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THE LEGITIMACY OF REDISTRIBUTIVE AGENDAS*

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Problem.

In this paper we test, but fail to confirm, a basic
assumption underlying Bachrach and Baratz's theory of
nondecisions (1962; 1963; 1970).

Bachrach and Baratz's Power and Poverty (1970) was the
culmination of a decade of theory and research on the
implications of pre- and post-decision politics for
redistributive agendas. This research was significant for four
reasons: First, because it extended conceptions of the process
by which public policy is formed both forwards (to
implementation) and backwards (to the identification and
specification of issues and the structure of agendas). Second,
because the identification and specification of issues and the
structure of agendas proved to be important determinants of what
decisions are made about public policy. (See Tversky and
Kahnman, 1974, on the effects of how issues are framed and Plott
and Levine, 1978, on the effects of how agendas are structured.)
Third, because it corrected distortions in the analysis of
community and national power which were undeniable even if one
was not a ruling-elite theorist. And fourth, because it
suggested ways of filling two large gaps in the theory of
collective decisions, one involving the less visible aspects of

power, the other involving the more problematic aspects of
legitimacy. (Although its determinants are the same, Bachrach
and Baratz argued that agenda politics are less visible and more
often involve contests over the legitimacy of actors, issues, and
tactics than decisions do.)

Notwithstanding its significance, Bachrach and Baratz's
theory has had only a minimal impact in sociology; its much
greater impact on political science has been largely at the
expense of the questions about the politics of the suppression of
issues that it originally asked; and the few political scientists
who have remained faithful to its vision of the world have been
largely mired in irreconcilable methodological conflicts. The
"redistributive hypothesis" that is central to their theory has
mostly been neglected.[1]

Their "redistributive hypothesis" is that the greater the
likelihood that a policy will, if adopted, redistribute existing
shares in status, power, or wealth, the less the likelihood that
it is on a polity's agenda. This is because in Bachrach and
Baratz's theory those most threatened by such policies are those
who control the agenda. The agenda is thought of as a gate, the
"haves" as the gatekeepers, and the gate opens or shuts depending
on the degree to which an issue challenges existing inequalities.

Redistributive issues are aborted in predecision politics rather than decided openly because decisions are more influenced by elections and have-nots are in the majority. The capacity to abort issues before they are decided lies both in the authority of haves over agenda practices and their differential access to rule-making practices. Legitimacy is a basic mechanism of the process: "Have-nots," because they are excluded (by hypothesis) from the effective polity are not legitimate political actors, do not have legitimate means of access to the polity, and their issues are often either "private" or "subversive." Hence, it is usually sufficient to manipulate the existing rules to delay or prevent redistributive issues from being decided. But the "haves" also have the capacity, if necessary, to make more rules. It is the combination of their rule-reinforcing, rule-invoking, and rule-making practices that aborts most redistributive issues before they are decided.

This "hypothesis" is obviously a complicated structure of ideas: It consists of (1) an empirical generalization about the frequency of redistributive agendas; (2) an explanation of this generalization, in terms of (a) the frequency of a particular set of initial conditions, the correlated bias of distributions of power, wealth, and status, and (b) a covering law, about the

determination of rule-reinforcing, rule-invoking, and rule-making practices by objective interests; and (3) an underlying theoretical strategy which divides the polity into two and only two antagonistic parts, each driven by rational self-interest to compete for finite resources and rewards.

Both the neglect of Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis and the irreconcilable conflicts in which it often gets mired are probably due to the third of these elements, the theoretical strategy that lies behind it. From a contemporary Marxist's point of view, it is either commonplace or vulgar (because of its instrumentalism as well as its economism); in either case, not very interesting. From an anti-Marxist's point of view, it is naive; again, not very interesting. The combination of the two has led to the neglect of Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis except by its special partisans, who have been few, and to the isolation of these partisans from the mainstream of both sociological and political science research, without serious attempt to confront the empirical issues that lie at its heart. It is in fact often argued that it is impossible to confront these issues because the hypothesis is irremediably untestable. "Nondecisions" are the undecided issues of a polity. There are an infinite number of things a polity does not decide, hence the need for some independent, observable, criterion of issueness. Bachrach and

Baratz infer issueness from auxiliary hypotheses about objective interests: For example, that the have-nots do challenge existing inequalities, whether observed to do so or not, because it is in their objective interest to do so. If no challenge is observed, therefore, it is because the issue has somehow been nondecided. To identify nondecisions, therefore, one relies either on cui bono or on the (biased) values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures of the polity. Hence, the large number of largely empty debates over testability. The obvious circularity of the method has been a principle bone of contention in these debates (which are summarized in Zelditch, et al, 1983, pp. 9-10).

But Bachrach and Baratz's work is serious and deserves to be taken seriously. It is not enough to claim that vulgar Marxism is ipso facto bound to be false or that nondecisions are ipso facto unobservable. For one thing, an operational definition of a nondecision is possible providing a comparative method is possible: A "nondecision" is simply an issue, suppressed by factor X, that is on the agenda of an otherwise similar polity in which X is absent (McFarland, 1969). It is no more unobservable than Dahl's definition of power (1957), to which it is formally equivalent. It is true, as Polsby insists, that the criterion is difficult to satisfy nonexperimentally (1980, Ch. 11). For

example, Crenson (1971) had found that the greater the concentration of ownership in a community's industry, the less likely that air pollution was on its political agenda. He argued that power, through the law of anticipated reactions, had suppressed the issue. Polsby objected that Crenson had not controlled for the rival hypothesis that the greater the concentration of ownership in industry the more likely workers were to trade dirty air for jobs. But, in principle, the difficulties are no greater than in any other nonexperimental comparison. Possibly in fact, it is only because the redistributive hypothesis is so pregnant with larger, "paradigmatic" meaning that the standards of internal validity applied to tests of it suddenly became so rigorous.

The present paper cannot and does not test the larger theoretical strategy lying behind Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis. No one investigation proves or disproves an entire way of thinking about sociology. But we do test the covering law they employ in explaining the legitimacy of redistributive agendas. Because of the kinds of objections that can legitimately be made to Crenson's nonexperimental methods, we employ an experimental method that meets fairly rigorous standards of internal validity.[2]

This method is unsuited to testing either the frequency with which redistributive agendas occur or the prevalence of correlated bias assumed by Bachrach and Baratz. Thus, in terms of the elements of their argument outlined in paragraph 5, the only part of the argument to which our experiment is relevant is 2.b. Elsewhere, we have tested a number of other hypotheses derived from Bachrach and Baratz, all having to do with the consequences of power or legitimacy for emergence of issues and all of which are supported, by the same experimental methods.[3] It should be emphasized that the present paper reports the only disconfirmation we have observed. It is, however, disconfirmation of the most important assumption of the theory.

The paper is divided into five parts. Because it is sometimes difficult to be exact about what Bachrach and Baratz mean to argue, we attempt a precise formulation of their hypothesis in part i. Part ii places this formulation in the context of the larger, "paradigmatic," issues that lie behind it; it is these issues that give the experiment much of its larger significance. Part iii describes an experimental method of operationalizing the concepts of Bachrach and Baratz's theory and part iv the results of this experiment. In part v, finally, we discuss the significance of the fact that our results do not fit Bachrach and Baratz's model.

i.   Bachrach and Baratz's Theory.

