, but “some strange psycho-physical product ‘made’ in Germany” (qtd. in Kalechofsky 50). However, she ignores the testimony of others who did perceive that Nazis treated Jewish people like animals. Many others, including liberators of the camps and people who later learned of the Holocaust, have also perceived that Nazis treated Jewish people like animals. For example, Brigadeer General Henning Linden, who accepted the surrender of the Dachau camp, reported that, “The outstanding picture I got from my inspection of this camp was the barbaric, infamous systematic effort of the camp routine to degrade the human to a point where he bordered on the animal” (Dann 91), and materials at The

---

18 While some nonhumans, such as companion animals, may be treated quite well, I and the other writers discussed here use this expression idiomatically to indicate that people who were “treated like animals” were not only subjected to harsh conditions, but were deprived of what may be considered “human dignity.”
Holocaust Teacher Resource Center state that, “The inmates were treated more like
animals than humans by the Nazis” (17-18). Even some survivors have made this
analogy. For example Tova, who was imprisoned at Ravensbrück as a girl, recounted, “It
was just, [the overseers] treated us like animals” (Saidel 74).19 That Tova and others
perceived that prisoners were treated like animals does not negate Kalechofsky’s
argument about the Nazi’s perspective that they were treated appropriately for Jews.

Tova’s testimony also does not indicate that she or others survivors would
approve of the analogy being reversed, as it was by PETA. Though Kalechofsky herself
neglects to practice rhetorical listening to people who belonged to other groups targeted
by Nazis, such as the Romani, homosexuals, and the disabled because she does not
mention them, she does make an important call for that animal advocates engage in
rhetorical listening to Jewish people. She states that although the difference in
perpetrator mindsets might seem petty in the face of the suffering experienced by both
groups of victims, “to the Jew, . . . it is anything but petty” because it is important to
understand the history of anti-Semitism to understand the Holocaust (40). While
Kalechofsky ignores Jewish testimony in which survivors claim they were treated like
animals in her analysis, she does clearly explain how Nazi attitudes toward Jews differ
from those attitudes held by humans who take part in animal agriculture and testing. She
argues that anti-Semitism is more than a manifestation of a generalizable hierarchical
mind-set and its specificity is central to how Jews were treated. Because PETA is not
interested in helping viewers understand the Holocaust, only in raising their

---

19 *Inside the Concentration Camps: Eyewitness Accounts of Life in Hitler's Death Camps* by Eugène
Aroneanu contains more testimonies that make this analogy.
consciousness about the conditions on factory farms, the history of anti-Semitism may seem irrelevant to them; however, by ignoring it, they both supported Holocaust denial and alienated many viewers.

Though Kalechofsky’s text is framed as a rebuttal of the analogy, she actually spends the majority of the book arguing that the attitude of detachment promoted by vivisectors enabled Nazis to experiment on human beings. The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale by Karen Davis reveals how much of Kalechofsky’s book supports the analogy. Davis repeatedly turns to Kalechofsky’s book to support her own argument that the analogy between factory farming and the Holocaust is valid. Kalechofsky writes, “one of the bridges that led to the Holocaust was the reduction of the laboratory animal to a non-sentient object” and “analogues of [lab animals’ and Holocaust victims’] suffering could fill catalogues” (55). However, she states that the comparison should not be made because “The Holocaust lives in an historic and symbolic context different from that of animals,” which is one of the important limits of the analogy (55). For Kalechofsky, anti-Semitism’s symbolic dimension developed from Christians’ history of branding Jews as “usurious,” “carnal,” “perfidious,” etc. which enabled them to be viewed as “pollution” (45, 49). Because animals have only been considered pollution in times of plague (she claims), the comparison should not be made. Though some animals are considered vermin who must be eradicated more frequently than Kalechofsky implies, it is certainly true that anti-Semitism has its own unique history.

Kalechofsky sums up her approach to history as “Every difference is a difference” (5). She believes this statement “constitutes a corrective to the natural
tendency of the cognitive mind to think through metaphors and comparisons, to make
corrections which erase distinctions, to veer towards tidy equations” (5). This statement,
then, corrects for our tendency to over-identify when we should be listening for
difference. It is true that analogies always elide something, always erase some
differences. However, this does not mean all analogies are inaccurate or damaging. No
analogy, no matter how authoritatively it is given or how much equivalence it asserts, is
given in a vacuum. As participants in the meaning-making process, readers are capable
of questioning the analogy, and, in fact analogies invite this sort of questioning because
of the inevitable gaps between the concepts being compared. Even poorly done,
appropriative analogies can elicit this response.

When PETA compares death camp prisoners to factory farm animals, readers are
provoked to think of the differences as well as the similarities, as evidenced by the
negative responses. In this way, the analogy can add meaning to both sides, though the
appropriative analogies may result in angry viewers rejecting the similarities and
emphasizing only the differences. If PETA had practiced rhetorical listening while
creating the campaign, they may have been able to make a more informed, conscientious
decisions about which differences they could gloss over and which they should
acknowledge if they wished for viewers to consider their analogy rather than dismiss it
in outrage.

However, Kalechofsky believes that comparing the Holocaust and animal rights
abuses “depletes both of meaning” rather than adding meaning. She believes that
“History is obliterated in a wash of metaphors” and that “The motives, causes, and
symbolism of each form of suffering differs vastly as it does with every form of suffering, and it is the task of the historian to trace the motives, causes, and symbolism of suffering when they are embedded in the laws, institutions, and social habits of a society. Unless we do this, each victim, human or animal, Jew or non-Jew, becomes a generalized metaphor for any other victim, and understanding of the how and the why of cruel institutions such as slavery or war or concentration camps is obliterated” (34). However, in order to trace motives, causes, and symbolism across laws, institutions, and social habits we need to be able to compare them across laws, institutions, and social habits. As previously discussed, Richards and Hayles argue that metaphors are central to our very thought processes. Kalechofsky herself points out that vivisection was informed by and promulgated the institutional and social symbolism, such as the supremely objective scientist, that was partially responsible for human experimentation during the Holocaust.

While metaphors can erase the differences between victims, in doing so they can also increase a form of emotional rather than intellectual understanding. For example, a student of the Holocaust may not know first-hand what it feels like to be anti-Semitic, they most likely do know what it is like to dismiss the suffering of those deemed subhuman. Though “empathy,” in its usual sense, for Nazis is not desirable, this analogy between mind-sets can be relevant to partial “understanding of the how and the why” of the Holocaust.

Not only would Kalechofsky’s suggestion to remove the Holocaust from comparisons prevent such an analysis, it could also result in the deprivileging of other
wrongs. LaCapra warns against making the Holocaust sublime (Interview 10), which is what Martinez was implying in his blog, and philosopher Tzachi Zamir shows us one negative effect of doing so. Like Kalechofsky, Zamir objects to the use of the Holocaust analogy. His complaint is reasonable on its own. He critiques the mind-set analogy by stating that “Jews were not killed to produce soap” (47). As Kalechofsky also points out, it is true that motivation matters when it comes to the treatment of people or animals. However, if we disallow all analogies in which the motivations for abuse differ, we would be left with few or none available. Zamir himself continues to use such analogies, comparing speciesism to slavery and involuntary prostitution at several points in the book.

Zamir neglects specificity in his analogy between the meat industry and child prostitution. Like PETA’s Holocaust analogy, it uses sensationalism to generate empathy. Zamir argues that though one vegetarian will not impact the meat industry, we should still stop eating meat because we do not want to endorse it, just like we refrain from endorsing child prostitution even though the industry survives without us. As with the Holocaust analogy, this makes some sense as a critique of complicity. However, like the Holocaust analogy, it ignores the circumstances that make child prostitution possible (e.g. poverty, patriarchy, ethnic discrimination) which differ from those behind the meat industry. If the Holocaust analogy is invalid and unethical, so is this one. Jews were not killed for soap and which children end up in brothels is likewise informed by factors outside of their use for others such as intersections of racism, classism, and sexism.
Zamir makes his analogies between animal and child abuse too cavalierly, but it differs from PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” because he is primarily making a comparison between perpetrators (rapists and meat eaters) rather than victims (children and animals). This approach puts his analogy in the same category as Costello’s lecture. Although the comparison of perpetrators is less likely to invoke the dehumanizing stereotypes of victims of the original atrocity, it is also important to acknowledge the motivations of the perpetrators so that the audience understands what, exactly, is being compared. PETA president Newkirk came close to doing so in her apology for the campaign.

Newkirk apologized on Holocaust Remembrance day in May 2005, and all evidence of the campaign has been removed from PETA’s website. Newkirk emailed her lengthy apology to several Jewish news outlets and defended the reasoning behind the campaign while, at the same time, admitting its emotional irresponsibility. She wrote, “The differences cannot be translated or reduced to a metaphor, particularly for the victims and survivors who still bear physical and emotional scars of persecution and for the Jewish community still so horribly vulnerable to continued acts of anti-Semitism.” Although Newkirk does not specify these differences and continues to support the analogy between Nazi and speciesist mindsets, her apology does show evidence of rhetorical listening to those offended by the campaign. It also recognizes that metaphorical, rather than metonymic, identification can unfairly reduce differences.

In her apology, Newkirk continues to draw attention to the “might makes right” perpetrator mind-set PETA spokespeople referenced in 2003. However, she does so in a
considerate tone, indicating that though she and PETA understand both the Holocaust and factory farming in this way, she is not at present focused on convincing her audience to agree. She writes, “to our minds, both systems are hideous and devastating. We understand both systems to be based in a moral equation indicating that ‘might makes right’ and premised on a conception of other cultures or other species as deficient and thus disposable.” Newkirk’s identification between perpetrators’ mind-sets in the apology, in contrast to the identification between human and animal suffering made in the visual campaign, limits the Holocaust analogy. By focusing on the danger of “might makes right,” the apology can accommodate both PETA’s belief that human uniqueness is illusory and the belief espoused by the ADL that humans are significantly unique from other animals.

**Survivor Agency and Historical Specificity in Analogies to Colonialism, Slavery, and Racism**

Holocaust analogies are not always as poorly received as Costello’s and PETA’s. For example, Bradshaw compares captive elephants to concentration camp prisoners and kapos in *Elephants on the Edge*, a nonfiction book that attempts to convince both popular and academic audiences that elephants have experienced trauma at the hands of abusive humans and as a result of human encroachments on land where wild elephants range. Though many reviewers mention her Holocaust analogies, they do not criticize them.  

*Few, however, acknowledged her comparisons of elephants to colonized African people. Helena Feder mentioned both uses. Feder states that “elephant violence is*

---

20 Reviewers who note Bradshaw’s use of the Holocaust are Elizabeth Cowles and Scott Runkle, John M. Kistler, Lynette A. Hart, and Ronald Baenninger.
another form of resistance to colonial oppression” because Bradshaw characterizes elephant-inflicted damage to human’s houses, crops, and bodies as an intentional attack on human privilege (441). Feder also quotes a passage in which Bradshaw compares elephants to black South Africans, but does suggest the comparison may be difficult to support or offensive to some readers. In contrast, she states that Bradshaw’s use of testimony from Holocaust survivors may be perceived as “controversial” (441). Perhaps the comparisons to the Holocaust stand out more to reviewers because of its prominent place in Western collective memory. That there is a long history of slavery analogies in animal advocacy may also make the comparisons of elephants and Africans less shocking to readers (Kim 314), especially when these comparisons focus on survivor agency rather than the degrading experiences of victims.  

One of the strengths of Bradshaw’s analogy is that she acknowledges the agency of colonized people. Analogies with farm animals do not typically mention the innumerable ways Jews in Nazi Germany or enslaved people (and those who escaped) resisted because such species do not exert many of these forms of agency. In contrast, Bradshaw makes much of elephants’ ability to resist oppression in ways that indicate that both individual elephants and their cultures are sophisticated. The most developed analogy in Bradshaw’s book comes from elephant ethologist Eve Lawino Abe.

Abe uses human suffering to illuminate elephant suffering without diminishing the severity of human rights abuses in Uganda. She compares elephants in Uganda to

---

21 The slavery analogy also appears in environmental rhetoric. Murray Bookchin argues that, “the very notion of the domination of nature by man stems from the very real domination of human by human” and discusses slavery in *The Ecology of Freedom* (65). In “The Land Ethic,” Aldo Leopold compares the way we currently treat to the land to the way Greeks treated their slaves, as property.
Acholi people, who mostly live in the Northern part of the country, and have suffered under the forced displacement policies of the Ugandan government and the violent actions of the Lord’s Resistance Army.\textsuperscript{22} Abe makes this analogy in her academic research and her activist efforts to build a community center that benefits Acholi and elephants (Siebert). Bradshaw, a psychologist who argues that elephants can experience Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, praises Abe’s research. Abe’s dissertation title, “The Behavioural Ecology of Elephant Survivors in Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP), Uganda,” indicates her own interest in elephant trauma and how it is similar to that of Ugandans. As Bradshaw explains, the term \textit{survivor} is a deviation from the objective language preferred in Abe’s discipline. She states that the word “implies agency, selfhood, and righteousness” and “is most commonly associated with human traumas: the European Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, the systematic elimination and subjugation of American Indians, and other iconic atrocities of the past centuries” (Bradshaw 55). This word, therefore, denotes that elephants have a culture that is disrupted when many of the older generations die (Bradshaw 55). It implies agency and, therefore, a stronger possibility for healing.

Abe argues that Acholi and other Ugandans’ fate is linked to that of the elephants, so they should work to coexist with them rather than compete with and poach them. Abe’s focus on the Acholi as a whole—past, present, and future—differs from

\textsuperscript{22} David Sangokoya describes how, after the overthrow of Idi Amin, the Ugandan national army was majority Acholi. The National Resistance Army, a rebel force that formed in 1981, took power in 1986 and then attacked Acholi civilians. In 1986, the Ugandan government began putting Acholi districts under a policy of “forced displacement,” interning Acholi in camps, with 1.7 million people displaced at its peak. Ostensibly, the camps were made due to the violent insurgency of the Lords Resistance Army, but, as most of the Acholi refused to cooperate with the LRA, it is assumed the policy was meant to oppress civilians.
PETA’s limited focus on concentration camp victims. PETA’s presentation of the Holocaust—as an event that has been tidily wrapped up into an archetype—implies that anti-Semitism is no longer a relevant concern (Kim 326). In contrast, Abe is aware of a range of human suffering in Uganda, which she presents as an on-going struggle. She displays rhetorical listening to the Acholi because the elephant is respected by them. Abe calls it their “totem,” so her analogy builds on one that is already in place in Acholi culture (qtd. in Bradshaw 54).

In contrast, PETA’s analogy to farm animals is not strongly based in Jewish culture. Whereas Abe’s analogy is contextually grounded by a shared history and geography, PETA’s analogy depends on the belief that the “might makes right” mind set is contextually relevant to both the Holocaust and factory farming. While this connection may seem like a strong one to some animal rights activists, it can appear tenuous to other audiences. Moreover, PETA’s analogy can more easily read as offensive as chickens and pigs are considered less flattering animals for a comparison than elephants, who may be considered “charismatic megafauna.”23 That the particular species of nonhumans domesticated for farm use are not valued is a large part of PETA’s point, as the Holocaust analogy is meant to show viewers that devaluing someone is morally wrong and leads to atrocities. However, PETA’s attempt to reframe our relationship to farm animals backfired when viewers became angry that the campaign reiterated the dehumanizing discourse used in Nazi rhetoric and therefore refused to follow PETA to the conclusion of their argument, that discriminating against animals is likewise wrong.

23 Welling uses this term to describe animals whose images are popular in conservationist materials and questions the efficacy of this “obsession with visuality” (63).
Abe does not need to reframe how elephants are seen in Acholi culture. Rather, she strives to remind Acholi of these traditions and convince them to continue to value elephants even when the Acholi themselves are suffering, as well as bring attention to the plights of both the Acholi and elephants to the West.

Abe creates identification between Acholi and elephants by explaining that the fates of these people and the elephants are not only similar in appearance, but are also derived from similar causes. Both groups have been subject to discourses of marginalization and are suffering from humans’ disregard of the ecological impacts of their actions. Moreover, both groups have also experienced the same acts of violence in the area such as the 1978-79 war when Acholi rebels joined Tanzanian forces to overthrow Idi Amin, and soldiers on both sides poached elephants, or the human rights abuses committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, which also poaches elephants.

In an interview with Milton Allimadi for Black Star News, Abe further creates identification between Acholi and elephants when she states that “Acholi people and elephants share common cultural customs and ethics.” She explains how the loss of elders, particularly matriarchs, has negatively affected both elephants and humans:

The role of matriarch is of major importance in the success of a family unit. Families composed of young, less experienced cows have difficulty finding food and water during times of stress and are less successful at rearing their calves than older cows are. . . Amongst Acholi people, with the elimination of the matriarchs, young, inexperienced girls became mothers and lack the skill to look after families. (6)
Abe also compares human male orphans to elephant ones in another interview when she explains to Charles Siebert that the humans “form these roaming, violent, destructive bands. It’s the same thing that happens with the elephants. Just like the male war orphans, they are wild, completely lost” (6). By acknowledging elephant violence, Abe displays evidence of rhetorical listening to Acholi who have come into conflict with the animals. However, both of these analogies “humanize” the elephants by anthropomorphizing them—as well-intentioned, but inept girls and traumatized boys—which presents their violence against humans sympathetically.

Abe also limits her identification between Acholi and elephants by describing Acholi violence toward the animals. She tells Siebert that during the war with Tanzania, soldiers on both sides engaged in poaching that reduced the elephant population of 4,000 individuals to only 150. She claims the armies were not only at war with each other, but also engaged in “war” with elephants (6). She states, “They’d just throw hand grenades at the elephants, bring whole families down and cut out the ivory. I call that mass destruction” (6). Her use of the pronoun “they” lumps both Acholis and their oppressors on the same side, against the elephants, and the phrase “mass destruction” further implies the elephants are victims of war.

Acknowledging differences between the Acholi and elephants is politically productive for Abe because it enables her to explain what each group needs to survive. When Allimadi asks Abe about solutions to human-elephant conflict in Uganda, she states that “Future generations need to learn to live with elephants. This means re-learning how the Acholi people used to live with elephants and which is congruent with
Acholi culture. Human and elephant recovery are linked. One cannot occur without the other. Elephants, like Acholi people, need to live in peace without constant fear—in order to raise families in stable communities and in expansive habitat.” Though Abe believes both groups value the same things, she places the responsibility for the change on the Acholi, not the elephants. By acknowledging that humans have more flexibility and power in some ways, she is able to identify changes they can make in order to co-exist with elephants rather than kill or remove them.

Abe also recognizes one way in which the elephants are more privileged than the Acholi: their visibility in Western media. Instead of expressing resentment towards the West or elephants, she uses the animals to draw attention to human suffering and call for justice for the Acholi. Abe establishes a familial identification between the two groups when she states “The majestic mammal is an endangered species like its kin the Acholi people,” and continues, “It was only after the elephant massacres, over several decades, taken to Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species of fauna and flora that it drew attention of world community. The massacre of Acholi people should also be taken to an equally high body—the United Nations. The same community can act and stop the decimation of Acholi people” (Allimadi). She then suggests things the UN needs to do to help stop this destruction, and most involve strengthening the relationship between Acholi and elephants. After she claims that state sovereignty should be deprivileged so the UN can intervene in Uganda, she also says that the sale of ivory should be halted until the futures of both people and elephants are secure, children should be taught “traditional ways that respect and are congruent with the land,” and
everything that can be done “to prevent further violence and trauma” should be done (Allimadi).

Whereas PETA chose to compare animals to a well-known example of abused humans in order to incite both controversy and sympathy, Abe selects a lesser-known example of human suffering. In the West, the forced displacement of the Acholi is less culturally “sacred” than the Holocaust and makes for a less provocative analogy. However Abe’s analogy is not more ethical than PETA’s because she chose a group of humans whose suffering is not highly valued by the West. Rather, her analogy works because it displays rhetorical listening and limits identification.

Bradshaw extends the limits of Abe’s analogy to cover all elephants and colonized human cultures in general (71). However, she does maintain a focus on agency and gives some attention to context. The one exception is her comparison of African-Americans to elephants, which appears at the end of the book, is not as clearly supported. While the analogy between human and elephant occupants of an area can legitimately describe how their actions can have detrimental effects on both themselves and the other group, this analogy suffers from that lack of specificity. When she states that African-American families are matriarchal and have several strong female caretakers, like elephant allomothers, she means this as a compliment. However, it also essentializes African-American families, ignores the socioeconomic reasons that make the nuclear family a less accessible option for some of these families, and naturalizes this cultural phenomenon.
Yet, the analogy focuses on the agency and care practiced in those families, which makes it less exploitative than PETA’s analogy between African Americans and nonhuman animals in the “Are Animals the New Slaves?” iteration of their “Animal Liberation Project.” That campaign failed at rhetorical listening because, like “Holocaust on Your Plate,” it also ignored perpetrator motivation and survivor agency. Despite Newkirk’s seemingly new perspective about what style of campaign is appropriative and hurtful in her May 2005 apology, PETA unveiled this visually similar exhibition three months later. “Are Animals the New Slaves?,” begun in July, featured twelve panels that juxtaposed images of American blacks experiencing racist violence during and after slavery with modern day uses of nonhumans for food, research, and entertainment. The panels contain quotations from civil rights leaders, notably King’s “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” (Brune). Like “Holocaust on Your Plate,” the campaign was suspended and removed from PETA’s website. However, unlike “Holocaust on Your Plate,” images of it have not been preserved in other online publications. While I cannot therefore perform an analysis of the visual details of “Are Animals the New Slaves?,” the choice of images means the exhibit focused on identifications between human and nonhuman victims rather than emphasizing similarities between perpetrators’ “might makes right” mind-sets.

When the NAACP objected to the exhibit, Newkirk spoke in support of it: “I would fail in my duty if I allowed this exhibit to disappear from sight because of anger on the part of those who cannot or will not look beyond their own pain to the pain of others who need help today” (Brune). In a matter of months, Newkirk states that those
who cannot look past their pain about the Holocaust should have that pain respected and
also claims that those who cannot look past their pain about slavery and subsequent
generations of racially motivated violence should not. This inconsistency makes the
apology to those offended by “Holocaust on Your Plate” appear insincere or indicates
that PETA does not believe Blacks suffer(ed) as much as Jews do/did from racism, does
not value their suffering as much, or some combination of these possibilities.

PETA may also have continued with the “Are Animals the New Slaves?”
campaign because they expected it to face less opposition regardless of its racist
appropriations of suffering. Rothberg opens Multidirectional Memory with Walter Benn
Michaels’s response to Khalid Muhammad’s criticism of the Washington D.C.
Holocaust Museum. Muhammad is angered that the nation ignores slavery, and Michaels
shares his belief that the Holocaust museum further obscures American racism in the
nation’s public memory (1-2). While Muhammad’s criticism is based in anti-Semitism
(Rothberg 2), the Holocaust does seem to have a more prominent place in public
memory. The Orlando Sentinel notes that “a survey of media outlets shows less outrage
about the ‘Animal Liberation Project’ than 2003’s ‘Holocaust on Your Plate’ campaign”
(Brune). PETA may have assumed that, although many non-Jewish Americans were
outraged by the Holocaust campaign, outrage over this one would be largely limited to
the black community and receive less press. While the response was smaller, PETA still
put the campaign on hold in mid-August after it sparked a protest in New Haven.
Though the campaign was temporarily resumed on the West Coast, it was ultimately
pulled.
A more generous interpretation is that perhaps Newkirk and PETA felt the slavery analogy was justified because the motivations of perpetrators were based on the instrumental use of their victims rather than their annihilation. That is, although, as Zamir states “Jews were not killed to produce soap” (47), black people were ostensibly enslaved for their labor. However, as with Zamir’s prostitution analogy, this position disregards the complex historical context behind who was enslaved and why.

Kalechofsky’s point that Holocaust/factory farming analogies are flawed because they ignore the role degradation played in Nazi policies could also be made when discussing slavery and subsequent acts of racism in the United States. Moreover, the position that the slavery analogy is acceptable because both groups were exploited shows a failure of listening on the part of PETA because this historical exploitation of black people is exactly why PETA’s appropriation of that history upsets some viewers. As Scott X. Esdaile, president of the Greater New Haven NAACP, said to reporter Dana Williams, “Once again, black people are being pimped. You used us. You have used us enough.” Thus, the very quality that might make this analogy seem more acceptable to PETA than “Holocaust on Your Plate” is what makes it offensive to some viewers.

That Esdaile uses language that analogizes the experience of black people with prostitutes indicates how common analogies of oppressions are. Like Zamir, Esdaile wants to exclude one group of people from analogies, but has no problem using another group—in fact, one of the same groups Zamir uses. However, like the slavery analogy, the prostitution analogy also exploits an already exploited group of people, those who have been forced into sex work. Despite the efforts of sex worker activists to engage in
media advocacy, this particular group of exploited workers has little recourse to voice objections to such analogies published in local and national media. A critique of “Holocaust on Your Plate” is important because PETA’s exhibit is part of a widespread use of analogies that engage in appropriation to highlight another’s suffering. While the use of the Holocaust in this way tends to elicit more media outrage (as Brune notes, fewer objected to “Animals Are the New Slaves?” than “Holocaust on Your Plate”), these other acts of appropriation should not be ignored.

What the relative timing of Newkirk’s apology and “Are Animals the New Slaves?” indicates is that, even though one may decide to practice rhetorical listening to one group, this is not sufficient. PETA speaks on behalf of a marginalized group, factory farm animals, and practices rhetorical listening to these animals through their research on farm conditions, but, like Esdaile, also needs to consider the groups they are using to make their arguments. Rather, rhetorical listening must be a consistent and conscious practice when making any attempt at identification, especially when one is making an analogy to a marginalized group. Abe’s thoughtful analogies between elephants and Acholi people are such an example. Though Abe, who completed her doctorate at Cambridge, is more privileged than most other Acholis, she considers their needs and desires at the same time that she voices her concern for elephants.

Likewise, Esdaile’s response indicates that even when one is part of a marginalized group, rhetorical listening is still important. Though no one expressed public outrage at Esdaile’s appropriation of the suffering experienced by individuals forced into prostitution, he makes the same misstep that PETA does. PETA and Esdaile
are concerned with the suffering of one group (abused animals and African Americans from slavery to the present) to the exclusion of others’ suffering. Considering the abuse and suffering of other groups does not mean that one must present one’s favored cause as less important. Instead, this listening can enable one to make the analogy in a more limited, thoughtful way.

