
The volume under review is the final part of Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s ten-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus*. Its publication marks the completed translation of the central, seventeenth-century part of the series (vols.7-9). The focus of this, the final, volume is the foreign policy of Hetman Khmelnytsky’s Ukraine, after the conclusion of the Pereiaslav Agreement with Muscovy in 1654 until the Khmelnytsky’s death in 1657. During this period, Muscovy failed adequately to support its Ukrainian Cossack allies as they were attacked from west and south. Khmelnytsky, over this period of less than three years, attempted first to consolidate an alternative alliance with Sweden, then to undermine negotiations between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and finally to create new alliances for Ukraine—with Sweden again, with Transylvania, and negotiations with the Ottoman Porte. At the same time, he tried to expand the Ukraine he controlled to include western Ukraine and parts of Belarus. Three long chapters cover this material, each distinguished and enriched by extensive quotation from documents from Transylvania and Hungary, as well as the Commonwealth, the Empire, and Muscovy. Of particular interest is the discussion of Khmelnytsky’s alliance with Sweden in 1655, an alliance that foundered explicitly on Sweden’s eagerness to establish a protectorate over Royal Poland (at the cost of restoring Poland’s eastern limit). As a result, Khmelnytsky was forced to withdraw from western Ukraine, an event that contributed to subsequent Ukrainian-Muscovite tensions over Ukraine’s desired expansion into conquered parts of Belarus*. Despite the political focus of most of this volume, Hrushevsky does not neglect to note that the events of 1655-56 were broadly destructive to ordinary Ukrainians, whose flight into neighboring Muscovy had already begun—an indication that the “Ruin” of Ukraine and its massive dispersal of Ukrainian populations was already underway at this early date.
Throughout the work, Hrushevsky’s positivism and his conviction of the need for careful and skeptical examination of documentary evidence are clear. For example, on the question of Ukraine’s role in the Muscovite-Commonwealth negotiations in 1656, Hrushevsky brought to bear an amazing diversity of materials not only from the two principal parties, but also from Imperial and Cossack sources. This second half of the second part of volume 9 of Hrushevsky’s work is throughout a resource- and detail-rich source.

Hrushevsky was the pre-eminent historian of the Ukrainian national school, skillfully documenting the early modern Ukrainian struggle for its national interests during the last years of the Russian Empire and the early Soviet Union. As Serhii Plokhi has written elsewhere, Hrushevsky was predominantly a populist—seeing the Cossack revolution of the 1640s as a national struggle and Khmelnytsky himself as a somewhat negative figure, who neglected the interests of the ordinary Cossack in favor of the officer class of which he was a part. But Hrushevsky was also a romantic nationalist, who could see Khmelnytsky as a Ukrainian hero. This ambivalence is clearly on display in Hrushevsky’s controversial final chapter in this volume (“Some General Observations”), where he offers an overall assessment of the Khmelnytsky era: “Khmelnytsky was a great man, but his greatness did not lie in either political construction or state-building…. He built up his rule … at the cost of terrible sacrifices on the part of the masses” (425). It is a judgment that more recent historiography has generally not shared.

This English version is a translation of a reprint edition of Hrushevsky’s magisterial work published in Ukrainian in New York in 1954-58. The editors and the Peter Jacyk Center at the University of Alberta have maintained the same high quality of previous volumes. The translation, undertaken by Marta Daria Olynyk, is highly readable, and the principles by which it was undertaken carefully and helpfully explained. Glossary and maps are helpfully added; Hrushevsky’s citations have largely been identified and assembled as a bibliography. And, as has become characteristic in these volumes, the volume editors have helpfully undertaken to locate Hrushevsky in modern debates. Yaroslav Fedoruk’s introductory essay offers a dense and careful update, examining new assessments and newly available
data on such debates as Khmelnytsky’s relationship with the Porte in the 1650s and the probability that he then sought a protectorate from the Ottomans. Frank Sysyn examines Hrushevsky’s evaluation of Khmelnytsky within a broader contemporary context, principally his debate with the statist historian, Viacheslav Lypynsky.

This detailed account (400 + pages) of three to four key years of Ukrainian history potentially occupies a very interesting position as an historical work. Hrushevsky is undeniably a Rankean. Neither the style of his analysis nor his approach corresponds well with current professional scholarship. Nonetheless, in the detail and particularly in the breadth of its source material, this work remains nearly incomparable—and not solely because many of the sources that it uses and quotes have since been destroyed. *Ipso facto*, that is, it holds very considerable interest for professional historians of Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire who routinely deal with the results of the particular development of the historical profession in their regions. But this volume and its immediate predecessors (vols 7-9) also offer an authoritative account of the development of the Ukrainian people in the early modern period—a reasoned argument supported by documentary evidence about the historical origins of one of Europe’s post-Soviet nation-states. Hrushevsky was no stranger to the intersection of popular politics and academic history. His work continues to offer the possibility of a modern contribution to that very debate.