Bachrach and Baratz's theory of "nondecisions" is concerned with the issues that a polity has not decided to decide. "Issues" are conflicts over preferences among alternative policies (including alternatives to existing states of society). Before they are decided they go through a complex process of identification, specification, and agenda setting. Such predecision stages of policy formation are critical to the shape and eventual fate of an issue. In Bachrach and Baratz's theory, predecision politics are determined by the comparative state of mobilization of two (and only two) classes, A and B. Bachrach and Baratz characterize all actors by their location in a system of inequalities: A is the class of those who benefit from the existing system of inequalities, B those who do not.

The society of which A and B are the (only) two parts is characterized by the distribution of benefits and burdens among members, by the manner (mechanisms) in which such benefits are allocated, and by the values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures that create and maintain these mechanisms. All benefits and burdens, all resources and rewards, are assumed to be unequally distributed, hence "biased" (the term is from Schattschneider, 1960). All kinds of bias are assumed to be

perfectly correlated. In particular, the polity of the society (authoritative procedures for making collective choices and members with access to them) is small and unrepresentative (hence also "biased") and its bias is perfectly correlated with inequalities in benefits and burdens. Thus, all members of the polity are A's and no B's are members.

Issues are characterized by Bachrach and Baratz in terms of their consequences for the existing system of bias. The sum of shares of status, power, or wealth is finite, hence a policy that would increase any share is redistributive, i.e., implies the decrease of someone else's status, power, or wealth. Any issue is redistributive if at least one of its possible policies is redistributive.

Both A and B are assumed to be rational, self-interested actors whose behavior an outside observer can predict from analysis of their objective interests, i.e., from analysis of the existing distributions of benefits and burdens (or the values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures that create and maintain them).

The behavior of B is described in terms of challenges to the system of inequalities. (Absence of such challenge constitutes a nondecision.) The factors that determine whether B challenges

the existing system of inequalities are the amount of resources available to B. the extent of B's dependence on A, and the legitimacy of B's participation in the polity, of the tactics available to B, and of B's issue itself.

The principal behavior of A is the "mobilization of bias" (also from Schattschneider, 1960). The "mobilization of bias" refers to three kinds of behavior: reinforcing rules, invoking rules, and making rules. Like all other features of a polity, rules are assumed to be biased, i.e., to benefit some members (A's) more than others (B's). Rules are in fact assumed to be pure instruments of power and it is purely power that makes them. Because "power" in this particular sense means membership in the polity, and it is in the interests of the polity's members that rules are made, the bias of the rules is again perfectly correlated with the bias of the system of inequalities. It is therefore always in A's objective interests to reinforce the existing values, beliefs, rules, practices and procedures of society which create and maintain this system and "mobilization of bias" is in fact normal behavior of any ruling class. But when issues are redistributive, A in addition actively invokes rules that prevent the issue from being decided: These define B as an outsider, B's tactics as offensive, the issue as private or

subversive. Because of A's differential access to the polity's rule-making practices, A makes more such rules if the existing rules are not sufficient.

The purpose of the mobilization of bias is of course to mask A's (and B's) real interests. A's power is by itself sufficient to prevent a redistributive issue from emerging, but without the mystification of A's and B's real interests induced by manipulation of legitimacy it is assumed that the existing system of inequalities is unstable.

The aggregate outcome of A's and B's behavior is a self-maintaining system of bias. (In this respect, Bachrach and Baratz's theory is quite unMarxist; it has no dialectic.) At any stage of a rather complex predecision process an issue can be either suppressed or else reshaped in a way that makes it more safe (i.e., less redistributive). The outcome is determined by the amount of pressure for change induced in B by the amount of inequality, the amount of power and amount of mobilization of bias by A, and the magnitude of the effects of A's power and mobilization of bias on B's attempts to challenge inequality.

The present paper is especially concerned with the behavior of A. We believe that Bachrach and Baratz's theory of this behavior can be summarized by the following model:

$$\bar{\Delta} = \alpha + \beta_1 i + \beta_2 \lambda i + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

Where $\bar{\Delta}$ = the magnitude of A's attempts to nondecide some issue,

i = the magnitude of A's vested interest in an existing
   system of inequalities,

λ = the existence of a value, rule, belief, practice or
   procedure that delegitimates B, B's tactics, or B's
   issue.

This model is a compact way of expressing three hypotheses:
(1) a main effect of "objective interests" on A's attempts to
delay or prevent decisions about a redistributive issue; (2) the
absence of a main effect of legitimation, i.e., the hypothesis
that legitimacy by itself does not determine the process but only
when combined with an objective interest; and (3) an interaction
effect of interest and legitimacy combined, i.e., the existence
of a vested interest determines the effect of legitimacy while
legitimacy magnifies the effect of an interest.[4] These three
hypotheses are a more precise (hence more testable) expression of
what in paragraph 5 was a single idea (the determination of rule
reinforcing, invoking, and making by objective interests). They
are linked to the redistributive hypothesis by the fact that i
increases as a function of the redistributive potential of a
policy. (This assumption is not itself tested by the present

paper because we experimentally manipulate it as an initially
given condition.)

ii. The Theoretical Strategy Behind Bachrach and Baratz's
     Hypothesis.

The confirmation or disconfirmation of Bachrach and Baratz's
redistributive hypothesis assumes a larger significance in part
because of broader issues of theoretical strategy that lie behind
it. The model described in the previous section is a more
precise and testable way of formulating a general strategy that
reduces legitimacy, and the ideas that give rise to it, to a
purely material base.

The theoretical strategy that guides the construction of
Bachrach and Baratz's theory assumes (1) that all action is
determined by objective material interests (economism); (2) that
there is a need to mask real interests when explaining and
justifying actions, i.e., a need to legitimate them (masking);
(3) that rational, self-interested individuals manipulate myths,
ideas, and rules instrumentally in order to accomplish this
(instrumentalism); and (4) that the ruling ideas are those of the
ruling class (domination). Implied in these four assumptions are
(5) that the rules thus made are arbitrary[5]; (6) that they bind B

but not A; and (7) that A is more conscious of, or if not more conscious at least more moved by, his real interests than B.

This strategy will be recognizable to most readers as a form of second-International ("scientific") Marxism, systematized in Plekhanov's manuals for the faithful, and after him in Bukharin's, and after Bukharin, in Stalin's Short Course. Bachrach and Baratz's theory is a kind of instrumental Marxism without the dialectic.

Not only anti-Marxists, but even most post-war Marxists have already rejected this kind of instrumental Marxism. At the time the present experiment was planned we had not prejudged its outcome, but, having failed to confirm the hypothesis, proceeding to publish the results may seem like beating an already dead horse. But Plekhanov is far from dead. His directives guide the construction of most ruling class theories of power (for example, Domhoff, 1983 and Hunter, 1980); many conflict theories of deviance (for example, Chambliss and Seidman, 1971, though not the second edition, 1982, or Platt, especially the second edition, 1977, or Quinney, 1970); and even some non-Marxist, syncretic theories (such as Lenski's theory of inequality, 1966, especially Chs. 2-3). All these theories not only grow from Plekhanov's basic assumptions about the nature of man and

society, they typically also incorporate some variant of Bachrach
and Baratz's specific hypotheses about how A behaves.