The campaign is discussed by multiple writers in the *Sistah Vegan* anthology who are concerned with oppressions of both African Americans and farm animals. Editor Breeze Harper sees similarities between the experiences of black people, women, and nonhumans. However, rather than claiming whether the campaign is “right or wrong,” Harper considers PETA’s motivations and the reasons for viewers’ negative reactions. She notes that at least one woman of color was involved in the campaign and that similar comparisons have been made by Spiegel and Patterson. In an essay later in the book, she concludes that the message that “eco-sustainability, nonhuman animal rights, plant-based diets, and human rights are inextricably linked” is right, but the usual ways in which it is conveyed are not. She writes, “it has been the tone and delivery of the message—via the white, class-privileged perspective—that has been offensive to a majority of people of color and working-class people in America” (20). PETA’s tone in its “analogy” campaigns is often too authoritative, presenting its analogies as truth rather than its own interpretation of the world.

Later iterations of the “Animal Liberation Project” seem to be more limited. In 2009 PETA again set up panels that compare images of human and nonhuman suffering (Flavell, Rodriguez). These panels are different than the “Holocaust on Your Plate” ones
because the images are separated rather than juxtaposed. The captions provide contextual information about the different images and the space visually separates the acts of violence, rather than simply equating them. The exhibit shows that rhetorical listening and limited identification can be practiced in this medium and do not have to be confined to lengthy, verbal works such as Patterson’s or Spiegel’s.

This version of the campaign has received less press than “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Are Animals the New Slaves?” though it is unclear if that is because its performance of rhetorical listening incites less outrage, because it does not invoke the Holocaust, or because its public presence has been relatively small. The project’s main presence is at the website for PETA2, PETA’s youth division, which means that visitors already have an interest in PETA’s cause. The site is framed as a “virtual museum,” a characterization that lends importance to animal suffering and implies that the exhibits within will be educational, providing context that encourages viewers to think about the display rather than relying solely on emotional impact. The door to the “main gallery” states “this exhibit looks back at history to show how we justified the abuse of humans in the past and continue to justify the abuse of animals today.” This idea is explained in the museum, but not deeply in the main gallery. Rather, the gallery’s intent is to create sympathy for nonhuman suffering by displaying it and introducing an abolitionist message through the comparison.

The main gallery pairs images of suffering, but they appear as individually framed photos on a museum wall and are not directly juxtaposed. Of the eight pairs, three depict African Americans: white men brand an enslaved woman; white police beat
a black civil rights demonstrator; and two doctors, white and black, inspect a subject of
the Tuskegee experiment. While African Americans are the only group who appear in
multiple images, these images all provide visual evidence of who the perpetrators are,
which avoids one misstep of “Holocaust on Your Plate.” The website users can enlarge
“plaques” under each image to read the captions. These provide historical context,
though it should be noted that this context is minimal. Each caption is about two
sentences and focuses more on the bodily experience of suffering than the context of the
violence. For example, the Tuskegee caption does not mention race.

Users can also choose to enlarge the photographs or not. This ability to interact
with the text provides the user with more agency than the versions of the campaigns set
up in physical public locations. While those viewers could approach the panels in any
order, leave the exhibit at any time, and ask questions of PETA’s staffers, the website
users have more direct control over their interactions with the museum. Barbara Warnick
explains, “New media theorists characterize the user as a vital element in the creation of
meaning and the experience because the user creates the text and experiences it as
appropriated and altered by means of his or her perception” (30). This is certainly true of
the “Liberation Project’s” virtual museum because users traverse its “rooms” nonlinearly
and in as much or little detail as they desire or as is accessible to them.

While users take an active role in authoring their experience of the website, this
does not necessarily mean authorial agency is decreased (Brooke 79). Users can
“wander” away from the main gallery while still remaining within the confines of the
“Liberation Project” campaign or click links to other areas of PETA2’s site. The
museum itself includes a “torture chamber,” “library,” “film gallery,” and a “gift shop” with free, downloadable pamphlets, web banners, and other digital materials that criticize speciesism and “might makes right” mindsets. These modes of communication might be more appealing to users than the main gallery. For example, the torture chamber relies on the analogy strategy, but the explicit analogy is between tools of oppression, not oppressed groups themselves. In one pairing, chicken shackles are compared to restraints used on prisoners. This technique limits identification between human and animal victims. It also can avoid charges of “publicity stunt” as it does not contain graphic images of suffering. There are no photographs of abused humans and other animals and even the “torture implements” are semi-realistic illustrations rather than photographs.

No images in the torture chamber or main gallery include the Holocaust, though whether this is because PETA respects the pain or fears the outrage it would cause is unclear. After all, the main gallery contains an image of corpses from the Cambodian genocide analogized with pig corpses. Two columnists specifically objected to a similar pairing in “Holocaust on Your Plate,” but no one has complained about the use of the Cambodian genocide (Smith, Lynne). The other images show child laborers for the Pennsylvania Coal Company, an African girl being circumcised, women in a 20th century textile mill, and the hand of an Iranian imprisoned in an Iraqi jail. By using images of human suffering that cover a range of historical and contemporary situations, the site manages not to equate any one group of notoriously dehumanized people to animals. Whereas Patterson and Spiegel’s book-length analogies have been commended
for their attention to context, I argue that the breadth of this campaign compensates for the lack of depth in its contextual analysis by showing the analogy is limited.

The diversity of the comparisons provokes viewers to ask “what do all of these abuses of humans have in common with one another?” as well as “what do they have in common with the way we treat nonhumans?” This diversity limits the analogy. Viewers know there are differences between textile mill owners and the Khmer Rouge, for example, and that they operated in different contexts, even if they do not know much about those histories. Therefore, the analogy tacitly acknowledges differences between human and nonhuman experiences. It instead draws attention to the “mind-set” explanation Newkirk described in her “Holocaust on Your Plate” apology because it draws connections between perpetrators while also acknowledging historical context that affected how “might makes right” was enacted.

Where the campaign loses focus on the mindsets of perpetrators is the inclusion of female circumcision, which is compared to the castration of pigs. While the other examples require that one group (industrialists, white people, etc.) feel themselves superior to another group of people, the women who engage in this practice do it to give their daughters a more secure future in communities in which uncut women are not considered marriageable (Mackie). While cutting is a manifestation of a patriarchal system that seeks to control women’s sexuality (Althaus), the women who perform cuttings differ from those who castrate pigs as part of their job because the women do not deem the girls essentially inferior to themselves and do nothing to them that they
would not want done to their own daughter.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, though cutting is a painful process that can have dangerous side effects, PETA’s statement that “in most cases, the procedure is performed by elderly women with no medical training” is misleadingly critical. It is true these women do not have Western medical training and therefore sometimes perform the ritual under unsanitary conditions; however, those who usually perform the cutting are chosen because they have training from previous generations of “elderly women” and their own years of experience (Mackie).

Despite the damage this ignorance of context does to PETA’s mind-set analogy, other aspects of the analogy are developed in more depth in the museum “library.” It provides more contextual information about how people justified cruelty and parallels several quotations supporting slavery, Nazism, and eugenics with ones in favor of factory farming. The “film gallery” also explicitly makes an analogy of mindsets across perpetrators. In “Liberation (Long Version),” three young adults define speciesism and explain that people once thought the exploitation of other humans was integral to the economy, etc. This analogy is developed most fully in the “gift shop” by a leaflet that concisely lays out PETA’s argument. It states “What do so many atrocities in our society’s past—and present—have in common? They are caused by the dangerous belief that might makes right. Whether it stems from greed, convenience, or hatred, this supremacist attitude has caused people to tolerate, perpetuate, and justify outrageously

\textsuperscript{24} The work done by the organization Tostan indicates how little their motivation has in common with that of farms. When some Senegalese women decided cutting was detrimental to women’s health, they implemented a pledge system to great effect. Women in hundreds of communities that intermarry decide to pledge not only to stop circumcising their daughters, but also to encourage their sons to marry uncircumcised women, thereby ensuring these girls will have the opportunity for a secure future (Tostan). There is no analogical solution to end the castration of pigs.
cruel acts toward those viewed as ‘inferior’ or ‘expendable’” (PETA2, *Liberation is Here*).

Though the leaflet contains some of the image pairs from the main gallery, its words do not explicitly compare any one human atrocity to our use of animals. Instead, it compares nonhumans to nonhumans to explain speciesism. The leaflet states that “dogs and pigs have the same capacity to feel pain, but it is prejudice based on species that allows us to think of one animal as a companion and the other as dinner.” This less emotionally charged analogy results in a non-accusatory tone and tacitly accepts a level of speciesism in the readers. That is, readers are able to consider humans more important than nonhumans because, for example, the leaflet does not ask readers to directly compare the number of people killed during the Holocaust with the number of animals killed in slaughterhouses. It concludes by politely asking the reader to “please consider vegetarianism” (PETA2, *Liberation is Here*). This shift in tone, away from accusing one’s audience of Nazi-level atrocities, keeps the dialogue open. While the prescriptive form of Godwin’s law is illogical and inconsiderate because it wrongly privileges the Holocaust above other organized mass killings, it is often an accurate depiction of an audience’s response. Once one side makes a Holocaust analogy, others assume they have “lost” the argument because the analogy is assumed to be fallacious. Therefore, the conversation either shuts down or ceases to involve listening. The tone of the leaflet and the website as a whole indicates PETA2’s willingness to listen because they limit analogies and provide context, which encourages more listening in its audience.
Another potential positive result of the website is that it draws attention to less publicized human suffering, such as the Cambodian genocides or child labor in U.S. history that PETA2’s target audience of adolescents might not know much about. True, PETA’s only motivation for using these events may be that those victims have fewer people to get offended on their behalf than Holocaust victims have. However, the result is a more diverse public memory among its viewers. Instead of merely using the Holocaust or slavery to draw attention to factory farming, this campaign has factory farming and human atrocities bringing attention to each other.

**Sisters and Sistahs: Rhetorical Listening in Collections by Women Writers**

Carol J. Adams similarly draws attention to objectification of both women and nonhumans in *The Sexual Politics of Meat*. She describes associations between meat eating and whiteness and masculinity. One of the most popularly mentioned topics of the book is her feminist analysis of meat advertising. As readers started mailing Adams examples of the sexualization of both women and nonhumans in advertisements, she compiled *The Sexual Politics of Meat Slideshow* which she continues to present today. Though Adams’s work discusses a range of oppressions, her focus is patriarchal devaluing of women and this is the theme that is picked up the most often by reviewers. Adams writes “the coherence [meat] achieves as a meaningful item of food arises from patriarchal attitudes including the idea that the end justifies the means, that the objectification of other beings is a necessary part of life, and that violence can and should be masked. These are all a part of the sexual politics of meat” (14). Though the writers in *Sister Species* and *Sistah Vegan* do not identify patriarchy as the root of these
attitudes, their essays unmask violence and question the means and the necessity of objectification.

A strength of these two books is that both are collections, and the inclusion of multiple authors helps encourage rhetorical listening, particularly metonymic thinking, in the reader. Though, for example, “Black-identified female vegans” is a small group, the twenty-five who contributed to *Sistah Vegan* came to veganism from a variety of paths and have diverse understandings of what veganism means in their own life and what it can mean for Black women and others. Some *Sistah Vegan* writers do not address nonhumans at all because they are more concerned about the relationship between race, diet, and health. A few of the contributors from *Sistah Vegan* also have pieces in *Sister Species*, which contains fourteen essays by women who work for animal justice in various capacities. As in *Sistah Vegan*, the diversity of the writers encourages rhetorical listening. Both abolitionists and welfarists are represented as some women advocate for better conditions for farm animals, while others wish to do away with the practice altogether. While some have made a career of animal advocacy, others are involved as one aspect of their work or through volunteerism.

The *Sistah Vegan* project itself was inspired by an act of rhetorical listening. Harper “eavesdropped” on a conversation on BlackPlanet.com about PETA’s use of images of slavery and civil rights abuses. Ratcliffe defines eavesdropping as “a rhetorical tactic of purposely positioning oneself on the edge of one’s own knowing so as to overhear and learn from others and, I would add, from oneself” (105). Though Harper was familiar with the BlackPlanet discussion boards, she does not participate in
the PETA discussion. Instead, she finds an outside position and, as Ratcliffe suggests, “grant[s] others the inside position” to learn from their responses (105). All but one of the forum members who commented found PETA’s campaign offensive. Harper, who was familiar with the slavery and Holocaust analogies made by Spiegel and Patterson, understood PETA was trying to critique the “master/oppressor ideology” involved in both the exploitation of humans and nonhumans, but also understood how the project’s obliviousness to sociohistorical context caused deep pain and anger in viewers (xiv). Rather than assuming that the respondents simply do not care about nonhuman suffering, Harper deduces that their anger is a sign that “the wounds and scars” from United States’ racism have not been sufficiently “addressed and reconciled” (xv).

She also listened to the point of view of Alka Chandna, a woman of color associated with PETA. Chandna responded to the NAACP’s criticism of PETA by asking people of color who have experienced racism to see the connections between rhetoric dismissing animal suffering based on the assumption that animals are “lesser beings” and racist rhetoric (qtd. in Harper xvi). Harper was inspired to find Black-identified female vegans who “see the connections speciesism has to all the ‘isms’” (xvi). The women participated in online conversations with one another before submitting essays for the book; therefore, rhetorical listening was an important part of invention for Harper and the other writers.

---

25 Val Plumwood critiques the “model of domination and transcendence of nature” (23). She claims that the linkage of humanity with rationality and masculinity combined with the positioning of this humanity in duality with nature “can be used to support the supposed inferiority not just of women, but also of slaves, people of other races and cultures (‘barbarians’) and those who perform manual as opposed to intellectual tasks” (47).
Several writers describe conversations they had with nonvegan friends, family, and fellow activists to stress the importance of listening to nonvegans. Harper describes being in the nonvegan position in college from which she resisted arguments made by white, wealthy, vegan students. She reflects that it was not that these students were wrong about the subject, but that they did not know how to convey their message to her effectively (35). Many of the sistah vegans are concerned with how to present veganism to other black people in ways that take into account the listeners’ values. Therefore, many stress the health benefits of a vegan diet and its possibilities as a method of decolonization.

For example, Ain Drew claims that her concerns about black health were ignored when she worked at PETA as the Urban Marketing Coordinator. She wanted to develop campaigns that would focus on diet and potentially alleviate health problems, while white PETA employees thought it was more important to get black people to stop wearing fur (63). Other writers point out the similarities between a vegan diet and traditional African diets. The book shows a complicated relationship to soul food, with some writers calling it a “slave diet” (though they do not explicitly base this claim on the dietary guidelines of the Nation of Islam), others critiquing only “neo soul food” as over-processed, and some who value its associations with family and history. The relationship to the mainstream American diet is simpler; the belief that animal products are essential to health is seen as colonization because it ignores high rates of lactose intolerance in Blacks and Native Americans and devalues non-Western foodways.
While many of the writers note similarities between the treatment of black people in the United States and nonhumans, none make it their sole argument. Of those who mention it, some make direct identifications and others present the identification as partial and based in their own perspective. Some focus on the similarities of enslaved people and animals, while others focus on black people’s current position of complicity in the abuse of farmed animals. The intersecting oppressions of racism and sexism are also a recurrent concern, as Tashee Meadows shows when she writes that, as she read *The Dreaded Comparison, Animal Liberation*, and other texts, “I thought of my ancestry as a Black woman: the rapes, unwanted pregnancies, captivity, stolen babies, grieving mothers, horrific transports, and the physical, mental, and spiritual pain of chattel slavery” (151). Patrice Jones uses Meadows’s essay to support her criticism of PETA’s 2005 slavery focused version of the “Animal Liberation Project” in the afterword. She states that “I hope that this anthology teaches animal advocates not that they ought to be trying to provoke such reactions [as Meadows experienced] but rather that they can trust that people are going to make the connections that are most meaningful to them without special prompting. Tashee Meadows didn’t need to be shown pictures of slave transport ships or people in prison to perceive the parallels” (196).

However, according to Meadows’s own narrative, it seems she *did* see pictures of these ships paired with images from factory farming before she came to her conclusion that farm animals suffer like enslaved people because she does not mention considering this analogy until after she read Spiegel’s *The Dreaded Comparison* (151). Spiegel’s chapter “Transportation, or the Unbearable Journey” places an illustrated floor plan of a
ship’s slave hold on the same page as a photograph of a “silo”-type egg factory (53). The book contains many other visual and verbal comparisons between slavery and factory farming and laboratory testing. In fact, PETA appears to have used material from Spiegel’s book in its “Are Animals the New Slaves?” campaign because Spiegel sued them for copyright infringement (Goldstein). Of course, people do not have to be shown paired images of suffering to draw this parallel, but that does not mean the analogy can never be presented by animal advocates.

While the ADL called *Eternal Treblinka* “offensive,” “ridiculous,” and “absurd” in a short article for their website, both this book and *The Dreaded Comparison* have in general received a more positive reception than “Holocaust on Your Plate.” Jason Edward Black praises Patterson’s attention to detail (84) and many of the sistah vegans praise Spiegel’s book, for which Alice Walker wrote a foreword. Much of this has to do with the texts’ accessibility. *Eternal Treblinka* was published by Latern Books, a relatively small press with a focus on vegetarianism and *The Dreaded Comparison* was published by a nonprofit Spiegel founded, the Institute for the Development of Earth Awareness (IDEA). Therefore, the books were not directly targeted to the general public, as “Holocaust on your Plate” was, but to more sympathetic audiences. The works also made nuanced analogies. Rather than conflating Holocaust victims and factory farmed animals, the books detailed similarities in the technologies of violence. While both authors point out similarities in perpetrator mindsets, they do not rely on this point alone. Patterson also describes how American slaughterhouse technology was incorporated into Nazi death camps, and Spiegel identifies overlaps between the technology used to
control enslaved people and instrumentalized animals. In contrast, PETA’s campaigns relied on decontextualized images and quotations. The problem is not that they made the analogy, but they did so without legitimately considering how other people would feel about it, and they forced identification at the expense of context.

Tara Sophia Bahna-James is particularly interested in hearing others’ perspectives over forcing identification in Sistah Vegan. She describes listening to Black female nonvegan acquaintances. She can understand why the analogies to slavery alienate them from animal rights activism and why they do not want to give up meat eating and wearing animal products because these behaviors are linked to material wealth. She does not feel the need to convert them and does not worry that she will be weakened in her veganism if she listens to their opinions (162). Bahna-James also seeks to understand why people get fanatical and determines that this is detrimental to their cause:

when . . . a person realizes . . . there is blood on his hands, he is tempted to distance his awakened self from his former meat-eating self and from all whose actions remind him of his former ones . . . But when our own conversion eclipses our appreciation for others and their own narratives (even narratives we have come to associate with the behavior of an oppressor), it is desperate. And there is a reason desperation is suspicious. It is always too personal. (165)

When being too personal, one does not take the person/people they are talking to into consideration, a failure of rhetorical listening. Therefore, one’s points are less likely to be appreciated by this audience that may feel alienated. Harper’s dismissive reaction to
the vegans she met in college and Drew’s frustration with her PETA co-workers who focused on the fur industry rather than the health issues she deemed more important are examples of the ways people may reject an argument they deem “too personal” to the speaker and irrelevant to them.

In *Sister Species*, Patrice Jones makes a point about fanaticism that is similar to Bahna-James’s:

> After we make a radical change in thought or behavior, we have a tendency to distance our new selves from our previous selves. That’s understandable, but not useful. If we can’t remember—much less have empathy with—our former ways of thinking and feeling, how can we make meaningful contact with those who still think and feel as we used to do? And, if we can’t make contact, how can we prompt others to rethink what feel to them like intensely personal choices? (47)

Bahna-James says it is important to “appreciate” others’ narratives, and Jones stresses empathy with our own former selves as a way to find connections with people with whom we now disagree. Similarly, *Sister Species* contributor Miyun Park looks for identification with people who have varied attitudes towards animal well-being. She explains, “There is no us-versus-them when it comes to collaborating to reduce suffering . . . With every meeting and every lecture, I have just one goal: to find common ground on which we can stand, together, to improve the lives of farmed animals” (84).

The phrase “common ground” evokes Burkean consubstantiality because it is a place that is created by people to join them in a larger purpose. Park objects to treating animals like “widgets in a factory,” but is not trying to immediately abolish factory
farming. Like another contributor, Twyla Francois, Park’s goal is to reduce the suffering of farmed animals. Because she believes that “there isn’t one answer” to this problem, she is able to be open to input from a variety of stakeholders, be they “animal advocates, scientists, consumers, legislators, corporate decision-makers, farmers, veterinarians, or vegans” (84). While these groups have different interests in factory-farming, they also have different abilities to change it.

Park’s approach to common ground recognizes differences while Newkirk’s essay does not. In her contribution to Sister Species, Newkirk states, “My appeal is . . . that we reject all classification as much as we possibly can and demand to be part of something bigger, members of the community of all living beings” (66). While such a worldview indicates why she finds the analogies made in “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Are Animals the New Slaves?” unproblematic, the reaction to the campaigns has shown them not to be particularly effective, especially among those who identify with the people analogized or who are invested in human rights concerns. Newkirk again shows a lack of interest in listening in this essay when she states that “Women still control most of the kitchens of the world, and I see no reason to object to the situation because food is vital to life” (70). Innumerable women in academic, popular, and personal discourse have explained their objections to the gendered division of labor that allots large amounts of unpaid work to women. Because veganism is a moral necessity to Newkirk, when she puts the burden of vegan food service on women, she makes them responsible not only for men’s bodies, but also their integrity.
Newkirk does not make any specific analogies between nonhumans and humans in this essay, though she does make an allusion to the Holocaust and another to women in Afghanistan. However, other writers in *Sister Species* and *Sistah Vegan* do compare nonhumans to oppressed people and also position people, even those who experience discrimination, as oppressors. In *Sister Species*, Lauren Ornelas quotes a worker who escaped bondage at a chocolate factory who said to tell Westerners “they are eating my suffering” (157). Ornelas says, “This is exactly what a nonhuman animal might say to those eating parts of their bodies, and their bodily products. I stopped eating all chocolate” (157). While Ornelas does not dwell on how these instances of eating suffering differ, she also does not equate the man to a nonhuman animal when she points out that the worker and the animal both suffer for a human’s enjoyment. Furthermore, it provides an example of how consideration for nonhumans can lead to consideration for humans. Ornelas was already a vegetarian, and the analogy she saw made her stop eating products that were derived from human suffering too. This experience indicates that, as Ornelas says, “animal advocates will draw more people, and become part of a more viable movement, when we explicitly connect injustices affecting the animals—human and nonhuman—and the environment” (159). While this claim is contested among activists, such explicit connections are persuasive to some people, such as many of the sistah vegans who are invested in making these connections and then making them known.

The connection between diet and health is mentioned by almost all of the *Sistah Vegan* writers. Many also make connections between diet and decolonization. For
example, Harper compares the belief that humans need to eat protein “derived from enslaved nonhuman animals” to the antebellum white belief that African slavery was necessary (34). Mary Spears asks “How many of my ancestors/Were treated like today’s farm animals? /How many of us look the other way?” when farm animals are used and suffer (81). Both writers draw a comparison between the mind-set of white people who were complicit in slavery and that of people of all races, but particularly black-identified people because they are a central focus of the Sistah Vegan project, who are complicit in the instrumental use of animals. To Harper and Spears, recognizing this mindset in oneself and adjusting it is a practice of decolonization.

There are fewer of these direct connections between injustices made in *Sister Species*, perhaps because the pieces for this book were collected differently. Lisa Kemmerer sent out a call for essays by women working for social justice for animals. Therefore, most of the writers argue that nonhumans deserve ethical treatment because of their inherent value, not because this will also benefit humans. Many of the writers in *Sister Species* seek to bring animals into humanist moral consideration through anthropomorphic language and empathetic descriptions of their suffering and happiness. *Sistah Vegan* writers who are concerned with animal justice also draw on these techniques. While these writers differ from Goodall, de Waal, and Bradshaw because most are concerned with farm animals rather than cognitively sophisticated elephants and nonhuman primates, they use similar anthropomorphizing techniques to those discussed in Chapter II. For example, in *Sister Species*, Jones describes roosters as
“emotional” and names one chicken Mosselle after her grandmother because of their similar “stubborn charm” (46).

One of the arguments for the inherent value of nonhumans in *Sister Species*’s that raises problems for some readers based on their relationship to feminism occurs in Kemmerer’s appendix. Here, she argues that the sex of the animals in factory farms (most are female) makes their “exploitation” a feminist issue (173). Though Kemmerer is right that many farmed animals are exploited according to their sex, the problem with the appeal to an essential, trans-species femaleness to encourage veganism is that it reduces the scope of the problem and its appeal. First, it devalues male farm animals simply because they are often killed at a younger age than female ones. Second, it disregards readers who are either not feminist-identified or subscribe to a non-essentialist feminism that, though it may center on women, does not see them as belonging to a natural category that transcends cultural differences among humans, much less species differences. While the point that both female humans and nonhumans are in some circumstances seen as vehicles of reproduction is one worth making to audiences who are interested in such connections, it does not necessarily make factory farming a “critical” issue for all feminists (173). Haraway critiques feminisms based on essentialism as exclusionary in “A Cyborg Manifesto.” She promotes “a conscious coalition” that recognizes differences among members (“Cyborg” 156). Individuals find affinity with one another, but their voices are not interchangeable, and no single voice can represent the entire group. Some of the writers in *Sister Species* demonstrate the importance of affinity by recognizing the diverse histories and motivations that led them
to activism. Many also describe finding affinity with nonhumans, from roosters to chimpanzees, by patiently observing behavior.

However, Francois is the only writer in this anthology to explicitly acknowledge that speaking for animals can be a problem: “One benefit of my position is that I am with the farmed animals—literally—and therefore act as a more legitimate spokesperson for them. I witness what is done to them daily, and I can therefore speak with some level of confidence about necessary changes” (61). This quotation acknowledges a relationship of affinity, and shows that Francois continually tries to consider what the nonhumans want rather than assuming she already knows. It also reveals the looseness of the affinity between the women themselves, as Francois is working to improve the living conditions of factory farmed animals, not end the practice, while other writers take a liberationist stance and work to end the instrumental use of animals.