Of course, one test of Bachrach and Baratz's theory neither
proves nor disproves Plekhanov. Assumptions like economism are
in themselves untestable. If disconfirmed in any particular
instance, they can still be held to be true in the last instance
or of larger scale processes of change. They are really
prescriptions for how to formulate problems and solutions, not
empirical claims. They acquire empirical import in particular
specifications, like Domhoff's, Chambliss's, or Lenski's. But
again, although a test of a particular specification confirms or
disconfirms it, this neither proves nor disproves an entire
theoretical strategy because each particular theory specifies and
operationalizes the relevant hypotheses in different ways.
Disconfirmation of Bachrach and Baratz's redistributive
hypothesis does not disconfirm Domhoff's, Chambliss's, or
Lenski's. In any case, the criteria by which particular theories
are assessed are themselves strategy-dependent and few strategies
are self-refuting; while rejection by criteria alien to the
strategy may be irrelevant, at least to its adherents.

But we are not trying to convert adherents, we are only
trying to understand the phenomenon of legitimation. We do not

claim that there are criteria outside all theoretical strategies making neutral assessment possible; we simply employ unashamedly mainstream positivistic criteria that we ourselves believe in. Nor do we claim that one test is sufficient to confirm or refute a whole way of thinking about society. What is required is a substantial accumulation of results; the present study is only one straw on the camel's back. Finally, if strategies are not testable, it is nevertheless possible to ask if they are useful; and, if not, in what ways they are not useful. In this sense, a test of Bachrach and Baratz's redistributive hypothesis has a somewhat larger significance even if one is not interested in nondecisionmaking.

iii. Method.

One hundred twenty-two male undergraduates were recruited to serve as paid volunteers in an experiment. When recruited, participants were told that they could expect to earn, on the average, approximately $6.50 for participating in a study of communication networks. Data collected on thirty-nine subjects who were suspicious or who otherwise violated the conditions of the experiment[6] have not been included in the analysis.

Basic Experimental Setting.

The setting consisted of a set of rooms, each equipped with a desk, chair, television monitor, signalling device, and a variety of message slips. When subjects arrived at the laboratory, they were asked to draw a colored token from a can, under the pretense that they were to be randomly assigned to one of six rooms, each corresponding to a different token (in reality, the can contained only "office" tokens). Each participant was then seated in a room labeled "Office."

Subjects received videotaped instructions which indicated that they were members of a six-person group which would work a series of two practice problems and ten criterion problems. Five members of the group would work on the actual problem-solving task, while the sixth member, the office, would be responsible for collecting the answers and tabulating team earnings. The office was asked to pay attention to the instructions to the problem-solving members before he received his own instructions.

"Office" heard the "problem-solving members" being told that each problem required the construction of a five-point, multi-line graph. Each team member except office was initially given some of the information required to solve the problem, but no member was given all of this information. Completion of a

problem required that each participant collect the information

given to the other four members, from that information construct

the graph, and then send the completed graph to the office. When

the office received all five answers, he would send each member a

message which indicated that the problem had been completed.

After a brief rest period, the office would then send each member

a message informing them of the team earnings on the completed

problem and instructing them to begin the next problem.

Office participants were led to believe that the other

participants had been assigned to a highly centralized "wheel"

structure (Bavelas, 1950) which consisted of a central position,

four peripheral positions (all of which were simulated by

confederates), and four open channels, one of which connected

each of the peripheral positions to the central position. Each

peripheral position could communicate directly only with the

center and the office. Furthermore, they could send only answers

and rental requests to the office. All communication was

restricted to written messages which were to be picked up and

delivered by messengers. This network was presented graphically

to the office, as well as being described in the instructions and

in a printed list of open and closed channels.

The study was presented as an investigation of communication

patterns in groups whose members could communicate only by
limited written messages. It was made clear that cooperation was
necessary for any member of the group to correctly solve the
problem. For this reason, all earnings were to be awarded to the
problem-solving group as a group. Each member was to submit an
answer and the group would receive $.25 for each correct answer
submitted on each criterion trial. The group earnings would then
be divided equally among the members at the end of the study. In
this manner, the equal distribution of rewards was established as
equitable. The office was to be paid a flat fee of $6.50 apart
from team earnings, since he did not participate in the actual
problem-solving task.

Subjects were instructed that the communication structure
could be changed by renting additional communication channels at
a cost to the team of five cents per channel for each trial
during which the channel was being rented. Channels could also
be closed at no additional cost. All "participants" were
provided with a list of open and closed communication channels,
and any problem-solving member could initiate specific network
changes by filling in a rental request form, specifying which
channels were to be opened and/or closed, illustrating the
proposed change by drawing in the arrows on a diagram of the

network, and sending the request to the office during a rest period.   If office endorsed the proposal, an election would be held and the proposed change would be implemented if a majority of the problem-solving members approved.   Rented channels would remain open until they were specifically closed through the same procedure.

Office was instructed that he would be responsible for deciding whether to let the group vote on the proposed change. If he approved the proposal, he was to endorse the request and forward it to the experimental staff, which would conduct the election and inform the office of the results.   If he did not approve the proposed change, he simply put the request aside and continued with the normal procedures of the task.   Thus, the office was given the power to determine the group's political agenda.

The procedures of the experiment of course provided the experimenter with complete control of all messages sent to all participants.   In all conditions of the experiment, a confederate of the experimenter's sent a rental request to the office at the end of the third criterion trial.   The experiment ended immediately after the subjects either did or did not endorse a proposed change.   Upon termination, the subject was asked to fill

out a questionnaire. He was then interviewed. All the
deceptions of the experiment were then fully explained and the
subject was paid for his participation.

Baseline Pressures to Change in the Control Condition of
the Experiment.

After two practice problems, participants were given a short
questionnaire to complete. After the questionnaires were
returned and before the start of the ten criterion problems, the
host reappeared on the monitor and indicated that although the
team had done well on the practice problems, it was thought that
members could work faster. To encourage individual
problem-solving members to work more quickly, a bonus of $1.25
would be awarded for each problem to the individual submitting
the first correct solution. The bonus was to be awarded
independently of team earnings and could not be divided. The
office was to inform the problem-solving members which one had
won the bonus on a given problem at the end of each rest period,
along with notification of team earnings.

The effect of adding the bonus was to create a substantial
inequity in the allocation of rewards to the group. In a
centralized network, the center would always receive all the
necessary information first. Other participants could not win

the bonus unless the network was changed or the rules violated.

The control condition of the experiment was designed to provide a baseline measure of the pressure on office to respond positively to proposals to change the structure of the communications network. Office was paid a flat fee of $6.50 regardless of team or individual performance. Office's earnings were uncorrelated with team earnings and he could not win the bonus. The peripheral positions in the wheel faced an obvious inequity. Office had no vested interest in maintaining the existing structure. In Bachrach and Baratz's terms, change was a "safe" issue; there should be no resistance to change. Therefore, office should endorse a comparatively high proportion of change-oriented agendas.