Francois is not interested in getting her readers to adopt her exact beliefs, but to act according to their own. She makes the same essentialist claim that Kemmerer does that “As women, we must be aware of the suffering of sows (and ‘dairy’ cows, and ‘laying’ hens),” but she also describes a different relationship between feminism and animal activism that is based on action rather than identity (63). She ends her essay with a call to young women to “resist, more and more, society’s grip” (63). Francois notes that as a preteen, she was a vegetarian despite criticism from her community, but then placed societal norms above her beliefs in early adulthood. She believes that there was

26 In *Thinking in Pictures: My Life with Autism* and *Animals in Translation*, Temple Grandin argues that autism makes her a credible voice for farmed animals because she thinks visually, which allows her to perceive the animals’ surroundings as they do.
more pressure put on her to uphold the status quo because she is a woman (60). She encourages women to “follow your intuition” (63) and so presents vegetarianism and animal activism as feminist not because of any essential bond between female humans and nonhumans, but because activism (excluding some reactionary movements) is a way for women to resist pressures to uphold the status quo at the expense of their own beliefs.

Several other *Sister Species* writers acknowledge the possibility that social justice for animals can aid humans, though few say how. Christine L. Garcia, however, promotes the false choice of either helping humans or helping animals. She claims humans do too much to help other humans, and this causes over population (141). In reality, helping other people, particularly women, gain education and have increased access to family planning services often reduces the birth-rate. World Overpopulation Awareness lists “Women and Girls” first in their list of successful approaches to reducing the birth-rates (Gaia). Education, gender equality, jobs, and land ownership are some of the subtopics; healthcare and family planning are the two other main strategies (Gaia).

Garcia also makes another misguided statement; this one is about weight. Similarly to Francois, she ends her piece with the importance of questioning authority. Garcia writes, “If I had never questioned authority, if I had continued along the prescribed track of attorneys, I would have become just another unconscious consumer in a conventional job and would probably be overweight from eating dead animals”

---

27 See Bulatao, Rodolfo and Singh, S. et al.,
(151). At the same time that she praises herself for being a questioner, she accepts and reiterates the stereotype that people are overweight because they are “unconscious,” a euphemism for what prejudiced coworkers might consider “lazy.” Mark Roehling found that overweight people were generally considered lazier and less conscientious in the workplace (403), though his literature review showed these stereotypes are unfounded. While questioning authority is important, and is certainly something both Garcia and Newkirk do, listening to other questioners is also important, both before and after one achieves one’s own position of authority as a published writer and/or leader of an organization.

None of the other writers in Sister Species trade in fat-phobic stereotypes, though none of them address the fraught relationship between vegetarianism and weight. Because the Sistah Vegan writers are more concerned with health risks related to obesity among black people, the topic does come up in this book. Many of the writers state that they lost weight after going vegan, but they invest only compassionate action, not physical appearance, with moral import. The final chapter, “Veganism and Misconceptions of Thinness as ‘Normal’ and ‘Healthy’” is compiled from a listserv discussion in which sistah vegans describe their experiences with weight-related stereotypes. The women recounted comments that they had received from others; some had been told they were “too big” to really be vegan, and others heard they were too fat or too thin to be attractive. The women also described their personal struggles with body image and/or how they have come to accept themselves. In their responses to each other, they empathize by sharing similar stories. Yet, they also assert difference. For example,
Raquel mentions that when she read one sistah call her “size 6 stomach . . . a ‘big ole glob of mess’ I have to fight back searing pain at my own self-judgment . . . and remember that it’s not about me” (178). She conveys both that size six is not, in her mind, big, and that this notion causes her pain, and also that she is still willing to listen to the other woman’s feelings about her body. In expressing both her pain and her continued interest in the other woman’s point of view, she models a form of limited identification that both respects the experience of the Other and her own.

**Summation of Analysis: The Rhetorical Risk and Potential of Analogies**

Analogies that come from a place of rhetorical listening are more likely to be respectful. When well-known historical sources of trauma, such as the Holocaust or slavery, are used to draw attention to animal suffering and invest it with the moral import associated with human trauma, this process is especially important. These comparisons should not be off-limits because analogies are involved in how we conceive of the world; they have the potential to transform our understanding of it by showing us interlocking systems of oppression. According to Cvetkovich, “Trauma becomes the hinge between systemic structures of exploitation and oppression and the felt experience of them” by illustrating how these oppressive structures operate on the individual level (12). While the structures of exploitation vary, analogies can help shed light on their similarities, as many of the *Sistah Vegan* contributors found.

The women’s willingness to speak and listen to critiques of social norms is central to the sistah vegans’ efforts at decolonization, animal rights activism, and increasing health awareness. Though not all of them endorse analogies between slavery,
racism, or sexism and speciesism, those who do so treat the analogy as a hinge that links oppressions together for a particular political purpose. Their use of these analogies is further non-exploitative because the writers often develop real connections between veganism’s benefits for nonhumans and black-identified humans, encouraging activism for both groups, rather than using analogies to only illuminate the suffering of one group. Some of the essays in Sister Species have the same effect, as does the work of Eve Abe. In contrast, PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Are Animals the New Slaves?” used the Holocaust and slavery to benefit nonhumans, but did not seek to increase understanding of these events or current manifestations of anti-Semitism and racism.

However, animal advocacy is a legitimate cause that should not have to also do work for human rights in order to be accepted. What is important is that animal-focused activism be “informed” by this other work so that it does not reinforce racism, sexism, or other discrimination experienced by humans at the same time that it attempts to undo speciesism. For example, Maneesha Deckha states that even though PETA need not campaign for women’s rights, their “campaigns should not intentionally entrench sexism and other difference-based hierarchies” (49). She criticizes several anti-fur advertisements that commodify women for the male gaze. While the ads draw attention to PETA’s cause, they ultimately undermine the organization’s “posthumanist project” because “[a]ll the usual suspects of things, rather than persons, are still aligned: women, body, animals” (55). Similarly, “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Are Animals the New Slaves?” aligns people who were dehumanized by racist discourse with animals.
With these two campaigns, PETA did not intentionally reinforce racism as many of the ads Deckha analyzes seem to do with sexism. However, using the Holocaust or racism as part of an analogy “suggests that the Jewish and black struggles have been successfully completed, that they have the settled meaning of archetypes” (Kim 326), so these analogies can reinforce the idea that racism and anti-Semitism are no longer present, at least in the U.S. where these campaigns are centered. While an animal-focused campaign is legitimate, and, as Kim stated, Holocaust and slavery tropes are important to animal liberation activists’ understanding of themselves as abolitionists, the use of such analogies without considering their historical specificity or that the discrimination against certain groups of people that made them possible lives on is appropriation.

PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” and the two versions of the “Animal Liberation Project,” the original and the most recent, are useful for outlining some of the major risks of such analogies. The first risk is simply that the person or organization making the analogy could be exploiting a group of victimized people and even reiterating dehumanizing discourse similar to the kind used to justify the mistreatment of them. An attendant risk is that the viewers may be alienated by the analogy, even if the speaker attempts to frame it in a non-exploitative way, if they perceive any use of the Holocaust or other such traumatic events as offensive. When the analogy does not contain sufficient historical context, it can obscure perpetrators’ culpability and victim’s agency. Paying attention to the values of the Other and then limiting the analogy is a way to circumvent these risks. A more limited identification likewise invites the
audience to exert more agency in the meaning-making process as people can decide whether or not they wish to extend some points of identification.

Such limited identifications display rhetorical listening to human survivors and those who care about them by preserving differences between human and nonhuman they deem important. Another benefit of limited identifications is that, by stressing specificity, they may be more able to pin point how an audience can alleviate suffering caused by a particular situation. For example, Abe clearly identifies steps that can be taken by Acholi and the global community to improve the well-being of Uganda’s elephants. While analogies that rely on totalizing identification generate some sympathy for nonhumans, analogies that recognize differences may be able to make more productive suggestions for channeling this sympathy into action.

It may not be possible to limit an analogy in a way that appeals to all audience members and still accurately conveys the speaker’s thoughts and feelings. Ideally, the speaker will have practiced rhetorical listening during the invention of her text and the audience will engage in rhetorical listening when crafting a public response, such as a press release, blog, book, or statement to a reporter. There is not an ethical obligation to listen to and consider perspectives one finds ignorant or reprehensible and outrage can be valuable public discourse. However, rhetorical listening is vital when one wants to engage in a conversation with the offending group. The responsibility for rhetorical listening is first and foremost on the speaker who chooses to enter a public forum and use a marginalized group for her own ends. Any group that makes a political call to action should be particularly concerned with incorporating rhetorical listening in the
development of their campaigns and showing evidence of it in the final product so that they do not encourage viewers to appropriate others’ suffering for their own ends. This listening would also enable the speaker to question how their terministic screen has filtered reality and perhaps adjust their text to accommodate multiple perspectives in their audience. Identification is central to our understanding of the world and can be a powerful political tool. However, analogies work not only through similarity, but also dissimilarity. These differences can likewise be productive because engaging in rhetorical listening to discover what differences are important to others is a way to open, and redirect, one’s own terministic screens.

**Criticisms of Speciesism in *Maus* and *The Rabbits***

The main part of this chapter addressed analogies made by advocates that made parallels between speciesism and other forms of discrimination in order to draw attention to nonhuman suffering at the hands of humans. Though speciesism, racism, and sexism are in some ways interlocking, it is possible to undermine one and reinforce others. Deckha provides examples of how anti-speciesist arguments can also be sexist in her analyses of PETA’s campaigns against the fur industry. Similarly, Bradshaw’s book is anti-speciesist, but at least one of its analogies reinforces stereotypes about African American women. In *Animal Rites*, Wolfe identifies speciesism in the film *The Silence of the Lambs* despite its anti-sexist and anti-classist portrayal of Clarice because she comes to realize that only people, not lambs, can be saved (105). However, just as it is possible to unwittingly affirm one form of discrimination while critiquing another, so can we undermine one while intending to critique another. To bring home this point, the
final section of this chapter analyzes how two illustrated narratives that intend to critique racial discrimination also draw attention to speciesism.

Art Spiegelman has commented that the animal figures in *Maus,* which depicts Jews as mice and Nazis as cats, are a metaphor that functions in “an ironic fashion, in that on the surface at least this tends to, uh, verify the Nazi racial theories, and of course that can’t hold up as a—tsshh, can’t hold up even as a metaphor. And as a result the metaphor cracks a number of times in the book” (Witek 91). John Marsden and Shaun Tan’s picture book *The Rabbits* uses a similar metaphor: numbats represent indigenous peoples of Australia and rabbits represent European colonists. Rabbits, brought over by British colonists, are considered an invasive pest species in Australia that “has inflicted more damage on the Australian environment than any other” (Light 115). The numbat is an indigenous endangered species. Unfortunately, *The Rabbits* does not explore the ironic “cracks” in the metaphor between species and ethnicities with the same acuity as *Maus.* The text has been criticized for portraying indigenous figures stereotypically, in accordance with the very colonialist framework that it claims to critique. While I agree that *The Rabbits* fails as an allegorical critique of colonialism, I argue that its animal metaphor successfully introduces a critique of speciesism. *Maus* also suggests a critique of speciesism because the fractures in its metaphor are stressed by, for example, an image of a pig (which are ciphers for Polish people) serving sausage, which can be read as an unsettling metaphor that analogizes meat consumption by humans with cannibalism. This section uses *Maus* as a lever to stress the cracks in *The Rabbits*’s
animal metaphors and argues that both texts show how speciesist discourse is related to discourses of racism that identify groups of people as nonhuman.

Because *The Rabbits* equates different species with human ethnic groups, it engages in the speciesist assumption that “the Animal” is a monolithic group by implying that the differences between species are no more significant than those among humans. However, representing different human ethnic groups with different species also replicates colonialist discourse that relied on claims from scientific racism about distinct biological differences between races in order to justify abuse. That the rabbits are anthropomorphized more than the numbats replicates the colonialist discourses that dehumanize indigenous people, even though the text aims to be a critique of colonialism. Though the book is participating in the tradition of using the animal fable as a means of political protest, its use of rabbits and numbats differs from the classic example of Orwell’s *Animal Farm* in which species and ethnicity are not paralleled. *The Rabbits* was published in 1998, when white Australia was beginning to publically recognize the mistreatment of indigenous peoples, and it shares some of the problems of the contemporaneous Australian discourse.

Brooke Collins-Gearing and Dianne Osland describe the book as an illustration of the “clash” of older narratives that claim Europeans “settled” an unoccupied land, rather than violently invading and colonizing it, and newer narratives that are aware of the “invasion and dispossession” of indigenous lands and people. While the text at first seems to reject the older narrative (*terra nullis*) by showing that the land was inhabited prior to “settlement,” the animal metaphor fails as allegorical critique of colonialism.
because it repeats the myth that indigenous people were “less human” than their European counterparts. Although the rabbits look “human,” wearing clothes and walking upright, the numbats are unclothed and are usually crouching. Unsworth and Wheeler point out how the numbats, whom they call bandicoots, are portrayed as passive by both the verbal text and the illustrations:

In several of the beginning illustrations the bandicoots are seen holding their spears just watching the rabbits. The rabbits, however, are seen as very active right from the start, driving, studying and measuring. This is mirrored in the text by the agentive roles taken by the rabbits and the bandicoots in relation to the kinds of processes represented by different verbs. The rabbits have active agentive roles with verbs like “made,” “brought,” “came,” “spread,” “ate,” “chopped” and “stole.” The bandicoots are less involved with words of action and more involved with communicative and mental process verbs like “warned” and “liked.” When they are involved in action, it is significantly negative – “lost.” (72)

The final page, which depicts a rabbit and numbat meeting in a wasteland, over an almost dry billabong, asks “Who will save us from the rabbits?” (n.p.) As Collins-Gearing and Osland point out, this ending takes away agency from indigenous people and depicts them as passively waiting for a savior instead of communicating with the rabbits about changing their behavior.

However, Tan’s illustrations that depict the rabbits’ cattle make the book more complicated than just a well-meaning, but unintentionally colonialist, allegory. When the
rabbits raise cattle and the numbats attack the cattle not because they hate or fear cattle, but because they want to kill them in order to harm the rabbits, nonhumans are engaging in speciesism. These scenes invite readers to question humans’ relationships to farm animals. The cattle and sheep are another trapping of the rabbits’ Europeanism like their coats and top hats. Moreover, that rabbits, herbivores, are raising animals for meat and dairy, as well as wool indicates that humans’ farming practices are as culturally based as their clothing choices.

The farm animals also reveal the speciesism inherent in Western Humanist thought that is not only manifested in the way we treat nonhuman animals, but also the way we treat animalized humans. Derrida defines “Men” as “first and foremost those living creatures who have given themselves the word that enables them to speak of the animal with a single voice and to designate it as the single being that remains without a response, without a word with which to respond” (32). The rabbits divide all living creatures into two categories: rabbits and everything else. Their attitude to non-rabbits, be they numbats, sheep, or cattle, mirror Derrida’s take on the human “tradition of a war against the animal” in which the animal is a tool for humans (101). According to Wolfe, this particular mode of being human is based on transcendence of “the ‘animal’ and the animalistic” (Animal Rites 43). Derrida calls this the “Cartesian tradition” in which “I am” comes into existence following the animal because Descartes defined “I” as the mind, which transcends the animalistic body (72). This mode makes possible “a symbolic economy” in which one can abuse the Other by identifying it as animal (Animal Rites 43).
The numbats provide an alternative to this “us vs. everything else” mode. Instead, they divide animals into “those we like” and “those that scare us.” Within this world view, cattle are “animals we like,” as evidenced by the location of the text near cattle and sheep in a rosy scene in which numbats congregate near their pasture. While I could claim that this is another colonialist thread in the book that implies that, even though Australia was occupied, indigenous people made less use of the land than European, and are therefore not deserving of land rights, I want to take the argument in a different direction and claim that this illustration does offer a critique. It critiques speciesism by showing nonhuman animals practicing it. According to Derrida, we tend to think of “the Animal” as an undifferentiated mass (Mallet x). Therefore, seeing animals “use” other animals in a systematic, culturally sanctioned way reminds us that animals are in fact diverse while at the same time providing a surreal mirror of our own practices. That the rabbits’ use of cows and sheep as if they were machinery, not fellow living beings, is highlighted by ridiculous features—the perforated lines on the cows’ hides that indicate where to carve them up into beef, the wheels that have replaced their hooves, and the 100% tags on the sheep’s wool—which all draw attention to the instrumental use of animals in the everyday practice of commercial farming. The sheep’s ear tags mirror their 100% wool tags, and the cows’ wheel-hooves are identical to ones on their milking machines.

28 Though nonhumans generally “discriminate” when it comes to who they mate with and/or eat, “speciesism” is based on a system of beliefs that depend on an understanding of species as a means of categorizing animals and ranking those categories.
While numbats do eat other animals (they are insectivores), the allegorical numbats do not perceive other animals as tools until colonization becomes violent. The numbats not only fight rabbits, but also destroy one of the rabbits’ steam-powered cannons and kill cattle. While dismantling the cannon shows the numbats resisting not only the rabbits, but also the industrialism that the book elsewhere blames for destroying the land, their attack on the cattle indicates that they share the rabbits’ speciesism. For the numbats, the cattle are no longer “animals we like,” but machines of colonization that need to be destroyed. Ironically, this spread depicts the numbats and the rabbits on the same side. The panels on this page are not in chronological order, so a panel featuring numbats armed with spears is stacked on top of one that contains rabbits with guns. They are facing the same direction instead of at each other. Though both groups have different cultures (as indicated in this illustration by the rabbits’ “might makes right” motto as compared to the numbats’ apparent lack of interest in slogans and militarism) and different types of power (the numbats have a better knowledge of the land, as they have located themselves on higher ground, but the rabbits’ weapons are more destructive), they are joined in their violence towards each other that also causes them to direct violence against other species in order to harm the enemy. In the numbats’ efforts to resist colonization, they take on the rabbits’ worldview and see cattle as a tool, like cannons, that they have a right to destroy. Thus, the book shows how speciesism, as well as the related discourses of racism and sexism that rank some people as subhuman, can also be enacted by oppressed groups.
Maus also suggests a critique of speciesism through ironic interactions between “human” animals, like the mice, and “animal” animals, like insects. Richard DeAngelis claims that the text “take[s] at face value the artificial hierarchy” between “humans and other species” (231). While DeAngelis criticizes the text because the characters and narrator do not verbally comment on this irony, I argue that the illustrations themselves sufficiently convey the critique and emphasize that humans are animals. A few panels show Art, the son of a Holocaust survivor who is writing a graphic novel about his father’s experiences, exterminate some insects. I agree with DeAngelis’ claim that these panels illustrate Art’s speciesist sense of superiority, but I disagree with his claim that the panels are not ironic. Only three pages earlier, the text explains that Zyklon B was invented as a pesticide and Art uses a gas pesticide to kill the insects rather than a fly swatter or his palm (71).

As DeAngelis points out, the final panel strategically draws attention to the dead and dying insects (241). The tender moment in which Art helps his wife up is spoiled by the dead animal underneath their clasped palms. Another insect weakly drops below the panel; it is the last image of this chapter. That a chapter which is entirely focused on Auschwitz ends with insects gassed to death is hardly a coincidence. Even without the verbal commentary DeAngelis thinks the panels need, the irony is apparent. The irony is actually heightened by the characters unawareness. Francoise remarks that “It’s almost impossible to imagine that Auschwitz ever happened” because her knowledge of it does not directly impact the tranquility of the evening. Though Art and his wife do not see the similarities between their behavior and the Nazi death camps, the parallel is (literally)
drawn: Art and his wife consider themselves good, decent people, but have no qualms about killing subhuman beings that “inconvenience” them.

While neither *Maus* nor *The Rabbits* actively pursues the metaphor between atrocities committed by humans on humans with speciesism, the cracks in their metaphorical representation of different human ethnic groups as different species opens up this analogy. *Maus* pursues these cracks more thoroughly with, for example, the panels that make an explicit connection between using pesticides for their intended use and using them in gas chambers or pigs who eat pork and human animals who eat other animals. Again, DeAngelis claims that this image is not ironic and, yet, one astute point that he makes actually supports a reading of this image as ironic. He correctly claims that the father’s work repairing leather shoes in the camp is not ironic, because, as DeAngelis puts it “There are no cows depicted in Auschwitz—either as humans or animals” (237). However, there are pigs in Auschwitz, and when we see them in one panel, as both “human” and “animal,” presenting their own kind to be eaten, there is visual irony. These panels complicate the animal metaphors in the book, indicating that racist analogies that compare different groups of people to different species cannot be sustained. They also begin to suggest an analogy between anti-Semitism and speciesism.

*The Rabbits* does not pursue such cracks in its animal metaphors as thoroughly as *Maus*, which is why the book re-inscribes colonialist thought by animalizing indigenous people into numbats and humanizing rabbits into Europeans. However, *Maus* can illuminate a reading of *The Rabbits* because the graphic novel is rife with irony. *Maus* is written for an older audience, which is one reason it delves into the animal metaphor
with more nuance and complexity. However, Tan claims that picture books do not have to be for children, and that *The Rabbits* is aiming for a broader audience (“Why” 1). *The Rabbits* could have been less colonialist, if, like *Maus*, it had engaged in more irony and tried to account for the specificity of the event, rather than trying to create a universal story of colonialism for a universal audience.

Tan has said, “I . . . try to remove any details that might interfere with the universality of an idea—that is, particular references to places, people, or things, anticipating that readers will fill these ‘gaps’ with their own personal experience, inevitably different from my own” (Interview 46). This approach works for many of Tan’s other works in which he writes the text as well as the images, such as *The Red Tree*, a picture book that evokes the experience of depression or *The Lost Thing*, in which a fantastical creature enters a humdrum world. These books do what Tan claims he wants them to do: they are “provocative” and encourage the reader to ask “questions of the book” which are “questions about their own experience” (“Picture Books” 5, 4).

Tan’s illustrations do work to open the *The Rabbits* a little, by creating a parallel in the numbats’ and rabbits’ treatment of cattle, making the normal practice of raising farm animals seem surreal and suggesting that the instrumental use of animals is similar to the use and abuse of dehumanized people. For *The Rabbits*, the speciesist assumption that “the Animal” is a homogenous group is, on one level, what makes the metaphor work to show that colonization is “humans abusing humans.” However, the book also suggests that “humans using animals” is also an abusive relationship made on an arbitrary divide, because it guides us to condemn the rabbits and numbats’ treatment of farm animals.
Unfortunately, the openness of Marsden’s text oversimplifies a historical event. In its attempts to create a story that can be applied to many situations by, for example, never naming the place and time, it presents a simplified version of colonialism that reiterates the myth that the colonizers are human and active, while indigenous peoples are animalistic and passive. The lack of specificity in *The Rabbits* also makes it easy for readers to deny their white privilege by distancing themselves from the rabbits. The final image denies the agency of indigenous people in the past and the present. In conclusion, *The Rabbits* does open up one avenue of decolonization through its animal representations that subtly critique Western industrialized use of nonhumans, but this is not a sustained theme of the book. Rather, it is one that has to be fought for by prying apart the cracks in animal metaphor. However, reading *The Rabbits* next to *Maus* helps us see how animal metaphors destabilize the animal-human divide, undercutting both speciesist assumptions about human superiority and the racism that functions by dehumanizing certain groups and making them available for instrumental use and abuse by self-identified humans. Analogies can only be extended so far, but this does not mean that atrocities such as the Holocaust or colonialism should be off limits. Paying attention to where a metaphor cracks is crucial to using it ethically.
CHAPTER IV

DEHUMANIZATION AND REHUMANIZATION IN TWO GRAPHIC NARRATIVES ABOUT THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

Despite the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement signed in 1993 by the Hutu government and the Tutsi rebel forces the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and the presence of a small international peace-keeping force in Rwanda, both government and private media refuse to curd their use of anti-Tutsi hate speech. After President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6th, 1994, Hutus were told to commence killing their neighbors with the intent to eliminate the Tutsi ethnic group (Thompson 2). The Interahamwe, paramilitary groups that had been organized and armed by Habyarimana’s government, were at the forefront of the killing (24). After 800,000 people were murdered, the genocide ended when the RPF won the capital city Kigali in mid-July (29). Since then, according to Madeline Hron, “writing about Rwanda has become a ‘hot commodity’ in the West,” with “hundreds of scholarly of books . . . as well as dozens of literary works” published including the two graphic narratives discussed in this chapter (163).

J.P. Stassen’s graphic novel Deogratias was released in 2000 by Belgian press Dupuis, with the English translation following six years later. Stassen’s fictional text displays the trauma experienced by a reluctant perpetrator, Deogratias, who has flashbacks to his crimes and frequent delusions in which he turns into a dog. Stassen’s work has received multiple awards and has been the subject of some critical attention. Madeline Hron condemns it as an example of Francophone fiction that, because of
sympathies with France’s pro-Hutu politics, obscures Hutu and French culpability in the
genocide. Though Suzanne Keen is interested in how the book generates empathy for a
perpetrator, she does not claim the text reduces his responsibility for his crimes. Another
graphic narrative about the genocide, Rupert Bazambanza’s *Smile through the Tears*,
was published in 2007. In contrast to *Deogratias*, this text focuses on the experience of
victims and has not received as much popular or scholarly attention. Bazambanza’s work
is creative nonfiction rather than a novel, but instead of describing his own experience as
a survivor, he tells the story of his close friends, the Rwanga family.

Both texts depict and condemn the dehumanization of Tutsis by extremist
rhetoric before and during the genocide. Both also seek to “rehumanize” Tutsis by
focusing on individual stories, and *Deogratias* also does this for a perpetrator, the title
character. How the graphic novels depict dehumanization and rhetorically work to
rehumanize people varies based on their conception of what it is to be human and to
have human memories. Therefore, this chapter builds on the discussion of the subject
from Chapter II. As argued in that chapter, Bradshaw and Goodall accepted the liberal
humanist definition of the subject as autonomous and rational for both humans and some
nonhumans, specifically elephants and chimpanzees, to encourage readers to identify
with these species and take steps to aid them. Bazambanza presents a similar view of the
human subject in *Smile* to similar ends.

Bradshaw and Goodall seek to include nonhumans in the realm of moral
consideration, and Bazambanza seeks to awaken Western readers’ moral concern for
Tutsis through appeals to identification. While I do not wish to unthinkingly compare
Tutsis and the nonhuman animals of other texts, I do think a comparison of the West’s attitudes towards these groups can be legitimate. Bazambanza makes such an association when he criticizes the West for expressing more concern for Rwanda’s gorillas than its people. By accepting the liberal humanist subject for people, if not gorillas, Bazambanza, like Bradshaw and Goodall, is able to invoke the agency of his readers by condemning their indifference that enabled the victimization of Tutsis and call for the readers to change their ways.

In contrast to Bazambanza’s text, which could be considered “humanist humanism” according to Wolfe as it is does not attempt to rethink the human or the medium of the graphic narrative, Deogratias functions as posthumanist rhetoric. While The Lives of Animals could be placed in the “posthumanist posthumanism” quadrant of Wolfe’s chart of posthumanism, Deogratias could more aptly be characterized as humanist posthumanism. Unlike The Lives of Animals, Deogratias does not ask readers to “rethink the hierarchy of human/animal” (Wolfe What is Posthumanism? 124). The graphic novel does deconstruct the human subject and critique agency through its ambivalent treatment of memory; however, it seems to accept that humans have, or should have, more responsibility than nonhumans and is only interested in nonhumans for what they can reveal about the human subject.

Deogratias’s relationship to the category of graphic novel can be described as posthumanist. Though not an academic work that critiques its own discipline, such as much of Derrida or Haraway’s work, Deogratias does reflect on the comic book as a medium. For example, Deogratias attempts to win a girl’s affection by giving her a
romans-photos, which is similar to a comic book, though illustrated with photographs rather than drawings, that tells a love story. As Keen points out, the girl turns down both Deogratias and his book, showing that readers are often not persuaded by texts, and “[t]hus Stassen acknowledges within his text that the uses of graphic narration are not as predictable as the naïve boy imagines, even as he attempts to use his art to raise readers’ consciousness of the bloody recent history of Rwanda” (136). Deogratias indicates that, though we can often choose to accept or reject overt efforts at persuasion, we are not aware of all the influences that affect our decisions. Deogratias, in particular, is shown to be affected by aspects of his mind, body, and environment that are beyond his control and partially obscured from him. This view of the subject, with diminished agency, makes it difficult to assign culpability for the genocide; therefore, the text focuses on the memories of individuals rather than crafting a public memory that makes a narrative of the causes of the genocide.

In contrast, Smile seeks to raise consciousness by providing a great deal of contextual information about Rwanda’s history of racism and the politics surrounding the genocide. Through the example of Rose Rwanga, who successfully teaches her family and community about racial harmony, Smile promotes the idea that learning about the causes of the genocide will persuade readers to avoid these dangerous behaviors and encourage Western readers to take preventative action instead of remaining bystanders to human rights abuse. In accordance with its acceptance of the liberal humanist subject, the text depicts humans as making conscious choices that led to the genocide, which gives readers the hope that genocide can be understood and thus prevented.
Hron criticizes *Deogratias* and other Francophone literature for not providing sufficient historical context and concludes that more attention should be paid to survivor testimony (163). Although I will argue in this chapter that *Deogratias* does not obscure perpetrator culpability, I also believe that the text should not stand alone, but be read with other accounts, such as *Smile Through the Tears*, to further encourage rhetorical listening and metonymic identification. Bazambanza and Stassen encounter a problem of identification also faced by those who write in support of nonhuman subjects: how to speak on behalf of those who cannot communicate or cannot do so to the same audiences in the same ways that the writer can. Strategies of empathetic unsettlement and limited identification are useful for speaking on behalf of both human and nonhuman subjects. These techniques are practiced to some degree by both authors, but reading multiple texts assists readers in practicing rhetorical listening by providing them with more voices to consider in what Nienkamp refers to as the “internal rhetoric” we engage in to make decisions.

This chapter begins by contextualizing the role of hate media in the genocide because, while this rhetoric did instigate violence, each graphic narrative presents the influence of media differently, according to its views of the human subject, in their own attempts to counteract the dehumanizing messages of hate media. The chapter then considers how the texts memorialize events and encourage sympathy for the individuals who experienced them through their use of identification and empathetic unsettlement. Running through this chapter is a discussion of how animalization has been used as
grounds for human abuse and also how animals, serving as witnesses to violence, have been used to reflect on the trauma caused by this abuse.

**Dehumanizing Language in Rwandan Media**

According to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), one phenomenon that led to the genocide was the degradation of Tutsis by the Rwandan hate media. The radio station RTLM and newspaper *Kangura* “called for the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group as a response to the political threat they associated with Tutsi ethnicity” (ICTR qtd. in Thompson 2). In its sentencing of RTLM founder Ferdinand Nahimana, the ICTR declared, “Without a firearm, machete, or any physical weapon, you [Nahimana] caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians” (qtd. in Thompson 305). Hassan Ngeze, the owner and editor of *Kangura* was told by the ICTR, “You poisoned the minds of your readers, and by words and deeds caused the death of thousands of innocent civilians” (306). RTLM and *Kangura* incited hatred before President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and called for the mass killing of Tutsis much more directly after this assassination.

The ICTR condemned RTLM and *Kangura* for defining all Tutsis as the “enemy.” These media characterized all Tutsi women as femme-fatale spies and conflated all Tutsi civilians with rebel groups by using Tutsi, Rwandan Patriotic Front, and *Inyenzi* interchangeably (Des Forges 48). English language representations of the genocide such as the film *Hotel Rwanda* translate *inyenzi* as “cockroaches.” *Deogratias* and *Smile* are translated from French, and the original texts use “cafards” and “cancrelats,” zoological terms for cockroach. In Burkean terms, the repetitious use of
inyenzi is meant to transform the substance of Tutsi individuals, in the eyes of Hutus, to that of anonymous vermin that should be exterminated. Burke calls substance an “ambiguous” term because, while we use it to mean the “essence” of thing, it etymologically refers to the “ground” under the term, or its context (Grammar 57). Despite the ambiguity of substance, the way that a particular substance is defined has “citable realities” (57). Burke identifies several ways in which substance can be defined, and both familial substance and directional substance are relevant to the characterization of Tutsis as inyenzi.

Inyenzi establishes a familial connection between Tutsis and cockroaches through dehumanization that codes Tutsis as a different species than Hutus. This familial identification can be seen in the title of the Kangura editorial “A Cockroach Cannot Bring Forth a Butterfly.” In Deogratias, a DJ for RTLM describes Tutsis as having “cockroach faces,” a phrase that moves them from the human family to the insect family (34). Describing Tutsis as cockroaches also implies a directional substance, which Burke explains as identifying a “motivating essence” (Grammar 32). This type of identification has the past, and therefore the future, “wound up” (32). The Kangura editorial states that “a cockroach brings forth a cockroach . . . The history of Rwanda tells us that the Tutsi has remained the same and has never changed” to claim that Tutsis, like cockroaches, will always attempt to invade Hutu homes because that is simply the way they are (2). Kangura thus uses directional substance to argue the two have substantially the same motivation.
However, “cockroaches” captures only one effect of the Kinyarwanda word *inyenzi*, the dehumanization of Tutsis as vermin that should be exterminated. For Rwandans, the term also evokes the *Inyenzi*, a Tutsi rebel group that existed in the 1960s and 70s. Just as the term establishes a familial and directional substance between Tutsis and cockroaches, so it does between civilians and rebels. According to Tutsi revolutionary Aloys Ngurumbe, the *Inyenzi* chose this name for itself, as an acronym that means “a member of Ingangurarugo [an army division of a 19th century Tutsi king] who has committed himself to bravery” (qtd. in Higiro 84). The group carried out nocturnal attacks, killing Hutu civilians, then quickly retreated to the countryside or neighboring nations. Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro states that “Due to this ability to terrorize the country and to disappear, the population associated the attackers with cockroaches instead of bravery” (85). “A Cockroach Cannot Bring Forth a Butterfly” declares that the *Inyenzi* of the 1960s is identical to the modern RPF, an identification based in familial substance. The editorial asks “can a distinction be made between the Inyenzi that attacked Rwanda in October 1990 and those of the 1960s? They are all related since some are the grand children of others. Their wickedness is identical” (3). The editorial also makes a directional identification between *Inyenzi* and civilians by declaring that civilians are also engaged in subterfuge by means of their money, education, and Tutsi “vamps” who marry Hutus (2). Thus, *inyenzi* was meant to invoke not only disgust, but also fear in Hutu audiences.

Higiro was the director of the government agency in charge of public media known as the Office Rwandais d’Information (ORINFOR) in the months leading up the
genocide. In support of the Arusha Accords, Higiro banned the use of *inyenzi* to refer to the RPF and “all language that incited violence” in state-run media (85). He believed that “Given the volatile political climate of the time, labeling a person or a group of people cockroaches was similar to sentencing somebody to death” (85). Higiro’s party ignored this ban, and private media such as RTLM and *Kangura*, despite their ties to the government, had no respect for Higiro’s efforts or the Arusha Accords. While legal, historical, and media studies approaches to Rwandan hate media shed light on the role it played in the genocide, literary representations of these media are also illuminating because they reflect on individuals’ response to them and how individual agency is affected by local communities.

**Representations of Hate Media in *Deogratias* and *Smile through the Tears***

Both *Deogratias* and *Smile through the Tears* portray hate media, especially RTLM, as dangerous yet also imply that individuals have sufficient agency to resist its efforts at persuasion. Where the texts differ is the relevance of this agency to individuals’ subsequent actions in the genocide. The liberal humanist subjects of *Smile* that are persuaded by the hate speech that occurred before the genocide also answer RTLM’s calls to attack specific individuals during the genocide. Deogratias’s brother Julius, a member of the Interahamwe, acts similarly. However, Deogratias commits the same crimes as Julius, the rape and murder of Apollinaria, Benina, and their mother Venetia, even though he rejects the messages of hate media. His actions indicate that belief and behavior are not directly linked.
That Deogratias’ ability to reject hate media’s persuasive attempts is irrelevant to his ability to resist other influences from his communities because he commits atrocities does not mean that Stassen’s text presents RTLM as powerless. Rather, the text shows that individuals have different reactions to hate media, depending on their own beliefs about race. Deogratias rejects racial discrimination because of two friends he has grown up with, Apollinaria and Benina. These two sisters are Tutsis, and Deogratias tells them and other characters that he thinks racial differences are insignificant at multiple points in the narrative. In contrast, Julius is a racist who parrots language from RTLM and becomes a member of the Interahamwe.

Deogratias places some culpability on RTLM in a panel that depicts a DJ’s words oppressing Apollinaria and Benina. In this panel the radio is foregrounded and is therefore larger than the sisters. The speech bubble filled with the DJ’s racist rhetoric takes up the top half of the panel, literally overwhelming the women. The DJ says, “Maybe the Tutsi COCKROACHES should dance a bit more to that good music from Kinshasa,” then laughs while stating that “their weird cockroach faces” make him and his listeners want to throw them in a river or “reach for a good bug spray!” (34). The sisters’ reactions to the radio indicate that these threats should be taken seriously. Apollinaria pretends to laugh along with the Hutu listeners in an effort to blend in. Benina chides her, which attracts the attention of the listeners. Their responses of smirking at the horrific humor of the DJ or glaring at the sisters because of their ethnicity indicate that the DJ’s words can enhance racial tension.
RTLM’s role in directing violence during the genocide is also dramatized when Deogratias and Benina hear RTLM announce the assassination of President Habyarimana and blame “that foul race of cockroaches” (57-8). The DJ tells his listeners to “go to work” with their “tools,” euphemisms for murdering with machetes, and to “eradicate” Tutsis (57-8). While Deogratias is not persuaded by such claims and instead hides Benina in his room, his brother Julius picks up the rhetoric of the radio, referring to the genocide as “work” and “the job” as well as speaking of “exterminat[ing]” “cockroaches” (56, 70). Like the RTLM listeners who smirked and glared at the sisters in the earlier panel, Julius uncritically accepts RTLM’s message that attempts to rhetorically transform Tutsis so that they are “substantially” the same as cockroaches, which in turn means murder can be transformed into the job of pest control. The text does not explain how Julius became a racist, but it is apparent that RTLM and other hate speech venues have played a role in his development. That Deogratias quickly succumbs to pressure from Julius and other extremists to participate in the genocide reveals how, when hate media is adopted by family and community, it becomes more influential.

Smile’s condemnation of RTLM places more importance on the individual’s ability to accept or reject hate media than Deogratias. Bazambanza’s text focuses on both hate media’s audience, like Deogratias, and its creators, like the ICTR trials, which emphasizes the agency exerted by those in each position. A narrative “voiceover” explains that “Habyarimana and his followers founded a radio station to spread hatred among the different ethnic groups. This was RTLM, ‘Radio-télérision libre des mille collines’” (29). The connection between the privately owned RTLM and Habyarimana’s
government is reinforced by the action in the panels. Hyacinthe Rwanga and her friend are walking by the RTLM office which is guarded by soldiers. These men stop the women and accuse them of attempting to bomb RTLM, then one soldier assaults Hyacinthe. That both soldiers and RTLM are promoting the same belief, that all Tutsis are enemies who are trying to kill Hutus, indicates that RTLM and the government are working together to promote this dangerous stereotype. The soldier guarding RTLM calls Hyacinthe and her friend “cockroaches,” and throughout *Smile* Hutus refer to Tutsis as cockroaches and other animals, such as snakes, to show “how the process of animalization precedes and justifies murder” (Chaney 96). This focus on the creators of RTLM emphasizes that the radio station is part of a systematic attempt to incite hatred against Tutsis, which makes its influence seem stronger.

However, the next page makes the point that hate media’s power to cause physical harm can only be exerted through the agency of individual listeners. A Hutu neighbor overhears Hyacinthe’s brother Wilson making fun of some print propaganda released by the CDR, the extremist Hutu party that the ICTR concluded conspired with RTLM and *Kangura* to incite genocide (Des Forges 44). The neighbor immediately informs RTLM, which then broadcasts this statement: “Right now at the Umuco bar, Wilson Rwanga and his Tutsi friends are saying that only idiots join the MRND and the CDR…” (ellipses in original, 30). A friend offers to drive Wilson home because “that’s the signal for the Interahamwe to come and kill those who were just named” (30). A voiceover reinforces this piece of dialogue by contextualizing it: “This tactic used by RTLM and the Interahamwe had already caused the death of many Tutsis” (30). The
dramatization of this tactic shows that, even though RTLM had government influence behind it, its ability to oppress Tutsi civilians and spark violence depended on the agency of individual listeners who must accept the station’s racist message, call in, and act on RTLM’s commands. Therefore, *Smile* depicts individual agency as more significant than *Deogratias*.

Though both *Smile* and *Deogratias* concur that hate media had some role in the genocide, neither one gives it primary responsibility. However, they do so for different reasons. *Deogratias* presents hate media as one force among many, including individual agency that, because they are too difficult to untangle, cannot be easily assigned blame. *Smile* blames the people who headed the organizations behind the genocide, including RTLM in a list with the MRND, CDR, and the Interahamwe; however, it distinguishes the audience from the creators and thus assigns more agency, and therefore more responsibility, to them for their reactions to hateful rhetoric.

**The Duty to Preserve Trauma in *Deogratias* through Empathetic Unsettlement**

*Deogratias* is set after the genocide, but contains many memories of life before and during it. Though readers who come to *Deogratias* with different sets of interpretative tools will draw different conclusions, a central question the text raises is “What is the duty of memory?” In 1998, the French Ministry of Culture funded a project called *Écrire par Devoir de Memoire, The Duty of Memory*, to generate literary texts about the genocide (Hron 165). Though *Deogratias* is not part of this project, it was produced contemporaneously. Nine *Écrire par Devoir de Memoire* texts were published by 2000, the year *Deogratias* came out (Hron 165). Most trauma studies writers with a
therapeutic background, such as Dori Laub and Herman, argue that telling one’s memories of trauma is the key to healing (Felman and Laub 59, Herman 68). According to this theory, witnessing works to heal trauma by transforming memories into a coherent narrative, rather than disorganized flashbacks, because the narrative allows one to understand the past and therefore focus on the future and become a functioning member of society. However, the title character of Deogratias refuses this “duty” to interpret memory in a way that benefits his community and, by extension, refuses justice and reconciliation.

His dog transformations are a visible manifestation of this refusal. The transformations reflect his unresolved trauma because they occur involuntarily, disrupting Deogratias’s attempts to move past his crimes, and alienate him from his community, which labels him as insane and determines both the homeless Deogratias and stray dogs to be nuisances. The transformations are also visible representations of the suffering caused by his regret for participating in the rape and murder of three women who trusted him. The illustrations indicate his regret through his tears and the painful-looking transmogrification. His transformations show he wishes to reject his status as human, and therefore presumably some of the responsibility for his crimes. They also indicate his refusal of the duty of memory, because, as a dog, he cannot construct a coherent narrative of events to “explain” the genocide and his part in it. Though the text encourages some identification with Deogratias, it also undercuts his refusal of the duty of memory through empathetic unsettlement by showing the toll that unresolved trauma takes on Deogratias and others. Rather than working towards healing
himself and the community, he murders three people who know the atrocities he committed in an unhinged effort to obliterate his past.

Though Deogratias suffers from trauma and harms others, the text itself also values trauma through the structural representation of traumatic memory as temporally dysfunctional. That is, instead of constructing a coherent, chronological narrative of the genocide, the text accepts that a disordered and unclear narrative can also provide important insight into the genocide and its impact. Many pages of *Deogratias* have panels from both the past and present. Out of seventy-eight pages, thirty-two have at least half of their panels set before the genocide. Another fifteen pages are devoted to the genocide. The earlier memories provide some historical and social context. One such scene is when Deogratias, Apollinaria, and Benina learn racist propaganda about Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa people in school. Hron criticizes such scenes for simplifying context for Western readers into something a child can follow (165). However, in *Deogratias*, the scene is not just educational, but also crucial to the literary representation of trauma in this graphic novel.

By making Deogratias a naïve critic of racism who says “the teacher is a fool” but does not seem to see the teacher’s words as part of an expansive, state-promoted racism, this scene heightens the betrayal of his later cruelty toward the sisters (18). The betrayal is foreshadowed in these panels because, while Deogratias looks like an innocent child, the sisters are not comforted by his declaration. Their downcast eyes, somber faces, and hunched posture show they have a more serious understanding of racial discrimination. They understand it as systemic because they experience racism
first hand in multiple venues. One such scene would be the panel described earlier in which the women hear a racist RTLM broadcast and receive a negative reaction from the Hutu listeners. Deogratias gives some contextual information about the genocide; however, the text focuses more heavily on trauma itself.

Caruth calls trauma “unclaimed experience.” She theorizes that the original event was “unclaimed” at the time it was experienced because it was too horrible to comprehend. Therefore, the trauma is not the event itself, but its unclaimed state or “the way that its very unassimilated nature . . . returns to haunt the survivor later on” (Unclaimed Experience 4). This haunting may take the form of flashbacks or other effects associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (57). For Caruth, the perpetrator of violence can experience trauma because she describes Tancred, in Tasso’s epic poem about the First Crusade, La Gerusalemme Liberta, as traumatized after he accidentally kills Clorinda, the woman he loves, during a battle (2). Though Caruth’s assertion about perpetrator trauma has been criticized, Rothberg astutely points out that it does not necessarily obscure the violence done by the perpetrator as long as we recognize that trauma does not confer moral value on those who experience it (90).  

LaCapra similarly argues that perpetrators can experience trauma, but that their trauma is “ethically and politically different” and should not be used to conflate perpetrators and victims (History and Memory 41). Like Tancred, Deogratias did not want to victimize these particular women, though he does so knowingly rather than mistaking them for his enemies.

---

29 For a criticism of Caruth’s argument, see Leys, Ruth.
The victimization of Apollinaria, Benina, and Venetia draws attention to the blurring of one’s conscious intention and other influences. Primo Levi claims that “each individual is so complex that there is no point in trying to foresee his behavior, all the more so in extreme situations; nor is it possible to foresee one’s own behavior” and therefore concludes that we should refrain from judging the “special squad,” death camp prisoners who escorted other prisoners to the gas chambers and operated the crematoria (60). Levi explains how these collaborators differ from the Nazi perpetrators, who can be judged, because the prisoners had suffered months or years of extreme oppression in ghettos before their grueling and disorienting deportation to the camps (59). Moreover, they faced a “rigid either/or, immediate obedience or death,” whereas the perpetrators would have suffered relatively moderate punishment (60). Levi thus places the special squad and other Jewish collaborators in “the gray zone.”

Deogratias differs from the special squad or other Jewish collaborators in the Holocaust because he did not experience great oppression before the genocide, but he may have similarly had to choose between obedience and death. His Hutu privilege continued to protect him during the genocide, but to what extent is unclear. Deogratias is not faced with an immediate choice between life and death until after he commits genocide and wants to return to the women’s corpses and Julius threatens to kill him (72). However, he does state that he was “forced” to rape and murder the women, and the threat of physical violence from Julius does seem present from the very beginning of the genocide (59). Whether or not Deogratias would be considered judge-able by Levi’s criteria is unclear as the graphic novel does not give much information surrounding his
actions. However, historical accounts show that moderate Hutus were frequently murdered for not participating in the genocide (Kuperman 111), which I would argue means some of the moderates who did participate may belong in the gray zone of collaborators forced to choose between obedience and death.

Deogratias’ own participation remains incomprehensible to him in part because it did not coincide with his feelings about these women in particular or his attitude to the racist rhetoric that attempts to transform Tutsis in general to his enemies. LaCapra explains that trauma can “raise problems of identity” for perpetrators, collaborators, and bystanders “insofar as it unsettles narcissistic investments and desired self-images” (History and Memory 9). Though Deogratias does not take responsibility for committing such atrocities, he also cannot escape them. The sheer amount of page space devoted to memories indicates how much the past intrudes on Deogratias’s present. Likewise, the blurry, unframed edges of the past panels show that they are not temporally bounded and can bleed into the present at any time. The panels in which Deogratias turns into a dog are framed, due to their present temporal location, but they reflect the “unclaimedness” of trauma in another way, through Deogratias’s vague, shattered language. He evokes images of the genocide with phrases like “they devour the bellies, and the bellies spill open” but does not recollect his culpability or create a narrative version of the events, leaving the experience unresolved (26).

Graphic narratives are a way to address unclaimed experience by depicting the struggle with representing trauma, rather than trying to “claim” and dramatize the traumatic events themselves. Caruth states that trauma “defies” witnessing because it can
never be fully described and also “demands” witnessing because the experience
persistently recurs to the sufferers in flashbacks. To account for trauma’s call for
witnessing and its elusiveness, Caruth suggests we address trauma in “literary” language
(5). Diamond similarly suggests that we should approach “the difficulty of reality”
through literature. This enables readers to recognize the complexity of reality, even
though the text cannot represent it. One function of posthumanist rhetoric is to evoke the
difficulty of reality through its deconstruction of the subject and its insistence on the
ambiguity of morality. According to Diamond, “the difficulty lies in the apparent
resistance by reality to one’s ordinary modes of thinking: to appreciate the difficulty is to
feel oneself being shouldered out of . . . how one is apparently supposed to think, [and]
to have a sense of the inability of thought to encompass what it is attempting to reach”
(58). This graphic novel brings attention to the difficulty of reality by showing
Deogratias’s struggle with it while not promoting or condemning any one approach to
this difficulty.

By creating empathetic unsettlement through identification and disidentification
with Deogratias, a perpetrator, the graphic novel brings attention to the complexity of the
genocide and its causes. “Empathetic unsettlement” is a strategy that LaCapra suggests
historians and others who read and write about traumatic events should use. Empathetic
unsettlement results from the “virtual” not “vicarious” experience of trauma in which
one imagines oneself in the victim’s position “while respecting the difference between
self and other and recognizing that one cannot take the victim’s place or speak in the
victim’s voice” (History in Transit 125). While LaCapra develops empathetic
unsettlement as a technique for recounting victims’ experiences, it also has potential for
describing the experiences of collaborators who operated under coercion. Encouraging
empathy with a perpetrator risks obscuring his or her agency and culpability; however,
empathetic unsettlement is a way to relate how a person became a perpetrator without
making him or her so sympathetic that this story diminishes the victims’ stories.

_Deogratias_ creates empathy with the title character through narration. Because
the story is told and illustrated from the perpetrator’s point of view, we develop more
empathy for him than we otherwise would. The choice to have Deogratias transform into
a stray dog, the subject of many public service campaigns in the West, likewise
generates some sympathy for him, even though he makes for a beady-eyed, scruffy adult
dog, rather than a cute, wide-eyed puppy typical of adoption materials. That the text
illustrates Deogratias as a dog further encourages readers to accept his point of view. In
these panels, other characters do not appear to see his transformations and behave as if
he is delusional. The illustrations validate his transformations and guide readers to
accept Deogratias’ blurring of his internal and external state. Therefore, the panels that
feature transformations create identification between the readers and Deogratias. His
submissive body language while in dog form also generates sympathy, particularly when
he sheds anthropomorphic tears (Stassen 67).

However, the dog transformations also unsettle the connection between reader
and character. The “otherness” of the canine species is highlighted by how grotesque the
process of transformation looks when it is illustrated. Also, near the end of the text, stray
dogs are shown eating corpses during the genocide. As Keen sates, Deogratias as “a
A scavenging dog that eats the flesh of the dead could be a mirror for the true self of a guilty survivor [which] evokes disgust as much as sympathy for the cringing creature” (140). Deogratias is associated with the scavengers because he transforms while crouching beside a pile of bodies that includes Apollinaria’s and Benina’s. Keen refers to this action as his self-condemnation (152).

The transformation emphasizes the “bestial” nature of his crimes by aligning him with the dogs, while also acknowledging his actions were even worse than theirs. Like the dogs, Deogratias did not hate Tutsis, and he figuratively feeds on their corpses because he participated in their deaths to sustain his own life. However, as the novel’s audience likely holds only humans, not dogs, to a moral standard, they should find his crimes more reprehensible. While I maintain that Deogratias would best be described as “humanist posthumanism” because it uses animals to reflect on aspects of human trauma rather than considering the ontological status of nonhumans, the dog transformations can be interpreted as undermining the divide between humans and nonhumans, a qualification for “posthumanist posthumanism.”