Objective Interests in Maintaining the Existing Structure.

In a second condition of the experiment, the office was given a material interest in maintaining the inequitable wheel structure by instructing him that, because the bonus complicated matters, he would be paid as much as the highest paid problem-solving participant. If no member of the team earned more than $6.50, office would be guaranteed the normal flat fee. But if any member of the team earned more, he would receive the same amount as the participant who earned the most. The

combination of this method of paying office with the structural
advantages of the center position provided office with an
economic incentive to suppress the issue of change.[7]

In this condition of the experiment, change is a
"redistributive" issue in Bachrach and Baratz's sense and
subjects should attempt to prevent or delay the emergence of such
issues. Bachrach and Baratz's model thus predicts that subjects
in the interest condition will reject a significantly higher
proportion of change-oriented agendas than in the control
condition.

The Legitimacy of Maintaining the Existing Structure.

In a third condition of the experiment, change was made
illegitimate by making it appear to damage the objectives of the
experiment. Office heard the experimenter instruct the
problem-solving participants in the purpose of the experiment
after the first practice problem. The purpose of the experiment
was said to require reliable measurement of detailed patterns of
information flow. Detailed patterns of information flow,
according to the experimenter, did not become stable until after
the eighth (criterion) trial of the experiment. All this was
made part of an elaborate history of previous research, described
both verbally and by a summary chart over everyone's desk

(including office's). Summarizing his instructions, the
experimenter told the problem-solving participants that:

> What we want to study is the detailed pattern of
> information flow in restricted communication systems. On
> the eighth problem we will measure the detailed pattern of
> information flow. To successfully measure this pattern, we
> need you to continue with the same restricted communication
> system for at least eight problems after you complete the
> two practice problems.

Thus, maintenance of the wheel structure was made a
necessary condition of the successful completion of the
experiment. A change would, in a sense, render the experiment
meaningless. It would violate the rules that constituted doing
the experiment. Earlier research (reported in Thomas, et al,
1984) had found that few problem-solving participants would
attempt a change under this condition. The question for the
present experiment was whether or not office would, under this
condition, veto or endorse change-responses by problem-solving
participants if they did make them.

When the bonus was introduced at the end of the second
practice problem, office was instructed that he would receive a
flat fee of $6.50 for his participation, regardless of team or
individual performance. Thus, in the third condition of the
experiment subjects were personally disinterested in the existing

structure.

Because there is no main effect of legitimacy in Bachrach
and Baratz's model, it predicts for this condition of the
experiment that the experimenter's instruction to the
problem-solving participants should have no effect on
agenda-gatekeeping. Office should therefore endorse the same
proportion of change-oriented agendas as in the control
condition.

The Interaction of Legitimacy and Interest.

In a fourth condition of the experiment, the legitimacy of
the wheel structure was again established by defining its
continued use as constitutive of the experiment. However, when
the bonus was introduced office was told that because of the
complications of the bonus he would be paid as much as the
highest-paid member of the problem-solving team, again providing
office with a material incentive for maintaining the inequitable
structure.

This condition allows comparison of the interaction of
interest and legitimacy with the independent effect of interest.
It is an important condition for evaluating Bachrach and Baratz's
model, which implies that legitimacy will have no effect apart
from interest but, when combined with interest will magnify its
effect.

iv. Results.

Table 1 shows the distribution of subject responses to the
rental request by the presence or absence of the legitimacy and
interest manipulations. As Table 1 demonstrates, virtually none
of the subjects in the control (baseline) condition vetoed the
rental request. The percentage of subjects vetoing the request
increased in each of the subsequent conditions, with the highest
percentage of vetoes appearing in the interaction condition.

Table 1. Effects of Interest and Legitimacy on the Log-Odds of Vetoing vs
Endorsing Proposed Changes in Communication Structure Estimated for Bachrach
and Baratz's Nested Effects Model.

Condition	N	Percent Vetoing	Effect	Parameter	ChiSquare	df	Probability
Baseline	20	5%	Constant	-0.29	0.75	1	.39
Interest	20	40%	Interest	0.96	8.00	1	.005
Legitimacy	23	61%	Legitimacy(I=1)	1.07	7.63	1	.006
Interaction	20	85%	Legitimacy(I=-1)	1.69	9.28	1	.002

A logit analysis was conducted to assess the relative
effects of interest and legitimacy on the behavioral responses of
the subjects. Logit analysis is roughly analogous to linear
regression with a dichotomous dependent variable (see Feinberg
1977, however, for a discussion of the limitations of this

analogy). Logit analysis is especially suited to the analysis of experimental data, in which response variables and design (explanatory) variables are clearly distinguished, and in which design variables are manipulated by the experimenter.

The equation underlying a complete, or fully saturated, logit model for our data would be:

$$\ln[p_{ij}/(1-p_{ij})] = \beta_1 + \beta_2 I + \beta_3 L + \beta_4 IL, \qquad (2)$$

where $[p_{ij}/(1-p_{ij})]$ is the odds of vetoing rather than endorsing the rental request; β_1 is the regression constant; β_2 is the main effect of objective interest; β_3 is the main effect of legitimacy; β_4 is the effect of the interaction between interest and legitimacy; I is the value of the interest variable and L is the value of the legitimacy variable as defined above; and IL is the interaction term, interest multiplied by legitimacy.

The saturated logit model always yields perfect predictions but is generally unsatisfactory because of its lack of parsimony. The choice of an appropriate model thus involves locating the model which gives the best fit to the data using the fewest number of parameters. The choice between alternative specifications of the model is made on the basis of a comparison of Likelihood Ratio statistics (G^2) for goodness of fit.

We employed a maximum likelihood (ML) logit procedure (PROC

FUNCAT, outlined in SAS Institute, 1982) to estimate the
parameters of the model. Logit coefficients are interpretable in
much the same way as regression coefficients. They represent the
effects of the independent variables on the log-odds (or logit)
of vetoing rather than endorsing the rental request. Effects on
the log-odds, however, do not tell us very much of substantive
interest and logit coefficients must be further transformed if
one is to draw meaningful substantive interpretations from the
analysis. Swafford (1980:672) has shown that logit equations can
be transformed into multiplicative equations that express the
results in terms of odds rather than in terms of the less
tractable logits. For our data, the estimated multiplicative
effect of a given independent variable on the odds of vetoing
rather than endorsing the rental request, holding all other
variables constant, can be obtained by the formula $e^{2\beta}$ (the
exponential function), where β is the estimated logit coefficient
for the variable in question.[8]

To test Bachrach and Baratz's model of A's behavior, we
estimated a nested effects logit model of the log-odds of vetoing
rather than endorsing the rental request. (A "nested effects"
model is a model in which one or more independent variables has
no main effect but does interact with other independent variables

in determining the dependent variable.) In the nested effects
model, we estimated a main effect of objective interest and a
separate effect of legitimacy for each value of the interest
variable. Equation (3), which represents this model, is an
operationalization of equation (1):

$$\ln [p_{ij}/(1-p_{ij})] = \beta_1 + \beta_2 I + \beta_3[L:I=1] + \beta_4[L:I= -1], \quad (3)$$

where again $[p_{ij}/(1-p_{ij})]$ is the odds of vetoing rather than
endorsing the rental request, β_1 is the regression constant, β_2
is the main effect of objective interest, and β_3 is the effect of
legitimacy when an objective interest is present [I=1] while β_4
is the effect of legitimacy when objective interest is absent
[I=-1]. Nested effects models are especially appropriate for
cases such as this, in which the effect of one of the independent
variables is hypothesized to depend on the value of another
independent variable. Our interpretation of Bachrach and
Baratz's model leads us to expect the following results: (1) a
main effect of interest on A's attempts to suppress
redistributive change; (2) the absence of a main effect of
legitimacy in the absence of interest; and (3) a reinforcing,
i.e., an amplifying, effect of legitimacy in the presence of
interest. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 1.