The comparison between Deogratias and the scavenging dogs implies that neither one is a fully conscious agent. However, though the graphic novel seems to imply human consciousness is not completely unique, it does not carry out Heise’s call to portray it as just “one mode of being among others” without making any claims of human uniqueness (505-6). Deogratias does not present readers with other modes of consciousness as literal animals do not appear often, and it seems to imply that morality
is unique to human consciousness. That is, the dog version of Deogratias expresses regret through tears, but the actual dogs in the illustrations do not.

Because Deogratias’s attempts to excuse or erase his culpability (through delusions and murder) are shown in a negative light, the text does not diminish Hutu and French culpability, as Hron suggests. The reader is never encouraged to identify with characters who do not experience regret, such as French sergeant and Julius. Also, though the flashbacks create empathy for Deogratias, they simultaneously heighten our empathy for Apollinaria, Benina, and Venetia. This means that our empathy for Deogratias is deeply unsettled at the end of the text when Deogratias reveals how he victimized them. Because we have seen the friends grow up together, we have an understanding of the sisters’ terror as well as their feeling of betrayal as Deogratias participates in their torture, but we also may retain some understanding for Deogratias who may have been killed by extremists if he did not join them. His decision to return to the women’s corpses, where he expects to be killed by the RPF, indicates his regret for taking their lives to preserve his own, as do his involuntary dog transformations that prevent him from joining his community’s project of moving on with life.

These transformations critique the use of animalizing language to enable the abuse of humans and show that its use continues even in the aftermath of the genocide. The villagers mockingly call Deogratias a dog because they are not sympathetic about his delusions. They treat him like a stray dog, dehumanizing him because he is a homeless beggar rather than a productive member of the village. The graphic novel makes parallels between the Hutu’s dehumanization of the Tutsis as cockroaches, a term
that appeared in both government and popular discourse, and the townspeople’s behavior when they treat Deogratias like a dog. On the first page of the graphic novel, the owner of a hotel bar brandishes a club at Deogratias and tells him to “beat it” (1). On the next page, the French sergeant who helped murderers flee has returned as tourist. He calls two Tutsi women “bitches” and implies that the worst thing about the genocide is that there are now fewer Tutsi women to have sex with. Moments later, the man is recollecting Venetia and is about to squash a cockroach with a bottle when Deogratias yells “No!” and knocks his hand out the way (5). This row of panels becomes more significant at the end of the book, in which we learn that Deogratias witnessed men rape Venetia with a bottle and behead her in a panel that is reminiscent of the one with the cockroach. The earlier panel is a skewed close up of the cockroach and a bottle surrounded by puddles of condensation. The later panel is a similarly framed close up of Venetia’s corpse and a bottle surrounded by puddles of blood.

There are also panels from before, during, and after the genocide in which Hutus call Tutsis cockroaches, showing that the racism that led to the genocide continues. The graphic novel does not imply that dehumanizing Deogratias, an individual, is identical to inciting hatred against an entire group and committing genocide, but, rather, indicates that dehumanization is a deeply rooted practice that cannot be overcome by a few years of human rights activism. The townspeople behave as if they have moved on after the genocide and mock Deogratias for his debilitating delusions. In this village, remembering trauma dehumanizes one; the human is that which forgets distressing experiences. Yet, this means that the villagers unthinkingly reiterate dehumanizing
discourse in their treatment of Deogratias. The text itself does not specify an optimal approach to memory. Though the town is critiqued for dehumanizing Deogratias and mocking him for preserving the trauma of the genocide, we also see how destructive Deogratias is. Because the graphic novel does not provide us with an ethical approach to memories of genocide, it highlights the difficulty of the genocide’s reality for the reader, who now must turn to a range of texts and experiences if she wishes to draw conclusions about memory, culpability, and reconciliation. Therefore, Smile Through the Tears can be productively read alongside Deogratias.

**The Duty to Resolve Trauma by Locating Culpability in *Smile Through the Tears***

Bazambanza’s work of creative nonfiction also reflects on what one’s duty to the memory of genocide may be and implies that the duty is to make memory useful. The text deflects the difficulty of reality of the genocide to claim that we can clearly determine its causes and that by remembering them we can spot other potential genocides and intervene. This text is more straightforward in content and structure than Stassen’s because its aim is different. When Cicero outlined the three functions of rhetoric as to teach, please, and move, he stated that whichever was the predominant aim would determine whether the orator would use plain, middle, or ornate style. The transmogrifications, disordered chronology, and use of framed and unframed panels are visual manifestations of ornate style in Deogratias. Cicero warns that the orator of this style must “temper his abundance with the other two styles” or risk being seen as a “raving madman” by his audience (99). While Stassen does include a few tempered teaching scenes, Deogratias the text like Deogratías the character comes across as
“mad.” This effect is constructed, not the result of a lack of precision as it would be with Cicero’s unsuccessful orator, but as a method of representing trauma.\(^\text{30}\)

In contrast, one of the main functions of *Smile* is to educate English and French speakers, both those in the West and Rwanda, about the historical context of the genocide. The text places culpability on specific individuals and political groups by creating an easy-to-follow narrative of events leading up to the genocide. However, by its very medium, the graphic novel goes beyond the merely educative function. Whereas the illustrations in a technical manual would be a visual example of plain style intended to teach, those in comics and graphic novels are meant to please and/or move, though they are also capable of teaching. Michael Chaney criticizes *Smile* for “blurring the boundaries between history and propaganda, memory and imagination”; however, such blurring is inherent to works of creative nonfiction (93-4).

Though the dramatization gives historical figures dialog they might not have said and therefore reveals Bazambanza’s interpretation of Hutu leaders’ motivations rather than uncritically presenting accurate quotations, the stated aim of the text is not to demonize particular Hutus but to “tell the whole world right to its face how racism was an abomination” and prevent genocide from occurring again (Bazambanza, preface). The dramatization is crucial to this mission because it rehumanizes the victims, countering the dehumanizing discourses involved in the genocide by depicting Tutsis as individuals rather than a homogenous group. The illustrated narrative about the Rwanga

---

\(^{30}\) While original aim of *Deogratias* was not to educate about the context of the genocide, this shifted after the French text garnered acclaim. The English edition comes with an introduction by the translator, Alexis Siegel, about the facts of the genocide, and the text has been recommended for classroom use by Feigelman in *School Library Journal* and Taylor in *Teacher Librarian*. 

180
family means the text engages readers by creating identification with the major characters and emotional investment in their fates. The narrative propels the reader forward because the graphic novel is told from the point of view of the Rwangas as they are experiencing events.

_Smile_ uses the graphic medium to guide readers to value Tutsis as a population by encouraging the reader to feel sympathy and admiration for individuals. Chaney refers to the text as primarily a “hagiography” (94). Christianity is very present in _Smile_. God is clearly present at multiple moments, such as when he tells a white missionary to protect the Tutsis instead of fleeing the country (Bazambanza 43). The Rwangas, particularly the women, express religious devotion. Chaney analyzes one moment in which Hyacinthe calls out to God for aid when she is being assaulted by the soldier outside of RTLM (94). Her face is lifted up to heaven and lit by heavenly rays of light (Bazambanza 29).  

Hyacinthe is further sanctified as she repeatedly turns down opportunities to use her sexuality for material gain. Before the genocide, but when oppression is heightening, a French soldier propositions Hyacinthe and suggests that he might be willing to take her to France. She angrily rejects him and later the priest who offers to hide her during the genocide. Hyacinthe becomes a martyr when she tells the priest “I would rather die than shame myself before you!” and he sends her out to the street where she is killed (59). While Hyacinthe is portrayed as saintly, the reason she expresses for valuing her virginity is that she does not wish to “dishonour” her parents (13, 59). Though

---

31 The graphic novel does not consider questions such as whether or not God was to intervene during the genocide, and the author expresses no blame or anger at God for the genocide.
presumably religion plays a part in her and her parents’ investment in her virginity, none of them specifically cite it, which makes her portrayal more three-dimensional than a “hagiography.” That Hyacinthe sacrifices her life for familial as much as religious devotion helps rehumanize her as an individual, rather than a saint, whose material connections to family are important to her and reminds readers she is genuinely missed by people.

_Smile_ is a tribute to the Rwanga family, but invests them with human rather than saintly dignity. Their human imperfections also encourage empathetic unsettlement in Western readers because they are dramatized in scenes that are specific to the Rwanga family. For example, although the parents try to teach their children not to stereotype, their son Wilson makes a generalization about Hutus (31-2). His mother Rose chides him for it, which reinforces her role in the text as an advocate for nondiscrimination, but the scene shows how difficult this project is because even a Rwanga falls short of it. The family also experiences tension when their other son, Degroot, joins the MDR. This political party plans to oppose President Habyarimana, but the father Charles has an outburst of anger because MDR led the 1959 revolution in which many Tutsi civilians were murdered. While Western readers may be able to relate to family disagreements about politics, the text is clear that the stakes are very different for the Rwangas.

This interaction serves to humanize the Rwanga family by showing they are subject to disagreement and expressions of anger. Despite this moment of tension between Charles and Degroot, the Rwanga men are all presented positively, and it is obvious that the family cares deeply about each other. Charles sacrifices himself in an
attempt to save his children, and Rose repeatedly tries to trade her life for her children’s. Rose is the person for whom Bazambanza encourages the most admiration because she also functions as the “teaching” voice of the text. Rose is the only Rwanga survivor, and Bazambanza reconnected with her after the genocide. In his preface, Bazambanza invests her with credibility when he writes:

A living emblem of an entire generation of ethnic betrayal, this extraordinary woman has refused to respond to hatred with hatred. She hasn’t lost her smile, a smile so captivating that people stop in the street to look at it. But today her smile appears turned toward the hereafter, turned perhaps to her loved ones who watch her from on high. Is there any other way she could have salvaged some hope for herself? It was to honour this woman’s calm courage, and to affirm our resolve to overcome our despair and live normal lives, that I chose to include the word ‘smile’ in the title of this spine-chilling tale.

In this passage, he positions Rose as a spokesperson for Rwandans because of both her experience and her reaction to it. She is emblematic because she was orphaned by the 1959 genocide and lost her husband and children in the 1994 one. Bazambanza does not restrict her iconic status to Tutsi experience, but to “ethnic betrayal” in Rwanda as a whole. Therefore, the preface implies Rose has the ability to provide a comprehensive representation of the genocide.

Unlike Deogratias, which bears the subtitle A Tale of Rwanda, Smile presents Rose’s life as the tale of Rwanda, making a metaphorical identification between her and all Rwandans whereas Deogratias opts for a metonymic identification. Ratcliffe explains
that “metaphor foregrounds resemblances based on commonalities, thus backgrounding differences; metonym foregrounds resemblances based on juxtaposed associations, thus foregrounding both commonalities and differences” (emphasis in original, 68). This metaphorical identification in *Smile* undercuts some of the empathetic unsettlement created in the narrative itself, in which Rwanga family experiences are depicted with specificity.

Rose’s status as a Christian is also used to give her words authority beyond her own personal experience and legitimize her metaphorical identification with all Rwandans. According to Bazambanza, Rose’s smile is derived from her interaction with the souls of her loved ones. Thus, it becomes a symbol of her divine wisdom. Bazambanza’s rhetorical question reinforces Rose’s credibility by implying that her path, a Christian trust in the promise of life after death, is the only way to psychologically survive the genocide. In the final sentence of this passage, Bazambanza identifies himself with Rose and all Rwandans through the ambiguous use of “our.” Therefore, while Hron is right to point out that survivors’ narratives can enhance readers’ understanding of the genocide, these narratives are, as she also acknowledges, “partial and politicized” (173). That Bazambanza’s work does not acknowledge its own partiality is perhaps due to his political and spiritual perspectives. Because Bazambanza states in his preface that he believes God spared him to be a witness to the genocide and also paints Rose as such a divinely appointed witness, their testimony is presented as complete rather than partial.
The graphic novel therefore develops an ethos for Rose’s character as the spokesperson for morality and has her state moral lessons plainly. Unlike Deogratias, Smile argues that clear moral lessons can be derived from the genocide. Rose says “to me the lesson [of the genocide] is this: none of us has the right to take the law into our own hands. We must let justice take its course. After all, impunity is what made the genocide possible in the first place” (62). The panel that contains this dialog is a close up of Rose’s determined face, turned to the right with her eyes looking slightly up. Because we read from left to right, the direction of her face implies she is oriented towards the future. The sensation of forward movement is especially strong in this graphic novel due to the page layout. Though there are some panels set in the past, they are not trauma-induced flashbacks, but narrative histories told to educate people about events leading up to the 1994 genocide. Every page, whether set before, during, or after 1994, consists of rows of panels arranged in chronological order from left to right.

Rose’s lessons are focused on the future. For example, when she is feeling despondent about rebuilding her family’s home only to live there alone she tells herself “It’s one way to honour the memory of my loved ones” (63). Thus, she sees constructive, future-oriented actions as more appropriate than melancholia. Even before the genocide, Rose was focused on improving her community. She intervened when a Hutu man mistreated his wife and instructed her children to refrain from stereotyping others. After the genocide, she continues to correct her neighbors’ behavior and smooth over ethnic tensions. This is a positive sign of what Herman calls “commonality,” or the resolution of trauma through re-establishing one’s connection to others, “belonging to a
society, [and] having a public role” (236). Because Rose is the moral center of *Smile* and the model for recovery, she has the last words of the text, telling young Rwandans that their mission is to “restore harmony so that [their] children will never know the meaning of the words ‘racial discrimination’” (64). In this final panel, she motions towards a sunny path that leads past two mass graves and into the horizon. There is no visible destination. Like Rose’s advice, the image is inspirational but vague. Readers are left to determine their own ways to achieve this goal, which means that, like the readers of *Deogratias*, they are shown that they need to draw on a variety of texts to make decisions about what actions are appropriate.

*Smile* itself demonstrates one productive way to follow this path: learn from history and share those lessons with others. *Smile* is structured to convey a great deal of information about Rwandan history. In contrast to *Deogratias*, this work is very text-heavy. Many panels are more word than image because Rose, her husband, and the narrator describe the context of the genocide and name the political and military leaders who instigated it. The book also contains explanatory footnotes when characters allude to a past event or political organization. *Smile* implies that all memory should be made useful. As Rose tells her son’s former fiancée and a young orphan she found calling for his parents at a mass grave, “None of your loved ones who are now dead would wish us to live our lives in mourning. What they want is for us to rise as one and combat the barbarism of a country that devours its own” (64). Because the preface implied that Rose interacts with the spirits of her own loved ones and describes her as “emblematic” of the generation who experienced the genocide, she has the credibility to speak for the dead.
According to Rose and *Smile*, memory is important when it identifies culpability so that one knows what to fight against.

One place *Smile* locates blame is the West. The opening page of the graphic novel states the legitimate and oft-made criticism that the international community could have stopped the genocide, but also goes a step further to claim that “the real question is why the international community did nothing against the country’s systematic racial discrimination” before the genocide even began (1). *Smile* chides Westerners for being more interested in protecting gorillas than Rwandan humans. This criticism aligns the West with Hutu extremists because President Habyarimana is quoted as saying that he will not allow refugees from the 1959 Hutu Revolution to return to the country for fear that they will impinge on gorilla habitats (2). This panel contains his official discourse in a speech balloon, and is followed by a panel of one of his Hutu listeners with a thought balloon containing his interpretation of the speech. This man is happy that Tutsi refugees are not allowed to return because Hutus commandeered their lands and do not want to relinquish them. The strategy of using gorillas’ endangerment to exclude humans from their land is repeatedly referenced in *Smile*. These panels imply that, though the West heard the official discourse, they ignored the subtext either willingly or due to cultural ignorance of Rwandan race relations.

Both *Smile* and *Deogratias* remind readers of their status as Westerners and bystanders, but Stassen’s text is less critical of them. *Deogratias* seems to accept that their ability for agency is minimal because it presents Westerners’ inaction during and after the genocide as due less to a conscious choice on their part and more to a variety of
influences and ignorance that was not entirely willful. Ignorance among Westerners who lived in Rwanda is critiqued through the character of a Belgian missionary who asks Deogratias what ethnic group he belongs to as a way of establishing a deeper relationship with him. The man does not realize that this question is objectionable to Deogratias because he refuses to believe that ethnicity is a central part of one’s identity and opposes the country’s pervasive racism. However, the character can also be used to excuse the ignorance among those in the West whose only exposure to Rwanda was mediated by news sources.

Because Stassen’s book shows how a moderate Hutu like Deogratias chose to commit rape and murder of his loved ones through the influence of his community and threats to his life, it is more willing to acknowledge a lack of agency in everyone, including Western bystanders. The problem with such a view of the world is, of course, that it makes it more difficult to locate blame. In contrast, Smile’s approach enables the text to place responsibility on those who were culpable for and/or complicit in the genocide. Therefore, the text gives hope that justice can be carried out on at least some parties and that similar actions can be prevented in the future.

Along with locating Western culpability, Smile establishes the human dignity of Tutsis by contrasting the West’s attitude toward humans and nonhumans in Rwanda. The text positions gorillas and humans against each other in the fight for Western aid, yet also hints at the posthumanist argument that the lives of the people and animals of a place are intertwined. When the genocidal regime realized it would be ousted, it had many of the gorillas killed so that the new government could not profit from Western
interest in them. Bazambanza’s relation of this fact is scathing: “In the end, racial
discrimination benefited no one. Had it only known, the world might have at least saved
the gorillas!” (61). However, the illustration has a different tone. It is a close-up of a
gorilla corpse facing the viewer in a puddle of blood. This image is reminiscent of
previous ones of human bodies. Sometimes the human remains are jumbled into piles or
are casually placed in the background of a panel to indicate the scale of the genocide and
the apathy of the murderers. However, some panels focus on the face of a corpse,
reminding a reader that each of the 800,000 murdered were individual lives. By
containing only one gorilla, the panel implies that gorillas too are individuals and that
each one’s death matters for more than economic reasons.

Though the graphic novel shames the West for focusing more on gorillas than
humans, it also creates a connection between Tutsis and nature in order to heighten the
importance of their suffering by illustrating the animals and landscapes in line with
Tutsis’ emotions. As Chaney states, “affect itself is transported from the scene of the
human to that of the clouds, the trees, or the jungle. . . The front cover, after all, depicts
Rose Rwanga beside a gorilla; between them a tree bleeds where a machete has cut it.
The jungle is thus history’s feeling mediator” (99). Chaney identifies “animal witnesses”
in the white doves that appear after the Rwanga men die and the gorilla that an RPF
soldier suggests is “begging us to right the wrongs [gorillas] have suffered at the hands
of the MRND” (Bazambanza 19). These animals work as expressions of the pathetic
fallacy, reflecting Tutsi emotions.
According to Chaney, this use of animals “imbues Bazambanza’s characters, as well as his readers, with an ethics that everywhere seems to transcend the human, stretched cosmologically between the sanctity of the angel and the quietude of the animal” (99-100). This transcendent ethics is not the posthumanist ethics described by Bauman or Zylinska. Rather, *Smile* identifies Christian, human-focused ethics in all levels of the world. The doves are a cipher for the Rwanga’s Christian souls and, while the gorillas are depicted as living beings who suffer, they also serve to show the RPF as virtuous because, in contrast to the corrupt MRND, they are presented as the gorillas’ defenders.

One animal witness Chaney does not mention is the frog that sees the Interahamwe chase the Rwanga men and other captives. One prisoner, Joseph Bitega, falls into the gutter where the frog is. Unlike other animals, the frog has a speech bubble. Instead of a symbol of Tutsi righteousness, like the doves and the gorillas, the frog seems to be an individual. Its speech bubble contains only a question mark, which is a reflection of both its species difference from humans and a similarity between humans and nonhumans that is more than a pathetic fallacy. According to Chaney, the animal witness “invoke[es] the same questions of address and audience that relentlessly vex traumatic narratives,” namely that the genocide is “so vicious that it strains human comprehension and the vicissitudes of narrating or indeed receiving the story of that killing” (Chaney 95). The frog’s wordless reaction works as an indication that human actions are often incomprehensible to other animals and that the genocide is incomprehensible to humans as well because it is impossible to translate it into verbal
form. While the doves and gorillas further the narrative telling of trauma, the frog is a witness to the “difficulty of reality” encountered by those who attempt to turn trauma into a narrative.

**Developing Ethos to Convey the Duty of Memory**

The stated goal of *Smile* is not to make individuals aware of the entangled relationship between Rwandans, wildlife, and the land, but to prevent genocide through education. In the preface, Bazambanza explains that he created the book because he wondered why he survived when so many others died and concluded, “I was spared so that I could be a witness. My mission was to be a town crier; I was to tell the whole world right to its face how racism was an abomination. I was to say this loud and clear, in the hopes of preventing another genocide or similarly terrible crime.” He fulfills this exigence by educating people on the sociopolitical trends that led up to genocide and by encouraging them to identify with the victims of genocide by showing the suffering of a particular family. Bazambanza establishes an ethos as a survivor who has not only experienced the genocide, but also reached conclusions about it. He positions himself like he does Rose, as a survivor who has found direction and purpose in life by taking up a social cause.

Stassen does not speak directly to his audience, so his ethos is established differently than Bazambanza’s. The back cover of *Deogratias* is filled with praise from reviewers, something made possible by the Belgian text’s renown and the size of the English language publisher, First Second. In contrast, Bazambanza’s book was published by a small Canadian press, Soul Asylum, and has no reviewer quotations on the back.
However, it does feature an excerpt from Bazambanza’s preface which establishes the authority of the survivor ethos. Because he has experienced the genocide, the back cover implies, he does not need Western reviewers to give their approval of his representation of it. In contrast, Stassen is not a survivor. He grew up in Belgium, so his biographical blurb seeks to establish his authority to write about the genocide by stating that he “has travelled all over the world” and “eventually settled with his family in Rwanda.” This section positions Stassen as cosmopolitan, implying he has an informed and complex view of the world while also establishing him as a Rwandan because he has chosen to make his home there. Thus Stassen is credited with detachment that enables critical thought, but avoids charges of passivity that have beset cosmopolitanism since the nineteenth century (Linklater 33). The blurb also establishes the authority of Stassen’s account of the genocide through awards, stating that he won “the prestigious Goscinny Prize” for Deogratias and “many awards” for other works. Below Stassen’s bio, it is noted that Deogratias was also declared the ALA Best Book for Young Adults and YALSA Great Graphic Novel.

Though Deogratias has received more acclaim, Smile is an equally valuable text. Deogratias is more well-known not only because it is older and was taken up by a larger publishing house, but also perhaps because it takes a more “literary” approach to trauma. Hron rightly points out that literary accounts of the genocide are more popular than testimonial ones and that this needs to be corrected. Smile walks a middle ground between the two. Though Bazambanza positions himself as a survivor in his preface, he only makes a cameo in the narrative, so his ethos is replaced by Rose’s. Smile’s middle
style and clearly stated lessons are easily grasped by the reader, while *Deogratias* is purposely difficult to comprehend. *Deogratias*’s difficulty as a text indicates that refusing closure is a valuable, though dangerous, form of mourning because it insists that the reality of the genocide is complex, even incomprehensible, and cannot be contained in a single narrative.\(^{32}\)

While mourning is traditionally seen as a way to “work through” trauma, Cvetkovich explains that refusing to resolve mourning is important when the *cause* of trauma has not been resolved (164). By refusing to resolve trauma, *Deogratias* reminds readers that racial tensions have not disappeared in Rwanda and that the attitudes that make genocide possible, including not only the extremists’ hatred, but also others’ complicity, continue to exist in the world. *Smile* also reminds readers of continuing racial tensions and, unlike *Deogratias*, offers hope that they can be resolved through constructive uses of memory. While *Smile* attempts to create a comprehensive interpretation of the genocide that leads to a resolution of trauma, it can also be productively read in relationship to *Deogratias* as one of many responses to the duty of memory. In this way, the reader confronts the difficulty of reality of not only the genocide, but also the complex ways in which we address moral questions by engaging

---

32 The text also critiques the post-genocide approach to justice and reconciliation. *Deogratias* apprehended for murdering the “French tourist” after the genocide. This is the sergeant from the earlier panels, whose identity as a soldier who assisted genocidaires has been forgotten by the country’s officials. Ironically, *Deogratias* is not seized for his actions against Tutsis during the genocide. The text’s criticisms can be supplemented by other works on the aftermath of the genocide such as Jean Hatzfeld’s four collections of testimony by perpetrators and victims published from 2005-2010. Positive, negative, and ambivalent responses to the Gacaca courts, which were formed in 2001 to try accused Hutus and set relatively mild punishments for them, can also inform the reader of the ways in which the duty of memory, in tension with reconciliation, has been framed in Rwanda.
in rhetorical listening to these texts and their characters as metonymic depictions of Rwandan experiences.
CHAPTER V

RHETORICS OF TRAUMA IN MEMOIRS ABOUT LIFE AFTER WAR*

As discussed in the previous chapter, some texts may encourage what LaCapra calls “empathetic unsettlement” in their readers. Because LaCapra is a historian particularly interested in how we remember the Holocaust, he is largely concerned with interpretations of trauma written by those who, like himself, were not there. He concludes that accounts which strive to create identification without empathetic unsettlement may “conceal the ways survivors are not simply victims but may themselves become effective political and ethical agents” (History in Transit 142).

Similarly, though Burke describes identification as a tool for joint action between two or more individuals or groups, Ratcliffe points out that this desire for identification can force the less powerful to compromise differences they deem important. Empathetic unsettlement allows for limited identification and survivor agency in joint actions between survivors and others. The trauma narrative, which features marginalized voices, can show how it is possible to resist the totalizing tendencies of consubstantiality by seeking rhetorical identification when evoking a reader’s empathy while also limiting identification by stressing the specificity of the traumatic experience and the effects of the traumatic aftermath. The result can be a call for social action that recognizes the diversity of individual experiences.

* Portions of this chapter have been previously published in “‘I Was Ready For a Mending’: Rhetorics of Trauma and Recovery in Doug Peacock’s Grizzly Years and Walking it Off” in Rhetoric Review 30.4 (Fall 2011): 406-422. Copyright 2011 by Taylor & Francis Group.
This chapter analyzes texts by two authors with different political aims to show that writing, and the consubstantiality that is part of this process, is a means of recovery that accommodates a variety of viewpoints. This chapter alternates between analyzing Doug Peacock’s and Jay Kopelman’s writing, moving through a discussion of different forms of consubstantiality present in the texts. Peacock and Kopleman, veterans of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars respectively, seek to both explain the impact of war on their psyches by depicting trauma for their readers and remind these readers that they cannot fully comprehend the writer’s experiences. Their experiences in war have also shaped the writers’ relationships with nonhumans, the central topic of the texts. However, each writer understands consubstantiality across species in different ways, with Peacock focusing on the disidentification between humans and “wild” animals, namely grizzly bears, and Kopelman creating strong identifications between traumatized soldiers and a dog who also lived in a combat zone. The writers interpret their relationships with animals to create consubstantiality among their versions of their selves.

Doug Peacock’s memoirs *Grizzly Years* (1990) and *Walking it Off* (2005) achieve consubstantiality through the literary interpretation of trauma, which aids their rhetorical function as environmentalist appeals. Jay Kopelman’s *From Baghdad to America: Life Lessons from a Dog Named Lava* (2008) also uses trauma to build consubstantiality, but with the goal of helping service members seek mental health treatment. The texts from both writers are memoirs by soldiers returning home from war and their experiences with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). They consider the importance of animals as therapeutic to humans. Peacock finds tracking grizzly bears and advocating for their
conservation a source of healing. Kopelman describes how Lava, the dog he rescued from Iraq, displays symptoms of PTSD and helps him recognize these symptoms in himself and seek treatment. The type of change each writer seeks to create is different, which affects how their texts create identification. Peacock’s project is more posthumanist in that he encourages readers to see humans as both insignificant parts of nature, vulnerable to grizzly attacks, and powerfully destructive. To convince readers that grizzlies should be left alone, Peacock makes connections between individual trauma, the devastation of war, and the destruction of wild animals and their habitats. He criticizes government, war, and conservationist efforts that put human convenience over animal lives.

In contrast, Kopelman is focused on validating his and other service members’ difficulties after redeployment and encouraging these individuals to seek treatment for symptoms of PTSD. He uses his dog Lava, whom he adopted in Iraq against military protocol and brought to the U.S., as a point of identification for this audience because Lava also displays symptoms of trauma. Because Lava successfully adapts to domestic life through behavioral therapy and medication, he models how humans can treat PTSD. Kopelman criticizes military policies against pets and military culture that makes it difficult for soldiers to seek psychological counseling, but, unlike Peacock, continues to see enemy combatants as one-dimensional “bad guys” and trusts that the Iraq War has a positive effect that outweighs the devastation he witnessed. He also leaves the humanist distinctions between human and animal relatively unblurred. Though Lava is depicted as
having a complicated internal life, Kopelman’s focus on dogs is the value they have for
the people who care about them.

Both Kopelman and Peacock’s texts conform nicely to Michelle Balaev’s
definition of the trauma narrative as one that “demonstrates how a traumatic event
disrupts attachments between self and others by challenging fundamental assumptions
about moral laws and social relationships that are themselves connected to specific
environments” (150). This definition applies to Peacock’s creative nonfiction because
the source of trauma is his time as a medic in Vietnam, where he saw people
dehumanized and the land destroyed—effects of an ideology that he links to the
destruction of American wilderness. The memoirs use trauma to establish identification
with the audience and persuade them to value not only the grizzlies and their habitat, but
also other humans. *Grizzly Years* is Peacock’s account of tracking bears during the
1970s and 80s, interspersed with flashbacks to his experiences in Vietnam. In this text,
recovery is initiated by what should be a traumatic moment: he is almost charged by a
grizzly. He experiences an adrenaline rush, then collapses, realizing “I was ready for a
mending” (51). The vulnerability of the body is the source of both trauma and recovery
because it indicates that, no matter how destructive humans can be, there are limits to
their power. This is not to say that Peacock does not underestimate the power of humans
as a species to drive grizzlies to extinction. He characterizes the 1970s approach to
wildlife management as “The grizzly could accommodate our notion of what a stroll in
the woods ought to be or go the way of the passenger pigeon” (270). He finds the
experience of vulnerability in the face of the bear a valuable insight into humans’ ability
to change for the sake of another species, rather than attempting to change or eliminate it.

When Balaev uses the word “environment,” she means both the social and geographical aspects of place, and Kopelman’s concerns are largely social as he has difficulties interacting with people in an environment where the threat of violent death is largely absent. After redeployment, Kopelman finds that he is quicker to anger with others because his service convinced him that any concerns unrelated to life and death in the war are petty. This is a significant shift in “fundamental assumptions” that leads to the dissolution of some relationships. Though Kopelman states that he does not have PTSD, *From Baghdad to America* shares the characteristics of a trauma narrative as described by Balaev. Kopelman believes that Lava has PTSD and finds that he can identify with many of Lava’s symptoms. He comes to realize that many of the strategies used to help Lava recover can also help him remake connections. At the end of the book, Lava is continuing to take medication and Kopelman has decided to return to therapy, not because their attempts at healing have been unsuccessful, but because recovery is an on-going process.

Peacock’s term “mending” is likewise significant because, as Herman writes, “[r]esolution of the trauma is never final; recovery is never complete” (211). “Mending” implies an active renegotiation of relationships that is not expressive of a desire to return to the past, but of a will to survive. Ruth Leys explains that PTSD is understood as “fundamentally a disorder of memory” in which the survivor’s past intrudes upon the present in the form of incoherent memories, flashbacks, nightmares, etc. (2). According
to this model, these disruptions affect the survivor’s ability to live in and interact with the present. Peacock and Kopelman’s books indicate that “mending” is possible by interpreting trauma through the act of writing. The books focus not on the original traumatic events, but the experience of PTSD and the difficulty of redefining one’s relationships. Because they are written for a public audience and have the rhetorical goal of inspiring group action (for wilderness conservation or a shift in military culture to destigmatize mental health services), the texts suggest a model for healing that is underpinned by consubstantiality. This model creates new attachments after old ones have been disrupted by trauma. Peacock’s texts illustrate how he builds consubstantiality with the grizzlies, with himself as he reconstructs identity after the disruption of trauma, and with his audience. Similarly, Kopelman creates consubstantiality with Lava, himself, and his audience—particularly those who have recent military service.

**Consustantiality in Depictions of Trauma**

PTSD is an exigence for both *Grizzly Years* and *From Baghdad to America*. In the first, PTSD results in the need to persuade the readers to adopt Peacock’s understanding of humans as part of nature, rather than above it, and to work for grizzly conservation. Kopelman seeks to persuade readers that everyone, human or animal, is shaped by their experiences and that if some of these experiences have resulted in symptoms of PTSD, they should seek treatment. Both texts depict symptoms of trauma to enhance their persuasiveness by building consubstantiality with the reader. In both texts, trauma means that one cannot control when and how the past intrudes on the
present. Flashbacks are depicted, then not explained, in *Grizzly Years*. Similarly, Kopelman records racing thoughts in his text and does not interpret them.

In *Grizzly Years*, Peacock describes traumatic events with little to no reflection, instead using narrative structure to build identification with readers and direct their interpretation of the text. The structure is shaped by his bouts of malaria, one of which was arrested by his first grizzly encounter when a bear almost charged him. These flare-ups are associated with PTSD both literally and metaphorically. Peacock contracted the illness in Vietnam, and its recurrent episodes not only evoke the repetitive quality of trauma, but also induce flashbacks. The structure of *Grizzly Years* creates identification by mimicking this effect of trauma for the reader, with disturbing scenes from Vietnam inserted into the narrative seemingly at random. “Triggers” are sometimes present, like a change in weather or the physical symptoms of an on-coming episode of malaria, but the reader is no more prepared for these flashbacks than Peacock’s character is. Also, there is no “talking through” after the flashbacks. Peacock does not reflect on them, much less impose a definitive interpretation of the events’ significance on the reader.

Despite the lack of verbal explanation, the reader is guided to interpret the memories by the structure of the narrative. The Vietnam interludes are examples of how, though Peacock often refrains from reflective analysis in this text, he is conscious of his readers and attempts to create a mutual interpretation with them through the non-narrative structure of the book. One example is the section in which Peacock describes investigating a tunnel in Vietnam. Inside, he discovers several dead bodies and also hears the breathing of a Vietcong fighter. Peacock explains that “Whoever was there
could have killed me or tried to at any time. But he did not. . . All I could hear was the regular sound of breathing. He did not move. He just sat there with the dead, and so did I” (40). Peacock then leaves the tunnel and tells his comrades that the place is empty. He does not interpret his action in the text, but its position in the narrative—it comes soon before Peacock’s first encounter with a grizzly—does give the reader a context for understanding it by drawing comparisons between Peacock’s interaction with this man and with grizzlies and therefore creates identification between reader and writer. Both the man and the bear, the enemy and the animal Other, display mercy despite perceiving him as a threat.

Peacock’s first grizzly encounter is accidental and could have been fatal, but the moment is not traumatic. It allows the previous Vietnam scene to be interpreted as not just a harrowing brush with death that makes one feel powerless over one’s life or one’s ability to effect change, but also as an opportunity to reevaluate one’s relationship to other people and the world. The tunnel scene becomes interpretable in light of the grizzly scene and vice versa. In both, Peacock encounters an individual from an Othered group and the two are able to construct consubstantiality without verbal communication. The point of identification in both situations is that both parties feel threatened by the Other and subsequently realize that the Other does not wish to harm them. That the reader is able to reach this interpretation of Peacock’s experience also creates a point of identification between the audience and their perception of the writer because they reflect on the significance of his memories.
Rather than using silence rhetorically, Kopelman records his inner monologues of racing thoughts to show how his experiences in Iraq continue to affect him. However, like Peacock, he does not interpret these moments for the readers. In *From Baghdad to America*, circling thoughts and second-guessing open the book. Kopelman has just gotten Lava to his home in San Diego, and the dog runs into the street and is hit by a car. Phrases like “*It’s happening again*” and “*wounded—not injured, wounded—puppy*” (italics in original 4) evoke Kopelman’s experiences witnessing violence and suffering in Iraq without explicitly making a connection between Lava and wounded or killed Marines. On the way to the veterinarian, Kopelman states that “My mind is racing, taunting me: *You broke the rules to get Lava here, and you deserve this. It’s some kind of sick karma coming down and you’re gonna lose Lava because you broke those fucking rules and saved a fucking dog. Asshole!*” (italics in original 4). Kopelman’s self-blaming for an accident that is not his fault along with his frantic concern for Lava invites identification with readers by presenting Kopelman as, like many of them, caring deeply for his pet. However, he also limits this identification by indicating that his panic is shaped by his time in Iraq because he feels as if he is being punished for saving Lava.

Kopelman’s shock that this could happen to his dog, which would be a fairly common reaction, is heightened by the contrast between the war zone he and Lava survived and the perceived safety of his home in the San Diego community of La Jolla. He asks “I mean, how in God’s name do you reconcile something like this with everything you know to be right? You’ve survived the absolute worst conditions in the world, including rocket attacks, mortar attacks, and suicide bombs . . . You come home
to ‘America’s Finest City,’ where you’re surrounded by surf, mountains, and desert—not
to mention your friends and family—you don’t look before you cross the street one day,
and *wham!* Just like that, it ends” (2). In this passage, Kopelman shifts from his own
point of view, which entails an understanding of San Diego as removed from war with a
landscape and social environment that comfortably enfoldes one, to Lava’s as he is hit in
the street. Such identifications between Kopelman’s and Lava’s thoughts occur
throughout the book and will be discussed in the next section.

**Cons substantiality across Species**

To speak of consubstantiality between individuals of different species implies a
shared language, and Burke explains “you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk
his language by speech, gesture, tonality, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways
with his” (55). Burke’s inclusion of the nonverbal in language resembles Wolfe’s claim
that language does not make humans different from animals in *kind* but by *degree* on a
continuum of communication techniques (*Animal Rites* 79). Wolfe’s example of a
nonhuman using language is the chimp Lucy. About to throw a tantrum, she signed
“Lucy cry,” recognizing herself and her actions (*Animal Rites* 84). Peacock’s approach
to the bears has a significant difference in that he, for obvious reasons, takes the Burkean
approach of learning their “language,” rather than, like the researchers working with
Lucy, teaching the animals to use a system already granted the status of language.
Peacock learns to read the grizzlies’ behaviors, to locate the bears, and, most
importantly, to know how to avoid a direct encounter with them. Similarly, Kopelman
draws on experience with domesticated dogs to read Lava’s behavior. For example, in
his first book *From Baghdad, With Love: A Marine, the War, and a Dog Named Lava* (2006), which details how he came to love Lava and the difficulties involved in bringing the dog to the U.S., he first assumes that Lava urinates whenever he sees him because he usually wakes the puppy up. Another marine tells him it is a sign of submission and Kopelman is disturbed because “I want him to be loyal, but I don’t want him to be submissive to anyone. I want him to survive” (*With Love* 69). As this book continues, and in *To America*, Lava takes more agency in their relationship.

Though Burke theorizes about consubstantiality as if it were a meeting of two equal individuals, this is almost never the case. To take Lucy’s situation as an example, some systems of communication are privileged over others. Ratcliffe’s critique of consubstantiality is concerned with inequalities of institutionalized and discursive power, but she does mention that for Burke “substance,” the meaning of a term as shaped by its context, has a material dimension that is inextricable from the cultural one (56). Building consubstantiality across species draws attention to how both material and immaterial power plays a role in identification between parties and the compromises they reach.

In Kopelman’s text, the power inequality between humans and dogs is made particularly evident when Lava is given antidepressant medication. He states, “I don’t want or need medication. Lava had no choice. It’s helped him enormously, though. Graham [Lava’s trainer] told me that medication has actually saved dogs’ lives; without it, they are just too hard to rehabilitate” (*To America* 126). While Kopelman tried behavioral training first and turned to medication only after Lava bites someone, the
choice between medication and euthanasia is constructed to privilege humans’ needs over dogs’ lives. The bite is material, but its “substance” as just cause for euthanasia is not. That is, limiting the options to medication or euthanasia for a dog who has bitten someone values human wellbeing over the dog’s life. Similarly, a human with behavioral problems like Lava’s would not be limited to these two options as human lives are privileged over dogs’.

Another unequal “compromise” is described in Grizzly Years, and Peacock condemns this privileging of human over animal. He describes “the great purges of the early seventies,” when park employees and people in the surrounding area killed or removed almost one hundred grizzlies and many other bears from the Yellowstone ecosystem (75). The impetus for this arrangement, in which bears were to be relegated to the backcountry and humans were to have a bear-free zone along the roads and campgrounds, was the killing of two people by grizzlies in Glacier National Park and Yellowstone’s desire to avoid similar attacks. This solution was determined by considering only human needs and not the bears’ needs. Against the advice of researchers who had observed grizzlies for several years, Yellowstone rapidly closed the open-pit dumps where bears had been feeding. As a result, they began seeking food in campgrounds or communities outside the park, endangering the safety of both humans and themselves (269). While physical power is overwhelmingly on the bears’ side when confronting a camper, the institutionalized humanism of the National Park Services (NPS) ultimately shifts material power to humans in this example.
When the bears “resist” the first human-made decision by continuing to seek garbage in campgrounds, the humans continue to force the “compromise” by killing or capturing the bears. Peacock seeks to undo the humanist separation that underpins the NPS’s actions by encouraging his audience to empathize with the grizzlies as they would with humans who are animalized and persecuted with his use of words like “purges” and “pogroms” that evoke genocide (75, 270). Within the context of the book’s posthumanist argument, this language is not a hyperbolic flourish that continues the animalization already experienced by Jewish people and other ethnic groups, but a destabilization of the entire animal-human divide. In this way, it fits within the liberationist strain of discourse that PETA drew from for its “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Animal Liberation” campaigns. In contrast to the NPS, Peacock’s understanding of grizzlies is based on observation and promotes an arrangement that acknowledges the bears’ needs by recommending they be allowed more land and that hikers be better educated about bear behavior. The bears are treated as subjects, not as a problem to be fixed.

Kopelman continues to recognize Lava’s subjectivity while giving him medication. Like Peacock, he does so by comparing this action on Lava to a similar one on humans. Rather than comparing killing bears to murdering people, though, he compares giving Lava antidepressants to humans voluntarily taking them. Kopelman speaks favorably of medication for both dogs and people and encourages readers with symptoms of PTSD to be open to it (126, 150). He is also careful to explain that he did not put Lava on medication for his own convenience. He first consults with Lava’s veterinarian who concludes that “with a dog with Lava’s background there were bound
to be issues that couldn’t be helped by behavior modification alone” (126). Kopelman’s approach to behavior modification also shows a consideration for Lava as a subject. This practice requires that both human and dog learn to communicate better with each other. According to Kopelman, the training “was as much about training me as training the dog. Lava knew how to push my buttons like the finest of best friends, and I always rose to the occasion. Graham didn’t have that problem. He could use physical posturing to show Lava some submission but not too much, and he’d keep his composure at all times” (116). Though Kopelman is at first resistant to the trainer, Graham’s, less assertive approach, he comes to appreciate it and his relationship with Lava improves greatly. That he describes Lava’s negative behavior as that of a “best friend” rather than a “bad dog” also frames their relationship positively and further creates consubstantiality across species by implying that Lava has a complex internal life.

Diagnosing Lava with PTSD has the same function. This medical explanation provides a way for Kopelman and the readers to understand Lava’s behavior not as a “problem” so much as the manifestation of Lava’s psychological complexity. The chapter title “You are the Sum of Your Experiences” applies to Lava, Kopelman, and his readers. In this chapter, Kopelman practices a layman’s version of Bradshaw’s transpecies psychology. Though not apparently familiar with her work, he likewise applies the criteria of PTSD to a nonhuman. Whereas Bradshaw works to convince readers that elephants have a complex psyche susceptible to trauma, Kopelman writes as if his readers share this assumption with him. He is able to do so by citing Steven R. Lindsay’s *The Handbook of Applied Dog Behavior and Training*, which lists eight
criteria to diagnose a dog with PTSD. Because Lindsay stands in as authority, Kopelman does not need to support the claim that dogs are able to experience PTSD, only the claim that Lava does. According to Kopelman, Lava meets five of Lindsay’s criteria and therefore has PTSD. Kopelman then takes his transspecies psychology a step further than Lindsay and puts Lava up against the Army’s description of PTSD.

Whereas Lindsay’s criteria are behavioral, some of the Army’s are more abstract. However, Kopelman illustrates that they can still be applied to dogs, reinforcing the idea that these animals have sophisticated minds. For example, the first symptom is “Reliving the event” and Kopelman states that “The ocean waves crashing on the rocks at the beach take Lava right back to his unhappy place. You’d think he was going to have a seizure on the spot” (113). Here Kopelman is interpreting Lava’s behavior as evidence of his psychic complexity. While Lava does not fit all of the Army’s criteria, he fits enough for Kopelman to consider him as having PTSD. This diagnosis, and the identification it creates between Lava, Kopelman, and other service members, is central to Kopelman’s goal of convincing others it is okay to use mental health services.

While Kopelman upholds some assumptions about the differences between humans and nonhumans, he characterizes both as trainable and this point of identification justifies his analogy between service members and Lava. Kopelman emphasizes the power of marine training on himself and others and the effects of repeatedly experiencing life-endangerment in the combat zone. Therefore, just as Lava can be trained out of his symptoms, so can we “train our heroes to modify their behavior in order to live happier and more fulfilled lives as civilians” (To America 133). Though
he sees both himself and Lava as trainable, the identification between Kopelman’s and Lava’s treatments is limited. For example, Lava cannot access the Virtual Reality therapy available to some service members and would most likely find it terrifying and confusing to be immersed in a simulation of warfare. Lava also cannot benefit from the verbal exchange in therapy that Kopelman has found so helpful, while Kopelman chooses not to take antidepressants. The variety of recovery methods practiced by him and Lava validate the idea that individual readers have a variety of methods available to them rather than one right path to follow.

Limited identification is also very important in Peacock’s texts, though for a different reason. He limits identification with the bears to emphasize the need to limit human interaction—or interference—with them. The closest encounter with a grizzly in either book occurs in *Grizzly Years* when Peacock is filming a blond grizzly for a documentary about the bears’ plight. He accidentally gets too close to the bear, who notices him but refrains from attacking and instead allows him to retreat. Sarah E. McFarland makes a salient point that Peacock represents the bears in stereotypically gendered terms and makes the blond grizzly appear less imposing than her male counterparts (56-7). However, I argue that this bear is not, as McFarland claims, rendered “inconsequential” and somehow less than a “true grizzly” than the male bears through his feminizing rhetoric (57). Rather, the encounter is significant as an illustration of a more equal “compromise” Peacock made with the bears.

He acknowledges that filming the grizzlies troubled him because it put ideology before individuals, as the Vietnam War did. He explains, “I was filming bears, bothering
them in the short run, hoping my long-term plans would alleviate their plight. When the bear most needed to be left alone, I had to get in even closer to make the grizzlies’ predicament more clear. The best compromise seemed to me to be to choose only those grizzlies who were already accustomed to the presence of humans” (237). Consequently, Peacock films the blond grizzly not because he sees habituated bears as feminized and therefore not “true grizzlies,” as McFarland argues, but because he believes it is less of an imposition to film them (57). Moreover, his nearness to this female grizzly is not presented as an act of aggression, but a nerve-wracking “miscalculation” that puts him at the risk of being mauled (258).

Peacock does not recount what he says to this grizzly; however, as he states in another story about facing a bear, “the words were irrelevant, but tone and posture were everything” (226). The body language is meant to convey confidence, by holding out one’s arms, as the grizzly might charge an animal it senses is subordinate. However the words that Peacock does relate from the other encounter, “Sure hate to bother you,” are respectful and acknowledge the grizzly’s right to the space over his own (226). Though the meaning of the words does not matter to the bear, combined with body language, they become a way to recognize the animal Other as a subject without losing one’s own subjectivity. When the blond bear stops approaching, he finishes the last minute of film. McFarland describes this as “antagoniz[ing]” the bear and attributes his behavior to a desire to “challenge” and dominate the grizzly (57). Peacock, however, shows an awareness that this action was “[n]ot too bright” (259). Moreover, his comment “I could see the muscles of her shoulder ripple. I could have touched them if I wanted” (emphasis
added) also acknowledges her dangerous strength. More significantly, however, these lines indicate a respect for the limits of identification, regardless of which party has more power. Though he “could,” theoretically, touch her if he didn’t mind the consequences, he does not want to. What this demonstrates about consubstantiality is that total identification between two interactants is not only not possible (except in a delusional form when one projects oneself onto the Other), but also not desirable because an over-identification results in one not recognizing the Other as a subject.

After Peacock experiences consubstantiality across the species line, he understands that humans should not invade grizzly homelands, just as humans should not destroy other peoples’ homes and cultures. Peacock’s interactions with grizzlies remind him that he is part of the material world and therefore undermine the concept of human uniqueness. After his first encounter, Peacock suddenly realizes, “my dreams were not so important. Something big was out there. For the first time since returning to the world, my thoughts chose themselves without Vietnam intruding” (51). His experiences in Vietnam are traumatizing because humans are animalized and abused by other humans. When the grizzlies remind him that humans are animals, he sees humanity placed in a larger system, one that is not motivated by hatred of the Other and in which animalization is not necessarily associated with abuse. What makes the grizzlies dangerous is that they too do not recognize humans as transcendent. Peacock never forgets that he is an animal when interacting with the bears, and an animal that is considerably less powerful than they.
Kopelman’s consubstantiality with Lava does not lead to such as posthumanist view. Instead of destabilizing the line between human and animal, the text uses Lava as a key to understand human trauma. Lava is depicted as sophisticated and capable of rehabilitation, but Kopelman is not interested in re-thinking how humans relate to the natural world because his main concern is how humans relate to one another, that is, how human relationships are negatively impacted by PTSD. The book’s secondary aim is to critique General Order 1-A (GO-1A), which states that service members cannot adopt animals and makes it nearly impossible for people to take these animals back to the U.S. The Foreword by President of the Humane Society of the United States, Wayne Pacelle, describes his organization’s efforts to change GO-1A and claims that Lava is a “therapy dog” (x). This argument, that service members should be allowed to adopt animals for the therapeutic benefit, retains the humanist assumption that animals should be valued first for their use to humans. Therefore, Pacelle and Kopelman present their goal as the increased well-being of service members and do not focus as much on the increased well-being of the animals who are adopted.

For Burke, identification requires that two people decide they share an aspect of themselves and thus can be persuaded to share a goal. Pacelle and Kopelman therefore use a love of dogs as a point of identification between themselves and their human readers to work towards their goal changing GO-1A. Peacock’s goals are focused on the well-being of grizzlies rather than humans. The bears obviously cannot discuss their goals beyond using body language to convey neither wants to receive or inflict harm. However, they do share certain interests: protecting the bears’ territory and lives.
Peacock aligns himself with the bears’ material interests through his political interpretation of them. This version of consubstantiality recognizes that all identification is constructed and the differences between the parties have the potential to be productive, despite the inherent risk of abuse when there is an unequal distribution of power. Peacock, as a human, can recognize how grizzlies are suffering from human actions. This perspective, combined with his respect for the grizzlies indicated by his willingness to interact with them on their own terms, means that he is able to communicate the bears’ interests to other humans and bring together their interests with those of the bears.

Similarly, Kopelman and Lava cannot discuss the impact of their experiences in Iraq has had on them. However, Kopelman can learn to read Lava’s behavior and to communicate with him in this way. While he cannot explain medication to Lava and get the dog’s consent for antidepressants, he does his best to take into account Lava’s interests. By carefully outlining Lava’s rehabilitation, Kopelman also shows that it is possible for dogs raised in war zones to live with human families in the U.S. In doing so, he critiques GO-1A.