Table 2: Effects of Interest and Legitimacy on the Log-Odds of Vetoing vs. Endorsing Proposed Changes in Communication Structure Estimated for Alternatives to Bachrach and Baratz's Model.

	Model					
	Additive[a]		Additive with Interaction[b]		Nested Effects II[c]	
Independent Variables	logit coeff.	std. error	logit coeff.	std. error	logit coeff.	std. error
Constant	-0.13	0.27	-0.29	0.34	-0.29	0.34
Interest	0.88**	0.31	0.96**	0.34		
Legitimacy	1.32***	0.31	1.38***	0.34	1.38***	0.34
Interest x Legitimacy			-0.31	0.34		
Interest (Legit=1)					0.65+	0.38
Interest (Legit= -1)					1.27*	0.56
Likelihood Ratio	0.92 / 1 d.f.		0 / 0 d.f.		0 / 0 d.f.	

+ p < .10.

* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
a. The model is $\ln [p_{ij}/(1-p_{ij})] = \beta_1 + \beta_2 I + \beta_3 L$.
b. The model is $\ln [p_{ij}/(1-p_{ij})] = \beta_1 + \beta_2 I + \beta_3 L + \beta_4 (I \times L)$.
c. The model is $\ln [p_{ij}/(1-p_{ij})] = \beta_1 + \beta_2 L + \beta_3 [I | L = -1]$.

Our results do not generally support Bachrach and Baratz's model. The nested effects model provides a perfect fit to the data, since it too is a saturated model, but the results show an interference effect of legitimacy rather than a reinforcing effect. We found a significant positive effect of interest on the odds of vetoing rental requests and significant positive effects of legitimacy in both the presence and absence of interest. Furthermore, the effect of legitimacy is much stronger in the absence of interest than in its presence. The odds of vetoing rental requests were 6.8 times greater when interest was present than when interest was absent. In the presence of interest, the odds of vetoing rental requests were 8.5 times greater in the presence of legitimacy than in its absence, while in the absence of interest, the odds of vetoing rental requests were 29.4 times greater when legitimacy was present than when it is absent. Thus, in contrast to Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis, we found a very strong main effect of legitimacy in the absence of interest and a much smaller than predicted effect of legitimacy in the presence of interest.

Table 2 shows the results for three alternative specifications of the model: a purely additive (main effects) model; a model with both additive main effects and a reinforcing

interaction term; and a nested effects model with a separate effect of interest for each level of legitimacy. As Table 2 demonstrates, the simple main effects model provides a good fit to the data ($G^2 = 0.92$ with 1 d.f., P = .34), with strong positive effects of both interest and legitimacy on the odds of vetoing rental requests. Because the legitimacy effect is significant this model also is inconsistent with Bachrach and Baratz. The additive model with a positive interaction represents a less instrumentalist model of A's behavior than Bachrach and Baratz's, one consistent with some alternative materialist theories of legitimacy, in which, once legitimacy exists, it does constrain even elites. This model shows significant positive effects of both interest and legitimacy on the odds of vetoing rather than endorsing rental requests, and an insignificant but negative rather than positive effect of the interaction. We cannot conclusively rule this model out, however, because there is a ceiling limiting the magnitude of the interaction effect. Every single subject in the interaction condition would have to veto rental requests to produce a significant interaction term.[9] To properly assess this model we would have had to repeat the experiment with weaker interest and legitimacy effects, allowing more subjects to change in the

interaction condition. We did not attempt this because the evidence of both the behavioral and post-session questionnaire data (see below) consistently favored an interference rather than reinforcement effect.

The alternative nested effects model, with a main effect of legitimacy and a separate effect of interest for each value of legitimacy, further reinforces our conclusion that there is an interference rather than a reinforcement interaction between interest and legitimacy. This model, which again provides a perfect fit to the data because it is a saturated model, not only shows a much stronger effect of legitimacy than the effect of interest in the earlier nested effects model, but also produces a larger difference between the effects of interest in the presence and absence of legitimacy. In fact, the coefficient for interest in the presence of legitimacy is short of statistical significance at the .05 level. According to the results for this model, the odds of vetoing rental requests are 15.8 times greater when legitimacy is manipulated than when it is not manipulated, holding interest constant. In the absence of legitimacy, the odds of vetoing rental requests are 12.7 times greater when interest is present than when it is absent, while in the presence of legitimacy, the odds of vetoing are only 3.7 times greater.

Thus, we find very little support for a reinforcing effect of interest and legitimacy, and some evidence, instead, of an interference effect. That is, when legitimacy combines with interest the proportion of subjects who veto change-oriented agendas increases: But estimates of the coefficients of both nested interaction models show that this increase is less than Bachrach and Baratz's model predicts, that in fact the effect of legitimacy is greater when interest is absent than when it is present.

To further evaluate Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis, we conducted logit analyses for five of the questions from a questionnaire administered at the end of the experimental session: the subject's approval of the communication network; the subject's opinion of the other team members' approval of the network; the subject's opinion of the amount of the bonus; the subject's opinion of the appropriateness of awarding a bonus to the team member who submits the first correct answer; and the subject's opinion of how appropriate the other team members would feel it is to award a bonus. Responses to these questions can be thought of in part as justifications of, or accounts for, subjects' behavioral responses to the conditions of the experiment. (The full test of the questions appears in the

appendix.)

Originally coded on a five-point scale, responses to these questions were collapsed to form dichotomous variables for the purposes of the analysis.[10] Table 3 shows the distribution of responses to these questions by the presence or absence of the interest and legitimacy manipulations.

Table 3: Percent Positive on Selected Post-Experiment Questionnaire Items[a], by Presence or Absence of Interest and Legitimacy (N in parentheses).

	Legitimacy			
	No		Yes	
	Interest		Interest	
Dependent Variable	No	Yes	No	Yes
Subject's Approval of Communication Network[b]	40%(20)	65%(20)	61%(23)	70%(20)
Others' Approval of Communication Network[c]	10%(20)	35%(20)	39%(23)	20%(20)
Opinion of the Amount of the Bonus Payment[d]	40%(20)	70%(20)	26%(23)	55%(20)
Appropriateness of Awarding a Bonus[e]	30%(20)	65%(20)	35%(23)	45%(20)
Others' Opinion of Awarding a Bonus[f]	5%(20)	40%(20)	35%(23)	40%(20)

a. See appendix for full text of questions.
b. Responses of "highly approve" and "slightly approve" were coded as 1, while responses of "neither approve nor disapprove," "slightly disapprove," and "highly disapprove" were coded as -1.
c. Responses of "highly approve," "slightly approve," and "neither approve nor disapprove" were coded as 1, while responses of "slightly disapprove" and "highly disapprove" were coded as -1.
d. Responses of "much too low," "too low," and "about right" were coded as 1, while responses of "too high" and "much too high" were coded as -1.
e. Responses of "very appropriate," "somewhat appropriate," and "not appropriate or inappropriate" were coded as 1, while responses of "somewhat inappropriate" and "very inappropriate" were coded as -1.
f. Responses of "very appropriate," "somewhat appropriate," and "not appropriate or inappropriate" were coded as 1, while responses of "somewhat inappropriate" and very inappropriate" were coded as -1.

To evaluate Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis, we again estimated a nested effects logit model for each question, with a main effect of objective interest and a separate effect of legitimacy for each value of interest. The results of the analyses are reported in Table 4. We do not report likelihood ratio statistics for goodness of fit in this table, since the nested effects model estimated here is a saturated model, and thus, yields a perfect fit to the data. For each of these questions, Bachrach and Baratz's model leads us to expect a strong main effect of interest, no effect of legitimacy in the absence of interest, and a reinforcing effect of legitimacy in the presence of interest.

Table 4. Nested Effects Logit Analyses of Post-Session Questionnaire Items (N=83)[a]

	Dependent Variable									
	Approval of Commu- ication Network[b]		Others' Approval of Network[b]		Opinion of Amount of Bonus[b]		Appropriateness of Awarding Bonus[b]		Others' Opinion of Awarding Bonus[b]	
Independent Variables	logit coeff.	std. error	logit coeff.	std. error	logit coeff.	std. error	logit coeff.	std. error	logit coeff.	std. error
Constant	0.38	0.23	-1.16***	0.28	-0.10	0.23	-0.26	0.23	-1.10***	0.32
Interest	0.36	0.23	0.16	0.28	0.62**	0.23	0.47*	0.23	0.69*	0.32
Legitimacy(Int=1)	0.11	0.34	-0.38	0.36	-0.32	0.33	-0.41	0.32	0	0.32
Legitimacy(Int=-1)	0.42	0.31	0.88*	0.43	-0.32	0.33	0.11	0.33	1.16*	0.56

* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
a. The model is $\ln[p_{ij}/(1-p_{ij})] = \beta_1 + \beta_2 I + \beta_3[1|I=-1]$.

b. See notes to Table 3 for full text of questions.

The post-session questionnaire results are more consistent
with Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis than the behavioral results
in the sense that interest has a main effect in three of the five
questions while in no case is there an independent legitimacy
effect. But in two of the five questions there is a significant
interaction in which legitimacy interferes with, rather than
reinforces, interest and even where the interactions are not
significant the same pattern repeats in all five cases. In all
five, the parameter for interest and legitimacy combined is less
than the parameter for interest alone and in four of the five,
the parameter for legitimacy and interest combined is less than
the parameter for the effect of legitimacy in the absence of
interest.[11]

Attitudes toward the bonus provide the strongest support for
Bachrach and Baratz's model. We found strong main effects of
objective interest on the subject's attitude to both the amount
of the bonus and the appropriateness of awarding it. The odds of
expressing the opinion that the bonus was too low or about right
were 3.5 times greater when interest was present than when it was
absent. The odds of believing that awarding a bonus was not
inappropriate were 2.6 times greater in the presence of interest
than in its absence. We found no significant effect of

legitimacy, under either condition of interest, on the subject's opinion toward either the amount of the bonus or the appropriateness of awarding the bonus. In fact, in the case of both variables, a simple model with only a main effect of objective interest provides a very good fit to the data with fewer parameters (For the subject's opinion of the amount of the bonus, G^2 = 1.91 with 2 d.f., P = .39; for the subject's opinion of the appropriateness of awarding a bonus, G^2 = 1.74 with 2 d.f., P = .42).

We also found a strong positive effect of interest on the subject's evaluation of the other team members' attitude toward the appropriateness of awarding the bonus, but in this case we found a significant negative interaction. The odds of thinking that other team members would feel that awarding a bonus was not inappropriate were 4.0 times greater when interest was present than when it was not present. In the absence of interest, the odds of thinking that other team members would feel that awarding a bonus was not inappropriate were 10.2 times greater when legitimacy was present than when it was absent. We found no effect of legitimacy in the presence of interest. Although we found no effect of interest on the subject's assumptions about the other team members' approval of the network, we again found a

large difference in the effects of legitimacy under different conditions of interest. In the presence of interest, legitimacy has a negative, but insignificant, effect on the log-odds of thinking that others approve of the network. In the absence of interest, on the other hand, legitimacy has a strong positive effect; the odds of thinking that others would approve of the network were 5.8 times greater when legitimacy was present than when it was absent. (It should be noted that the two strongest interaction terms were found in items concerned with attitudes of others.)

v.   Discussion.

The Behavior of the Subjects.

The behavioral findings of the experiment depart in two significant ways from Bachrach and Baratz's model. First, legitimacy has an effect that does not depend on interest. Second, the correlation between interest and behavior depends on the level of legitimacy but the effect of interest is less rather than greater when legitimacy is present.

This latter, "interference," effect does not disconfirm Bachrach and Baratz's argument that vested interests have a greater effect when they can be legitimated. Rather, it implies that the effect is more complicated and does not depend entirely

on the motives of the individual. The function of legitimacy is
to provide accounts acceptable to others for one's behavior.
Hence, analysis of the process of justification must take into
account the conditions under which claims are acceptable. Since
Kant, if not earlier, Western philosophy has held that
self-serving motives undermine the legitimacy of moral
justifications. Both Hollander and Ridgeway have reported
experimental support for the hypothesis that subjects in
experiments are Kantian (Hollander and Julian, 1970; Ridgeway,
1982). The effect of a need for acceptability is therefore the
opposite of the effect that an interest has on motives: The more
transparent the self-interest of a claim, the less its
acceptability as a justification. There are therefore two
countervailing factors at work in the interaction condition of
the experiment. The existence of a vested interest increases a
subject's motivation to justify his behavior by appeal to the
experimenter's purposes but it also undermines the acceptability
of the justification as an account for his behavior. The first
factor increases the rate at which subjects veto change-oriented
agendas but the second significantly reduces the magnitude of
this effect.

Both the independent effect of legitimacy and the

countervailing effect of a need for acceptability lead us to reject Bachrach and Baratz's model of agenda gatekeeping. The nested interaction model that best represents their redistributive hypothesis does not fit the data. The alternative nested interaction model that does fit it has both a main effect of legitimacy and an interference rather than reinforcement interaction. A more parsimonious main effects model also fits the data quite adequately (though the fact that the interaction term is not significant could be due to a ceiling effect), but it is also inconsistent with Bachrach and Baratz because legitimacy has an independent effect on behavior.[12]

The Questionnaire Results.