**Consubstantiality with the Self**

Kopelman’s and Peacock’s books contain a call to action that uses descriptions of trauma for persuasive purposes. This rhetorical dimension differentiates it from the therapeutic writing studied and promoted by Pennebaker who states that, when writing about a traumatic experience, “you will be better off making yourself the audience. In that way, you don’t have to rationalize or justify yourself to suit the perspective of
another person” (*Opening Up* 42). However, even writing to one’s self entails writing to an audience and these texts written for the public also present themselves as therapeutic for the writer. Pennebaker asked research participants to write about the same upsetting past experience and their emotional responses three to five days in a row. Those who revised their writings the most over this period, particularly those who developed a narrative consisting of causality and insight, experienced the most benefits such as fewer doctor’s visits, a higher GPA, and more successful job search. (Pennebaker “Telling Stories” 5-7, King 359). This revision seems to mimic the effect of a live listener with whom the writers were able to interpret past events and future possibilities as a coherent narrative.

Paul Ricœur conceives of the self as dialectical, consisting of *idem* and *ipseity*. *Idem* is “the same,” patterns one identifies in past actions, and *ipseity* is “changing,” intended future actions (101). Defining the self in this way allows for consubstantiality, the identification between two or more substances (defined as “actions” by Burke) (*A Grammar of Motives* 33). Consubstantiality with one’s self is the process of identifying commonalities between one’s past deeds and the actions one wants to perform in order to persuade the self to act in this manner. For the traumatized subject, whose connections not only with society, but also within the self, have been disrupted, consubstantiality indicates recovery is in process because the subject is reinterpreting his or her past and present experiences to achieve a sense of coherence, as Pennebaker describes. This new interpretation gives the promise of a future.
One way Kopelman finds consubstantiality with himself is through writing. In *To America*, he claims that “until I started writing this book, I didn’t think I had any issues coming out of the war” (47). More specifically, it is writing about Lava that helps him better understand himself by both identifying with and differentiating himself from Lava. As Kopelman comes to realize how Lava’s experiences in Iraq have had negative effects, such as making him aggressive and easily stressed, he notices these responses in himself. This recognition of a change he dislikes in himself involves a dialog between *idem*, his past patterns of behavior that helped him define who he perceived himself to be, and *ipseity*, the way his military experience has shaped him. It is also linked to the hope for a positive change. He sees that therapy has been useful for Lava, and considers that therapy might be a way for him to take agency in the ways he changes. As part of his contemplation on starting therapy, he writes:

Lava and I know firsthand how easily life can be taken away if you’re not paying vigilant, constant attention. (Even that is not always enough.) So maybe I’m not a ‘normal’ person, especially if Lava and his actions—like being protective of his family, for example—are a reflection of my own. Okay, I don’t just arbitrarily assault other people when I see them at the dog park. And as far as I know, I haven’t tried to hump anyone in public as a display of my dominance. It’s just that from time to time, I still think about the things I saw and experienced during our time in Fallujah. (118-9)

The disidentifications between himself and Lava in this passage use humor to deflect some of the seriousness of the possibility that a therapist will diagnose Kopelman with
PTSD. They also stand in for, and deflect, the violent behavior exhibited by some humans experiencing PTSD that Kopelman mentions a few paragraphs earlier (117). By using Lava to minimize the possibility that Kopelman might have PTSD and that PTSD might manifest in assault rather than the disturbing thoughts that only affect the individual, Kopelman makes consulting a therapist seem less intimidating. This act of self-persuasion works for himself and, by representing it in writing, it provides a model of self-persuasion his readers can use if they are considering therapy but are reluctant to seek it.

Peacock’s dialectic between idem and ipseity is most apparent in Walking it Off, the more reflective of his two books. In it, Peacock contemplates his relationship with Ed Abbey and compares his younger self, the source material for Abbey’s fictional character George Hayduke in The Monkey Wrench Gang, with his current self and the self he hopes to become. Peacock explains that his goal on the series of long walks recorded in this memoir was “to walk myself into good health: to walk off the roll of belly fat around my middle-aged gut, to walk away from war, to walk up and on in defiance of my hereditary gift of high cholesterol and blood pressure into a dimly perceived better world and maybe a new beginning. I wanted more out of the living I had left” (2). He is seeking identification between his younger self, a defiant character, and his goals for his present self, who is now concerned with defying cholesterol, but also still objects to land developers and any others deemed a threat to conservationist efforts. This dialectic between idem and ipseity exists not only in the act of interpretation, but, for Peacock, is also tied to the literal action of walking.
Walking is itself a type of interpretation as Peacock recounts it in this memoir. Through walking, one reads the land, noticing traces of people and other animals, and the way that Peacock interprets these traces informs the constitution of his self. For example, while hiking the Sonoran Desert, Peacock trespasses into an Air Force bombing range and finds a Hohokam Indian site that was used for target practice. Hohokam potsherds intermingle with napalm containers, thousands of slugs, and destroyed cars that were brought in for target practice (Walking 179). Peacock decides to the name area “the Bullet Site,” which emphasizes military violence against nonwhite cultures (180). This scene is one of many moments in both books that draw a contrast between American Indians, whose traditional ways of life are portrayed as peaceful and sustainable, and those Americans who seek to dominate nature and other people. Through his naming of the site, Peacock associates himself with oppressed cultures and so builds an identity for himself and an ethos for his audience.

He does not blame the military for destroying the Hohokam, who disappeared from the archaeological record before European contact, but criticizes how the Hohokam are treated after their society ends. The military's fault is that they “bombed the shit out of” the place, showing no respect for the people who once lived there or for the artifacts that remain (180). Haraway extrapolates the Latin etymology of respect, respecere or to see again, to entail “to hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay attention, to have courteous regard for, to esteem” (When Species Meet 19). Peacock shows respect for the Hohokam by paying attention to the things they left behind and those that they did not. Though a certain place in the site seems like it would be a good
spot to camp, he decides to keep going because there are no pictographs in the vicinity, indicating that perhaps “something unfortunate or terrible” that he cannot access happened there (180). That Peacock recognizes his anxiety but chooses not to create an interpretation for it beyond the evidence the Hohokam did, or rather did not, leave, is an act of respect because it is not only a response, but also limited. This limited response helps constitute a self for Peacock that is a sympathizer with indigenous peoples who does not claim to speak for them. As Burke argues, identification can never be total, and Peacock conforms to this theory by limiting his interpretation of Hohokam history. However, consubstantiality is “an acting together,” and, while Peacock aligns his own agenda, harmonious living with nature and across human societies, with the Hohokam way of life, his works do not contain calls to “act together” with living Indian activists.

Some other mentions of Indians, particularly in *Grizzly Years*, are problematic because they appear as attempts at consubstantiality, but ultimately function to empower the Self by continuing to Other this group. Peacock aligns American Indians with the grizzly by characterizing these peoples as endangered or extinct throughout the book. While it is true that much cultural heritage has been destroyed or lost, and some groups such as the Hohokam have disappeared, the book ignores the existence of activists who work to reclaim and carry on traditions. Moreover, equating the experiences of Indians and grizzlies recalls the Western practice of animalizing the Other. Haraway writes, “The discursive tie between the colonized, the enslaved, the noncitizen, and the animal—all reduced to type, all Others to rational man, and all essential to his bright constitution—is at the heart of racism and flourishes, lethally, in the entrails of
humanism” (When Species Meet 18). Blurring the species distinction between humans and other animals for only some groups of humans allows for the racism that Haraway claims is central to humanism.

Though in most of Grizzly Years and Walking it Off, Peacock describes all humanity as animals, there is one chapter in the first book that conflates indigenous people with grizzlies in a way that erases these people in order to establish a Self for Peacock and other environmentalists as heirs to an indigenous environmentalist legacy. “The Sacred Bear of the Blackfeet” presents this tribe as a model for how to identify with and live with bears. For example, the chapter states that when the Blackfeet hunted grizzlies, more bears were alive and the hunt was a rare occasion that was part of sacred rituals. However, rather than building towards consubstantiality with the Blackfeet, the chapter partakes in over-identification with their value system (as interpreted by white scholars) in order to erase living members and establish an ethos for modern day white conservationists as the rightful successors to this heritage.

The chapter concludes, “Since the passing of the traditional Indian, the attitude of the dominant culture toward grizzlies has become one of unmitigated hostility. Whatever the Blackfeet, along with nearly all other ancient peoples of America, knew or learned of the grizzly has been lost. By the time we got around to finding out about these people, they, like the grizzly, are mostly gone” (150). This statement, though it may seem to undermine the humanist divide between humans and other animals, actually reinforces the racial Othering that Haraway critiques. Characterizing indigenous peoples as nearly extinct animals fits a pattern in American thought identified by Renée L. Bergland:
“Native American ghosts function both as representations of national guilt and as triumphant agents of Americanization” (4). Peacock's rhetorical appeal, by mourning the vanished “traditional Indian,” feeds a white desire that is not to create consubstantiality with Native Americans, but to impose a totalizing identification in order to construct a unified Self as their heir rather than a more complicated identity as one who, as an heir of those who exploited indigenous people, has benefited from this exploitation yet still sympathizes with the victims of it. The chapter on the Blackfeet follows a European-American pattern of defining indigenous peoples as “authentic” and oneself as their spiritual heir by critiquing the atrocities that disrupted indigenous societies. It establishes the writer, and a sympathetic reader's, supposed right to represent this “vanishing” culture. Though Hohokam society faded away centuries ago, the number of people identifying as Blackfeet in the US census increased 73%, from 21,964 to 37,992, in the decade leading up to 1990, the year in which Grizzly Years was published.

This conflation of Blackfeet and grizzles is not intentionally exploitative, but identifying solely with indigenous ancestors and ignoring the fact that native “heirs” to these traditions also exist precludes consubstantiality with modern Indians in favor of constructing an identity for white environmentalists. Therefore, while Peacock's discussion of the Blackfeet may seem to show respect like his passage on the Hohokam does, it fails to do so because it lacks what Haraway identifies as the companion to respect: response. While respect is a display of esteem, which Peacock does show for the Hohokam and early Blackfeet, Haraway defines response as the process of “comprehending that subject-making connection is real,” and that it exists in “an
entangled relationship” (*When Species Meet* 227). While Peacock listened to the nonextant Hohokam and recognized them as separate subjects, he does not acknowledge the words of existing Indians in this chapter and also ignores the role the Blackfeet play in his own subject-making and the entangled, ethically suspect relationship between indigenous and white Americans.

Kopelman also draws on racism to shape an identity for himself and some readers. However, unlike Peacock’s attempt at respect that neglects response, Kopelman’s racism in *To America* is intentionally derogatory. This is in contrast to his first book, *With Love*, which reflects critically on some acts of racial prejudice in Iraq in a way that takes into account *idem* and *ipseity*. In one such passage from *With Love* he describes riding in a Humvee with three other Marines and Lava. They “make jokes about the old men in dresses and fat women behind veils” in a refugee camp. When Lava barks, they “egg on” the dog saying “Kill, Lava, kill” (46-7). Kopelman’s assessment of this situation is mixed. His criticism “we think it’s so damned funny” is quickly mitigated with the excuse “We’re nervous. It helps pass the time,” which gives the impression that racism is part of the *idem* identity for their Iraq selves, a pattern they return to for comfort (47). However, Kopelman also describes his immediate regret he felt on the ride. When the refugees stare at the Marines, rather than yelling back at them or attacking them, Kopelman “start[s] feeling like I’ve pulled off a brilliant practical joke that went too far and Lava’s *rooing* starts getting to me . . . it’s not funny anymore” (48). In this passage, Kopelman criticizes both this moment of joking, and the war as a whole. This *ipseity* is part of his increasing ambivalence to the war. He reflects that the
“joke” is in part on him because he imagines the war as a game, “Capture the Flag with grenades,” he had no part in starting (47). Kate McLoughlin describes laughter in war literature as a reaction to and criticism of the “hyperlogic of the war zone,” which is “rejected by the mind and makes the body laugh” (187-8). While the group laughter expressed by the Marines is directed toward the civilians, Kopelman’s bitter description of the war as a practical joke that follows the logic of a game can be considered an example of McLoughlin’s theory. In With Love, Kopelman reflects on his racism as a manifestation of the situation—nervousness about violence from Iraqis—but also criticizes it and the hyperlogic of war, creating a dialectic between idem and ipseity.

While Kopelman’s feelings about the war are ambivalent, he does ultimately believe it was justified and that his participation was for the best. This conviction seems to have become stronger by the second book, To America, and the racism in this book is not presented critically. Racial prejudice against Iraqis is not an inevitable part of supporting the war; however, in To America it bolsters Kopelman’s belief his participation in the war was correct. Kopelman is highly aware of the unpopularity of the war, particularly among his community in La Jolla. Speaking in support of the war, and racism, is a way of creating identification with himself across time, rather than a more complicated consubstantiality, by emphasizing idem over ipseity. That is, he returns to his earlier pattern of racism instead of critiquing it.

Kopelman calls Iraqis “bad guys” and Marines “kids,” painting them as innocent, value judgments that present the war in fairly black and white terms (To America 10). This frame-work appears in another Marine-penned text, the song “Hadji Girl.” Tyler
Wall analyzes this supposedly humorous song in which a Muslim woman invites a Marine to her home where he is attacked by her family and he kills them all. Wall points out that “Hadji Girl” opens with lyrics that position “soldiers as victims of Iraqi violence without acknowledging the larger geopolitical project: military occupation of Iraq” (77). Wall calls this sort of framing “racial inversion.” Michael Rogin developed this term to describe “instances in which historical actuality is perceptually inverted so that red, black, brown, or yellow-skinned persons become the murderers of white people, instead of vice versa” (Wall 77). Likewise, Kopelman emphasizes violence done to Marines without framing this violence as resistance to an occupation.

Wall’s critique of “Hadji Girl” is also applicable to To America:

“Hadji Girl” reveals that the sovereign convention of demarcating who may live and who must die has all too often been a racist and racialized project . . . The U.S. killing state is premised on a racist proposition, though it is subtle and rarely acknowledged outright. “Hadji Girl,” however, brings it forcefully to the surface. . . . Therefore, Belile’s song articulates mythologies of regenerative violence and racial superiority and inferiority (see Slotkin, 1973; 1992) that have been circulating through the U.S. body politic from the colonial period into the violent present. (Wall 78)

In To America, Kopelman evokes racial inferiority by repeatedly referring to Iraqis as “smelly fuckers” and describing how Lava is superior to Iraqis. The racist comments are not framed as part of a virtual flashback to his experiences in Iraq, but are clearly presented as his current opinions and part of his justification for the war and his
participation in it. For example, he states that “In 2004 there didn’t seem to be the level of emotional or nationalistic investment by the Iraqi military you would expect to see from people who wanted to live in a free, democratic and secure society. I’d like to think this seems to be changing, slowly but surely, but I’m not sure. With Lava, the commitment never wavered. He was fully vested in his rescue and delivery to a free, democratic, and secure society—Southern California” (26). Projecting on Lava an understanding of democracy is done in jest, as Kopelman often adopts a jocular tone in the book. However, it also legitimizes the expectation that the Iraqis should be as loyal, adoring, and obedient to the U.S. military as an orphaned puppy is to those who take care of him.

When Kopelman compares himself and other service members with Lava, he does so in a sympathetic manner that breaks down barriers between species with productive results for both dogs and humans. “Bad” dogs like Lava are portrayed sympathetically as trauma victims and shown to be redeemable; humans who may suffer from trauma are also given hope. In contrast, his comparisons of the Iraqis and Lava draw on the “discursive tie between the colonized, the enslaved, the noncitizen, and the animal” described by Haraway (When Species Meet 18). By placing the Iraqis lower than the animal, Lava, Kopelman strengthens identifications between the “men” of his story (Lava, himself, and service members whom Kopelman usually refers to as men or boys) by distancing them from Iraqis. This (mis)use of Iraqis constitutes a self for Kopelman whose racism is supposedly justified and whose similarities with a dog are not to be interpreted as demeaning because the dog is apparently superior to many humans.
Kopelman also reveals the role of racism in “demarcating who may live and who must die” (Wall 78) in this book. At one moment, he does acknowledge that readers might perceive his attitude toward Iraqis as racist, but insists they are wrong to do so. He states, “How do you think it looks when we’re [Marines] taken out by some jackass wearing a ‘man dress’ because we took the time to think rather than rely on our instincts and training?” Then he anticipates readers’ objections to this comment, which portrays Muslims as inferior and feminized, with “And don’t tell me, by the way, that I’m being racist. No one wants to befriend someone you might have to kill in the next minute, or who might open fire on you and your best friend” (69). These sentences acknowledge the existence of an alternate point of view, that Kopelman and others in the service hold racist attitudes to those with whom they are in combat. However, Kopelman does not acknowledge this perspective as having legitimacy. His reason, which seems to be that racism is necessary to surviving war, justifies both his past and present bigotry in his mind. However, even if one were to grant that racial prejudice during combat is useful for preserving one’s own life and killing the enemy and that this practicality outweighs any harm that results from racism, Kopelman’s justification should only apply to his racism displayed in Iraq, not his racist comments published in the books. By extending his bigotry and his justification of it into the present, he creates identification with the self in Iraq who practiced racism. Clinging to racism in the present is a way to further deny or justify past examples of it.

Kopelman’s interactions with Lava, described in the previous section, are a way to find consubstantiality with himself without depending on bigotry. Reflecting on how
Lava’s and his behavior have changed in similar ways enables him to recognize *ipseity*. Lava had problems with irritability and aggression, and Kopelman saw these in himself. He explains that upon his return, the problems of his girl-friend and their social circle seemed petty to him, and he would say so. While he originally felt this behavior was justified, “Having the advantage now of time and some self-reflection, I can see that I was a jerk, behaving more like a child than a responsible, mature adult. Intentionally? Maybe. Was it my fault? Yes and no.” (47). In this passage, he is able to be sympathetic to his past self while also criticizing his behavior. That the intentionally and “fault” of his behavior are left ambiguous leaves room to acknowledge that some civilians were also rude to him, but it also indicates that symptoms of trauma-related stress affected his behavior. As he describes his work with a therapist to control some of these symptoms, he recognizes that change is possible and that he has some agency over it.

Peacock also establishes identity in a variety of ways. *Walking it Off* uses an interplay of identification and difference within the self rather than erasure of an Othered group. In this second book, Peacock uses Abbey’s caricature of him, as Hayduke, and Abbey himself as points of identification. All three (Hayduke, Peacock, and Abbey) share an on-going anger towards government-sanctioned destruction of humans, other animals, and environments, but exercise it differently. *Walking it Off* depicts the dialectic between *idem* and *ipseity* as Peacock carries these past and possible selves with him on a solo hike he takes after Abbey’s death. Peacock carries a representation of his former self in his memory and in the form of Abbey’s last novel, *Hayduke Lives!* He also takes
Abbey’s notebook with him, and these thoughts of his mentor indicate possibilities for future selves.

Peacock calls Hayduke “a one-dimensional dolt” and describes this caricature as an abuse of their friendship by Abbey because Hayduke “reflected the adolescent, wayward son, not the maturing friend” (Walking 12). However, Hayduke, while not a flattering portrait, is just as reflective of his creator as his model, as Peacock implies when he writes “The real Hayduke was buried” after illegally interring Abbey’s body in the desert (Walking 49). Harold Alderman argues that Hayduke is an exaggerated manifestation of Abbey’s anarchistic tendencies (144), which is the point of identification between Abbey and Peacock that Hayduke represents. Alderman states that Abbey’s writings express “a man in perpetual rebellion—against himself, against the status quo, and against the mediocrity of the past that crushed the human spirit” (148-9). This rebellion against oneself is what makes change possible. While consubstantiality within the self requires that one make identifications between idem andipseity, it necessarily implies that there is some conflict between the two.

Hayduke, as a simplified and exaggerated representation of Peacock, serves as a map. The caricature exaggerates certain traits and omits others, and so provided him with a key to understanding himself. Peacock explains that “Abbey probably did me a favor in creating a caricature of myself whose dim psyche I could penetrate when my own seemed off-limits; Ed painted the ex-Green Beret Hayduke, with precise brushstrokes, as caught in an emotional backwater, a backwater out of which I wanted to swim” (Walking 13). Peacock’s word choice reflects the construction of PTSD described
by Leys, in which, because the mind experienced dissociation during a traumatic experience, access to these memories and/or the ability to interpret them is “off limits.” The image of a backwater, where a current is obstructed, is analogous to the traumatic state in which one feels stymied, unable to move forward with life and reintegrate into the main currents of one’s society. Though PTSD was not officially recognized as a medical condition until five years after the publication of *The Monkey Wrench Gang*, Peacock writes that “Ed nailed the PTSD with visionary accuracy and sketched the character of Hayduke with the insight that George’s great anger resulted from witnessing injustice—such as events in Vietnam—and that this rage could be turned into a positive weapon, especially in the war against industrial desecration of the wilderness” (*Walking* 109).

*Grizzly Years* is the story of how Peacock himself came to this realization, and the person it depicts is certainly different than Abbey’s Hayduke. While both are portrayed as loners who are passionate about the wilderness, Peacock’s representation is not a caricature. Instead, this character is undergoing profound change because of his experiences with the grizzlies. Peacock explains of himself in the years immediately following his military service, “Unlike Hayduke, the real man was not content to stay out in the cold; he wanted to cross back over into the human realm,” and grizzly-related activism enables this reintegration (105). Peacock saw the figure of Hayduke as a regression, but it also served as an exigence for self-revision, though he recounts that his life continued to be troubled by flashbacks and marital problems.
However, because the character is a static portrait, it does not provide a model for carrying out this change. In *Walking it Off*, Peacock mentions that he attempted to read *Hayduke Lives!*, but put it down in favor of Abbey’s notebook (169). Peacock includes some of these notebook entries, in which Abbey contemplates his approaching death and the life he has lived. The journal functions as a better method for identification than *Hayduke Lives!* because he perceives Abbey as a mentor. Whereas Hayduke is a representation of a past self, Abbey functions as a potential self. Abbey’s reflections on death make Peacock “ashamed of the way I treated the people I’ve loved, the utterly slothful mismanagement of the simple elements of my daily life, the squabbling” (182). Abbey’s notebook was addressed to himself in order to reconcile himself with death, but it persuades Peacock to regenerate his life because, as Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca point out, when discussing the self-deliberating subject, even when we are writing to persuade ourselves, we are drawing on methods of argumentation and social values (41-2). Though Pennebaker guided his participants away from imagining an audience for whom they must “rationalize” their or others’ actions, writing intended for the self can still persuade other readers when this audience shares the values used in the writer’s self-deliberation (42). That Abbey and Peacock had a long relationship and similar ideals would make the notebook relatable.

However, just as consubstantiality with another human or another animal is never a complete identification, so does it never quite result in a unified self. Near the beginning of *Walking it Off*, after Abbey’s death, Peacock states, “I was still confused. I felt that I was none of these people whose mask I had worn: grizzly man, father, earth
warrior, husband, Hayduke, drunk, Green Beret medic, nature boy” (55-56). By the end of the text, Peacock has recounted his experiences as all of these identities. The memoir amalgamates them into a narrative of himself without ignoring the differences between them. Though each role changes him, the connecting thread the narrative establishes is a love for nature which, along with conservation activism, aids the process of mending.

Consubstantiality with an Audience

This narrative of healing has a persuasive appeal because it serves as an elaborate example of the power of Peacock’s environmentalist philosophy by illustrating how his understanding of humanity’s relationship to the wilderness, that is, humans’ material connection to their world and the limits of human control, “mended” him. Kopelman’s book also depicts recovery, for him and Lava, which is likewise persuasive because it shows readers that therapy can be useful.

Kopelman persuades service members to seek counseling for symptoms of PTSD by building consubstantiality with reluctant readers through narrative. Kopelman narrates his reluctance to seek therapy for himself, his experience researching PTSD for the book at the behest of his publisher, and his realization that therapy is beneficial and military culture is wrong for discouraging people from seeking it. Kopelman uses humor to acknowledge and identify with readers’ fears about therapy and also to reassure them. He describes his paranoia that his therapist will discover he is insane and will permanently commit him. He records his anxious, racing thoughts on his way to his first appointment. Because the therapist’s office is on a floor with steel doors, Kopelman assumes he has been sent to “The end of the floor where the real crazies hang out . . .
This is when it hits me that someone, somewhere, thinks I am completely over-the-top stark raving mad. Why else would I be in this area with controlled access?” (141). He soon acknowledges that his fears of committal are completely unfounded and that therapy has helped him become a better husband and father, but is also honest with his readers that therapy is difficult.

Kopelman critiques his previously dismissive, sexist attitude toward mental health services. He sees his perspective as learned from the larger negative attitude toward counseling in the military. He explains that “‘WTF’ is the common response to hearing that someone’s gone to the doctor. In fact, pilots call the logbook they have to sign when they go to a doctor the ‘snivel log.’ Now, what red-blooded American fighting man is going to voluntarily sign that thing?” (110). This rhetorical question is answered by the title of the following chapter, “Opening the Snivel Book.” Here, Kopelman describes his positive experiences with therapy and the troublingly high rate of symptoms of stress disorders in veterans. By “owning” the phrase *snivel book*, he critiques this derogatory term. While he does not analyze the sexism at play in the dismissive attitude towards mental health services, he does provide research that states “[f]or women, sexual harassment or not being perceived as integral to success in combat makes for particular susceptibility to PTSD” (129).

Kopelman uses the second person to identify with readers in the Marines and branches of the Armed Forces. He explicitly criticizes the anti-therapy attitude: “You may think it’s a sign of weakness in character and body. *It’s not.* That there’s ever been a stigma attached to therapy or to seeking help is wrong” (146). By appealing directly to
these readers through the second person, Kopelman emphasizes his point that the choice to seek treatment is an individual one that should be removed, as much as possible, from concerns about negative social judgments. He also makes this point when he lists some of the consequences of stress-related disorders, such as divorce, suicide, and substance abuse, then asks “So what are you going to do about it? Therapy is one way to go, and it’s an important option” (150). He creates identification by speaking to these individuals directly, but he does not tell them they must do what he did. By presenting therapy as option, rather than a requirement, he creates a consubstantiality that does not presume therapy is the right answer for everyone.