Analysis of the gatekeeper's justifications of his behavior, measured by post-session questionnaires, fits Bachrach and Baratz's model better than the behavioral data but the interference effect is repeated there too. In the three questions about the bonus, interest has a significant main effect while legitimacy does not. But in the two questions about the opinions of others, there is a statistically significant interaction that again implies some sort of "interference" when legitimacy and interest are combined. And even though the interaction terms are not significant in the other three items,

the same pattern is found in all five. This does not rule out
Bachrach and Baratz's hypothesis as conclusively as the
interference effect in the behavioral data because one could
argue that in the case of post-session questionnaire data the
experimenter's instructions already justify the subject's
behavior, which reduces the need for ideological work. Hence,
there is less pressure to "approve" the structure and bonus in
the IL condition. But the questionnaire data do rule out the
possibility that a main effects with interaction model was
rejected only because of a ceiling effect. It is consistent with
the interference hypothesis. It is suggestive that the strongest
interference effect is found in attributions of attitudes to
others, tending to support the "need for acceptability" argument.
And the "need for ideology" argument does not explain the
behavioral data.

Significance of the Results.

The first conclusion to draw from this experiment is that
legitimacy is not reducible to purely material interest. One
experiment is not sufficient grounds for rejecting a whole way of
thought and we did not even try to test the theory of
norm-formation that is at the heart of this way of thought, but

we found no evidence to support the hypothesis that an agenda
gatekeeper's "mobilization of bias" depends on a vested interest.
The same "bias" was mobilized without such an interest and the
presence of an interest decreased rather than increased its
effect.

It would require a whole sea of anomalies to sink a
theoretical strategy, and we are not trying to argue that we have
empirically tested and disconfirmed economism. What we are
arguing is that instrumental Marxism has conceptualized the world
in a way that has no place for our findings and is therefore not
very useful. The dichotomy between base and super-structure and
the monocausal, one-way relation between them on which economism
is built is impossible to maintain: The base is a mix of
elements some of which are material (tools), some not (property
relations); the superstructure is a mix of elements (values,
rules, empirical beliefs, nonempirical beliefs) with several
different kinds of (causal) relations to the base. The findings
of our experiment have no systematic place in instrumental
Marxism; they can be treated by it only as uncorrelated error,
and therefore only as a residual class of undifferentiated
factors necessarily left unanalyzed by it.

A second conclusion to draw from the experiment is that the

"mobilization of bias" does not depend on its instrumental
manipulation by agents of the ruling class. It has always been
an embarrassment of instrumental Marxism's that A behaves more
rationally than B, that A's behavior requires a different
explanation than B's.[13] In the present experiment, A is like B
bound by the rules, is about equally nonrational, and as
reluctant to make or invoke rules arbitrarily. It is useful to
compare the results with those of a companion experiment (Thomas,
et al, 1984) in which the same amount is at stake, the same
methods are used to make the communication network valid, but the
subjects are located in the peripheral positions of the
communication network. In the control condition, 80% of subjects
made change-responses. Under conditions that correspond to the
interaction condition of the present experiment, only 30% made
change-responses. This implies that under open interaction
conditions, the sheer existance of a normative order would have
suppressed the issue 70% of the time; we would have observed
redistributive issues (.15 x .30) = 4.5% of the time; and an
agenda gatekeeper would have suppressed the issue only (.85 x
.30) = 25.5% of the time. Under similar conditions, Zelditch and
Ford (1984) found that the sheer existence of a power structure
had the same effect: Potential power at the center suppressed

redistributive issues without any overt threats or promises by A.
In both experiments the rate of nondecisionmaking was high, but
in neither did it depend on motivated, specific acts by agenda
gatekeepers. It depended only on the sheer existence of
normative frameworks and power structures. Instrumentalism thus
creates for instrumental Marxism the same problems as economism:
It robs the strategy of tools for analyzing how such "structural"
effects come about.

Not all Marxisms make the assumptions we have just rejected:
Many Marxists as well as anti-Marxists have rejected them as
vulgar, even unMarxist[14] from the start, including: the
refutation of economism by Hegelianizing Marxisms (Korsch,
Lukacs), the even more thorough-going rejection of
instrumentalism as well as economism by Horkheimer and Gramsci
(whose rejection of vulgar Marxism goes so far that he is hardly
distinguishable from Parsons), but especially post-war
neo-Marxisms which have been most self-conscious about it.
Hegelianism has flowered in post-war critical theory, especially
in Habermas's Legitimation Crisis. Offe is quite forthright in
his rejection of instrumentalism (nicely expressed in Offe and
Ronge, 1975.) Equally important has been the emphasis by Marxist
structuralism on the autonomy of the state (as in Poulantsas,

1973), and the importance, even independence, of ideology (the former in Althusser, 1971, the latter in Therborn, 1980). We are not ourselves Marxists and are not trying to make positive claims in favor of any or all these neo-Marxisms; we merely point out that our results do not touch all kinds of Marxism. We might have said more had we been able to definitively identify the best alternative to Bachrach and Baratz's model. But the only conclusion of which we are sure is that a nested interaction model with a main effect for interests and an interaction in which legitimacy reinforces interest does not fit the data. A better nested interaction model is one with a main effect for legitimacy and an interaction in which interests interfere with it. But we cannot decisively rule out a main effects model or even a main effects model with a positive interaction, both of which are as consistent with most neo-Marxisms as with anti-Marxism.

What does emerge from the experiment is a conception of the "mobilization of bias" in which agenda gatekeepers act to maintain a normative order whether interested or not and the existence of a normative order causes nondecisions whether agenda gatekeepers act to maintain it or not. It is not that interests play no role in the process, but the mobilization of bias is the

outcome, not of the rational acts of concrete interests, but of the way social systems are organized.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In sociology, one can count Vidich and Bensman's analysis of
small town politics as a precursor of Bachrach and Baratz;
Molotch's analysis of the Santa Barbara oil spill as a direct
outgrowth of it; and Moore's historical study of German
unrevolutionary politics as certainly influenced by it. (See
Vidich and Bensman, 1958; Molotch, 1970; Moore, 1978.) Lukes
founded his "radical," "three-dimensional" theory of power on
Bachrach and Baratz and Gaventa's prize-winning field study of
unprotest in Appalachia was based on this reformulation. (Lukes,
1975; Gaventa, 1980.) Finally, Smith's brilliant study of
differences between the decision and predecision politics of
fluoridation, although from a wholly different (ecological)
perspective, was certainly rooted in Bachrach and Baratz.
(Smith, 1979). In political science, agenda research exploded
after Bachrach and Baratz, but little of this research was
concerned, as they were, with the politics of the suppression of
issues. (For summary reviews see Cobb and Elder, 1972; Mansbach
and Vasquez, 1981.) The most important exception was Crenson's
study of the unpolitics of air pollution (Crenson, 1971), but its
fate has been typical of research on "nondecisions": It

disappeared in a maze of methodological critiques (such as
Polsby, 1980, Ch. 11). "Nondecisionmaking" proper is a subject
made up largely of programatic virtues (such as in Baratz, 1977)
and metamethodological vices (summarized in Zelditch, et al,
1983, pp. 9-10.)