One way Walking it Off establishes consubstantiality with its audience is by paralleling Peacock’s trauma and recovery with the reader’s own experience of learning about the My Lai Massacre to show the similarities and differences of these experiences. This section of the book is not only a personal reflection, but also an appeal to collective memory. Peacock describes his response to Ronald L. Haeberle’s photographs of the massacre published in LIFE, which provides a point of identification with his audience: “the scale of the My Lai massacre made me literally tremble. My soul shuddered. That image of slaughtered babies lying bloody in the ditch was seared across my consciousness forever” (Walking 110). The use of the demonstrative pronoun, “that image,” and definite article, “the ditch,” establish this connection with the reader who, if they have seen this photo, may also have it etched in their memory because they experienced a similar horrified reaction.
For many Americans, the uncovering of the My Lai Massacre was analogous to trauma in that it was a shock that required them to reconsider their interpretation of the Vietnam War, American identity, and humanity in general. As Kendrick Oliver explains, those whose opinions were centrist and those who were indifferent to the war were forced to investigate their feelings more deeply and anti-war sentiment rose. According to Walter Capps, regardless of how individual Americans feel about the war, they agree that it was “a national trauma, a rupture in the nation’s collective consciousness, and a serious and somber challenge to the ways we wish to think about ourselves, our role in the world, and our place in human history” (2). The actions at My Lai and the pathologies behind them entered the American cultural consciousness as characteristic of the Vietnam experience, meaning readers from later generations would also be familiar with this interpretation of the war (Oliver 250). The \textit{LIFE} photographs, famous images that have been crucial to framing the United States’ collective memory of Vietnam, also created a sensation of powerlessness in the face of government institutions. Just as the American public was incapable of preventing My Lai because of their ignorance and their social as well as physical distance from it, so was Peacock. He further identifies with the audience by explaining that on the day of the massacre, he was flying over the My Lai hamlet as he left Vietnam for the U.S., completely unaware of the killing and unable to do anything if he knew (110).

A few pages of photographs is not the equivalent of actually witnessing such atrocities, and they provide a way for Peacock and the audience to identify with each other as witnesses to trauma without subsuming differences. LaCapra insists that a
listener must be empathetic in a way that “resists full identification with, and appropriation of, the experience of the other” and depends “on one's recognition that another's loss is not identical to one's own loss” (Writing History, Writing Trauma 79). This practice is similar to consubstantiality in that it depends on both identification and difference. The listener shows respect by refusing to absorb the other in a totalizing identification. Peacock does not collapse the differences between himself and these readers or himself and those who were directly affected by the massacre. While the news of the massacre astounded the American public, Peacock claims, “I had known such atrocity prowled the earth. In Vietnam, individual monstrous events, the murder and rape of civilians happened every day. Massacres of non-combatants, little My Lai’s, were common” (110). He separates himself from his readers, whose experience of the massacre is further removed than his, but also reminds them that he is not affected in the same way that Vietnamese people, who experienced such abuse themselves or had loved ones and community members who did, were affected.

Kopelman also uses photography to aid persuasion by encouraging readers to identify with other veterans who adopted animals and to identify Kopelman as part of this tradition through identification. Six letters from veterans, with the photographs of them and the dogs they cared for during their service, are inserted throughout From Baghdad to America. These letters were sent to Kopelman after the publication of his first book. The writers tell Kopelman they were moved by From Baghdad With Love and describe how important their dogs were to them and their fellow service members. The reproduced photographs of the veterans’ dogs have been given artificially ragged edges.
to create the illusion that they have been handled many times over the years. This digital manipulation implies these men think of the dogs frequently and fondly, which helps civilian animal lovers identify with the men’s feelings for these dogs. Moreover, the letter writers explain how their dogs made them feel better during their service. The affection with which the writers describe their dogs creates identification with readers while the detailed descriptions of the dogs’ appearances and behavior help limit this identification by reminding readers of the individual dogs’ uniqueness as well as the risky circumstances under which they were adopted.

Though Kopelman criticizes GO-1A, his main focus in this book is not to present Lava as an individual example who generates sympathy for other military mascots that were abandoned or killed because of the regulation. Instead, Lava functions as a mirror that, though slightly warped into dog-form, reflects the experiences of traumatized service members. In contrast, Peacock makes explicit the connection between the abuse of the animalized Other and the abuse of the animal. In *Grizzly Years*, he writes, “The way we treat pacified Indians or Vietnamese villagers and the way we manage wildlife draws from the same well” (101) and in *Walking it Off*, “This hostility towards other races of humans, native animals, and the wild land are connected, born of the same antagonistic alienation” (129). Both quotations come well into the text, after consubstantiality between Peacock and grizzlies (and, by extension, humanity and all wild animals) is depicted and after the texts have worked to build consubstantiality with their audience. While these two quotations are similar, and provide a consistent point of identification between the two works separated approximately by a decade, what is
significant about the second one is that it provides a root cause: antagonistic alienation.
This term evokes the complaints Haraway and Wolfe, among others, have made about humanism’s definition of “the Human,” which is predicated on uniqueness and superiority. The two texts by Peacock provide an example of the alternative, consubstantiality among species.

However, the authors’ ability to identify with animals does not make them immune to racism. Like Haraway, who identifies a “discursive tie” between animals and dehumanized people, Wolfe identifies racism and other forms of discrimination as part of the “symbolic economy” generated by a mode of being human that centers on humanity’s transcendence over the animal body (When Species Meet 18, Animal Rites 43). Yet, he acknowledges that texts which question speciesism can also support racism, colonialism, etc. in his analysis of Michael Crichton’s novel Congo. Though the novel seems to undermine speciesism with the character of Amy, the ape who can communicate with humans, Wolfe points out that it “leaves intact the category of the human” in a neocolonialist project (Animal Rites 186). Amy is associated with the Western humans while the Kigani tribe is dehumanized by its similarities to Congolese gorillas, and both of these groups are manipulated by Amy and First World humans (186-7). Peacock engages with the discursive tie between animals and people who have been dehumanized by the United States with the apparent intent to generate sympathy for grizzly bears. As with PETA in “Holocaust on Your Plate” and “Are Animals the Slaves?,” he neglects to consider how the connections he draws may be appropriative. Similar to Bradshaw’s comparison of African American women to female elephants, his
use of the Blackfeet is meant to indicate respect, but instead indicates a lack of rhetorical listening.

Kopelman’s overt racism should not overshadow Peacock’s; however, it is different in that Kopelman refuses to even engage with the reality that there is a symbolic economy that many draw on to dehumanize and therefore abuse people. Instead, he participates in this discourse to draw comparisons between the dog Lava and the human citizens of Iraq such as the one in which he contrasts Iraqis’ apparent lack of enthusiasm “to live in a free, democratic and secure society” to Lava’s “commitment” to make it the democratic haven of the United States (To America). Because Kopelman frames these comparisons to flatter the dog, he elevates Lava closer to realm of humans’ moral consideration on the shoulders of Iraqis. Such comparisons do more to re-inscribe racism than to undermine speciesism and neglect to get at what Haraway calls “the entrails of humanism” in which animals and a variety of Othered humans are lumped together (When Species Meet 18).

While Peacock’s project is more posthumanist than Kopelman’s in that the earlier writer does recognize the abuse of dehumanized people and nonhumans “draws from the same well” and attempts to critique both, the two writers have in common their descriptions of trauma which are used to call for social action. They use consubstantiality, with animals, within themselves, and with their audience, to generate and limit reader sympathy. Both writers are also nonconfrontational in their attempts to persuade readers to take action. For example, rather than imposing Peacock’s values, as other possible genres for environmentalist appeals such as the manifesto would, the
memoir gives the audience more freedom of interpretation. Kopelman’s use of the memoir also emphasizes the specificity of his experience with combat-related stress. Though he found therapy helpful and strongly believes military culture should value it, he does not tell other individuals they must seek it. Therefore, though both writers reach out to humans as part of their own “mending,” they do not seek to control others. The act of writing and publishing itself is part of this mending because it forms consubstantial bonds with the audience to be persuasive.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has identified several examples of posthumanist rhetoric and common techniques these texts use to draw identifications between humans and nonhumans. Anthropomorphism, analogy, and narrative are often intertwined to establish identification, and they can also be used to draw attention to differences between species. The inclusion of species-specific details in texts that otherwise attempt to build identification encourages rhetorical listening. Ratcliffe conceptualizes rhetorical listening as a conscious practice of identification that considers power differences among groups. The listener pays attention to others’ desires for disidentifications and, instead of forcing a wholesale identification, respects these points to create limited identifications. Many of the texts analyzed in this dissertation limit identifications between humans and nonhumans as well as between writers and readers.

One hallmark of posthumanist rhetoric is that it uses recent scientific discoveries to support its use of anthropomorphism. Therefore, these identifications depend on differences as well as similarity as, for example, when Bradshaw describes how the equipment for the Mirror Self-Recognition (MSR) test had to be adjusted for elephants at the Bronx Zoo. The MSR uses a subjects’ reaction to a mirror as a metric for self-consciousness. Bradshaw explains that researchers kept the mirror covered for several days so that the captive elephants’ reaction to a new stimulus could be recorded and contrasted with their behavior during the mirror test, a precaution that is not considered necessary for human infants (3). That Bradshaw accounts for species differences in her
arguments that human and elephant minds are substantially similar means her claims are not easily dismissed as naïve, sentimental, or delusional by skeptical readers.

After Bradshaw uses scientific evidence to argue that elephants have complex minds and social structures, she makes emotional appeals by imaginatively describing individual elephants’ experiences and encouraging readers to identify with them through narrative. In one such instance, she defines the symptoms of human and elephant PTSD, then shows how the orphan Ndume’s behavior qualifies him for this diagnosis while using anthropomorphic terms like “screaming” and “baby” to describe him (139). Goodall also relies heavily on anthropomorphism and narrative to create identification with nonhumans. Because Goodall is a public figure and *Reason for Hope* is her eighth book published for adult readers, she is not in Bradshaw’s position of needing to introduce herself to readers as a serious, competent scientist. Instead of reviewing scientific literature about the chimpanzee mind, she relies on her own research and presents it as anecdotal experiences with the chimps. These narratives about individual chimpanzees work to create identification between readers and chimps. Narrative is closely linked to the use of anthropomorphism because it conveys that nonhumans are, like humans, unique from individual to individual and therefore each life should be considered valuable. Every being has its own story.

While narrative can create identification when anthropomorphic language is used, it can also limit this identification when the uniqueness of individual experiences is stressed. With Goodall’s narrative about the chimpanzee Mel who adopts the orphaned Spindle, the story of two unrelated individuals forming familial ties is one many readers
can relate to. However, this particular experience, of losing one’s mother to an epidemic and adopting an orphan who also lost his mother at the same time is much more specific. The identification with readers is further limited when Goodall adds species-specific details about Spindle clinging to Mel’s stomach like a frightened young chimp does with its mother. While readers might identify with this experience of Mel’s on an abstract level because human subjects also deviate from heteronormative social expectations, the use of detail focuses more attention on chimps’ behavior than humans’ (Butler 155).

Analogy seems to be a form of identification that is more difficult to limit; however, it can be used productively. PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” is an example of an analogy that does not convey the creators’ intentions, at least not the intentions later professed by the organization’s spokespeople. Unlike Bradshaw and Goodall, who use narrative to establish reader sympathy for individualized animals, PETA’s campaign relied on visuals without narrative arrangement that instead emphasized the anonymity of human and nonhuman victims killed on a mass scale in the Holocaust and factory farming. Analogy can be used in a more limited way, as shown by PETA’s “Animal Liberation” campaign, which attempts to focus more on similarities between perpetrators of violence rather than those between human and nonhuman victims, and Eve Abe’s work on elephants in Uganda in which she draws attention to how a shared history has affected these animals and the Acholi people who live in their vicinity.

Perhaps Doug Peacock’s brief narratives about the bears he repeatedly recognizes work to make his deployment of the Holocaust analogy less shocking. As the bears are not social, Peacock’s descriptions of them differ from Bradshaw and Goodall’s
ones of elephants and chimpanzees in which the writers admire and marvel at these animals’ ability to create cultures and loving relationships among themselves. However, Peacock does create individualized personas for the bears by naming them and analyzing behavioral evidence to create brief backstories for them as, for example, more or less habituated. Therefore, while disidentification and literal distance are always important in his writings, readers do still come to know the bears as individuals.

Disidentification through the use of detail is important not only for persuading an audience, but also for recognizing the subjectivity of the animals or humans the text is about. Texts that investigate the relationship between humans and animals can use identifications to undermine human superiority as a species but may also reify the importance of certain qualities of the liberal humanist subject by granting them to nonhumans and obscuring differences among species. It can be difficult to know which differences are significant to particular nonhumans, but as Francois points out, one can still work hard to do so (61). Peacock’s attention to the details of grizzly behavior and Bradshaw’s extensive research on elephant ethology are two positive examples. Narrative can also create and limit identification among humans as shown by Stassen’s and Bazambanza’s accounts of the genocide in Rwanda which generate identification with the victims of trauma while also stressing the uniqueness of their lives. Similarly, Peacock and Kopelman recount their experiences in war and with symptoms of trauma in ways that establish moments of identification with readers and at other times forestall such identification.
Disidentification among humans recognizes the subjectivity of others and therefore leaves space for agency, even though it may mean the writer is less specific about helpful actions humans can take. Goodall allows for disidentifications among her readers and between readers and herself. Her remonstrative tone and decision to frame the book as a memoir instead of an explicit argument demonstrates a respect for their subjectivity. Kopelman’s *From Baghdad to America* works similarly because, like Goodall, he provides readers with “a reason for hope” but does not insist on it. He suggests mental health resources, yet does not claim that therapy or medication are solutions that all service members troubled by symptoms of trauma must seek.

In contrast, though Bazambanza’s use of narrative in *Smile Through the Tears* stresses both the specificity of the Rwanga family’s experience and the more generalized suffering of Tutsis, he makes a definitive, instead of remonstrative, argument about the causes of and culpability for the genocide. Bazamabanza’s aim is to educate readers about the genocide because he believes this will prevent future racial violence. Whereas *Smile Through the Tears* explains the political orchestration of the genocide, J.P. Stassen’s *Deogratias* investigates it on the micro-level of one perpetrator’s experience in the “gray zone.” While this text complicates subjectivity and agency, it does so in politically problematic ways that might diminish the culpability of individual perpetrators and the Rwandan government as well as Western political bodies and individuals.

Culpability, or responsibility in a more general sense, is a recurring concern in posthumanist theory because of its relationship to agency. A consistent theme in
posthumanist thought is the role of relationships in constituting the subject. Wynter conceptualizes an autopoietic subject that adjusts to social norms, and Wolfe describes a similar version of the subject whose autopoietic closure also entails openness. That is, because the subject’s self-troping mechanisms are complex, it is vulnerable to environmental influences. Haraway insists that such relationships entail responsibility and praises a posthumanist view of the world that draws connections, and therefore obligations, among humans and nonhumans (When Species Meet 5, 227). She describes humans who recognize such relationships as “worldly” (287). Shaping worlds through discourse is a recurring interest of Haraway’s ever since her discussion of “cyborg writing” as “the power to survive . . . on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other” in “A Cyborg Manifesto” (174).

Rhetorical identifications and disidentifications among readers, nonhumans, and the writer are constantly shifting. This shifting is an important part of posthumanist rhetoric because it can be read as an acknowledgement that these relationships are entangled and shifting themselves. To know that (dis)identification is not static is to know that it can be changed and this potential for change makes evaluating the political implications of potential identifications relevant so that we can attempt to create non-exploitative ones. In When Species Meet, Haraway highlights the role of respect in world-making (19). For her, respect means “pay[ing] attention” (19). Ratcliffe’s theory of rhetorical listening provides a method for paying attention and creating a response that is limited and open to change.
How posthumanist rhetoric locates responsibility and how it might also convey respect for its audiences as well as nonhuman subjects could be an area for future research that helps us envision a “world-making” that does not make “discursive victims” of animals or animalized humans (Haraway, *When Species Meet* 311). Rhetorical listening is particularly useful for political activism because it can decrease the chances of alienating audiences. It stands in contrast to shame, a frequent tactic in animal rights discourse that seeks to persuade audience members to change by showing them their culpability. While both shame and rhetorical listening involve disidentifications between speaker and audience, rhetorical listening is an expression of respect that does not necessarily place responsibility on the other.

In recent years, shaming has been acknowledged to be therapeutically useful for the disempowered when targeted at those who are smug about their privilege (Locke 156), but also criticized as not very productive politically (Jones 157, Locke 148, and Nussbaum 221). Jill Locke conceptualizes shame as “a negative global self-assessment” (149) and Martha Nussbaum similarly describes shame as a feeling that negatively focuses on “the very being” of a person (208). She clarifies her definition of shame by contrasting it to guilt, a “self-punishing anger” one feels in response to a harmful action one committed (Nussbaum 208). PETA’s *Holocaust on Your Plate* attempted to inspire shame in its viewers by equating them to Nazis, a group generally painted as wholly evil in Western memory rather than as decent individuals who were guilty of some harmful acts. PETA, as an abolitionist organization, does perceive the act of eating factory-farmed animals or animal products as more than just an action. It is, according to their
spokespeople, one manifestation of a speciesist mind-set that affects society on multiple levels beyond the industrialized production of meat.

Nussbaum allows that shame under some circumstances might be politically productive, and PETA’s criticism of a speciesist mind-set might qualify as they perceive this attitude to have wide-ranging effects. Nussbaum uses Barbara Ehrenreich’s book *Nickel and Dimed* as a positive example of shaming (212). Ehrenreich experimented as living as a woman without qualifications or credentials for several months and described her difficulties acquiring work and making ends meet in low-paying, part-time jobs. She concludes her book by claiming her readers should not just feel guilt for the difficulties facing the working poor, but shame. Nussbaum concludes that Ehrenreich calls for shame because these difficulties result not from easily identifiable and rectifiable actions but “from deeply rooted and long-standing patterns of thought and commitment in American society: the love of luxury, the common resentment of redistributive taxation, the belief that the poor cause their poverty, and a lot more,” so readers need to “reexamine our habits and our national character” (212). Nussbaum concludes that this type of shaming can be constructive, assuming that the reader agrees with Ehrenreich’s preceding analysis in her book (212).

PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” lacked detailed analysis, relying on a victim analogy rather than explaining a perpetrator analogy. The campaign also perhaps focused too heavily on the individual perpetrator. Whereas Ehrenreich shows readers flaws in American thought, according to Nussbaum, “Holocaust on Your Plate” did not thoroughly develop a critique of speciesism that showed how it is shaped by and affects
multiple aspects of American society. Because shame as a political tactic relies on the oppressor to change his or her ways (Locke 156), viewers who rejected PETA’s attempt at shaming also rejected its pro-vegan message.

Locke concludes that the energy put into shaming could be perhaps more usefully redirected to creating spaces for the disempowered to speak (159). She calls this activity “world building,” a term which recalls Haraway’s work. Whereas Haraway is interested in redrawing the world by mapping new relationships, Locke lists concrete ways to provide alternative worlds that value marginalized voices when she states “rather than focusing on those who shame us, let’s make film, tell stories, tend parks, paint murals, open farmers’ markets, build schools and universities, support clinics, and foster misfit salons” (159). One example of marginalized voices drawing new relationships is the Mercy for Animals parody of the California Milk Processor Board 2011 advertising campaign that claimed milk reduced symptoms of PMS. The parodies express anger, but, because they target actions rather than make a global negative criticism, they do not rely on shaming. Instead, they allow audiences to draw their own conclusions about their responsibilities to dairy cows.

The milk board’s campaign, with its catchphrase “everything I do is wrong,” addressed men befuddled by the supposed hysteria of pre-menstrual women. A series of print ads depicted a frightened and confused man presenting two cartons of milk and making an insincere apology that frames women as irrational. Examples of these apologies include “I’m sorry I listened to what you said and not what you meant” and “I’m sorry for the thing or things I did or didn’t do.” The milk board quickly pulled the
campaign because of negative reactions that claimed it reinforced stereotypes about both sexes because, in the words of a *Ms. Magazine* blogger, “If Milk’s women are overly emotional, irrational and angry, its men are oafish, dumb, submissive and insincere” (Berkenwald).

Mercy for Animals’ parody ads critique both the sexism of the originals and the practices of the dairy industry. Two prospective print parodies were circulated online, with the intent to publish them in *Ms*. Both ads feature an angry-faced woman holding milk cartons that are stained with blood with the text “PMS? No, I’m *livid* with the milk industry for abusing and killing cows” (emphasis in original). The parodies express anger at an industry’s actions rather than shaming the individuals who buy its products. It is up to the audience to conclude that when they purchase dairy products, they support these practices. That the viewer does not receive a global negative criticism of his or her self may mean he or she is less likely to defensively reject the campaign’s message.

The parody also attempts to side with the audience, rather than shame it, by expressing anger at the sexism of the original ads. The parody acknowledges that women’s expressions of anger can be legitimate and therefore need to be addressed with significant action, rather than dismissed as a hormonal imbalance that can be soothed with offerings of milk. The Mercy for Animals campaign attempts to appeal to viewers’ existing anger at the sexist ads and encourage them to apply that anger to the dairy industry itself. By having female models express frustration that their anger has been dismissed as PMS, the parodies imply the animal rights movement values women’s voices. As Drew has shown in her essay about being a black woman staff member at
PETA, this is not always true (63). However, Mercy for Animals’ critique of sexism in the milk board’s ads seems to be in good faith. The result is that the parody engages in world-building by drawing connections between consumers, dairy cows, industry, and women activists. While women’s expressions of anger often draw attempts at shaming, the ads recognize their anger and imply that audiences have a responsibility to act on these complaints rather than dismiss them. Therefore, women’s subjectivity is central to the success of the campaign’s message.

While the parody is feminist, it is less clearly posthumanist. The campaign does not include a verbal posthumanist statement such as PETA’s claim that “animals are not ours to eat, wear, experiment on, use for entertainment, or abuse in any way” (“All About PETA”) and no explicit identifications are made between them and humans. There is a small line of text at the bottom of the ad that deploys some elements of posthumanist rhetoric. It states that “Most cows in dairy production are painfully mutilated, intensively confined, and mercilessly killed,” creating a brief narrative of a dairy cow’s life and somewhat anthropomorphizing the cows by claiming they are deserving of mercy. The ad also hints at the subjectivity of cattle in its criticism of violence in the dairy industry. The animals are made a visible referent in the discourse surrounding milk. Adams describes farm animals as “absent referents”:

Behind every meal of meat is an absence: the death of the animal whose place the meat takes. The “absent referent” is that which separates the meat eater from the animal and the animal from the end product. The function of the absent referent is to keep our “meat” separated from any idea that she or he was once an animal,
to keep the “moo” or “cluck” or “baa” away from the meat, to keep something
from being seen as having been someone. (emphasis in original)

The blood on the milk cartons then draws attention to both the “someone” of the dairy cow and the violence from humans she experiences. Therefore, while the ad does not make a verbal claim that animals have an innate right to an existence apart from human desires or make extensive parallels between humans and cows, it does remind viewers of dairy cows’ existence. Though the ads express anger, they operate through remonstration. Rather than telling audiences to stop purchasing dairy products, the ads lay out Mercy For Animals’ objections to the industry and let viewers come to their own conclusions about what actions they should take. By illuminating the relationship between these cows and the people who profit from and purchase their milk, the parody campaign makes viewers more “worldly” and, therefore, draws their attention to their responsibilities.

That Mercy For Animals suggests these responsibilities without shaming may also be a manifestation of posthumanist thought. As Nussbaum points out shaming is often tied to a narcissistic desire to control others and reinforce one’s own delusions of completeness and invulnerability (220-1). Bahna-James, in Sistah Vegan, and Jones, in Sister Species, make similar critiques of animal activists who tend to distance themselves from people who remind them of their past nonvegan selves (165, 45). Both women describe this tendency as a defense mechanism used to reinforce one’s identity as an ethical vegan. Nussbaum, concerned with how shame is used across a range of situations, describes shaming as a technique to reinforce our own ideal humanity (which
is impervious to vulnerability and neediness) by dehumanizing others (26, 31, 221). Therefore, shaming as a persuasive technique is not only limited in its effectiveness but also antithetical to a posthumanist perspective that values relationships and welcomes humans’ vulnerability to influence.

Encouraging audiences to first accept one’s world view, in which humans and nonhumans are biologically and culturally intertwined, then agree that these relationships entail responsibility, and finally act on that responsibility is an immense task. It is not surprising that groups like Mercy for Animals do not address all three tasks in a single campaign. Even book-length works that take human and animal relationships as their subject, like Bradshaw’s, may not cover all three points thoroughly as, for example, her concluding calls for trans-species activism seem less grounded than her suggestions for elephant welfare activism. This dissertation argues that a rhetorical analysis of posthumanist texts, focused on their use of strategies such as analogy, narrative, and anthropomorphism, can illuminate the implications of how human-animal relationships are framed. When identification is used to highlight relationships and encourage attitudes of responsibility and behavioral change, exploitation can occur if the identification is made without regard for all the parties involved. Rhetorical listening is a useful tactic for expressing respect by limiting identification in ways one’s audiences and the subjects of the text would find meaningful. Disidentification recognizes others’ subjectivity and agency, which in turn implies that new points of identification may arise or disappear as the subjects interact.
Concern over the agency available to posthumanist subjects is manifested in posthumanist texts that make claims about culpability. Where posthumanist rhetoric locates responsibility, such as the audience members as individuals as in PETA’s “Holocaust on Your Plate” or an industry much of the audience already dislikes as Mercy for Animals did, is worth investigating for what it might reveal about agency. Haraway’s interest in the cooperative act of world-building may provide a starting place to think about the role of discourse in not only shaping subjects, but also enabling them to make politically conscious efforts at shaping the world. Rhetorical analysis of these efforts is essential to maintaining an awareness of the types of relationships they are establishing.
WORKS CITED


Althaus, Frances. “Female Circumcision: Rite of Passage or Violation of Rights?”


Bulatao, Rodolfo. “Reducing Fertility in Developing Countries: A Review of


DeAngelis, Richard. “Of Mice and Vermin: Animals as Absent Referent in Art


Edbauer, Jenny. “Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation


Francois, Twyla. “From Rural Roots to Angels’ Wings.” Kemmerer 57-64. Print.


---. Interview by Aleisa Fishman. Voices on Antisemitism. United States Holocaust


Keen, Suzanne. “Fast Tracks to Empathy: Anthropomorphism and Dehumanization in


Park, Miyun. “Fighting ’Other.’” Kemmerer 79-86. Print.


267