2.   For comments on the costs to external validity, see
Zelditch, et al, 1983, pp. 19-21 and Zelditch and Ford, 1984, pp.
37-39.

3.   See Ford, 1981; Lineweber, Barr-Bryan, and Zelditch, 1982;
Thomas, et al, 1984; Walker, et al, 1982; Zelditch and Ford,
1984; and a review of these studies by Zelditch, et al, 1983.

4.   This model does not imply that A has no effect on B if A
does not mobilize bias. Bachrach and Baratz's theory in fact
implies that the power and legitimacy of A and the powerlessness
and illegitimacy of B have effects on B even if A does nothing
and even if A does not intend any such effects. See Zelditch, et
al, 1983 for a brief review of various studies of the behavior of
B, and bibliography cited in note 3 for details.

5.   Bachrach and Baratz do not assume the more extreme thesis
that pure power suffices to make a rule. Although the ghost of
Thrasymachus haunts their theory, they tacitly assume that it is
logically impossible for pure power to make a rule because a

rule requires acceptance, not merely compliance. In their theory, it is authority that makes a rule. But it is nevertheless possible to assume, as they do, that authority can make rules arbitrarily, i.e., entirely instrumentally, and entirely with reference to self-interest, without regard either for prior consensus or the existing values of B. Hence, the implication that A himself is free of the rules.

6.   Subjects were excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: Four subjects were suspicious, doubting the presence of any other participants; eleven subjects failed to understand experimental procedures; eighteen subjects failed to recognize the inequity of the Bavelas structure; four subjects failed to understand the authorization manipulation; one subject exhibited an individualistic response (redistributing the bonus); and one subject was excluded because of a procedural misunderstanding.

7.   The decision to observe subjects in the office position, rather than in the center of the communication structure, was motivated by at least two considerations: The nature of the experimental procedures did not provide any way to vary the interest of the central position, and it was expected that placing subjects in the office position would reduce the possibility of individualistic redistributions of the bonus

(i.e., privately negotiated changes that avoided collective decision).

8.   This variant of the formula for the transformation of logit coefficients is appropriate for our data because both of the independent variables are dichotomous and because the data are effect-coded. Under effect coding, coefficients represent comparisons with the unweighted mean. For dichotomous variables, the coefficient for the omitted category of a variable is equal to the negative of the coefficient for the included category. The contrast between categories of the independent variable is represented by the difference between the coefficients, or two times the coefficient for the included category.

9.   The predicted logit for the main effects model with both interest and legitimacy present is 4.27, which corresponds to a predicted probability of vetoing of .81. A hypothetical logit analysis with only one subject in the interaction condition endorsing the rental request did not produce a significant interaction term.

10. Collapsing of categories was necessary not only to make the logit analysis easier to enterpret, but also because of small sample sizes.

11. We also found that in no case was there a significant
interaction term when estimating a model of two main effects with
interaction. This result is helpful in interpreting the
behavioral data because there is little reason to suspect a
ceiling effect in the questionnaire data. The number of subjects
available to estimate a reinforcement effect in the IL cell
ranged from 30% to 80%, averaging 54%. Thus, it did not require
perfection to achieve a reinforcement effect. In the two items
with a significant (negative) interaction, 60% in one and 80% in
the other could still have changed before reaching 100%.

12. A simple way to save Bachrach and Baratz's argument would be
to claim that the best model is a main effects model with a
positive interaction but that the interaction is insignificant
because of a ceiling effect and the effect of legitimacy is
really the effect of power. This is not a very compelling
argument because there is no ceiling effect in the questionnaire
data and, by design, very little power in the experiment. The
experimenter has no direct or indirect effect on the subjects'
academic standing; their material rewards in the experiment are
unconditional; and they may be apprehensive about the
experimenter's evaluations of them but he never once appears in
person in the experiment. (The distance between experimenter and

subject was modeled on Milgram's finding that distant
experimenters have markedly less effect on subjects; see 1974,
pp. 59-62. We may be wrong in thinking that the effect of
legitimacy is a demand characteristics effect, i.e., an effect of
the subjects' knowledge of the experimenter's objectives and of
what it means to do an experiment. But even if one argues that
the effect is due to the experimenter's explicit directives, it
is authority, not power, voluntary, not involuntary compliance,
that explains it and therefore still legitimacy, not power.

13. In Marx, of course, it was the bourgeoisie, not the
proletariat, that was falsely conscious (although he never used
the term) and the two were equally rational.

14. Instrumentalism is inconsistent with an emphasis on "the
totality," i.e., with Marxist holism. It is about rational,
self-interested motives for specific, individual acts. But Marx
and Engels were more often concerned with macro than micro
phenomena, with large-scale transformations of society, its major
institutional features, and mass phenomena not consciously
willed, not specific acts. When Marx and Engels did explain
ideas (such as equality, liberty, or contract) by their relation
to the base, they were more likely to explain them in terms of
the functional requirements of capitalism than self-serving

defense of ruling class interests. (Cf Marx on the Jewish
question.) This does not mean that vulgar Marxism is not Marx
and was only a later invention (either by Engels or someone
else). Gouldner (1980) and Timpanaro (1975) are probably right
that both Marx and Engels were internally inconsistent and that
it is wrong, if fashionable, to blame Engels for a vulgarism Marx
never shared. But the instrumentalism of a more vulgar Marxism
is inconsistent with the holism of a less vulgar Marxism and in
that sense Marxists who reject it as unMarxist are right.

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APPENDIX

TEXT OF QUESTIONS EMPLOYED IN SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES

A. Based on your experience would you approve or disapprove of
this communication system? Circle the point on the scale which
best represents your feelings.

APPROVE			DISAPPROVE	
highly	slightly	neither approve	slightly	highly
approve	approve	nor disapprove	disapprove	disapprove
1	2	3	4	5

B. In general do you believe other team members approve or
disapprove of this communication system? Circle the point on the
scale which best represents your feelings.

APPROVE			DISAPPROVE	
highly	slightly	neither approve	slightly	highly
approve	approve	nor disapprove	disapprove	disapprove
1	2	3	4	5

C. In general how do you feel about the amount of the bonus
payment? Circle the point on the scale which best represents
your feelings about the bonus payment.

much too low	too low	about right	too high	much too high
1	2	3	4	5

D. How appropriate do you believe it is to award a bonus to the
first team member who submits the correct answer? Circle the
point on the scale which best represents your feelings.

APPROPRIATE			INAPPROPRIATE	
very	somewhat	not appropriate or inappropriate	somewhat	very
1	2	3	4	5

E. In general how appropriate do you believe other team members
would feel it is to award a bonus payment to the first team
member who submits the correct answer? Circle the point on the
scale which best represents your beliefs about their feelings.

APPROPRIATE			INAPPROPRIATE	
very	somewhat	not appropriate or inappropriate	somewhat	very
1	2	3	4	5